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THE POLITICS OF THE MIXED ECONOMY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE 1970s*

Andrew Shonfield **

THE mixed economy is everywhere reviled; it is pronounced to be sick and its demise is freely predicted; yet in a large part of the Western world it continues, with apparent vigour, to go about its daily business. My first purpose is to explore this seeming paradox. When an object is declared hateful by so many and so commonly embraced, the event deserves notice: there is often something more serious involved than the attempt to combine outward respectability with the enjoyment of illicit pleasure.

I should start by explaining how I identify the object. It is not easy to list all its characteristics and it defies precise definition. This discussion will, therefore, restrict itself to an indication of the nature of the mixed economy, proceeding largely by way of illustration. A mixed economy is one in which prices and supplies of goods and services are largely determined by market processes. At the same time the state and its agencies have a large capacity for economic intervention, which is used in an endeavour to secure objectives that the market would, it is believed, not achieve automatically or would not do so fast enough to meet some requirement of public policy. What is a 'large' capacity for intervention? It may be felt that I have begged an essential question. Sticking to my resolution to prefer imprecision to protracted definition—let me point to an outstanding example of a modern society which was *not* a mixed economy. This is the United States before Franklin Roosevelt. The component of public power was so small and the consequent mixture so thin that it could not function as a mixed economy—like cement mix which has had so much water put into it that it could not be used to hold a building together.

One might almost say, carrying this metaphor a little further, that the

* The edited text of the 28th Stevenson Memorial Lecture given at Chatham House on November 29, 1979.

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opponents of the mixed economy have a preference for dry walls—the building blocks of private enterprise depending on their shape and relationship to one another to keep the structure standing. Indeed, authority for using pre-Rooseveltian America as an ideal type of a *non*-mixed economy may be said to have been given by Arthur Burns, former chairman of the American Federal Reserve, in a notable lecture this autumn delivered on the occasion of the IMF's annual meeting,[1] on the theme of what has gone wrong with the economic performance of the Western World? His answer, essentially, is that its deficiencies can be traced to the advent of the mixed economy—and he traces the origins of that malign development precisely to the New Deal of the 1930s.

I want to make three further points about the way in which mixed economies behave nowadays. First, governments and their agencies may intervene either to accelerate a market process, or to delay it, or to bias the market in a certain direction by means of subsidies or taxes or by direct regulation. Direct regulation is of course very old—almost the favourite business of pre-industrial states. What is novel about its contemporary form is that it attempts increasingly to make some explicit allowance for the social costs of the market process to set against private gains. The opponents argue that the costs of the regulatory exercise are themselves not adequately calculated, and contend that they generally outweigh the social benefits.[2] Whether this argument is right or wrong, the important point is that some calculation of social costs is attempted, and that the outcome of the calculation often aims to even the balance by an addition to private costs.

The second point is straightforward: simply a warning that the degree of 'mixedness' is not determined by the size of the public sector or the proportion of public expenditure to the national income. The Japanese for example have much the smallest ratio of public expenditure of any advanced industrial country; yet there is no doubt about the effectiveness or the frequency with which government agencies intervene in the management of the Japanese economy. It is the *function* adopted by the state rather than its *mass* which counts.

Thirdly, it has hitherto been one of the aims of the mixed economies to reduce the losses of output and welfare which are caused by fluctuations in private business sentiment and activity. This is undoubtedly the aspect of the matter which has been most insistently questioned in the late 1970s. The new British ambassador to Washington, Sir Nicholas Henderson, has in a public speech claimed it as one of Mrs Thatcher's achievements to have made 'a final decisive break with the thinking of J. M. Keynes'.[3] If he is right, in the sense that public policy, notably fiscal policy, now stays neutral in the face of a fall in business activity—which would imply that a recession was accompanied by a

1 'The Anguish of Central Banking', Per Jacobson Lecture, Belgrade, Sept 1979
2 See Murray Weidenbaum, *Business, Government and the Public* (Prentice Hall 1977).
3 Financial Times, September 15, 1979

drop in net public spending, as tax revenue fell—that would indeed be a large-scale retreat from the mixed economy.

Perhaps Sir Nicholas is pointing to a larger development, which goes beyond his intended compliment to Margaret Thatcher for having broken with the dangerous doctrines of one of her compatriots. There is evidence of a widespread change in the thinking of the leaders of the major countries of the Western world in their response to the second oil crisis of the 1970s. If one compares their reaction in 1979 with the line of policy to which they gave their collective support after the first oil 'shock' in 1973, one is struck most of all by the absence of any belief in their capacity to limit the consequent damage to the welfare of their own societies. It is worth recalling that in 1974, in the wake of the four-fold increase in oil prices, the main preoccupation expressed by the leading statesmen of the West was how to avoid the consequent fall in our real incomes from inducing a drop in demand and a general slump. They failed. But at least some of them tried hard to offset the secondary consequences of the fall in demand; and all agreed that it would be a good idea to do so.

If one proceeds to the Tokyo summit conference in July 1979 and listens to the tone of what was agreed there, one obtains a sense of the intellectual distance traversed in the previous five years. What the leaders of the mixed economies of the West agreed was that there should be no attempt whatsoever to cushion the shock to their economies of the rise in the cost of energy: incomes had to be reduced at once and there was no hint of any counter-action to moderate the effect of this upheaval on the level of business activity in our economies. That meant, other things being equal, that unemployment, already high by postwar standards, would have to rise further.

This is at any rate how I read the implication to be drawn from the Tokyo meeting. The key point in the communiqué is that each country is adjured to pursue its own appropriate economic policy to achieve 'durable external equilibrium'. There is no recognition of the kind that followed the first oil shock in the early 1970s, that since a collective deficit of the rest of the world with the oil producers was inevitable, separate decisions each aiming to eliminate a national deficit would cause still more collective damage.

I am not going to try to trace the historical process by which we got from there—in 1973—to here in 1979. I am chiefly concerned with the consequences. It is however, worth making the point that the marked change which has taken place in the attitude of policy-makers cannot be simply attributed to changes in the composition of Western governments. The Social Democrats are still in power in Germany, and in Washington the Democrats have replaced a rather right-wing Republican administration of the early 1970s. It seems to me that the new doctrines had penetrated very widely well before Mrs Thatcher appeared on the scene. Even among the smaller advanced industrial countries there is a greatly weakened will on this occasion to sustain internal demand and the employment deriving from it. When the Swedes beat a

retreat from Keynes—or as perhaps they might prefer to say, from Myrdal—that surely signals a climacteric!

I shall return later to some of the international aspects of the weakened confidence of Western governments in their capacity for the day-to-day management of their economies. As already indicated, the mixed economy is concerned with a number of other important matters besides the business of short-term demand management. It is indeed a mistake too often made to think that the big change which brought this system into being was all, or mainly, to do with Keynes. There were other powerful formative influences, including the contributions made by the socialists and the planners.

The Socialists were concerned above all with the control of what they called 'the commanding heights' of the economy; and their solution was to nationalise them. In the event, the Socialist governments of the postwar period have been able to 'command' precious little from these eminences which they captured or had captured for them. Whether it was that the economic landscape of the second half of the twentieth century had changed, so that the newly nationalised industries like coal and steel no longer counted as much as before, or whether the original analysis was mistaken, does not matter too much for our present purposes. The significant result was that governments were left with a large stock of productive assets in their possession and with direct responsibility for a large number of industrial employees. It has indeed proved more difficult for non-Socialist governments to get rid of these assets and transfer them to private control than it was to put them into the public sector. Anyway, it seems to me that in many countries the issue has lost some of its original ideological edge.

There is a notable absence of excited argument surrounding such events as the effective transfer of large parts of the French steel industry to public ownership in the 1970s, or about the similar fate of the great bulk of Swedish shipbuilding. For both of these governments, whose politics were clearly and consciously right of centre, nationalisation was just treated as an obvious expedient to be employed as a means of safeguarding the future of an important national asset during a period of poor business and commercial difficulty. In this context, those who point to the current activities of the British Conservative government and to the promises of Sir Keith Joseph would do well to recall the heroic attempt of an earlier Tory administration under Mr Heath to put the firm of Rolls Royce, which was losing a lot of money, into bankruptcy. Already the modifications of the first great burst of denationalisation rhetoric following the 1979 Conservative election victory has suggested that this government, in common with others which are in the business of running a mixed economy, is in the end moved by the fact that a large-scale industrial enterprise—whether it is in North Sea oil or in advanced electronics—has to be thought of in terms of its function as a long-term national asset. Simply washing one's hands of all responsibility for it and

handing it over to the highest bidder who happens to come forward, regardless of his provenance or his intentions, turns out not to be practical politics.

I am not forecasting that Sir Keith will fail to dispose of *any* of the business assets at present in public ownership—he may well be able to sell shares in enterprises like oil and airways to a lot of small investors, probably with a minimum effect on the conduct of management. All that I am saying is that judging by the record of this and other countries, it will be difficult to bring about a significant change in the ratio between publicly-owned and private assets, especially if the idea is to get rid of those assets which do not make a useful contribution to public revenues. Governments, both of the Right or the Left, do not enjoy having to call on taxpayers to make good the losses that are periodically made by the big businesses which they own; but in the end it would be hard to detect the difference in their behaviour for a person who happened to be deaf. For the main observable distinction lies only in the kind of painful noise that they make about it.

Exploring the reason why this should be so brings us straightaway to the second group of people whose influence on forming the mixed economy has been so important—the *planners*. Their influence on this question of the ownership of important industrial assets derives in part from a clear trend in the second half of the twentieth century towards the increasing concentration of business, which is noticeable in nearly all Western countries. The result in the medium-sized countries—as well as more obviously in the smaller countries—is that activity in a particular industrial field is in many instances dominated by one or two, occasionally three, major enterprises. It is hardly necessary to give examples. I am sure that all of us could think of half a dozen important industries running from chemicals through to electrical engineering in which there is one dominant national firm in each of the big European countries and in Japan. And the pattern is even more marked in the smaller countries—though of course with fewer significant firms.

The consequence of this process of concentration is that these big firms are thought of in the guise of 'national champions'. That is to say that it becomes less important whether it is a public or a private body which owns them than that they are visibly controlled in the national interest. That interest is itself rarely defined; indeed the question of whether a firm is or not truly a 'national champion' is usually only brought up when there is the possibility of ownership passing into the hands of a foreign national. But what this means is that both parties, the government and the big private enterprise, are expected to engage in a 'mixed' style of decision-making when questions affecting the long-term future of the industry concerned are under consideration. To term it 'mixed' rather than 'joint' decision-making is not, however, to suggest that there is a formal commitment of any kind to submit a certain category of decisions to the government for approval. It is more a matter of habitually recognising that common interests exist, though the degree of involvement of the representatives of the public side will vary greatly from one case to another.

This 'mixed' decision-making, which is sometimes dignified with the title of indicative planning, is conducted with more or less vigour in different countries. It is notoriously vigorous in Japan and France. It has for quite a long time been taken for granted by the smaller West European countries, for whom looking after the health of a 'national champion' has traditionally been a major aspect of foreign policy, as well as of the conduct of domestic affairs. Until recently it may have been thought that the United States was an exception to this style of behaviour, but after the massive rescue operation mounted in 1979 to save the Chrysler Corporation this is hardly a plausible view. Of course the Americans might be surprised to hear Chrysler referred to as a 'national champion'; they would no doubt point out that they already have two other rather successful champions in the same industry. But that would be taking the business of championship rather too literally—as if it was a variation on something like a medieval form of jousting. The simple point is that the Americans, for historical and also, partly, for well-established ideological reasons, feel that they need a minimum of three large motor firms in order to serve the public interest. It is not, either, simply a matter of making sure that there is adequate competition in the motor industry: there is more than enough of that coming from outside, and likely to continue to do so. The American authorities just take the view that they should have three automobile companies 'of their own'.

The experience of Chrysler, and the sense of outraged shock which is conveyed by reading American commentary on the affair, is merely a case of a lag in recognition. Bigness in a nation has certain advantages, but it does sometimes serve to swamp the national perception of what is obvious to smaller peoples. There is besides a deep reluctance to put a great American corporation like Chrysler in the same category as British Leyland or the ailing German electrical giant, AEG, which is also being prepared currently for what looks like being an expensive rescue operation. But when the matter is considered in the broader context of the evolution of the public purpose in the Western democracies during the past quarter of a century, there is nothing here that is worth puzzling over. The fact is the governments have been saddled with responsibility for securing a rising minimum of welfare for their citizens and for preventing situations in which any one community within the nation—for example, an economically backward region—is substantially worse off than the average.

This issue of regional policy and its implications for the management of the economy offers a particularly clear illustration of the typical compulsions of the mixed economy as it operates today. It has come to be almost an article of faith that a national society is unhealthy if a large disparity in the economic performance of different regions within the country is dealt with by shifting more and more people from the old established centres to the areas of geographical advantage. This is not solely a matter of sentiment about the destruction of familiar places and institutions, or concern for the personal

discomfort of some of those who are uprooted. The state, and through the state the average taxpayer, is necessarily involved in the financial consequences of this displacement of people, and the effect is often costly. This is because the state generally has a large investment in the social infrastructure of existing communities, and this infrastructure has absorbed increasing amounts of investment during recent years, as public welfare services have advanced. Besides, there would be new social investment to be paid for in the places to which people move—and probably more expensive investment, because of the costs of congestion which are typically associated with these rapidly expanding, affluent centres of business activity and employment.

At the very minimum, therefore, the state has an interest in seeing that public investment produces a high return and does not have to be written off prematurely. So, regardless of the ideology of the government in power, it is impelled to intervene; and its intervention in such cases is designed to prevent market forces at work in the private sector of the economy from fulfilling their normal function—for the labour market, if left to its own devices, would no doubt respond efficiently, to the rewards and penalties offered by businesses looking for the optimum location for the conduct of their activities.

This is but one example among many of the way in which the state finds itself under a compulsion to intervene in the market economy, with the aim of securing a desirable distribution of the resources for which it is responsible. To some extent this formulation, with its emphasis on the degree of responsibility assumed, begs a number of questions. But this is in order to emphasise the other aspect of the matter, which is that the state cannot confine its concerns exclusively to the expenditure of the actual sums of money with which it is entrusted in a given budget year. In a mixed economy it has to think about the *overall* efficiency of the deployment of national resources, if only because the size of the amounts which will become available for the purpose of pursuing the public interest—whether directly through such activities as education or indirectly by means of income transfers to people like old-age pensioners—depends on the efficiency with which capital and labour are deployed *throughout the economy.*

Any example shows the state intervening with the intention of frustrating, or delaying, the operation of market forces. But it may, and does, equally intervene on occasion to *anticipate* market forces. This could be the case, for example, in the market for energy, where the government might raise the price above the current market level because the latter does not adequately discount the probable future scarcities and costs of particular resources. By the time the free market catches up with a full awareness of the facts, it may be rather late to start investing in the more expensive forms of energy production. The government may, therefore, deliberately set out to raise the price of energy in order to accelerate the market process, leading potential investors to apply their capital to this purpose in preference to others.

It is not necessary to lengthen this list of possible ways in which

governments may set out to influence, or to frustrate, market forces in a mixed economy. The essential point is not whether their judgement is right or wrong, but that they cannot evade a share of the responsibility for certain economic decisions, private and public, with strategic consequences for the use of national resources—including most especially the nation's resources of manpower.

The next point to observe—and this brings us directly into the international sphere—is that this advance of the national state into a wider range of economic activities within the domestic sphere has coincided with a massive increase in the volume of transactions between nations. The most obvious and familiar case is that of international trade in industrial products, which has, in most years during the past quarter of a century grown at an annual rate which is two or three times as fast as the increase in industrial production. This is a more extraordinary aspect of the world in which we live than is generally recognised, and the reasons for it are not sufficiently well understood to make one confident that it will necessarily continue for the rest of the century as it has done ever since the war. But that is not the subject of this particular argument. We do not have to try to predict the future; it is sufficient for our purposes to point to the effect of what has happened to date on the attitudes of those responsible for policy in both the public and the private sectors in the advanced industrial countries.

The necessary consequence of the fact that trade has increased much faster than production is that the proportion of industrial output which is now directed to foreign markets has become very much larger. We have come to depend for our prosperity on a set of arrangements which will keep these markets open—and, if possible, maintain the momentum of the last twenty years in opening them up further. If there is one thing that we know we cannot afford, it is trade wars.

Yet, in the context of the mixed economy, the governments whose activities have been described here find themselves under pressure to do a variety of things—in the promotion of the social welfare of disadvantaged groups; in regional policy; in creating fresh opportunities for employment in a period of slower economic growth—that impinge on the interests of other states which depend on free access for their trade to the market that is being interfered with. Intervention at the national level constantly grows at the same time as the international consequences of interfering in the operation of market forces become an increasingly sensitive issue. Evidently there are dangerous risks ahead of a clash between the welfare-state ideal—of which the mixed economy is one expression—and the international order among advanced industrial countries, whose benefits we have enjoyed in such a large measure during the period since the Second World War. The cause for wonder is, perhaps, that it has taken so long for the potential conflict between these two forces which have moved the economic policies of Western countries in the second half of the twentieth century to emerge as an actual threat. So far, it must be said, we have

been strikingly successful in keeping this source of conflict under control. That conclusion applies, it should be added, only to economic relations among the advanced industrial countries; it is regarded by many of the developing countries as being merely the expression of a successful conspiracy among the affluent. Even so, it has to be admitted that it is a remarkably successful conspiracy which has endured a remarkably long time.

Will the 1980s be different? First, it is worth noting that, as a broad generalisation, international economic policies have been pushed forward with comparative success in precisely those areas which are affected by state action in pursuit of the social objectives of the mixed economy. This point can probably be most readily made by means of concrete examples. Take the case that we were considering earlier, of the efforts of the state in a mixed economy to ensure that employment opportunities do not suddenly collapse in a particular region or industry. The textile and clothing industry provides a familiar example of the way in which governments try to preserve jobs in an occupation which still provides more employment than any other single manufacturing industry in most of the advanced industrial countries. The impulse to be protectionist is very strong. On the other hand there is a well-established fear, among governments and industrialists alike, of the cumulative process of trade restriction which could well be set in motion by the arbitrary use of import controls by each country at its own will.

Out of this combination of anxieties has come the series of agreements, painfully negotiated under the aegis of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) on the collective limitation of trade in textiles coming from low-wage, developing countries. The sense of the agreements—which express what I regard as a characteristic compromise of the mixed economy when faced with some awkward pressure deriving from the international system—runs as follows:—Yes, we recognise the right of foreign countries to sell in our markets things which they make more cheaply. But we also insist that the rate at which they increase their exports shall not be so high as to cause sudden major disturbances, social and economic, in our countries. So we set down limits to the maximum rate at which the low-wage countries as a group are to be allowed to conquer extra shares of our total domestic market, in each of the textile products concerned, in any one year.

Once this has been done and the total amounts laid down, the next step is a highly complicated and hotly contended series of negotiations with individual exporting countries—there are scores of them—about what in detail they will be permitted to export to whom. This marathon series of negotiations has been taking place about once every five years. I am not holding it up as an ideal means of conducting international business. But the important point is that it works, more or less—the developing countries increase their textile exports and the welfare states of the Western world engage in the style of market intervention to which they have become accustomed, in support of the interests of groups of their citizens who are vociferous and feel menaced. The

connection with the regional policies which have become a standard feature of public policy in the mixed economies of the West is that textile employment is often concentrated in certain traditional centres and that, in some of these, alternative jobs may not be readily available.

What is so interesting about developments in the 1970s is that this kind of effort, which tries to accommodate the interventionist activities of the state in a mixed economy to the need for a predictable and orderly set of rules governing transactions with the international community, has become the everyday business of international politics. The most recent example of the genre is the agreement made in the GATT, again laboriously negotiated point by point over the five years of the so-called 'Tokyo Round', just ended, on a new code of rules on public procurement—setting limits to the freedom of governments to place orders for goods for public programmes with suppliers whom they have chosen hitherto, naturally among their favourites at home, in total disregard of possible foreign interests. The new code of conduct does not bind the hands of governments; but it does place some constraints on blatant local favouritism.

The picture, then, is one of a slowly creeping tide of international intervention, at the same time as the territory influenced by national government action in the modern mixed economy is steadily extended. This is not to suggest that the speed of the inward-moving tide matches the rate at which these islands of national government activity extend their borders. But there is at least a visible movement in both directions.

Contrast this with the other field of government action referred to at the start—the day-to-day management of demand and employment in the economy. To use the jargon of economists, what I am saying is that micro-economic intervention by the state is growing and is increasingly the subject of international negotiation, while macro-economic policy-making is increasingly in doubt and decreasingly subject to international co-ordination. It is as if governments, having built up a vast arsenal of extremely powerful weapons on the macro-economic front over the past thirty years, and having also made a point of consulting closely with their allies abroad about the way in which this weaponry should be employed, have now decided that this armoury is after all too dangerous to be used. Nobody knows precisely the range of the guns and there is some doubt about the direction which the missiles which are fired off may eventually take: some of the strategic experts even suggest that most of them are boomerangs.

With short-term demand management so much out of fashion in so many countries, it is hardly surprising that the Western world has failed totally to arrive at any joint policy for tackling the severe business cycle of the 1970s—the worst that has hit them for forty years. There is a tendency for governments to say: we have each sinned individually, usually by failing to control our own money supply, and now we must each make individual amends. Indeed the extremists among them take the view that control of the national money supply is a complete and better substitute for any amount of

international co-ordination of policy. It is a slightly surprising doctrine to find being adopted at a time when national frontiers are being simultaneously opened even wider to international transactions. Britain's abolition of all foreign exchange control in the autumn of 1979 is only the latest step in a series. In fact international interdependence grows while the notion of international management of the world economy moves into disrepute.

If anyone feels that that is an exaggerated statement, let him consider the way in which the great nations of the Western world have approached the problems of the business cycle of the 1970s. They started off with the most extreme kind of inflationary boom in 1973. This was all too well co-ordinated—indeed it was the simultaneous timing of that violent upswing in so many countries which made it so dangerous. Next, they ran involuntarily into a thoroughly co-ordinated slump in 1975; and then failed entirely to engage in any joint endeavour to exploit the opportunities for economic recovery which emerged in 1976. 1977 and 1978 were spent mainly in wrangling between the strong and the weak economies about who should do what first; and when that had finally been sorted out, there was the second big oil shock (from Iran) in 1979—and they reacted to the price increase by agreeing that this time all of them would deflate their economies simultaneously. The last item might, I suppose, be counted as a piece of common macro-economic policy!

But the truth is that each of the major countries decided to give a deflationary bias to its economic policy for its own *national reasons*—with the underlying sentiment being that Germany and Japan had been so successful after the first oil shock because they were quicker off the mark in deflating their economies, and that it would be worth trying to follow a similar tactic the second time round. In short, this is not a case of co-ordination, but rather the accident that everyone happens to have read the same (German) drill book.

This does not look like a promising beginning for the 1980s. A particular trouble about the old drill book which is now in such active use is that it makes no concession whatever to the facts of international interdependence. Each nation independently does the right thing, via the control of the money supply, to hold inflation down; and the other good things automatically follow. Now this is a slightly paradoxical outcome of the new mood of distrust of the conventional postwar practice of demand management in the Keynesian manner, since one of the causes of the loss of confidence in macro-policy is precisely that the international forces beyond the control of national governments have increasingly asserted themselves and frustrated the policy-makers. Great nations have spent a great deal of time during the past few years in trying to regain their economic autonomy and control, which they believe they have temporarily mislaid rather than lost, through inadvertence.

Milton Friedman, for example, advised the Joint Committee of the United States. Congress on this subject in the late 1960s that: 'Foreign payments amount to only some 5 per cent of our total national income. Yet they have become a major factor in nearly every national policy.' This he plainly

regarded as silly, and he went on to recommend the United States to adopt a system of floating exchange rates as a means of overcoming the trouble. After a characteristically self-confident piece of argument about the way in which market forces, once brought to bear on the determination of the value of the dollar, would automatically solve the problem of the balance of payments, which had been unnecessarily created by an incompetent lot of busy-bodies he concluded: 'It is not the least of the virtues of floating exchange rates that we would again become masters in our own house. We could decide important issues on the proper ground . . .' [4]

As a remedy for the loss of national autonomy, Friedman's formula of a floating exchange rate, which the United States has pursued so vigorously since 1973, must be judged a resounding failure. The dollar was, and is, much more exposed to the decisions taken by people outside the United States than he so confidently believed; in fact his purported measure of the low international dependence of the United States is a largely irrelevant number, and most especially so for a country running an international currency which is in trouble. Still, Friedman's statement is worth recalling because it so well illustrates an underlying mood of Americans and of others—a mood which expresses the conviction that there must be some remediable defect in a system which makes 'us', whoever we are, quite so dependent on the views and actions of foreigners.

I do not believe that there is such a remediable defect. There is either a way forward towards greater international co-ordination of the day-to-day management of our economic affairs, that is of macro-economic policy, or a decisive move backwards towards the dismantling of the welfare state and of its concomitant in Western society—the mixed economy. The latter is in fact the choice that is now being proposed, by people who are, once again, looking for ways of regaining the lost satisfactions of national autonomy. The most recent version comes from Arthur Burns, who presided for many years over the American central bank, in the annual IMF Per Jacobson lecture to which I referred earlier. As we have seen he traces the trouble in the United States—whose condition he tends to equate rather too readily with that of all other advanced industrial countries—back to President Roosevelt's New Deal. It is simply the advance of government regulation and government-supplied welfare benefits—a process that took a further huge leap forward during the 1960s with President Johnson's 'Great Society Program'—which makes rational management of society impossible. The consequence is American inflation, 'which has become a major threat to the well-being of much of the world'. And Burns concludes sadly that there is no remedy which central bankers can provide: what is required is a major reversal of those forces which built the interventionist state into the monster which he believes it has become. That will require he says, a deep change in the 'political environment'.

4 *The U.S. Balance of Payments*, Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Part 3

There is evidence that Burns reflects an important current of thought in the United States today. It is incidentally far more radical in its rejection of the *charitable* and supervisory role of the state than the contemporary British Tory party. It is a force to be reckoned with in the American politics of the 1980s.

There are also other forces, less extreme than this, which express a spirit of frustration in the United States that will make their effect felt on the rest of the world for some time to come. We in Europe may tend to underestimate the elements of the tragic in the American experience of the late 1970s. Starting from President Carter's election, the government acted as if it could by its own will manage to generate a great economic expansion, regardless of what was done in the rest of the world. From 1976 onwards it embarked on a programme which vastly increased the number of people employed, gave a powerful and sustained lift to international trade, raised the level of welfare and of business profits—and then, in 1979, it had to bring the whole operation to a dead halt, essentially because the other key countries in the world economy had refused to join the game, or to do so soon enough. Of course there are other reasons, for which the Americans must in part at least blame themselves, which are seen as having contributed to this failure. But I do not think that the essential fact will fail to register—the inability of the United States to run its economy in its own way without the accord of the rest of the world.

I am not forecasting that this will cause a return to the isolationist spirit. There is in fact no easy way back from the United States' international involvement. But there is likely to be much greater caution in the future about undertaking the risks and economic costs of international leadership—and that just at the time when such leadership is going to be badly needed. There will also, I believe, be a tendency to look for a new and more favourable political-economic trade-off with Europe and Japan in the future.

Part of what I am saying is that the old style of United States leadership, with the world-wide dollar system as its base, which made the international context of the mixed economy rather comfortable and comparatively easy to manage, has now probably gone. This coincides with a need to increase the range of international co-operation in economic policy beyond the bounds at which it got stuck in the 1970s. We thought that we could deal with the international repercussions of our changed domestic economic system on a piecemeal basis, without calling for any major change in the day-to-day management of the world economy. International action was on the whole directed to questions which I have referred to as 'micro-economic'— including some very important matters, but *not* touching those critical questions about the different responsibilities of individual countries to run their internal affairs in such a way as to maintain the prosperity of the international system as a whole.

Back in the 1960s it all seemed so much easier. International economic policy was agreeing to the OECD's target of 50 per cent growth in the

of its Communist supporters to levels which undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Can the Khalqis ask the Afghans to accept a social revolution and at the same time ask them to give up Sher Shah's legacy of fierce independence? If that is a choice to be made in Moscow, rather than Kabul, do the Russians understand what they are up against in Afghanistan?

The Legacy of Daoud

They have had over twenty-five years to learn. Extensive Soviet influence in Afghanistan first arose at the instance of Mohammad Daoud Khan, a cousin of the then reigning monarch, Zaher Shah, who assumed the premiership in 1953. Spurned by the United States in his quest for military support, the royal prime minister signed an agreement with the Soviet Union which was to make the Afghan army entirely dependent on its northern neighbour for arms, training, and financing. With Soviet encouragement, Daoud reversed the postwar trend towards capitalistic—albeit monopolistic—development in Afghanistan, and embarked the nation on a series of ambitious, Stalinistic five-year plans. The effect of Daoud's policies was to give the Soviet Union not only a great strategic stake in his country, but also an ideological commitment to making Afghanistan's development work. Afghanistan thus became the first non-Communist country to seek Soviet development aid in the postwar period. Many observers viewed this event as epochal, regarding President Nasser's fateful switch to the Russians in 1956 as having been inspired by Daoud's example.[1]

Throughout this article it will be argued that the Soviet stake in Afghanistan is more than merely geopolitical. A country of high—2,000 metre— mountains and roads, often little better than goat paths, Afghanistan is a poor staging ground for modern war. While nomad armies in the past have used the country as a highway for the conquest of the subcontinent, the lack, or extreme fragility, of its technical infrastructure now makes such a 'highway' unusable. And despite the high martial reputation of the Afghans, the human *materiel* of the army is poor—half of the young men drafted are turned away because of physical disabilities.[2] Thus neither Afghanistan's highways nor its nine divisions offer the Soviets much strategic advantage. On the other hand, in developing Afghanistan, the Russians aim to create both a modern infrastructure and a modern army. If they were to succeed, they would realise both the strategic advantage of gaining a viable military base, and the equally significant ideological advantage of proving Soviet development capabilities in a very poor country.

The Russian stake in Afghanistan was imperilled by the abrupt fall of Daoud in 1963. After ten years of Daoud's Soviet gambit the development of the country showed little improvement. Ousting Daoud from the premiership by a

1 See, for example, J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (London: Pall Mall for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1969), p. 269.

2 See Fred Halliday's article, 'Revolution in Afghanistan', *New Left Review*, Nov.–Dec., 1978, p. 27.

constitutional sleight of hand, a clique of American-educated technocrats took charge of the government. In a manner reminiscent of the nineteenth century's Great Game, they began cautiously to juggle Soviet and American influence in order to gain more aid from both super-powers. Their third Five Year Plan (1963–68) relied heavily—to the tune of 30 per cent of expenditures—on Soviet and American financing, ostensibly for the foreign-exchange component of the plan, but in reality for the basic outlays. The juggling act failed to impress either of the super-powers with the sincerity of the Afghans' allegiance. Aid cutbacks by both the United States and the Soviet Union brought the plan's expenditures down to 40 per cent below the previous plan, after having been budgeted at 200 per cent above it.[3]

The failure of this non-alignment posture to secure aid, together with the economic stagnation produced by the emasculated plan, were Daoud's mandate to return to power. After a decade in retirement Daoud seized power from his royal cousin Zaher Shah and declared himself President of a Republican Afghanistan. Among the enthusiastic supporters of the new regime were the junior army officers who had been schooled in the Soviet Union—at the rate of about 1,000 annually—under the 1953 agreement signed by Daoud. Afghanistan's two leftist parties, Khalq and Parcham, were likewise visible in the early days of the new regime. Divided more by personality and style than by substantive issues, the two parties lacked, in any case, the significant mass support to contend for power.[4] Both looked to Moscow for inspiration, however, and Daoud availed himself of this shared 'Moscow connection' to develop an alliance of convenience that led observers to conclude that the Republican revolution constituted a Communist takeover—with *Le Monde* solemnly calling Daoud, 'le prince rouge'.

That early presumption, that Daoud's coup was a Communist takeover, proved to be wrong. When the Communist threat actually materialised in the April 1978 coup, observers were reluctant to acknowledge the fact, remembering their mistake of five years earlier. Nevertheless, there were some who understood the relationship between the two events, even at the time of Daoud's coup, including a quite clairvoyant minister who told the American ambassador, Elliot in 1973, 'I give Mohammad Daoud six years, six years before the Communists decide to dispense with him'. Meanwhile, soon after Daoud's putsch, the deposed Prime Minister, Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, was found dead in his jail cell. Daoud expressed his 'shock'. Maiwandwal was the dean of the Westward-looking technocrats, and the most distinguished statesman of the liberals. If the Soviets did have a schedule for taking control of Afghanistan their move could not have been better timed.[5]

Russian benevolence under Daoud's presidency made his premiership look

3. Ministry of Planning, *Five Year Plan*, Kabul, 1966. See also, *Financial Times*, March 18, 1969, p. 22, for discussion of planning failure during the liberal regime.

4. Haliday, *op.cit.*, p. 25. Halliday uses undisclosed German sources.

5. Louis Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', *AUFS Reports*, 14, Part II, 1978, p. 4.

like famine. In rapid succession the Russians offered Afghanistan hydroelectric stations; nitric fertilizer factories; a new road; irrigation for Jelalabad province; and—the jewel of the whole complex—a natural gas industry in Mazar-i-Sharif. By 1975 the Russians and the Afghans had agreed on over seventy projects.[6]

Yet each of the projects had its catch—as even the Afghans learned that there is no such thing as a free lunch. The road, for example, linked Kabul with the Soviet border, with a capacity for 80-ton vehicles: there were no such vehicles in Afghanistan, or in the Soviet Union, besides Soviet battle tanks. The Soviet irrigation projects were tied to fruit-export agreements. This needed boost to Afghan export earnings was soured somewhat by Russia's classification of all Afghan produce as 'lowest quality': sorting was done in the Soviet Union by Soviet sorters. The Jaraduq Natural Gas Project, a joint venture between Soviet Mitroprom and the optimistically named Afghan National Oil Company, was capitalised at 62·5 million rubles, with the Soviets financing two-thirds of that. According to the agreement, 2 billion cubic metres of gas were to be exported to the Soviet Union each year after 1976. Again, this silver lining had a cloud: the price of gas was fixed in 1975 and remained there long after the world price of natural gas had soared. The Soviets, who had similar agreements with Iran, bought that gas at whatever price the Iranian National Oil Company chose to sell it. The Afghans did not have the kind of clout the Shahanshah enjoyed.

Further Soviet penetration of the Afghan economy occurred in more traditional areas. The Afghan Karakol wool market, typically an exclusively London affair, was partially diverted to Leningrad where it had to compete with the Soviet Union's own domestic Karakol industry. Profits there were credited directly into the servicing of Afghanistan's burgeoning debt to the Soviet Union. An important 10 per cent of the country's export earnings were thus tied into the Soviet system.[7]

But the key source of Soviet control in Afghanistan lay in the structure of the economy. Under Soviet pressure Daoud nationalised the major industrial ventures and turned these into unwieldy lynchpins for massive industrialisation.[8] Afghanistan was to be a show-case—a model of Soviet-style development in the poorest region of Asia. If the Russians could not help to develop a country on their own borders with strong cultural and historical affinities to successful socialist Central Asia, where could Soviet aid be shown to be effective? Adhering to the Soviet doctrine that industry comes first, Afghanistan joined those countries in the Middle East that must import food to feed themselves. With only 4 per cent of the arable land given over to the production of cash crops, and with 90 per cent of the people living in a largely subsistence economy, this emphasis on heavy industry was quixotic, to say the

6 See Kabul Times, 1974–75.

7 Based on discussions with former Interior Minister, Ahmad Shaliz.

8 See Maxwell Fry, *The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance and the Critical Constraints to Economic Development* (Leiden: Brill, 1974), p. 67.

least. In order to develop agricultural produce the government concentrated on a few, mechanised co-operative farms and intensive tractorisation of the rich Jelalabad region. The displaced peasants and nomads found themselves victims of what the Soviets like to call capitalist exploitation. The impinging of agrobusiness—to call a spade a spade—on the countryside is a striking repetition of events in neighbouring Iran, only in this case with the state as the capitalist, financed by the Soviet Union.

All these ventures cost the Soviet Union money—over a billion dollars by 1978—but it was determined to make a go of Afghanistan. So signs in 1975 that Kabul was again tempted to play both sides of the fence brought about a reassessment of Soviet policy toward Daoud's regime.

Concerned over his dependence on Soviet aid, in 1975 Daoud began to resuscitate the fence-sitting policies that characterised the last royal Cabinets. On the domestic front Daoud shook himself loose from his erstwhile allies in the leftist Parcham and Khalq parties by sending the enthusiastic, youthful ideologues 'out to the people'. The Afghan *Narodniki* proved no more successful in radicalising the masses than their Russian predecessors in Turgenev's day.[9] They rusticated in the hostile provinces while, more importantly, they lost their party cohesion in the capital. Daoud now had a free hand to move against leftists in his army, whom he purged in late 1975. Abroad, Daoud sought to replace declining American aid as a counter weight to the Soviets by turning to the Middle East oil states. As a Muslim country, as well as one of the world's poorer states, Afghanistan readily qualified for aid from the proliferating numbers of aid and lending institutions, including the Kuwait Fund, the Islamic Bank for Development, and the OPEC Special Fund. Grants from Saudi Arabia included a half billion dollars for hydroelectric works, while the United Arab Emirates offered 8·5 million dollars for a sugar factory. Iran, anxious to secure its eastern border against Soviet influence, offered 2 billion dollars in aid, surpassing the Soviets in pledged contributions to the Afghan Seven Year Plan (1976-85).[10]

The aid from Iran proved to be more than the Iranians were equipped to transfer, and more than the Afghans could have absorbed. After two years, only a fraction of the total pledged reached Afghanistan. As with other aspects of the Shah's *Drang noch Osten*—including his parleys with Bhutto and Daoud, and his calls for an Iran-Afghan-Pakistan economic union—the aid pledge turned out to be more smoke than fire. Some observers speculate that the Shah's moves provoked, first concern in the Kremlin, and then Communist-inspired counter-moves throughout the region. It is hard to know how seriously concerned the Russians were over the Shah's aborted diplomacy.[11]

Daoud's new posture vis-à-vis the Russians brought him widespread support

9 Dupree, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 3.
10 *Washington Post*, May 6, 1976
11 Selig Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', *Foreign Policy*, March 1979.

from moderates, as well as conservative Muslim clergy, who had strongly, even violently, opposed the increasingly visible Soviet presence in the country. Conscious of this religious support, Daoud repaired strained relations with Muslim Pakistan, and made a widely publicised journey to Saudi Arabia, via Islamabad. These moves were too palpable a reversal for the leftists, slowly recovering from their 1975 setback. The Khalq and Parcham, regrouped and recovered from their forced rustication, cemented their leadership differences and joined in stepping up activity against the regime, which resulted in a brutal crackdown on students and army officers in the capital. Pay-rises for the army and subsidised prices for the civil servants—which cost the government 3 billion rupees a year—did not win Daoud broad support in face of 20 per cent inflation. Slipping into a siege mentality, Daoud authorised the assassination of seven prominent leftist personalities, while sending into diplomatic exile even sympathetic moderates. The purge of 1978, more far-reaching and final in its intent than that of 1975, gave the Khalq and the Parcham the choice of liquidation or revolution.

How disturbed the Soviets were at these reversals of policy by their protégé Daoud, and how much part they played in his overthrow, is impossible to know. But the scale on which they have backed Daoud's leftist successors speaks volumes. Immediately twenty-five agreements with Comecon countries were signed by the new regime; an unusual burst of diplomacy on the part of a government scarcely secure in its own capital. While street-fighting went on in Kabul, the government began contracting for Bulgarian television and East German printing equipment, together with an additional 22 million dollars from the Soviet Union to exploit natural gas. Fidel Castro paid a brief visit shortly after the revolution, presumably to assure the new government that it is possible to run a small country entirely on Soviet aid for years. Congratulatory telegrams from Poland's Henryk Jablonski and other Warsaw Pact heads of state, flooded in.[12]

The Khalqi regime

Observers who had been quick to call Daoud's regime Communist in 1973 were now willing to give the new government the benefit of the doubt. Said a former USAID official, 'I think they're just raising the level of rhetoric in order to be heard above the rhetoric Daoud used'. The Western Press pointed out the American connections of both the new President, Nur Mohammad Taraki—a former translator at the American embassy—and the Prime Minister, Hafizollah Amin, a Columbia alumnus.

An Afghan, now living in exile, cautioned against attaching a strong ideological colouring to either of the Afghan leaders. 'I used to have lunch with Taraki and Amin every day for two years. Taraki, he is a weak, kindly sort of man. That's why they made him president. But Hafizollah Amin is very sharp, a good speaker. He's after the power.'

12 See, for example, various articles in the *Kabul Times* during April and May 1978.

It is hard to know the motives and goals of the new regime at the moment it seized power. Some suggest that Taraki and Amin, both members of the Khalq Party, moved according to a prearranged plan in consolidating their power and proclaiming their affiliation with Moscow. According to this view, the Khalq leaders (1) joined with the Parcham in a tactical alliance; (2) overthrew Daoud's regime; (3) consolidated power in Kabul while disguising the extent of their ideological commitment to Communism; (4) executed the July 1978 purge of the Parcham and army officers sympathetic to their rivals; and (5) institutionalised their relationship with Moscow in the last months of 1978. Others hold that Taraki and Amin were forced into the hands of the Russians by the unexpected violence of the opposition against them. In this view, successive attempts by the new regime to assume direction of the rural areas provoked local resistance, first in remote Nuristan province and afterwards in Paktia and Herat. Thus Taraki was forced to seek Soviet backing, culminating in the defence pact of December 1978 with the Soviet Union, in order to secure the regime militarily against the growth of rural insurgency.

Whatever Khalq aspirations may have been before coming to power, the course of events in the wake of the coup, and the growth of Soviet influence, show a logic of their own. At first the regime assumed a posture of conciliation. Whether sincerely or not, the new government invited 'all progressives' and 'all victims of Daoud's repression' to participate in the country's development. Nevertheless, several pro-Western opponents of Daoud remained in prison with the change of regimes and misgivings about the possible Communist orientation of the new government began to surface in Kabul. However, Afghanistan's well-spoken Prime Minister, Hafizollah Amin, rejected the Marxist-Leninist label for two good reasons. In the first place, the American Department of State had hitherto proved unwilling to invoke the automatic clause in the foreign assistance act (which prohibits aid to Communist countries) by calling Taraki's regime Communist. While the United States thus preserved whatever diplomatic leverage it enjoyed in Kabul, Taraki and Amin salvaged the 15 million dollar American aid programme. Secondly, the Marxist-Leninist label would have further alienated the fundamentalist Afghan clergy, who equate the material philosophy of communism with atheism. For their benefit, then, the Khalqi regime proclaimed itself socialist—a political hue common enough throughout the Muslim Middle East to be acceptable to the men of religion.

The argument, waged largely in the Western Press, as to whether Taraki's regime was Communist or not soon became academic. One may well doubt whether the 'scientific socialism' of Marx was fully understood by the Khalqis—or, for that matter, by many self-proclaimed Marxist regimes in the Third World: neither private property nor private capital fell victim to the new regime. Yet in a manner familiar to other Communist dictatorships Taraki's regime began to narrow its base of power and grasp for centralised, bureaucratic control over the masses.

One of the greatest problems facing the new regime was to assert its legitimacy over the masses of the people in the isolated rural districts that make up 90 per cent of the population. Members of the governing élite have little contact with the people, and their attitudes toward them run from the disdain entertained by the older élite to the fashionable condescension of the young leftists. The tribal, intensely proud, rural people reciprocate with fear, suspicion, and a chauvinistic attachment to their traditional way of life, expressed as attachment to Islam. In their view, the Kabuli élite is very nearly *kafir*, unbelieving. The government presence in the countryside, a troika of soldier, schoolteacher and tax collector familiar from Tsarist Russia, is only an outward emblem of Kabul's control. Real authority is shared with the local notables, tribal chiefs and village headmen, who function as middlemen between Kabul and the people. The mutual ill-will of the governing élite and the rural masses was traditionally tempered by the historical association of the dynasty with the local notables—from which class it had emerged.[13] Extirpating the dynasty and its legacy of rural legitimacy, the Khalqi regime needed to find a way of winning the confidence of the 'toiling masses' so dear to their ideals. Instead they threatened them in the most palpable ways. In remote Nuristan, for example, immediately on seizing power they imprisoned the popular sub-governor—a local notable—and replaced him with a Kabuli party member. This young radical interfered with the ritual performance of the Muslim fasting month, confirming the Nuristanis in their fears that the new regime was hostile to Islam. In the eastern provinces, strongholds of tribal and religious sentiment, the government sent teachers and soldiers to 'liberate' the tribal masses from their 'oppressive' khans and clerics. Subsequently, quite a few of these youthful ideologues were reported to have been killed by resentful tribesmen.

One can only question the realism of the Khalqi government in confronting popular sentiment so crudely. The lack of realism here may stem from the historical gulf between the ruling and the ruled of Afghanistan, but it also reflects the alienation of an increasingly Soviet-styled ruling clique seeking to maintain power through force.

The Khalqi government did respond to the rural opposition which by the summer of 1978 had become endemic throughout the East. Recognising the necessity of at least neutralising the opposition of the local notables to the regime, the government invited tribal khans and village chiefs to meetings in the provincial capitals, trying to quiet their increasingly vocal fears that Kabul had 'gone Communist'. In deference to the sensibilities of the notables, party members stopped calling one another 'comrade', while the Kabul press began to report every government event as having included a 'recitation from the Holy Koran'. As to the government's plans for social and economic reforms, the Planning Minister, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, gave assurances that 'We have done nothing yet but put through what was planned'.[14]

13 Best discussion of this in Mike Barry, *Afghanistan* (Paris, 1974)

14 *MEED*, June 30, 1978, p. 6

At the same time as Taraki and Amin backed off from their headlong collision with popular sentiment, the two Khalq leaders moved decisively against rivals within their leftist front. In July, Cabinet members with Parcham affiliations were first posted abroad to diplomatic posts, then fired. Show trials were arranged for those Parchamis slow to leave the country. The demotion of two well-known pro-Soviet personalities, the Deputy Prime Minister, Babrak Karmal and the Defence Minister, General Abdul Qadir, led observers to speculate that the Khalqi's regime would rapidly drift away from Soviet influence. Subsequent events were to prove otherwise.

Karmal had advocated a gradualist reform of the country—for all his vocal support for the Russians, he had recognised the realism inherent in Daoud's programme of cautious reforms. Amin, on the other hand, urges rapid social reforms at whatever cost. With the purge of Karmal and also Keshtmand—whose sanguine reassurances about the direction of the government had proved useful in the government earlier in the summer—the Khalqi regime prepared to embark on an ambitious scheme of reforms.

If carried to completion these reforms would revolutionise Afghan society. None of the reforms are new in conception, having been drafted under previous royalist and republican ministers. But the earlier generation of reformers had been daunted by the difficulties confronting them. Anxious lest rapid social reforms should alienate their power-base of tribesmen, religious figures and landowners, the pre-revolutionary governments had always moved slowly on basic reforms, much to the frustration of the young leftists. Now speed is the order of the day. Land reform Proclamation VI, promulgated in July 1978, cancels all debts, returns all mortgages and frees all sharecroppers from financial obligations contracted in the last decade. Rural money lenders have been jailed, while newspapers have announced that large landowners have given 'gifts' of thousands of *jeribs* of land to the revolution.[15]

We may well wonder what is the reality behind all this. Rural credit, as in many poorer countries, is usurious because it reflects the scarcity of capital in the country. Without any alternative source of credit (the Agricultural Development Bank still being largely a figment of Kabul's imagination), what will the farmers do for credit now that the local money-lending system has been crushed? Dislocations caused by land disputes and claims adjustments in the wake of reform are to be handled by a 'Land Arbitration Board' in every provincial sub-capital. There are over a hundred of these sub-capitals in the country—without any cadastral records, without any trained personnel, and without the administrative infrastructure to control a massive transfer of land. The activities of the boards in the three provinces where they have been established—all near big towns—seem to be limited to collecting testimonies from recently landed peasants about how happy they are with the revolution.

The zeal of the government's action on behalf of the peasants seems at best

15 *Kabul Times*, June 1978; *Anis* (Persian and Pushtu, Kabul), July 15, Aug 26, 1978

misplaced. Destroying the system of rural credit on which small farmers rely for seed has curtailed plantings this year and threatens shortages a year hence. Already observers predict a short-fall of 500,000 tons of wheat in 1980. The Soviet Union and India have pledged only 100,000 tons.[16] As ill-conceived as any land reform in the Middle East, this Proclamation VI may be a formula for disaster.

Nor is the land reform necessarily of much significance. In this arid, mountainous country, land is 'dirt cheap' and access to water is the source of wealth. Powerful landowners and tribal chiefs regulate the distribution of irrigated waters according to a time-honoured, if self-serving, pattern. If the government means to step in and supplant the khans and the waterlords—as they are called—they would have to establish water boards in the countryside. The Bolsheviks did just that in their takeover of Central Asia, though they only had to control two rivers, the Oxus and the Jaxartes. Can the Afghan regime with its lack of trained cadres establish a water board for the thousands of seasonal rivulets that nourish the agricultural land of the millions of small farmers? If they do not, the land reform remains a dead letter.

In another utopian move, the government announced the formation of rural co-operatives with government salaried staff. While other developing countries might have studied the problems of co-operatives before implementing their plans, Kabul opened its first co-operatives in August of 1978, four months after the revolution. The waiting days under Daoud had made them impatient.

These activities rapidly undermined whatever legitimacy the Khalqi regime may have gained from its conciliatory gestures to the restive rural areas. The Afghans may be characterised as being highly susceptible to rhetoric, but even in Afghanistan actions speak louder than words. Whether 'communist', 'progressive', 'anti Islamic' or 'truly Islamic', the Khalqi regime aimed to extend its bureaucratic control over the countryside, and the countryside aimed to resist. While the Kabul press hailed the success of the land reforms in Herat, Jelalabad and Kabul—that is, the major urban areas—no official reportage came from the rural areas. On the other hand, reports began to surface telling of massacres of party workers by tribesmen and of Kabul air-strikes against rural insurgents in the eastern provinces of Nuristan, Nangrahar and Konar.

In Nuristan, successive provocations through the summer of 1978 led the locals to attack the sub provincial capital, rescue their old governor from jail and take on a regiment of regular army troops sent to punish them. In a surprise upset, the Nuristanis threw back the government, capturing enough arms and ammunition to equip all military age men in the district—that is, aged between ten and seventy—and the revolt became official.[17]

Kabul took the uprising seriously. Planes bombed Nuristan in July and

16 *Dawn* (Karachi), Dec. 5, 1978

17 Details based on conference at Asia Society (New York) chaired by Dr Chris Brunner, notable speakers were Khalil Nuristani, Dr Richard Strand, who had recently come from the rebel area

August 1978, while the equivalent of a division moved in to isolate the rebel province. Stirring up ancient tribal emnities against the Nuristanis, the government also committed irregulars to the fight, promising rival tribesmen they could do what they liked to the Nuristanis once they were beaten. The progressive government even proclaimed a 'Jihad', or holy war, against them. Fighting raged from mid-summer until mid-winter, when snowfall ended operations. The Nuristanis managed to hold the narrow defiles and high passes that lead into their provinces, and celebrated this stalemate over the Kabulis by declaring themselves independent.

The last two months of 1978 saw the Afghan regime consolidate its ties with Moscow. Whether planned, or whether induced by the revolt in Nuristan, the congruence of Soviet attitudes with those of the Khalqs made such a consolidation inevitable: the course they pursued domestically since coming to power had left them no option but to move closer to Moscow.

In November the Afghan Cabinet travelled to Moscow to meet in joint session with the Politburo. Meanwhile, in the countryside peasants were organised for voluntary labour in road construction (King Zaher Shah had abolished corvée labour by the peasants in 1968 amid liberal acclamation). Demonstrations of workers, peasants, students, soldiers and civil servants took place in the provincial capitals, and ministries, barracks, schools and factories were closed down to encourage attendance. Taraki's birthplace was designated a national shrine (although why the self-proclaimed 'son of a poor shepherd' should prove to be from a substantial farmstead is less than clear).

During Taraki's visit to Moscow, he took part in commemorating the anniversary of the Great October Revolution, making the obligatory pilgrimage to Lenin's tomb and giving a singular speech over Afghan television. Defending twenty years of inconclusive Soviet aid to Afghanistan, Taraki had this to say: 'The Soviet Union extended unconditional aid. Although some were not pleased, the aid was so beneficial to the toilers that no one could object'. He went on to praise relations with the Soviet Union, preparing his listeners for the announcement, on December 5, that Afghanistan and the Soviet Union had signed a defence pact.[18] The first country to seek Soviet aid, back in 1953, now joined Cuba, Angola and Ethiopia in having a mutual defence pact with Moscow.

This pact came just in time, as the level of opposition to the regime throughout the eastern provinces was now approaching that of an epidemic.

The counter-revolution

The success of the Nuristanis in resisting government authority had encouraged the mood toward a general uprising in all the peripheral provinces that had traditionally maintained a sullen independence from Kabul. The tribes of the Sarhadd, opposite Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, declared themselves against the Khalqi regime in the first months of 1979. The chiefs

18 *Anis*, Nov 25, 1978

of the largest tribes, the Mohmand, Afridi, Waziri, and Yusofzai, met in a *jirga* (council) to co-ordinate their activities.[19] These chiefs were joined by refugees from Kabul, representing dissidents of all colours: royalists, republicans, high-ranking army officers, and even apolitical technocrats anxious to overthrow the Khalqi regime. A notable presence in the tribes is that of Afghanistan's most distinguished religious leaders, fleeing what is widely viewed as a bloody purge of Afghanistan's influential clergy. Closely connected with the *ancien régime* by kin ties and political alliance, these *pirs*, or saints, are highly regarded by the tribal people. They are thus doubly distrusted by the Khalqi regime. The *pirs*, like the tribesmen, are Sunni Muslims, the official sect of the country—although Shia also exist. Responding to Taraki's proclamation of a *Jihad* against the 'Made-in-London Muslims' (a reference to the cosmopolitan education of many of these *pirs*), the *pirs* called for a *Jihad* against Taraki and backed themselves up with the support of the Sarhaddi tribesmen.[20]

The tribal *jirga* called for a direct assault on Kabul.[21] Prudent counsels in the *jirga* reminded the chiefs of the experience of the Nuristanis under the government's air-strikes. In the mountains, such bombing had terroristic effects; against tribal levies, massed for assault, it would be devastating. Others noted the defence agreement between Kabul and Moscow, and pointed out the large numbers of Soviet military advisers in the base at Jelalabad, just a few kilometres down the road. Up to the present, therefore, despite routine designation of such-and-such a day as 'D-Day', guerrilla warfare of varying intensity has been the rule.

Many regions of the country have settled down into a Hobbesian 'state of nature', like the rugged Hazarajat in the centre of the Hindukush, where a local governor issued rifles to his retainers and declared war on the distant government. He has not, like his Nuristani counterparts, declared himself independent from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the behaviour of these local rebels is more reminiscent of the warlords of the Chinese Civil War than of the more co-ordinated Islamic Revolution of Iran. The fragile mosaic of social groups in Afghanistan underscores this segmenting effect. The rebel bands are isolated by their mountains, like the Hazaras; by linguistic and cultural identity, like the Nuristanis; or by bitter memories of political rivalries, like the Pathan khans of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. It should not be forgotten that the Khalqis are all Ghilzai Pathans, long-time rivals of the Durrani Pathans, including the former royal family and many of the present rebel clans.

The unity of the rebels based near the Pakistani border hangs precariously on the efforts of traditional go-betweens to maintain a constant dialogue between the suspicious, jealous leaders of the revolt. Recent reports of a unification of several factions into a National Front (ANLF) may be more

19 *Dawn*, May 12, 1979
20 *Anis*, April 22, 1979
21 *New York Times*, April 19, 1979, article by Robert Trumbull based on interview with Zia Khan Nassry. I interviewed Nassry as well as Said Ahmad Gailani, courtesy *New York Post*

apparent than real, if the following anecdote is any indication. A partisan of the Gailani-led Islamic Party of Pakistan, Jamiat-i-Islami said of the ANLF's leader, Sibghatullah Mujadidi, 'his father was a great man, but the son is not up to his stuff'. Mujadidi replied to the affront, 'Who is this Gailani? He is a nobody. We know what he is'. A third spokesman of the ANLF said of Engineer Gulbedin Hikmatyar's, Hizb-i-Islami movement, 'that Tajik has no more chance of ruling Afghanistan than a Negro has of becoming American President'.[22]

Despite the fragility of the coalition of the several rebel groups, fighting in the North-West Frontier Province has become more and more in earnest throughout 1979. The Pakistani-based rebels, feeling the squeeze of Islamabad's pressure to stop guerrilla activity in the refugee areas, have fought tenaciously to gain bases within Afghan territory. Kabul has responded by launching air-strikes against the rebels using napalm. Indirect confirmation of the number of air attacks launched by Kabul is given by Pakistan's complaints that nearly a hundred overflights into Pakistani airspace have resulted in Pakistani villages being bombed. Fleeing the bombing in Afghanistan, the number of refugees in the North-West Frontier Province has swelled to over 300,000.

While the rebel groups struggle for a toe-hold in Afghanistan and call for immediate assault on Kabul, a long-run perspective on their campaign offers neither so grim a prospect as they presently face, nor yet one so optimistic as their spokesmen suggest. It is true that the rebels cannot muster a direct assault on the capital, given the sheer fire-power of the government troops armed with the heaviest model Soviet gun-boat helicopters. On the other hand, a long war of attrition sidesteps their opponents' superior fire-power, making an issue of the relative staying power of the two sides. The Khalqis' conscript army has been wracked by mutinies since the fighting started. Whole units have reportedly defected, along with their equipment. Except for élite security units in the capital—where nearly half the army is tied down—the fighting determination of the troops is questionable. There is evidence, however, that a long war of attrition might be acceptable to the rebels. The main business of the tribes, besides herding, is smuggling. The fact that official Afghan-Pakistani trade is conducted under restrictive currency agreements has created a black market for all sorts of consumer goods sought in both countries. Nomad smuggling serves that market, reaching a greater volume as government control wanes. Since the outbreak of fighting, smuggling has flourished. The tribesmen have, therefore, the means to pursue the war. At the same time, customs receipts, generally one half of the government's revenues in normal times, have fallen dismally, undermining the Khalqis' capacity for prolonged conflict.[23]

The tribal rebels have strong disincentives to end the conflict on the

22. *Impact International*, June 22, 1979, p. 38; interview with Burhan uddin Rabbani of Jamiat-i Islami.
23. *Dawn*, July 6, 1979.

Khalqis' terms. Like most Middle Eastern governments, the Khalqi regime has plans for 'rationalising' the pastoral industry of Afghanistan. Together with the World Bank it has opened a livestock slaughterhouse in Herat and set up a field service veterinary group for the nomads of neighbouring provinces. (Although the plan was conceived under Daoud's regime, its implementation has begun under the new government.) The plan envisages the government as the sole buyer, at a fixed price, of the nomads' livestock, with the government having the responsibility for marketing it. So far there have been few, if any, takers. The concept of the plan is to deprive the nomads of their free market, cut off the lucrative smuggling trade with meat-hungry Iran, impose government taxes, impose military service and governmental administration on tribal life, and eventually settle them on the government's terms. Free pastoralism is not possible in a socialist state, however useful an adaptation it represents to the marginal ecological niche of most of Afghanistan. Following the Soviet lead in abolishing pastoralism, the Khalqi regime hopes to settle the nomads in the next five years. The nomads, many of whom are refugees from Stalin's genocide of Central Asian pastoralists in the 1930s, are fully capable of understanding the implications of the government's mood.

Fighting for their economic and social existence, the nomads are bound to be more tenacious than their lacklustre performance in the *Jihad* to date suggests. Behind them is a significant history of resistance against regimes that threatened them on bread-and-butter issues. When the reformist Amani regime in the 1920s tried to impose taxes and regular military service on the tribes, the grandfathers of these men swooped down on Kabul and ousted the reformers. Their fathers participated in the Jelalabad revolt of 1949, when the tribes forced the government to cancel its reforms by attacking and destroying the army base in Jelalabad. In 1963 when Pakistan closed its borders to the tribes in response to Daoud's Pakhtunistan policy, the stranded tribesmen rebelled and in effect provoked the coup d'état which ended Daoud's first decade in power.

The tribes of the Sarhadd number somewhere between two and three million pastoralists. If the inflated number of the 'official' Afghan population is reduced to the best guess of the SUNY demographic team—suppressed by the Afghan government—from 17 million to 11 million, this nomadic group accounts for a substantial part of the population. Add to this the fact that these are the richest, the best organised, the best armed—in a country where the average adult male is a walking arsenal—and the most politically acute, and the scale of the problem facing the government and its Soviet backers can be well appreciated. The Sarhadd tribes have been the kingmakers of Afghanistan from a logic that goes beyond tribal lore and tradition. They have been the political muscle of every Afghan regime, or else the Achilles heel, from the first unified monarchy in 1747 to Daoud's last tenure as president. And they know it. One Waziri chief expressed it this way: 'We live in the mountains, a difficult life. But we conquered Nuristan for Abdurrahman Khan. We beat the British with

sticks and stones in our hand. We overthrew Baccha Saqao for the King, and we made him get rid of Hashem Khan, his uncle. For we are the true Afghans'.[24]

Faced with a rebellion of a quarter of the population, the best that the Khalqi regime can do is hold the fort—Kabul, with its population of 600,000 together with the other major urban centres, Kandahar, Herat, and the industrial Kondoz corridor, comprising an additional 434,000. Significantly, in this latter area along the Soviet border, the new regime has recognised Turki—the common language of the hitherto culturally repressed Turkic population—as the official language. Undoubtedly, seepage of prosperity from the Soviet Union, plus a generous ethnic policy, and the fact that the industrial north is more amenable to Soviet-style planning policies than the rest of the country, will help solidify the regime's hold on this region. But the territory adjacent to the Soviet border should hardly be a problem for the government.[25]

The fact is that the experience of tribal rebellions elsewhere in the Middle East suggests how tenacious and unamenable to settlement they can be. In Iraq, for example, the Kurds managed to hold out for fifteen years against the Baghdad government despite the leftist Baghdadis' considerable Soviet backing. Likewise in the Sudan the Equatorial provinces kept up a civil war against the government in Khartoum for over twenty years. The fact that both of those conflicts ended with capitulation by the rebels disguises a more significant point. Both Baghdad and Khartoum experienced sudden about-faces in the course of the wars, with the hard-liner, pro-Moscow cliques deposed from power and conciliatory regimes installed in their places. In both cases the Russians, seeing which way the wind was blowing, accepted the inevitable and helped bring about the compromise.

Of course, Afghanistan is not Kurdistan or South Sudan. It shares an 800-mile-long border with the Soviet Union, which makes the Soviets both extremely concerned about and quite capable of aiding their friends in Kabul. But there are other differences between Afghanistan and Iraq or Sudan which are in the *mojahedin*'s favour. Neither in Iraq or the Sudan was a crucial, dominant part of the population engaged in the conflict, nor did they have the ideological support of religion in their struggle. The Kurdish insurrection was identified by many Kurds as a personal power-play on the part of Molla Mustafa Barzani. The secessionist tendencies of Southern Sudan were laid at the door of imperialist plots against African integrity. But in Afghanistan there is no such ambiguity about the issues at stake.

Trouble for the wider region

The civil war in Afghanistan developed a wider aspect from the start, when the Nuristani insurgents sought refuge from government air strikes inside the

24. Letter in the author's possession.
25. Based on discussion with Eden Naby (Harvard).

Pakistani border, in the Chitral region. The refugees took up residence with tenuously traced kinsmen, thus muting the official problem of passport control. As the uprising spread, the number of refugees within Pakistan swelled to 75,000 by the winter of 1978–79, imposing a considerable strain on the resources of the border area, and causing a tricky diplomatic problem for the Pakistani government.

Between Peshawar and the Afghan city of Jelalabad runs a merely nominal border, the Durand line, crossed yearly by millions of nomads on the annual migrations. Bisecting this border at the Khyber pass is a single paved road. The jurisdictions of Islamabad and Kabul even in the best of times extend no further than this road. The tribes of the Sarhadd and Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province rule themselves, without regard for the niceties of international diplomacy, and it is in their domain that the refugees have pitched camp. The presence of these Afghan refugees in this limbo of sovereignty poses Islamabad a ticklish problem. If it tries to administer its own nominal territory, it must inevitably clash with the tribes—something which the cautious military government of General Zia-ul-Haq seeks to avoid. If, on the other hand, it ignores the activities of the tribes and the refugees in the tribal area, it opens itself up to the charges of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan that it is abetting counter-revolution. Islamabad has avoided either extreme. A 'hands off' policy vis-à-vis the refugee camps allows the rebel leaders discretionary freedom to pursue their political objectives. Since the border is ill-defined at best, Pakistan can be selective in its assertion of jurisdiction over the rebels' activities. On the other hand, this laissez faire policy towards the rebels leaves the refugees' human problems up in the air, dependent on local charity and on scarcely adequate emergency measures taken at low-levels of the Provincial government. Pakistan has been scrupulous in not giving grounds for any Soviet allegations that it provide more than the bare minimum, humanitarian assistance.

Pakistan's caution is consistent with its complex policy constraints.[26] General Zia's new non-aligned foreign policy, Islamabad's departure from the Central Treaty Organisation, the Russians' huge steel mill project in Karachi, are all factors which enter into the Pakistanis' calculations. The danger of Afghanistan's polarisation transmitting itself to the Pakistani political scene is another factor. The Communist Party of Pakistan openly supports the Khalqi regime and echoes Moscow and Kabul's accusations that Pakistan has joined in an 'imperialist' plot against 'progressive Afghanistan'. In Peshawar, where the party of Communist sympathising Abdul-Ghaffar Khan is powerful, armed clashes between the Islamic rebel groups and the Pakistani leftists have taken place. But polarisation on the Left is only part of Pakistan's worries. The Jamiat-i-Islami has urged the government to do more for the refugees, while

26 Based on discussions with Pakistani officials off record. The attitudes of the left and right of Pakistan can be observed in the division that has arisen in Muslim Students Association in New York—split over the issue of whom to support in Afghanistan.

indirectly intriguing for military aid to the Islamic rebels. The Jamiat-i-Islami is an important backer of General Zia's military government, having played an instrumental role in bringing down Ali Bhutto's government in 1977. The mouthpiece of militant Islamic sentiment in this ideologically Islamic country, its power is growing, and it may step into the lead when General Zia's government steps out. Its insistence that the government act in support of the Islamic rebels in Afghanistan could turn into a destabilising domestic issue, further limiting Islamabad's ability to cope with the crisis.

Perhaps the gravest constraint on Pakistan's freedom of action is the attitude of the United States. The killing of the American ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubbs, on February 14, 1979, promptly cooled Washington's previously correct relations with Afghanistan. Suspecting official Afghan, as well as Soviet, complicity in the tragedy, Washington protested sharply and shaved off 11 million dollars of planned aid to Afghanistan. The ambassadorial position remains vacant. Recently a former Under Secretary of State, Harold Saunders, expressed official American displeasure at the growing violence in Afghanistan and the Soviet role in it. Yet the Department of State is quick to point out that its continued recognition of the Khalqi regime is not in question. Officially, Washington has had no contact with any of the rebel groups in Pakistan. Wary of becoming involved in anything remotely resembling foreign intervention in a country abutting the Soviet Union, the United States has restrained itself to criticising the Soviet role in Afghanistan. As to the possibility that America is engaged in covert action in support of the rebels, a senior policy maker noted recently that the CIA had to inform in advance seventeen congressional committees before committing covert activities. 'If the CIA were there', he concluded, 'I think we would all know about it by now'.

Even if the United States were interested in exerting influence on the Afghan problem, through its old ally Pakistan, both policy and legal constraints intrude. On the one hand, America is wary of relying on the shaky military government of General Zia, preferring to let the dust settle on a solution of Pakistan's three-decade search for political institutions before coming out in support of an existing regime. On the other, with Pakistan's announced intention to develop nuclear capabilities in excess of the limits allowed by treaty, the United States has been bound by law to end all military aid. Conflict has arisen in Washington policy circles between those concerned with American security ties with South Asia and those responsible for anti-proliferation policies. But the fact of the law itself will make it almost impossible for America to resume its close military relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan is unable to intervene decisively in the Afghan crisis, and, in turn, the United States lacks the leverage necessary to influence the region's actors. Both countries have, therefore, assumed a position of non-interference.

Not so Afghanistan's neighbour to the west. Rumours of Iranian support for the counter-revolution fly hard and fast in the wake of talks between representatives of the Afghan Islamic groups and members of the Ayatollah

Khomeini's entourage.[27] The avowed purpose of these talks was to secure transit for Afghan workers stranded in Iran to join the rebel forces in Pakistan. In fact, during March 1979 several thousand Afghans crossed from Iran into the province of Herat, sparking off an uprising there against the government. Air strikes against the quaint medieval town of Herat brought the revolt to an end with heavy casualties. In a reverse movement. as many as 8,000 refugees fled Herat for Iran.

According to recent travellers in the region, the frontier towns of Tayyabad, Torbat-e Heydari and Jam display a flurry of Afghan refugee activity. Although the local committees of the Islamic Revolution initially treated the Afghans as Soviet *agents provocateurs,* co-operation between the various Islamic groups has taken shape. There has been no direct Iranian intervention in the fighting, despite Soviet and Khalqi allegations to that effect, for the Iranian army in the province is a shadow of its former self. Rather, the Islamic committees are organising relief for the refugees, selling arms to the rebels, and raising money through the bazaars of Mashhad. Iranian newspapers are full of stories sympathetic to the rebellion, while leaflets and radio broadcasts attacking the Khalqis flood Iran and spill over into Afghanistan.

A delegation of Afghan clerics, both Shii and Sunni, has ventured to Qom to take up their cause with their Iranian counterparts. The most prominent of the Shiites, Sheikh Mohseni of Kandahar, has taken up residence in Qom and leads the local bazaar committee to raise money for the rebels. His hosts, the college of Ayatollahs which dominates Iranian politics, agree on few things, but they are united in condemnation of the present regime in Kabul. When Ayatollah Khomeini promised Taraki the fate of the Shah if he should continue to 'oppress Islam', the Afghans responded by calling Khomeini a 'maniac'—and subsequently, the Iranian press expressed its satisfaction when Taraki's death was reported. Meanwhile, in Kabul, a purge against the local Shiite minority has been reported. Kabul's Shiite Qizilbash families provided many officers to the *ancien régime*. Now these have joined the Khalqis' other enemies in prison, while wall graffitti read, 'death to Khomeini', and 'death to the Shiites'.

The role of the Iranians in the whole affair is most elusive, given the fluid state of that country's politics in the wake of the Shah's downfall. Historically, Iran has always sought a secure, if not dominant position in Afghanistan. The Shah's plans to replace the Soviet Union as Afghanistan's biggest trade-and-aid partner followed this precedent. There is no reason to think that the present Iranian regime will not try to turn the troubles in Afghanistan to advantage, holding out the prospect of future ties to an Iranian 'Islamic Republic', if only security and stability are forthcoming.

The view from Moscow

It is to be wondered whether Moscow shares the doctrinaire inflexibility of

27 See various articles in *Etelaat*, *Tehran Journal*, *Iran Times*, published between June and September 1979. For a leftist, pro Khalqi view of the Afghan conflict see *Mardom* (Tehran) in the same months.

its protégés in Kabul. After thirty years of active Soviet participation in the internal development of Afghanistan, one would think that the Russians would have foreseen many of the problems now facing the Khalqi regime. In question too is the extent of unconditional support which they will extend to an indigenous Communist party, such as the Khalq. It is not at all clear how the Russians view the options of the Khalqis now, or how far they will go in trying to extricate them from their difficulties. But the record of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan does not promise encouraging flexibility on Russia's part in a resolution of the conflict.

It is easy for a super-power to forget that its backing may be the kiss of death to a policy or a leader in a xenophobic country. It is easy for citizens of a super-power to stroll down the streets of a Third-World capital and be comforted by the sight of so many familiar pieces of material culture. The Russians in Kabul see the Volga car; the Americans in Tehran saw pizza parlours. To this extent, the Soviet Union is no more myopic about Afghanistan than super-powers are generally.

Yet Soviet myopia is more specific, and has more specific causes. To begin with, whatever the faults of American aid policies in Afghanistan, most Americans active there came away with a better grasp of the rural realities of the countryside than that enjoyed by high-level members of the Afghan government. The Russians, in contrast, had no large-scale rural programmes. The differing foci of the two countries' academic and cultural ties are also significant. While the Russians cultivated Pushto literature, trained the Pushtun military élite, but gave relatively little attention to the Pushtun nomads—or any of the country's many other ethnic and tribal groups—the United States sent many scholars to investigate tribal and ethnic cultures, often in conjunction with rural development programmes. It is perhaps not so surprising, therefore, that Americans are rather better informed about the lives of Afghanistan's 10 million herdsmen, farmers and tribesmen than are the neighbouring Russians: the latter *do*, however, know the detribalised, military and civil Pushtun élite of Afghanistan—though these people are only a small and unrepresentative sample of their countrymen.

But the Soviet Union's perceptual difficulties in Afghanistan run deeper than this, and go back to the historical genesis of Communism in Central Asia. The Bolsheviks carried out a lightning conquest of Central Asia in the 1920s, subjugating the local elite, and building an oasis of Soviet-style development in the midst of the steppe, all in an environment historically and culturally linked to Afghanistan. The very success of the Soviet Revolution in Central Asia creates a perceptual problem for their successors in dealing with present day Afghanistan.

In Central Asia the Bolsheviks found a country of latifundia, of extreme class division between the peasants and the often absentee landlords. The power of the central government was as extensive as it was despotic. By toppling a few autocratic khans, the Bolsheviks simply took over the state

administration and rechristened the system 'socialist'. Expropriation of water rights and grazing rights was more gradually executed, though not without much bloodshed and an exodus of refugees to Afghanistan.

A Soviet anthropologist warned the Bolsheviks about the different conditions to be found in the kingdom below the Oxus. In Monich's *Letter from Turkistan* (1927) we read,

> 'Landlords greater than these (owners of 100 acres) can be counted on one's fingers. As one leaves Turkistan, the domain of small landholders increases. Yet nowhere does the peasantry experience such horrors as where it is economically independent . . . feudal landlords moderate the bandit treatment of the peasants by the officials'.

The social role of the khans of Afghanistan today in most of the country remains as Monich describes it, while the rapaciousness of the local officials increases as each coup shortens the tenure and security of the petty bureaucrats. Where the central government interferes in rural life, the tribal khan is the best protection against tyranny. Where government is non-existent, the tribal khan assures against anarchy. Far from being the 'parasitic', 'feudal' class that the Bolsheviks encountered in Central Asia fifty years ago, the khans of Afghanistan are vital to the social survival of their people.

It is Moscow's insensitivity to this, its confidence in bureaucracy and centralisation as the solution to the problems of development and political integration that may blind it to the challenge it faces in Afghanistan.

This is not to say that the Russians have no room to manoeuvre. Tactically they have a free hand over the Khalqis, as demonstrated by their open consultation with members of the *ancien régime*, including the former King Zahir Shah (condemned to death in absentia by the Khalq government) and the Grand Vizier, Nur Ahman Etemadi (now reported to have been executed by the Khalq in Kabul).[28] Such moves have been widely interpreted as an attempt by the Soviet Union to expand the base of the regime. But no new faces have come forward to co-operate with the Russians, as a generation of leaders have chosen apolitical apathy rather than involvement with the Soviet Union.[29] At the same time, Russian feelers towards the former king and the royal Vizier underscore their narrow understanding of the problems facing them. The rebels in Peshawar greeted the news of the Soviet-Zaher Shah dialogue with incredulity. In exile for seven years, alienated and isolated from Afghan politics, the former King is almost as indifferent towards the future of Afghanistan as the rebels and the Khalqis are towards him. But the Russians, relying on their Pushtun élite contacts, cannot come up with any alternatives.

The Khalqis, for their part, have grown suspicious of Soviet commitment to their revolution. Some Khalqis have expressed concern that the Soviets will

28. *New York Times*, September 17, 1979
29. See analysis by P. R. Chari of the New Delhi Institute of Defense Studies Analysis in *Asiaweek*, Sept. 3, 1979

wait to see how the chips fall before doing anything more for the Khalqi regime. They claim, for example, that many of the millions of dollars of aid pledged by the Soviet Union to Kabul have yet to materialise: if the Khalq should falter, the story goes, the fault will rest with the Russians. But it may not be the external opposition to the Khalq government which is tying up Soviet aid so much as the internal struggles in the Khalq party, from which the Soviet Union must remain aloof. Though it may initially have favoured the Parcham party, with its closer ties to Moscow, the Soviet Union gracefully accepted the purge of the Parchamis and the emergence of the Amin-Taraki duo in the summer of 1978. It acquiesced in several ministerial changes which advanced the power of the strong-man Amin, and it made no overt move when the ousted Taraki was killed. The Russians lack a power base in Afghanistan outside the purged Parchamis and the rapidly contracting Khalq Party. Were they to shift support back to the Parchamis, there would be little mutual trust and credibility for any Soviet-Afghan leftist relationship. Therefore, without committing themselves firmly to supporting the Khalqi government, the Soviet Union can do little actively to replace it.

It is widely agreed that the Russians are unhappy with the Khalq, and yet the Soviet Union may be preparing to intervene massively with a military force. Indeed, it may be no contradiction to say that the Russians may find it necessary to secure a regime they do not completely support. Strategically their policies in Afghanistan have inflexible parameters. The civil war, in Afghanistan causes special concern to them because it is precisely here, in Afghanistan, that the Muslim nationalities of the Soviet Union look onto the Muslim world. The Russians have long pursued a policy of stabilisation on their southern frontiers, interrupted by Stalin's postwar attempts to extend the frontiers seaward. As discussed by Enders Wimbush and Alexandre Bennigsen in their recent work, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union*[30] the Soviets have been reluctant to stir up ethnic and religious conflicts in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, for fear of domestic repercussions. Particularly with regard to the tea-kettle of Kabul the Russians have always been alive to the threat that the kingdom should prove ungovernable. Now, with more confusion and instability in the 'Northern Tier' of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan than in any year since 1946—the heyday of Communist activity in the region—the Russians are faced with the prospect of a broadly anti-Soviet, Pan-Islamic movement threatening Central Asia. Hence their need for a stabilisation of the situation.

André Fontaine, writing in *Le Monde*, pictures the Russians 'devant un choix delicat, soit intervenir massivement dans la guerre civile . . . soit abandoner à son sort le régime très impopulaire . . .'. For a super-power, the choice is always delicate, for there can be no simple answer to any policy dilemma. As the fighting winds down during the winter months, the Russians

30. Chicago, London: Chicago University Press, 1979.

will probably try a little of everything—support for Amin, support for an alternative, massive intervention, selective compromise. In the end they may succeed in preserving their position in Afghanistan through determined intervention and forced communalisation of the countryside. Or they may keep the Khalqi regime just barely afloat, an island of Marxist ideologues in a sea of hostile peasants. The tragedy of the small country, confronted with the superpower, is that this 'delicate choice' must be made in Moscow, not in Kabul.

THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEES: CAUSE AND EFFECTS *

Milton Osborne **

WAR, and the threat of war, mark the contemporary history of the Indochinese region; and one of the most striking and poignant reflections of the human costs of this continuing political instability has been the massive outflow of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea (the former Cambodia). Since early 1975 at least one million people have fled from these three countries, with by far the largest number leaving Vietnam.[1]

Accurate statistics for the tide of refugees an difficult to establish. No agreed figure exists, for instance, for those 'boat people' refugees who have perished at sea before making landfall, and there have been suggestions that deaths at sea could have claimed the lives of as many as 50 per cent of the numbers who reached land. While this estimate is almost certainly too high, there is no doubt that the number of deaths through drownings and attacks by pirates has been large and, at very least, involves a figure of 28,000 persons—or 10 per cent of the refugees who have arrived in the various countries of South-east Asia and in Hong Kong by boat.[2] The problem of establishing accurate statistics is further complicated by the presence in Thailand of refugees from both Kampuchea and Laos whose numbers are not officially recorded. Perhaps as many as 40,000 hill people from Laos fall into this category—they are living with only minimal contact with the Thai authorities in remote northern regions of the kingdom. The number of Kampuchean refugees in Thailand living outside camps established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has fluctuated almost daily as a function of the developing conflict just to the east of the Thai-Kampuchean border. As of early November 1979 there

* This article reflects insights and understandings gained in the course of the Conference on Indochina Refugees held at the Australian National University, Canberra, July 30–31, 1979.

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1. For material relating both to statistics and refugee matters generally I am most grateful for discussions held with Dr Guy Goodwin-Gill of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee Office in Sydney; Mr Michael Richardson, South-east Asian correspondent of *The Age* (Melbourne); and Dr Carlyle Thayer of the Department of Government, Royal Military College, Duntroon, Canberra. In expressing my thanks for their assistance I emphasise my own responsibility for the material in the present article.

2. See the article by Michael Richardson in *The Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Oct. 26, 1979.

were at least 200,000 such Kampucheans seeking sanctuary inside Thailand's eastern border.

Yet despite the difficulty of providing absolutely accurate statistics the broad picture is clear enough, and it is one that underlines the great human suffering that has accompanied developments in the Indochinese region since Communist governments came to power in Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam. As has already been observed over a million persons have left these three countries as refugees since April 1975. Based on figures available at the end of August 1979, some 675,000 refugees had left Vietnam; more than 250,000 refugees had crossed into Thailand from Laos; and perhaps 150,000 had fled from Kampuchea into Thailand—even before the further major movement of Kampuchean refugees later in the year. In addition there were some 321,000 persons who left Kampuchea for Vietnam as refugees while the Pol Pot regime was still in power. (Well over a third—125,000—of this last group were ethnic Kampucheans and there have been reports that most have now returned to their own country). With the possibility of a further major outflow of refugees from both Vietnam and Kampuchea, two broad questions demand attention: why has the refugee exodus occurred, and what has been its effect on the countries of first asylum to which the refugees have gone?

The causes of the exodus—Vietnam

Although the desire to escape from unacceptable conditions within the countries in which they had previously lived is common to all the Indochinese refugees, it is vitally important to recognise the differences that lie behind this superficial similarity of motive. Not only have there been significant differences in the refugees' experience from country to country, but the motives leading to their becoming refugees have also varied according to ethnic and class background and—in the case of Vietnam—according to the geographical region of the country in which they formerly lived. It is necessary, therefore, to proceed on a country-by-country basis and to take account of the different motives and circumstances that have affected the flow of refugees at any particular time.

Population movement arising from political change is not a new phenomenon in Vietnam. Following the Geneva Accords of 1954 some 900,000 refugees, at least 60 per cent of them Roman Catholics, moved from areas of northern Vietnam to the south of the country below the seventeenth parallel, where they formed an important part of President Ngo Dinh Diem's power base.[3] As an end to the Second Indochina War drew near in the early months of 1975, it became apparent that a significant number of Vietnamese who had associated themselves with the Saigon government and with its

3 A detailed discussion of the movement of refugees from northern Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Accords appears in J Buttinger, *Vietnam. A Dragon Embattled*, Vol 2 (New York Praeger, 1967), pp. 1116 17, nn 118 and 118.

American sponsor wished to leave the country before a Communist regime gained control of Vietnam. Initial American estimates had suggested that only those who had held senior position under the Saigon government or who had been very closely associated with the United States civil and military efforts in Vietnam would wish to leave the country.[4] This judgment proved to be erroneous, and during the month before Saigon surrendered to the Communist forces some 135,000 refugees fled southern Vietnam. The bulk of these refugees were ethnic Vietnamese, and the numbers involved showed that there was widespread fear that any association with the collapsing Saigon regime or with the American effort in southern Vietnam held the risk of subsequent discrimination or punishment.

However, between May 1975 and May 1978 only a *relatively* small number of refugees fled the country. Between those two dates the total number of refugees leaving Vietnam and arriving in countries of first asylum was approximately 30,000. To speak of this number as small is in no sense to diminish the personal costs to the individuals who abandoned their homes for an uncertain future. Moreover, the figure of 30,000 must be recognised as being that of the refugees who survived. Yet even if one postulates the loss at sea of a further 20 per cent of those who left Vietnam, the total number of departing refugees is still notably small when compared with the later flood of persons leaving the country. Given the long duration of the First and Second Indochina Wars, the marked social and economic differences between northern and southern Vietnam, and the natural disasters that plagued Vietnam almost from the moment of the Communist victory, a retrospective judgment might well be that it is surprising the number of refugees who left before May 1978 was not larger. What, then, led to the sudden increase of departures after that date?

This question is much easier to answer in relation to southern Vietnam than for the northern section of the country. The second Indochina War did much to emphasise the different character of southern Vietnam by comparison with the northern section of the country which came under Communist control in 1954. Saigon (now renamed Ho Chi Minh City) with its twin city of Cholon had been Vietnam's commercial capital throughout the French colonial period. From the time that Vietnam achieved divided independence following the 1954 Geneva Accords, Saigon's commercial character was given increasing emphasis, but in a very particular fashion. While remaining the vital hub of the southern rice trade, Saigon's commercial growth was in the services sector of the economy. In a fashion unmatched in the rest of South-east Asia Saigon was a remarkably unproductive city. As the years of war dragged on and Saigon's size rapidly increased, a growing urban population depended on massive American financial backing to survive. Once this financial backing

4. The issue is discussed in G. P. Kelly, *From Vietnam to America A Chronicle of the Vietnamese Immigration into the United States* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1977), p. 54. See also, F. Snepp, *Decent Interval* (New York: Random House, 1977), Part 3, 'Collapse'.

was removed, the artificial nature of Saigon's wartime prosperity was revealed and the commercial community that had benefited so greatly from the war found itself suddenly deprived of its normal livelihood. This sudden change was felt most sharply by the large ethnic Chinese community whose members had dominated commerce of all kinds throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods.

Nevertheless, for three years the changed circumstances in southern Vietnam were not reflected in refugee departures on a dramatic scale. By early 1978, however, developments both inside and outside Vietnam led to a sudden acceleration in the refugee outflow. The links between these new developments and the change in the rate of refugee departures may be charted without difficulty. In terms of Vietnam's external relations it had become clear by the beginning of 1978 that there could be no quick or easy settlement of its differences with Kampuchea. At the same time, relations with China were worsening to the extent that the leadership in Hanoi could not ignore the possibility that tension along the Chinese-Vietnamese border might lead to substantial armed clashes. The threats posed by these external developments were magnified as the result of the domestic difficulties Vietnam was experiencing.

Vietnam emerged from the Second Indochina War politically united but facing formidable problems of postwar reconstruction. Damage to the infrastructure was widespread and much of southern Vietnam's agricultural land had been devastated by the defoliation programmes of the war years. Expansion of the agricultural sector was announced as a high-priority goal, but efforts to increase the rice harvest in both the northern and the southern regions of the country encountered major difficulties. These difficulties were in part beyond the control of Vietnam's officials. The natural disasters of drought and flood fall into this category. Other problems related directly to shortcomings in management, and it is abundantly clear that the long years of conflict have not provided an opportunity for the training of administrators able to deal with the problems of peace as opposed to those of war.[5] Efforts to increase agricultural production through the development of 'new economic zones' encountered problems as former city dwellers were expected to undertake pioneer agricultural labour, often in very primitive conditions with only minimal assistance from the state. The fact that some of these new economic zones lay in areas close to Vietnam's borders with Kampuchea further complicated matters as the Pol Pot regime stepped up its strategy of cross-border raids.

In addition to the problems faced by Vietnam in its attempts to expand its agricultural production there were other difficulties associated with absorbing substantial numbers in the southern population who were, at the very least, reluctant to give up their earlier political identification and style of life. The

5 A useful compendium of material relating to Vietnam's postwar development in which the problems of management are made clear in, Lê Thành Khôi, *Socialisme et development au Viêt Nam* (Paris, 1978)

extremely diverse politico-cultural character of southern Vietnam posed special problems for the newly victorious Communist administration. No problem was greater, however, than that of dealing with the urban population concentrated in Ho Chi Minh City (including Cholon). Of the population of over three million living in Ho Chi Minh City in 1975 over a million were ethnic Chinese living in the Cholon section of the city. Although many of these ethnic Chinese had become Vietnamese citizens to avoid legalised discrimination against their commercial activities, their community appears to have remained a classic example of a state within a state. The Chinese concentrated in Cholon, and in addition those in the towns of the Mekong Delta, lived in Vietnam but they were not really part of the Vietnamese community.[6]

This separation did not, of course, extend to commercial dealings, and although firm evidence is difficult to obtain, there seems no reason to question the widely-held assumption that during the Second Indochina War the ethnic Chinese community in southern Vietnam did business with both sides, each of which was in some considerable degree dependent on that community's control of the rice trade. A telling reflection of the separate nature of the ethnic Chinese community in the south comes from the reports of its members greeting the victory of the northern Vietnamese Communist troops by decking their shops and houses in Cholon with the flag of the Chinese People's Republic as well as the flags of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government.[7]

In its efforts to absorb southern Vietnam, and most importantly the former Saigon, into a state pursuing socialist goals the government in Hanoi acted with some caution. During 1975–77 the Hanoi leadership appeared ready to take account of the very different character of the south and to pursue a relatively limited programme of socialisation. Both as a matter of policy, and as the result of a significant level of corruption among cadres working in the south, so-called 'bourgeois trade' was allowed to continue until early 1978. In March of 1978, however, there was a sudden change of policy. The authorities announced the abolition of bourgeois trade. They closed down the businesses connected with this trade and seized the assets of those engaged in it. When this measure was followed in May 1978 by the introduction of a new national currency in a fashion that rendered hoarding of the preceding currency almost worthless, the fact that there was no longer a future in southern Vietnam for members of the ethnic Chinese community wishing to pursue their former livelihood—even in a modified form—was finally and firmly made clear. It was from this period that the major outflow of refugees from southern Vietnam began. The strong link between refugee status and Chinese ethnicity is shown in the fact that approximately 60 per cent of the boat people who have left

6. Remarkably little scholarly study has been given to the ethnic Chinese community in southern Vietnam. A now dated work is, Tsai Maw Kuey, *Les Chinois du Sud Vietnam* (Paris, 1968).

7. See, T. Terzani, *Giai Phong: The Fall and Liberation of Saigon* (London: St Martin's, 1976), p. 226.

southern Vietnam for countries of asylum in South-east Asia are of ethnic Chinese descent.[8]

This figure brings out very clearly the close link between ethnic backgroun and the decision to become a refugee. But a large minority of ethni Vietnamese have also chosen to flee. (The fact that a substantial proportion o ethnic Vietnamese have left southern Vietnam contrasts, as will be shown with developments in northern Vietnam.) Detailed information on th occupational or class background of the ethnic Vietnamese who have lef southern Vietnam since May 1975 has not been correlated in any ver satisfactory fashion. An impressionistic survey suggests that a wide range o occupational backgrounds is to be found among the ethnic Vietnames refugees who share the common characteristic of not wishing to remain unde Communist rule. There should be no surprise at the fact that members of th former Saigon regime's bureaucracy and armed forces should seek to leave Equally unsurprising is the fact that many members of the professions, an those associated with institutions of higher learning, have found life under th new regime unacceptable. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that onl members of what might be described as the southern Vietnamese middl classes have opted for flight. This is not the case and the men and women wh have left include a significant number of artisans, and even some farmers an fishermen.

During 1978 and in the first half of 1979 the numbers fleeing from southern Vietnam grew so rapidly that by July 1979 a total of some 204,000 had landed in South-east Asian countries of first asylum. Since the number o boat people who had reached South-east Asia before June 1979 wa approximately 30,000 persons, the average monthly rate of arrivals of boa people between June 1978 and July 1979 was nearly 12,500 over th fourteen month period. The boat people who reached South-east Asia wer spread very unevenly throughout the region. By far the largest number cam ashore in Malaysia, where more than 120,000 refugees found first asylum almost all in areas along the less-developed east-coast region of the Peninsula Approximate figures for the total arrivals by boat people in the other countrie of South-east Asia up to July 1979 were as follows: Indonesia 40,000 Philippines 11,000; Singapore 2,100; and Thailand 30,000.

Without, in any sense, discounting the very real human costs involved, th exodus of refugees from southern Vietnam provides a relatively straightforwar example of a major shift of population as the result of a basic change in th system of government following a long and bitter war. The fact that from Ma 1978 onwards there was a significant degree of government involvement i

8 Efforts at calculation are made extremely difficult because of a lack of agreed statistics and the changin ethnic composition of refugees from Vietnam over various periods. The percentages recorded in this artic result from calculations that make the following assumptions: the total refugee exodus from Vietnam up August 1979, including those who left before Saigon fell in 1975, is of the order of 675,000; more than 95 pe cent of those refugees who crossed the border from northern Vietnam into China were ethnic Chinese; at lea 80 per cent of the 'boat people' who have arrived in Hong Kong are ethnic Chinese; of the 'boat people' wh have arrived in South east Asia some 60 per cent are ethnic Chinese.

the processing of the outflow does not detract from this judgment. A more significant qualification lies in the fact that the ethnic Chinese commercial community's loyalty came into question because of external developments as well as in terms of their unwillingness to toe the Vietnamese government's economic line. With growing tension between Vietnam and China, finally developing into outright war, the ethnic Chinese in southern Vietnam came to be regarded as a political as well as an economic danger to the state. Yet, when all factors are taken into consideration, the refugee flow from southern Vietnam was not in itself a surprising development, however much of it was largely unpredicted. What did give the refugee exodus a particular, if not unique, character was the fact that virtually without exception the refugees were unwelcome when, having left southern Vietnam, they reached the countries of Southeast Asia. In brief, the Southeast Asian countries of first asylum were unready to accept the refugees as settlers.

If the large scale departure of refugees from southern Vietnam might have been expected, even if it was not widely predicted, a different situation might have appeared to exist in northern Vietnam. Following the partial victory of the Vietnamese Communists in 1954 there had been little if any indication that the ethnic Chinese community had failed to become assimilated within northern Vietnamese society. The events that have taken place since 1977 bring a whole range of assumptions concerning the place of the ethnic Chinese in the north into question. And there is by no means universal agreement as to what role the government in Hanoi has played in causing the exodus of all but a small number of those who were its Chinese citizens. Although there is no doubt that following the Chinese punitive invasion of February-March 1979 the Vietnamese authorities actively encouraged the departure of ethnic Chinese, the situation is less clear for the earlier period—particularly up to mid-1978.[9]

Whatever Hanoi's policy before the February 1979 invasion, the position of the ethnic Chinese in northern Vietnam from that date onwards was an unenviable one. The invasion forced them to choose between making a fundamental personal identification with Vietnam or with China. The fact that the choice appears to have been conceived in these terms suggests that past records of party membership, participation in the Vietnamese People's Army, and in some cases many generations of living in Vietnam had not removed their basic sense of being, above all else, Chinese. The size of the exodus from northern Vietnam underlines the way in which persons of Chinese descent could no longer see a place for themselves in a country at war with China. In 1975 the estimated ethnic Chinese population of northern Vietnam numbered approximately 300,000. According to Chinese accounts of developments no

9. The issue of government involvement in the departure of ethnic Chinese from northern Vietnam is analysed in some depth in the forthcoming book, *The Boat People*, an *Age* investigation with Bruce Grant, Melbourne—Chapter 4 of which draws on interviews carried out by Michael Richardson with refugees in Hong Kong.

fewer than 250,000 refugees crossed into China during 1978 and 1979. Some of those who sought sanctuary in China were members of the upland minority groups such as the Nung, Yao, Meo and Lolo. These minority groups probably did not, however, make up more than 5 per cent of those who left Vietnam for China, so that of the 250,000 refugees already noted almost 240,000 were ethnic Chinese. An uncertain proportion of these ethnic Chinese who crossed into China from northern Vietnam were originally from southern Vietnam, and possibly some were originally resident in Kampuchea. Even allowing for these facts and after taking into account the more than 38,000 ethnic Chinese from northern Vietnam who arrived in Hong Kong as boat people, it becomes clear that at most 30,000 ethnic Chinese remain in northern Vietnam in late 1979. The fact of this massive exodus of ethnic Chinese from the north indicates there is a need to re-examine many of the judgments that have previously been made concerning the place of the Chinese community in northern Vietnam.[10]

The causes of the exodus—Kampuchea

Because of the uncontrolled circumstances of their arrival and their high 'visibility' the boat people have captured much of the international attention given to refugees. Only in the latter half of 1979, when the horror of developments in Kampuchea became widely recognised, was the plight of refugees from that country given anything like equal attention. One index of the brutal character of the Pol Pot regime which controlled Kampuchea from April 1975 until January 1979 was the fact that while it was in power some 125,000 ethnic Kampucheans fled from their country into neighbouring Vietnam. Such a flight from Kampuchea into Vietnam is without historical precedent. Movement in the other direction, into Thailand, was a common feature in Kampuchea's past.[11] But for ethnic Kampucheans to seek refuge in culturally alien Vietnam stresses the enormity of Pol Pot's domestic policies and the extent of the dislocation of society in Kampuchean border regions as the result of Phnom Penh's armed confrontation with Vietnam. The ethnic Kampucheans who moved as refugees into Vietnam were part of a total of some 321,000 persons who left Kampuchea. The balance of this exodus was made up of more than 170,000 ethnic Vietnamese and some 24,000 ethnic Chinese.

While Pol Pot was still in power his armed forces prevented any large-scale exodus of persons into Thailand. Some were successful in evading border patrols but it was not until after Pol Pot's deposition in January 1979, following the Vietnamese-led invasion of Kampuchea, that refugees started reaching Thailand in really large numbers. By May 1979 there were more

10 See, for example, G. McT. Kahin, 'Minorities in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam', *Asian Survey*, July 1972, pp. 580-86.

11 See my *The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and Response (1859-1905)* (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 215 for discussion of such movement in the 1880s.

than 40,000 Kampuchean refugees in Thailand. At least as many Kampucheans who had sought to find sanctuary in Thailand were sent back across the border into Kampuchea by the Thai authorities during April and May as fighting between Vietnamese troops and the remnants of the Pol Pot army increased at the close of the 1978–79 dry season.

The beginning of the 1979-80 dry season signalled a new exodus from Kampuchea. With their armour, artillery, and transport able once again to move off the limited all-weather road system, the Vietnamese by early November had already begun their campaign to crush the remaining Pol Pot forces operating in western Kampuchea. At the same time the Vietnamese were directing attacks against the much less formidable *Khmer Serei* (Free Khmer or Kampuchean) forces whose troops were located along the Thai-Kampuchean border to the north of the main road leading through the town of Poipet out of Kampuchea into Thailand. Faced with an inflow of more than 200,000 sick and starving Kampucheans as the result of these military operations, the Thai Government reversed its earlier policy of repatriation and announced that it would provide temporary shelter for these refugees on humanitarian grounds.

The causes of the exodus—Laos

Developments in Laos have lacked the tragic savagery of Kampuchea but they have, nevertheless, been such as to generate large numbers of refugees. The final accession to power of a Communist government in Laos during 1975 was unwelcome to various groups within the Laotian population. There was, predictably, an early flight out of Laos by those politicians and military officers who had been closely associated with the right-wing in the past. They were followed by persons who had occupied a less elevated position within pre-Communist Laotian society but who still found the policies that followed the change of political direction sufficiently unattractive to spur them to leave. For the ethnic Laotians, whose major settlements have always been in lowland areas, there was the attraction that only the Mekong River separated them from a country—Thailand—with which they had close ethnic links.

However, members of the lowland ethnic Lao element in the Laotian population only accounted for part of the refugee exodus from Laos. Of considerable importance, also, were refugees from Laos who belong to one or other of the upland ethnic groups. Among these groups the Hmong (also widely known as Meo) people are the most prominent. As with so many other statistics relating to refugee numbers there is real uncertainty as to just how many Hmong have left Laos since mid-1975. In general, however, a rough break-down of refugee statistics suggests that of the approximately 250,000 persons who have left Laos since mid-1975 half are ethnic Laotians while half are members of a range of upland minority groups, with by far the largest number of these—probably more than seventy percent—being Hmong people.

The reason for this large number of Hmong people among the refugees from

Laos is easily found. During the Second Indochina War the Hmong people were recruited by the United States to fight against the Communist-led Pathet Lao forces. As members of the so-called 'secret army' the Hmong became closely identified with the anti-Communist front in Laotian politics. With the end of the war they were unprepared to abandon this position, and they continued to fight against the Laotian Communist forces and the Vietnamese troops present in Laos to support their Laotian allies. Some elements of the former Hmong secret army were still fighting in Laos in late 1979, but many more had decided they had no alternative but to flee into Thailand in the face of a stronger and better equipped enemy.

The refugee exodus and the Sino-Soviet dispute

Although much of the refugee movement from the countries of Indochina has been caused in the main by local factors, the Sino-Soviet dispute has also been important in exacerbating developments in the region. The worsening of relations between Vietnam and China that culminated in the Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam in February 1979 has pushed Vietnam into a close alliance with the Soviet Union. This alliance, which gives deep offence to China, has ensured that the conflict in Kampuchea is fought out in the most bitter fashion. The circumstances of international power politics led to the Soviet Union's interests being identified with the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime, while China has continued to give rather embarrassed support to Pol Pot at the same time as it searches for a way to develop a more broadly based Kampuchean anti-Vietnamese resistance. In Laos, too, the close identification between the government in Vientiane and the Vietnamese has led to the adoption of an anti-Chinese position that can only be uncomfortable for the Laotian leadership. Possessing an extended land border with China and with Chinese-built roads running into the northwest of its territory from Yunnan province, Laos is a highly vulnerable target should the Chinese decide to 'punish' the Vietnamese again, but to do so by less direct means.

The involvement of the Indochinese region in the Sino-Soviet dispute has had a direct affect on the evolution of the refugee problem. Large numbers of refugees would almost certainly have left the countries of Indochina following the 1975 Communist victories whether or not there was rivalry between the two great Communist powers. The fact that this rivalry existed and that the largest of the Indochinese states has sided with the Soviet Union has added a further element to the situation that seems likely to complicate developments and influence them for the worse for a considerable time to come.

The response of the outside world

The July 1979 Geneva Conference on Indochina Refugees was a recognition of the international dimension of the exodus of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. Most immediately, the holding of the conference reflected the growing problem posed by the arrival of very large

numbers of refugees in the countries of South-east Asia. The fact that the conference was held and that it brought about a significant increase in the number of refugee settlement places throughout the world was closely related to the demands that were being made by the members of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) for international action. Among the members of ASEAN Malaysia and Thailand had accommodated the largest number of refugees, and the governments of these two countries had jolted world opinion by their declarations in mid-1979 that no new boat people would be allowed to land on their shores. A similar declaration was made by the Indonesian authorities and concurrently the Thai government pursued a policy of repatriating Kampuchean refugees who had crossed into Thailand to escape the fighting in western Kampuchea.[12]

Yet despite joint ASEAN statements on refugees, such as that issued following the meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Bali in late June 1979, the problems posed by the refugees varied considerably from country to country, as did the policies each country pursued. Moreover, the ASEAN states were not the only countries to receive large numbers of refugees from Indochina. As has already been noted, China has accommodated some 250,000 refugees and no fewer than 68,000 refugees have landed in hard-pressed Hong Kong—which has by far the largest proportion of refugees to permanent population of any receiving territory. Because of these differences there is, once again, a need to proceed on a country-by-country basis in an effort to provide a clear picture of developments and the policies each government has chosen to follow.

Thailand

Until mid-1979, when a sudden and very large influx of refugees from Kampuchea captured the interest of the world press, Thailand's role as the non-Communist South-east Asian country with the largest number of refugees was given little recognition. This fact was a clear result of the character of the refugee flow into Thailand. In contrast to the dramatic landfalls made by boat people in their usually frail and overcrowded craft, the refugees who had entered Thailand came either from Laos or from Kampuchea. Moreover, with approximately 80 per cent of the refugees in Thailand coming from Laos, roughly half of these refugees were—as ethnic Lao—culturally little different from the Thai inhabitants of northeastern Thailand. It would be an overstatement to suggest that the Thai authorities welcomed these ethnic Lao refugees, but their presence has not posed the same problems as those raised by the hill people refugees from Laos and the ethnic Kampucheans from Kampuchea.

It is the refugees from Kampuchea who have presented Thailand's leaders with their sharpest dilemma. The passage of these refugees into Thailand has

12. For a useful survey of statements concerning policy towards refugees see, K. Das, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 22, 1979.

been directly linked with the conflict in Kampuchea, and so with the wider Sino-Soviet dispute. Thai policy towards refugees from Kampuchea has tried to find a middle path between giving offence to China, as the patron of the remaining Pol Pot forces, and avoiding antagonising Vietnam, as the backer of Heng Samrin's regime in Phnom Penh and as the dominant military power in Kampuchea. It has also had to take account of some domestic reaction against refugees by its own population.

Despite the earlier forced repatriation of Kampuchean refugees in June 1979 and the stern statements at that time from the Thai Prime Minister, General Kriangsak Chomanan, a reversal of policy was announced in late October. Reacting to growing world concern about the fate of the Kampuchean people as war, famine and disease devastated their country, the Thai authorities stated that temporary asylum would be provided for refugees coming from Kampuchea. It is not clear how long this policy will last, nor is there any real certainty about the likely outcome of developments within Kampuchea which might affect this policy. Most observers believe that the Vietnamese will be able to crush the bulk of the remaining Pol Pot forces as well as those of other anti-Vietnamese factions aligned against them. As of early November 1979, however, the possibility remains that some anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean forces will survive the dry campaigning season as an irritant if not a threat to the Vietnamese-backed regime in Phnom Penh. If this should prove to be the case, Thailand will continue to find itself having to formulate a policy that takes account of both Chinese and Vietnamese susceptibilities. And the possibility of yet more refugees flooding out of Kampuchea will remain.

Malaysia

The number of refugees who have reached Malaysia is, at some 120,000, considerably fewer than the number of 'land people' who have fled to Thailand. The circumstances of their arrival by sea, the fact that Malaysia's total population is very much smaller than Thailand's, and the ethnic character of the refugees—more than 60 per cent of them being ethnic Chinese—has made them highly visible and raised a strong political reaction against their presence. While Malaysian policy towards refugees has altered from period to period, a constant feature of that policy has been that no Indochinese refugees who land in Malaysia can expect to become settlers.

As a result of geography, Malaysia has been the country that has received the largest number of refugees who set out by boat from southern Vietnam. The shortest distance from Camau Point in southern Vietnam to West Malaysia (Peninsular Malaysia) is only a little more than two hundred miles. The greatest distance is less than five hundred miles. This fact of geographical propinquity brought first a trickle and then a flood of refugees to Malaysia, despite periods of adverse weather and the operations of pirates in the Gulf of Thailand. But the same geographical circumstances that make Malaysia so accessible to refugees also led those refugees to a section of the country least

ready to deal with a sudden alien presence. The east coast of Malaysia is relatively underdeveloped and, in contrast with the population pattern on the west coast, it is a region with a much smaller ethnic Chinese minority and a dominant, and devoutly Islamic, Malay majority population.[13]

While it was made clear from the start that the boat people refugees from Vietnam would not be accepted as settlers, initial Malaysian reaction to their presence was relatively muted. As the number of arrivals began to accelerate rapidly through 1978, however, there were increasing signs of tension followed by a decision by the Malaysian government to isolate the refugees in islands off the coast. Then, in June 1979, the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir bin Mohamed, announced that refugees in Malaysia would be expelled and those seeking to enter in the future would be shot if they ignored warnings to go away. Although the Malaysian Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein bin Onn, subsequently denied that refugees would be shot he made clear that Malaysia would turn away boats attempting to land refugees.

The tough stance adopted by Malaysia was, with the similar policy announced by Thailand, a significant factor in urging the international community towards action and so to the convening of the Geneva Conference in July 1979. The sharp drop in refugee departures from Vietnam following that conference has not meant that arrivals in Malaysia have been eliminated altogether. Small numbers have continued to arrive. Some have been accommodated in island camps and some have, indeed, been sent back to sea.[14] The length of Malaysia's coastline and the problems of mustering adequate surveillance resources means that should refugees start leaving Vietnam once again in substantial numbers it will be extremely difficult for the Malaysian authorities to apprehend and turn away all those who try to land. It is most unlikely, however, that Malaysia will reverse its existing policy and it must be expected that any such future arrivals will ultimately be expelled unless there is rapid resettlement of the refugees already in Malaysia.

Singapore

Singapore's geographical compactness has caused the island republic's authorities to follow a strict policy of neither accepting refugees for settlement nor providing them with temporary asylum. Unless refugees have a guarantee of an assured onward passage for resettlement elsewhere the Singaporean authorities have not been prepared to let them come ashore. Instead, they have turned boats away after renewing supplies of water and fuel. This policy has meant that while more than two thousand refugees have been allowed to land and spend short periods of time in Singapore there have usually been no more than six hundred refugees in holding camps on the island.

13. Malaysia has accepted a small number of Islamic Kampuchean settlers who have been located in Kelantan state. Note should be taken of the fact that approximately 100,000 refugees from the southern Philippines are currently in East Malaysia, in the state of Sabah. These refugees are followers of Islam.

14. See Michael Richardson in *The Age*, Oct. 26, 1979.

Indonesia

For some time it appeared that Indonesia would be largely spared the problems associated with refugee arrivals. More distant from the source of the refugee exodus, until April 1979 Indonesia had provided temporary refuge to 3,200 boat people at most. But as the attitude of Malaysia and Thailand towards the refugees hardened, more and more have looked for sanctuary in Indonesia. By July 1979 there were some 40,000 refugees in Indonesia and the country's Minister of Defence, General Mohammed Jusuf, had made a statement echoing the pronouncements of his ASEAN colleagues to the effect that no more refugees would be allowed to land.[15] Rigorous implementation of this policy was avoided as the result of Vietnam's agreement in Geneva in July to a moratorium on further departures.

The Indonesian view of the refugees has been coloured, in a fashion very similar to reactions in Malaysia, by the fact of so many of the boat people being ethnic Chinese. Still deeply suspicious of China and concerned that uninvited ethnic Chinese arrivals might include some persons who could undermine state security, the Indonesians have followed the Malaysian model of isolating refugees from the general population. To this end camps have been established in the remote Anambas Islands, a sparsely settled group lying some six hundred miles north of Jakarta in the South China Sea.

The Philippines

Among the members of ASEAN, and with the exception of Singapore, the Philippines has had the smallest influx of refugees from the states of Indochina. Even so, there were some 6,000 refugees in the Philippines at the beginning of November 1979. A significant proportion of these—perhaps as many as one third of the total—reached the Philippines after the July Geneva Conference, as those determined to leave Vietnam managed to evade controls and to take advantage of the favourable winds to make the passage across the South China Sea.

As in Malaysia and Indonesia, it has been the policy of the Philippines authorities to hold refugee arrivals in areas separate from the local population. So far, however, the relatively small numbers of refugees reaching the Philippines has enabled the government to avoid the more radical policies of its ASEAN neighbours: although the Philippines is unprepared to accept refugees as settlers it is not publicly committed to turning boat people away from its shores.

China

Until the major movement of population out of Kampuchea into Thailand in the closing months of 1979, China had received the largest number of refugees from Indochina. (During 1978 this distinction was held by Vietnam as the result of the refugee exodus from Kampuchea, but it is believed that the

15 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 22, 1979

bulk of the ethnic Kampucheans who were refugees at that time have now returned to their own country.) Chinese policy has been to accept all those who have left Vietnam as refugees while denouncing the government in Hanoi for forcing them from their homes.[16] As might be expected, almost all of the refugees have been settled in China's southern border provinces. The largest concentration of refugees has been in Kwangsi province, but there are additional, substantial refugee settlements in Kwangtung, Fukien, and Yunnan.

The cost of settling these refugees has been considerable and there have been reports of some local resentment against them because of the call their presence makes on limited resources. The demands posed by the arrival of the refugees is reflected in a Chinese decision to request assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In addition to itself accepting refugees, China has also provided considerable assistance to those refugees travelling by boat who have made Hong Kong their target for first asylum accommodation.[17]

Hong Kong

In terms of humanitarian action the Government of Hong Kong holds a high place among the locations of first asylum to which refugees have gone. Despite its already very overcrowded urban circumstances, with a highly disadvantageous ratio of population to available land, Hong Kong has not turned away a single refugee from Indochina. The costs of such generosity have been high and are reflected in the fact that in November 1979 there were more than 60,000 refugees in Hong Kong still awaiting settlement. Accommodation is Hong Kong's major problem in relation, but the situation has been considerably eased because of the colony's chronic labour shortage which enables a large number of refugees to work while waiting for resettlement. Against this must be set the relatively small number of resettlement places allotted to refugees from Hong Kong compared with other first asylum locations.[18]

Prospects for the future

At the Geneva Conference on Refugees in July 1979 the representatives of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam gave an undertaking to limit refugee outflow 'for a reasonable period of time'. Since July Vietnam appears broadly to have kept that undertaking. In contrast to Kampuchea, no major wave of refugee departures from Vietnam has occurred—certainly nothing to match the

16. For useful statements of the Chinese position see, *Beijing Review*, March 23, 1979, pp. 21-23, and May 4, 1979, pp. 10-17. The Vietnamese position is summarised in 'The Truth about Viet Nam-China Relations over the last 30 years' a statement circulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi, 1979 (mineographed).

17. See Barry Came, *Newsweek*, Sept. 17, 1979.

18. Statement by Sir Jack Cater, Chief Secretary, Government of Hong Kong, at the Australian National University Conference on Indochina Refugees, Canberra, July 30, 1979.

months of late 1978 and early 1979 when tens of thousands of refugees were leaving each month. Initially the Vietnamese undertaking given at Geneva was hailed as a triumph for international opinion, but as the implications of the undertaking have been reviewed the ambiguities of a policy that calls on a Communist state to prevent the departure of those wishing to do so has become apparent. Not least there is a striking contrast between this demand upon Vietnam and the differing demands put to the Soviet Union and other East European states to allow the departure of their dissident minorities.

Vietnam has been widely criticised for adopting domestic policies that are resented by a substantial number of its population. When rhetoric is put aside, however, it is hard to explain why the victorious Vietnamese Communists should not have been expected to try to introduce socialist economic measures throughout the country once unification had been achieved. If it is contended that the Vietnamese government should have been more moderate in its policies Vietnam's manifold problems following the end of the war, and the marked reluctance of nations of the Western world to provide aid after the Communist victory must also be recognised. While the issue may be less clear in relation to the ethnic Chinese population of northern Vietnam, there seems no reason to doubt that many of the ethnic Chinese of southern Vietnam were quite unready to live under the changed circumstances that followed the Communist victory. The same quite explicable unreadiness to remain in a changed Vietnam has motivated a smaller but still significant number of ethnic Vietnamese to leave as refugees.

This is where the human dilemma lies. Is it possible at one and the same time to demand that Vietnam stops the refugee exodus and to criticise the policies that Vietnam is pursuing internally? This is a question that needs to be asked as the world contemplates the grim possibility that many more refugees could still stream out of the three countries of Indochina. More than a million ethnic Chinese yet remain in southern Vietnam, and it would seem fair to assume that a large proportion of these would welcome the opportunity to leave. An uncertain number of ethnic Vietnamese must also be included in the still large reservoir of potential refugees.

The situation in Laos and Kampuchea is, if anything, less clear than that in Vietnam. Among the ethnic Laotians there are many in refugee camps in Thailand who look forward to eventual return to their own country, and this hope is probably shared by a significant number of those still moving out of Laos into Thailand. Some Hmong still remain in Laos and it may be expected that most of these will try to move into Thailand, along with smaller numbers of other hill people groups. The uncertainties attached to future movements out of Laos are eclipsed by those relating to refugee movement from Kampuchea. Developments in Kampuchea have a tragic quality far greater than those associated with the refugee problem as it has developed in the rest of Indochina and in relation to those countries that have become places of first asylum. Few doubt that Vietnam will survive as a state when, eventually, there

is an end to the refugee crisis. The future of Laos may be less certain, but at the end of 1979 its existence was not in question—even if that existence involved heavy dependence on Vietnam. In the case of Kampuchea, however, the survival of the state remains in doubt and the refugees who have poured out of western Kampuchea are a tragic reflection of this uncertainty.

FRANCE AND THE ARMS TRADE

Edward A. Kolodziej *

THE characterisation of French arms sales as 'commercial pragmatism', a term applied to British policy, is only partially useful in explaining French behaviour.** It captures little of the complexity or dynamism of the circumstances shaping French behaviour. No one factor but a nexus of three sets of differentiated but related factors must be relied upon to explain the scope and direction of French arms-sales policy and decisions. These include the exterior environment within which France acts, specifically the structure of global and regional security, and the efforts of successive French governments to influence and adapt themselves and the nation to that environment; the economic incentives, national and parochial, encouraging an open arms-transfers policy; and the process by which politically authoritative decisions are made to produce and sell arms and know-how.

Each of these levels of analysis provides a key to an understanding of French governmental action. None is alone sufficient to provide a fully satisfactory explanation. Moreover, the weight borne by each set of factors can be shown to have shifted during the course of time. If security and foreign-policy considerations predominated in the initial efforts after the Second World War to reconstruct France's defense industries, economic and internal-regime interests have progressively grown in importance.

If arms sales are viewed from these three perspectives, and account is taken of the play of forces within each, it becomes clear that few activities permeate and penetrate French political and economic life more than the sale of military technology and arms—and few are more important. Distinguishing between foreign and domestic policy as the primary source of French conduct, therefore, has little or no relevance. Moreover, the guns *or* butter dichotomy, normally used by analysts to explain or condemn arms sales, has been transformed within the French context into an imperative of guns *and* butter. For most French within the government and bureaucracy concerned with arms sales, and many within the opposition, the security and foreign-policy functions of the government, on the one hand, and popular expectations of its

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** This is a companion-piece to Lawrence Freedman's review of British arms-transfer policy entitled 'British Foreign Policy to 1985. IV: Britain and the Arms Trade', which appeared in the July 1978 issue of *International Affairs*, pp. 377-92.

responsibilities for welfare, on the other, are more joined than at odds. What this joining implies is the existence of a broad political consensus in France on the Right and Left that promotes arms transfers—although their partisans, the proclaimed and the fellow travellers, differ in their reasons for their support.

The security and foreign policy objectives of French arms sales

Overlooked in the present concern about rising global arms deliveries—by the latest count of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency accounting $17.6 billion in 1977[1]—and France's role as third largest supplier ($3 billion in 1977)[2] is the long history of France as a major arms producer and supplier. Arms transfers, under royal, imperial and republican regimes, have long been an important instrument of French security and foreign policy[3]—as illustrated, for example, by the supply of arms to the revolted American colonies in the eighteenth century and to East European states in the early twentieth century to check German and Russian power.[4] The transfer of French arms and military technology should, therefore, be viewed as a process which is felt to be linked to the preservation of the French state and nation and the promotion of its interests abroad, and not as a series of isolated and discrete acts. Although French regimes may have differed as to who should receive arms or who should direct their production—the state or private enterprise—they have been consistent in their pursuit of an independent weapons capability.

The Second World War disrupted the traditional role played by France's arms industry. As an initially occupied power, France emerged from the war dependent for arms on its allies (principally the United States) to defeat Germany and to retain its sprawling colonial empire. The Atlantic Alliance was the conduit by which American military aid could be sent to France to

1 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1977* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 11.

2. Table 2 lists figures for the value of arms deliveries that are considerably greater than those cited by the ACDA or the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). ACDA purports to include deliveries to all countries; SIPRI furnishes data only for Third World states. See Freedman, *op. cit.*, for further discussion

The figures below should be weighed with caution. Those for ACDA are in the millions of current dollars and may be compared to data cited in Table 2. SIPRI figures are given in millions of constant 1975 dollars. Unfortunately, deflators are not given by SIPRI so conversion into current dollars was not possible. It can be assumed that, as a rule, SIPRI figures are lower than those cited by ACDA since developed states are not included in its estimates.

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
ACDA*	725	850	700	675	925	1300
SIPRI**	351	538	449	593	553	1245

* ACDA, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

** SIPRI, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1978* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1978), pp. 256. SIPRI does not cite deflations; ACDA does, *op cit*, p. 24. Also note differences between SIPRI *Yearbook 1978* and *1977*. For the latter, pp. 308–309.

3. See, for example, A. Bigant, *La Nationalisation et le Contrôle des Usines de Guerre* (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1939) and bibliography.

4 French aid to the American colonies is recounted in Edward S. Corwin, *French Policy and the American Alliance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1916); Robert E. Harkavy, *The Arms Trade and International Systems* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1975), describes French sales in the interwar period and includes bibliographical citations to earlier works that deal with France's history as an arms supplier.

support its colonial wars and its rearmament, including the modernisation and expansion of its military-industrial base. If dependence on American aid to preserve the French empire was a temporary expedient, support for the reconstitution of the French arms industry was seen as a prerequisite for the development of an independent security and foreign policy.

After 1945 there was also very little for French military engineers to do, and there was widespread resentment within the French security community about the country's dependence on American arms.[5] Between 1950 and 1968, France received more than $4 billion in military assistance from the United States. This sum, the bulk of which was received by the Fourth Republic, was almost twice as much as the next highest level of support to be received by a European power—Italy—and four times as much as the United Kingdom.[6] To support the Indochina War the Truman administration subsidised approximately one-quarter of France's defence budget and one-half of its rearmament.

American aid thus fueled the French rearmament programme. By 1949 work had begun on the AMX 13, a light tank that was completed in 1952: within two years a total of 230 copies had been ordered by Israel (150), Egypt (20), Peru (40), and Venezuela (20).[7] Over a thousand were eventually produced. Dassault's M.D. Ouragon 450—the first jet-propelled aircraft purchased by the French air force, begun in 1947—was subsequently sold to Israel (60) and India (104) in the 1950s.[8] The French government also received almost one billion dollars in 'off-shore' contracts, approximately half the total granted to all European states under American mutual security legislation.[9] By the estimate of an aeronautics official with Dassault, these contracts permitted the French aircraft industry to strengthen its base and assisted in the development of Dassault's Mystère fighter aircraft. In 1954, the United States Air Force placed an 'off-shore' order for 225 Mystère IV's. Another 60 were subsequently delivered to Israel in 1955-56 and 110 to India in 1958.[10]

By the mid-1950s France had re-emerged as an indigenous arms producer and supplier thanks to its own efforts, which were significantly supplemented by aid from the United States. It would, however, be an exaggeration to suggest that arms sales were a major preoccupation of the French military establishment in 1950. They were considered an adjunct to the major tasks of fighting colonial wars in Asia and Algeria, and discharging France's

5 Interview with former official in the Délégation Ministérielle pour l'Armement (later renamed the Délegation Générale pour l'Armement), April 3, 1978.

6 US Department of Defence, *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts* (December, 1978), p. 17

7 SIPRI, *The Arms Trade Registers. The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975), *passim*

8. *Jane's All the World Aircraft* (London: MacDonald, 1954-1955), p. 135

9 American military assistance to France is discussed by Jean Godard in 'La Contribution alliée aux dépenses militaires de la France', *Revue de Defense Nationale*, XII, (April, 1956), pp. 436-45.

10. SIPRI, *op cit*, and *Jane's, op cit*, p. 136.

responsibilities in Europe within Nato. Dassault had no international sales force. Like the state-run arms producers, it concentrated on producing material for the French armed forces.[11]

The Fourth Republic laid the foundations for France as a major arms producer. The Fifth Republic broadened and modernised this base and provided a rationale for a policy *à tous azimuts* for arms transfers and military technology. From a security and foreign policy perspective, selling arms became more than an enterprise to decrease the unit costs of defence material by larger runs. It was portrayed as a crucial means by which to maintain French independence and to assist other nations in developing their own defence systems. The foreign policy philosophy of the de Gaulle regime, carried forward by its successors, rejected the notion of regional or global security systems based on either super-power hegemony or super-power conflict. The first condition was attacked as illegitimate since only the nation-state was viewed as the final repository of political authority, and an independent defence capability assured the validity of this principle. On the other hand, the super-power struggle threatened to erupt into a global conflagration, drawing states into a war not of their choosing or interest. Insulation from super-power illegitimacy or instability was found in an independent French national security policy centered around the creation of a *force de frappe*. This national policy was in turn projected on an international scale as a model for other states to follow. A multipolar international system was thus envisaged, composed of states possessing sufficient military capabilities to resist super-power threats and to decrease, if not eliminate, their dependence on one super-power or the other for their security or foreign policy goals. French arms sales promoted such a fluid and decentralised system. Third-World states would have an alternative, or at least a supplementary, supplier to the super-powers. In a world of multiple arms suppliers their hold would be relaxed if not fully broken. Paris could then pose as the guardian of the nation-state against the hegemonic drives of the super-powers, and as the protector of the independence and interests of the developing states.[12] Michel Debré, French Minister of Defence between 1969 and 1973 and de Gaulle's close collaborator for over twenty years, summarised thus the broad political and security considerations that rationalise French sales:

> It is difficult for us to shirk the duty to respond to the requests of certain countries, solicitous of their defence and desiring to assure it freely without having recourse to the dominant powers of each of the two blocs. Not to respond to these requests would accentuate the hegemony of the two great [powers] . . . .[13]

In providing these arms France could also sustain its own defence effort more

11. Interview with a former sales representative of Dassault, June 1978.

12. The international dimensions of Gaullist foreign policy are discussed at length in the author's *French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), especially pp. 555-98.

13. (Michel Debré), *Livre Blanc* I (Paris: 1972), p. 54.

efficiently through increased production runs, could purchase, if it wished, a greater number of arms, and could ostensibly support a broader research and development programme to keep pace with American and Russian efforts. Increased sales of conventional arms compensated for the emphasis in the French defence budget on nuclear arms. They supported a larger military-industrial base than would otherwise have been possible.[14] The most notable success was Dassault's Mirage III and V, of which 1,350 copies were made and sold to twenty air forces of the world, including that of France. Other Dassault successes include the follow-on F-1 fighter, the Jaguar (developed with the British Aircraft Corporation), and the Alpha-Jet, a trainer produced in co-operation with the German firm Dornier.[15]

The other areas of exceptional success have been in tactical missiles and helicopters. Hundreds of thousands of French missiles have been sold abroad. The most important among them are the R- and Super-530 and Magic air-to-air missiles, the Roland and Crotale ground-to-air missiles, Martel and AS-11, -12, and -30 air-to-ground missiles, the sea-to-sea Exocet and Otomat, and the SS-11, -12, Milan and Hot anti-tank missiles.[16] France is also second only to the United States in world helicopter sales. Of 4,600 helicopters produced by Aérospatiale since 1956, approximately 3,350 have been sold abroad, divided geographically in the following manner: Europe (2,600 to 18 countries, including France); Asia and Oceania (600 to 20 countries); North and South America (750 to 27 countries); and Africa (480 to 24 countries).[17]

Sales of ground and naval equipment and arms have been promoted abroad, but they have enjoyed less success. A major fillip was provided in the mid-1970s by Saudi Arabia, which chose France as a major supplier of its ground forces—to be equipped with 450 AMX-series tanks and vehicles as well as a specially designed ground-to-air missile, the Chahinn, for desert conditions. Sales of naval craft have been concentrated in fast patrol boats and small submarines, such as those of the Daphne class.[18]

Table 1 summarises French arms contracts for 1978-79. It lists sales to nineteen countries on five continents. The bulk of these sales are to the developing world, particularly to the Middle East oil producers. This pattern reverses that of the 1960s when two-thirds of the value of French exports and sales were sent to advanced industrial nations.[19] In 1977, approximately 90

14. Data on French arms deliveries may be found in the following general sources: SIPRI, *op. cit.*; SIPRI's annual yearbooks, the latest being *World Armaments and Disarmament*, 1978, *op. cit.*, 1978; the monthly issues of the *International Defense Review*, published in Geneva; the publications of the French aircraft trade association, Groupement des Industries Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales (GIFAS); *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, and the annual publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London)

15 *Avions Marcel Dassault – Bréguet Aviation*, 1977, a promotional publication of Dassault-Bréguet.

16. GIFAS, *Rapport*, 1977, and promotional materials for the Paris air show.

17. Aerospatiale's latest review of its activities does not include production of Lynx or Gazelle, and it only cites part of the production for the Puma. These helicopters are produced in co-operation with British Westland. (Error in export totals for helicopters is found in Aerospatiale's published papers.)

18 See n. 14.

19 Debré, *op cit*., p. 55

Table 1
Major Identified Arms Agreements July 1978–June 1979

Recipient	Primary Supplier	Date of Agreement	System	Quantity	Cost ($m)	Expected Delivery
(a) Western Europe and NATO						
Germany	France/Britain[a]	Dec. 1978	Lynx helicopter	12	110	1979-80
Norway	France/Britain[a]	July 1978	Lynx helicopter	4	14	n.a.
		Early 1979	Lynx helicopter	2	7	n.a.
Spain	France	July 1978	Mirage F-1CE fighters	48	700	1980-82
	France/Britain[a]	Late 1978	Puma helicopter	12	n.a.	1979
(b) Middle East and North Africa						
Egypt	France/Britain[a]	Jan. 1979	SA-342L Gazelle helicopter	20	n.a.	1979
Iraq	France/Germany[a]	Early 1979	HOT ATGW	360	n.a.	n.a.
	France	Late 1978	AMX-30 med	100	n.a.	n.a.
Jordan	France	Mid-1979	Mirage F-1 fighters	36	n.a.	n.a.
Lebanon	France	Nov. 1978	FAC(M)	3 }	} 250	n.a.
			AMX-13 lt tks } AMX-30 med tks }	100 }		
			Gazelle helicopter	n.a. }		
	France/Britain[a]		Puma helicopter	n.a. }		
			Milan ATGW	200	3·5	Feb. 1979
Libya	France/Britain[a]	Late 1978	Gazelle helicopter	n.a.	n.a.	1978-79
Morocco	France	Early 1979	VAB Armoured cars	400	n.a.	n.a.
Saudi Arabia	France	Mid-1978	Panhard Armoured cars	250	n.a.	1978-79
Syria	France/Germany[a]	April 1978	HOT ATGW	n.a.	30	n.a.
			Milan ATGW	n.a.	30	n.a.
(c) Sub-Saharan Africa						
Nigeria	France/Germany[a]	Early 1979	Alpha-Jet trg ac	12	80	1981-82
(d) Asia and Australasia						
China (PRC)	France/Germany[a]	Oct. 1978	HOT ATGW			
			Milan ATGW	n.a.	700	n.a.
	France		Crotale SAM			
India	France/Britain[a]	Oct. 1978	Jaguar fighters	40	816	1979-81
Pakistan	France	Mar. 1979	Mirage V fighters	32	330	1981
Singapore	France	Mid-1978	AMX-13 lt tks	150	n.a.	n.a.
(e) Latin America						
Argentina	France/Britain[a]	Aug. 1978	Puma helicopter	12	n.a.	n.a.
	France	Mid-1978	A69 frigates	2	n.a.	1979
		Mid-1978	SA-315 Lama helicopter	12	n.a.	n.a.
Bolivia	France	Mid-1978	SA-315B Lama helicopter	5	n.a.	Feb. 1979
Ecuador	France	Mar. 1979	Sextuple Exocet SSM	6	n.a.	n.a.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1979-80* (London, 1979), pp. 103-107.

a. *The Military Balance* data were modified to show co-production of ordered equipment. Items listed are co produced by France and the designated state.

per cent of France's arms orders and 86·4 per cent of its deliveries were outside the European community and North America.[20] The French have been very skeptical about American proposals for standardisation of Nato equipment. Since the two-way street favours the United States by a ratio of ten to one, the French see few possibilities in the Nato area as an alternative to their markets in the developing countries.

The security and foreign policy justification for French arms transfers advanced by Debré is so general that it can indeed rationalise almost any level of sales to any nation of the world. All that is required, in effect, is a request from a *bona fide* state capable of paying for its purchases. That the French attach few political conditions to their sales is suggested in another of Debré's statements as Defence Minister: 'If France is often solicited, it is because she does not set any political conditions, as certain powers do, in selling its arms'.[21] The principal restraint is a prohibition against re-transfers. However, even this condition is tenuous since Paris has found it difficult to enforce its edicts, and it has not always been vigorous in applying its own embargoes. Libya paid no heed to its promise not to re-transfer any of its 110 Mirage aircraft when it sent some of its fighters to the Egyptian air force during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

The embargo against Israel—invoked partially after the Six Day War and, totally, after Israel's attack on Beirut airport in December 1968, using French Super-Frelon helicopters—was sufficiently porous to permit spare parts to reach Israel to service its French aircraft.[22] In the 'vedette affair' of December 1969, embargoed patrol boats purchased by Tel Aviv were spirited out of Cherbourg past French habour security. Since then, the embargo against arms sales to the Middle East has been lifted partly as a consequence of the Libyan violation, which exposed the futility of the French effort to enforce the ban, and partly to take advantage of rising Arab arms purchases, highlighted by a billion dollar deal with Saudi Arabia in 1974.[23]

France's arms trade with South Africa suggests that there are few foreign policy checks attached to French sales except those imposed largely from the outside. France was the last Western supplier to abandon its lucrative arms trade with South Africa, and then only after sustained pressures from the Black African states and the United Nations. For several years French sales of military aircraft, missiles, armoured ground vehicles, and naval craft were justified as contributions to South African external security, and not as material that was 'susceptible to be used for police or repressive action'.[24] The

20. France, Assemblée Nationale, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, *Avis sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1979, Defense Depenses en Capital*, No. 573, Oct 5, 1978, pp. 149 50.

21. *Le Monde*, Sept. 11, 1970.

22. In a debate over Middle East policy in 1973, Gaullist deputy, Alexandre Sanguinetti, Chairman of the Committee on National Defense of the National Assembly, alleged that despite the embargo France had supplied Israel with enough spare parts to maintain its Mirage force intact, *France, Journal Officiel*, Oct. 18, 1973, p. 4479

23. *Le Monde*, Aug. 9, 1974.

24 Quoted by Jean Klein in his "Commerce des armes et politique: le cas français", *Politique Etrangere*, XLI, No. 5 (1976), p. 578.

thinness of this distinction gave way before African criticism, leading President Giscard d'Estaing to declare on a tour of Zaïre in August 1975, that only naval armaments would henceforward be sold.[25] Two years later even this reservation was dropped and South African orders for four warships (two submarines and two avisos) were annulled.[26] However, French adherence to the United Nations proscription against arms to Pretoria has still not cut off South Africa's access to French arms since it still enjoys licensing rights—including authorisation to produce F-1 fighters, the most advanced fighter in the French arsenal.[27] The willingness of France to sell sophisticated equipment to gain a competitive advantage may also be seen in its introduction of military jet aircraft in its sale of 14 Mirage V's to Peru in 1969-70.

The economic incentives behind French arms sales

It may now be argued more plausibly than before that economic—not strategic or foreign policy—considerations have become the major support for French arms transfers. The lax political conditions attached to sales abroad reflected in French operational policy lend credence to this thesis. The inability, or unwillingness, of the Giscard d'Estaing regime to decrease arms sales provides additional evidence of the economic pressures motoring French transfers. When he was campaigning for office in 1974, President Giscard d'Estaing intimated that selling arms would be a lesser priority: 'I do not think it is a sector in which we ought to accent our effort', he said.[28] The pledge was never kept. As Table 2 demonstrates, French arms deliveries more than

Table 2

French Arms Deliveries 1972-1977
(in hundreds of millions of dollars)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Arms Deliveries	800	1175	1386	1944	2435	2992
(a) Air	607	867	871	1166	1695	1830
(b) Ground	103	104	269	316	514	688
(c) Naval	23	64	117	196	37	174
(d) Electronics	68	70	130	266	190	299

Source: French parliamentary reports, 1973-78. Exchange rates for francs based on International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, *XXII*, No. 7, July 1979, p. 144.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 578-79.
26. *Le Monde*, Nov. 10, 1977.
27. For an extensive discussion of French arms trade with South Africa, see SIPRI, *Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict* (New York: Praeger, 1976), *passim*.
28. *Le Monde*, May 3, 1974. For an analysis and critique of French arms control policy, see the author's 'French Disarmament and Arms Control Policy: International and Domestic Dimensions and Determinants', *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* (forthcoming).

doubled between 1974 and 1977, climbing from almost \$1·4 billion to \$3 billion. In the same period, orders for new military equipment jumped from \$3·8 billion to \$5·5 billion, an increase of about 45 per cent. This suggests that the flow of French arms is likely to continue for some time in the future since these orders will take several years to fill—while still newer contracts, as Table 1 outlines, are fed into the pipeline.

The growing dependence of France on arms transfer may be measured in several dimensions. First, arms compose an increasing share of France's trade, especially in capital goods under which military equipment may be categorised.[29] Between 1972 and 1977, military exports rose from 3 per cent of all trade to 4·6 per cent, the highest level of the postwar period. In the period 1972 to 1976 the proportion of arms deliveries to capital goods exports rose from 12·5 per cent to 15·3 per cent.[30] In the three-year period between 1974 and 1976, capital goods exports rose by 48 per cent while arms sales increased by 75 per cent. France's ability to increase its capital goods and high-technology exports is thus tied closely to the expansion of its arms deliveries, which help to lead the way. Expanding its sales in this area is critical since these goods are labour intensive, and the value added from national sources improves France's balance-of-payments position.

In the absence of arms sales, France's external economic position and the strength of the franc would be in serious jeopardy. Between 1974 and 1977 France annually averaged a commercial deficit of \$5·1 billion. (The deficit in 1976 was the largest in France's postwar history at \$7·3 billion.[31]) In the same period arms sales averaged approximately \$1·4 billion. Without these arms sales France would perhaps have had a deficit of over \$6 billion on a yearly basis. To be sure, other investment outlets and export opportunities were foregone in the concentration on arms, but in the short and middle term, conversion to non-military production is extremely difficult. The French economy works at too close a margin to permit wholesale reconversion to other sectors unless markets could be assured. These close margins in the face of sizeable deficits suggest some explanation for the hesitancy of the Giscard d'Estaing regime to cut back on arms transfers. Boosting sales abroad suited the deflationary policies of the Barre government, which sought to dampen internal demand while increasing exports. And few areas are as lucrative as arms.

There is also a close correlation between France's arms sales and its oil imports. France must import over 98 per cent of the oil which supplies approximately two-thirds of its energy needs.[32] In 1977, approximately 83 per cent of these imports came from the Middle Eastern Arab states and Iran. Over

29 International Monetary Fund (IMF), *International Financial Statistics*, XXXII, No 7, July 1979, pp. 146–47.

30. France, Centre Français du Commerce Extérieur, *Commerce Extérieur de la France Resultats 1976* and figures for arms deliveries, Table 2.

31 IMF, *op cit*, pp. 146–47

32 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Quarterly Oil Statistics, Second Quarter, 1978* (Paris), *passim*

one-half of France's supply derived from Saudi Arabia (36·4 per cent) and Iraq (15·3 per cent).[33] It is precisely with these states that France has signed its largest contracts for arms since 1974. Although the exact sums are not known, they are more than $2 billion with Iraq and approach this level with Saudi Arabia.[34] Earlier, when France was more heavily dependent on Libyan oil (17·4 per cent in 1970 contrasted with 2 per cent in 1977), its sale of Mirage fighters was estimated to have covered approximately $400 million of its oil imports from Libya.

For the immediate future France's ability to gain access to oil is tied to its role as an arms supplier. Since oil is so critical to French economic growth and prosperity, there is little incentive to forego arms sales simply because they might de-stabilise the military balance in the Middle East. These security risks are depreciated when balanced against the economic benefits that are anticipated The notion of security extends far beyond the capacity of French military forces to project military power abroad. It extends to the military production and arms sales system directed by the French government and its ability to keep arms flowing abroad in return for oil. 'Oil is probably, at the present time, in a country like France, the most elemental product', remarked President Pompidou in June 1971. 'To scorn oil is fashionable but fatal!'[35]

The decreasing ability of the French defence budget to provide support for the arms industry offers further proof of France's dependence on foreign military sales. Over the past decade defence spending has fallen from 4·3 per cent of gross national product to around 3 per cent. Meanwhile, the proportion of funds spent on equipment has steadily deteriorated in favour of current operations, particularly for improvement in the pay, living conditions, and social status of military personnel. In 1977, only 41 per cent of the budget was for military capital goods. A decade earlier, the division of spending between heavy equipment and operational activities was roughly equal.[36]

Meanwhile it should be noted that the ratio of the value of arms deliveries to internal military capital expenditures (title V of the French defence budget) has also risen from 20 per cent in 1965 to 62 per cent in 1977.[37] An increasingly large proportion of France's arms production capacity is, therefore, being diverted to foreign markets. This process harnesses the French military-industrial complex to the national-security and foreign-policy interests of other states, a condition potentially threatening to the independence so vigorously expounded by Paris. This is the so-called 'back-end' problem of arms transfers, by which the supplier becomes ensnared in the security and foreign-policy interests of client states. Recent American experience in Iran indicates that the problem is real and that it may soon confront France.

33. *Ibid., passim.*

34. US, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Prospects for Multilateral Arms Export Restraint*, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979, p. 11.

35. Documentation Française, *Politique etrangère de la France*, January-June, 1971, p. 244.

36. France, Assemblée Nationale, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, *Avis sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1978, Défense: Dépenses en Capital*, No. 3150, Oct. 11, 1977, p. 15.

37. France, Assemblée Nationale, Commission de la Défense Nationale, *op. cit.*, No. 573, pp. 148–50.

These troubling implications are difficult for France to face not only because of the economic benefits of arms sales but also because of their importance for employment and for the solvency and growth of such key advanced industries as avionics and electronics. Since the oil crisis of 1973 and the recession of 1974–75 France has been in a state of chronic stagflation. Arms represent one of the major growth areas to combat high unemployment and inflation. Unemployment reached over a million by the end of 1977—the highest level under the Fifth Republic—and consumer prices rose more than 30 per cent between 1975 and 1978.[38]

Estimates vary regarding the number of workers employed in the arms industry. Official estimates list 280,000 employees of which 90,000 are said to be working for exports.[39] Of this total, 75,000 work directly for the General Delegation for Armament (DGA), located in the Ministry of Defence and constituting the hub of the French military-industrial complex. An additional 25,000 employees are concerned with atomic energy development; and the remaining sectors include the aeronautics industry (105,000), electronics (40,000), and other fields (35,000). Military production installations are spread throughout the country. Paris has about 105,000 workers in military-related production; the other 175,000 are distributed unevenly in the provinces. Any reduction in arms sales without a compensating increase in national defence spending would be a serious blow to the French economy. Lagging sales of French naval equipment and ships are already a serious problem for the government, reflected in the low figures for exports of naval equipment in Table 2. There is not enough work available to support both the government shipyards at Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, and Toulon and the private constructors which have shown, incidentally, the most initiative in attracting new contracts. Underemployment is a considerable problem for the Ministry of Defence, since the largest component of the DGA is the Technical Direction of Naval Construction with 35,000 employees or almost half of the DGA total.

The figures released by the government regarding employment in the arms industry appear to be significantly understated. The continuing rise of French deliveries and orders suggests that more of the work force is involved in arms production than the Ministry of Defence's figure of 280,000. That number has been cited for several years while production has mounted and the division between production for domestic and foreign buyers has tilted decidedly in favour of the latter. More than one-third of the personnel of the French arms industry would appear to be filling foreign orders, if we are to take as a measure the ratio of the value of arms deliveries to military capital expenditures of the armed forces noted above.

The French aviation industry is especially dependent on arms sales. In the

38. IMF, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–45, and *Le Monde, L'Annee Economique et Sociale, 1977*; *La Longuer* (January, 1978), p. 50.

39. France, Service d'Information et de Relations Publiques des Armées, *La Delegation Generale pour l'Armement* (December, 1977), p. 10.

mid-1970s approximately 60 per cent of French production was devoted to military purposes.[40] Except for the Caravelle and now the Airbus the French aircraft industry has been singularly unsuccessful in breaking into the civilian air market dominated by the United States. The *Concorde* (Aérospatiale) and *Mercure* (Dassault) programme have been major failures. Only military sales to the French and foreign air forces have kept the French aircraft industry aloft. Dassault is especially attached to foreign markets. In 1976, almost 70 per cent of Dassault's total business receipts were derived from military exports. Between 1971 and 1976, these exports accounted, on average, for approximately 55 per cent of all sales. Dassault's success has prompted the company to launch its own programme, the Mirage 4,000, exclusively aimed at foreign buyers. This two-engine attack aircraft is designed as France's major candidate for the foreign market in competition with a panoply of American and European craft, including the F-15 and Tornado. Dassault's dependence on foreign markets explains somewhat the tenacity of the French drive to sell the F-1 M53 to its partners in the Atlantic Alliance and the sense of defeat felt in French aircraft circles when the American F-16 was chosen instead.[41]

Aérospatiale, larger and more broadly based than Dassault, and SNECMA (Société Nationale d'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs d'Aviation), the principal producer of aircraft motors, must also rely heavily on military sales at home and abroad. In 1976, receipts from military sources comprised 57 per cent of Aérospatiale's business. The percentage of its business affairs derived from exports were seven per cent from aircraft, 76 per cent from helicopters, and 60 per cent from tactical missiles or 52 per cent of its overall receipts. Most of the company's military exports, as suggested earlier, are in helicopters and tactical missiles. In the same year SNECMA derived 70 per cent of its business receipts from military sales, which comprised 67 per cent of its exports.[42]

Co-production programmes, like expanding arms exports, also weaken the independence of France's weapons production system even as both, paradoxically, provide support for its continued maintenance. Table 3 outlines current joint production programmes, which have been largely confined to development of aircraft and tactical missiles in association with the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy. These are important programmes, and not simply ancillary to indigenous efforts. Of thirty-two orders for major arms, listed in Table 1, sixteen are for joint-production items. The incentives for joint production are obvious enough: guaranteed orders from the military services of the producing countries; decreased research and development costs (although

40. France, Documentation Française, *Problèmes Economiques*, 'L'Aéronautique européenne face à la concurrence américaine,' Feb. 18, 1976, p. 21.

41 This point is made forcefully in a manuscript of Ingemar Dörfer, who is completing work on a multi-state analysis of the 'sale of the century' See also, for example, David Fouquet, 'To Compete and/or to Cooperate? The Atlantic Arms "Race" *European Community*, No. 196 August September, 1976, pp. 26-29

42. France, Assemblée Nationale, Commission de la Défense Nationale, *op. cit.*, No. 3150, p. 89

Table 3

Current French Co-operative Arms Production Programmes *

Countries	Designation	Year design begun	Year of proto-type flight	Year in pro-duction	Number: domestic/ export or total
Aircraft					
1a. France (50%)/ United Kingdom (50%)	Jaguar, *Sepecat* strike fighter/trainer	1964	1968	1971	
1b.	Jaguar International export version	—	—	1975	—124[a]
2. France (50%)/ W. Germany (50%)	Alpha-Jet multi purpose aircraft	1969	1973	1977	408/29[b]
3. France (50%)/ W. Germany (50%)	C-160 Transall transport	Early 1960s	1963		4/—[c]
Helicopters					
1a. France/ United Kingdom[d]	SA 330 Puma medium tactical transport		1965	1968	209/413[e]
1b.	Lynx WG.13 multipurpose	1968	1971	1974	186/37
1c.	SA 341/342 Gazelle light utility		1967	1977	368/70[f]
Missiles					
1a. France/ W. Germany	HOT mobile/ helicopter tank	1964	1971	1975	440/(168)[g]
1b.	Milan portable to-tank	1963	—[f]	1972	8520/—[h]
1c.	Roland mobile to aircraft				
	I clear weather version	1964	(1968)	(1974)	—[i]
	II all weather version	1968	(1975)	(1976)	
2. France/ United Kingdom	Martel aircraft to-fixed				
	AS.37 anti radar	(1960)	(1966)	1973	—[j]
	AS.168 TV guided	(1960)	(1966)	1973	—[j]
3. France/Italy	OTOMAT ship/ aircraft-to-ship				
	I. initial version	1969	1971		470[k]
	II. longer range	1969	1974	(1975)	
	III. Téséo extended range	—	—		

* *Source: World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1978* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1978), pp. 169–95. These exclude arms sold under licensed production

total costs for the weapon are invariably higher than those incurred by a single state); and the possibility of expanding markets by drawing on the collective access of the producing states to markets abroad.

After a mixed experience with the United Kingdom in developing the Martel missile—in which both states attempted to maintain parallel production systems—the French now prefer specialisation arrangements such as they have with the Germans through Euromissile. Each state specialises in those components of a weapon system in which it is most expert. But this approach, while more efficient, decreases national control over all phases of production—a problem that becomes important during wartime or crisis. On the other hand, those familiar with Euromissile, which groups Aérospatiale and Messerschmitt-Bölkow Blohm to produce Hot, Roland, and Milan missiles, have found that overall programme stability is greater when two or more states enter into a production scheme since cancellation of a programme by one partner carries higher political risks than if he were acting alone within an insulated national framework. If the sale of Hot and Milan missiles to Syria in 1978 is any indication, overall export of arms may be enhanced through co-operative ventures since what one partner may be constrained from selling, another may be able to transfer. German inhibitions on entering the Middle East market were circumvented through the French connection. Meanwhile, both partners enjoy a split in production work at potentially lower political cost.

France has preferred to embark on such joint production projects on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of a national strategy. Interestingly enough, under Giscard d'Estaing's administration France has not begun a new weapons programme with any other states although Giscard has been more disposed in style and rhetoric than his two predecessors to Atlantic and European approaches. So far, not much has come from France's membership in the Independent European Programme Group. While Gaullists at home have opposed the discussion of European arms production, the governments of de Gaulle and Pompidou were most instrumental in developing such joint

a. Does not include order for 40 Jaguars by India through Britain (see Table 1).
b. Does not include order for 12 training aircraft by Nigeria (see Table 1).
c. France will purchase four from a run of 25. The remainder is designated for export.
d. SIPRI reports that Puma and Gazelle are predominantly of French design. France's Aérospatiale and Britain's Westland divide production of these aircraft at a ratio of approximately 60:40. Lynx is largely of British design. All three helicopters are co-produced.
e. France and the United Kingdom ordered 209 aircraft; at least 72 of the 622 ordered are for civilian purposes.
f. Of the total order of 907, more than 710 have been delivered; some are for civilian purposes.
g. A total of 4,800 missiles have been ordered by eight countries.
h. 76,000 have been ordered by 15 countries; 30,000 have been delivered. The United Kingdom has a requirement of 50,000. Most of these will be produced in Britain, making it the third partner.
i. French and German requirements are 10,800 and 12,200 missiles, respectively. Norway has ordered 900. The United States will produce its own all weather version under French license, but will also have the option to sell its version on the world market.
j. Deliveries to the French of the AS.37 and to the British of AJ168 are completed, and further production is in question.
k. Of this total, approximately 100 have been delivered.

programmes as at present exist. Gaullist reservations, linked to those of the military-industrial bureaucracies managing the nation's arms production system, would hinder any attempts—which have indeed yet to be made—by Giscard to pursue a more ambitious European policy than the ad hoc approach that has prevailed hitherto. These domestic constraints on joint arms production are joined to still stronger ones, as the discussion below suggests, that block efforts to restrain French arms transfers.

The politics of French arms transfers

In contrast to the public controversy engendered in the United States, for example, over arms transfers, much of the political manoeuvring over arms transfer in France happens behind the scenes. It is a model of closed bureaucratic politics, but one in which the principal actors share a common interest in selling arms, although for different and even divergent reasons and also influences significantly the outcomes of the process.[43] What is striking about the politics of arms transfers in France is the absence of broad public or inter-party debate or even serious disagreement between the major political groupings over France's arms position. The furore raised over the embargo against Israel and the sale of Mirages to Libya were exceptional events and are related more to France's Middle East policy than its sale of arms per se.[44] The so-called 'Mayer Report', the only major review of the arms industry, commissioned by the Prime Minister with the consent of the ministers of defence and finance, was not released when it reportedly raised too many criticisms of internal operations.[45] Public criticism is largely confined to dissident church or confessional groups and to peace organisations. Except perhaps for the pacifist wing of the Socialist party, these groups appear to have no influence on governmental or party behaviour.[46]

The Communist-and Socialist-dominated trade unions, which have organised parts of the military industry, are another potential source of opposition to an open arms-transfer policy, but that expectation has not materialised to any appreciable degree.[47] The public stance of these unions is

43. For a contrasting model of bureaucratic politics in which the actors do not share common values and interests, see Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1971). The French elite concerned with arms transfers presents a more cohesive front.

44. For critiques of the French embargo against Israël, see Uri Dan, *et al.*, *De Gaulle contre Israël: Documents sur l'embargo* (Paris: Jacques Lanzmann, 1970) and Raymond Aron, *De Gaulle, Israël, and the Jews*, trans. John Sturrock (New York, Praeger, 1969). The government's defence is found in the statement of the then Prime Minister, Jacques Chaban Delmas, *La Politique de la France en Mediterranee*.

45. Interviews with officials in the press, National Assembly, and the defence community 1977–1978.

46. The peace groups have been a major source of public information about arms sales out of all proportion to their members. See, for example, Centre Local d'Information et de Coordination pour l'Action Non Violente (CLICAN), *Les trafics d'armes de la France: l'engrenage de la militarisation* (Paris, Maspero, 1977); *Responsable*, 'Que penser du commerce des armes?' No. 85, March, 1977; and Conseil Permanent de l'Episcopat Français, *Note de reflexion sur le commerce des armes* (Paris: Editions du Centurion, 1973).

47. The three most important labour groupings in the defence industries are the Confédération française democratique du travail (DFDT), the Confederation générale du travail (CGT) and the Force ouvriere (FO). See, for example, the CGT's critique of the government's arms production policy that is seen to favour the use of foreign materials, *La Federation national des travailleurs de l'etat CGT et la politique d'armement* (circa. 1978).

to deplore France's position as a leading arms supplier while temporising or cutbacks in production that might lead to unemployment. The union leaderships attach a number of reservations to any reduction in arms sales: other nations, especially the super-powers, must stop supplying arms first; alternative civilian outlets for employment must be found to compensate for the loss of jobs in the military sector; or the French military budget must absorb some of the productive resources now concentrated on foreign orders. None of these possibilities appear likely in the immediate future, nor do the unions appear to set much store by them. The major issue for them, like the parties on the Left with which they are associated, is gaining control or exercising increased influence over the military-industrial complex, rather than diminishing its size or its dependence on foreign sales.

Intra-party debate has focused primarily on the larger issue of nationalisation, in connection with which key parts of the military-industrial complex that remain outside the direct management and control of the government have been identified for takeover. The 'Common Programme' signed by the Communist and Socialist parties in 1972 as the principal campaign document for the presidential and legislative elections of 1974 and 1978 called for the nationalisation of nine industrial sectors, including Dassault-Bréguet and Thomson-Brandt, France's largest electronics firm and a leading producer and foreign supplier of advanced military equipment.[48] The Dassault firm was later subjected to an extraordinary parliamentary investigation of its use of government subsidies since the Second World War.[49] The inquiry was catalyzed by the disclosure that a high financial officer of the Dassault firm absconded with millions of francs.[50] Marcel Dassault's heavy contributions to the Gaullist party and his possession of a seat in the National Assembly, although his firm does considerable business with the French government, were more fundamental motives for the inquiry and interest of the Socialist and Communist camps in the affair. The defeat of the Left in the legislative election of spring 1978, however, took much of the wind out of its nationalisation sails.

One other notable, if still frustrated, attempt to widen Left and parliamentary control over arms sales concerns a bill deposited by two prominent Socialist leaders in the National Assembly in 1978.[51] The proposal calls for greater parliamentary oversight of arms transfers and mandatory consultation with parliamentary committees. In view of past parliamentary

48. Le Monde, *Le Dossier des nationalisations*, November, 1977.

49. France, Assemblée Nationale, Commission d'enquête parlementaire, *L'utilisation des fonds public alloues aux entreprises privees ou publiques de construction aéronautique*, 21 April 1977.

50. Sketches of the so-called Vathaire affair and its relation to the parliamentary investigation of th aeronautics industry, with special reference to Dassault's dealings with the government, are found in *Le Monde* March 17 and March 31, 1971.

51. On behalf of their Socialist colleagues in the National Assembly, Jean Pierre Cot and Charles Hern offered a *Proposition de loi instituant un contrôle du Parlement sur les exportations de materiels de guerre*, Jul 1, 1978.

indifference to the subject,[52] this is an exceptional move, but it must still swim upstream against resistance to parliamentary intervention in the government's areas of perceived responsibility in general and in the arms-sales business in particular.

The plights of President Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterrand, the leader of the Socialist opposition, in their attempts to address the arms sales issue illustrate the insulation of the politics of arms sales from the political process in France. Were Giscard to keep his promise to cut back on arms sales he would have to move against his own supporters in and out of parliament and, at the very least, drive a wedge between his Centre supporters and the Gaullists on his Right. Such a move would be politically risky and would gain little in return in the form of broader Socialist or Communist support—since they are focused in any case on taking over the government. Decreasing exports would also hardly ease the government's problems of maintaining solvency, access to oil, employment, social stability, and popular support. The Left would also score few points with its own constituency if it attacked their jobs by advocating decreased military sales. It also cannot count on acquiring support from the Right any more than the French President from his Left.

The President's deft manoeuvrings and those of François Mitterrand on the arms-sale issue reflect these constraints. Giscard's address to the United Nations special session on disarmament in spring 1978, said very little about arms transfers. The issue was set in the larger framework of France's willingness to co-operate in regional arms limitations, provided that they were initiated by the local states. French co-operation in conventional arms-transfer talks with the Soviet Union (CAT) appears contingent on preceding recipient self-restraint and on super-power accord.[53] Since neither condition is likely to be filled in the immediate future, France remains disposed to sell arms, as evidenced by the record high sales that it has achieved in the last few years.[54]

François Mitterrand's critique of French arms sales during the legislative campaign of 1977-78 suggests similar hesitancy to attack the problem directly. It was not so much arms sales as such—rather the direction of their trade to certain countries—that was highlighted as a major issue. The government was condemned for having sold arms to authoritarian regimes such as those in Chile and Brazil, and to racist nations like South Africa; but the principle of arms sales, however deplored, was not rejected.[55]

The wide public and inter-party consensus supporting arms sales, and the paralysis of the government and the opposition in their efforts to gain control of the military-industrial production and sales system have tended to create a

52 Two articles by pro-government deputies on the role of the National Assembly in defence reveal a very narrow conception of its ability or right to intervene in the government's management of defence policy or arms sales. See Joël Le Theule, 'L'Opinion publique, le parlement, et la defence,' *Defense Nationale*, XXXIII (August-September, 1977), 39-46, and M. S. Violquin, 'Les Parlementaires et la défense', *Défense*, No. 7 (October, 1976), pp. 39-44.

53. *Le Monde*, May 27, 1978.

54 Rising criticism of President Carter's arms sales policy may be seen in the line of analysis offered in the congressional document cited in n. 54.

55 *Le Monde*, Dec 15, 1977

vacuum below the level of national presidential and legislative politics that is filled by the civilian and military managers and technicians who preside over and direct the daily operations of the system. The DGA is the organisational instrument through which the sprawling parts of the French system are pulled together and priorities are established. The structure is somewhat of a maze since the French production plant is more the result of historical growth and social pressures than a logically designed response to the needs of efficient weapons development. The army arsenals and navy shipyards have, since the days of the French monarchy, been under the control of the government. They are presently under the direction of the Ministry of Defence. A second set of producing units are semi-public corporations, like Aérospatiale and SNECMA. They receive substantial subsidies from the state and have public officials on their boards. They are also able to act in some ways like private corporations in borrowing money or in hiring and firing personnel. Finally, an increasing amount of production is done in the private sector where Dassault-Bréguet, Thomson-Brandt, Panhard *et al.* play important parts.

All requests for exports deriving from these varied units must be approved by an Interministerial Committee for the Study and Export of War Materials, chaired by the Secretary-General of the Secretariat of National Defence which is attached to the Prime Minister. Also sitting on the committee are representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Economy and Finance. This committee is charged to approve not only requests for exports but must also grant permission for units to search for contracts or to negotiate them.

These ostensibly rigid and controlled procedures obscure the critical role played by the DGA and by its Director of International Affairs who presents all requests to the interministerial body. Since this Directorate is also expected to discover new arms markets and to assist the various segments of the French military production plant in exploiting these leads it is placed in the unique position of judging upon its own requests. To be sure, the representatives of the three key ministries have the final say, and all of them must answer to the Prime Minister. However, this oversight can be questioned since the Directorate of International Affairs reports to the Minister of Defence through the DGA, and the latter, run by military engineers, has an interest in producing and perfecting weapons and finding financial support through sales at home and abroad for their products. Thus, once the Defence Ministry is on board, the other representatives tend to fall into line if it can be shown that the prospective purchaser can pay for the equipment that is being ordered.[56]

Concluding remarks

In the immediate future there appear to be no major factors or forces at work to diminish the flow of French arms abroad. Demand for arms remains strong.

56. The work of the interministerial committee is reviewed by Claude Lachaux in his 'La Réglementation des exportations de matériels de guerre,' *Défense Nationale*, XXXIII (December, 1977), pp. 35-41. This section is also based on interviews with principal actors in the process, Paris, 1977-78.

Third-World states, striving for statehood and a measure of independence—or at least a symbolic substitute through arms—help rationalise an arms policy *à tous azimuts*. Super-power sales and transfers reinforce, rather than restrain, an open arms policy. Internal economic, social, and political imperatives foster more, not less, arms sales. The support structure for French arms transfers is thus firmly in place. It rests solidly on a tripod of security and foreign-policy considerations as well as domestic economic and political requirements.

The implications for international security of French arms policy—or of that part, at least, which is susceptible to governmental control—are, therefore, not encouraging. Neither the international environment—with its lack of super-power accord, and the continued Third-World demand for armaments—nor the internal imperatives of economic growth and political stability are such as to dispose France, whether governed from the Right or from the Left, to place checks on its transfer of arms and, increasingly, of military technology to other states.

THE PALESTINE POLICY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR GOVERNMENT 1947: THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW *

Ritchie Ovendale * *

Dr Ovendale's article on the British Labour Government's Palestine policy 1945-1946 was published in the July 1979 number of *International Affairs*.

AT the end of 1946 British policy towards Palestine was in a state of suspension. It seemed to British statesmen, and particularly to the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, that any attempt to achieve a negotiated solution between the Arabs and Zionists likely to safeguard British strategic interests in the Middle East would merely be offered up on the altar of American domestic politics and politicians' concern for the Zionist vote in that country. President Truman's speech on October 4, 1946 endorsing the Zionist solution in Palestine—partition—seemed finally to scotch British plans. At the end of 1946 the dilemma was obvious: the creation of a separate Zionist state would alienate Arab sympathies, and, at the time of the emergence of the cold war, endanger Britain's strategic interests in a vital area. But the United States President would not allow anything less, while Britain's Palestine commitment was eroding the morale both of the public and of the armed services on the spot.[1]

This was the situation which confronted Bevin when he travelled to New York in November 1946. There he had several 'rather scrappy' conversations on Palestine with James Byrnes, the Secretary of State, in which he hinted that Britain might offer the mandate to the United States, or hand it back to the United Nations. Byrnes implied that, in Britain's position, he would follow the latter course.[2] When Bevin discussed Palestine with Truman on December 8 the Foreign Secretary emphasised that provincial autonomy was 'a very fair and practical proposal': it would avoid reference to the United Nations and the introduction of other powers, including Russia. Truman

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1. See Ritchie Ovendale, 'The Palestine Policy of the British Labour Government, 1945-1946', *International Affairs*, July 1979.

2 *Prem 8*, 627 pt 6, PM/NY/46/1, Bevin to Attlee, Top Secret, Undated.

agreed that it would be wise to keep them out. The President, however, was cautious: if Britain were able to achieve an accord in Palestine the United States would be pleased to give any help it could including finance. Bevin pointed out that an accord was unlikely. The British government had given conflicting pledges. (Truman interjected with surprising frankness: ' so have we.') Britain's aim was to ' narrow differences ' so that there should not be too much hostility from either side to whatever policy was adopted. The United States could help by changing its immigration policies to take more Jewish immigrants. Truman agreed that the United States would have to do this. Despite all the difficulties Bevin still hoped for a settlement, as he felt that the attitude of both Arabs and Jews was now more helpful than it had been. Truman concluded by saying that it would be easier for him to assist now that the elections were over: the number of Jews in New York had made the situation difficult. Nevertheless, on the whole Bevin did not receive much encouragement from United States officials.[3]

Bevin's visit to the United States convinced the Foreign Secretary that Britain should consider abandoning the mandate. The British position in Palestine seemed intolerable and there was little evidence that any support would be forthcoming from the United States. In the wider context, there had been indications that America was prepared to take over Britain's responsibilities in Greece and Turkey and to commit itself in Europe. But hostile domestic reactions in the United States to a continuing British presence in Palestine could jeopardise that great advance. Consequently when Bevin returned to London he and the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, attempted to work out an agreed policy for Palestine. Their conversation reflected almost irreconciliable points of view: Creech Jones stood by the Zionist case for partition, even if Britain had to impose this solution by force; Bevin was prepared to hand over to the United Nations.

Around December 22 Bevin was against any policy involving a continuing British military commitment in Palestine: there were insufficient resources and public opinion would not stand it. The Foreign Secretary felt that before surrendering the mandate to the United Nations it should be offered to the United States. The Americans would almost certainly refuse the responsibility, but it would then be possible to say to them that, as they were not prepared ' to shoulder the burden which we have already carried far too long, we had no alternative but to lay it at the feet of the United Nations '.[4] P. Mason of the Foreign Office pointed out that since the demise of the League of Nations no mandate technically existed. Such a transaction could, however, be achieved through a bilateral arrangement with the United States.[5] Surrender of the mandate, however, was anathema to Creech Jones: he argued that if, after the forthcoming London conference with the Arabs, Britain announced its

3 *FO 371*, 61762, E221 46/9, Conversation between Truman and Bevin (extract), 8.12.1946.
4 *FO 371*, 61761, E74/1/46, Minute by Beeley to read as Bevin to Attlee, Top Secret, Undated.
5 *Ibid.*, Mason to Beeley, 31.12.1946

intention to do this, the administration of Palestine would immediately become untenable. Intensified Zionist terrorist activities would follow, the Arabs would abandon their policy of restraint, and there would be a crescendo of Zionist propaganda designed to influence the General Assembly. Even if a special session of the General Assembly were convened, Britain would have an impossible local situation to handle in Palestine before it could take its decision. Bevin, however, argued that such a move would have a ' pacifying effect ' in Palestine. He could see no other way out of a situation in which everything Britain might do was bound to be severely criticised and result in a diminution of British prestige. He acknowledged that the effect on Britain's strategic position in the Middle East would have to be considered and the opinions of the Chiefs of Staff sought. The diplomatic and political implications of evacuating Palestine would be serious and had to be weighed against the advantages of being released from ' an embarrassing and thankless task '.

Bevin proposed that the British delegates to the London conference should know that if the discussions failed Britain was prepared to throw in its hand. He envisaged four possible objectives for these delegates. Firstly, the provincial autonomy plan, which the Arabs and Zionists had rejected and the United States had not understood. Secondly, acceptance of a ' period of transition ' during which Britain should try to develop organs of self-government while admitting Jewish immigrants at the rate of 4,000 a month for two years. Bevin envisaged that at the end of that period improvement of conditions in Europe would have reduced pressure for immigration to Palestine: but there would be no Arab acquiescence to the admission of 96,000 Jews over two years without the assurance that that would be the end of Jewish immigration. Thirdly, a possible objective was partition, a solution favoured by Creech Jones. The Colonial Secretary believed that this would be acceptable in Britain and to important sections of the Zionist movement. But Bevin thought that any partition Britain could propose would be different from the Zionist conception and would not finally satisfy their demands. And probably the United Nations would not approve partition anyway. Fourthly, there was the possibility of negotiations on the basis of the Arab plan. According to Creech Jones Britain could not accept the Arab proposals, even in a modified form, because of past commitments. Bevin, however, was satisfied that Britain could carry a settlement based on the Arab proposals through the United Nations; such a policy would be ' in accord with the prevailing current of thought on dependent territories and with our own present course of action in India and Burma '.[6]

On December 23 Creech Jones told Bevin that he was not satisfied that it was ' impossible to find a solution which, even if it did not secure the open approval of one or both of the two communities, could not be imposed without the use of force greater than that we ought to be prepared to contemplate '.

6. *Ibid.*, Beeley to Brook, Minute of Discussions between Bevin and Creech Jones on Palestine, 22.12.1946.

The Colonial Secretary still hoped for a scheme of partition sufficiently fair to Arabs and Jews to win the approval of the United Nations.[7] But the Foreign Office did not like this. An official commented that Creech Jones gave the impression that ' the principal aim of our policy in Palestine has been and should be to reach an agreement with the Zionists. Desirable as such an agreement could be, it is from the Foreign Office point of view far more important that we should avoid a quarrel with the Arab States over Palestine '.[8]

Britain's Palestine policy had to be decided against the background of an excited public opinion, the Russian menace in Europe, the increasingly promising American attitude to this, imperial security requirements in the vital strategic area of the Middle East, and the safeguarding of oil supplies. A Cabinet paper of January 3, 1947 stressed the vital importance for Britain and the Empire of the oil resources of the Middle East.[9] At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on January 6 Lord Tedder, Chief of the Air Staff, went so far as to suggest that even in the event of Britain's own strategic needs being met by a solution of the Palestine problem, if this alienated Arab goodwill it would be unacceptable. This would endanger Britain's wider interests in the Middle East and deny Britain the freedom of movement through the area which was so essential.[10] On January 13 Attlee was advised that the Chiefs of Staff stood by their previous conclusions that Britain's strategic position in the Middle East would be gravely prejudiced if the right to station British forces in Palestine were not retained. Apart from the canal zone, Egypt was being evacuated and Palestine was the only area able to accommodate Britain's Middle East reserve. Air bases were also needed for imperial communication.[11]

Sir Alan Cunningham, the High Commissioner in Palestine, heard in London from Bevin on January 4 of a five-year plan entailing provincial autonomy and leading eventually to partition. Cunningham explained that he preferred proposals that did not involve a period of transition: ' finality ' was all important.[12] ' Proceeding resolutely direct to partition ' would deny the Arabs the opportunity of perfecting their resistance organisation. There was no solution to the problem of the Zionist illegal armed forces. Cunningham argued that there was no prospect of co-operation between the central government, the Arabs, and the Zionists on the basis of the provincial autonomy plan.[13] In a memorandum of January 14 he dismissed this scheme as an ' admirable piece of administrative planning ' apt for a country where ' political reasoning ' had a chance of success over pure nationalism—but there was no such chance in Palestine ' because the forces of nationalism are

7. *Ibid.*, Creech Jones to Bevin, 23.12.1946

8. *Ibid.*, 61762, E153/46/31, Creech Jones to Bevin, 31.12.1946; Unsigned and Undated Comment by Foreign Office Official

9. *Cab 129*, 16, f. 19, CP(47)11, Memorandum on Middle East Oil, Top Secret, 3.1.1946.

10. *FO 371*, 61763, E363/46/G, COS(47)4, JP(47)1, 6.1.1947

11. *Prem 8*, 627 pt 6, COS 161/7, Top Secret, 6.2.1947.

12. *FO 371*, 61762, F318/46/31, Minute by Beeley, 5.1.1947

13. *Cab 129*, 16, ff. 231–32, CP(47)31, Annex, Memorandum by Cunningham, 8.1.1947

accompanied by the psychology of the Jew, which it is important to recognise as something quite abnormal and unresponsive to rational treatment, and because Arab politics have their raison d'etre not in the field of government or administration but in the field of religion and nationalism only '. The High Commissioner argued that both sides wanted independence and would not be happy until they got it. That was a legitimate aspiration and could only be achieved by partition. ' Partition without independence (i.e. the Provincial Autonomy Plan) is an essentially unattractive object '.[14]

On the other hand, P. McGarran of the Foreign Office submitted a minute on January 6, considering the political consequences of a solution unacceptable to the Arabs. He emphasised the Russian threat: the primary objective of Russia's Middle Eastern policy was to undermine Britain's position in the Arab countries and to replace it with Russian influence. There was a serious risk that a blow to British prestige, and the outburst of anti-British feeling in the Arab countries which would follow a settlement in Palestine unfavourable to the Arabs, would give Russia the conditions it needed to further its plans. Russian penetration would probably start in Iraq and spread from there to the Levant. Even if it spread no further for some time, Britain's position would be gravely prejudiced. British influence would be diminished in Iraq and Iran, and the consequent possible loss of oil supplies would be particularly serious in the light of the growing dependence of Britain and the Empire on Middle Eastern oil supplies both in peace and war.[15]

The Cabinet evaluated the conflicting advice over the Palestine question on January 15. Norman Brook had warned Attlee the previous day that the course of discussion in the Cabinet would depend on the character of Bevin's opening statement, and he had not been able to discover what line the Foreign Secretary intended to take.[16]

The Cabinet first heard the views of the Chiefs of Staff. Attlee explained that it might become necessary to impose a solution in Palestine that would be actively resisted by one or both of the communities there. The Prime Minister enquired whether law and order could be preserved in such circumstances. According to Field Marshall Viscount Montgomery, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the situation could be handled with existing military forces if there were resistance from either Zionists or Arabs alone. But active opposition from both communities would necessitate military reinforcements. These could be provided from the forces of occupation in Germany without retarding the demobilisation scheme.

This possibly optimistic assessment of military capabilities was influenced by the military belief that Britain needed to stay in Palestine. As Tedder explained, there were three cardinal requirements for the future defence of the British Commonwealth: the defence of the United Kingdom and its development as a base for air offensive; the maintenance of sea

14. *Ibid.*, f. 230, Annex 1, Memorandum by Cunningham, 14.1.1947.
15. *FO 371*, 61874, E2932/951/31, Minute by McGarran, 6.1.1947.
16. *Prem 8*, 627 pt 6, Brook to Attlee, 14.1.1947.

communications; and the retention of Britain's existing position and influence in the Middle East. These were the three ' vital props ' of Britain's defensive position. They were all interdependent and, if any one were lost ' the whole structure would be imperilled '. These fundamental principles would be unaffected by any change in the nature and use of weapons or in assumptions about the potential enemy. It was essential for Britain's defence that it could fight from the Middle East in war. This meant that Britain had to maintain a foothold there in peace. Though lightly manned in peace these bases could be used for the rapid deployment of greater force in the event of a threat of war. India would no longer be available for such bases so the retention of those in the Middle East was essential. And here Palestine was of special importance. In war Egypt would be Britain's key position in the Middle East. Palestine had to be held as a screen for the defence of Egypt. As Britain had undertaken to withdraw from Egypt it had to be able to use Palestine as a base for the mobile reserve of troops which had to be kept ready to meet any emergency throughout the area. The facilities in Transjordan were insufficient. If separate states were established in Palestine it would be necessary to secure the full use of ports, airfields and communications, and to obtain military facilities by treaty arrangements with both states. Provided such facilities were obtained, it was immaterial whether Palestine became one or two states. If one of the communities had to be antagonised, it was preferable that a solution be found which did not involve the continuing hostility of the Arabs. Arab hostility would mean difficulties for Britain throughout the Middle East. In conclusion Tedder explained that British strategic policy for the Middle East was not wholly dependent on preserving the friendship of Spain, Italy, Greece and the other countries bordering the northern seaboard of the Mediterranean. The line of communication through the Mediterranean would still be of substantial value even if one of those countries were hostile, provided the countries on the southern shore of that sea were not also hostile.[17]

Against the background of this strategic assessment, the Foreign Secretary outlined his ideas to the Cabinet. Bevin's analysis of the history of the Palestine question betrayed his impatience with Truman: the president had encouraged Jewish ' ambitions ' with his demands, and deflected British approaches by his intervention. Bevin mentioned the plan he had formulated in December 1946 for a ' transitional period ' during which Palestine would remain, under mandate, a binational unitary state with the right of seccession for either province after a fixed time. He hoped that this might bring home to the two communities the advantages of collaboration and lessen pressure for a Zionist state. But Cunningham had warned him that the ' lack of finality ' in such a solution would result in continuing disorder which could lead to a breakdown of the British administration in Palestine.[18]

The Foreign Secretary explained that the government's legal advisers had

17 *Cab 128*, 11, ff 7-9, Cab(47)3, Confidential Annex, 15.1.1947.
18 *Ibid*, ff 11-13, Cab(47)4, Confidential Annex, 15.1.1947.

concluded that United Nations approval was necessary to implement partition; such approval, though not essential for the provincial autonomy plan, was politically expedient.[19] (The Colonial Office had not assisted in preparing Bevin's main memorandum for the Cabinet. In this he argued that partition would be unacceptable to the United Nations: effective support for such a policy would only come from the United States.) Bevin suggested an alternative approach. The Morrison-Grady proposals, the provincial autonomy plan, could be amended to point towards a unitary state. The Foreign Secretary argued that if Britain allowed the Zionists to insist on partition and the creation of a Zionist state, which he emphasised had not been promised in the Balfour declaration, Britain would face defeat at the United Nations. The alternative to a resolute decision by Britain and its enforcement was withdrawal. This possibility, however, was not examined because the Chiefs of Staff had insisted that Britain's right to station troops in Palestine was essential to the preservation of its strategic interests in the Middle East. Arab hostility to partition was so clear, and the consequences of permanently alienating the Arabs would be so serious, that partition on that ground alone had to be regarded as a desperate remedy: ' the risk cannot be excluded that it would contribute to the elimination of British influence from the whole of the vast Moslem area lying between Greece and India. This would have not only strategic consequences—it would also jeopardise the security of our interests in the increasingly important oil production of the Middle East '.[20] Indeed Bevin feared that if there were widespread disorder in Palestine interested nations might argue before the Security Council that the situation endangered world peace.

In reply Creech Jones argued the Zionist case: he had, after all, been appointed because of his known sympathies for that cause. The Colonial Secretary urged on the Cabinet Cunningham's view that partition was the only practicable solution. The administration and military forces in Palestine were working under great strain. Early action to relieve them was essential. Any solution would meet with difficulties in the United Nations. The Arab plan was no answer: illegal immigration would continue and Britain would still have responsibility for law and order. The Zionists would reject provincial autonomy as it did not provide for a Jewish state.

There was support for Creech Jones from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton: Zionist determination to secure further immigration ruled out all solutions other than partition. Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health, endorsed this view. He feared the consequences of repressing by force the continuing disorder in Palestine: a general outbreak of anti-semitism. From the Zionist point of view partition was a compromise—and there was a danger that the leadership might pass to extremists. Bevan even challenged the strategic argument that it should be a British objective to avoid estranging the Arab

19. *Cab 129*, 16, CP(47)28.
20. *Ibid.*, ff. 200-27, CP(47)30, Memorandum by Bevin and Annex, Top Secret, 14.1.1947.

states. He felt that a friendly Zionist state in Palestine would provide a safer base: there was the danger that India and other Moslem countries could pass under Russian influence and the security of a military base in Arab Palestine would then come into question. This analysis horrified the Minister of Defence, A. V. Alexander: if the Arabs were alienated they would be supported by Russia which intended to undermine the influence of the British Commonwealth and the United States in the Persian Gulf area. He advised the Cabinet that Britain should look to its own strategic interests and it was therefore vital to retain the goodwill of the Arab world. To balance this Emmanuel Shinwell, the Minister for Fuel and Power, warned that Britain should not follow a course of action that would alienate the United States: it had been Britain's policy to encourage that country to shoulder increased responsibilities in that area. The United States would support partition.[21]

Creech Jones, having secured some support in the Cabinet for partition, prepared a memorandum on the subject the following day. At this time the Colonial Secretary and the Foreign Secretary had a markedly different understanding of the predicament. The Arab plan, founded on normal democratic principles in accordance with United Nations charter, had, in Creech Jones's estimation ' not the slightest hope ' of working in practice. It incorporated most of the provisions of the British White Paper of 1939 which the Zionists had rejected: ' it would spell the cessation of immigration, the arrest of Jewish development in Palestine, and the permanent subjugation of the National Home, with its highly organised European population and its extensive commercial and industrial interests, to a backward Arab electorate, largely illiterate and avowedly inimical to its further progress '. There would be disorder and bloodshed on a scale Britain could not contemplate. The British government would not be able to defend its position to the United States, the Commonwealth, or even to the British electorate. Such a policy would amount to ' a gross betrayal ' of the Jews and be in conflict with undertakings given by the Labour Party regarding the development of the National Home. Creech Jones also dismissed Bevin's scheme: it would mean the subordination of the Zionists to the Arabs, the complete frustration of Jewish national aspirations, and it would bring about a situation in which the Zionists had to be held in subjugation by force. For the Colonial Secretary the only reasonable solution was that recommended by the Royal Commission of 1936, namely partition. This solution offered the ' finality ' urged by the High Commissioner, and it would give each community the ' maximum degree of power ' to manage its own affairs. He acknowledged that under partition Britain would not acquire all the strategic advantages insisted on by the Chiefs of Staff. But partition was the solution most in harmony with the trend of public opinion in Britain, the one most likely to win United States support, and also the endorsement of the Labour Party. To Creech Jones, however, the question was not what policy Britain should implement but rather what policy

21. *Cab 128*, 11, ff 11-8, Cab6(47)4, Confidential Annex, 15 1 1947.

it should recommend to the United Nations. Britain should draw up a plan for partition, recommend it to the United Nations, and indicate the difficulties inherent in alternative schemes.[22]

On January 22 Creech Jones's memorandum was placed before the Cabinet, and reinforced by ones from the High Commissioner for Palestine. Bevin explained that he was not opposed in principle to partition, but there was a danger that the use of force against the Arabs might be referred to the United Nations as creating a situation likely to endanger world peace. Efforts should be made during the forthcoming talks in London to bring the Zionists and the Arabs closer together, and he felt that the Cabinet should not commit itself to any particular solution before these negotiations. If the talks failed the question would have to be brought in some form before the United Nations. Creech Jones supported Bevin in this, but insisted that the solution would have to be along the lines of partition.

At this meeting the Cabinet was convinced that if there were no agreed settlement the matter would have to go to the United Nations. But the General Assembly was not due to meet until September and it was doubtful if the situation in Palestine could be held until then. A special meeting might have to be called earlier. Some ministers felt that there was much to be said for leaving it to the United Nations to find a solution—but this could mean that Britain would not be able to secure the military facilities in Palestine judged to be necessary to its strategic position in the Middle East. The Cabinet insisted that it should be consulted before any indication was given either to the Zionists or the Arabs as to what policy the British government would support.[23] Around this time Bevin, commenting on a Foreign Office assessment of the anticipated reaction in Arab countries, minuted: ' this means that we could never settle it. Must we go on in the present state. It is impossible '.[24]

Even before the Cabinet meeting the United States was sounded as to its likely reactions. Lord Inverchapel, the British Ambassador in Washington, discussed the situation with Dean Acheson, the Under-Secretary of State, on January 21. Partly because of United States domestic considerations Acheson thought his government would find partition the easiest solution to back; the United States itself would not, however, be involved in the use of force in Palestine.[25] Inverchapel was told of the official American position on January 27: partition was preferable; a scheme somewhere between partition and the Morrison-Grady proposals acceptable; any solution which did not provide for entry in the near future for 100,000 Jews and for further immigration at a reasonable rate thereafter would be difficult to support. The United States would not use armed force in this matter and would try to ease the situation by

22. *Cab 129*, 16, ff. 234-8, CP(47)32, Memorandum by Creech Jones, Secret, 16.1.1947.

23. *Cab 128*, 11, ff. 20-2, Cab11(47)2, Confidential Annex, 22.1.1947.

24. *FO 371*, 61874, E951/951/31, Foreign Office Minute by Howe, 22.1.1947; Minute by Bevin, Undated.

25. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*) *1947*(5), pp. 1008-11, 867N.01/1-2147, Memorandum by Acheson, Secret, 21.1.1947; *FO 371*, 61764, E743/46/G, Inverchapel to Bevin, Telegram No. 399, Secret, 21.1.1947 r 22.1.1947.

urging Congress to relax the immigration quotas. But as Britain had expertise, and would have to bear the primary responsibility for implemen any plan for Palestine, the final decision would have to rest with the Bri government. The United States would regret any British decision to turn mandate over to the General Assembly without recommendations.[26]

The Palestine conference met in London at the end of January. Follow the Zionist conference at Basle the Jewish Agency declined to take part, Creech Jones managed to arrange with Ben Gurion that responsible meml of the executive would be in London and available for informal discussion: The Eastern department of the Foreign Office kept the United States emb fully informed of the proceedings. This information was of a highly confider character not usually given to a foreign government, but the confidence not abused.[28] The views expressed by the British delegates at the confere did not reflect the considered opinion of the government: the absence Zionists drove them into advocating the Zionist position.[29] Britain hac weigh carefully the views of the United States, but on Palestine, as Attlee nc in suggesting that Opposition leaders in the House of Commons be informe the United States attitude, there was little possibility of ' anything us coming from the American side '.[30]

The initial meetings between British officials and the Arab delegates on hand, and the Zionist representatives on the other, revealed the intransige of the protagonists. Jamal Husseini of the Palestine Arabs spoke of inflex opposition to partition; the Arabs wanted self-determination.[31] Dr F. Jama Iraq explained that the Arab peoples were the only ones who seemed tc called upon to pay for what Hitler had done to the Jews.[32] The real obstacl a peaceful settlement was perhaps explained by Faris Bey Khouri of Syria w he said that the Jews looked upon non-Jews as subordinates ' whom would use for their own ends—and for this they considered they had bib warrant ': the Jews had to be persuaded to abandon the idea of a state basec religious and racial principles.[33] C. Bey Chamoun of the Lebanon asked British delegates to substitute the words ' Great Britain ' for ' Palestine ' to say what the reaction would be in Britain ' if a third Power were to im upon her an alien element whose presence was of a nature to disrupt national life and her political and territorial unity '.[34]

The Zionists, for their part, had the impression that ' Bevin was boss ' favoured the Morrison-Grady plan in some form.[35] Ben Gurion argued

26. *FRUS 1947*(5), pp. 1014-5, 867N.01/2-1247, State Department to British Embassy, 27.1.1947.

27 *Cab 128*, 11, f 14, Cab6(47)4, Confidential Annex, 15 1 1947.

28 *Cab 133*, 85, f. 7, Note by E. A Armstrong on Liaison with the United States Government

29. *FO 371*, 61782, E6116/46/31, Minute by Beeley, 11.7.1947.

30 *Ibid*, 61765 E1174/46/31, J. Addis to J. P. E C. Henniker, 30 1 1947; Minute by Bevin, Und Foreign Office Minute, 13.2 1947

31. *Cab 133*, 85, f. 3, Meeting 8, 27 1.1947; *FRUS 1947*(5), 867N.01/1 2847; Telegram, Gallm Marshall, Secret, 28.1.1947

32. *Ibid.*, f. 17, Meeting 9, 30.1.1947.

33. *Ibid*, f. 19, Meeting 9, 30.1 1947

34. *Ibid*, f. 10, Meeting 10, 4.2.1947

35 *FRUS 1947*(5), pp 1019-21, 867N 01/1-3047: Telegram, Gallman to Marshall, Secret, 30.1.19

although the Arabs had a right to remain in Palestine, the future of the Arab peoples and culture did not depend on that country. ' For the Jews that little country was the only one in which they could ensure the continuance of their race.'[36] The Zionists needed Palestine for the unborn generations of the Jewish people: they wanted to create there ' something worthy of the generations of Jewish martyrs '.[37] Bevin responded by attacking partition and insisting that Britain had no intention of imposing a solution which would mean taking up arms against the Arabs. Britain, according to the Foreign Secretary, did not need Palestine strategically and was prepared to throw the problem without recommendation to the United Nations.[38] Ben Gurion finally admitted that the word ' state ' had not been used in the mandate, but argued that ' National Home ' surely meant more than that a number of Jews would be allowed to live in Palestine. The riposte of Bevin was that it was a ' dreadful thing that Jews should be killing the British soldiers who had fought their battles for them against Germany '.[39]

Even Creech Jones seems to have been weaned away from his Zionist sympathies by these meetings with the Arabs and the Zionists. Perhaps, too, the Colonial Secretary was influenced by Bevin's forceful personality. In accordance with the Cabinet instruction of January 22 to submit for approval any definite plans to be laid before the protagonists, Creech Jones and Bevin drew up a joint memorandum on February 6. Between December and February Bevin had envisaged and supported various proposals. The joint memorandum reflected the tenor of Bevin's thinking at the end of January. The Foreign and Colonial Secretaries agreed that the conversations with the Arabs and Zionists had convinced them that there was no prospect of finding a settlement acceptable to both parties. It was finally clear that partition would be resisted by the Arabs of Palestine with the support of the governments and peoples of all the Arab states. The Zionists still interpreted the Balfour declaration and the mandate as implying that a Jewish state would be established over the whole of Palestine. Ben Gurion had spoken of 1,200,000 Jewish immigrants. For Britain that was unacceptable.

Creech Jones and Bevin decided that although the solution they recommended might not be acceptable to the two communities in Palestine it could be defended in Britain and in the United Nations. Partition could not be so defended: Arab minorities would be left within the Zionist state; and the Arab area could not be economically self-supporting even if attached to Transjordan. Bevin and Creech Jones suggested an alternative plan which had as its object the establishment of self-government in Palestine leading to independence after a transitional period of five years under trusteeship. There would be a substantial measure of local autonomy in the Arab and Jewish areas. The plan also provided for 100,000 Jewish immigrants over the

36. *Cab 133*, 85, f. 5, Jewish Delegation Meeting 1, 29.1.1947.
37. *Ibid.*, f. 16, Jewish Delegation Meeting 2, 3.2.1947.
38. *FRUS 1947*(5), pp. 1026-8, 867N.01/2-547: Telegram, Gallman to Marshall, 5.2.1947.
39. *Cab 133*, 85, ff. 12-13, Jewish Delegation Meeting 3, 6.2.1947.

following two years. Immigration after that would be by agreement of the two communities, and failing that, through United Nations arbitration. The Secretaries acknowledged that this plan offered no guarantee for the preservation of Britain's military position after the five year period of trusteeship.[40]

The Chiefs of Staff, when confronted with this memorandum on February 6, stood by their stated view that the preservation of Britain's strategic position in the Middle East would be gravely prejudiced if the right to station forces in Palestine were not retained. They were particularly concerned with the statement that if neither of the parties would accede to the plan the British government would have to submit the problem to the United Nations without making any positive recommendations. Such a step would almost certainly entail the loss of practically all British military rights in Palestine. They felt it essential that during the interim period of trusteeship Britain should retain these rights and ensure that they could be retained when the trusteeship ended. For this reason the Chiefs of Staff were unhappy with a five year period: that was an insufficient time in which to establish a stable state with which Britain could negotiate a favourable treaty. They preferred that the period of trusteeship should be left indefinite, but that it might be subject to review in five years.[41]

Despite the warnings of the Chiefs of Staff, Bevin suggested, when he presented the plan to the Cabinet, that if the parties did not acquiesce to it, Britain would have to submit the Palestine problem to the United Nations without making any recommendations. Creech Jones also explained his change of mind. The Colonial Secretary's support for partition had been based on the views of Cunningham and of his advisers in the Colonial Office. But Creech Jones had been impressed by the practical difficulties: the Arab attitude; the difficulties of securing support in the United Nations; and, most of all, by the prospect of the ensuing disorder in Palestine which would involve a substantial British military commitment. He felt the joint plan went some way to meet Zionist demands for immigration and land transfer and that they might be prepared to discuss it.

The Minister of Defence, A. V. Alexander, explained the reservations of the Chiefs of Staff but these were rejected by the Cabinet: a definite and short period of trusteeship was essential to convince the two communities that Britain intended independence for Palestine. The Cabinet felt that there was no reason to suppose that it would be more difficult to obtain a military alliance with an independent Palestine than it has been with Iraq or Transjordan. These proposals were based on the hope that the Zionists and Arabs would collaborate in a unitary state. It was admitted that there was not much sign of such readiness.[42]

40. *Cab 129*, 16, ff. 322-26, Joint Memorandum by Bevin and Creech Jones on Palestine, Top Secret, 6.2 1947

41 *Prem 8*, 627 pt 6, COS 161/7, Top Secret, 6.2.1947.

42 *Cab 128*, 9, ff. 76-77, Cab 18(47)2, Secret, 7 2 1947.

The United States was informed immediately of the British proposals.[43] Loy W. Henderson, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African affairs, commented that ' the plan should not be so objectionable to the Arabs as to the American Jews '. The British, in Henderson's views were trying to ' live up to the letter of the mandate and to preserve strict impartiality as between Jews and Arabs '. He argued that it would be unwise for the United States to comment until the storm following its announcement had subsided.[44]

The Zionists rejected the new proposals. Ben Gurion saw them as a retreat from the Morrison-Grady plans in the direction of the White Paper of 1939. He argued that the British conception of an independent state of Palestine meant one with an Arab majority: it would be a state composed of Palestinian nationals of Arab and Jewish race. This was unacceptable: ' they were first and foremost Jews and they wanted a Jewish state in Palestine in which the Jews would be a majority '.[45] Bevin responded a few days later: ' under the Jews the Arabs would have no rights but would remain in a permanent minority in a land they had held for 2,000 years '.[46]

In the view of the Arab delegates the new proposals would lead to partition. They also rejected them because they provided for further Jewish immigration.

On February 13 Bevin and Creech Jones, in another joint memorandum, stated that they had concluded that it was impossible to arrive at a peaceful settlement in Palestine on any basis whatsoever, except with the backing of the United Nations. Britain had to shoulder its present responsibilities until the matter could be referred to the General Assembly. During this period the situation in Palestine would be critical. Before September there might have to be a military administration.[47]

Bevin explained the situation to the Cabinet on February 14. Viscount Jowitt, the Lord Chancellor, attempted a last-minute intervention on behalf of the Zionists. John Strachey, the Minister of Food, also argued that the Jewish claims were just and that British strategic interests would be best served by military facilities in a friendly Jewish state. It was explained to Strachey that a safe base in Palestine would not be much use if the achieving of it estranged the surrounding Arab countries. Furthermore, after the recent Zionist terrorist activities in Palestine, it could not be assumed that full support for the Zionist claim would be acceptable either to public opinion in Britain or to the British troops in Palestine. Tedder warned again that, without adequate bases in the Middle East, Commonwealth defence would be undermined. Dalton was still in favour of partition and was relieved to learn that that solution would not be excluded if the matter were referred to the United Nations. The general view of the Cabinet was, however, that the whole problem should now be submitted to

43. *FRUS 1947*(5), pp. 1033-35, 867N.01/2-747, British Embassy to State Department, Undated; pp. 1035-37, 867N.01/2-947, Bevin to Marshall, Undated.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 1038-39, 867N.01/2-747, Henderson to Acheson, Secret, 10.2.1947.
45. *Cab 133*, 85, ff. 1-14, Jewish Delegation Meeting 4, 10.2.1947.
46. *Ibid.*, f. 8, Jewish Delegation Meeting 5, 13.2.1947.
47. *Cab 129*, 17, ff. 58-60, CP(47)59, Memorandum by Bevin and Creech Jones, Top Secret, 13.2.1947.

the United Nations without any British recommendation for a solution. If the settlement suggested by that body were not acceptable, Britain could then surrender the mandate and leave the United Nations to make other arrangements for the future administration of Palestine. Tedder told the Cabinet that once the announcement of submission to the United Nations was made it would be difficult to maintain the discipline and morale of the troops. Attlee remained adamant that there should in the meantime be no concessions on Jewish immigration, and it was generally felt that there should be soundings to see if the matter could be referred to the United Nations before the scheduled meeting of the General Assembly in September.[48]

Britain kept the United States informed of these developments. The United States, as the British had correctly assessed, had no definite policy on Palestine. Henderson thought that it might be wise to suggest to Britain that the matter be laid before the trusteeship council which would have its initial meeting in a month, rather than wait for the General Assembly. George Marshall, the new Secretary of State forwarded this suggestion on February 17, with Truman's concurrence.[49] Next day Bevin accordingly announced to the House of Commons that the Palestine issue would be referred to the United Nations.[50]

On February 25 the Foreign Secretary, with a comprehensive brief drafted by the Foreign Office before him, spoke extemporaneously to the Commons on Palestine. Bevin did say that he would be willing to try again for a settlement before a United Nations decision. A good deal of his speech, however, was devoted to the charge that America's ' intervention ' in Palestine had ' set the whole thing back '. Bevin stated: ' in international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections '. The House of Commons cheered this attack on Truman only a few days after the United States had decided to take over Britain's responsibilities in Greece.[51] Bevin was correct in his analysis, but this personal attack at a crucial time when the Foreign Secretary had just succeeded in securing a United States commitment to Europe is difficult to understand. It could be attributed to frustration and bad temper. It was certainly undiplomatic, and Bevin had to excuse his behaviour to Lord Inverchapel, the British Ambassador in Washington, in terms of the need to demonstrate to the House how Britain had tried to secure United States co-operation.[52] The storm was brief. On March 11 Inverchapel was able to report that it had been engulfed by the all-absorbing interest in the Greek crisis.[53]

There was a degree of desperation evident in Britain's policy over Palestine at this time. Bevin, judging from some of his Foreign Office minutes, had decided that Britain could not continue to handle an intractable problem. But

48 *Cab 128*, 9, ff. 92-94, Cab22(47)2, Secret, 14.2.1947.
49. *FRUS 1947*(5), pp. 1054-95, 867N.01/2-2147: Telegram, Marshall to Bevin, Secret, 21.2.1947.
50. *Cab 128*, 9, f. 97, Cab23(47)3, Secret, 18.2.1947; *U K Parl Deb H of C*, 433, col. 985, 18.2.1947.
51 *Ibid*, col. 1901, 25.2.1947; *FRUS* 1947(5), pp. 1056-7, 867N.01/2-2547, McWilliams to Marshall, 25.2.1947; pp. 1058 9, 867N.01/2 2647, Telegram, Gallman to Marshall, Secret, 26.2.1947.
52 *FO 371*, 61769, E1832/46/G, Bevin to Inverchapel, Telegram No. 1851, Top Secret, 26.2.1947.
53 *CO 537*, 2313, 75872/14, Inverchapel to North American Department, 11.3.1947

the advantages of being freed from a task which not only brought Britain international censure but was also being increasingly resented at home had to be set alongside the strategic needs of Commonwealth defence. From the military point of view there seemed no alternative to Palestine, even if Bevin at one point did tell Jewish delegates that Britain did not need Palestine ' strategically '. The situation was complicated by the breakdown of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations in January 1947 over the Sudanese issue.[54] But this was a period of withdrawal from commitments that had become impossible to sustain: at the end of January the Cabinet decided that responsibility for Greece and Turkey could be taken over by the United States;[55] on January 8 the Cabinet agreed to the transfer of power in India and a phased withdrawal of British authority[56] and on February 18 it was decided that power would be transferred by June 1948.[57] In line with this overall policy, solely for ' political considerations ', the Cabinet agreed on April 3, 1947 to reduce the period of national service from eighteen to twelve months. Montgomery felt that this was acceptable on condition that certain overseas commitments such as Palestine and India were liquidated by 1949 or 1950.[58] But there was general agreement that the Middle East was a vital area for Britain, and officials did not welcome United States intrusion in that traditional British sphere of interest.

Perhaps a major factor influencing British policy was the deteriorating situation on the ground in Palestine, and the effect the burden was having on the British public. Sensational kidnappings in retaliation for death sentences passed on Zionist murderers inflamed people in Britain. Plans were laid for the imposition of martial law in Tel Aviv, and this was imposed briefly in March after twenty British soldiers were killed in an attack on the Jerusalem officers' club.[59] There were fears that the illegal immigration would worsen and that the French would not co-operate even though they were seeking a general alliance with Britain at the time.[60] Many of the immigration ships were manned by United States captains and crews. Sir R. Howe of the Foreign Office suggested that the American citizens caught in this traffic should be given a ' good stiff term of prison ', and complained of the lamentable weakness of the Palestine government in dealing with such cases.[61]

The Cabinet decided on March 20 that the results achieved from the imposition of martial law were disappointing, and decided upon a firmer stand. It instructed the Chiefs of Staff to outline the measures necessary for maintaining law and order in Palestine over the following six months,

54. *Cab 128*, 9, f. 51, Cab 12(47)2, Secret, 27.1.1947.

55. *Ibid.*, f. 92, Cab 14(47)4, Secret, 30.1.1947; *Cab 129*, 16, CP(47)34, Policy towards Greece and Turkey, Top Secret, 25.1.1947.

56. *Cab 128*, 11, ff. 3-4, Cab 4(47)1, Confidential Annex, 8.1.1947.

57. *Ibid.*, f. 30, Cab 23(47)1, Confidential Annex, 18.2.1947.

58. *Ibid.*, 9, f. 159, Cab 35(47)5, Secret, 3.4.1947.

59. See Nicholas Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle* (London, 1979), pp. 297–304.

60. *FO 371*, 61801, E1616/48/G, J. D. Higham to J G. S. Beith, Confidential 14.2.1947.

61. *Ibid.*, 61838, E1587/84/31, Minute by Beith, 22.2.1947.

including the possibility of imposing martial law over the whole co Creech Jones's recommendation that there should be no increa immigration certificates and no modification of the land transfer regu was also endorsed.[62]

This was the general background against which Bevin kept parliamentary pledge and saw members of the Jewish Agency brie February 27. Nothing came of these talks.[63] Britain then suggested th United Nations set up immediately an *ad hoc* committee of enquiry would report to the Secretary-General on the Palestine problem. Tryg agreed with this, as did the French, the Chinese and the Russians. The States did not agree.[64] It mounted its opposition in terms of the legality proposal, and implied that it wanted a fairly precise recommendation United Nations from the British government.[65] Lie thought that th procedure was for Britain to request a special session of the assembly. April 2, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British representative at the Nations, complied.[67] The majority of members agreed to Britain's reque the special session met in New York on April 28.

After discussions between Bevin and Attlee, Cadogan told the worl that Britain would welcome an acceptable solution, but should not hav responsibility for enforcing one not accepted by both parties.[68] On May special session adopted a resolution providing for the setting-up of a fact-fi committee on Palestine. The Russian delegate, A. Gromyko, how surprised the assembly in the closing stages.[69] Russia moved from its pre position of limited support for the Arab case coupled with a reluctance t an anti-Jewish line[70] to suggesting that the solution of partition would h be considered. The Zionists thus began to feel that they would even secure Russian support for partition. Beeley's personal estimate wa Gromyko was preparing the way for a Russian proposal, at a later stag some form of joint trusteeship in which the Russians would be associated.

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) con of eleven neutral states, did not include any of the Great Powers or an state, and had broad powers to investigate all relevant issues in Palestin elsewhere. On the American side, Marshall felt that the general results special session were 'very satisfactory' and that there was hope t 'practicable solution' would be presented to the General Assemb

62 *Cab 129*, 17, ff 226 9, CP(47)95, Memorandum by Creech Jones on Palestine, Top 19.3.1947
63. *FRUS 1947(5)*, p 1058, note 2
64 *Prem 8*, 626, T I Rowan to Attlee, Urgent, 10.3.1947
65 *FRUS 1947(5)*, pp. 1062-3, 867N.01/3-847; Telegram, Austin to Marshall, Secret, 8.3.1 1066 7, 867N.01/3 2847, Department of State to British Embassy, 28.3.1947
66. *Ibid*., p 1067, note 1.
67 *Ibid*., pp. 1067 8, Cadogan to Hoo, 2 3.1947.
68 *Cab 128*, 9, f. 185, Cab 11(47)2, Secret, 29 4.1947; Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel* (1965), p 379.
69. *FO 371*, 61777, P Garran to Sir Orme Sargent, 23.5.1947
70 *Ibid*., 61774, E3543/46.31, Minute by P. Garran, 30 4 1947
71 *Ibid*., 61777, P Garran to Sir Orme Sargent, 23.5.1947.

tember.[72] Warren Austin, the United States representative at the United ;ions, was similarly encouraged but urged that the time was short for the ited States to work out a tentative position. He suggested that, as a working othesis, the United States should consider supporting an independent estine as a member of the United Nations. The state would not be based on al or religious factors, and hence not being either Arab or Jewish. Austin clearly reflecting here the views of the State Department.[73]

t is evident that at this time there were United States officials thinking ng the same lines as their British counterparts. But there was still no agreed ited States policy on Palestine. For Britain, the United States' position on estine remained obscure throughout this time of the emergence of the man doctrine, of Marshall aid, and of the American commitment to stop Russian advance in Europe.

JNSCOP arrived in Palestine in the middle of June. Cunningham reported Creech Jones towards the end of July that the majority of the Committee ned to be in favour of partition.[74] But early in August, in Geneva, it eared that the partition bloc crumbled and a majority began to form behind lan for a ten-year period, probably under British trusteeship, with the ependence of a unitary state as its goal, and with limited immigration in the ntime. This resembled the Morrison-Grady plan.[75] R. H. S. Crossman, o had been a British member of the Anglo-American Committee, rushed to neva to try to stop this unsatisfactory development and to urge partition.[76] UNSCOP veered in that direction again Beeley noted: ' nevertheless there be little doubt that the Jewish Government would raise immigration to the nest possible figure, and would sooner or later present the world with a nand for *lebensraum.* It is abundantly clear that partition is regarded by the ish Agency as a stepping stone to control the whole of Palestine. This is naps the principal argument against it, from the point of view of British rests.'[77]

JNSCOP's report was signed on August 31. The majority plan suggested ition into an Arab state, a Jewish state and the city of Jerusalem. There ild be a transitional period towards independence from September 1, 1947 ing which Britain would continue to administer the mandate, under the pices of the United Nations, and to admit into the proposed Jewish state),000 immigrants. Jerusalem would be under an international trusteeship. : minority plan, proposed by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia called for an ependent federal state after a transitional period not exceeding three years, ing which time responsibility for administering Palestine would be usted to an authority designated by the General Assembly.[78]

:. *FRUS 1947*(5), pp. 1085-6, 501.BB/5-1647, Marshall to Truman, 16.5.1947.
. *Ibid.*, pp. 1086-8, 501.BB Palestine/5-2247, Austin to Marshall, Secret, 22.5.1947.
. *CO 537*, 2272, Cunningham to Creech Jones, Private and Personal 19.7.1947.
. *FO 371*, 61784, E7453/46/G, Minute by Beeley, 15.8.1947.
. *Ibid.*, 61785, E7568/46/G, Beeley to MacGillivray, Top Secret, 13.8.1947.
'. *Ibid.*, 61786, E7855/46/31, Minute by Beeley, 29.8.1947.
:. *FRUS 1947*(5), p. 1143.

The period of the UNSCOP enquiry saw the final wearing-down of British morale in Palestine. Early in June Cunningham urged that the United Nations should consider the forthcoming UNSCOP report at the earliest possible moment since delay could only mean a further deterioration in the already critical situation in Palestine. Creech Jones was anxious that ' the present almost intolerable situation should be brought to an end with the least possible delay '. There were limits to what could be asked of the forbearance of the troops and the civilian administration.[79] The estimated military expenditure in Palestine for the army and air force alone was £23,500,000.[80]

Two incidents in particular served to convince Britain that it had to withdraw quickly from Palestine. The first was the arrival in Palestine of the *President Warfield*, renamed *Exodus*, with 4,493 illegal immigrants on board. Britain, with the co-operation of France, placed the immigrants in transports and returned them to their French port of embarkation. There the French authorities declined to force the immigrants to disembark. The other incident—which influenced the discussion about what was to be done with *Exodus* immigrants—was the hanging and booby-trapping of the bodies of two British sergeants in retaliation of the execution of Zionist terrorists. The bodies were found on July 31.[81] There were serious outbreaks of anti-semitism in Britain: the *Yorkshire Post* carried anti-Jewish editorials; synagogues were daubed with swastikas. Feeling in Britain also ran high against the United States for providing money for the Zionist terrorists: the *Daily Mail* on August 1 appealed to the feelings of ' American women whose dollars helped to buy rope '. With opinion like this in Britain landing the *Exodus* refugees there was out of the question.[82] Bevin was aware of the probable repercussions in the United States of sending them back to the British zone in Germany, but he pointed out to Inverchapel that there was no alternative. They were shipped back to the British zone in Hamburg, making the greatest Zionist propaganda success of the time.[83] It was in these circumstances that, as early as July 29 Aneurin Bevan suggested, in a Cabinet discussion about Britain's balance of payments difficulties, that such drastic action might be taken as the withdrawal of British forces from Palestine.[84]

Following the UNSCOP report Bevin prepared a memorandum for the cabinet dated September 18. The Foreign Secretary commented that the frontiers of the UNSCOP majority plan were more unfavourable to the Arabs than anything the British government had ever contemplated. After Cadogan's statements to the special session Britain was not committed to accepting or carrying out any recommendation the Assembly might make.

79. *FO 371*, 61931, W. A. C. Mathieson to C. W. Baxter, 19.6.1947.

80. *Ibid.*, 61941, E6111/6111/31, British Middle East Office to Foreign Office, Telegram No. 107, 7.7.1947 r 8.7.1947.

81. CO 537, 2281, CS699, High Commissioner's Monthly Report for July 1947, Top Secret.

82. Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914–1956* (London, 1963), p. 116.

83. CO 537, 2313, E7490/48/G, Bevin to Inverchapel, Telegram No. 8281, Secret, 16.8.1947; Sykes, pp. 381–4; Bethell, pp. 316–44.

84. *Cab 128*, 10, f. 92, Cab 65(47)2, Secret, 29.7.1947.

Although Britain would not want to obstruct an Assembly recommendation by refusing to accept it, enforcement of it was another matter. And Britain could not enforce the majority plan. It was so manifestly unjust to the Arabs that it was difficult to see how, in Cadogan's words ' we could reconcile it with our conscience '. Furthermore, Bevin pointed out, there would be an Arab rising in Palestine supported by the rest of the Moslem world, and, in the estimate of the Chiefs of Staff, at least one division would have to be sent to the Middle East. The long-term strategic and political consequences were even more serious: any treaty rights accorded to Britain by a Zionist state would be poor compensation for the loss of Arab goodwill and with it the prospect of establishing the firm strategic hold in the Middle East which was an indispensable part of Commonwealth defence policy. Bevin envisaged Zionist irredentism and the Arabs in that state playing a ' part in history not unlike the Sudeten German minority in pre-war Czechoslovakia '.

One alternative was an adjusted partition scheme reducing the size of the Arab minority in the Zionist state. But this UNSCOP minority plan, involving substantial adjustments, was unacceptable to the Zionists and its enforcement would inevitably have lead to increased Zionist terrorism. The Chiefs of Staff, however, estimated that no reinforcements would be needed to deal with this eventuality. But, in view of the planned run-down of British forces in the Middle East, the point would soon be reached when the necessary strength could only be maintained there at the expense of some other commitment. Furthermore the minority plan depended on the co-operation of the Arabs and the Zionists which would not be forthcoming—and any enforcing power would therefore probably not be able to extricate itself from Palestine after the three year transitional period.

There would be grave disadvantages in Britain undertaking to carry out any of these solutions. Bevin argued that the Cabinet had to prepare for an alternative course. The situation in Palestine was intolerable and could not be allowed to continue. If the United Nations failed, or if it proposed a solution for which Britain could not accept responsibility, ' the only remaining course would be to withdraw from Palestine, in the last resort unconditionally '. Withdrawal in the absence of agreement between the Arabs and Zionists had disadvantages: the period between the announcement of intention and actual withdrawal would be more difficult for the administration than any previous period; the consequences of British withdrawal would be unpredictable and some or all of the Arab states would probably become involved in the resulting disorders. The Security Council might intervene. But even if British withdrawal had to ' be effected at the cost of a period of bloodshed and chaos in the country ' it would have two major advantages: British lives would not be lost and British resources would not be spent in suppressing one Palestinian community for the advantage of the other; Britain would not be pursuing a policy destructive of its own interests in the Middle East. Britain could weaken the force of any accusation from either Arab or Zionist that it had not fulfilled its obligations in Palestine.

The Foreign Secretary accordingly recommended that, failing a satisfactory settlement, Britain should announce its determination to withdraw its forces and administration from Palestine. It should be made clear to the General Assembly at an early stage that Britain's mind was ' made up '. There was a chance that this announcement could produce a solution for which Britain might feel justified in accepting responsibility. But Britain had to be prepared, if there were no prospect of this when the Assembly finished, to make a further statement announcing the date on which British forces and the civil administration would be withdrawn from Palestine. The offer of British assistance to help the Zionists and Arabs to reach agreement should be repeated at that time.[85]

The Chiefs of Staff, in their recommendations of September 18, emphasised the overriding importance they attached for Britain's strategic position to the retention of the goodwill of the Arab states and of the Moslem world as a whole. They warned that if Palestine were handed over to an authority containing a considerable Russian element Britain's interests would not be served. A body dominated by the United States would be comparatively acceptable. Control should pass to a ' national or international authority friendly to us, and both willing and able to resist Russian encroachment '. Even United States control would only afford temporary security.[86]

The Foreign Office also provided notes to prevent arguments in the Cabinet against extremes. It seemed to accept withdrawal. The notes, however, warned of dangers in drawing analogies between Palestine and India: unlike India, Palestine had no structure of self-government; in India Britain could not be held responsible for the warring communities, whereas in Palestine the ' Jewish National Home ' had been created as a ' result of a British promise and under British protection '. The Foreign Office suggested that Britain should make it clear that while it was determined to withdraw from Palestine in the absence of a peaceful settlement, it was not planning its withdrawal with complete indifference to the future of Palestine.[87]

On September 20 Bevin put his policy to the Cabinet: failing a satisfactory settlement Britain should announce its intention to surrender the mandate and to plan for an early withdrawal of British forces and of the British administration from Palestine. Bevin considered the UNSCOP proposals unacceptable. Creech Jones implied that a settlement was unlikely, and warned of the difficulties of safeguarding British interests like air-fields and oil installations with Palestine in chaos. By the time Alexander spoke the probability of British withdrawal seemed to have been accepted by the Cabinet. The Minister of Defence explained that Britain would have to choose between ceasing to administer Palestine immediately and merely maintaining such order as was necessary to ensure the withdrawal of British forces and civilians,

85. *Cab 129*, 21, ff. 48-56, CP(47)259, Memorandum by Bevin on Palestine, Top Secret, 18.9.1947.

86. *Ibid.*, ff. 120-29, CP(47)262, Memorandum by Alexander on Military and Strategic Requirements, Top Secret, 18.9.1947.

87. *FO 371*, 61789, E8833/36 G, Foreign Office Minutes dated 19.9.1947.

or attempting to maintain law and order throughout the whole of Palestine until the date announced for the end of the British administration. The former course would involve loss of life and property but would not need reinforcements; the latter would require substantial reinforcements. Bevin wanted it made clear that whatever decision the United Nations reached it was Britain's intention to relinquish the mandate. But Shinwell felt that Britain should help in enforcing the majority report if it were accepted by the United Nations. In Dalton's view the date of withdrawal should be announced as soon as possible, though he appreciated that it would be impolitic to do this before the Assembly had considered the UNSCOP report. Attlee concluded by saying that he felt there was a close parallel between the position in Palestine and the recent situation in India. The prime minister did not think it reasonable to ask the British administration to continue in the prevailing conditions. The policy of withdrawal was accepted.[88]

After his return from the United States in December 1946 Bevin had seriously considered the need for Britain to withdraw from Palestine. He had only been swayed from this policy by the strategic arguments put forward by the military. The insistence of the Chiefs of Staff on the need for a British base in Palestine forced the Foreign Secretary to try again proposals for bi-nationalism, and then to present the problem to the United Nations. The Cabinet decision for withdrawal, late in September, was consistent with the policy Bevin seems really to have wanted to pursue at the end of 1946. The Foreign Secretary felt that the attitude of the United States President placed Britain in an untenable position. It is evident that until September 1947 there was no agreed United States policy for Palestine: officials in the State Department were urging the necessity of defining one. The progressive deterioration of the situation in Palestine itself increasingly undermined British morale. The UNSCOP recommendation for partition was the end. With that, even dissent within the Cabinet finally melted away. There was general agreement that Britain was in a hopeless position in Palestine. It would have to withdraw.

88. *Cab 128*, 10, ff. 148-50, Cab76(47)6, Secret, 20.9.1947.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT AND COMMUNITY LAW *

Dear Sir,

Professor Mitchell's article of January 1979 on ' The Sovereignty of Parliament and Community Law ' was written for ' those who are not specialist constitutional lawyers ' (p. 33) and was presented as an attempt ' to clarify argument ' (p. 45) on the issue of the apparent conflict between the British constitutional principle of the sovereignty of Parliament and the principles of European Community law as interpreted by the European Court of Justice.

This article seems to me to require a reply because it was written for, and presumably largely read by, laymen who may have acquired the impression that what they were reading was a definitive statement by an eminent constitutional lawyer of the correct legal position on this issue. Although I am a layman myself in legal matters, it does seem to me that the legal position is somewhat less clear than Professor Mitchell maintains.

The issue under consideration arises out of the repeated assertion by the European Court of Justice of the principle that Community law must always take precedence over national law wherever there is a conflict. This seems to contradict traditional British constitutional practice centred around the concept of the sovereignty of Parliament. If this doctrine is followed, the principle asserted by the European Court cannot be valid.

According to British constitutional doctrine, an international treaty does not have the status of law until its content is incorporated in statute law. So European Community law is only valid in British courts by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972. But another fundamental principle of British constitutional practice is that no Parliament can bind its successors, so that where a later statute conflicts with an earlier one the courts always apply the later in time, on the principle *lex posterior derogat priori*. If this principle were applied when a Community law came into conflict with a statute enacted subsequent to the European Communities Act, the later statute would take precedence. This is exactly the opposite conclusion from that of the European Court, which maintains that any Community law takes precedence over any statute law with which it conflicts regardless of the date of enactment of the statute. The constitutional principles which form a part of the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament seem, therefore, to form a stumbling-block to the unqualified acceptance in British courts of European Community law.

It is the existence of this stumbling-block which Professor Mitchell seeks to deny. He does so by arguing that the validity of Community law does not rest upon the European Communities Act. Instead he argues that a revolution has taken place which has instituted a new set of constitutional principles. On entering the European

* A response to Professor J. D. B. Mitchell's article on ' The Sovereignty of Parliament and Community Law: The Stumbling-Block That Isn't There ', which appeared in the January 1979 issue of *International Affairs*, pp. 33–46.

Stephen George would like to thank Josephine Steiner of the Faculty of Law, at the University of Sheffield for her comments on an earlier draft of this extended letter. Although she bears no responsibility for any errors which may remain, she was responsible for the elimination of several errors which might otherwise have appeared.

Communities the United Kingdom entered a pre-existing legal order with its own rules. The act of joining this legal order changed the Constitution, because in entering it the United Kingdom necessarily accepted its rules. There is no problem, therefore, about the principles of Community law taking precedence over national law. There is only a problem if the fundamental constitutional principle remains the sovereignty of Parliament, which it does not: the primacy of Community law is now the fundamental principle of our Constitution.

Mitchell buttresses his argument by quoting precedents for the acceptance of such a revolution in constitutional principles both from the historical experience of the United Kingdom and from the experience of other member states of the Community. In both cases the statement may appear to the layman to be authoritative. But there are perhaps more problems than Mitchell suggests.

On the question of British precedent there already exists a thorough critique of an earlier use of this argument by Mitchell.[1] In this F. A. Trindade points out that there is no reason to assume that either the Acts of Union or the Statute of Westminster 1931 (and subsequent statutes recognising the legal independence of former Dominions) have any status superior to that of ordinary statute law. On the Acts of Union he says:

> It is generally accepted, though not by Mitchell, that legislation contrary to the Acts of Union was enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament in the Universities (Scotland) Acts 1853 and 1932.[2]

There would be no problem about the later Acts being accepted by United Kingdom courts, despite their incompatibility with the Acts of Union, because the courts apply only one constitutional principle to all statutes, that of *lex posterior derogat priori.*

On the validity of the Statute of Westminster as a precedent for a constitutional revolution Trindade says:

> There is no evidence whatsoever that an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament will be declared invalid by the British courts if the statute is enacted contrary to section 4 of the Statute of Westminster 1931 or the various Independence Acts . . . On the contrary, it seems that the courts in the United Kingdom would be bound to say that the statute was a valid Act of the United Kingdom Parliament. This has been the constant view of the courts in the United Kingdom . . .[3]

There does not seem to be any precedent in either the Acts of Union or the Statute of Westminster for the type of revolution in constitutional principles which Mitchell wishes the courts to recognise. Nor is there any firm evidence that the courts have accepted the latest supposed revolution. This is a point to which I shall return, but first I would like to make a few comments on the experience of other Community member states.

Here again Mitchell seems to suggest that the position is straightforward: other member states have faced the same problems that face the United Kingdom in adjusting their national legal systems to the existence of the Community systems, but they have eventually come to accept the argument that the Community represents a superior legal order. There is reason to suggest that matters are not quite so clear.

In West Germany the existence of a federal constitution has made the acceptance of the principles of Community law easier than in states which have unitary systems. Yet even here there remains a barrier to the unqualified acceptance of the primacy of Community law. Mitchell mentions that ' in one case . . . the Constitutional Court maintained the possibility of testing Community law against the provisions of the

1. See, F. A. Trindade, ' Parliamentary Sovereignty and the EEC , *Modern Law Review*, Vol. 35, 1972, pp. 375-402.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 389.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 387.

Constitution on fundamental rights ' (p. 44). This seems to play down a genuine problem for anyone who, like Mitchell, wishes to maintain that other member states of the Community have accepted the argument that membership constitutes a revolution in their constitutional principles. In its judgment in the *Internationale Handelsgesellschaft* case (1970) the European Court was adamant that ' the validity of a Community instrument . . . cannot be affected by allegations that it strikes at . . . the fundamental rights as formulated in that state's constitution.'[4] In its consideration of the same case the Federal German Constitutional Court came to the decision that Community law, while certainly valid within the Federal Republic, had to abide by the principles of the Constitution, and in particular the provisions on individual human rights, just as national laws had to do. Were this not so, in the absence of ' equivalent legal safeguards ' the principle of the constitutional state would be undermined.[5] This fundamental disagreement between the Federal German Constitutional Court and the European Court remains unresolved.

It might also be argued that Mitchell makes too light of the reliance of the French Cour de Cassation on Article 55 of the French Constitution in its judgment in the case *Administration des Douanes* v. *Soc. des Cafés Jacques Vabre* (p. 43). As Mitchell says, the decision to rest the judgment on a provision of the national constitution was made contrary to the urging of the Procureur Général, and may be seen as a deliberate attempt to comply with the requirements of membership of the Communities while minimising the implications for national sovereignty. In short, the French Cour de Cassation found a specifically French solution to the challenge of accommodating the domestic legal order to the legal demands of the Community. And it did this rather than accepting the argument for a revolution in French constitutional principles.

I would suggest that something similar is actually happening in the United Kingdom. European Community law is accepted and applied in British courts, but there is little reason to suppose that this is because British courts have accepted Mitchell's argument for a revolution in constitutional principles. It is more likely that Community law is being applied because it has been incorporated in United Kingdom law by the European Communities Act 1972.

It is true that there have been cases where Community law has been given precedence over British statute law even though the British statute was enacted later than the European Communities Act. No statement was made in any of these cases on the general principles involved, but it is safe to assume that the decisions were in response to sections 2 (4) and 3 (2) of the European Communities Act. Section 2 (4) indicates clearly to the courts that any Act of Parliament ' passed or to be passed . . . shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section '[6] (i.e. subject to the provisions of Community law). Section 3 (2) clearly states that national courts should take notice of ' any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the European Court '.

Acceptance of these sections of the Act by the courts does imply a modification of the principle of *lex posterior derogat priori*, but rejection of them would constitute a rejection of the clearly expressed will of Parliament. This places the courts in a genuine dilemma, but one which they seem to be in the process of solving in a typically pragmatic manner, without talk of revolution. The traditional principle is being modified to take account of the political fact of membership, but this is not the same as accepting that entry to the Communities produced a revolution in constitutional principles in itself. It is the existence of the European Communities Act which

4 *Common Market Law Reports*, Vol. II, Part 56, 1972, p 283.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 185.

6. See, for example, Re an Absence in Ireland (National Insurance Commissioner), *Common Market Law Reports*, Vol. 19, 1977, pp 5-11, where Community rules were given precedence over section 82 (5) (*a*) of the Social Security Act 1975.

requires the modification to the principle of *lex posterior derogat priori*, if this view is accepted.

Although Mitchell presents it as ' an extreme view ' (p. 40), it is the logical consequence of his solution to the problem under discussion that the European Communities Act was unnecessary for Community law to become enforceable in British courts, and that ' any repeal of the European Communities Act would be immaterial ' because the ' rights, to which it draws attention, continue . . . so long as the United Kingdom remains a Member State of the Communities ' (p. 41). As there is no provision for any member state to withdraw from the Communities under international law, the implications for national sovereignty are considerable.

If the courts were to accept the alternative argument which I have presented they would achieve for the United Kingdom just what the French Cour de Cassation has attempted to achieve for France: they would accommodate the political fact of Community membership and the obligations which that imposes, while minimising the damage to national sovereignty and to the constitutional principle of the sovereignty of Parliament. If a subsequent Parliament does not wish to be bound by the European Communities Act, it would remain free to repeal the Act and so banish Community law from the Kingdom.

In the absence of any definitive statement from the courts we cannot assert with confidence that they are in the process of accepting either Mitchell's argument or the alternative outlined here. But at least I hope to have shown that there is a choice of legal arguments available; readers of Mitchell's article may have gained the impression that there was none.

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BOOKS

THE KOREAN WAR

Geoffrey Warner *

EVEN in 1950, the Korean War was seen—at least in the West—as marking an important turning-point in the history of the cold war. As President Truman put it in the statement which he made on June 27, 1950, two days after the war began, 'The attack upon Korea mades it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.'[1]

From their differing perspectives, later historians have tended to agree that the Korean War did indeed form some sort of watershed. 'A most important milestone in the Cold War was passed between mid July and October 1950', writes the 'revisionist' Walter LaFeber:

> During these months, the United States decided not only to roll back invading North Korean troops to the 38th parallel but to move beyond the parallel itself. This historic decision marked the moment when the United States decided to move from a policy of 'containment', as defined by President Truman in 1947, to a policy of 'liberation', or the rolling back of Communism.[2]

The more orthodox John Lewis Gaddis also contrasts the events of 1947 and 1950, but reaches a slightly different conclusion:

> The Truman Doctrine [he writes], far from representing a revolution in American foreign policy, was very much in line with previously established precedents for dealing with shifts in the European balance of power; . . . despite its sweeping language the Truman administration, between 1947 and 1950, had neither the intention nor the capability of policing the rest of the world; . . . the real commitment to contain communism everywhere originated in the events surrounding the Korean War, not the crisis in Greece and Turkey.[3]

Regardless of which of these two interpretations is the more accurate, there can be no doubt about the practical consequences of the Korean War for Western governments: a huge increase in anxiety and a massive rearmament programme.

There were also important consequences in the Communist world. We have Mao Tse-tung's own testimony that the Korean War cemented a somewhat shaky Sino-

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1 Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, *Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 339.

2 Walter LaFeber, 'Crossing the 38th: the Cold War in Microcosm', in L. H. Miller and R. W. Pruessen (eds.), *Reflections on the Cold War: A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974), pp. 74-75.

3 John Lewis Gaddis, 'Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?', *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 52, No. 2, January 1974, p. 386.

Soviet alliance. 'After the victory of the revolution', he told the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1962,

> [Stalin] . . . suspected China of being a Yugoslavia, and that I would become a second Tito. Later when I went to Moscow to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, we had to go through another struggle. He was not willing to sign a treaty. After two months of negotiations he at last signed. When did Stalin begin to have confidence in us? It was at the time of the Resist America, Aid Korea campaign from the winter of 1950. He then came to believe that we were not Tito, not Yugoslavia.[4]

The Soviet leader, it appears from Italian Communist sources, shared Western anxieties about the possible spread of the Korean War. He was so concerned by the international situation at the end of 1950 that he contemplated a large-scale reorganisation of the Cominform, warning the Italians that a global conflict could break out at any moment and that the Communist parties in Western countries might be banned.[5]

Granted the importance of the Korean War as outlined above, what does recent scholarship and new source material enable us to say about it? The remainder of this article will attempt to answer this question, concentrating upon three major issues: the origins of the war, the United States decision to cross the 38th parallel, and the Chinese intervention of October/November 1950.

The most important recent study of the origins of the war is undoubtedly Robert Simmons's *The Strained Alliance: Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War.*[6] Simmons argues that 'although the Russians certainly armed the North Koreans, and did expect a war, . . . the *timing* of the war—which was primarily a *civil* conflict—can best be understood in terms of the indigenous conditions on the Korean peninsula.' This timing, he maintains, 'was caused by intense intra-Korean Workers' Party (KWP) rivalry in the north, combined with appeals from South Korean-based guerrillas who had powerful supporters in the north. These pressures forced Kim Il-Sung into a war date earlier than the one which his Soviet mentors and he had probably agreed upon.'[7] In support of his contention that the actual invasion date—June 25, 1950—was earlier than that originally planned—which he puts at 'about August 7'—Simmons cites evidence to the effect that the North Korean forces were neither fully armed nor mobilised in June, that only 12 per cent of the battle-hardened Korean veterans of the Chinese People's Liberation Army had returned to their country by the 25th, and that the chief of North Korea's military intelligence was in Moscow on that date. That the Soviet Union was, in fact, taken by surprise by the invasion is indicated, according to Simmons, by a 36-hour delay in the issuing of any Russian statement on the fighting and by the absence of its delegate from the United Nations Security Council. As president of the Council in August, Simmons claims, the Soviet Union would have been able to prevent any United Nations business regarding Korea from being transacted.[8]

This, it must be admitted, is an intriguing and plausible hypothesis. It must also be admitted, however, that it is based entirely upon circumstantial evidence. Simmons does not produce a shred of direct, first-hand evidence to sustain his case, which is hardly surprising since there is none. In a perceptive review of Simmons's book, William Stueck shows how a similar use of circumstantial evidence can point to there

4. Stuart Schram (ed.), *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters 1956-71* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 191.
5. Pietro Secchia, 'La Richiesta di Stalin e le decisioni di Togliatti', *Rinascita*, April 3, 1970, p. 30.
6. New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1975.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
8. *Ibid.*, Chapter 5, passim.

having been such a close and subordinate relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union in 1950 that it would have been inconceivable for the latter not to have known what was going on.[9] Stueck, moreover, produces two pieces of direct evidence: the first is an article in the June 27, 1960 issue of *Life* magazine, written by Pawel Monat, who was Polish military attaché to both China and North Korea from 1951 to 1954, and who defected to the West in 1959; the second is the first volume of the Khrushchev reminiscences. Both maintain that the Russians were fully apprised of the launching of the North Korean invasion, although they differ on the extent to which they were involved in conceiving and planning it.

Of the two, Monat's testimony is the least reliable. Defectors often tell their hosts what they want to hear, and the date of publication of his article—almost ten years to the day after the outbreak of the war—suggests that it was a commemorative piece specially written for the occasion. Monat, moreover, was not in China or Korea in 1950, so he was clearly not a witness of the events he describes. Khrushchev, however, is in a different category. Since the publication of the second volume of his reminiscences in 1974 we have known that they are authentic in the sense of having been written, or rather dictated, by their purported author.[10] Whether they are any more or less truthful than the memoirs of other retired statesmen is, of course, another matter, but they must at least be taken seriously.

Khruschev's account is as follows:

> About the time I was transferred from the Ukraine to Moscow at the end of 1949, Kim Il-Sung arrived with his delegation to hold consultations with Stalin. The North Koreans wanted to prod South Korea with the point of a bayonet. Kim Il-Sung said that the first poke would touch off an internal explosion in South Korea and that the power of the people would prevail—that is, the power which ruled in North Korea. Naturally, Stalin couldn't oppose this idea . . . [but he] persuaded Kim Il-Sung that he should think it over, make some calculations, and then come back with a concrete plan. Kim went home and then returned to Moscow when he had worked everything out. He told Stalin he was absolutely certain of success. I remember Stalin had his doubts. He was worried that the Americans would jump in, but we were inclined to think that if the war were won swiftly—and Kim Il-Sung was sure that it could be won swiftly—then intervention by the USA could be avoided. Nevertheless, Stalin decided to ask Mao Tse-tung's opinion . . . [The latter] approved Kim Il-Sung's suggestion and put forward the opinion that the USA would not intervene since the war would be an internal matter which the Korean people would decide for themselves . . . We had already been giving arms to North Korea for some time. It was obvious that they would receive the requisite quantity of tanks, artillery, rifles, machine guns, engineering equipment, and anti-aircraft weapons. Our air force planes were being used to shield Pyongyang and were therefore stationed in North Korea. The designated hour arrived and the war began . . .[11]

Apart from the attribution of an excessively naïve viewpoint to Mao Tse-tung, for which there is an obvious explanation in terms of Sino-Soviet polemics, this version rings true. But even if Simmons were right in his contention that the date of the North Korean invasion of South Korea was brought forward and took the Soviet Union by surprise, would it have much significance? An affirmative answer could only be given if one accepts the theory of Communism as being totally monolithic in this period, and there can be few scholars who would adhere to such an over-simplified interpretation

9 William Stueck, 'The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War', *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 4, July 1976, pp. 622-35.

10 Strobe Talbot (ed.), *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (London: Deutsch, 1974), pp. xi–xix.

11. Edward Crankshaw (ed.), *Khrushchev Remembers* (London: Sphere Books, 1971), pp. 333-34.

today. The key point surely—and, as we have seen, this is conceded by Simmons—is that the Soviet Union was not only aware of North Korea's intention to invade the south, but also provided the wherewithal to carry it out.

'Probably a contributory factor in P'yongyang's decision to invade', Simmons writes, 'was a desire to disarm [Syngman] Rhee's military machine before—as seemed likely to happen in the near future—it became too powerful to contend with.'[12] This brings us to the 'revisionist' argument, first put forward in the West by I. F. Stone in 1952, that the North Korean attack was provoked or indeed pre-empted by hostile action on the part of South Korea.[13] A fresh lease of life was given to this argument by Dr Karunaka Gupta in an article in the *China Quarterly* for October/December 1972. Dr Gupta provides evidence in support of the possibility that the North Korean assault of June 25, 1950 was in fact preceded by a South Korean attack upon the strategic North Korean town of Haeju. The April/June 1973 issue of the same journal carried rebuttals by three scholars, including Robert Simmons, but Dr Gupta's reply to these rebuttals drew attention to significant weaknesses in their arguments. Once again, however, the point seems largely immaterial. No one disputes that there was continual tension along the 38th parallel and that this had frequently erupted into armed clashes. On June 25, 1950, however, the North Korean forces were clearly poised to launch a large-scale invasion of the south. Dr Gupta does not suggest that the attack upon Haeju, assuming it took place, was part of a similar South Korean plan to invade the north.

In one important sense, of course, it is true that South Korea stood to gain from war. In June 1950 the Syngman Rhee regime was on the point of collapse. Inflation was rampant and elections in May, which had only been held as a result of American pressure, had produced a parliament hostile to the South Korean president. A war might unite the nation behind Rhee. But this was only true if he were sure to win it, and this in turn depended upon the willingness of the United States to come to his support. It was this combination of circumstances which prompted some—notably I. F. Stone—to speculate about the possibility of some kind of deal having been cooked up between Rhee and the Americans. The American Commander in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, and the Republican consultant to the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, are the villains in this scenario and the presence of the latter in South Korea just before the outbreak of the war is vested, as indeed it is in the Communist literature, with much sinister significance in this connection.

Thanks to the publication of the relevant volume in the State Department's invaluable series of documents on the history of American foreign policy,[14] we now have more details of what Dulles actually said to Rhee. A memorandum of June 19, 1950 shows that the South Korean President did indeed request 'a special unscheduled interview with Mr Dulles . . . with the apparent objective of impressing upon [him] his view that more positive action must be taken to make more difficult the task of the communists in North Korea.' Rhee argued 'that before the Chinese communists have an opportunity to consolidate their position in China the division of Korea at the 38th Parallel must be removed . . . [Although] his desire for positive action did not necessarily mean action by armed forces . . . he was insistent that unless something was done the cold war would be lost'.

If Rhee was thinking in terms of an armed attack upon North Korea, Dulles's reply cannot have been very reassuring. 'Mr Dulles went to considerable length to explain', the record runs,

12. Simmons, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

13. I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (New York, London: Monthly Review Press, 1970), Part I. The edition cited is a reprint of the original published in 1952.

14. US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950*, Vol. VII, *Korea* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976).

> that formal pacts or alliances or treaties were not necessarily prerequisites to common action against a common foe and that the important thing was for a government to prove by its actions that it was in fact a loyal member of the free world in which case it could count on the support of the other members . . . against the forces of communism. Mr Dulles explained that it was the opinion of the best informed minds in the U.S. Government that Soviet Russia did not for the present wish to become involved in a shooting war but that its more likely action would be to foment insurrection, intrigue and sabotage within countries.

Although the United States could help combat this, it could only do so

> if the governments threatened were themselves taking active steps to create conditions within their countries which would prohibit the growth of communism. A true allegiance to the principles of representative government and a real effort to self-control and hard work to create a stable economy and a government which deserved the support of its people would insure the continuation of such additional aid as might be needed.[15]

Whether there were other conversations between Rhee and Dulles in which more positive pledges of support were offered, or whether such pledges were conveyed to the South Korean President by General MacArthur, is not known. No positive evidence has been produced, however, and it seems unlikely. Even if it were true, how can Dulles and MacArthur, let alone Syngman Rhee, have been certain that President Truman and his advisers would react in the way that they did when news of the outbreak of the war in Korea reached them in Washington? 'Revisionism' is on much safer ground when it draws the distinction between planning and exploiting a given situation, for if there is no evidence that Dulles and MacArthur planned the Korean War, there is plenty that they exploited it to the full.

This comes out very clearly, for example, in connection with the American decision to cross the 38th parallel. Thus, on July 14, 1950, Dulles wrote to Paul Nitze, the director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, vigorously protesting against a proposal which he understood was being advocated by the Staff to respect the boundary between North and South Korea.

> The 38th Parallel, if perpetuated as a political line and as providing asylum to the aggressor [he wrote], is bound to perpetuate friction and ever-present danger of new war. If we have the opportunity to obliterate the line as a political division, certainly we should do so . . . I would think that, from a national standpoint, it would be folly to allow the North Korean army to retire in good order . . . and reform behind the 38th Parallel . . . To permit that would mean either the exposure of the Republic of Korea to greater peril than preceded the June 25th attack or the maintenance by the United States of a large military establishment to contain the North Korean Army at the 38th Parallel. The North Korean Army should be destroyed, if we have the power to destroy it, even if this requires pursuit beyond the 38th Parallel. That is the only way to remove the menace.[16]

Similarly, General MacArthur told two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 13 that 'he meant to destroy the N[orth] K[orean] forces and not merely drive them back across the 38th Parallel. He said that in the aftermath of operations, the problem would be to "compose and unite Korea". He added that it might be necessary to occupy all of Korea, although this was speculative at that time.'[17]

15. Allison memo., June 19, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 107–109.
16. Dulles memo., July 14, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 386–87.
17. General J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime: the History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), pp. 82–83. General Collins was Chief of Staff of the Army and present at the meeting in question.

On July 17, 1950, President Truman formally requested the National Security Council 'to prepare for his consideration a report on the subject [of future United States policy towards North Korea], covering the policy which should be pursued by the United States after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th Parallel.'[18] A Policy Planning Staff paper of July 22, drafted in response to this request, advocated a halt at the 38th parallel, except for purely tactical action, on the grounds that to proceed otherwise would greatly increase the danger of conflict with the Chinese or the Russians and might also create difficulties in the United Nations.[19] In response to protests from dissentients, however, the paper was re-drafted on July 25 to advocate the postponement of any decision.[20]

As far as one can tell from the available documents, the moment of decision was reached at the end of August. On the 24th, the junior members of the National Security Council (NSC) staff met to discuss the question. 'The consensus seemed to be', runs the record of their meeting,

> that ground operations north of 38° subsequent to the withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea would probably lead to the direct involvement of the Soviet Union and Communist China, or both, in hostilities, which might well become generalized. The question was raised as to whether there might not be some intermediate line north of 38°, but short of the Manchurian and Siberian borders, to which the UN forces might push without grave danger of provoking the Soviet Union to open hostilities. It was generally conceded that the occupation of North Korean points within easy striking distance of Vladivostok and other strategic centers would be more provocative than a limited occupation which stopped short of such points.[21]

For the rest, however, the conferees were content to pass the buck to their superiors.

The latter, meeting on August 25, reached 'general concurrence that the UN Commander should be allowed to go in with ground troops north of 38 degrees, but he should keep clear of the borders. It was further agreed that this general authorization should be limited as follows: "If intelligence indicates that important organized USSR or Chinese Communists opposition is pending, the UN Commander should not go in without reference of the matter to Washington."'[22] This formula was written into a draft paper for the NSC on August 30,[23] but on the following day, there was a significant change. The new draft stated quite bluntly that 'the United Nations' Commander should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, but should reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel.'[24] This sentence was included in the final text of the NSC paper approved on September 11, 1950 and incorporated in orders to General MacArthur.[25]

It is not clear from the available documents why opposition to crossing the 38th parallel in the event of Chinese or Russian intervention was expressed more unequivocally on August 31 than on August 30. Up to that date, the United States had not seemed unduly perturbed at the prospect of Chinese, as opposed to Soviet, intervention in Korea. As early as July 6, General MacArthur had stated that 'should

18. Lay memo., July 17, 1950, *Foreign Relations, op. cit.*, p. 410.
19. Unsigned draft memo., July 22, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 449-54.
20. Allison memo., July 24, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 458-61; unsigned draft memo., July 25, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 469-73.
21. McConaughy memo., August 24, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 641 43.
22. McConaughy memo., August 25, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 649-52.
23. Unsigned draft State Department memo., August 30, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 660-66, especially p. 664.
24. Unsigned draft State Department memo., August 31, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 671-79, especially p. 675.
25. National Security Council Report, NSC 81/1, September 9, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 712-21, especially pp. 712, fn 1; 715, fn. 2; and 716.

Chinese combat forces become involved in active opposition to U.N. forces in Korea, sufficient power must be added to U.N. forces to insure fulfillment of currently assigned missions.'[26] In talks with the British later in the month, the Americans regarded Chinese intervention as quite possible,[27] and at the NSC meeting on August 25, it was felt that if this occurred, the United States should act according to its latest contingency plan: namely, it 'should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China', but, 'as long as action by UN military forces now committed or planned for commitment in Korea offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, such action should be continued and extended to include authority to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China.'[28]

Why did Communist China intervene in the Korean War and could her intervention have been avoided? In *The Strained Alliance*, Robert Simmons writes that:

> the usual interpretation of China's entrance into the Korean Civil War has been that it was done cautiously, in an effort to protect the Manchurian frontier. While this is obviously correct, it is also an insufficient explanation of the circumstances and causes of China's crossing the Yalu. These can be fully found only in the interrelationship between the three communist allies. It was the Soviet Union's reticence which finally prompted China's intervention. [China] entered the war not only when it seemed that the United States was actually threatening her territory, but also, and equally importantly, when it became obvious that Russia would steadfastly refuse to use her troops on the peninsula to protect China from an American incursion which was using the Korean peninsula as an invasion corridor. China's hopes for a successful military alliance with the Soviet Union were thus negated on the Korean peninsula in October [1950].'[29]

Khrushchev's version is, once again, rather different from Simmons's, and since the latter's is based upon even more tortuous extrapolations from the radio broadcasts of the countries involved than usual, the present writer would be more inclined to accept the Russian's first hand testimony. According to Khrushchev, when the North Korean army was almost destroyed, Chou En lai flew to see Stalin on Mao Tse-tung's instructions. Stalin later told Khrushchev that Chou had asked him 'whether Chinese troops ought to be moved into North Korean territory in order to block the path of the Americans and South Koreans. At first, Stalin and Chou seemed to conclude that it was fruitless for China to intervene. However, just before Chou En-lai was due to return home, one of them'—it is a great pity Khrushchev appeared not to remember which—'reopened the whole matter. They then agreed that China should give active support to North Korea. Chinese troops were already stationed along the border. Stalin and Chou believed these troops could manage the situation completely. They would beat back the American and South Korean troops and save the situation from disaster.'[30] There is, of course, nothing in all this which detracts from the hypothesis so brilliantly advanced by Allen S. Whiting in his 1960 study for the RAND Corporation that China's motives were essentially defensive.[31]

Before the intervention, diplomacy was employed in the hope of avoiding it by

26 Unsigned memo. of teletype conference between Washington and Tokyo, July 6, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 311.

27 Unsigned, undated memo on US UK Discussions on the Present World Situation, July 20 23, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 462 65, especially p. 463.

28. McConaughy memo., August 25, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 650 and fn. 4.

29 Simmons, *op. cit.*, p. 168

30. *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 336 37.

31 Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu. The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960)

persuading the Americans not to cross the 38th parallel and thus preserving North Korea as a buffer between China and the United States. The Chinese efforts in this direction have been public knowledge since the then Indian ambassador in Peking, K. M. Panikkar, published his memoirs in 1955.[32] The Russian effort, however, has only recently come to light among the 1,600 pages of the State Department's volume of documents on Korea in 1950. On October 4, Vassili Kasaniev, a Russian employee of the trusteeship division of the United Nations secretariat, who was apparently on good terms with Andrei Vishinsky, the Soviet Foreign Minister who was then in New York for the meeting of the General Assembly, asked Hans Engen of the Norwegian delegation to the United Nations to lunch. During the course of this lunch, Kasaniev told Engen that 'MacArthur should stop at the 38th Parallel. The North Koreans would then lay down their arms and . . . a United Nations Commission would be allowed to go into North Korea to hold elections, et cetera.' It appeared from a subsequent conversation on October 6 that the Russians wanted negotiations outside the United Nations, and on October 7 Engen was asked by the Americans to probe Soviet intentions in more depth. The flavour of the subsequent discussion is conveyed in the following passage from Engen's account to the member of the American delegation to the United Nations who acted as link man:

> Kasaniev . . . said if he should . . . put Engen's questions to Vishinsky it would make a lot of difference to know if the question comes from Engen personally or whether Engen would convey what Vishinsky might answer. Engen then repeated that he had asked the question for his personal information but said to Kasaniev that if the latter wanted Engen to convey any answer Engen would, of course, be willing to consider it. Engen added that his attitude would depend on whether Kasaniev had an interest in Engen conveying an answer.'[33]

Unfortunately, it was too late for such pussy-footing; American troops had crossed the 38th parallel on October 7, 1950 and the Russians broke off the contact.

The Russians made no threats concerning what they would do if the Americans crossed the parallel, but the Chinese issued a categorical warning through the Indian ambassador in Peking that they would intervene in the war if this happened. Thanks to the State Department's documents, we can now reconstruct the United States reaction to this threat in detail for the first time. The warning arrived in Washington at 5.35 a.m. local time on October 3, 1950, in the shape of a telegram from London relaying the information as reported to the British Foreign Office by its representative in Peking. At 8.30 a.m. this telegram was relayed to General MacArthur 'for information'. It was also placed by the Secretary of State in his noon batch of important telegrams for President Truman's attention. It was also discussed at the regular 9.30 a.m. meeting in the office of the Under Secretary of State, James Webb. At this meeting, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Livingston Merchant, 'expressed [his] belief that we should treat it with extreme seriousness and not discount it as a bluff.' His impression, however, was 'that the majority present were inclined to regard it as a bluff pending more information.' It was therefore agreed to obtain confirmation from New Delhi before sending an evaluation of the report to the President; to discuss the matter urgently in New York with other delegations at the United Nations. General Assembly; and to discuss it urgently 'at a high level' with the Defence Department.[34]

At 11.57 a.m. a telegram from the American ambassador in Moscow arrived which

32. K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp. 109–11.
33. Ross memo., October 5, 1950, *Foreign Relations op. cit.*, pp. 877–79; Ross memo., October 5, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 879–80; Ross memo., October 6, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 897–99; Ross memo., October 7, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 906–11, especially p. 908.
34. Holmes tel., October 3, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 839; Merchant memo., October 3, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 848.

stated: 'British Embassy concurs our speculation that Chou En-lai's statements to Panikkar may be last minute Chinese attempt to play upon Indian apprehension to point where maximum profit for China and USSR can be salvaged from North Korean reverses.' Alexis Johnson of the State Department's Office of Northeast Asian Affairs did not altogether agree. 'Although the statement attributed to Chou En-lai undoubtedly contains a large element of bluff . . .' he wrote, 'I do not feel that we can assume it is entirely bluff.'[35]

On October 4, O. Edmund Clubb, the Director of the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs, wrote that 'the Chou En-lai *démarche* cannot safely be regarded as mere bluff . . . [and] must be regarded as having been made with foreknowledge and support of USSR. The political and military stakes are considerable, and Moscow and Peiping may be prepared to take considerable risks.' Clubb recommended that 'our missions at strategic points in different parts of the world be informed of the Chinese Communist *démarche*, its possible implications, and asked to report urgently any untoward developments which have recently come to their attention and which might be relevant.' This was done on October 5. The posts circulated were those with contacts in China. Most, but not all, the replies are printed. They offered no confirmation, except in so far as they repeated statements by Panikkar himself. In some cases they expressed considerable scepticism. Thus, according to the Swiss foreign ministry, 'intelligence reaching the Political Department indicated that Kremlin continues to desire localization of Korean conflict and does not favour direct Chinese participation.' For good measure, the American minister in Switzerland and erstwhile China specialist, John Carter Vincent, added: 'personally, I believe we should cross the 38th parallel . . . irrespective of whether Chou En lai is bluffing or not', an interesting comment from a man who had been banished to Switzerland precisely because the Republicans considered him 'soft on Communism' and who later became a victim of the McCarthyite purge in the State Department. Finally, on October 12, 1950, the Central Intelligence Agency reported: 'despite statements by Chou En-lai, troop movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities and border violations there are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full scale intervention in Korea.'[36]

In reality, as we now know from the recently published fifth volume of his *Selected Works*, Mao Tse tung had already issued the order to intervene. 'In order to support the Korean people's war of liberation', he wrote, 'and to resist the attacks of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, thereby safeguarding the interests of the people of Korea, China and all the other countries in the East, I herewith order the Chinese People's Volunteers to march speedily to Korea and join the Korean comrades in fighting the aggressors and winning a glorious victory.'[37] This order was dated October 8, 1950, the day after the first American troops had crossed the 38th parallel.

Although the first Chinese prisoners were captured on October 25, the major Chinese attacks upon the United Nations forces in Korea did not occur until the beginning of November. They were broken off after a few days of bitter fighting, whereupon the new enemy seemed to vanish as suddenly as he had first appeared upon the scene. One possible explanation of this strange behaviour is that the Chinese were still hoping for a diplomatic solution which would safeguard their interests. It was a possibility which the British Government, at any rate, felt was well worth exploring. On November 13, the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, informed the British

35 Kirk tel., October 3, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 850; Johnson memo., October 3, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 849

36 Clubb memo., October 4, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 864-66; Webb tel., October 5, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 877; Service tel., October 7, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 902; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 304, 710-13, unsigned CIA memo., October 12, 1950, *Foreign Relations op. cit.*, pp. 933-34.

37 Mao Tse tung, *Selected Works*, Volume V (Peking: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977), p. 43

ambassador in Washington that the Cabinet believed 'that in view of Chinese intervention in Korea we should endeavour to find a solution to the Korean problem which will not result in the hostilities dragging on . . . with the ever growing risk of extension beyond Korea.' The key element in the British plan was the establishment of a demilitarised zone along the Sino-Soviet border with North Korea, which would be administered by the United Nations in association with Communist China until the reunification of Korea. On November 17 Bevin said that he wished the British delegate to the United Nations to 'give a broad outline of these suggestions' in the current debate in the General Assembly, and added that, in the meantime, 'the Chiefs of Staff believe that . . . [MacArthur's planned] offensive should be held up . . . I endorse their view.' [38]

MacArthur, of course, regarded any talk of buffer zones as rank appeasement, and while the United States administration did not take so extreme a view, it felt that the British proposal went much too far. On November 24 the Secretary of State explained in a message to Bevin that MacArthur's forces were already well to the north of the British Foreign Secretary's proposed zonal boundary in a number of places. 'Therefore to make such a proposal at any time in the near future in the UN would be suggesting that we should abandon considerable areas and population in the east which had already been brought within UN protection and in the west that we should abandon positions which may be of very considerable importance to secure, and for which Gen[eral] MacArthur's forces would at the very moment be putting forth a great effort under adverse circumstances and undoubtedly heavy losses. The effect of such a proposal on the conduct of military operations, upon the morale of the troops, upon the morale of the Koreans and upon public opinion in the US which has furnished the great bulk of the troops would, in my opinion, be disastrous. I do not think it is possible to fight a war or to maintain the support of the population in Korea under these circumstances.'

Acheson went on to say that he could find no real assurance in Bevin's proposal, either that the North Korean forces could be removed from the suggested demilitarised zone, or that the Chinese could be prevented from re-entering it. He also felt that 'the effect of the proposal at this time and of this nature . . . would be taken by [the Chinese] as a starting point for negotiations to obtain something much more favourable to them and as an indication of the greatest weakness upon our part.' In the circumstances, it appeared to Acheson to be of the greatest importance that General MacArthur's offensive be given every support by all concerned. 'The result of his operation will make much more clear many matters which are now obscure . . . By taking present military requirements as a starting point, we may be able to stabilize the political situation by proposals which originate from a position of strength and which will help to end the fighting and achieve the results of the UN on a more permanent basis.' [39]

The general offensive, which MacArthur confidently expected would lead to victory within ten days, was launched on November 24, 1950, the day of Acheson's message. It was immediately blunted and thrown back by massive Chinese counter-attacks, mounted by an army which had continued to reinforce itself during the fortnight's lull in the fighting. Acheson's prediction that the offensive would 'make much more clear many matters which are now obscure' came true all right, but hardly in the way he had hoped. The blood which flowed on both sides during the weeks and months that followed not only failed to reunite Korea; it formed a divide in relations between the United States and Communist China which could not be bridged for another twenty years.

38. Bevin message, November 13, 1950, *Foreign Relations op. cit.*, pp. 1138-40; Bevin message, November 17, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 1172-73.

39. MacArthur tel., November 9, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 1107-10, especially pp. 1108-09; Acheson message, November 24, 1950, *ibid.*, pp. 1226-27.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Global Politics. By James Lee Ray. *Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1979. 416 pp.*

Theory and Reality in World Politics. By Carey B. Joynt and Percy E. Corbett. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 147 pp. £7·95.*

BOTH these books are introductory texts for undergraduates. Both arise from a sense of the inadequacy of what is currently available. Carey Joynt and Percy Corbett aim to repair the neglect of ethical and historical approaches to the subject. James Lee Ray sets out to provide students with an understanding of history, of scientific approaches to the subject, and of the future of global politics in a way that integrates these three things rather than succumbing to the historian's allergy to pattern in human affairs, the scientist's jargon, and the futurologist's dated topicality and obliviousness to history.

Ray's book is well organised, ascending a scale of generality from individuals, to states, to international and transnational actors, to the system as a whole conceived both internationally and globally. It is a nice blend of theory and practice, paying little attention to the sterile debates about methodology, but marshalling arguments on issues particularly well in regard to transnationalism, war, and the global crisis. There are occasional lapses. For example, the discussion of 'great man theories of history' gets tangled up in a philosophical knot: the problem of the definition of power and influence is solved by a suspicious *tour de force*; and the history of the emergence of the states-system is sketchy to the point of caricature. But the book is well-written, in catchy prose, clear without being simplistic, and only rarely platitudinous (as when we are told that 'if a state has a large population, a productive industrial sector, and a large, sophisticated military force, it is virtually certain to be quite powerful' p. 101). British readers will be surprised to learn that 'they cannot fight a war at all', and less surprised to discover that there are many of us who 'wonder whether it is worth the expense to maintain any meaningful military force' (p. 151).

Professors Joynt and Corbett do less well. Chapters on ethics, justice, law, the behavioural sciences, systems theory, the international impact of American theory, force, and explanation seem only randomly connected. No theme emerges except a certain flabby eclecticism enjoining adherents to different approaches to put their shoulders to the common wheel, a persistent didacticism by authors seemingly irritated by the confusion of their students (especially in the systems chapter), and a simple-minded belief in the inevitability and desirability of world government. This is a pity, for there are plenty of intelligent jottings, and some interesting questions that might have been treated in greater depth. For example, the chapter on the international impact of American theory, for which the authors rightly claim some originality in research, might have profited from a treatment at book length, so that a textbook not long enough even to introduce the subject satisfactorily could have become an extended argument on an arresting theme.

The attention paid to history in both books is a welcome product of pre- and post-behaviouralism in the United States. But it is still the rag-bag approach to history,

history as a laboratory, or as a source of examples for the instruction of this or that contemporary debate. This is not to object to the use of history in this way provided it is not in the process reduced to mere data. History is not so much stuff lying around waiting for some social scientist to pick up and process, but a discipline with its own canons of scholarship, and its own theories which are not susceptible simply to packaging for use elsewhere. Trespassing on the domain of the historian is necessary in doing Social Science, but it is trespassing and we should not blunder about unawares.

Finally, Houghton Mifflin are to be congratulated on the production of *Global Politics*: it is not merely well-designed and presented but footnotes appear where their name insists they belong, and not lost at the end of the book.

University of Keele R. J. VINCENT

Concepts of International Politics: In Global Perspective. 3rd edn. By Charles O. Lerche Jr. and Abdul A. Said. *Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1979. £10·20.*

DESPITE the listing of the authors, this book, the third edition of a text originally published in 1963, has been rewritten by Said, following the death of Lerche shortly before the publication of the second edition in 1970. Having said this, however, the book is fundamentally the same as the second edition, with much of the content unchanged except for factual revisions and additions. What is new is reflected in the addition of the subtitle—international politics is now to be seen ' in global perspective ' (sic). This seeming change of emphasis, is, however, more apparent than real since, although there are some four new chapters in the final section of the book, most of the content is the same with the proviso that references to international politics have been replaced by global politics. Indeed, this view is further supported by the fact that two of the new chapters are versions of existing publications by Said, and by the observation that the four chapters are the only ones in the book to use footnotes. In essence, then, this is basically a textbook of the late 1960s with new chapters to take account of ' new ' issues in international relations.

The book is divided into three sections. Part One deals with the actors in ' global politics '; in this case that means the state. This section is almost identical to the 1970 version and examines the nature of foreign policy, the process of policy-making, the capabilities of states, and the implementing of decisions. Part Two looks at the major patterns of interaction in the ' global system ' (the conditions of the global system, conflict, and limitations on state action). Finally, in Part Three, the book turns to examine the major issues of contemporary ' global politics '—war and arms control, ideology and nationalism, the ecosystem, interdependence and North-South relations, multi-nationals, ethnic groups and terrorism, and human rights.

As a textbook this will, no doubt, be of use to those teaching an introductory course in international politics. However, the individual chapters seem to be of more use than the book as a whole since, although they are often very useful as short introductions to areas of the subject, the book is too firmly based, for this reviewer, in a very traditional view of the subject. Thus, in the first section, the concept of ' national interest ' is used as an organising concept, yet without any recognition of the limitations of the term which, even if not deemed to outweigh the advantages, should at least be addressed. Unfortunately, then, this is a book which, despite its subtitle and concern for the problems of the late 70s, is methodologically firmly placed in the 1960s.

University of East Anglia STEVE SMITH

Moral Claims in World Affairs. By Ralph Pettman. *London: Croom Helm. 1979. 199 pp. £8·50.*

MORAL claims in politics are counterweights to power. Overweening might, stimulates opposition based on right. Moral claims are the natural and unconsumable weapons of the underdog; of the governed rather than the governing; and of the exploited rather than the exploiter.

The forum of moral claims is the court of natural justice, which is freely open to all claimants. British trade unionists cite natural rights as a defence when governments propose legislation to curb their powers: non-unionised British workers cite natural rights as a defence against trade unionists urging closed shop legislation to extend their powers.

The operation of moral claims in international relations is not totally unlike their domestic operation. The extent of the ' moral liability ' of those individuals assigned to act on behalf of a state, for instance, is a problem similar in some ways to that concerning the liability of the directors of a firm that may become involved in wrong doing. But some questions have meaning only within the context of international relations. The two most often asked, probably, are: at what point does the permeability of a state's boundary to moral claims from the outside become inconsistent with the maintenance of the state; and is there a true moral commonwealth of states or are there as many moral communities internationally as there are cultures? And it is with addressing these questions—or questions very similar—that the first part of this collection of essays is chiefly concerned.

Hedley Bull, J. D. B. Miller and R. J. Vincent, not unexpectedly, all have interesting things to say, with the latter two writing essentially as historians of ideas and Hedley Bull centring his remarks upon the subject of ' human rights '.

The bold second part of the collection, which has at its heart a surprisingly long chapter on the moral precepts of both Soviet and Chinese foreign policies, does not work quite so well, simply because it lacks a bridging essay on the relationship between what are called moral claims and what is called ideology. Yet the most daring thing in the entire book—a really remarkable piece by Arthur Lee Burns on international justice and evil—is the most successful. It is a scholarly sermon of the kind Cardinal Newman might have delivered to a learned congregation; with piety, learning, liberal sentiment and originality all present in harmonious proportions.

No one will suggest that this collection is anything but worthwhile, but not even the Canberra school's greatest admirers could call it modern. Old-fashioned subjects do not, by law, as it were, demand old-fashioned treatment. An empirical chapter on, say, what convergence may be observed between the positive legal arrangements of different states, and on what this may mean in terms of an evolving moral commonwealth embracing these states, would have done something to dispel the cobwebs from the corners.

University of Lancaster IAN BELLANY

Principles of Foreign Policy: The Civil State in its World Setting. By Roy E. Jones. *Oxford: Martin Robertson. 1979. 259 pp. £13·50.*

THIS is an odd, but occasionally intriguing book. Dr Jones sets up a theoretical model of foreign policy, enunciates the principles of foreign policy to be derived from it, and then convincingly shows how misleading the model is and how useless, if not merely tautological, are the principles. He then examines seven different kinds of foreign policy issues: the problem of executive domination; foreign policy and international organisation; foreign policy as the pursuit of national interest; war and foreign policy;

the role of morality; intervention; and some economic problems of foreign policy. The level of treatment varies. The economic section elucidates some interesting structural problems of the international economic system, but is vitiated by the level of generality. There is a good critical disection of traditionalist shibboleths of the ' national interest as a practical imperative of statecraft ' when it may be no more than ' a kind of tribal rallying cry by statesmen under stress ' (p. 41). He deals effectively with assertions that international organisations are forms of international constitution-building as well as with the narrower view that they are mere instruments for the multilateralisation of member states' interests; they are both these and more. He makes some shrewd comments on the role of morality, but in criticising the view that order has priority over morality he appears to ignore the possibility that order is itself a moral good if only because it is a precondition of the realisation of other moral values.

Dr Jones's main contention, however, is not only that the traditional distinction between what is domestic and what is foreign needs to be rethought (along with other largely inherited concepts of foreign policy), but also that the springs of foreign policy lie less in the pressure of external events and more in the domestic nature of the state. This leads him to differentiate between three types of state: ' civil states ', in effect parliamentary democracies; anti-political or totalitarian states; and unpolitical states which are neither civil nor totalitarian and which appear to encompass a mixed bag of tyrannies and quasi-religious or racial communities. Much of the rest of the argument is devoted to identifying the characteristics of relations between the ' civil states ' which make up what he claims to be a ' peaceful international political society ' (shades of the First World War?) and the special problems ' civil states ' have in their relations with anti-political and non-political states which hold very differing conceptions of, for instance, the use of force, the proprieties of intervention, and the relevance of external moralities. This is pretty tough going. What purports to be a tight, logical exposition of the problems involved in the three sets of relationship, at places degenerates into a kind of private musing marked by a crippling lack of historical illustration and by considerable repetition. Dr Jones's approach has a real potention. Unhappily it is only fitfully realised here.

G. L. GOODWIN

Patterns of Diplomatic Thinking: A Cross-National Study of Structural and Social-Psychological Determinants. By Luc Reychler. *New York, London: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in the UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 295 pp. £12·00.*

PROFESSOR REYCHLER'S book is concerned with an examination of what he calls ' a rather virgin area of international relations ', namely the thoughts that diplomats have about international relations. He argues that whilst diplomats have always been in the limelight of the international arena, their behaviour and thoughts have been neglected as an area of study: his study aims to fill that gap.

Reychler starts from the assumption that diplomats are important in international relations in two ways: as a ' missing link ' in the study of international relations and as a source of information for the students of international behaviour. The former category results from the roles diplomats play in international relations in areas such as conflict management, problem-solving, cross-cultural interaction, negotiation and bargaining, and programme management. Diplomats are considered to be a source of information because of five factors—their inputs into foreign policy making; their conduct of foreign policy; their position as national representatives; their role as professional participant-observers; and the width of their experience. Given this assumption as to the importance of diplomats, Reychler attempts to uncover their ' patterns of thought '. More specifically, the study is concerned with examining four

components of diplomatic thinking: the perception of the international environment, the views of world order and peace, the style of analysis, and the approach to strategy. These four aspects of diplomatic thinking are seen as being of significance as intervening variables between the independent variable of the determining factors of diplomatic thought and the dependent variable of international behaviour.

The plan of the book is to outline the patterns in diplomatic thought in the four areas noted previously and to relate these to two determining variables—the location of the diplomat's country and the international climate. The former variable is subdivided into seven measurable categories (centre-periphery, economic development, penetration, economic inter-dependency, aid receipt, military expenditure, and security investment) whereas the latter is subdivided into six indices which reflect the diplomats' perceptions of the international climate (international law, Marxist perspective, shared principles, Hobbesian world, 'we-ness', and instrumental exchange). The findings of the study are derived from an extensive data base developed by the author—this is the result of the participation of some 266 diplomats of 116 countries in interviews and in filling in questionnaires.

The results of these interviews and questionnaires are presented in a lengthy series of tables in four chapters, each dealing with one of the components of diplomatic thought outlined above. Clearly, the detailed nature of the results and the exceptionally rigorous statistical testing that they are subjected to, makes summarising the results an impossible task in this limited space. However, the one finding that runs through all four areas of analysis is the difference between the thoughts of diplomats from the developing and developed worlds. Thus in all four areas of diplomatic thought, the most significant determining variable was that of the degree of development: diplomats from the developing world saw the world in different ways, had different values, had a different analytical style, and had a different strategic approach to diplomats from the developed world.

The findings of the book are obviously of interest although a crucial point regarding diplomatic thought is barely touched in the book, and, surely, it requires considerable attention in order to provide a frame of reference for the findings—how important are the thoughts of diplomats and what is their status as 'intervening variables'? Whilst accepting that diplomats may be of significant importance in the style of some policies' implementation, how, and in what ways, are they important in policy formulation and decision making? Therefore, although the findings of the book are of considerable interest and the research is impressive on a wide range of criteria, the study suffers from a lack of a detailed consideration of the setting within which patterns of diplomatic thought operate.

University of East Anglia STEVF SMITH

Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future. By John Dunn. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979. 120 pp. £8·50. Pb: £2·95.*

Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States. Edited by Raymond Grew. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1979. 434 pp. (Studies in Political Development, 9.) £17·20. Pb: $4.40.*

FROM entirely different angles, the two books under review address themselves to the perennial question of how to conceptualise politics. Incidentally they both shed some light upon the complex relationship between international relations and domestic politics.

John Dunn's, *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future*, is written in the best tradition of British political philosophy: it is a well-organised, coherent product of one author written to be read continuously; despite the depth and the width of its

analysis it has a limited and therefore sharp focus. Despite the subtlety of the argument and the many epigrammatic and occasionally controversial comments it is written extremely clearly; it is intelligible to readers without prior knowledge of history or philosophy while further inquiry is facilitated by the extensive footnotes into which much of the author's wide learning has been conveniently relegated.

Mr Dunn rightly contends that we have not developed in the capitalist West a meaningful, ecumenical moral theory of politics. He is, therefore, as comprehensive as possible by analysing four basic concepts which we have been customarily using in thinking and talking about politics: democratic theory, liberalism, nationalism, and revolution. It is impossible to reproduce without gross oversimplification the author's rich argument. To use his own summary, he claims that ' democratic theory is the unthinking normative political theory of the West '; that ' liberalism is its painfully precarious reflective normative theory '; and that ' nationalism is simply a comforting if shifty accommodation to practicalities ' (p. 80). The relevant three chapters succinctly outline the historical evolution of the three concepts as well as their intellectual inadequacy.

Of greatest interest to many readers will be the fourth chapter: ' Revolution?'. It is limited to its Marxist origins and starts with a pithy criticism of Marxism: the faulty initial expectations that communism would mean a genuine resolution of all conflicts; the dialectical illusion that the ideological inadequacies of capitalism mean that it could be replaced by another—untried—mode of production; Marx's vagueness about the latter; the weakness of his basic epistemology, especially the inevitability of the historical process he claimed to discern; his utter neglect of strategic prudence. Agreeing with Stuart Hampshire, the author considers Marxism to be primarily a moral programme corrected and informed by the sciences of man—which are regrettably fluid and unsatisfactory.

Mr Dunn as a philosopher exposes the weaknesses of all four of these concepts. He does not eschew strong normative conclusions from the identified intellectual shortcomings. The fundamental one is that we should look beyond the traditional categories and use our imagination in facing the future. Having identified the danger of utopianism in its Marxist manifestation, he does not proceed from his severe criticism of the functional shortcomings of nationalism to an idea of globalism; his procedural guideline is an essentially conservative, prudential strategy.

The volume, *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States*, edited by Raymond Grew, can be regarded as an expression of a complementary rather than alternative approach. It is also written in the best traditions of scholarship but, in conformity with American academic habits, it is a symposium, is much more voluminous, and employs a political scientific methodology applied to history—the special terminology is, however, limited and the style is generally perfectly clear. Mr Dunn deals with operational concepts and, therefore, his main task lies in disentangling the semantic confusions, the relationship between declaratory and operational policies, and aspirations and behaviour. The Princeton symposium, by contrast, is based on a deliberate social scientific conceptualisation evolved in the previous eight volumes of the series *Studies in Political Development*. Starting from the structural/functional analysis originally developed by Almond and Powell, in what the editor calls ' a kind of reductionist triumph ', the committee dealing with the methodology of the series has reduced all the various functions ascribed in contemporary literature to a modern polity to one comprehensive scheme. The framework identifies the general direction of political development as increased capacity, equality, and differentiation—the historic functions are the system's ' inputs ' and development is manifested in its general political ' outputs ' (e.g. procedural efficiency, universalistic law, secularisation). The actual process of political transformation lies between these ' inputs ' and ' outputs ' and is analysed in terms of

'crises' or areas of critical change. While the notion of 'crisis' remains a rather vague though useful central metaphor, however indeterminate, the actual areas of change eventually decided upon—identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration, and distribution—are used as categories of analysis. The scheme has proved to be sufficiently flexible to enable the individual authors, all specialist historians, to develop their individual analyses without doing violence to the idiosyncracies of each case-study while, at the same time, enabling the editor, and the reader, to make a few useful generalisations and, most importantly, to compare and to pose significant questions about similarities and differences between the single polities.

In contrast to Mr Dunn, the symposium entirely eschews evaluative and normative comments. All the authors take the world as it is, to be described and analysed along defined and hence comparable lines. The difference from John Dunn's analysis is best exemplified in the morally neutral definition of 'nationalism' by the editor who regards it not as an autonomous force but as usually 'a response to other needs, a means of mobilising support for such things as increased participation, social mobility, economic growth and protection against threatening change'. How different from John Dunn's negative evaluation!

The real test of the volume lies of course in the substantive ten historical analyses of the crises in the political development of individual polities: the United Kingdom, Belgium, Scandinavia, the United States, Spain and Portugal, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, and Poland. They are of very high standard and offer an interesting new angle for looking at their respective histories.

University of Southampton JOSEPH FRANKEL

The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance. By Peter Willetts. *London: Frances Pinter; New York: Nichols. 1979. 310 pp. £12·50.*

SINCE 1945 Third-World countries have been conspicuous, though by no means united, in the espousal of three causes: abstention from cold war alliances; anti-colonialism; and reform of the world economic system. Today the limelight falls on the last of these, championed by the Group of 77, now numbering more than a hundred states, but the numerical preponderance, and not inconsiderable political weight, of that coalition owes much to the outcome of the earlier two campaigns, in which the Non-Aligned Movement was in the vanguard. The latter, then, has been, even if it is no longer, a phenomenon of some significance in world politics, and merits sustained analysis.

Peter Willetts, eschewing the role of either apologist or knowing outsider, has looked at this movement with scientific detachment. He opens with a longish history, though one which traces its origin no further back than the flurry of meetings involving Tito, Nasser and Nehru in 1955. He thus excludes India's important mediatory role in the Korean armistice, and after, because India was then largely on its own, and saw itself as a great power in itself, rather than part of a coalition of the small and weak. The analysis mainly consists of 'snapshots', following the first three Non-Aligned 'summits' (Belgrade 1961, Cairo 1964, Lusaka 1970), of the behaviour of participants in these summits compared with other groupings using such measures as delegation size and alignment in the United Nations, diplomatic relations with the 'divided' countries, and with South Africa, and trade patterns. Statistics are almost always intelligently, and sometimes originally, used to generate, and not merely to illuminate, his conclusions.

By 1970 the Non-Aligned, belying their name, exhibited no distinctive stance on East-West questions, the trend towards radicalism in the older members being blurred by the entry of new members with Western links (amounting to seventeen of the fifty-

three who attended Lusaka). By contrast, on anti-colonialism, and particularly on Southern Africa, their voting patterns differed more sharply than it had in 1961 from other Third-World countries and the European neutrals. There was no great corresponding reduction, however, for any of the five groupings used, even in the *proportion* of trade that was done with South Africa. The Non-Aligned of 1961 showed *some* reduction in this, though not as much as the West, from a higher initial level. The other three groups (Latin America, ' non-bloc ' states and the Communists) actually increased in this period, the proportion of their trade done with the supposed outcast.

An abundance of complicated, and often unexpected findings of this kind make this a very valuable contribution to knowledge; it permits a disciplined, rather than a merely impressionistic, understanding of its subject, though at the cost of a certain narrowness of focus. There is, for instance, no discussion of the present relation of the movement to the Group of 77, or of what non-alignment meant in the context of the Sino-Soviet split. The UN General Assembly's Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories is mentioned only to note its demise. Moreover, there is no attempt to assess the *impact* of the Movement in promoting detente or decolonisation. There are some misconceptions, such as citing the United Nation's Congo operation as a case of ' pacific settlement of disputes ', and some confusions, such as defining ' non-bloc states ' at one point (p. 62) as if the category covered those *not invited* to Non-Aligned conferences, and at another (p. 98) as if it did not. Such blemishes irritate, but considered as a whole, the book's methodology, which is explained and defended at some length, is amply vindicated. No international relations library should be without it.

University of Sussex RODERICK C. OGLEY

Regimes for the Ocean, Outer Space, and Weather. By Seyom Brown *et al.* *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1977. 257 pp. £7·50. Pb: £2·95.*

THIS book, which is a result of the Technology and International Institutions project of the Brookings Institution, deals from an international relations perspective with three areas which up till now have remained relatively specialised—the regimes for the oceans, outer space, and weather. Over half of the book, in fact, is devoted to maritime issues and the authors outline inter alia the regimes for the management of navigation, fisheries, oil and gas, and marine scientific research. The remainder of the book deals with, for example, alternative regimes for outer space (termed the ' nonland realm '), remote sensing of the earth's resources by satellite, and controlled climatic change. The major theme which runs through the policy recommendations accompanying each of the three sections is international accountability. The authors conclude that before there can be meaningful international ownership, there is a need to build up substantial international accountability; in most cases they recommend the development of a new range of international institutions.

The value of this book lies primarily in the success it has in clearly drawing together a range of specialised material which one would normally find in technical publications. In the second section of the book, however, chapter 13, which deals with the radio spectrum and geostationary orbit, is misplaced and those unfamiliar with satellite technology should consult this chapter in conjunction with chapter 9. The level and amount of analysis in each section does also tend to vary somewhat. In the section on ocean regimes, the People's Republic of China is incorrectly identified (p. 27) as a spokesman at the Law of the Sea Conference for the group of states favouring extreme antimaritime positions on coastal state jurisdiction, scientific research and the powers of the international seabed authority. In fact extreme positions on these

issues have tended at different times to be taken by a variety of spokesmen, including Peru and a number of Arab states. Indeed, a marked feature of the Law of the Sea Conference has been the impact made by the representatives of a number of small countries.

In the section on outer space regimes the discussion on the interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty could have been broadened to include reference to the efforts of the so-called ' equatorial ' states (e.g. through the Bogotá declaration of December 3, 1976) to win recognition for their claim to national sovereignty over certain portions of the geostationary satellite orbit. Nevertheless, this is a valuable book which brings together much specialised material, enabling the student of international relations to bring a wider perspective to the discipline.

University of Lancaster R. P. BARSTON

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

Strategy and Ethnocentrism. By Ken Booth. *London: Croom Helm. 1979. 191 pp. £10·50.*

THIS is an excellent book which deserves a much wider audience than its specialised-sounding title might suggest. The author sets out to raise our consciousness about the particular, mostly unhelpful, effects which ethnocentrism has on the formulation and pursuit of strategic theory and policy. He succeeds fully in this, and then transcends his objectives by using ethnocentrism as the basis on which to mount a penetrating and wide-ranging critique of strategic studies as it is currently practised. The whole is then rounded out with some thoughtful proposals for improvement and reform. This is one of those rare books on strategic studies which attempts to look at the wood rather than at the trees, and it has much of value to offer to both newcomers and old hands in this field.

The basic argument is that ethnocentrism is pervasive among strategists; that it leads to incuriosity about, and stereotyping of, enemies; and that strategy without proper knowledge of enemies is both sterile and dangerous. This critique is mounted in a powerful, but not destructive, way, for throughout the book there is a strong conviction that strategic studies is a vital area of concern. Reform of the field, not abandonment of it, is the message. Many important threads of argument are knitted together here with wit and insight. The subjective nature of rationality, as opposed to a widely assumed objective nature, is used to undercut conventional wisdoms about deterrence, arms racing, and ' unacceptable damage '. Stock truths about the importance and durability of an opponent's capabilities as opposed to his intentions are neatly dissected. The consequences of American hegemony in the literature are laid bare, and many other problems like the poor record of threat assessment, the propensity to concentrate only on the negative aspects of ' realism ', and the use of inappropriate conceptions of war, are all subjected to rigorous and searching criticism. In short, Booth argues that strategic studies is in an unacknowledged state of crisis, and that ' those strategists who do not attempt to be part of the solution will undoubtedly become an increasingly important part of the problem.'

Ethnocentrism is a vice of many scholars of international relations, as well as of strategists, and students of the broader field will find much of use in this book. In addition to its very considerable intellectual merits, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* is a good read, full of pungent observation and wry humour. At times the style becomes a bit too dense, and could use a more generous leavening of illustrative example, but this is a minor complaint in what deserves to be a major book.

University of Warwick BARRY BUZAN

Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective. 2nd edn. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1979. (First publ. 1975.) 152 pp.*

THE maintenance of effective civilian political control of the Pentagon is a major concern of students and practitioners of national-security policy in the United States. It is well understood that any President finds it difficult to get his wishes implemented with respect to national-security policy. However, only recently has it been fully appreciated that the budgetary side of the policy process can be used to aid political control by the executive. Just how the defence budget might be used to maximum bargaining advantage is the principal objective of this study.

Professor Kanter shows how budgetary considerations affect all the organisations and procedures which produce decisions on national security, and how the President might exploit his authority regarding the defence budget to affect matters other than the purely financial. He uses budgetary data to examine the defence politics of the Eisenhower administration and the Kennedy-Johnson period. Popular descriptions draw striking contrasts in technique and purpose between national security policy in the 1950s, and that of the ' McNamara Revolution ', but Kanter demonstrates that there was little actual difference in budgetary outcomes in the two periods. His analysis leads him to conclude that the Eisenhower administration was more active and successful in formulating defence policy than is generally believed to be the case. The new techniques introduced by McNamara, while recognising the importance of restructuring the formal budgetary system and the potential of the budgetary allocation process as both an instrument of policy and a mechanism of organisational control, revealed an innocence about the corollary need to work on and with those responsible for implementing defence policies. While the McNamara tenure does not provide ' an entirely fair test of the opportunities for aggressive civilian leadership of the national security bureaucracy ' (p. 122), it illustrates the need for a strategy which permits the politicians to develop control techniques with respect to who gets what in terms of funding and also take advantage of, rather than try to change, the existing situation with respect to policy implementation by their military subordinates.

Overall, this is a stimulating initial foray into an underdeveloped area of research. From a methodological point of view, hard data is used in a skilful, persuasive and not too ambitious way to validate the significance of a budgetary approach as an important facet in understanding and evaluating national security policy-making and as a practical tool for improving civilian control over policy implementation. Kanter also shows how the technical complexities of formulating the defence budget might be linked with an exploitation of the real nature of the national security bureaucracy to improve civilian executive influence over national security policy decisions and actions. Republication of this study is all the more important given the resurgence of congressional activity which is designed to increase the influence of legislative priorities on annual defence budgets and on the execution of national security policies.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

The Future Global Challenge: A Predictive Study of World Security, 1977–1990. By Neville Brown. *London: RUSI; New York; Crane, Russak, 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Seeley, Service, London.) 402 pp. £9·95.*

Can We Avoid a Third World War Around 2010? The Political, Social and Economic Past and Future of Humanity. By Peter Peeters. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 266 pp. £6·95.*

ANY single author taking-on ' The Future ', especially the future of International Relations, is taking upon himself a major task. The breadth of vision required, and the

capacity to master many diverse disciplines and marshall them towards the single goal of prediction, is an undertaking that daunts and deters many. In order to write predictive studies in an age of increasing specialisation, it is, therefore, necessary to reverse the trend towards concentration upon single narrow issues and seek instead ' overviews '. This requires an ability to walk the delicate line between overspecialisation, on the one side, and trite generalisation, on the other. Any author setting out along this lonely road must, inevitably, be open to the charge of intellectual arrogance, yet if a consistent view of the world ahead is to emerge between the covers of a single volume it may be necessary for some scholars to undertake this task. Whether such scholars should be self-selected—as these two authors appear to be—may be open to question.

Taking the two volumes under review, it would be unfair to Mr Brown to compare his work with that of Dr Peeters. Although the science of futurology is underdeveloped and lacking in an accepted methodology, Dr Peeters volume adds nothing either to our knowledge or to the development of any coherent theory. Dr Peeters volume, in fact, barely qualifies as futurology, with only the final chapter of the book attempting to draw together the widely diverse threads of the previous 240 pages, and to project them into the future. Most of the book is history, and history of the very worst kind. Ten chapters dealing with different aspects of life on this planet take a wide ' broad brush ' view and find that everything is regulated by cycles—energy, economic development, nationalism, population *et al.* Economists, of all schools, will stand aghast at the chapter entitled ' The History of the Economy '—thirty-eight pages from pre-recorded history to the present day. Demographers will find the chapter on ' The Human Society ' equally breathtaking—they will, for example, find it interesting that effective birth control techniques only developed in the 1950s (p. 135) whilst the chapter ' Weapons, War, and Power ' suggests that Dr Peeters has never heard of the concept of deterrence, amongst others. Throughout the book statistics are sprayed around like bullets from a machine gun, and the main thrust of the book seems to be determined by a series of inverse graphs, but not a single source is quoted for any of the figures that are given, and not a single footnote graces the whole book. (2010, incidentally, is when India will be most likely to plunge the world into nuclear war. If this does not happen the Industrial Age will draw to its inevitable end and, ' all human beings may have become equal, respected citizens of one great world community ' p. 258.) In short, the book cannot be taken seriously. So mechanistic and deterministic a work may be useful as a tract for the new ' Cult of the Cycle ', but it offers no contribution to scholarly debate, and one wonders how so reputable a publisher came to be involved with it.

By contrast, Mr Brown's work, although individualistic, and even idiosyncratic in places, is a model of scholarship. Arguments are developed logically and cogently, sources are given, and such conclusions as are drawn derive from the arguments presented. Mr Brown also has the humility to question the value of the exercise in which he is engaged (ch. 4). However, as he suggests, ' We shall be obliged to hold or juggle with many rather awkward (issues) between now and 1990 ' (p. 337) and his volume, by isolating some of the issues, and throwing some light upon them, serves a useful purpose.

The Future Global Challenge is organised into five parts, giving twenty-six chapters in all. Without doubt, Mr Brown regards Part Two, dealing with ' Economic and Social Stress ' as the most significant. It is a coherent, and hard-hitting group of chapters that reveals the author as a, perhaps overenthusiastic, Malthusian. However, it is with Part Three ' The Military Factors ', that one feels Mr Brown to be most at home, if only because his specialist knowledge emerges most clearly and frequently at this time. This is especially true of the chapters on air and naval power. Part Four, ' Regional Perspectives ', reveals a penchant for the neglected art of geopolitics.

Somewhat disconcertingly, the chapters in these first four parts do no more than indicate the perceived problems and their dimensions before terminating abruptly. It is left to the ' Synoptic Appreciation ' of Part Five to take up the multitude of threads and draw them together. The pattern that emerges from his predictions suggest a future that will be neither easy nor comfortable, and is, on the whole, pessimistic. The author's panacea—of the international community planning ' a much bigger and well co-ordinated . . . extension into the last of Man's great physical frontiers—that of Outer Space ' (p. 386)—seems rather unconventional. Rather, one suspects, that mankind will reach the twenty-first century through sensitive diplomacy and the exercise of delicate political skills.

A strength of Mr Brown's book, which makes a serious attempt to inter-relate a variety of disciplines, is its stimulating breadth of vision. This same breadth must also be a weakness, however, because of the butterfly-like need to alight so briefly at any one point. In this respect, Mr Brown, along with his fellow futurologists, would be seen to be the victim of a self-created, and unavoidable, Catch 22 situation.

Glasgow College of Technology ROGER CAREY

New Conventional Weapons and East-West Security. Edited by Christoph Bertram. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 97 pp. £8·95.*

THE variety of sophisticated non-nuclear weapon-systems already in existence or under development is of peculiar importance to the West, for two reasons. The main threat to stability is the steadily increasing power of the Soviet Union to mount a massed conventional attack in *blitzkrieg* style without prior warning. The West, banned from pre-emptive attack by its own rules and unable to match the numbers of the East, relies on its (dwindling) technological superiority. Very accurate or very destructive systems, or a combination of the two, might obviate the need for an early recourse to ' tactical ' nuclear weapons, the ultimate disaster for the West which, again by its own rules, is fighting on its own territory. The question is whether these weapons favour a passive defence.

The answer, to put it mildly, is discouraging for Western planners. These new technologies are obvious to their Soviet opponents who are naturally improving their own forces to meet what they clearly perceive to be new threats. Ironically, Nato, having, for instance, adopted the guided anti-tank weapon, has yet to procure sufficient to provide a fully effective defence, while the Soviet Army is already re-organised to defeat them. The upshot is likely to be a large army facing another smaller one, both equipped with the new high-technology weapons, but with the means to counter them confined to the larger!

Nor is there any indication that the Soviet plans exclude the use of nuclear weapons immediately hostilities start. Worse, as one of the contributors to this symposium points out, the Soviet strategists are ' reconsidering the value of accurate, low-yield cannon-fired weapons'; another, the vulnerability of over-sophisticated command and control systems to the cruder forms of conventional attack. The conclusion must be that with or without the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the side which takes the initiative of offensive action continues to have its historical advantage, except during short periods of weapon imbalance.

At least that is what appears to be the case from the consensus of these papers, presented by thirteen distinguished contributors at the 1977 conference of the International Institute of Strategic Studies. All are of great interest, but it is not invidious to single out Dr Hudson on the weapons themselves; Dr Karber's analysis of current Soviet doctrine; and General Farrar-Hockley, who brings both common sense

and military realism to a subject in which the mere contemplation of technical marvels is deceitfully reassuring.

This bound volume contains the substance of two Adelphi papers retailed by the Institute at £1·00 apiece. £8·95 for a case-bound version is ridiculous. The quality of these essays would have justified their expansion to book length.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

European Defence Cooperation (Report of a Working Party under the chairmanship of Sir Bernard Burrows.) *London: Federal Trust. 1979. 37 pp. Pb £1·50.*

THIS short report is valuable primarily as marking out the ground for a debate which is likely to liven up in the next year or two as Conservative governments in Britain and elsewhere in Europe investigate the possibilities of closer co-operation in defence, and the obstacles to making substantial progress in defence co-operation. It presents the conclusions of a working group which brought together British Defence experts from all three parties committed to closer European co-operation. Not surprisingly, they failed to agree on priorities or on immediate practicalities, but share a common concern to find ways and means of edging forward in procurement, strategical and tactical doctrines, and even force integration.

The report notes the relative ineffectiveness and duplication of existing structures for European co-operation in this field. The Independent European Programme Group has taken over many of the functions of the Euro-Group, but does not yet include regular ministerial meetings in its operations, to provide greater impetus and greater possibilities for sorting out differences of perspective. Exchange of personnel between armed services, shared training facilities, and even language training remain very limited. The European Community has established some limited competence in industrial policy, but has no authority to concern itself with military procurement. European Political Co-operation discusses arms control and security issues, but stops short of more strictly defence issues.

The report raises a large number of awkward issues, including the future relationship of the British and French deterrents to the European defence effort and the role which the European Community might come to play in the defence and security field. It notes the differences of view within the European Parliament on the Klepsch Report on European defence co-operation, and carefully distinguishes between those areas where there is a certain consensus about ways forward (for example in increased specialisation of defence roles among European states, or much more extensive exchanges of personnel between defence ministries and armed services) and those in which disagreements remain deep. One senses throughout the report an underlying tension between the cautious pragmatists and the real enthusiasts. Derek Prag's statement in one of the appendices ' that a common European security policy is inseparable from a common foreign policy, and is long overdue ' goes to the heart of the problem. The European Community is still a long way from a common foreign policy, and logically a common defence policy has to follow that, not precede it.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe USSR. By Walter D. Connor. *New York: Columbia University Press. 19 pp. $25.00.*

WITHOUT too much exaggeration, two points can be made about communist They have been dominated by political scientists, economists and historian: sociologists have been in a minority. And they have been orientated towards c empirical case-studies rather than towards comparative ones. At the same tin the sociological and the comparative strand within them have mostly been pur scholars based in North America.

The book under review helps to redress the imbalance. Written by an A scholar, it deals in a comparative way with patterns of social stratification and in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and, thus, with equality and inequalit socialism, primarily under that of the Soviet type, to a lesser degree under th Yugoslav type.

Since its main focus is on inequalities of occupational groups, the book pa limited attention to inequalities of place or of sex. Moreover, it neglects cor inequalities between the economically active population and the retired one, a old-age pensioners are not an insignificant social category in the area. limitation is that neither the GDR nor Albania are included, because they have produced sufficient data.

In discussing at length social mobility, Connor asserts that the mass mobility (of workers to administrative positions and of peasants to th environment and factory employment) generated by socialist economic develop the early years provided a cushion against lowered general living standards and a good deal of potential unrest. In this connection it should be asked whet another factor has not contributed to political stability, namely, the mass incl women in the labour force. The question arises from the findings of Soviet ar sociologists that women show greater compliance than men, both at school and life.

While the author disregards the question, he does not omit other implica female employment. Particularly, he emphasises the significance of the di between individual and per capita household income, and that of the sex com of various occupational categories. The significance of the former stems from th female wage differential and the status of women as secondary earners wit family, and that of the latter from the heavy feminisation of lower white-coll and the domination by men of skilled manual work.

The author also stresses the importance of the family. The structure of ineq the socialist states, he says, did not simply grow. It is partly a product of tr partly of the ' market ' and its reflections of scarcities, and partly of design, imp socialist regimes on society. There are important breaks from the old pre- systems, but the points where socialism has not broken with the past are critical. These, in a sense, resolve down to one point: socialism has left the fan household, intact as a unit. And it is through the family that young people acq characteristics that so heavily influence their mobility chances.

Not surprisingly, Connor deals not only with the reality of inequality, but issue of equality as well. Both in the East and in the West, the modern debate i not simply about equality versus inequality, but about the kind of equality that desirable, and attainable. On the one hand, there are those who advocate eq result, the pursuit of which brings up the broader question of liberty. On th hand, there are those who endorse equality of opportunity and defend some in

in terms of the performance principle. A tension exists between them, and socialist governments, with a monopoly of power, have chosen to pursue a middle course.

All in all, the book is vulnerable to criticism. A major point might be that the analysis is mostly based on a scheme that distinguishes in the socialist social structure merely four categories, namely: the elite or the intelligentsia; routine non-manuals; workers; and peasants—and thus is rather crude. One of the minor points might be that it is controversial whether the intelligentsia and non-manuals have greater opportunities for extra work than other strata (pp. 249 and 301): the non-manuals are mostly women, and in the socialist economy, characterised by inadequate services and repair facilities, widespread moonlighting and odd jobbing in spare time on the part of workers seems to be more than probable.

Yet, the book is worth reading, since it raises significant questions and offers fresh insights. And since it makes not only cross-communist but cross-system comparison also, it could attract even those who do not specialise in communist studies.

St Antony's College, Oxford J. L. PORKET

Imperialism, Intervention and Development. Edited by Andrew Mack, David Plant and Ursula Doyle. *London: Croom Helm. 1979. 393 pp. £10·95. Pb: £4·95.*

THIS reader is intended to provide an introduction to some of the key issues in international politics in the post Second World War era, and is primarily intended for an undergraduate audience. The focus is mainly on relations between the developed states (particularly the United States) and the Third World. It is divided into two parts. Part One, titled ' Imperialism and Intervention ', looks at four main issue-areas—decolonisation, the cold war, counter-revolution and revolt, and the relationship between monopoly capital and overseas expansion. Part Two, entitled ' Imperialism and Development ', also has four sections. Two different approaches to Third-World poverty are examined—first, the thesis that underdevelopment is primarily caused by internal constraints and secondly, that underdevelopment arises from the operation of the global capitalist system. The third section looks at the relationship between world population and the food crisis, and the final section is a consideration of China's developmental strategy.

Whilst not providing a collection of ' balanced ' articles the editors have chosen pieces written from different perspectives. In brief introductions to each of the eight sections the editors highlight the salient points for further exploration and emphasise the differences between the respective authors. In a book of this nature it is to be expected that there will be an unevenness in the quality of the papers. This is the case here but there are enough good articles to make this a worthwhile effort. Most of these pieces have been published before. Among the better ones are those by Fieldhouse on decolonisation; Barnet on intervention; Moran on American corporate capitalism; and Galbraith on the causes of poverty.

There are three new articles—two on China's developmental approach, and one on radical theories of development. Andrew Mack and Richard Leaver in ' Radical Theories of Development: An Assessment ' provide an admirably concise examination of three radical theories of development, purporting to explain how the developed countries obstruct economic growth in the Third World. After a penetrating critique of the exploitation hypothesis they reach the conclusion that it is ' weak, highly susceptible to attack and, even in its strongest formulation, not particularly convincing ' (p. 270). They are more sympathetic to the other two theories examined: that the trade policies of developed countries, by denying access to their markets to the manufactures of the developing countries, perpetuate an

international division of labour which is inimical to the growth of less-developed countries; and that ' urban bias ' in development planning and foreign-aid appropriations results in a skewed allocation of resources which exacerbates rural poverty. Dennis Woodward provides a succinct summary of Chinese economic policies which shows the centrality of certain themes, despite the frequent changes of direction. Bill Brugger in ' China's Relevance for Third World Development ' argues very convincingly and correctly that China's economic and social history, vast size, and immense human and material resources makes it a special case. The Chinese experiment in self-reliance cannot be mechanically exported to other developing societies.

On the whole this reader should provide the student of international relations with a handy collection of articles with which to supplement his basic textbooks.

University of Sussex MARC WILLIAMS

The Imperialist Revolutionaries: Trends in World Communism in the 1960s and 1970s. By Hugh Seton-Watson. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1978. 157 pp. Index. Pb: $6.95.*

PROFESSOR SETON-WATSON presents us in this book with a characteristically competent and thorough account of the fortunes and misfortunes of the communist movement in the past two decades. Most important events and personalities are recorded, and there is a good index. The author's main aim, however, is to provide an historical perspective on those events. His account brings out very well how to talk of communism today is to talk of the whole world, and how to pass judgment on what has happened under the banner of Marxism-Leninism is to assess the current predicament of all mankind. In the small space available to him (only a hundred and fifty pages) the author quite rightly goes for the big themes: revolution, nationalism, and the communist movement's mythology. The second of these themes is treated exceedingly well and forms the axis of the work; the first and third are treated less well, for reasons connected with what follows.

The problem in reviewing this book concerns questions of objectivity and of the historian's role. The author clearly wishes the work to be a personal statement on what communism has offered to date and appears capable of offering. His basic point of view is that Western civilisation is threatened by communism—not so much by Marx's ' spectre ' of 1848 as by the forms which communism has come to adopt today and by the military and diplomatic power which supports those forms. Since the author is quite competent enough to argue convincingly that in military and diplomatic terms the Soviet Union is still predominant within the communist movement, the book reads at times like a Foreign Office assessment of the Soviet threat. The barometer which registers the ebbs and flows of the communist movement is marked in such a way as to indicate the increasing or decreasing chances of Soviet jackboots marching in Paris, Pisa or Pimlico. This, for citizens of these places, is an extremely meaningful way of reacting to the ' movement of the communist movement '. But it is only one way, and although it leads us some way towards understanding what communism has been about in all the now very wide organisational and theoretical variety which that phenomenon has shown, it prevents us from arriving at any full understanding.

One illustration must suffice. The author never clearly defines what is to count as part of the communist movement and what is not. He includes in his account Trotskyists and ' ultra-leftists ' of various persuasions, but these parties and individuals are presented as problems *for* communism and as external to it, communism itself being seen predominantly in terms of the Soviet Union and of such parties and states as the

Soviet Union can coerce or cajole into its service. Now these other parties are indeed problems for the Soviet Union; but then the Soviet Union is an even bigger problem for *them*. They are as much a part of the communist movement as Luther was a part of the history of Christianity. Moreover the historian of *that* movement has to accommodate the Sermon on the Mount as well as the Inquisition, the temporal power of Rome as well as the fathers in the desert. If Saladin's councillors viewed Christianity in terms of West European lances they may have been good statesmen, but not thereby great historians.

University of Manchester MICHAEL WALLER

The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy. By Mostafa Rejai. *New York: McKay. 1977. 194 pp. Pb: $3.95.*

A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence. By J. Bowyer Bell. *New York: Basic Books; London: Harper and Row. 1978. 292 pp. £5·95.*

THE two books under review present a complete contrast in style and methodology. *The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy* is written in a dry, detached, almost mechanical manner, and approaches revolution as though it were an inanimate object. *A Time of Terror* is more concerned to offer a narrative of events in a highly readable form, with more profound analysis reserved for the last chapter.

The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy bases itself upon a very dubious usage of the term ' strategy '. It is stated that ' Strategy refers to all actions, policies, instruments and apparatus necessary for mounting a revolutionary upheaval . . . Strategy has five principle components: leadership, ideology, organisation, the use of terror and violence and the manipulation of the international situation ' (p. 31). What Rejai is in fact attempting in this book is a comparative study of revolutions, using a rather limited analytical framework which assumes that his five principle components of revolutionary strategy are the factors which determine the success or failure of a revolution. The introduction of the concept of strategy into this enterprise is both misleading and unnecessary. Having undertaken a review of the literature in Part I of the book to support his choice of key variables, he uses them in Part II as a guide to the analysis of revolution in Bolivia, North Vietnam and France in 1968. In Part III he attempts to draw conclusions from this empirical work, though they prove to be rather banal. ' While not all the components of strategy are equally present in every revolution, collectively they seem to do a good job of gauging the potential success or failure of revolutionary movements ' (p. 165). Unfortunately, Rejai tells us little about how they are to be ' collectivised '.

This book is thus a good example of both the positive and negative aspects of modern analytical political science. On the one hand, it offers a useful brief synthesis of the available literature, an overt methodology and analytical framework, a number of case studies, and a final synthesis. On the other, it does not answer or attempt to tackle the questions which really seem central to an analytic study of revolution—such as which factors were most important in particular revolutions, and why. In short, this may be a useful teaching text, but it does not appear to substantially advance knowledge in this area.

A Time of Terror is a descriptive treatment of the emergence in the late 1960s and 1970s of a number of types of violence directed against specific states by small groups of people, and the response of those states and the international community to these activities. Bowyer Bell highlights the case of the Croation group which hijacked a TWA aircraft in the United States in September 1976, and eventually surrendered in Paris. He clearly feels that this episode illustrates both the ease of such an operation

and its political value to dissident groups. He then goes on to discuss the way hijackings and other armed attacks for political purposes developed during the 1970s, and the limited evidence of international links between these groups. Part II starts with a long chapter chronicling the responses of governments to these developments, and then proceeds to a rather limited discussion of the vulnerability of high-technology sectors of advanced economies. It then highlights the limitations placed upon states by the need to operate within the framework of their own laws, and concludes with an examination of the contrasting policies of no-concession and accommodation used by certain governments after 1973 in their dealings with such groups. These chapters are very readable, with copious illustrations and case studies, and bring out with great clarity both the choice of strategies faced by governments in such situations, and the key role played by the media in furthering the aims of dissident groups. The relevance of the next section of the book is rather unclear, however, as it consists of in-depth case studies of the IRA in Eire and postwar Italy. The purpose of including these case studies of the internal use of violence by dissident groups is obscure, though they do have some value as case studies in their own right. Bowyer Bell then concludes, in Part IV, by arguing that in modern democracies there can be no solution to the use of violence by dissident groups: the state just has to learn to live with it.

This is a well-written book but one that could have been considerably improved by strengthening some of the sections (e.g. on nuclear terrorism) and omitting others such as the two case studies. Above all, it is a book written by a pragmatist and its main message is one that all governments would do well to note: that where governments either will not or cannot find solutions to internal political problems, there is not likely to be any autonomous legal or technical solution to the problem of anti-state violence.

University of Southampton JOHN SIMPSON

Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook. By Edward N. Luttwak. *London: Wildwood House; Australia: Bookwise. Rev. edn. 1979. (First Publ. Harmondsworth: Allen Lane. 1968). 215 pp. £5·95.*

WELL over half the governments in the world came to power through coup d'état, which has become by far the commonest means of political change, yet I know of only two general contemporary books on the subject: S. E. Finer's *The Man on Horseback* and Luttwak's *Coup d'Etat*, here under review. These complement each other: Finer analyses the wide range of motives which soldiers have for seizing power; Luttwak goes into detail on how they do it.

Luttwak, at LSE in the late 1960s, became disenchanted with the lack of understanding about the African states then emerging to independence. It was naïvely assumed that, at the raising of the flag, a sophisticated political community would appear overnight, complete with all the machinery for peaceful democratic change. He sensed that the real power lay and would continue to lie in the hands of the military.

How right he was. Since his book was first published there have been over a hundred military coups, while only five guerrilla movements have come to power and three of these did so (in Africa) as a direct result of the coup in Portugal in 1974.

His book is concise and easy to read. He examines the conditions which make a coup d'état possible, analyses its strategy, planning and execution in some detail and ends with statistical tables of successful and unsuccessful coups.

He puts his finger on the vulnerabilities not only of Third-World countries but also of some others, like France, Spain, Portugal and Greece. He looks at the anatomy of bureaucracies in democratic and totalitarian states, at the organisation of armies and at the characteristics and motivations of army officers, from the embittered passed-over

captain, to the general determined to save the soul of his country. He describes the techniques of infiltration both of armies and bureaucracies, and especially the posting of sympathetic officers into key posts, but it is a pity that the Greek ' Colonels' Coup ' of 1967 happened too late for the first edition and is not included in the second, for that was a classic.

One weakness of the book is that it pays far too little attention to the handling of the media, not only in executing a coup, but also in building up the conditions in which it will succeed. This is probably the most vital ingredient of all.

Is his book worth reading? Yes—and worth owning too, along with *The Man on Horseback*. Luttwak has been criticised for telling people how to seize power but it can be assumed that many many more of his readers are the potential victims. This book alerts them to their vulnerability and should enable ordinary people to contribute to defeating this unhealthy form of change. It will also help the rest of us to interpret much better what goes on behind the news.

University of Exeter RICHARD CLUTTERBUCK

The Marxism of Regis Debray: Between Lenin and Guevara. Hartmut Ramm. *Lawrence, Kansas: Regents Press 1978. 240 pp. $13.50.*

HARTMUT RAMM'S book seems to have two purposes: to place Regis Debray's ideas in the ideological context of Guevarism, Marxism-Leninism, Trotskyism and the debates with Latin American Communists (with some reference to anarchism and social democracy); and to trace Debray's intellectual biography through various Parisian, Cuban, Bolivian and post-Chilean (Parisian) phases.

The first task could probably merit an extended article—interesting if esoteric, the second probably wouldn't justify even that. This leaves a question mark over this book-length treatment. Debray's significance as a writer was less intrinsic—for his own intellectual contributions—than as a mechanism of communication between Castro's Cuba and dissident Marxists in Europe and Latin America. His was a symbolic and polemical role, rather than as prime-mover in debate. As translator, apologist and interpreter he had at least an inspirational impact on the New Left (mainly if not exclusively through his booklet *Revolution in the Revolution*. Many of Guevara's ideas were filtered through Debray, and he also communicated with some other, and later, practitioners of ' armed struggle '; though Ramm's book is less than helpful on this most significant aspect.

Ramm's painstaking exegisis of Debrays various volte-faces, personal and political, continually raises the question of whether his contribution deserves such treatment. As one follows Debray's convoluted ideological development, one is bound to conclude that whilst Guevara and others had an impact on the real world, Debray's was often confined to pseudo events. Here is the stuff of debate for revolutionaries-by-proxy, the ' Guevaras-manqué ' ideas divorced from application, only retrospectively applied to events; or interpretations of ideological schema into which versions of history are subsequently fitted. Thus the export of Guevara's notion of the ' foco ' became symbol rather than strategy.

Ramm's book is critical of Debray only within the narrow frameworks of neo-Marxian interpretation. (Guevara for example remains ' above reproach ' despite his, admitted, theoretical lacuna.) This makes the study not a work of scholarship (nor of simple polemic) but of inter-sectarian commentary. A major criticism of the text is that it is not clear where reportage of someone else's position ends, and Ramm's own statement of line begins. As one tires of the twists and turns of Debray's biography, one is tempted instead to try in turn to place Ramm himself in this ' error '-strewn cockpit of ideological struggle, to detect the magical ' correct position '.

Whilst cognoscenti of the guerrilla-left may have no problems with the book, a great deal is assumed for the rest of us; oblique references to Lenin, Althusser, and the history of Latin American communism abound. Although anarchism is mentioned, its actual relationship to Debray's work is utterly unclarified. (Which anarchism?) Above all the author's claims that Debray is a Marxist, or that he ' advanced our knowledge about the nature and role of revolution ', are not only debateable, but no real attempt is made to establish them.

University of Bradford NIGEL YOUNG

Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. *Madison, London: University of Wisconsin Press. 1978. 344 pp.*

Money and Power: Banks and the World Monetary System. By Jonathan David Aronson. *Beverly Hills: Sage. 1977.*

THESE two books are out of the same stable of young, up-and-coming American political economists who, as the United States slowly turns inwards on itself, are battling to provide non-Marxist explanations of how the international economy is actually working. Aronson's is the less ambitious of the two, and he provides a good, straightforward analysis of the power that banks have had in world affairs. The Katzenstein volume is extremely ambitious, works most of the time, but has a handful of quite important flaws.

Katzenstein has edited a volume which originally appeared as a volume of *International Organization.* His co-authors are Charles Maier, Stephen Krasner, Stephen Blank, T. J. Pempel, Michael Kreile, Alan Posner and John Zysman. The question they set themselves is why the strategies of advanced industrial states differ so much in face of common threats such as the 1973 oil embargo. They set out to provide the answer by giving a series of historically detailed case-studies of the domestic structures in countries like the United States, Britain, Japan, West Germany, Italy and France, trying to show that it is historical differences in these underlying structures which determine distinctive national approaches to international economic issues.

Those familiar with the *International Organization* style will know what these contributions are like. Extremely thorough and well documented, they tend, particularly in Katzenstein's two pieces, to try slightly too hard to fit the messy real world into tidy patterns. This is most noticeable in the editor's apparent determination to view the British as firm defenders of the liberal international economic order, which just is not true in sectors such as textiles where, if anything, the British have led the search for some ' managed-trade ' solution.

This is not to say that there are not some very good chapters—Kreile's on Germany, for example—but I was ultimately left with conflicting emotions. On the one hand, a lot of genuine scholarship has gone into the national cases. On the other hand, these cases are sometimes not quite centred on the right questions because none of the authors is an authority on international trade politics, which is one major part of foreign economic policy. There is something unnerving about this book's only crediting itself in its index to two references to GATT, and none at all to the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, which is an apparently lasting testament to the political importance of textile lobbies round the world. However, despite a bit of irritation with the book at its edges, I am judging it by the very highest standards. If it is not quite excellent, it is still far above average and is a thoroughly creditable attempt at an extremely ambitious theme.

Aronson has set the banks (particularly American ones) in a full transnational

relations context. He analyses the question of corporate power and then, through an excellent marshalling of the evidence from Roman times forward, sets out to test what kind of influence bankers have actually had on what kind of world affairs. He wears his historian's mantle lightly, primarily concentrating on the role that banks played in the 1958-76 period as the dollar slowly toppled from grace. He is always interesting and well-informed and his judgments seem difficult to fault. This is a book which can be read by the banking practitioner and political scientist alike. In many ways, he aimed less high than the other volume under review, but his is the more satisfying achievement, in that he brings his study home with remarkably few questions left unanswered.

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

The Role of Tariff Quotas in Commercial Policy. By Michael Rom. *London: Macmillan for the Foreign Policy Research Centre. 1979. 258 pp. £12·00.*

TARIFF quotas, i.e. arrangements by which a limited quantity of imports of some commodity or group of commodities may enter a country/customs union at a preferential tariff rate, are a matter of increasing interest because of their importance in schemes to give preferential access to the exports of manufactured goods from less-developed countries in the markets of developed countries. This book reviews a number of these schemes and discusses the role of tariff quotas in the process of harmonising national tariff structures in the EEC as well as their use as a means of protection in the United States. It is argued that, in general, tariff quotas are a more liberal form of trade restriction than either tariffs or quotas, though Dr Rom emphasises that the outcome of tariff quotas depends quite sensitively upon the method by which they are operated. In particular, the distribution of the benefits of the preferential tariff between producers and importers is affected substantially by the method of allocating the quota with the extremes being represented by a ' first come, first serve ' procedure and a system of strict licensing. The difference between these methods is important also if one is to predict the possible consequences of tariff quotas on market prices and domestic producers in the importing country. Further, the extent to which eligibility for tariff quotas is specified for narrow or broad groups of commodities or countries will clearly affect both their overall impact and again the distribution of their benefits.

Since the governments of developed countries seem unwilling to move wholeheartedly towards unrestricted trade Dr Rom argues that tariff quotas offer a method of trade liberalisation which enables them to realise some of the benefits of freer or preferential trading arrangements, while retaining the ability to safeguard sensitive industries. The difficulty with this approach, as he recognises, is that tariff quotas may be used in an essentially protective manner rather than as a method of smoothing the contraction of domestic production and its replacement by imports. Unfortunately, this book sheds relatively little light on this or other important issues of current interest concerning tariff quotas, since almost all of its empirical material refers to the 1960s or earlier. In addition, I found the analysis rather disappointing, since most of it is carried out at an excessive level of detail and is not successful either in elucidating the major general issues of principle and practice relevant to an assessment of the relationship of tariff quotas to other forms of commercial policy or in suggesting directions for the future use and investigation of this tool of trade intervention. The book will, of course, be of some interest to those intimately concerned with the administration of trade policy, but it is not one which I would recommend to a wider audience.

Christ's College, Cambridge GORDON HUGHES

International Indebtedness and the Developing Countries. By George C. Abbott. *London: Croom Helm; New York; Sharpe. 1979. 312 pp. £11·95.*

OF the many problems encountered by the developing world George Abbott singles out two as potentially being the most serious sources of tension and disruption in the international economy. The first is the debt problem and the second is the shortage of funds on concessional terms for development purposes. The major theme of this useful book is that these problems should be analysed in tandem, and that what is needed is an integrated scheme which uses debt relief as both an end in itself, to reduce the level of indebtedness, and as a means to an end, to provide extra funds for development.

A large proportion of the book is concerned with a thorough empirical investigation of both the flow of resources to developing countries through all the various governmental, institutional and private channels, and the worsening debt problem which developing countries face. Up to now much of what has been written on the subject of debt has been available only in somewhat obscure official reports. George Abbott's book brings much of this information together in a more accessible form. The book is, therefore, a very useful reference text. However, whilst the author has clearly been extremely painstaking in his collection and presentation of statistical information the reader may sometimes feel rather submerged in the torrent of facts and figures.

Having examined the size of the debt problem the book goes on to investigate international debt strategy in the past. Again this is very carefully catalogued. The author concludes that whilst quite a lot has been done to try to cope with the problem, the situation has continued to deteriorate: the time has come for a concerted international attack on the problem of debt. Various forms of debt relief are advocated including a debt moratorium and cancellation, as well as the more conventional, but on their own inadequate, rescheduling and refinancing. Such measures are viewed in the context of increasing the amount of aid.

According to Abbott, development needs should represent the first charge on developing countries' limited foreign-exchange reserves. Aid should be the target and debt relief the variable instrument by which this target is achieved. In the analysis of his debt- and aid-policy package Abbott applies instrumental analysis as developed by Adolph Lowe. This reviewer found the application to be rather unhelpful, the exact meaning of sentences such as, ' the hypothetico-deductive method of analysis which it uses is one directional and progressive ' not being immediately clear. The policies suggested may however be worthy of close scrutiny. Unfortunately space does not permit a thorough review of them here.

The book involves little theoretical analysis of aid (though there are references to the literature), and almost takes it for granted that aid is a ' good thing '. No doubt those opposed to the whole concept of aid will dislike much of the argumentation used in the policy part of the book.

As claimed on the back flap, George Abbott's book will be of interest to students following courses in development economics, and to administrators and policy-makers in government institutions and international organisations which deal with the debt problem at first hand. It is a book that needed to be written and deserves to be widely read.

University of Surrey GRAHAM BIRD

Economic Relations Between Socialist Countries and the Third World. Edited by Nayyar Deepak. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 265 pp. £15·00.*

THE nine essays contained in this volume (six of which have been previously

published) maintain a satisfactory quality and coherence of theme to make a useful work for those unfamiliar with the original articles.

The major common area is the attempt to evaluate the gains from trade and aid to specific Third-World countries from their economic relations with Socialist states. Whilst the country-study approach predominates, resulting in considerable depth, breadth is provided by Deepak Nayyar's introductory essay, Biplab Dasgupta's commodity study (Soviet oil) and finally, by Suzanne Paine's detailed, systematic (and previously unpublished) study of China's economic relations with less-developed countries.

A critical problem in assessing the benefits of any trading relationship to the participants is the specification of the alternative situation that would have prevailed in its absence. If the arrival of a new trading partner merely serves to divert existing trade flows from existing partners at the previously prevailing set of prices, the net benefits of the new relationship to the Third-World country are apparently zero. However the new trade relationship itself will have repercussions in other markets which may affect that country's terms of trade, either favourably (by stimulating new competition), or particularly in the case of a major supplier of a basic raw material, negatively, by removing a major potential purchaser from alternative markets. Under these circumstances existing world prices may give a poor indication of the terms of trade that the Third World would otherwise have faced. In the Soviet-Third-World case the problem is further complicated by the existence of bilateral agreements in non-convertible currencies (although their significance is declining) normally involving bilateral balance in conventional trade agreements and project-tied aid, involving repayments in the form of products from the recipient nation.

The major strength of this book is that the contributions provide serious theoretical and statistical approaches to these questions whilst the similarity of results obtained from different country sources lends them considerable credence. On the question of prices, for example, the majority of studies confirm the similarity of the terms obtained by Third-World countries in trade with socialist and capitalist countries alike (*viz.* Mabro—Egypt p. 69; Bienefeld—Tanzania p. 70; Noman—Pakistan p. 177; Stevens—Nigeria and Ghana p. 85; Paine—China p. 225). A further similarity can be detected on the terms on which aid is offered. What gains, therefore, can be considered to accrue to Third-World countries as a result of their relations with Socialist countries? Mabro provides a valuable analysis of the limitations of existing prices as an indication of the opportunity costs involved. Nayyar provides a detailed study to indicate that India's trade with the Socialist bloc mainly represents trade creation rather than trade diversion whilst a consensus view appears to be that a considerable benefit has been that the competition provided by Socialist countries has improved the Third World's terms of trade and aid with the industrial West.

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London ALAN H. SMITH

Oilgate: The Sanctions Scandal. By Martin Bailey. *London: Coronet/Hodder and Stoughton. 1979. 288 pp. Pb: £1·50.*

Mexican Oil and Natural Gas: Political, Strategic and Economic Implications. By Richard B. Mancke. *New York, London: Prager. 1979. (Distrib. in the UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 163 pp.*

THESE contrasting books are both worth reading. Bailey tells the depressing story of how various oil companies kept the oil flowing to Rhodesia after UDI, with at least the tacit consent of the British authorities for a good part of the time. Mancke has produced a reasonable specimen of a new publishing phenomenon—the monograph on the oil economy of individual oil-producing nations. In his case, he has chosen Mexico,

and, although showing some signs of his American roots, he provides a well-balanced analysis.

Bailey is a free-lance journalist who, along with Bernard Rivers, has played a major part in unravelling how Rhodesia was supplied with oil in the years after UDI—particularly after the United Nations' decision of December 1966 to impose a mandatory ban on the supply of oil, or oil products to Southern Rhodesia. As has become clear, the only time Rhodesia felt genuinely short of oil was after the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which strained the whole world's supplies. What happened?

Bailey draws on his and Rivers's researches, supplemented by the official report of Thomas Bingham. He shows how the routing of the oil supplies varied with time, and that the exact corporate channels they flowed through were varied on at least one occasion, apparently to allow British officials and politicians to swear that British companies were not directly supplying oil to the rebel state. Since most of the detailed research and investigative hearings have been held in London, the book is particularly harsh on British Petroleum and Shell amongst companies, and the Wilson administration amongst the politicians. Clearly, though, there is more to be uncovered about the role of American companies.

It is impossible to summarise the events in the space available. Instead I would heartily recommend this book as essential reading for everyone who is having to think through Western policy toward Southern Africa now that the chance of mandatory oil sanctions against South Africa is increasing. Again, it is essential reading for all those who want to get a better sense of the way companies will go to extreme lengths to have things all ways, in the kind of moral and legal morass that exists in Southern Africa. One has some sympathy with London executives who argued that they were not fully in control of their South African subsidiaries, but, then, BP did show in 1977 that it was possible to impose limits on them if the international headquarters were determined to get action. However, this book should not just be read as a condemnation of the oil companies. It should also be read as a condemnation of both Labour and Tory ministers who either chose not to know about what was happening (the Tories) or acquiesced in cosmetic solutions when the unpleasant truths about what British companies were up to was forced upon them (Labour).

No one comes out of this story with any credit, except for investigators like Bailey. He has dug deeply. He has not always structured his book as clearly as he might have done, but for all that, it is important reading.

Mancke has produced a study which is well above the average of the recent glut of oil-producer studies. He tells the history of Mexican oil clearly, going back into the 1910s and 1920s which have set the tone for so much which has happened since then. There is an open-minded chapter on Pemex which gives some idea of the problems involved in starting up a National Oil Company from scratch in the circumstances which Mexico faced after 1938. At the same time, Mancke provides evidence of areas where one can argue that Pemex has not been performing as effectively as it should have been. The strength of this book is that it goes relatively deeply into recent political developments in Mexico to see how these might affect the oil policies of the ruling PRI. Most readers will be interested in the penultimate chapter, which deals with future United States-Mexican energy relationships. He strongly believes that persuading the Mexicans to step-up production is a much more economically attractive proposition for the United States than going for crash programmes to develop all kinds of exotic new fuel sources. Where he is weak is in considering how the United States might persuade the understandably prickly Mexicans to do this. . . . But, then, this is a problem found the world over. Mexico is not the only oil producer which feels that it is not in its interests to develop its hydrocarbons at the maximum rate. Mancke's book helps one realise the kind of considerations which go into Mexico's decision-making.

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

Raw Materials and Pacific Economic Integration. Edited by John Crawford and Okita Saburo. *London: Croom Helm. 1978. 343 pp. £14·95.*

ALTHOUGH this collection of essays concentrates on the developing trading relationships between Australia, Japan and other Western Pacific countries in the last quarter century, it has a much broader relevance. This is particularly true of the studies by Ben Smith on Long Term Contracts, and by Ross Garnaut and Anthony Clunies-Ross on Taxation of Natural Resource Projects. Indeed, a version of the latter was published in the *Economic Journal* in 1975. This book brings together a series of papers written over a period of years in a joint research project by Australian and Japanese economists. Altogether about 150 researchers were involved at various times, and an annotated list of the supporting papers produced is contained in pages 312-27. Thus the project was a highly ambitious undertaking which began in a critical period of Japanese-Australian relations when the massive bilateral trade built up in the later 1960s and early 1970s was being buffeted by external shocks such as currency instability and world recession. Although most of the papers were published several years ago, it is very useful to have them together as they often complement each other. This offsets the dated nature of part of the discussion, and the disadvantage, for a book published in 1978, of stopping most of the statistics at 1974.

The book is divided into three sections. A short introductory part sets the Western Pacific in the broader context of the world economy and of American foreign policy. It highlights the complementary nature of the two main economies, Japan and Australia, and pinpoints their trade in raw materials as of vital interest. Japan's heavy dependence on imports of oil, industrial raw materials and even of foodstuffs raises many national security issues. Over the postwar period Japan has transformed from a partially industrialised to an advanced nation, a metamorphosis with which neither Japanese policy-makers nor the West has yet fully come to terms.

Part II of the study by the joint editors plus Peter Drysdale and Kiyoshi Koyima is mainly descriptive. It shows the close interdependence of the two economies and the shape of that interdependence, with ample statistical tables. One advantage of the joint authorship is that both sides are fully represented. The consequences of interdependence both in the short and long term are analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. As fluctuations in the larger economy have a magnified effect on the smaller, major economic policy problems have been posed for Australia. Equally though, Australian national policies, expressed through export controls and investment criteria, have reverberated on Japan. Different inflation rates and exchange-rate movements have sometimes strained contractual relations, and the bargaining strengths of the two parties have fluctuated. Australia's dependence on raw-material exports, and the success of those exports have posed problems for industrial policy. The study broadens into a discussion of the two main nations' dealings with the developing economies elsewhere in the region, and of their trade and aid policies. The movement of Papua New Guinea from colonial status to full independence raised specific issues for Australia.

The third part of the book is more analytical and prescriptive, amplifying some of the issues set out in Part II. A quantification of the effects of Japanese economic fluctuations on Australia by Chikashi Moriguchi and John Nevile concludes that interdependence is unlikely to cause great problems for Australia at least at the macro economic level, beyond those normally experienced by an open economy. Chapter 11 is a useful descriptive analysis by Sabura Okita of Japanese dependence on imports and of the policy requirements that implies. Then come the studies on long-term contracts and resource taxation, and a final paper by Richard Caves on Policies Towards Trade in Raw Materials. This again is of wider relevance than the immediate context of Japanese Australian relations.

P. C. F. CROWSON

Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved. By Irvin C. Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian. *Basic Books: New York. 1978. 244 pp. $10.00*

AFTER the Second World War nuclear physicists and industrialists suggested that nuclear power could generate electricity less expensively than coal-burning power plants. The major actors in the electrical generating industry found their first client in 1963 and by the end of 1967 American utility companies had ordered 75 nuclear power plants totaling 45,000 mw of capacity. One technology in particular, the light-water reactor, had taken a substantial lead over its competitors. Its rise to prominence raised a question which became the focal point of Bupp and Derian's research: ' How had American light water reactor technology come to dominate the world-wide market for nuclear power plants so thoroughly?' In remarkably clear prose they review Euratom's failure to devise a common energy policy and explain in convincing terms the initial successes of nuclear energy in an extremely hostile economic environment. By the end of the 1960s the international context had significantly altered, making nuclear power more attractive to perceptive observers. In 1969 the Commission Consultative pour la Production d'Electricité d'Origine Nucléaire (PEON) cautioned against continued heavy reliance on fossil fuels and advised the French government to develop commercial nuclear power, specifically recommending the adoption of the American light-water reactor. Several reasons supported this choice. First, French engineers had finally mastered the enrichment process—an advance which would ultimately safeguard France from American political pressures concerning the use of enriched uranium. Secondly, industrialists realised that any rival to the light-water reactor would have great difficulty penetrating world markets. Thirdly, a consensus had emerged in the French nuclear community that the American reactor surpassed all rivals. Hence, it was to France's advantage to master and then to improve on light-water technology. In their discussion of this recommendation the authors offer an uncritical appraisal of the commissioners' work, charging that they merely accepted Westinghouse's advertising tracts on comparative advantage of light-water technology. On the contrary, the Commission prefaced its recommendation with comments clearly indicating the tentative nature of cost projections and other possibilities of error. In the United States, however, the Atomic Energy Commission, created to supervise the nuclear power industry in the name of the public interest, actually backed the industry's claims even though it lacked the entrepreneurial skills to assess them.

In the final chapters the authors point out that experience has provided abundant evidence which undermines assumptions guiding the nuclear industry. Contrary to expectations, experience gained from reactor construction and operation has not led to cost reductions. Industry responds that the government regulatory agencies have altered safety criteria too often, making it impossible to standardise production techniques. A second mistake occurred when the aggregate generating capacity of reactors of the pre-1965 era was used to forecast operating costs of much larger reactors. Again, the expected economies did not occur. Managers are not alone in their concern over mounting costs: in France the trade unions are particularly attentive to the problems of financing the nuclear programme and also voice concern on questions involving waste management. In general, the opposition parties have manifested mature restraint in these matters, perhaps convinced that heated public debate might endanger the nuclear option which they too consider essential to France's energy future. If the authors' dim forecast for nuclear energy in the United States appears accurate, they overestimate the potential for social conflicts in France on this issue of vital national concern.

American College in Paris TERENCE MURPHY

LAW

Human Dignity: *The Internationalization of Human Rights* (Essays based on an Aspen Institute Workshop, with selected International human rights documents). Edited by Alice H. Henkin. *New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies; Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana; Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff. 1979. 203 pp.*

Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration. (Commemorative volume on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.) Edited by B. G. Ramcharan. *The Hague, London: Nijhoff for the International Forum on Human Rights. 1979. 274 pp. Fl. 90.00.*

UN Law/Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law. Edited by Antonio Cassese. *Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff. 1979. 258 pp. Fl. 76.0. $38.00.*

EACH quinquennium of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been accompanies by its quota of celebratory books and lectures. Not much of this activity has been of lasting significance (a point on which this reviewer is consciously vulnerable, as a contributor to the present round!). Perhaps there has not been much to celebrate. Progress in the protection of human rights has been little-by-little and it has not been without its setbacks. Emphasis has been on procedural developments rather than substantive achievement. There has been criticism, of course, but often destructive and sometimes strident, not easy to accommodate when the object is to praise the idea of human rights and not to bury it. And that, I think, has been the great problem: in defending human rights against hostile assaults, its adherents have muted more moderate criticism so that much of the writing has appeared bland and unrealistic.

The Aspen Institute Papers unhappily fall into this familiar category. They are very short, eighty pages, some of them blank and big print on those that are not, with rather more pages of documents—extracts from the Charter, the Universal Declaration, the United Nations Covenants and the Helsinki Final Act. Besides being brief, the papers (there are six altogether) as well as comprising a summary of the discussions, are general and enthusiastic in a rather naïve way. They give the impression of raising questions for discussion, but not very provocative ones. The conclusions are pretentious. Already, satisfaction with President Carter's human rights policy seems misplaced and the claim that the group had ' convincingly demonstrated ' that the gap is narrowing and may already be bridged between Western conceptions of civil rights and, what they call, ' Second and Third conceptions of economic and social rights ' is not made out. Indeed, the very composition of the group, largely American, with a couple of West Europeans and two Third-World diplomats, limited its capacity to come to any convincing conclusions. And where, one asks, was ' the opposition '? Even among Americans, there are heirs to the Bricker tradition or people like William Buckley or Pat Moynihan who might have tempered the easy consensus.

Human rights sceptics are not much in evidence either among the contributors to the papers edited by Dr Ramcharan but at least they take account of the conflicting currents about the past performance and future ambitions of the international community in this field. This perhaps because they are only too well aware of them for they are all (with the exception of Professor Freymond) part of the human rights machine, though it must be said that the severity of their criticism seems to be in direct proportion to their distance from the centre of United Nations operations. Not the least of the achievements of Dr Wilfred Jenks was to take full advantage of the disclaimer that his academic writing was not to be taken to represent the position of

the International Labour Organisation to canvas controversial and stimulating ideas. His example, despite the inevitable exclusion of vicarious responsibility has not often been followed by international civil servants. Dr Ramcharan, who contributes three essays, is particularly cautious and Dr van Boven, the Director of the United Nations Human Rights Division, is reluctant to come to terms with implications of the 1977 Third Committee debate on implementing human rights (though, to be fair to him, he does write with greater vigour in the Cassese essays). In a review of that debate, Mr Moskowitz shows no such hesitation. The debate, he says,

> revealed a deep-seated desire for revision of all traditional thinking of the UN in the area of human rights and for new approaches to the subject based on an understanding of different traditions, values, stages of development and social and economic realities (p. 122).

The danger is that such a reappraisal would lead to the worst of all conclusions, that the moral superiority claimed for the protection of human rights, based, however imprecisely, on some notion of limits on the power of the State to deal with its citizens (and ultimately to a forfeiture of its legitimacy in the event of it grievously overstepping those limits) would instead be called in support of a variety of relative and dispensible standards and serve to legitimise systems where the collective will crushed individuals within them.

Too many of the essays seem to proceed on the assumption that Res. 32/130 had never happened and that the United Nations programme established before then will continue to unfold. Thus Dr Ramcharan's and Dr Das's chapters on the implementation of human rights standards seem to proceed on this assumption that things will be much as before. Other chapters include ones by Professor Humphrey on the status of the Universal Declaration—he does not convince me that it has the status of customary law, although I do agree that whether it has is an important question; by Professor Freymond on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, noting the difficulties in running a unilateral national policy on this topic, with which the State Department would now doubtless sympathise; by the UNESCO Secretariat, a sort of adversarial brief written as if for an inter-agency demarcation dispute in which the object is to advance UNESCO's cause rather than that of human rights (and which can be safely avoided); and a much better one on the ILO by Dr Valticos.

Despite the criticisms, this book does seem to me to address some of the important questions about human rights. Its answers may not be definitive and may not, because of their even-handedness, stand the test of time but, if they are not compelling, they are worth considering and they do deserve answers themselves. This book, unusually among its kind, does serve a useful purpose and human rights teachers, at any rate, should for a few years find it a handy work to which to refer their students.

The last essay in the Ramcharan book is the most controversial. It is written by the editor of the last book under review, Professor Cassese, and its theme is taken up by several of the essays in it. His claim is that the states system, even when it operates through the United Nations, is too careful of the interests of the states to be able to provide an effective regime for the protection of human rights. Accordingly, the system needs supplementing by the efforts of ' transnational ' actors, non-governmental organisations like Amnesty, and private bodies like the Russell Tribunals. Despite the irritation of vaguely Marxist incantations, this thesis is attractively presented by Cassese. He demands, of course, ultimately not merely a revolution in individual states but in the very nature of international society. Indeed, in his essay on the Algiers Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, Professor Rigaux calls for a ' Copernican Revolution ' in the structure of the international community. I do not see it myself. The states system seems as strong as ever and the actual problem is to see how the protection of human rights can best be achieved within it. Other essays

on this topic are by Professor Falk, also on the Algiers Declaration, by Dr McCarthy on Transnational Corporations and Human Rights and by Professor Leary on Amnesty's initiatives towards action to prohibit torture and have it characterised as an international crime. This essay and Dr Gros Espiell's on ' Self-determination and ius cogens ' are too short to give proper consideration to the most difficult problems with which they are concerned. Professor Cassese's own contribution on self-determination is a good one, conceding legal status to the idea and discussing possible developments in its substantive content.

The book is a collection of lectures given at the University of Florence in 1977. Only half are on human rights. The others are on United Nations law, a field in which Professor Cassese himself has made extensive contributions recently. The essays are all of some interest. Among them, Professor Salmon's novel approach to the difficulties of the application of international law through the medium of characterisation perhaps takes the palm but Dr Ciobanu has written a typically well documented account of US-Soviet relations and their impact on the United Nations, valuable for its unfamiliar East European perspective, and Professor Roling lays down the challenge to United Nations lawyers to provide the means for the organisation to respond to the entrenched positions of the developed world by pressing for the implementation of the aspirations of those states who played no part in creating the United Nations system. The essays in both parts are of a radical tinge: they present challenges to established values and traditional legal techniques. They are tinged, too, with an idealism which may make their challenges difficult for an unsympathetic international community to accept. They deserve every consideration by all those involved with these questions, whatever their inclinations as to the answers.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

The International Court of Justice: An Analysis of Failure. By John King Gamble and Dana D. Fischer. *Lexington, Mass., Farnborough: Heath. 1976. 157 pp.*

Conflict Through Consensus: United Nations Approaches to Aggression. By Julius Stone. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1978. 234 pp. £10·25.*

THE International Court of Justice is generally believed to have contributed little to the maintenance of peace, and it has often been suggested that the Court be reformed, and that, in particular, it be accorded the power of compulsory jurisdiction.

The authors of the first book find this general belief acceptable, but claim that common prescriptions for the reform of the Court are not based on an objective study of states' behaviour, and that any worthwhile suggestion about improving the record of the Court must be based on a realistic idea of the processes that determine which disputes are taken to the ICJ.

With this end in view, the authors devote the bulk of their book to a statistical analysis of the Court-related behaviour of states, and attempt to work out probabilistic correlations among a number of factors characterising the nature of states (e.g., geographical locations, per capita gross national product); their treaty-making pattern (e.g., bilateral treaty frequency); and their support of the Court (e.g., frequency of appearance before the Court). Those who are allergic to a statistical study of international relations should not reject this book offhand, as the analysis is explained very clearly. However, while the authors show awareness of the limitations of their approach, their understanding of the philosophy of science appears somewhat shaky.

One interesting point that emerges from the analysis is that there is no significant correlation between the degree of states' acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction and their appearance before the Court. This, the authors claim,

undermines the common prescription, for increasing adherence to the optional clause may not result in any significant increase in the Court activity. Before any judgment can be made on this issue, however, it must surely be necessary to investigate the *reasons* why those states, which have accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with minor or no reservations, have done so in the first place, and yet have not appeared before the Court very frequently.

In the final chapter, the authors experiment on their ability to predict whether a dispute will be judged by the Court. They do this by feeding in information about the past cases judged by the Court to a series of probabilistic hypotheses which they hope to be capable of predicting the likelihood of an ICJ action. The result is somewhat amusing. The Right of Passage Case, which did in fact get a judgment from the Court, should not really have got it, according to their *post*diction. It is ' difficult to explain away ' why this should have happened, so they comment: ' it is probably a fluke that it made it through the labyrinth to get to the Court ' (p. 113)! It will be left to a diplomatic historian to show how what really should not have happened, according to the complicated, but nevertheless primitive, calculations of the authors, did really happen.

The second book under review deals with another area of interest regarding the problem of enhancing the contribution of international law to our life: the definition of aggression. The approach taken by its author, by contrast to the first book, is entirely ' traditionalist '. No claim of aspiration to scientific objectivity is made, and no methodological innovation is even contemplated. The aim of the book is to assess the significance of the 1974 UN General Assembly resolution on the definition of aggression. For this purpose, the author analyses in detail the resolution and its *travaux préparatoires*, examines the politics of definition, and points out the futility of the whole enterprise as well as the positive harm that might result from the adopted definition.

The author's analysis of the resolution, exposing its many loopholes, is extremely thorough but somewhat lengthy. The penultimate chapter, however, conveniently summarises the detailed analysis of the preceding pages.

In the author's view, the definition was finally reached not because states genuinely desired peace, but because they wanted to save the United Nations from the humiliation of having fruitlessly struggled for an ' authoritative definition ' for over twenty years. And because in vital areas like the definition of aggression states are too self-regarding to accept any set of general principles detrimental to their particular concerns, the only way to arrive at the definition was to transform the conflicting positions of the pre-definition stage merely into conflicting interpretations of the definition.

The author further argues that the attempt to create peace through the definition of one single notion, such as aggression, is at any rate misguided, for, in his view, the legal structure of the ' so-called society of States ' is too primitive, and the conditions of life in it too unstable and violent to allow such a notion, defined in legal or quasi-legal terms, substantially to contribute towards peace. He aptly points out that in the municipal sphere the legal system does not use notions like aggression, for there the system is based on an elaborate multitude of substantive and procedural rules, broadly supported by the sense of unity among the community members.

But the author goes even further in his critique of the General Assembly resolution, for, in his view, the tyrannical majorities of the General Assembly, taking advantage of the ambiguities and silences of the adopted definition, can now use it as a political weapon against the Western interest and standard of decency. This might lead to the breakdown of the organisation itself as the Western powers may retaliate by withdrawing support and participation.

Whether this conclusion is taken as the perceptive remark of a farsighted thinker, or

the unpalatable ego-centricity of Western man may depend on one's outlook. But the author's perception of the extent to which the non-Western powers, led by the Soviet Union and the Arab oil-producing countries, can affect the Western position through the manipulation of the General Assembly resolution in question seems exaggerated.

The book covers a number of other highly contentious issues of contemporary international law and relations, and is likely to provoke controversy and disagreement.

University of Keele HIDEMI SUGANAMI

The World Court and the Contemporary International Law-Making Process. By Edward McWhinney. *Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff. 1979. 219 pp. Fl. 70.00. $35.00.*

FEW international lawyers would take exception to Professor McWhinney's first premise that there have been substantial changes in the substance of international law during the last thirty years. Rather more might dispute the second leg of his thesis, that these changes have been brought about by radical transformation of the law-making processes themselves. Professor McWhinney seeks to describe rather than to explain these developments, one important feature of which has been the blurring in the international system of the distinction between the legislative and adjudicative functions. It is necessary, in a period of rapid social change, he argues, that the International Court of Justice take a ' flexible approach to the acceptance of new modes of international law-making where the new norms are properly evidenced and rest upon unimpeachable concensus or acceptance of the parties concerned '. He establishes the possibility, the actuality and the desirability of this process by an analysis of the judgments in the ' South West Africa, Second Phase case and the Namibia Opinion '; the ' Nuclear Test cases '; the ' Aegean Continental Shelf case '; and the ' Western Sahara Advisory Opinion '. The development of international law is, he says, a dialectical process in which the Court itself has a role to play. He shows that there are other legislative mechanisms available to the international community, by an examination of the work of the Law of the Sea Conference and the elaboration by the General Assembly of the New International Economic Order and its treatment of the ' representation '/' credentials ' question.

This is a difficult book. It is difficult because it addresses *the* problem of modern international law, the nature of the international law-making process or, as we positivists would say, the nature of the sources of international law. It is difficult because, as a collection of lectures and previously published essays, there is a good deal of repetition. And it is difficult because on too many occasions, Professor McWhinney deserts his usual clear prose for the convoluted and jargon-ridden constructions which get ' policy-orientated ' jurisprudence such a bad name: we ought to be spared ' procedural, adjectival law ' once, let alone the ten or a dozen times it occurs and once is certainly enough for ' the Court's own solo initiative '. While one is intrigued by his careful analysis and inspired speculation about judicial behaviour in the various cases under review, in the end this is not a wholly satisfying book. For instance, on General Assembly Resolutions, there is no indication as to which Resolutions create legal obligations and the explanations of how they might do so are not consistent (*cf.* pp. 11–12 and p. 123). Professor McWhinney's enthusiasm for the judge's rule in developing the law contrasts with his conclusion that, in view of its actual legislative ambition compared with its formal codificatory brief, the Law of the Sea Conference would have succeeded better if economists, marine biologists and politicians had been more conspicuous in its deliberations and lawyers less so. As Judge Gros said in the *Western Sahara Advisory Opinion*, ' Economics, sociology and human geography are

not law '. From his catholic conception of the law-making process, it seems Professor McWhinney does not believe him.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination. By Lee C. Buchheit. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1978. 260 pp. £12·60.*

THE subject of self-determination is laden with enormous difficulties for the international lawyer. Despite the frequency with which the term self-determination is used, there exists a large degree of confusion concerning its legal status and content. Mr Buchheit also has to struggle with the political aspects of the use of the term. The result is a sometimes confusing but wide-ranging review of a subject which, by its nature, contains many inherent tensions and contradictions.

First, the author examines the historical development of the principle of self-determination, and its uneasy relationship with the concept of secession. An examination of existing international law seems to show strong support for the idea that the principle has legal force. Some writers would even argue that it is a peremptory norm. This is despite the general disagreement about the content of the principle, especially in relation to the question of secession. Where a right of secession is accepted, it is usually only in cases of extreme misconduct on the part of the governing state.

The author then looks at six selected case studies: the Congo; the Kurds; Biafra; the Somalia-Kenya/Ethiopia dispute; the Nagas; and Bangla Desh. They are chosen because, despite their diversity, they all concern secessionist movements which have disturbed, or threatened to disturb, international peace. They demonstrate not only the variety of circumstances which may come under this heading, but, more revealingly perhaps, the political motivations which affect state actions in the absence of any clear-cut legal obligation. There is a need, as the author points out, to establish some legal standard by which states' activities concerning secessionist movements may be regulated and judged.

This, however, is easier said than done. The author's analysis of the problem is understandably more impressive than his suggested solution. He recognises that it is neither reasonable nor realistic wholly to exclude or include secessionist movements in the principle of self-determination. Nor is it reasonable or realistic to rely simply on the principles of non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force, when states in practice will violate both of these principles and use the ' peremptory norm ' of self-determination as justification for doing so.

The answer, he rightly argues, is to find a standard of legitimacy against which secessionist claims can be measured. This standard of legitimacy would be calculated according to the merits of the claim, balanced against the disruption likely to occur if the secession is allowed. The author supplies a theoretical model of how this calculation could be applied. Using this standard, the international community may then determine whether the claim qualifies for the legal protection conferred by the principle of self-determination. It is unfortunate that the rest of the book can only lead us to doubt that such a rational scheme for dealing with secessionist movements will ever be put into use.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth ILONA C. CHEYNE

The Court of Justice of the European Communities. By L. Neville Brown and Francis G. Jacobs. *London: Sweet and Maxwell. 1977. 254 pp. Pb: £3·25.*

New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe. Edited by Mauro Cappelletti. *Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff for the European University Institute. 1978. 406 pp. Fl. 92.00. $46.00.*

A GLANCE at the judicial statistics reproduced in Messrs. Brown and Jacobs's monograph on *The Court of Justice of the European Communities* (pp. 151–58) is ample proof, if any were needed, that the European Court now occupies a prominent place among the growing number of international courts and tribunals. Its case load is far in excess of that of other international courts, and the impact of its judgments, in practical terms, far more important. One of the reasons for the authoritative nature of its jurisprudence is the requirement that all judgments must be unanimous. Any dissenting views which may be voiced in the course of the Court's deliberations merge in the judgment and are never revealed in the reports. This is in direct contrast to the practice of the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights where the number of dissenting judgments is often such that a majority view is reached only by an extremely narrow margin.

The procedure of the Court is based on the continental system of extensive written submissions, limiting oral proceedings to a minimum. This system enables the Court, having regard also to relatively strict time-limits, to reach its decisions more quickly than might otherwise be the case. In addition, the institution of advocates-general who are required to submit their views to the Court in all cases helps to define the issues and fill any gaps in the submissions of the parties.

' Preliminary rulings ' of the Court under article 177 of the Treaty (cf. pp. 131–49) have the most immediate impact on the rights of individuals litigating in the municipal courts of member states, and in recent years their number has exceeded that of other types of litigation before the Court. The enthusiasm of the English courts, in submitting cases for preliminary rulings, has been somewhat limited in the past. One of the difficulties is the interpretation of article 177, paragraphs 1 and 2, which leave the decision whether to submit a case for a preliminary ruling to the municipal court. That court may decide, whatever the submissions of the individual litigant before it, that the question which arises is not one which calls for such a ruling. Time will show whether article 177 will receive a liberal or restrictive interpretation in this country. As far as the original parties to the Treaty are concerned, there is every indication that their courts have made ample use of their powers to submit questions for preliminary rulings by the Court.

Messrs. Brown and Jacobs's book deals admirably with these and all other relevant matters affecting the jurisdiction of the Court, and it is far more readable than one might expect of a legal textbook dealing with subject-matter that does not easily lend itself to ease of style and exposition.

New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, contains a number of contributions submitted at a conference held in the European University Institute in May 1977. It deals with questions of substantive law in the European context and is, of necessity, of a somewhat esoteric nature. Article 215, paragraph 2, of the Treaty refers to ' the general principles common to the laws of the member states ', a formula—*mutatis mutandis*—familiar to international lawyers from the statutes of a number of international courts and tribunals. Beyond that general formula there are, of course, especially in the context of the European Community, codified rules governing specific subjects. A common law of Europe, however, while it may be a *desideratum* for the future, is not at present within the realm of practical politics.

Those contributing to the eight sessions of the conference view the prospects of a common law of Europe with varying degrees of optimism, and their contributions provide an instructive background to the history of attempts at assimilation made in the past, as well as to more recent progress in this field. The value of the book would have been enhanced by the inclusion of an index. Otherwise it is extremely well arranged and produced.

F. HONIG

HISTORY

Day by Day: The Forties. By Thomas M. Leonard. Edited by Richard Burbank and Steven L. Goulden. *New York: Facts on File. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Clio Press, Oxford.) 1051 pp. Illus. £29·95.*

THIS is a remarkable volume. Many will remark when they first lift its weight or see its price. But pound for pound, or pence per highly informative page, it rates as very good value for money. With qualifications, it is an invaluable reference book for researchers into the 1940s and it also leads to semi-compulsive browsing. It is well indexed and it contains some fascinating photographs.

The present work is based upon the *Facts on File Yearbooks* (which are available from 1940 to the present), ' supplemented by major newspapers and scholarly reference works '. Each single day of the decade is listed horizontally (unfortunately without the days of the week) and set against ten vertical columns. The five on the left-hand page are: World Affairs; The European War Zone; the Pacific War Zone: Other Countries and Territories (these last three convert in September 1945 to Europe, Africa and the Middle East, and Asia and the Pacific); and the Americas. The right-hand page is devoted almost exclusively to the United States. The five columns are headed: Politics and Social Issues: Foreign Policy and Defense; Economy and Environment; Science and Technology; Culture and Life Style.

The bias is evident from this approach. Certainly the quantity and quality of data upon United States social and political life in this period is, for obvious reasons, far superior and more accessible than that pertaining to the bulk of the remainder of a largely ravaged and war-torn world. But it is not chauvinism that leads to the following criticism of both the main text and Thomas M. Leonard's introductory survey to the decade. The ' feel ' for all aspects of American life comes over vividly; the section on Europe might have been written, and not just typeset, by an unsympathetic computer. Such overall background features to European developments, as the resistance movements, the rise of communism and Christian Democracy, rationing, constitution-making, and nationalisation just do not emerge from the essentially factual presentation, whereas such themes as reconversion, civil rights, problems of demobilisation, and escapism, stand out clearly from the data on the United States. The loss of life and material destruction in the old world might never have happened, while the right-hand page is packed with fascinating and informative minutiae, buttressed by statistics, on American life-styles. The unsuspecting reader would think that the Truman administration, alone among governments, was confronted by the problems of a change from war to peace; the difficulties of the rest of the world—shortages of dollars, rolling-stock, food, clothes, newsprint, fuel—emerge infrequently and incidentally, never contextually. Space forbids further examples along these lines, or any indication of the not excessive errors of commission and omission amongst the mass of data in the non-American sections. Yet, at the end of the day, one can only commend this volume to any individual or institution having an interest in the United States in the 1940s, and/or who is content with a view of the rest of the world during this decade, couched mainly in terms of events of diplomatic and military significance.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932–1939. By G. C. Peden. *Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press. 1979. 227 pp. £6·00.*

As the public records of thirty years and more ago are opened, so the opportunities increase for historians to examine in ever greater detail the crucial phases of British

political history in the years immediately before and after the Second World War and in so doing to correct or modify received judgments on the motives of the actors and the behaviour of organisations involved in the transactions of that fateful epoch. This piece of research needs to be seen in that context. Dr Peden has gone to documentary sources recently made available in order to find out whether it is necessary to revise the commonly voiced opinion that one of the mainsprings of the resistance to a realistic appreciation of the threat from Nazi Germany and, therefore, of the need to rearm, was the Treasury. Put more crudely, the question is whether the Treasury was a decisive force in maintaining a policy of appeasement even when the dangers of such a policy could no longer be overlooked.

At the risk of simplifying far too much what is a complex and often ambiguous pattern of events, it can be said that Dr Peden absolves the Treasury from any major responsibility for imposing restraint on rearmament in the name of appeasement or for seeking to block the policy initiatives of the defence and foreign affairs departments once the necessity of rearmament had been accepted. Indeed, he goes a long way towards demonstrating that quite early in the 1930s leading figures in the Treasury were closer to supporting measures of rearmament than were many of those in the departments chiefly concerned with external and defence policy. Certainly there were senior officials in the Treasury who took a far more bleakly realistic view of the future than did many of the politicians in office in this period and who were, moreover, prepared to put their views on record. Not the least of the conclusions to emerge from this study, however, is that Treasury opinion on defence and foreign policy issues remained that of the layman: in the last resort it was the politicians and the ' experts ' in the armed services who determined how far and how fast policy could change.

One of the merits of Dr Peden's work is that he is interested both in the Treasury as an organisation and the individuals in it. His first aim is to make a contribution to administrative history by trying to define the impact of the Treasury as an organisation on defence policy-making and on the execution of defence programmes. But in so doing he does not neglect to take the opportunities presented by his research to throw fresh light on the political influence and outlook of key figures in the Treasury, notably Sir Warren Fisher. Dr Peden's success in combining discussion of organisational roles with an account of how particular individuals reacted to events, did their work and sought to shape outcomes is no doubt made easier by the fact that the Treasury of those days was so amazingly small. The key actors hardly exceeded half-a-dozen people, knit together by years of shared experience and common values. In such circumstances the behaviour of the organisation can, to a substantial degree, be described in terms of the actions and relationships of its leading members; they *were* the Treasury. Whether future historians dealing with the much larger administrative units of our time will be able to fuse so successfully the study of organisation with an account of how leading officials behaved is, I fear, very doubtful. If so, this will be a matter for regret, since when events are analysed within the abstract categories of organisation there is always the risk that all sense of what the problems and personalities were really like will disappear. Above all, there is under such conditions the danger of losing sight of the limitations imposed by sheer ignorance and uncertainty. One of the great virtues of this study is that unpretentiously Dr Peden succeeds in communicating a feeling of what it was like to be in the Treasury in the 1930s. Not surprisingly, the fact that nobody had the benefit of the hindsight of history turns out to be an important point, explaining why Fisher and others proceeded pragmatically and critically, being ready to endorse defence policy changes but not neglecting the need to scrutinise specific proposals in the light of a wide range of economic, financial and political considerations which it was the Treasury's responsibility to raise. Dr Peden deserves congratulation on an admirable piece of political-administrative history.

Nuffield College, Oxford

NEVIL JOHNSON

Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939–1945. By Bernard Wasserstein. *Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London. 1979. 389 pp. £7·95.*

WHILE parts of this book are bound to disturb, nevertheless, it is one to be read with some care. It is obviously intended to ' prove a case ' in that part of the Holocaust debate concerned with the so-called ' misdeeds ' of the Allied nations who (so it is argued) must also be held responsible for the Final Solution or Holocaust, notwithstanding the fact that the first and final responsibility for that crime rests with Nazi Germany. Apart from this obvious intention, more worrying are the methods used to achieve that aim.

Dr Wasserstein blurs many important historical considerations and facts, and misleads the reader with too many polemical remarks. He tries to create the impression of a direct correlation between the Holocaust and those aspects of British foreign policy which involved, or affected, Jews, but allows of no distinctions of subject or time as and when these are obviously required. Contrary to his inferences in the Preface (p. vi), British policy-makers were not confronted by any choice between the ' priorities ' of Jewish survival in Europe and decisions to be taken in British policy, certainly from 1939–41. It is especially important for the reader to be aware that the systematic extermination of European Jewry did not begin until during and after the invasion of Russia in June 1941, nor was there anything before to indicate to those in Whitehall, and even to some in the Nazi leadership, that this would be the form of the Nazi ' final solution ' of the Jewish question in Europe. His initial and incorrect assumption therefore provides a false kind of framework for the reader. The ' fate ' of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe (and that of other civilians) could hardly be an ' issue ' in British foreign policy. The only issue involving Jews was the maintenance of the White Paper policy on Palestine, and when reading those sections dealing with Jewish refugees trying to enter Palestine during 1939–41, or even early 1942, the reader really has to separate such events from the Holocaust itself.

Dr Wasserstein is hardly more accurate when he implies that the policy of ' extermination not emigration ' was somehow forced on the Nazi leadership because Britain, not Germany, ' sealed the escape routes '. Nazi Germany's Jewish policies were *not* contingent upon British actions. Nor were the Gestapo and Adolf Eichmann concerned with the emigration of the ' great majority of Jews ' (p. 45). They only wanted continued Jewish emigration from Germany itself, the expulsion of Jews from the rest of Europe being preserved until after the war, a solution dependent upon a *German* victory. But even if the Jews had to remain in Europe and not be allowed to immigrate elsewhere, why did they have to be deliberately done to death by the Nazis?

A proper evaluation of British policy is difficult to obtain, therefore, because in addition to such constant blurring, a clear enough distinction is not made (in the discussion of particular events and episodes) between the pre-Holocaust period and that of the Holocaust itself. Only from 1942, when the Allies knew of the exterminations, can the controversy over Allied restrictive immigration policy and its consequences for Jewish refugees be joined to that about the general attitude of the Allies towards the Jews and the lack of a so-called ' rescue ' from the Holocaust: what did the Allies do when they knew of the Final Solution, and was that sufficient? Yet in turn it becomes necessary to ask something else: what were the Allies able to do in a situation of total war? Within the context of Allied military operations during 1943, Germany's own effective ' sealing of all escape routes ', and above all the intensity and haste of the extermination process, it really is a *non sequitur* to talk of ' significant relief ' not being offered to the Jews and the non-efficacy of ' Allied rescue efforts ' (p. 221).

But there is more. Dr Wasserstein's account of British reactions and Jewish intentions during 1942 when news filtered through of the extermination process really

has to be supplemented—and in parts supplanted—by this reviewer's article in *The English Historical Review*, January 1977. Propaganda about Nazi crimes against the Jews was not the point at issue—mention of such crimes in any postwar judicial prosecution of those crimes was. Dr Wasserstein has also allowed a false impression to emerge in parts of his account of the British reaction to requests by the Jewish Agency to bomb Auschwitz. Contrary to his statement that the Foreign Office officials decided to ' block further action ' (p. 315) on the matter, thereby showing ' the ability of the British civil service to overturn ministerial decisions ' (p. 316), the fact is that from July both Churchill and Eden ' passed ' the matter to the permanent officials for consideration in the normal way. It thus became their responsibility to investigate and reach a conclusion: a policy recommendation then to be put to the Foreign Secretary for approval. These comments by Dr Wasserstein, and the further one, ' meanwhile the officials considered how best to dispose of the matter ' (p. 315) are misleading and inaccurate. By omitting parts of minutes and letters, he has also placed the wrong emphasis on the fact that the Foreign Office did not pass to the Air Ministry topographical data about Auschwitz.

The book is a contribution to the Holocaust debate, with a great deal which makes for uncomfortable reading, while the documentation confronted Dr Wasserstein with a daunting task. Nevertheless, it is a flawed study, not least of all for the surprising number of polemical and often misleading remarks to be found in what is supposed to be a serious work of history. The serious degrees of omission and misunderstanding which occur in his treatment of 1942 and the bombing of Auschwitz episode make one wonder what else could be found upon closer examination. One really cannot accept this book as the final word on the subject—for all its dependence on the documents—so that in the final analysis it can only be seen as a pioneer work.

JOHN P. FOX

France's Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914–1924: The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe. By Walter A. McDougall. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1978. 420 pp. £16·70.*

THIS scholarly monograph focuses on French policy in the strategic area of the Rhineland in the period immediately after the Treaty of Versailles had laid down its demilitarisation and Allied and associated occupation for fifteen years. After Clemenceau's failure to secure a Rhine frontier for France in 1919, successive French governments sought to encourage the development of an autonomous Rhineland within the new Weimar Republic, and to fan the flames of Rhenish separatism. Their attempts in this direction are clearly outlined, as are the activities of the disparate separatist groups who operated in the Rhineland in the early 1920s. While endeavouring to maximise French influence in this area, French leaders also sought Belgian, British and American co-operation in the political and economic containment of Germany. Not surprisingly, Belgium and Great Britain feared French domination of Western Europe almost as much as a revival of German militarism, and struggled instead to promote a rough kind of political and economic equilibrium between the two antagonists. The resulting misunderstandings and disagreements and their fateful repercussions have been well-documented.

However, Professor McDougall shows us very clearly that France was not strong but weak in the early 1920s, that she was suffering from chronic financial and economic weaknesses as well as from fears of military insecurity, and that she could only recover from the war with the help of Great Britain, the United States or Germany. The Weimar government stalled on reparations, and the truculent Ruhr industrial barons did all in their power to starve Lorraine's iron furnaces of coke. Great

Britain was determined to promote German economic recovery rather than aid French industrial expansion. The United States was intransigent in regarding reparations and war-debt repayments as separate issues, and in demanding a strict settlement of the latter before sanctioning loans to Europe to facilitate payment of the former. Thus the invasion of the Ruhr in 1923 is rightly portrayed as a last desperate French attempt to break out of a position of increasing political, economic and financial weakness. Unfortunately, it served only to confirm France's dependence on the unsympathetic Anglo-Saxon powers, and her inability to police the Versailles settlement herself, let alone revise it in France's favour.

This book exhibits all the strengths and weaknesses of published dissertations. It contains the fruits of meticulous and exhaustive research in the French, Belgian, German, British, and American archives, a host of footnotes and elaborate bibliographical references. As a result, the major issues of the book are in danger of becoming engulfed by a wealth of explanatory detail. The main strands of argument are broken up into a multitude of intertwining threads which at times obscure the overall analysis. The book will be an invaluable French perspective on the early interwar period for research students and university teachers specialising in twentieth century history, but it will almost certainly daunt the undergraduate and the general reader interested in the roots of the Second World War.

University of Lancaster RUTH HENIG

The Catholic Church and the Soviet Government, 1939–1949. By Dennis J. Dunn. *New York: Columbia University Press for the East European Quarterly, Boulder, Col. 267 pp. (East European Monograph, No. 30.) $21.25.*

THIS book illuminates a previously unexplored aspect of historical development in Europe and the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1949, namely the relations between the Soviet government and the Catholic Church both in the Soviet Union and in predominantly Catholic Eastern European areas under Soviet influence during that period. Dunn is concerned with the Catholic Church of both the Latin and the Greek rite. He shows how the state of these relations was both affected by, and affected, war and post-war policy of the Soviet government and of the Vatican not only to each other but to all the nations, participating in the Second World War. In the process he brings out clearly the importance of religion and ideology as factors influencing foreign relations as well as internal nationality policy. The elaboration of this main theme of the book is preceded by three useful chapters which provide a historical perspective and an exposition of the theoretical work of Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the role of religion in society.

It must be emphasised that the book is written from the point of view of someone firmly on the side of Catholicism and the Vatican and strongly anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet. This bias affects not only the style of reporting but prevents an objective presentation, let alone evaluation, of the historical facts and of the content of Marxism-Leninism. Whereas the beliefs and activities of the Vatican are related in a detached, historical reporting style, those of the Soviet side are described in emotive language, with phrases such as ' lusting after power ', and ' bludgeoning religion ' being typical examples.

Dunn's religious and political bias comes out most strongly when he explores both Soviet and Vatican motivations for adopting particular policies and when he provides explanations for the courses of action adopted. While the analysis of papal attitudes and policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is well researched and thoroughly documented, the portrayal of the motivations of Soviet leaders is largely based on mere speculation. Although the latter is partly due to the paucity of source material it is no doubt also ideologically conditioned.

Dunn's approach to these problems is also very one-sided. The Vatican's stance is shown to be mainly a reaction to ' the inborn wickedness of Bolshevik Communism ', as perceived by the Papacy (p. 71). Soviet hostility to the Catholic Church, in contrast, is seen to be due to two basic reasons. These are the political-cultural heritage of the tsarist past with its national chauvinism and ' Moscow as the Third Rome ' pretensions and, more importantly in Dunn's view, the nature of Marxism-Leninism, particularly its atheist element. There is no systematic elaboration of the point that the nature of Catholicism as a total ideology, particularly its political content, as well as the past political record of the Papacy, have a lot to do with the hostility of the Soviet government towards the Vatican. The Soviet Union is presented as the villain throughout the book.

The absence of a critical approach to the Vatican and its interpretation of Catholic religion leads Dunn to overemphasise Marxism and Leninism as the sources of Soviet hostility to the Catholic Church. Whereas there is ample clear evidence that the Soviet anti-religious stance stems from these origins, the thesis that religious *persecution* is primarily due to Marx and Lenin's theoretical approach to religion is much more controversial than Dunn makes it appear. This suggestion is, at the least, oversimplified in that it wrongly equates the advocacy of an activist anti-religious stance with persecution. Also the claim that religious persecution under Stalin was the natural development of religious victimisation under Lenin and his political successors during the 1920s goes against most of the current academic evaluations of Stalinism which, while not denying important political continuities, see Soviet society under Stalin as a social system quite distinct and separate from that which preceded it. Furthermore, this attribution of a predominantly persecutory stance to Lenin makes little sense in view of the fact that many contemporary campaigners for greater religious freedom urge a return to Leninist legality on the question of state-church relations.

It is even more contentious to suggest, as Dunn does, that anti-Catholicism has its main root in Marx and Lenin's work. Such a claim makes it impossible to explain why the Catholic Church has consistently attracted the wrath of Soviet governments so much more strongly than most of the other churches and sects. Thus the sects saw the 1920s, the time when the Catholic Church suffered fatal blows, as a time when religious freedom and vitality were at their height, compared both with the earlier tsarist period and the succeeding decades under Soviet rule. In seeking for reasons for this discriminatory stance Dunn's other major explanation, the political cultural heritage from the tsarist past, particularly its nationalist orientation, is much more persuasive when dealing with a supranational and politicised church, such as the Catholic one. This nationalist outlook, it must be pointed out, has only resurfaced during Stalin's rule and was quite alien to the cosmopolitan and internationalist orientation of Soviet political leaders in the 1920s. This does not mean, however, that the early Bolshevik leaders would tolerate a threat to the security of the new state and the stability of the new regime from disruptive religious and national elements. The fact that the ideology and practice of the Catholic Church and the Vatican was, and still is, a much more *real* threat to the Soviet state than was posed by most of the other religions in Soviet society, needs to receive much more emphasis than Dunn's uncritical pro-Catholic approach allows for.

Apart from this consistent anti-Soviet bias, the book is also marred by numerous printing errors and Dunn's unfortunate predilection for pretentious and obscure words (e.g. ' to occlude ', ' to inchoate ', ' to opine ', ' to tautologize ', ' fulcrum ', ' incubus ', ' synergetic '). These defects, together with his Catholic partisanship, considerably detract from the merit of the book in shedding light on a little known aspect of Soviet, Vatican, and general European history between 1939 and 1949.

University of Cambridge CHRISTEL LANE

The Parish Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party 1939–45, by Yeshayehu Jelinek. *New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1976. 206 pp. (East European Monographs No XIV) $18.75.*

THE short-lived ' independent ' Slovak state was governed by a Catholic party founded by the fiery Father Hlinka after the incorporation of Slovakia in the newly established Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. A devious parish priest, Josef Tiso, became the first and only President of this model German satellite after it broke away from the remnants of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Christianity and Slovak nationalism allegedly provided the moral and spiritual foundation of this priest-ridden theocracy, and although the Vatican was clearly uneasy about the statesmanship displayed by a group of parish priests and Catholic Lumpenproletariat in Slovakia, the Slovak episcopate did little to restrain the racialist and authoritarian activities of its flock and their pastors. There were those who tried to mitigate some of the worst excesses of Hitler's new order in Slovakia, but in general the Hlinka Party's rule consisted of an unattractive mixture of rampant greed, peasant cunning, jockeying for position, Slovak patriotism, ideological naïveté and dubious theology, overwhelmed in its final stages by despair and total surrender to German control.

The book under review limits itself to a description of the activities and internal conflicts of the Hlinka Party—no attempt is made to analyse the policies and problems of the ' Parish Republic ' which it pretended to rule. Nevertheless, it provides a reasonably written and thoroughly researched account of a relatively obscure episode in the history of Central Europe. Apart from special pleading published by former functionaries of the Slovak State little has been written about ' independent ' Slovakia. Dr Jelinek tries hard to adopt an objective viewpoint, he appears to have consulted all the available sources and has obviously devoted much time to consulting the surviving leaders of the Hlinka regime now living in the West. The specialist will find his book useful and interesting, but the general reader would probably welcome a more detailed examination of the antecedents of the Slovak state and its leaders. The author decided to conclude his study with the outbreak of the Slovak National Rising as this put an end to any vestigial autonomy Tiso's government may have enjoyed. However, the progress and failure of the rising, the role played by the Communist Party and the influence of the Soviet Union created a situation to which the Hlinka Party had to react and which, in its turn, added a new dimension to the Slovak question and pushed the post-1945 Czechoslovak Republic to adopt policies which were bound to affect its stability and internal cohesion. The tensions between Prague and Bratislava were among the prime causes of the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia; and they have certainly not been resolved by the installation of a Slovak President in Prague. It would have been valuable if Dr Jelinek had taken his story beyond 1944. His book is disfigured by disgraceful printing and careless proof-reading; his august publishers have not served him well.

University of Surrey OTTO PICK

The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle Between the British, the Jews and the Arabs 1935–48. By Nicholas Bethell. *London: Deutsch. 1979. 384 pp. £7·95.*

The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict 1917–1929. *London: Royal Historical Society. 1978. £8·25.*

IN spite of its title Lord Bethell's book deals mainly with the history of what Zionists call the ' War of Liberation '. The author has had access to the British Cabinet Papers of the period and has been able to supplement and correct the many partial accounts of the war already available. But his unfamiliarity with the Middle Eastern scene and his

uncertain grasp of the earlier history of the Palestine problem show through. Neither Leonard Stein on the Balfour Declaration nor Yehoshua Porath on the Palestinian Arab National Movement appear in his select bibliography, and his account of the Arab rebellion of the later 1930s is thin. However, after the ' local Arab factor ' had been nullified, not by the Irgun in 1943, as Begin claimed (p. 155), but by the British Army in 1938, the virtual absence of the Arab point of the Palestine Triangle hardly affects the narrative, and Lord Bethell has given us a careful and connected account of the struggle between the Zionists and the British for the control of Palestine, and explains how much the triumph of the former owed to efficient terrorism and unscrupulous propaganda.

It was a struggle the Jews were bound to win. Yishuv and Diaspora were shocked and enraged by the horrors of the holocaust in Europe and, despite disagreements over tactics, Haganah and Irgun were strategically united in a skilful and determined drive towards the Jewish state. The Jews enjoyed the active sympathy of Britain's wartime allies, and even in Britain itself, the bombing of the King David Hotel and the murder of the two sergeants caused no more than a short interruption in the Zionist sympathies felt by most British people. It was a struggle the British were bound to lose. Their hearts were not in it. Exhausted by their efforts in the war, the British people could not understand what their government was trying to achieve in Palestine. When Lord Gort complained in 1945 of ' the lack of any settled policy towards which I should aim ' (p. 199), he was echoing the sentiments of the British people, as well as those of all his predecessors as High Commissioner since Sir Herbert Samuel.

It was a cruel and vicious little war, from which neither side emerged with much credit. Its history has been deeply buried under the propaganda which was one of the most effective of the Zionist weapons. Lord Bethell has done a creditable job of exhuming what really happened. His account of the skill and humanity with which the Royal Navy tackled the distasteful task of intercepting the illegal immigration ships detracts nothing from the courage and inventiveness of their Haganah crews, but it helps to wipe off some of the muck which bespattered the British in the American press. However, his blindness to the third point of his triangle leaves his picture of the ignominious end of the Mandate for Palestine a little unbalanced.

Dr Wasserstein's account of the Mandate's beginnings is far more satisfying. Based on an Oxford PhD, it is an excellent study of the early development of British rule in Palestine and of the attitudes and prejudices of some of the men who shaped its future. It begins with the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration set up by General Allenby after his capture of Jerusalem in December 1917. Three months later the Zionist Commission arrived in Palestine to start giving effect to the policy laid down in the Balfour Declaration. Its impatience to carry out this mission clashed sharply with the obligation to maintain the status quo ' as far as was consistent with military necessity ', laid upon the military administration by the Hague Convention of 1907. By the time Sir Herbert Samuel arrived and a civilian administration took over in June 1920, relations between the soldiers and the Zionist Commission were severely strained, and the continuing pattern of discord between government in London and British officials in Palestine was already established.

Samuel firmly believed that his liberal principles and his Zionist hopes must be reconcilable. So he set out to achieve the legitimation of the Mandate by attempting to draw the native population into co-operation in developing self-governing institutions. His brave attempt finally failed in October 1923, and for the remaining twenty-four years of British rule the Palestine government was left in the position of an umpire between two communities, unable to command the loyalty of either. For reasons largely foreign to Palestine, the next High Commissioner, Lord Plumer, was able to preside over three years of peaceful stagnation. But when the favourable circumstances altered after his departure, his successor, Sir John Chancellor, had to face the

communal riots of 1929. The experience persuaded him that the Balfour Declaration policy was a ' colossal blunder ' involving ' a grave injustice to the Arabs ' (p. 156).

Before ending his book with a description of the events of August 1929 Dr Wasserstein devotes three interesting chapters to discussion of the attitudes of British, Arab and Jewish officials, attitudes which normally resulted in British officials glumly continuing to serve a policy in which most of them did not believe, and in Jewish and Arab officials generally placing loyalty to their communities above the loyalty they owed to their employer. He concludes that the British Mandate in Palestine was doomed from the outset, and that,

> The absolute nature of the Arab-Jewish conflict, the increasing stature of the Arab and Jewish quasi government, the gulf between British official perceptions of the conflict in London and Jerusalem, and the hollowness of the concept of a political community in mandatory Palestine (pp. 240–41)

were the deeper ills which lay behind the bloodshed of 1929. One can cordially agree with this judgment, but neither Dr Wasserstein nor Lord Bethell has provided an answer to the nagging question of why His Majesty's Government continued for thirty years to pursue so doggedly a policy recognised by many in the first two or three years, among the Ben Gurion (p. 140), as inevitably leading to trouble and strife. One answer was given by Lord Curzon in 1923:

> It is well nigh impossible for any government to extricate itself without substantial sacrifice of consistency and self respect, if not of honour (p. 127).

It may be objected that an equivalent sacrifice of self-respect and honour had already been incurred when we abandoned our wartime promises to the Arab people, and in any case history seems to teach that governments seldom place honour and self-respect above self-interest for as long as thirty years, so Lord Curzon's answer must be incomplete. Perhaps another part of the true answer lies in the persistent failure of government in London to recognise the Palestinians as a people with legitimate national aspirations. Politicians in London preferred to see them as Colonel Kisch saw them in 1923, ' an eastern and backward people, accustomed to the strong hand of Turkish misrule ' (p. 123), or, as many British soldiers saw them in 1938 and some Israelis profess to see them today, as terrorists and gangsters. Throughout the Mandate the British government persistently preferred to negotiate about Palestine with Arabs from outside Palestine; the Hejazi Amir Faisal, the Saudi 'Abdul' Aziz al Sa'ud, and the Iraqi Nuri Sa'id, are cases in point. Predictably such negotiations never resulted in a viable settlement with Palestinians. It is not reassuring that the United States government is following the same path today.

J. C. B. RICHMOND

Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine Under the Mandate. Rev. edn. By Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak. Trans. by Charles Hoffman. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1979. (First publ. Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977) 292 pp. £13·30.*

IN establishing at the outset the frame of reference for this impressive work the authors, both social scientists at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, confront the problem of the relation between history and social science. The social scientist who wishes to deal with historical materials must, they write, ' learn to live with the tension between the two disciplines '. In this book the authors employ the (at times forbidding) language and methodology of political sociology to tackle problems of interest both to social scientists and to historians.

Essentially the book is concerned with exploring the problem of the embryonic political development of Israel in the social and political structure of the pre-state *Yishuv*. The authors make use of a modified form of Edward Shils's model of political development based on a distinction between centre and periphery. The process whereby the central institutions of the *Yishuv* were able, beneath the British Mandatory umbrella, to acquire in the years leading up to 1948 a high measure of ' authority without sovereignty ' (the title of the authors' suggestive article on the same theme in *Government and Opposition*, 1973) is here subjected to detailed and sophisticated analysis.

The authors stress the influence of ideological pressures in facilitating the development in mandatory Palestine of ' two different and parallel economic and stratification systems of different levels of modernisation '. They show how Zionist ideology, coupled with the Mandatory policy of devolving functional powers to communal institutions, brought about the growth of a Jewish political centre ' which enjoyed a large degree of authority even though it lacked the sanctions available to a sovereign power '. They examine the intricate relations between the *Yishuv*'s central institutions and ' innovative sub-centres ', and they provide a striking profile of the *Yishuv*'s political elite.

This book is of value in its graphic depiction of the process of internal partition whereby Arab and Jewish Palestines followed increasingly divergent paths of development long before the territorial partition of the country. Drawing on a broad range of economic, demographic, and political sources it also provides a convincing portrait of the political culture of the pre-state *Yishuv*. The authors conclude by remarking that ' the attainment of sovereignty was followed by a gradual fading of utopian aspirations ' and by ' the tendency of Israeli society to become more and more like all other nations '. Nevertheless both the historian and the political scientist will find here, in creative tension, a theoretical and factual framework for an understanding of what it is that makes Israeli politics still unique. It is only to be lamented that an otherwise handsomely produced book should suffer from so many misprints.

University of Sheffield BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

SECOND WORLD WAR: ITS ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH

Munich: The Price of Peace. By Telford Taylor. *London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1979. 1084 pp. £13·95.*

IT cannot be easy to write a volume of over one thousand pages and, having done so, persuade publishers that the project is worthwhile. In this case the reader gets more pages for his money than is normally the case and, understandably, is offered ' the definitive account of the fateful conference of 1938 '. Certainly there is no other book on this theme which matches it for length—this reviewer's own book is less than half its length. Congratulations are therefore in order, particularly when the writing of modern history is simply the hobby of a successful lawyer. His legal experience is relevant: he represented the United States at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials as the chief prosecutor and from time to time is able to draw upon his personal impressions of some of the defendants in his assessments. Taylor states that he began work on the book over a decade ago and his mastery of primary and secondary material is impressive, though not complete. Scholars working in the field will be surprised by a number of omissions from the bibliography, so that while full and thorough, it is not absolutely comprehensive. To call it ' definitive ' raises other questions. It is

undoubtedly a book which everyone interested in the diplomacy of the interwar period should read but no volume on the Munich conference is likely to be definitive in the sense of settling all the tantalising aspects of the settlement beyond future debate. Taylor does indeed bring to the subject a remarkable openmindedness for someone of his generation and degree of personal involvement. It would be interesting to know how far his views have changed in the course of the writing. His final chapter which he calls ' An Assessment of Munich ' does state the pros and cons with commendable clarity even if in the style of a lawyer rather than a historian. He does try to give Neville Chamberlain, this ' man of decision ', the benefit of the doubt, though there is always the feeling that the dock is the right place. He is particularly critical of Chamberlain's insistence on ' cash limits ' even in vital spheres of rearmament but seems never to pause to ask why Chamberlain was so anxious in this regard. The fears among the government's advisers about the country's economic strength and capacity to finance a major war deserve, at the very least, careful consideration. The author is constantly irked by Chamberlain's very late conversion to the idea that Britain should develop a continental army but he does not adequately place this reluctance in the context of a general British reluctance to be involved in Europe. His feel for the domestic politics of the countries chiefly involved is adequate but some slips reveal that he is an outsider. He quotes remarks made in 1938 by Arthur Henderson junior under the impression that they were made by Arthur Henderson senior—the father had been dead for three years. When Ormsby-Gore became Baron Harlech he is described as inheriting his father's baronetcy and Neville Chamberlain is thought on several occasions to be improved by becoming Sir Neville. Little things, certainly, but one does not feel that the nuances and subtleties of British politics in this period have been captured. What is actually going on inside Czechoslovakia is also somewhat mysterious. The Czechoslovak government is normally referred to as ' the Czech ' and the complexities of relations between Czechs, Slovaks and Germans largely ignored. The author's strength, as one would expect, lies in the careful analysis of documents and he has a keen eye to inconsistencies in the records. It should be explained that the Munich conference itself is disposed of in the first part of the book—a mere seventy pages. Before the final assessment, the remainder of the book is devoted to an exposition of the main currents in diplomacy and politics in the interwar period which led up to the crisis of 1938. While the narration of this main section is clear, it cannot be said to be very exciting or enlivened by much wit. Near the end the author does himself wonder whether he has not detained the reader's attention unduly and that anxiety would have had less foundation if the text had been pruned.

University College of North Wales, Bangor KEITH ROBBINS

Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II. By Ian McLaine. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1979. 325 pp. £9·95.*
The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942–1945. By Allan M. Winkler. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1978. 230 pp. £8·60.*

UNLOVED and unsung, the Ministry of Information (MOI) was not blessed by an official history. Such rites were performed over the Office of War Information (OWI) but the end-product reposes unpublished in the archives. These governmental bodies have been disinterred by Messrs. McLaine and Winkler and their brief lives reincarnated from the official documents and a wealth of other primary, as well as secondary sources. Exposed to the light of rigorous research and analysis, and shaped by excellent writing, these monsters of yesteryear are revealed as sad, misunderstood creatures in the Caliban or Quasimodo mould, rather than the Frankenstein prototype

of the Ministry of Truth, which Orwell saw in the MOI. Both of these excellent and wide-ranging studies provide a mass of new information upon the organisation, operation and impact of propaganda in democratic societies at war.

The MOI was developed spasmodically from 1935, mainly by part-timers, almost entirely professional administrators, who brought to bear, as much knowledge of the needs of war-time propaganda, as experience with such bodies as the University Grants Commission and the Export Credits Branch of the Customs Department permitted. The perfect bureaucratic sinews lacked the requisite flesh and spirit when war broke out. The man behind the successful Guinness adverts of the 1930s left MOI at an early stage, complaining of ' a terrific weight of people in authority at the top of the Ministry before one gets down to anyone who has practical experience of propaganda and publicity '. Blinkered by conceptions of class, these top people framed the propaganda to be directed at the British public, as if dealing with an alien race. In the critical 1939-41 period their exhortations were ' unnecessary and inept '. Often they were merely clueless: ' For want of something better ', the MOI Planning Committee concluded in June 1940, ' we shall have to plug (1) the navy, (2) the Empire's strength and (3) what a hell of a fine race to build up both '. Gradually they learned that the public attributed ' irresolution to the government whenever cooperation was requested rather than ordered '. Latterly the MOI developed ' a finely tuned appreciation of what it was best to leave alone '.

The OWI grew in the shadows cast by distrustful memories of George Creel's Committee on Public Information in the First World War, and Roosevelt's technique of dividing and ruling through a multiplicity of overlapping agencies. Thus the OWI's Domestic Branch competed and conflicted with a range of government bodies and clashed with a distrustful and increasingly conservative Congress. Where Parliament merely ridiculed the MOI until Brendan Bracken made it ' less exciting than the British Museum ', Congress effectively turned the Domestic Branch into ' a coordinating agency which shuttled between other government agencies and the communications industry but did little more on its own '. The Overseas Branch, run as a private fief in New York by Robert Sherwood, came to grief over the Italian Armistice. Ultimately, OWI's greatest contribution to successful propaganda was military, played as a supporting role in the operational theatres of the war.

Bureaucratic in-fighting and demarcation disputes compelled less than parental feeling by those called upon to administer the propaganda bodies. Elmer Davis, OWI's long-suffering director, ' felt like a man who had married a wartime widow and was trying to raise her children by all her previous husbands '. Duff Cooper, third in a ' sprightly succession ' of Ministers of Information, rejected the paternity of ' a misbegotten freak bred from the unnatural union of Sir Horace Wilson and Sir Samuel Hoare '. Their greatest battles to implement a desired ' strategy of truth ' were waged against their own armed services, particularly during the periods of initial military defeat. Churchill at the Admiralty preferred ' a policy of silence '. In Davis's view, Admiral King's ' idea of War Information was that there should be just *one* communiqué. Some morning we would announce that the war was over and that we won it '.

Davis believed that the failure of the United Sates to procure the Holy Grail of a congenial political order in 1918 ' ought to have cured us of our inclination to go grailing '. The lesson had to be relearned by the inveterate but sincere ' grailers ' around Sherwood and Archibald MacLeish, who brought their compound ideology of New-Deal Liberalism and anti-Fascism to the OWI. They discovered that in wartime the Round Table fitted ill in the Oval Office. Camelot became the Arsenal of Democracy. The thrice and future fourth-term President sanctioned some chivalrous deals of the older variety with Darlan, Badoglio and a host of black knights on the domestic stage. The battered ' grailers ' resigned their seats in the magic circle. New

crusaders replenished the serried ranks and promoted their war aims as the real thing: ' The Statute of Liberty stood erect, arms raised, holding four bottles of Coca-Cola. The caption read: " The War That Refreshes: The Four Delicious Freedoms ".' The propaganda of war ' finally came to represent the war being fought ', reflecting ' American policy and indeed America itself '.

The MOI successfully resisted attempts to extend censorship beyond security grounds, it effectively co-ordinated government publicity, protected the BBC, and made important contributions to the working of post-air-raid services. But its most enduring achievement was ' to take the nation's pulse '. Britain began the war ' backward in the field of social survey '. The Ministry's Home Intelligence Division, aided by such sub-contractors as the Wartime Social Survey, Mass Observation, and the British Institute of Public Opinion, introduced the British government to an unparalleled vista of the needs and aspirations of those it governed. Utilising such sources, McLaine provides an intriguing social history of Britain in 1939–45, and adds to and often challenges existing knowledge about such features as anti-German feeling, morale during air-raids, reaction to the American ' occupation ', conceptions of the postwar domestic order, and British anti-Semitism. It is unfortunate that Winkler does not give us an equivalent ' feedback ' picture of the response of American society to war and propaganda, which the files of OWI's Bureau of Intelligence could presumably provide. This is a sorrowful not angry criticism. Both authors have produced valuable studies which can only enlighten and entertain both general and specialist readers.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations Vol. I. By F. H. Hinsley *et al. London: HMSO. 1979. 601 pp. £10·00.*

MI 9: Escape and Evasion 1939–1945. By M. R. D. Foot and J. M. Langley. *London: Bodley Head. 1979. 365 pp. £6·95.*

THERE is a true story of a junior officer in the secret intelligence service who, when visited by the then ' C ' on a majestic tour of inspection, did not look up from his work. Criticised later for a lack of courtesy, the young man burst forth: ' But I thought we were not supposed to know who he is! '

The impersonality of *British Intelligence in the Second World War* is excused in the preface:

> throughout the book—in many cases where security is no longer at stake and where readers may regret our reticence—we have cast our account in impersonal terms and refrained from naming individuals . . . The performance of the wartime intelligence community, its shortcomings no less than its successes, rested not only on the activities of a large number of organisations but also, within each organisation, on the work of many individuals. . . .

The cool stream of anonymity flows past the structures of intelligence disturbed by no ripple of name, personality, rank, honour, award or in-filled index; in this one there are fewer than one hundred names, of which about half are ' foreigners '. The impersonality surprises and irritates until it becomes its own showman and makes the reader aware that within the body of intelligence there beat the warm heart of human endeavour, of the men and women behind the machines and the wireless waves, whose inventiveness took and used what these gave and turned them to marvellous advantage. Without man Enigma could not have been broken and its secrets revealed, nor could the waves of the air have been bent, intersected and manipulated.

As they pursue their cool and passionless way, Professor Hinsley and his co-authors have done a fine job in introducing and explaining to the reader the uses of each structure, and its shape. The Royal Navy's famed Room 40 joined in 1919 to the War Office's less austere and more diffuse MI1(b); their cryptoanalytical work became in due course the Government Code and Cipher School (GC & CS), the mouthful now known as ' Bletchley ', home of Ultra. This factory of boxes contained in 1939–45 men and women conning Enigma, sorting, testing, communicating, issuing hopes, fears, certainties and suppositions, rising as time went on to high peaks of code-breaking success. The impregnable tower of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), incorporated Interception (Y) and Direction Finding (DF) which had their start in the First World War when Winterbotham, Bragg, Hemming and others studied the intersection of sound waves from enemy artillery—flashes and puffs—and learned from them the position of the offending guns. The ' corridors of power ' housed the Joint Intelligence Committee; the Inter-Services Security Board; the secret centres of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6); of scientific, industrial and economic intelligence; combined intelligence with the USA; planners acting on intelligence; Service Departments' ' I ' branches; Photo Reconnaissance; the Inter-Service Topographical Department (ISTD); and the easy chairs from which ambassadors informed their Foreign Office. White walls concealed the Middle East Intelligence Centre (MEIC) and brown the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB). None for Russia; all intelligence stopped on June 22, 1941, when Germany invaded. A small structure called Tina delicately held the key to the morse characteristics of individual wireless operators, friend or foe.

High in importance beside them all stood the structure which contained the subject of the second book under review—the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) and, on its top storey, the secret department MI9.

MI9 is a comprehensive, warmly personal account of the organisation of aid for prisoners-of-war and those who evaded capture. Both authors have experienced what they write about so are able to personalise the book from the head of the organisation in London, Brigadier Norman Crockatt (who emerges as a sympathetic man of integrity and vision), right through to the least of the many characters who appear in it. In this index there are between five and six hundred people's names. ' Not many of the people of whom we write ', say Professor Foot and Colonel Langley on page 16, ' brought off their feat of escape and evasion alone; most of the escapers had had large backing among their friends in the camps they left, and most of the evaders depended to a terrifying extent on the folk who sheltered and supplied them on their way. The size of this army of helpers, many of them anonymous, cannot even be guessed at. . . .'

It is objective, does not sentimentalise, tells a rattling good story, is compulsively human reading. ' The real escaper ' said one from Colditz on page 126, ' is more than a man equipped with compass, maps, papers, disguise and a plan. He has an inner confidence, a serenity of spirit which make him a Pilgrim.' And makes him too, an excellent subject for a book.

JOAN ASTLEY

La vie économique des Français de 1939 à 1945. By Alfred Sauvy. *Paris: Flammarion. 1978. 256 pp. F50.00.*

ALFRED SAUVY is one of those rare scholars who can address themselves with equal ease to the specialist and to the general reader, and it should be stated at the outset that his latest book falls squarely into the second category. For this book has little of the great academic rigour of Sauvy's monumental study of the French economy between the wars: it is not concerned with structures or economic mechanisms, makes no

attempt to assess the character of Vichy's New Order, and has only minimal bibliographical and scholarly apparatus. It is what it claims to be: a general survey of the economic and social conditions prevailing under Vichy; a discussion of the nature and extent of the privations suffered by Frenchmen during the Occupation. In that respect the book has much in common with the ' La vie quotidienne ' series which has proved so popular in France. And it is as such that it must be judged. Simple, lucid presentation of economic information is a high priority in such a work, and indeed Professor Sauvy uses simplified tables and crisp statistics to good effect, presenting his information in very easily digestible form. Certain aspects of the war economy are very well brought out: the feebleness of French provisioning policy in 1939–40, for instance, and the relative levels of resources in the free and occupied zones. Again, useful statistical material is presented on such matters as investment rates, dividends, and unemployment levels. It is perhaps no accident that some of the most incisive judgments come in the early section of the book, where the discussion centres on the economic legacy of the Popular Front and the ineffectiveness of France's preparations for war. Here there is an assurance, a strength of argument that somehow seems to fade in some of the later chapters, particularly those on aspects of Vichy's social policy. Rather too often for my taste the discussion becomes anecdotal, particularly where Professor Sauvy seeks to explain economic [illegible]nts to the uninitiated, and the author has recourse to occasional clichés that would seem more properly the preserve of the caption-writer (' Laval, dit le Talleyrand de banlieue . . .'). Overall, however, the book presents a useful, very readable introduction to the subject, always interesting if sometimes rather undemanding. But for a deeper appreciation of the social and economic nature of Vichy the specialist reader will still be more rewarded by turning to the work of Robert Paxton and Alan Milward—which for the most part this book seems to ignore.

University of Manchester ALAN FORREST

The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War. By Frank G. Weber. *Columbia, Miss.; London: University of Missouri Press. 1979. 244 pp. $19.50.*

THIS book is a critical account of Turkey's behaviour during the Second World War. The author believes that the relatively benign attitude adopted by Western historians towards Turkey's neutrality originated in Turkey's pro-Western policy during the cold war years. His theme is that ' Turkish diplomacy during the war was a brilliant accomplishment by all standards except those of honesty and integrity.' He has written a detailed monograph which, for the most part, concerns Turkey's intrigues with Germany: in return for joining the Axis Turkey was to secure extensive territorial gains at the expense of her neighbours. These machinations failed chiefly because of Germany's inability to formulate a coherent Middle Eastern policy to overcome the deep-seated hostility of the Turks and Arabs. In the end, of course, Turkey declared war on Germany in February 1945, too late to render any effective assistance to the Allies, but in time to figure as a victorious power.

All Dr Weber's evidence for Turkey's alleged double-dealing and cupidity is based on the British and German diplomatic archives but, given the circumstances, neither source could be expected to reveal other than a jaundiced view of Turkish policy. While the Turkish government's refusal to allow him access to its archives might suggest a guilty conscience, it is surely impossible to construct a convincing case against that country in their absence. Indeed, many of Dr Weber's findings might be construed in a more favourable light. While all European neutrals were in a precarious position during the Second World War, that of Turkey was possibly the most delicate

of all: given that it was surrounded by belligerents; under almost continuous pressure from one side or the other to abandon its neutrality; economically poor and dependent on imported manufactured goods; its army small and ill-equipped and Istanbul exposed to aerial bombardment—it is hardly likely that the Turks would have embarked on a high-risk strategy when the sole impediment to a successful invasion was the mountainous nature of her terrain. The author suggests that the Turks were culpable in 1940 in not honouring their 1939 alliance with France and Britain. However, given Britain's exposed position after the fall of France, one would have thought that the Turks behaved very wisely in keeping out of the struggle. Indeed, her inflated territorial demands may well have been calculated to reduce Germany's enthusiasm for Turkish collaboration and, if so, they were successful.

The author could well have discarded much of the detail with which the book is packed since the reader becomes increasingly confused as to the ultimate aims and objectives of the various participants, and irritated by its moralising tone. It is not clear what alternative policies Dr Weber could have expected the Turks to pursue, but it is surely both grotesque and naïve to think they could base their policy on anything other than a rational assessment of their national interests, with survival as the most crucial.

King's College, London M. L. DOCKRILL

Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangen 1941–1945. By Christian Streit. *Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1978. 445 pp. (Studien Zur Zeitgeschichte Band 13.) Pb: DM 32·00.*

A MEASURE of the importance of this book is that it necessitates modification—greater or less—of all previous books on the Russo-German war: greater in the case of historians who failed to do justice to its ideological character; less in the case of those who appraised it more justly. But even the latter drew a distinction between the war of racial extermination, as waged by the SS, and that waged by the *Wehrmacht*. Streit makes it clear with impeccable research and sober argument that this distinction cannot be sustained; by 1941 the *Wehrmacht*, as a whole, had accepted both the end willed by Hitler and the means by which he intended to achieve it. The acid test was the treatment of Russian prisoners, of whom 3·3 million died in German hands. Moreover the *Wehrmacht* co-operated in singling out Jewish prisoners, as well as the *Kommissars*, for elimination by the SS, thus preparing the way for application of the 'Final Solution' to all European Jews. Isolated protests won no backing from superior officers. Streit thus provides fresh vindication of the decision of the International Military Tribunals to try the German Generals, who used the occasion to ascribe all blame to the SS.

The only regret of this reviewer, in assessing Streit's fine achievement, is that he does not examine the role of Rosenberg, Minister for the Eastern Territories, who took up with Hitler the treatment of the prisoners some weeks before general recognition of the prolongation of the war forced the leadership to make some effort to conserve life, because of the acute shortage of manpower. Admittedly there is no evidence that Rosenberg's interventions were effective; but the phenomenon of the chief ideologist hesitating to see his theories applied deserves investigation. Some reference is made to Rosenberg's subordinate, Bräutigam, but it must be clear that he could not have espoused an unpopular cause without his Minister's approval.

It is a great tribute to contemporary West German scholarship that disclosure of these uncomfortable facts should come from the country where they are least palatable. Even Soviet scholars have found them too hot to handle, partly because the Red Army did not have clean hands and partly because it still seems impossible for

Russian historians to admit Stalin's initial strategic blunders and the unpopularity of his rule. which made the mass surrenders inevitable. This book does not make for easy or pleasant reading; but as documentation of the terrible triumph of ideology over man's better nature it has no equal.

Streit points out in his last chapter that to ignore the widespread acceptance of Nazi ideology leads to a narrowing of the responsibility for the inhumanities of the Third Reich. This is displayed in books such as Fest's biography of Hitler, in which the *Führer* is blamed for all major decisions, even where explicit evidence is lacking, as well as for the broad ideological guidelines of the regime. This type of historiography is naturally more popular in Germany, since the omniscient, omnipotent *Führer*-figure becomes in retrospect the scapegoat for the complicity of the people.

R. CECIL

Norwegian Resistance 1940–1945. By Tore Gjelsvik. Trans. by Thomas Kingston Derry. London: C. Hurst. 1979. 224 pp. £9·00.

DURING the war the Norwegians never lost their self-respect. The Swedes played their double game; the Danes never entered the struggle (apart from their admirable latter-day resistance); but the Norwegians, having fought stoutly in 1940, sent King and government to London, kept the national flame alight and worked for the end of the war. Their overt activities have often been described—the famous Shetland bus service, the coast-watch on German warships which fed our Naval Intelligence, even the safe arrival in our hands of the classic Oslo Report. But the pattern of their domestic or civil resistance is less well known, and as it has almost a model quality this account by a geologist who became secretary of the various clandestine committees preparing for liberation is most welcome.

Unlike Poland or the Low Countries or France, Norway before 1940 had no experience of modern occupation. So one may despise but not be surprised by the ineffable Quisling, or by the quite substantial numbers who tacitly or openly went along with *Reichskommissar* Terboven and his minions. What is surprising was the rigid refusal by the main organs of Norwegian society to play the Nazi tune. The Supreme Court resigned, en masse, as early as December 1940. School and university teachers, as usual in the resistance field, were active in opposition. But the impressive feature of Gjelsvik's story, very full in its detail, is of a complete civil community organising itself by underground methods against the day of liberation. The cool long-term planning is striking. Even the military side of the internal resistance movement, *Milorg* (by comparison with the activists working from England under SOE), concentrated rather on slow preparation for the final day than on futile incidental gestures. Perhaps in no other occupied country was so much realism combined with such icy restraint.

Enough of Gjelsvik's personal experience is revealed for one to understand how difficult it was to swim and to survive in this turbid sea. The Nazi regime became increasingly ruthless—for Norway's strategic value was a matter of faith for Hitler and was constantly harped on in our own deception schemes. So conspiracy had to face the well-known gamut—arrests, torture, hostage-taking, reprisals: as well as the risks of operating among fellow-countrymen who had sold their souls. And there was another difficulty well brought out by Gjelsvik, and characteristic of situations where a local resistance has allegiance to a government overseas: in spite of radio traffic, and couriers, and dangerously contrived visits, there was the inherent and often actual danger of disagreement about policy between the men in London and those in Oslo. The fact that everything was under control when the first Allied military mission brought liberation in May 1945 redounds enormously to the credit of those concerned—not least to the author of this book.

RONALD LEWIN

Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial. By Werner Maser. Translated by Richard Barry. *London: Allen Lane, 1979. 368 pp. £7·95.*

THIS latest contribution to the extensive literature on the International Military Tribunal follows hard upon the heels of recent studies by Bradley F. Smith and the late Airey Neave. It stakes no claim to compete with the latter's statement of vivid personal recollection, and yet it also lacks much of the analytical clarity which distinguished the more closely comparable work of the former. Like Smith, Maser takes due notice of such merits as the trial possessed while also raising weighty queries about the full propriety of the proceedings. Indeed he goes even further than the American author in probing the defects of this 'Victors' Tribunal'—the phrase used for the sub-title of the original German edition of 1977. Maser proves especially adept at enlarging upon the difficulties encountered by defence counsel in the acquisition of documents and the presentation of evidence. He also makes quite effective use of substantial quotation from lesser-known sections of the trial transcript, even if the significance of the exchanges is sometimes rather less unambiguous than he supposes. The book at large manages to make many good points and no few palpable hits, concerning both the legal and the political issues raised or accentuated by Nuremberg. Unfortunately Maser's attempts at binding these together into some kind of coherent overall argument are altogether less impressive. Such bittiness is nowhere more apparent than in the concluding section, on 'Nuremberg in History', which surveys only very untidily the postwar defeat of many of the hopes nurtured by the Tribunal for a better regulated international order.

University of Reading MICHAEL D. BIDDISS

WESTERN EUROPE

State and Society in Contemporary Europe: Edited by J. E. S. Hayward and R. N. Berki. *Oxford: Martin Robertson. 1979. 269 pp. £15·00. Pb: £4·95.*

THE prime aim of this book is to discuss current changes in the relationship between state and society, making a fundamental distinction between Western and Eastern Europe so that each topic chosen to illustrate developments in this relationship is conceived within the limits of one or other of the units. The issues are, therefore, treated in a supranational, but not a transcontinental, way. Secondly, the study introduces three international systems, namely the European Community, Comecon and the multinational enterprise, which have a rather specialised interaction with European states.

The analysis for Western Europe is set within the traditional liberal, democratic ideology of the functions of the state. It argues that, although this may have been somewhat uncertain about precise policy objectives, it has been possible to assume that, in a pluralist society, the role of the state is both limited and expressive of the general interest. The rise of corporate bodies such as interest groups and trade unions, together with the growth of the economic and managerial responsibilities of the state, have clouded these old assumptions and put into question the function of political parties and parliamentary institutions. Since no new synthesis, either intellectually or practically, has as yet been achieved institutions constantly fail to meet expectations.

The treatment of Eastern Europe does not rest on a consideration of the same issues but of certain themes classically considered important in the collectivist states, namely: the relation of the communist party to state institutions; the position of national groups in states professing a communist ideology; and the function of state economic planning. Despite important changes, such as the move from personal

dictatorship to collective leadership, the paramountcy of the party remains but there are signs that the grip of the state on society is less secure and its purpose less clear cut than was once the case, whilst nationalism remains a vital force not just within Russia itself but within other East European states. The original model of central economic planning has become modified and thus in the East, no less than in the West, evolutionary changes bear witness to considerable discrepancy between original theory and existing practice.

The third element in the book places these changes within the context of wider political groups, tracing the differences that emerge in the relationships between each major power and its satellites and the problems of inter-bloc management created by detente. Old certainties have been further confused by the development of the multinational enterprise.

The conclusions drawn from this far-reaching study are necessarily rather broad and it is impossible to do justice to all the issues raised. The analysis suggests that each side has failed in its own ideological terms but that both have been relatively successful in achieving stability and material progress. At the same time the book raises many issues of methodology and terminology, ranging from such basic questions as the geographical boundaries of ' Western Europe ' to the meaning of the term ' integration '. Many political issues today seem to call for transnational consideration but this brings with it the challenge that old concepts may stand in the way of, rather than help, the attempts at elucidation. This book has an interesting theme but doubts do arise as to whether it has been treated most effectively.

University of Leeds DOREEN COLLINS

Eurocommunism: A New Kind of Communism? By Annie Kriegel. Trans. by Peter S. Stern. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1979. (First publ. Paris: Libraire Hachette, 1977.) 131 pp. $12.00.*

Eurocommunism. By David Scott Bell. *London: Fabian Society. 1979. 28 pp. (Fabian Research Series, 342.) £0·90.*

ALTHOUGH a direct comparison between these two Anglo-French responses to Eurocommunism (a ' publicity gimmick ' for Bell, an ' alloy of verbal radicalism, practical reformism and strategic nationalism ' for Kriegel) may not be entirely fair given the differences in their length and substance, they nevertheless offer a stimulating read in combination. Annie Kriegel writes with insight, flair and involvement borne of her past membership of the French Communist Party (PCF) and her earlier impressive scholarship on the party which, in this essay, is used as the pivot for a wider assessment of West European communism. David Bell's short Fabian pamphlet rings with assurances to the British Labour Party that it and European social democracy need not be too concerned by the Eurocommunist ' challenge '. He is frequently scathing of the ' pocket Bolsheviks ' which represent one variant of Eurocommunism in Britain. Both authors then are, or have been, part activist, part academic. For both it is the activist's reflections which are clearly to the fore in these works since they are essentially polemics written at the expense of detailed academic analysis.

Bell's pamphlet seeks to identify Eurocommunism for Labour activists and to offer guidance on how the Labour Party should respond. There is little new in the pamphlet for those familiar with other Eurocommunist literature, with the exception of a rather mystifying and unconvincing section on State Monopoly Capitalism as the ' key notion ' from which has sprung the Eurocommunist strategy in Western Europe. Eurocommunism is said to reflect not the crisis of Western capitalism but the crisis of Western communism and shows that social democracy's great rival is in the throes of

a battle for survival. Nevertheless, Bell argues that the Labour Party should be encouraged to talk to the French, Italian and Spanish Communist parties to further their democratic evolution and to persuade more of them to adopt the ' practical ' orientation of good social democrats.

The view from France is different in tone if not in substance. Kriegel's familiarity with, and understanding of, the historical roots and political context of the PCF leads her not to underestimate the French party's ability to determine its tactics vis-à-vis the Socialists and the PCF's patience in manoeuvring towards its long-term goal. Unlike Britain, social democracy in France, in Kriegel's view, has always developed in the shadow of communism and faces a very resilient political competitor. Kriegel's original essay on Eurocommunism, published in 1977, has been translated into English with the addition of a preface and epilogue by the author, in which she neatly fits the PCF's rupture with the Socialists prior to the March election of 1978 into her original analysis. Although some may disagree with Professor Kriegel's comments, especially her impatience with both Ellenstein and Althusset, nevertheless her avid intellectual and political curiosity in communism achieves a judgment of its ' Euro ' variant which, albeit interim, is recognisably within the framework of her analysis of French communism established in her earlier works. There is more to be learned about the PCF here than about the Italian and Spanish parties which nominally are part of the overall focus. It is not, nor does it claim to be, the definitive work on West European communist parties but is an extension outwards of some of the shrewd assessment and sceptical conclusions on the likelihood of Eurocommunism transforming the face of communist parties whose internal and international environments have undergone change. Not surprisingly, therefore, the essay is at its best in fitting the PCF into its political arena in France. Professor Kriegel's interpretation of the Socialist-Communist rupture in 1977 is succinct and convincing. ' one group in this tug-of-war [between the Socialists and Communists] has stronger arms; the other practices better footwork. Between the two, the rope broke ' (p. 121).

On the whole, despite a very short gestation period of three months, her book is worth reading not merely for some provoking thoughts on Eurocommunism, but as an interesting chapter in the sixty-year-old saga of the PCF.

UMIST, University of Manchester CAROLE WEBB

Conflict and Consensus in France. Edited by Vincent Wright. *London: Cass. 1979. 149 pp. £9·95.*

Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival. By Ezra N. Suleiman. *Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978. 299 pp. £12·50 Pb: £6·15.*

IN October 1978 readers could purchase a copy of the review *West European Politics* for £2·25. Today they are offered the same, minus a dozen pages of useful book-reviews, in hardback for four times the price. Anyone tempted by such a bargain will get a useful survey of the political, social and economic conjuncture in France in the wake of the general election of March 1978—that pseudo *choix de société*, as Hayward put it. And the volume tends to stress the underlying continuity within the French polity more than the (defeated?) forces of change. Its main strength is probably the wide number of aspects of contemporary France on which it touches, though the quality of the individual articles is by no means uniform. V. Wright leads off with a vigorous and concise account of the 1978 electoral campaign and analyses the positions of the major political protagonists during it and since: he stresses especially the conflictual yet binding relationship within both Left and Right in France. There are also well-documented and up-to-date surveys of developments in local government (where H. Machin chronicles the recent reversion from decentralisation) economic

policy (where D. Green brings out well the improvisory and, rhetoric apart, rather unoriginal nature of current policy) and the politics of the upper administration (where A. Stevens reaches some well-supported if unastonishing conclusions). The pieces which this reviewer found most stimulating, though, were those by D. Pickles and J. Hayward. Pickles is very crisp and lucid on defence policy, and she singles out the dilemmas faced by the Giscardian state. Can it afford both a large standing army and a decent nuclear force? Can it continue a foreign policy that logically involves ever greater co-operation with Germany while continuing to forbid the latter any access to nuclear capability? Writing on dissentient political culture, Hayward swiftly undermines Crozierite theses about the innate immobilism of French society, to reveal possible new social models within France. He deals with ecological and regional movements and, more lengthily, with the CFDT, that trade union which aspires to be a veritable counter-society. His conclusion is that the best chance of success for any such forces lies probably in working through the official Left. There are a couple of articles which add little to this volume, notably another episode in the speculation about whether there are ' two Frances ': this version manages to conclude even less than some of its predecessors, and to avoid discussing the Left/Right split in economic terms. Another article seems fascinated by the consensus which its author discerns almost everywhere; it would be hard to infer from this that there were still forces in France that seriously wanted to challenge the structures of French capitalism. Hayward provides an alternative view.

On the whole, then, this volume is a wide-ranging and judicious *mise au point* of the situation in France today. One of the articles in it is in fact a boiling-down of the earlier chapters of Professor Suleiman's latest work on the subject for which he is well-known, viz. the functioning of the upper reaches of the French civil service. This book, very well-documented and based on much empirical research, concentrates on the top *grands corps* of that institution, explaining how they are selected, how they operate within the French political system and how they perpetuate themselves. It is thus a study of (p. 12) ' state-trained elites, who are trained, promoted and legitimised by a highly selective education system and who use state education and state service as a base from which to launch themselves into other careers '. The book is on the whole rather verbose, advancing its arguments in crab-like fashion and thus often seeming to go over the same ground several times. But it is worth persevering with. Suleiman shows particularly well how elites are groomed; he rightly sees French higher education as a ' two track system ', with the *grandes écoles* reserved for a small elite, alongside the more numerous (and inferior) universities, which cater for the mass. He shows clearly the corporatism of the *grands corps*, serving as virtual employment exchanges for their members at the summit of public and private sectors alike, and their strategies for survival and aggrandisement. He also underlines their conservatism and hostility to any notion of decentralisation or increased participation—a reflex logical enough, perhaps, in members of a corps which has instilled into them the belief that they alone know best. Some points might have stood greater clarification, for example, how do the different corps arrange the largely tacit division of labour whereby certain sectors of activity are reserved while others are conceded to rivals? How does the elite acquire its ' generalist ' knowledge, which enables it to lord it over ignorant ' specialists ' later on? What is the nature of the elite's much vaunted ' contact with reality ', as opposed to the useless (and subversive) ' theory ' which, it alleges, vitiates the best efforts of mere university graduates? (It has always seemed to this reviewer that products of the *grandes écoles* from Chevènement to Giscard d'Estaing were informed by a theoretical bias at least as strong as that of lesser ideologues). But perhaps these are carping points.

Where one might feel disappointment is in the last part of the work, which deals with the political consequences of French elitism. Clearly anyone writing in the

Mosca/Pareto tradition is likely to have problems in distinguishing between elites and ruling classes (or indeed ' castes ', another concept used here). Such distinctions are not on the whole drawn particularly well; and this emerges in the disappointing discussion of the well-known symbiosis between the administrative elite and the private sector, resulting from the Gaullist state's drive for industrial expansion in the 1960s. Some of the existing literature, notably Birnbaum and Poulantzas, makes stimulating attempts to grasp possible relationships between administrative elites and the objective needs of an expanding capitalist economy and those of its ruling fractions (by no means reducible to a monolithic bloc, as is implied here). But Suleiman prefers on the whole to avoid this debate. Perhaps he will take it up in a later work. For the moment he has left us a sound, empirically grounded picture of an entrenched group—so much so that even the Left, if ever it were to take power, would be unable (and indeed at heart unwilling) to shake its hold. This is perhaps the most thought-provoking aspect of an informative book.

University of Reading DAVID HANLEY

France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present. By Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. Trans. by Derek Coltman. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1978. 276 pp. £12·60.*

' LAFAYETTE, nous voici! ', General Pershing was prompted to say when he laid a wreath on the famous grave in the Picpus cemetery in 1917. The old alliance by which France had secured the independence of the United States was renewed, this time against the Germans. Lafayette gets his due in Professor Duroselle's book, as do other notable personalities in Franco-American relations—Franklin, Jefferson, Tocqueville (and his less well-known contemporary, Michel Chevalier, who also reported on the America of the 1830s); and in the present century, Clemenceau and Wilson, Roosevelt and de Gaulle. The author is good on individuals, but he has been rather hard pressed to find a theme which unites them. His brief is provided by the series, in which this is the second volume to appear—' The United States in the World: Foreign Perspectives ', under the editorship of Professor Akira Iriye. The aim is to interpret American foreign relations through the eyes of non-American scholars; and in the space at his disposal, and in an admirable attempt to review opinions and attitudes as well as diplomacy, the author can offer only a brief introduction to his subject. As such, it is stimulating and entertaining; though more might be done to help a reader forward when his interest has been aroused. The select bibliography is indeed highly selective, and might with profit be expanded in a second edition.

Throughout, the book is stronger on the French side than on the American, and better grounded in the French historiography than on the American or the British. The chapter on the 1914–18 war, for example, gives some valuable indications to British readers of the way in which current French writers (notably André Kaspi and Yves Henri Nouailhat) are increasing our knowledge of Franco-American relations at that time. But in later chapters, the account of French policy in the 1930s needs amending in the light of Professor Adamthwaite's recent book on *France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936–1939*;[1] and the discussion of Franco-American relations during the Second World War seems rather over-dependent on Robert Murphy's testimony. The author's explanation of the hostility between de Gaulle and Roosevelt in terms of ' a clash between two types of great men ' fails to

1. Totowa, NJ, London: Cass, 1977. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1978, p. 311.

grapple with the intricacies of that difficult relationship. On the postwar period, Professor Duroselle may well be wise in choosing to ignore the orthodox-revisionist *brouhaha* about the origins of the ' cold war '; but the reader who comes fresh to the subject might need at least some indication of the political and historical morass which is being by-passed. Despite this, the postwar chapters are full of interest. The author emphasises the economic, political and military interests which have compelled France to have a fundamentally pro-American policy, in spite of the strong anti-American sentiment which has often flourished on both Right and Left (and which is analysed here with a ruthless and dismissive clarity). Even de Gaulle's anti-Americanism had its limits.

At the end of the book, the author cannot argue with any conviction that there was any ' special relationship ' between France and the United States providing a core to his work. The book remains a series of episodes, though all will offer some illumination to the non-specialist reader. The translation is clear and lively, preserving much of the humour and sharpness of Professor Duroselle's style.

University of Liverpool P. M. H. BELL

Germany at the Polls: The Bundestag Election of 1976. Edited by Karl H. Cerny. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1978. 251 pp. Pb: $4.75.*

IN this book seven German and three American scholars analyse German electoral politics with special reference to the 1976 federal election. Four of the essays deal with the four major parties; of these Professor Kaack's on the Free Democratic Party (FDP) is nearly twice as long as Professor Sontheimer's on the Social Democratic Party (SPD). This is justifiable partly because of the dearth of studies in English of the FDP, and partly because the party in every election since that of 1957 has held the balance of power. In this connexion one notes Genscher's honest rejection of opportunism and his admirable insistence that his party declare its coalition intentions before voters go to the polls. *O si sic omnes!* The FDP in 1976 was stressing its ' Liberal ' character, even though the exact meaning of this term remained obscure to voters. This has perhaps always been the case in German history, except when Liberal was coupled with National.

Although, as all contributors point out, the 1976 election, in comparison with the two preceding ones, lacked excitement and a central theme, it was not without interest, if only because it demonstrated that the SPD had not consolidated the power won in 1972 and was most unlikely to rival the CDU/CSU's record of twenty years hegemony. One major reason for this was the activity of the far Left, represented by the Young Socialists (JUSOS); despite the fact that they lay low during the election campaign, their disruptive potential evidently repelled the floating vote. On the other hand, the antipathy between Kohl and Strauss prevented the two union parties from presenting a united front.

The two final chapters deal respectively with the campaign coverage in four responsible newspapers of differing political complexion, and with the influence of public opinion polls. As it is generally agreed that in Western Europe most people derive political information chiefly from television, it is perhaps surprising that the Press should have been singled out for attention. However the two chapters are closely linked, inasmuch as opinion polls are mainly publicised through the Press. One fact that emerges clearly is that the newspapers studied devoted relatively little space to actual issues, such as those concerning foreign policy, particular social groups, etc., in comparison with the allegations and assertions of parties and politicians. If this applied to responsible newspapers, the criticism would have had even greater force in

application to the cheap Press. It should be taken seriously since, as the joint authors of this chapter observe, ' The media determine what will be perceived as political reality by the average person ' (p. 172). The main issues that have emerged since the election, such as energy conservation, were non-party ones and, as such, were largely ignored during the campaign. This book can be recommended to all students of the electoral process in a modern democracy, especially one where, as in Germany, election campaigns are financed from public funds.

R. CECIL

Norway and Europe in the 1970s. By Hilary Allen. *Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Global Book Resources.) 289 pp. Nkr. 120. $24.00.*
Studier i Dansk Udenrigspolitik. Edited by Niels Amstrup and Ib Faurby. *Aarhus: Forlaget Politica. 1978. 396 pp. Dan. kr. 100.00.*

THESE two books, each in their own way, add considerably to the rather slim collection of publications on the Scandinavian countries in international affairs. Dr Hilary Allen sets out to answer two questions: why did the Norwegians reject membership of the EEC in the referendum of September 1972, and how have Norway's relations with the Community developed since then? There is a certain irony in the first full-length study of this subject being undertaken by a non-Norwegian but Dr Allen has the advantage of many Norwegian sources and contacts and of being a disinterested party in the whole Norway-EEC debate—unlike many Norwegian political scientists. These advantages are put to good use: Dr Allen's book provides a well-documented account of Norway's relations with the European Community written with a thorough appreciation both of Norway's political scene and evolving international factors.

How then does Dr Allen answer her two questions? She seeks the reasons for Norwegian rejection of Community membership not just in the fiercely fought referendum campaign but also in the earlier Norwegian applications for negotiations with the EEC. These were never so whole-hearted as those of Denmark and displayed a caution born of political necessity. This was particularly the case for the 1966-67 round when the Norwegian government was a non-socialist coalition with some members opposed to joining the European Community. However, rather than endanger their government, these opponents supported a Norwegian application on the grounds that it did not commit them to membership, and anyhow the British attempt to join the Community would probably be rebuffed again by the French. In this they were proved right. Dr Allen correctly treats Norwegian attitudes to the 1968-70 plans for closer Nordic economic co-operation (Nordek) as a prelude to the EEC debate and shows how the subsequent negotiations for terms of entry to the Community weighted the balance further in favour of the opponents of Norwegian membership. The EEC supporters were unable—or unwilling—to start their referendum campaign until they knew the terms of accession and the ' Six ' appeared to be ' deliberately ignoring Norwegian interests ' (p. 98) in such areas as fisheries and agriculture. The referendum was turned by the anti-Marketeers into a debate on the future of Norwegian society, whilst the EEC's supporters ran an indifferent campaign and never managed to pull back the lead from their opponents.

The rest of the book describes in some detail the subsequent free-trade agreement between Norway and the Community and the relationship between the two sides since 1973. Particular attention is paid to important areas such as the working of the free-trade arrangement, the use of Norwegian oil, and the extension of Norway's fisheries limits—bringing out the effect of Norway's domestic politics on these questions.

Dr Allen answers her two questions. The narrative is detailed and well documented. Perhaps the major shortcoming of the book is the lack of a rigorous

framework of analysis with a more systematic evaluation of the relative importance and other factors in Norway's relations with Europe. Despite this, Dr Allen is to be congratulated on writing such a thorough account of the subject. Incidentally, it is particularly enjoyable to read a book—especially one published abroad—that is not full of errors made by author and typographer.

Studier i Dansk Udenrigspolitik is dedicated to Professor Erling Bjøl, doyen of international relations in Denmark, by members of the Institute of Political Science, University of Aarhus. Its major interest is for the Scandinavian specialist, though two of the twelve contributions are in English. The contributions are divided into three sections: the Danish decision-making process with chapters on Danish parties and foreign policy, the Foreign Policy Board of the Danish Parliament, Danish bureaucracy's adjustment to EEC membership and Denmark and the presidency of the Council of Ministers; security policy with contributions on United States-Danish relations and Greenland from 1945-48, Danish defence options 1948-49 and the size factor in states' relations; and three chapters on international economic factors—Denmark's foreign trade, multinationals and Denmark's balance of trade, and Denmark and the new international economic order. A useful bibliography covering material on Danish foreign policy is provided. The book gives the sort of overview of Danish foreign policy not previously attempted and the standard of contribution is consistently high. It is interesting to note that the publishers have followed up this volume with a special edition of their journal *Politica* [1] on comparative foreign policy.

University of Aberdeen CLIVE ARCHER

Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State. By Halil Ibrahim Salih. *Alabama: University of Alabama Press. 1978. (Distrib. by AUPG, London.) 203 pp. £9·45.*

THE writer of this book, a Turkish Cypriot who now holds United States citizenship and teaches at a Texas college, provides *inter alia* a moderately expressed statement of the view that the 1960 Cyprus constitution had broken down completely before the internecine violence of 1963-64 brought this to the world's attention, and that the island's two communities cannot coexist peacefully under a unified central government. There are also some useful, if hardly novel, observations about Greco-Turkish disputes and other international factors that seem to the author to frustrate any hope of bringing about a reconciliation through outside influence and pressure. But the book contains almost nothing new. Some of it (e.g. Chapter 6, ' The Intercommunal Talks ') seems to antedate the coup of July 1974 that led to the present state of affairs, and none of it appears to have been written later than 1975. It is thus seriously out of date in some respects, and has not been well put together. The text has been decked out with a disproportionate number of appendices (what can be the point of the list of British High Commissioners and Governors, which in any case leaves one out?) and a fairly exhaustive bibliography—many items of which are irrelevant to the author's purpose. The result is an over-elaborate, rather repetitive and expensive little book, the essential substance of which could have been compressed into a pamphlet.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

1. Number 1, 1979.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Soviet Perceptions of the United States. By Morton Schwartz. *Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press. 1978. 216 pp. £8·75.*

Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case. By Christer Jönsson. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1979. 266 pp. $16.90.*

THESE books make substantial contributions to the literature on Soviet foreign policy. At their core, both start from the premise that the images held by Soviet decision-makers and analysts are a neglected, yet important, subject of inquiry. The increased importance and sophistication of the Soviet ' foreign policy intelligentsia ' has long been recognised, and Schwartz examines their views on the structure of American society, the nature of the political system, and those factors affecting policy debates, such as bureaucratic influences, public opinion, the press and various interest groups. In an extensively documented and closely analysed argument, Schwartz concludes that ' the vulgar Marxism of the Stalin era . . . has given way to considerably more perceptive assessments ' (pp. 151–52). Foremost amongst Soviet academicians are Arbatov and Inozemtsev, the influential directors of the USA Institute and the Institute for World Economy and International Relations. The writings of both men are used extensively, including a remarkable tirade by Arbatov against his own colleagues who in the days before ' the upswing of creative Marxism ' produced ' vulgaristic works ' in the social sciences and ' masked their own dogmatism, laziness of thought or simply lack of knowledge with lofty ideological considerations, with " concern " for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory ' (p. 156). The recognition that the American foreign-policy *mekhanizm* is top-heavy, cumbersome, bureaucratic and governed by vested interests is less reminiscent of the Marxian unity of the ruling class than it is of Allison and Halperin. Yet so advanced have American analysts become that one of them, Shvedkov, actually welcomed the bureaucratic-politics model because it provided American analysts with a more realistic appreciation of their own system (p. 61)! Schwartz clearly examines the limits set not only by ideology but also by their own experience. Thus, as Schwartz points out, phenomena such as bureaucratic parochialism and strong leadership à la Nixon and Kissinger could be easily ingested. Yet, Watergate, the spectre of ' investigative journalism ', and the easy anarchy of American politics, sometimes called pluralism, have left them somewhat bemused.

Jönsson's book has a rather wider objective than Schwartz's. He seeks both to apply the existing literature on bargaining and game theory to Soviet behaviour during the test-ban negotiations of the early 1960s, and to examine the validity of generally held views about Soviet diplomatic style in the light of his findings. Unlike Schwartz this book is not an ' easy read ', though like Schwartz it is both interesting and rewarding. In Part One, Jönsson sets out his theoretical framework in which he discusses problems of methodology, the inter-relationship between images and ideology, and the extent to which the test-ban negotiations can be conceptualised in game theoretical terms as a ' Prisoner's Dilemma '. The negotiating period is divided-up into three stages: from the inception of negotiations to the autumn of 1960; from autumn 1960 to late 1962; and from late 1962 until the treaty was signed on August 5, 1963. Jönsson then examines the impact on the negotiation of events in the international system, the Communist bloc and within the Soviet Union itself. The downing of the American U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory in May 1960 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 had a decisive influence on negotiations, as did the split within the Soviet leadership over the handling of these crises and the benefits of arms control. Jönsson points out that ' if it had not been for the existence of internal divergencies between different groupings, it is unlikely that these international events, in and of themselves, would have triggered major shifts in Soviet behavior ' (p. 215). He also

found that China exercised only minimal influence on Soviet behaviour i: negotiations, despite the fact that the test-ban issue was of vital importance i development of the Sino-Soviet dispute. As to Soviet bargaining behaviour, Jö found it to be ' more flexible and less propagandistic than could be anticipatec consulting Western observers ' (p. 77).

Both authors were in agreement that Soviet perceptions and images need to be closely scrutinised in order to avoid cold war stereotypes about Soviet intention behaviour. Careful reading and examination of Soviet speeches, articles and reports go a long way to build up a more accurate picture. Yet both authors agre the necessity to regard much of what is printed as ' esoteric communication ' wil to continue. A quotation from Alexander Bovin, *Izvestiya's* political commen should serve as a warning to anyone wanting to regard Soviet pronouncements at face value: ' The verbal expression of policy can play a dual role: it either reflec political interests and intentions, or, conversely, is called upon to conceal interests and intentions ' (Schwartz, p. 6). The careful use of sources, as in books, indicates the progress that nevertheless can be made.

University of Southampton KAREN DAWISI

Russia and the United States: U.S.-Soviet Relations from the Soviet Point of By Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakovlev. *Chicago, London: Ch University Press. 1979. 301 pp. Index. £8·45.*

HISTORIANS are the victims of their societies in terms of the prejudices unde their work, and in the Soviet Union they face even more overt pressure to (history: to avoid the wrath of GLAVLIT—Soviet censorship. This leaves the 1 with a conundrum: to what extent is the text a true reflection of the histo preferences and how far does it stem from the arbitrary imposition of censorship danger is that we will treat Soviet works entirely as the result of these ex constraints and underestimate the contribution from the historian himself, thus 1 to see the extent to which the interpretation the historian offers may actually 1 assumptions gleaned from Soviet archival material.

The problem confronts us once again with the publication of *Russia and the U States.* The two authors are Soviet specialists on contemporary American history work was, as the Preface states, ' reviewed by the Academic Council of the H Department of the University of Moscow ' prior to publication, like all manus submitted to the University of Moscow Press (p. xv).

On all the basic issues—Allied intervention in Russia, the origins of the S World War and the development of the Cold War—a fairly orthodox Soviet vi presented, backed by Soviet documents (*Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki* especially) and the works of ' some American historians ' who ' do look objecti at these events (viz. p. 47). Certainly in relation to the period up to 1939, the au largely reflect the perceptions of the world situation Soviet diplomats held a time—this can be confirmed by consulting the *Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki*. Whether this is ' objective ' truth is not always so clear. For in this interpretat events, the most striking deficiency lies in the wilful blindness to the crucial role revolutionary movement and national liberation fronts organised from Mosco factors exacerbating East-West relations. With this omitted we have the sto Hamlet without the ghost. Hamlet (the United States) goes around seeking reven his uncle (the Soviet Union), killing Polonius in the process (Allende's governi for example), for no reason at all.

It is gratifying to learn that ' there is no substitute for the objective necess markedly improve the Soviet-American relations and put them on a s

constructive, and cooperative basis ' (p. 262), but if Soviet historians are to write ' objective ' history they will have to rise above the assumptions made by their government at the time crucial international events were taking place.

University of Birmingham JONATHAN HASLAM

The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, 1949–64. By George Ginsburgs and Carl F. Pinkele. *New York: Praeger. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 145 pp. £12·25.*

THIS useful monograph is an analysis of the role of the international legal factor in the Sino-Soviet territorial dispute. It is a detailed study of a specific aspect, in a narrow time span; for despite the title, the authors concentrate on the 1961–64 period. The analysis is subtle, the respective communist attitudes well inter-woven, with a view (suitably disguised) generally favourable to Chinese goals and tactics. The resulting assessment is that the border dispute is merely a part of a larger process and not an attempt to regain territory. International law was used sparingly, and then only as a ' sparring match ' in a ' superlative essay in choreography ', not as part of a ' deadly duel ' (p. 129–30).

Although this book is largely successful in attaining its limited self-appointed objectives, there are a few significant problems. Apart from a tendency toward a tedious legalistic style, an over use of lengthy quotations in such a short work, and an obscure standard in determining relevant dates (e.g. the cut-off date of 1964), the authors' main problem is with certain crucial political concepts. They have an unfortunate habit of denigrating what they call ' ideological issues ', which turn out to be non-Western values. On page 103 they suggest that the main problem in the territorial dispute is that Peking is standing firm on its ' diplomatic etiquette ' in demanding that the various treaties be pronounced ' unequal '. The authors do not see this as an ' organic divergence of opinion ', and thereby ignore Peking's deep seated concerns with honour and national legitimacy which lay at the heart of the Chinese revolution. This analysis also completely ignores China's factional disputes on border issues when it suggests that Peking's policy on these issues has been consistent and is likely to be so in the near future. Previous Sinological work, not to mention the recent excellent RAND Corporation studies by Gottlieb (R-1902-NA-Nov. 1977) and Lieberthal, (R-2342-NA-July 1978) clearly show that no such uniformity exists. Ginsburgs and Pinkele argue that the territorial dispute is likely to continue unchanged as China has no incentive to remove it from the Sino-Soviet agenda and the Soviet Union has no viable alternative (p. 132). The problem with this view seems to be that such a ' black box ' analysis ignores the forces at work for at least a modicum of Sino-Soviet detente. There is good reason to believe that important factions exist in Peking and Moscow which recognise, for example, the need for greater manoeuvrability in the great power triangle that would result from a degree of Sino-Soviet rapprochement. This book is strongest when dealing with legal issues, and it is regrettable that occasionally weak political analysis should mar such a fine effort.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth GERALD SEGAL

The Soviet Theory of Development: India and the Third World in Marxist-Leninist Scholarship. By Stephen Clarkson. *London: Macmillan. 1979. (First publ. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1978). 322 pp. £12·00. Pb: £4·95.*

SINCE the 1950s there has been a steady trickle of scholarly works about relations between the Soviet Union and the Third World. As the cold war gave way to detente the emphasis of Western studies shifted from Soviet penetration of the Third World to

the relevance of the communist model to the less-developed countries. In so far as Soviet sources were used, it was for potential insight into Soviet policy intentions. Few Western works concerned themselves with Soviet perceptions, or with Soviet international relations theory. The communist model of development remained imprecise and ill-defined. Professor Clarkson offers to the anglophone reader an analysis and interpretation of one communist model—the Soviet theory of development. He bases his exposition on a large number of Soviet scholarly writings on India, from which he extrapolates a general Soviet model of development.

In his introduction the author describes the hazards of using Soviet sources and coming to grips with Marxist-Leninist concepts and terminology. He gives a brief historical survey of the intellectual and policy inputs into contemporary Soviet theory, and outlines five phases of Soviet thinking on the colonial question. The fifth phase is current Soviet theory.

A section of the book is devoted to each of the three dominant foci in Soviet Third-World writing: the concept of state capitalism, foreign aid and trade, and agriculture. Professor Clarkson demonstrates that on each of these topics divergent and contradictory views co-exist, sometimes in the work of a single scholar. While this often leads to inconsistencies and casts doubt on the existence of a coherent Soviet model of development, the absence of intellectual monolithism may indicate growing academic autonomy and seems to this reader to be an optimistic sign. It is in the description of Soviet relations with the less-developed countries that Soviet scholars are at their weakest. Here there are no diverse opinions. Descriptions of Soviet aid programmes are so overstated ' that the spectre of a credibility gap confronts the reader . . . a careless, hyperbolic style damages what is a very strong case ' (p. 171).

The final part of this excellent book assesses the intellectual value and impact of Soviet development analysis, On the positive side is the fact that Marxist-Leninist political economy is an integrated discipline with a common methodology which links history, ideology, sociology, politics and economics into one interlocking analysis. Soviet concepts are simple and stable, making the theory accessible to all readers. The explicit normative system underlying the analysis has both positive and negative aspects—it leads to frankness, but it causes a confusion of ' the ought ' with ' the is '. More grievous scholarly shortcomings are unadmitted and unexplained contradictions, and lack of substantiating evidence. The author finds no evidence that Soviet development analysis has had any impact on the Third World itself. He concludes that it is more likely to continue ' to serve as an uncertain guidebook for watchers of the Kremlin than as an alternative paradigm for students of the third world ' (p. 268).

Professor Clarkson has rendered complex Soviet concepts larded with rhetoric into palatable English, easy to read and understand. His translations from Russian are superb. The absence of a bibliography detracts from the overall excellence, but there are copious references in the notes. This lucid book is a valuable contribution to Soviet Studies and to international relations theory.

University of Surrey MARGOT LIGHT

Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World. By Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1979. 267 pp. (Publications of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, No. II.) £13·00.*

Who Are the Soviet Dissidents? (Ernest Stockdale Lecture, 1977.) By Alex Shtromas. *London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. 1979. 19 pp. Pb: £0·60.*

IF this book had been available twenty years ago some of us might have foreseen the

extraordinary growth of conflicting nationalisms within the Soviet Union. And we would have been better placed to understand the burgeoning national Marxist regimes of the Third World. But students of the Soviet Union suffer from ' acute Eurocentrism ' (p. 71), often in practice equating the Soviet Union with Russia.

There is plenty of evidence available about Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union but it has been too sparsely analysed. This book by no means exhausts the subject but it is an excellent beginning, and all the essentials are there.

The Muslims who joined the cause of the Russian Revolution were liquidated by Stalin but not before their message had been transmitted to their co-religionists abroad and also to other Asians. The original Muslim National Communists of the Soviet Union gave its ' Eastern face ' to communism. It is a matter for further research how much present-day Asian Marxists are consciously aware of their debt to them, but it is clear that they are the source of the most powerful ideas of present day Asian ' Marxism '. The inverted commas are necessary in the case of the Soviet pioneers because ' it is unlikely that more than a handful of them had ever read Marx ' (p. 30), and ' for them Marxism was a flexible doctrine. They rejected its major tenets except the most essential, that the time of the underdogs was at hand '. For them practice was more important than doctrine. It does not appear that they have ever renounced the lack of scruple or the concomitant cruelty, which Lenin made a part of the Soviet system.

They invented a doctrine of ' proletarian nations ', meaning thereby that not only the working class of the Muslim nationalities in the Russian empire but whole nations, rich and poor alike, were exploited by the Russians in the way that capitalists everywhere exploited the proletariat. In their view the Russian revolution had not changed this. If any ' nation was a capitalist oppressor before the revolution, it will remain a socialist oppressor after it ' (p. 48). So much for the Russians. ' The vast majority of Muslims were united behind a leadership which placed autonomy from the Russians above all else '.

On the other hand they thought that the Russians were ' ignorant and afraid of Asia ' (p. 55). It was for Asians and above all for Soviet Asians to bring revolution to Asia, thereby ' encircling ' the capitalist countries of Europe with revolutionary governments which controlled their raw materials and essential markets. But this involved throwing off the Russian yoke. ' Appearing in the East under the sole flag of the Russian Communist party, we condemn ourselves to failure because our enemies will denounce us as simple successors to former Russian imperialism.'

Their form of Marxism had to be ' national in essence and socialist in form ' and not the other way round, or they would have none of it. They lost to Stalin but their aspirations survived. Sixty-years later it is clear that ' the Soviet leadership's desire to russianize all non-Russians ' has failed. The continuing strength of cultural Islam in the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union is astounding. And it is now clear that with this there goes a great deal of religious belief, mainly supported by underground groupings. Moreover, the Russian population is increasing very slowly, while the Muslims are multiplying so fast that on present trends they will outnumber the Russians at some point in the next century. The consequences for the Soviet Union and for the world are likely to be enormous, but they are little explored, because there is very little contact between the intellectual leadership of ' Russia in Europe ' and the Soviet Muslims.

Who Are the Soviet Dissidents? by Dr Alex Shtromas is the best short account of its subject that I know, but nowhere does he indicate that the Soviet Muslims have their own ideas for the future.

JOHN LAWRENCE

Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy-Making. By Peter H. Solomon, Jr. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 253 pp. £10·00.*

THIS book falls firmly within the ' revisionist ' school of Soviet political studies, influenced (as the author acknowledges) by Professor Jerry Hough. This reviewer, too, must identify his own sympathy for the methodology, assumptions, arguments and conclusions of Peter H. Solomon's book; other scholars might be generally less well disposed.

It is important to note these points because, as Solomon correctly remarks in his introductory chapter, there are now clear distinctions among the different ' generations ' of specialists on the Soviet Union, with a growing tendency to reject the ' totalitarian ' model that dominated in the 1950s, and to apply to the study of Soviet politics the kind of criteria used in judging politics in other modern, complex societies. Solomon's impressive, scholarly study represents a further significant challenge to the ' orthodox ' position and to long-accepted views about the scope and nature of specialist participation in policy-making.

The author uses the formulation of criminal policy from the late Stalin years to the early 1970s as a case study of scholarly involvement in Soviet political processes. He examines the question from several angles, using an array of complementary techniques and approaches. Basing himself soundly on a thorough reading of specialist Soviet sources, backed up most valuably by interviews with over forty Soviet scholars, he recounts case histories of three specific items of policy, and is able to document a range and scale of scholarly involvement that would scarcely have been imagined a decade or two ago.

There was, surprisingly, a significant level of participation even under Stalin; after 1956 criminology revived as a scholarly discipline; and in the 1960s criminologists' involvement in sometimes controversial policy arguments, *prior to* the adoption of policy, became institutionalised. Moreover, the author argues, their contributions were of good quality, and their level of involvement is comparable with that found in Western states.

Solomon's study (which grew out of a doctoral dissertation) is well designed, competently executed, and carefully presented; the book deserves a wide readership among those interested in Soviet politics, or in the role of specialist disciplines in Soviet society, or specifically in criminology and criminal policy.

Not that the book is without blemish. In particular, it would have benefited from a severe pruning of the fifty-two pages of notes (which compare with 163 pages of text); and it is a pity that the author's meticulous scholarship did not extend to his proof-reading. The references are riddled with transliteration errors, and the text also contains inconsistencies and inaccuracies; for example, the date of Khrushchev's retirement is incorrectly recorded (p. 74); a number of names appear in several variants (Professor V. M. Chkhikvadze is never correctly rendered); note 45 on page 209 is missing; and, on a point of translation, the reader might be misled by the references to the Ministry for the Defense of the Social Order, which is really the Ministry for the Maintenance of Public Order.

These and other lapses, irritating as they are to the specialist reader, do not however detract from the real worth of this study, which must represent a further significant nail in the coffin of totalitarianism.

St Antony's College, Oxford RON HILL

Marxism-Leninism in the German Democratic Republic: The Socialist Unity Party (SED). By Martin McCauley. *London: Macmillan for the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. 1979. 267 pp. £12·00.*

MORE than simply a party history, this book examines East German development from

the early postwar years to the present. Much of the material is not new, although a large proportion has previously only been available in German. What is often new is the interpretation.

Particularly in the early years, the author has retraced original sources—not in the determination to produce a ' revisionist ' history of East German socialism. The purpose is simply to subject some of the generalisations about a confusing period in German and East German history to closer scrutiny. For example, important guidelines had indeed been thought out ' before the first Soviet soldier put his foot on German soil ' (p. xiv). Yet, as the author also rightly points out, although prepared for occupation, the *Gruppe Ulbricht* was not prepared for either the division of Germany or the construction of socialism. Indeed, it was the SPD not the KPD which in 1945 was pushing for a united working-class party and a socialist economy. Yet ultimately it was the Soviet Union and the majority of the KPD leadership which, with little effective resistance from Grotewohl in the Eastern zone, prevented the establishment of German socialism, insisting instead on the creation of a ' party of a new type ' modelled along Soviet not German lines.

In the process history was rewritten. Yet different strands of thought persisted. There were policy debates within the SED in the 1940s: should there be one Germany or two? Should Germany recognise the Oder-Neisse frontier with Poland? Differences of opinion on political and economic issues persisted into the 1950s and 1960s, calling into question elements of Ulbricht's political and economic strategy. The background to these policy differences, their impact on the SED, and their consequences for East German social and economic development are discussed, the relevant data and organisational changes being assembled in summary form throughout.

Foreign policy is one area where the author is less meticulous. The assumption that: ' Only once were there major differences between him [i.e. Ulbricht] and Moscow on German policy. That was in 1971 and on that occasion Moscow won hands down ' (p. 108) understates the complexity of Soviet-GDR relations. Ulbricht did not suddenly become a national communist ' late in life ' (p. 172). Over the years he had developed a unique and internally consistent concept of the GDR's place both in history and in European politics.

The transfer of power from Ulbricht to Honecker in 1971 might bear closer scrutiny also. Did the Soviet Union finally depose a recalcitrant Ulbricht—or was there also considerable domestic opposition to his handling of economic, as well as foreign policy? Presumably that answer is important to an understanding of GDR-Soviet relations under Honecker.

These points are important and the debate will no doubt continue. Yet, as an analysis of the GDR's domestic political and economic development, the book is invaluable. Its coherent framework and lucid exposition have brought considerable clarity to some very clouded issues. The final chapter, summarising the main developments of the Honecker period, brings the analysis right up to date.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth EDWINA MORETON

The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia. By David W. Paul. *New York: Columbia University Press for the East European Quarterly, Boulder, Col. 1979. 361 pp. (East European Monographs, No. XLVIII.) $23.10.*

THE Prague Spring of 1968 is still attracting the attention of historians and politico-sociologists. The present addition to the literature on the subject pursues two interconnected objectives. The first is indicated by the author, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington, as follows: ' Within every society

there are underlying forces working to resist, retard, or condition the process of change . . . These forces may be . . . tangible . . . but they may also be very intangible. It is on such intangible social forces that this study attempts to focus, specifically those deriving from Czechoslovakia's political culture ' (p. 1). His aim, then, is to identify forces which, inherent in Czechoslovak society as resultants of historical experiences, thwarted or deflected social changes which the ruling Communists wanted to impose—if such changes ran counter to the ' political culture ' of the Czech and Slovak nations. The inquiry starts with a brief sketch of present conditions in Czechoslovakia, turns then to former centuries to try to trace the origin of the main features of Czechoslovakia's national traditions (he finds ' reason, libertarianism, and humanism central to the Czech mentality ', and religion to the Slovak one) and examines the development of the Communist Party from a ' subculture ' to a ' ruling ' and eventually to a ' colonial elite '. The second part of the book consists of a discussion of the ' deeply rooted pluralism of society ', of the problem of the Czechs' and Slovaks' national identity (small nations, foreign domination), devotes a separate chapter to Slovak nationalism, and endeavours, under the title ' From Švejk to Dubček ', to apprehend the national character as it appears in ' the humour and pathos of political nonviolence '.

There is a wealth of factual information (with but a few minor errors, e.g. the date of the first Czechoslovak-Soviet pact of alliance is May 1935, not November 1934) and many helpful observations, yet as a whole, the book is somewhat disappointing. What is at fault obviously is its method. The author's second objective seems to have been to apply to ' socialist Czechoslovakia ' the ' political culture ' method (or model) hoping thereby to gain a deeper insight and, at the same time, contribute towards the refinement of the method itself. Neither of these expectations can be seen as fulfilled. The ' political culture ' approach, especially if applied to revolutionary—not only communist-caused—upheavals, can easily tempt to an overemphasis, and overestimation, of the change-resisting power of the ' intangible social forces ' (in itself a rather vague concept leaving ample latitude to the inquirer's predilections), and to upholding them as *legitimate* as against the *inorganic* irruptions of ' subcultures '. The words are italicised to indicate the question whether the ' political culture ' model, as used here, does not reveal a distant family likeness, *mutatis mutandis*, to Edmund Burke's organism idea and its numerous variations. Historical traditions, it is a truism, play certainly a very important part in the life of every community. But the method applied here prevented the author from grasping fully—and without bias—those ' intangible social forces ' as well as from making their role evident because he tried to impose a pattern, too simple, rigid, and mechanistic, on complex and elusive processes of social change. The author's wish ' of encouraging further study of political cultures, an enterprise that is in need of some systematic methodological groundwork . . .' (p. 282) is well-founded.

University of Sussex EDUARD GOLDSTÜCKER

Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945. By Stella Alexander. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979. 351 pp. £15·00.*

THE visitor to Yugoslavia may be confused by such questions as: ' Why do the Catholics tend to be more afraid of the authorities than the Orthodox?' ' How can nuns complain that they can do nothing because they are persecuted, while a priest who lives in the same house is snowed under with youth work?' Stella Alexander's book does not attempt to give simple answers to such questions; she stresses the complexity of the situation: ' Every generalisation about Yugoslavia is riddled with exceptions ' (p. 1). But she does point in the directions in which possible answers

could lie. She does not impose her own opinion, though those who read between the lines will find it.

'Those who are acquainted with the history of the Balkans . . . may find new facts in these pages, but few surprises; the events of the last thirty years spring directly out of the history of the country' (p. 1). This book is a study of the documentary evidence, much of it not available outside Yugoslavia, filled out and interpreted 'by numerous conversations with men and women who had lived through these events, Marxists and Partisans, Catholics and Orthodox, both inside and outside Yugoslavia; without their help this would indeed have been a dry chronicle' (p. xii). The result is a thrilling story; the reader may need to reread some paragraphs in order to retrieve the lost thread, but in general he will find it hard to put the book down.

The book begins with a background chapter on Yugoslavia during the War, including the history of the infamous Ustashi movement and its relationship with the Catholic church. It continues with sections on the struggle of the Catholic and Orthodox churches in the postwar years, including a chapter on the trial of Archbishop Stepinac; it describes the history of the controversial Priests' Associations in the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, and the tensions between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian dioceses. A chapter on the law reforms and their effect on the Church is followed by a description of the change in the situation of the Catholic church after the deaths of Stalin, Stepinac and Pius XII, and a section on the further history of the Orthodox Church, including the Macedonian and other schisms. The epilogue hints at recent trends, including changes too new to be documented. The appendices include further statistical and other material.

It is regrettable that the author was prevented from continuing her research to cover Islam as she had originally intended. Those who are concerned with the small Protestant churches would have appreciated the inclusion of a chapter about them. As it stands, the book is a unique study, which makes fascinating reading and provides invaluable information and insight to those who are seriously interested in Yugoslavia. Its real disadvantage is the price, which will put it beyond the financial reach of many who should read it. They would be well advised to order it from their libraries.

NICKY CRANE

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Christians in the Arab East: A Political Study. By R. B. Betts. *London: SPCK. 1979. 318 pp. £4·95.*

THIS is a revised edition of a book originally published in 1975. Dr Betts has produced a good survey of a complex situation, although he is not always convincing in his historical conclusions and political judgments. The work lacks the final note of authority which such surveys should ideally possess. This is not to deny, however, that the book contains a lot of useful information.

The position of the Christians of the Middle East has for long been delicate, not to say precarious. As with all minorities, the choice between emphasising their differences and exclusiveness and the natural desire to merge with the majority has been agonising. Most of them in this difficult situation have suffered some kind of persecution. Their fate has been considerably worsened by internal and sectarian squabbling and by the intervention of the West. A united stand could perhaps have improved their position but split into some thirteen sects by theological and national differences, they have presented a very weak front to their Muslim rulers. Some have struggled (and continue to struggle) to assert their identity—such as the Maronites in

Lebanon; others have chosen to swim with or in some cases lead Arab (largely Muslim) movements—for example the Orthodox Arabs; yet others, weak and defenceless have almost been annihilated—such as the Assyrians in Iraq. Christians have also been at the head of emigration away from the Middle East.

Dr Betts gives the subtitle ' A political study ' to his book which is a suitable description of the role the Christians have been forced into. Sheer survival has been a political effort, but it also describes the politicking within and between the various churches. Religious life has often taken second or third place to national, sectarian and personal rivalries. Understandably, therefore, little attention is paid in the book to the quality of Christian life in the Middle East or to the attitude towards the various ' reforming ' trends prevalent in the West. The book deals chiefly with the religious demography of the area, described by sect and by country, to the social structure of Christian communities, and to the role of Christians in ' religious ' and secular politics. This latter section is in fact often little more than a mention of any Christian who has held government office. Lebanon is, of course, another matter and Dr Betts's approach here is rather confusing. The 1975 edition of the book was obviously written before the civil war. Like most authors he then saw Lebanon as the ideal of sectarian co-operation and he appears somewhat reluctant to revise (or rewrite) his opinions in the light of recent happenings. His firm prediction that ' Christians in Lebanon will continue to govern their own affairs and destiny ' (p. 226) seems optimistic and begs the question what kind of Lebanon will be left for them to govern?

The historical introduction is not always convincing, notably his titling the period 633–1798 ' the dark millenium ', implying that only with Napoleon came light to the Middle East. Is the period after the French invasion which witnessed the massacres of Armenians and Assyrians brighter than the earlier years of Muslim-Christian co-operation in Spain and elsewhere? Less sweeping judgments can also be questioned. For example the tone of Ottoman-Christian relations is set by his sentence—the Ottomans ' contemptously termed the socially inferior Christians ' *rayah* or flock. But according to Gibb and Bowen in Ottoman usage *rayah* denoted settled free farmers and their families, both Muslim and *dhimmi*, in contrast to the men of the pen and of the sword. It was not necessarily a term of contempt, or if it was, not exclusively applied to Christians. There is a number of other dubious historical statements and rather glib political judgments.

Finally, one can sympathise with the author in trying to provide up-to-date statistics, having to use the 1960 census in Egypt, Syria 1960, Iraq 1957 and Lebanon 1932 and 1921! Very few useful statements can be made on the basis of such figures.

St Antony's College, Oxford DEREK HOPWOOD

Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective. By Shlomo Aronson. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1978. 448 pp. £14·25.*

THERE is a striking disproportion between the excessive length of this new book on the Middle East conflict and the paucity of the original material it contains. A second and related deficiency stems from the author's inability to develop a coherent analytical framework or to present any distinctive central thesis. This conspicuous absence of any clear focus leaves him free to roam over the entire history of the conflict during the last three decades in a most unsystematic and unscholarly manner. Any hope of discovering the basic purpose of the book is irrevocably shattered by the concluding chapter which consists of a series of largely disconnected and obscure generalisations expressed in the most convoluted and pretentious style. ' Historically ', we are told, ' it is an asymmetrical conflict in which cognitive-postulative leaders like Ben-Gurion

and Sadat act their limited roles in their coalitions, while manly-responsive bargainers, and emotional-postulative or ideological-legalistic leaders, like Nasser, Eshkol, Meir, Dayan and Begin play their roles in their own and in other camps ' (p. 352). The ' bargaining ' part of the book deals at length with Kissinger's diplomacy and here we are told that ' One can see this step-by-step approach as an expression of the structural-functionalist variant of positivist-evolutionary thinking on the future ' (p. 201). Anyone who can see this can see anything.

Although both the conflict and the bargaining involve the super-powers as well as the local parties the author decided, as he explains in the Preface, to refrain from offering an in-depth analysis of Arab and Soviet behaviour. The wisdom of this decision is fully vindicated by the quality of his subsequent reflections on Soviet and Arab behaviour and especially by his epilogue on Sadat's peace initiative. The bulk of the book is about Israeli behaviour in the conflict and America's role in the search for peace. In the discussion of Israel's foreign and defence policies the author rightly stresses the impact of domestic factors but, in the absence of any coherent framework, political analysis frequently degenerates into a miscellaneous and only very loosely related mass of details. His treatment of the images and perceptions which condition Israel's behaviour is not without interest but is by no means original. On American policy the author does not add significantly to what is already available in the more substantive and reliable works of Bernard Reich, William Quandt and Nadav Safran. By ploughing through this tome the dedicated area specialist will come across some new facts, occasional insights and some intriguing speculations on Israel's position in the nuclear field. The general reader will find it a frustrating and unrewarding experience.

University of Reading AVI SHLAIM

Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat. By Raymond William Baker. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1979. 290 pp. £11·20.*

THIS is probably the most convincing assessment yet made of the extent to which Egypt's regime since 1952 has changed the economic and social condition of her people. ' In later years ', Professor Baker notes, ' the regime realised that, strangely enough, the ease with which it had accomplished the revolution from a long-term perspective constituted a drawback ' (p. 27). Having prepared their coup in secrecy, the leaders found themselves in possession of absolute power without anything approaching a comprehensive programme of reform and without a political base. Their attempts to establish the latter were only moderately convincing and, while their objectives evolved in practice over a broad front, they did so in response to political imperatives as much as to fulfil any ideological concept. The agrarian reform which was their first major achievement was to a considerable extent motivated by the need to break the political power of the large landowners, and was in any case of relatively modest dimensions, resulting in a redistribution of 17 per cent of the cultivable land to about 8 per cent of the *fellahin*. Two of Mr Baker's chapters are of particular value in tracing the subsequent efforts of the regime to alleviate rural poverty by extending the agricultural co-operative movement and the provision of health care in the villages. They also throw light on the ways in which admirable reformist intentions have been undermined by Egypt's notorious bureaucracy, the numbers of which are said to have grown from about 250,000 in 1952 to over a million by the 1970s. This growth in turn had a positive as well as a negative aspect, being in part a response to the massive problem of unemployment and underemployment.

There have of course been success stories, most notably in the administration of the

Suez Canal from its nationalisation in 1956 to the ambitious enlargement programme which is now in process of fulfilment. It was obvious however from the birth of the Republic that, as Nasser said, ' there is no alternative for us but to become an industrial power in the shortest possible time ' (p. 45). This in turn demanded an inflow of foreign investment, which President Sadat has sought to attract both by his policy of economic liberalisation and by seeking to put an end to the Arab-Israel war or at least to extricate Egypt from its direct influence. So far his success has been limited, and he is far from solving the problem epitomised in the slogan of the workers and students demonstrating in Cairo in January 1977: ' Hero of the Crossing, where is our breakfast?' (p. 133).

Unusually in this field of study, Professor Baker uses language in a way which illuminates his thought; and his bibliography is exceptionally useful.

HAROLD BEELEY

The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1978. By Nikolaos van Dam. *London: Croom Helm. 1979. 147 pp. £7·95.*

A POPULAR paradigm for describing and explaining Middle East politics is that of ' primordial ' loyalties. The key assumption is that membership in a religious or ethnic community is predictive of political behaviour. Thus, Muslim against Christian in Lebanon, Shi'i against Sunni in Iraq. The van Dam study of Syrian politics is underpinned by this assumption although he expresses reservations about the paradigm. In the introduction he indicates that there is an overlap between economically deprived regions and minority group membership and that primordial solidarities are frequently based on both the ties of clientelism and factionalism. Despite these riders, the general thrust of the analysis is one in which a Hobbesian sectarianism has primacy.

Utilising secondary materials, newspapers, interviews and internal party documents he analyses conflict within the Ba'ath party and the Syrian officer corps as a struggle between Sunni, Druze and Alawi. He argues that from a historically determined subordinate position in Syrian society, the non-Sunni minorities, through their recruitment into party and army, achieved a dominant position in Syrian politics. Sectarianism followed its inevitable path and the Alawis subsequently purged the Druze. Syrian politics was stabilised only when an intra-Alawi factional struggle resulted in Hafiz al-Asad's faction, composed of relatives and clients, imposing its authority over other Alawi factions.

Although van Dam's study is carefully documented, the analysis is not that far from the reportage of Beirut newspapers and the gossip of Damascene political salons. It is a perspective that is unnecessarily narrow. The notion that ' people who are born into a specific religious community but have become areligious are nevertheless considered in this study as being members of that community ' (p. 20) leads to a rather conspiratorial *reductio ad absurdum.* Although the proof of Alawi dominance is their control of institutional positions, when non-Alawis are appointed to powerful positions van Dam writes that such appointments ' could very well have been made with the idea of placating the Sunnis and of dispelling the impression that the most important posts were exclusively held by Alawis ' (p. 88).

To the work's credit, it is a well documented use of the sectarian paradigm with valuable translations of internal party documents. Syrian politics is more complex and although van Dam does refer to the complexity what is required is a more rigorous study of the way in which sect and class, rural and urban, army and party, ideology and policy interact. After all, it was not only purged and plotting colonels who took up

residence in Beirut in the 1960s, but also a substantial sector of the intelligentsia and the propertied.

University of Manchester DAVID POXL

Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977. Edited by Howard R. Penniman. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1979. 333 pp. (AEI Studies, 203.) Pb: $6.75.*

The Government and Politics of Israel. By Don Peretz. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press; Folkestone: Dawson. 1979. 219 pp. £9·00.*

ISRAELI democratic practice emerges from its esoteric shell to become the subject of an ' At The Polls ' volume in the series directed by Dr Penniman for the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. The collection of eleven essays by well-qualified hands is a most useful account of the 1977 election which dislodged the exhausted labour alliance from power to make way for the populist coalition led by Menahem Begin.

The result of the election took politicians, pundits and political scientists by surprise. Even those few who had expected a Likud victory had not expected it to command a majority in the Knesset without leaning on groups uncongenial to it. While the Likud gained more than a third of the votes, Labour sank below a quarter owing to the defection of many of its sympathisers to the reform banner headed by Professor Yadin.

As is made clear in this volume, the big change was due to a gradual cumulation of factors undermining labour control, at least since the Yom Kippur war of 1973, rather than to any sudden swing in the election year. This compendium provides much of the material needed for an explanation and evaluation of the election, although it does not offer an integrated overview. Asher Arian's concluding essay, for example, interesting and enlightening in itself, betrays no indebtedness to the other contributions. These display a great variety of skills, opinions and methods of analysis, making up in readability what they lack in editorial uniformity.

Professor Arian, the dean of Israeli psephologists, analyses the changing electorate in a demographic light, and in his second essay which concludes the volume, he discusses possible interpretations of change. It will be interesting to see whether in his own forthcoming volume in the election series which he has edited for many years, he may offer a more satisfactory treatment of the role of ideology. The reader is left guessing by his remark, ' ideology was not an important explanation for the final results of the election ' (p. 301), followed cryptically by, ' the Likud's winning of power underscored the place of ideology in Israeli politics: both the medium and the message were cast in ideological terms ' (p. 302).

Avraham Brichta presents a precise formal survey of the issues of electoral reform, while Leon Boim gives much useful detail on the financing of the election. Benjamin Akzin for Likud and Myron Aronoff for Labour give authoritative accounts of the two major parties, while Efraim Torgovnik and Elyakim Rubinstein do the same for the Democratic Movement for Change and the various minor parties, respectively. A most interesting analysis of the media by Judith Elizur and Elihu Katz, of all the essays perhaps the one with the likeliest relevance for comparative study, pays particular attention to the impact of the media in setting the agenda of the election campaign. Bernard Reich devotes more space to the new government than to the election as such, explaining that foreign policy was not a significant issue in the campaign on account of the general consensus. He appears to regard this consensus as a primary autonomous factor, ignoring the extent to which government shapes it.

It is a trifle ironic that the treatments of the election which is the focus of study are altogether less weighty than the brilliant introductory essay in which Daniel J. Elazar

elucidates the Israeli political system as a whole. Elazar's synoptic 'Israel's Compound Polity' is a revealing economical statement about the nature of Israeli society conceived in ideal terms. Elazar's richly suggestive analysis is undoubtedly enhanced by his rare erudition in the Jewish heritage, which enables him to observe latent continuities with the ancient Jewish past. It is the more surprising that in fitting the Arab population into the model of 'ethnoreligious pluralism' he should ignore altogether the effects upon the 'compound polity' of Israel's sustained military control over more than a million Arabs whose aspirations lie in a different direction. It is difficult to see in the circumstances how Elazar can be so confident that there are no threats whatsoever to 'constitutional legitimacy or the republican form of government' (p. 32).

If Elazar has much to say for the specialist, Peretz fills a gap in which beginners have long been stranded. In introducing his book Professor Peretz indicates that it 'is intended as an introduction to the study of the country's political system for those who are not specialists. It should be useful in survey courses of Israel's politics and as supplementary reading for courses in Middle East government and politics' (p. ix). This is an accurate description of the work. Many in this country who are involved in first-year teaching may heartily wish for the introduction of survey courses of the American type into the British syllabus. Such courses, although they lack intellectual glamour, would at least reduce the generation gap.

Peretz is among the best expositors of the Middle East. In this book he does not disappoint, maintaining the sure touch and the fluency that will carry the reader painlessly through unknown territory. The book is full of judicious generalisations and felicitous thumbnail sketches of persons and institutions. It should whet the appetite of the student.

The book follows a standard American pattern in texts of this type: a brief historical introduction is followed by a lively outline and discussion of politics under the familiar rubrics; 'political culture'; parties and ideologies; and interest groups. Only then, in the last third of the book, are details offered about the actual workings of government and the pattern of policy and administration. I suspect that students in this country would have been happier to begin here, and will crave more detail on the mechanical and constitutional arrangements.

University of Sheffield NOAH LUCAS

Zionism and the Palestinians. By Simha Flapan. *London: Croom Helm; New York: Harper and Row. 1979. 361 pp. £11·95.*

THE eight chapters of this book are linked by a common theme. All are in varying degree critical of Jewish-settler policies and attitudes towards the Palestinian Arabs during the thirty years of British rule; in some of them the author, a former member of the bi-nationalist socialist movement *Hashomer Hatzair*, retrospectively argues in support of alternative strategies that might have averted or mitigated the irrepressible conflict. Much the most substantial and controversial studies are the first and last, 'Dr Weizmann and his Legacy' and 'The War of 1948'. As Mr Flapan sees it, the central Zionist error, for which Weizmann must carry the chief responsibility, was over-reliance on British support. This entailed the damaging subordination of what he describes as a non-colonialist, non-exploitative movement to the imperial interests of a non-Middle Eastern power; and, as a corollary, a regional 'Hashemite connection' that distracted attention from the primary task of finding a *modus vivendi* with Palestinian Arabs before any others. This neglect of the native inhabitants derived partly from Weizmann's own nineteenth-century colonialist prejudices; it facilitated the policy of economic segregation, and an assumption that the Palestinians would somehow be absorbed or looked after by the rest of the Arab world.

That there were other choices open to Weizmann and his followers is shown, the author argues, by the ' passionate debates ' about policy that took place within the Zionist leadership, which he illustrates from archival sources and memoirs. Broadly speaking, he holds that more attention devoted to the economic plight of the Palestinian peasantry, and the landless workers driven to seek casual labour in the towns, as well as a greater readiness to accept the risks of a legislative council before the achievement of a Jewish majority *might* (he never, I think, ventures beyond the subjunctive) have paved the way to a lasting accommodation. A third, ' mixed ' sector of the economy was an essential; complete economic integration would have produced ' classical colonialism ', whereas the all-but total separation that came about in the later 1930s merely strengthened Arab opposition to the National Home.

This book, by a convinced Zionist, is consistently thought-provoking, though the general trend of its arguments seems to me wholly unconvincing. To take a few points: how, given the background to the Balfour Declaration, could Weizmann have dissociated himself from the ' British connection ' without jeopardising the highly-placed ' Gentile Zionist ' support in London which, down to 1937-38, was so often of crucial importance to the cause? Was Zionism, before Weizmann's alleged distortion of its ethos, really a movement that eschewed great-power patronage and a colonial role? One may recall Herzl's words in *The Jewish State* (1896): ' We would there form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilisation as opposed to Barbarism.' Recent work by Neville Mandel and others has shown how developed and articulate a consciously Palestinian nationalism had become by 1914; can one suppose that after the Balfour Declaration this nationalism could have been nullified or contained by agrarian or economic developments? Even if one accepts the argument that Zionist settlement was *per se* essentially different from colonialism as exemplified (for instance) by the French in Algeria, surely the fact that after 1917 it was taking place as part of an arbitrarily imposed colonial regime that denied self-determination would have blinded nearly all Palestinians to the distinction? Would not the author's recommended policies for the mid-1930s have entailed a very drastic curtailment of immigration just when refugee pressure was mounting dramatically? It is hard to see how any *Yishuv* politician could have accepted this and survived.

The basic question must surely be this: did any responsible or representative Palestinian ever signify a clear acceptance of the National Home? The author can find three occasions when it looked as though it might happen: in 1921 (a group of Husseinis in an approach to Dr Eder, pp. 62-63); 1928 (when the eighth Palestinian Congress ' refrained from adopting any explicit resolution against the Mandate or the Balfour Declaration ', p. 68); and 1929 (the rather mysterious Magnes-Philby dealings, pp. 70-71). It seems far too insubstantial to serve as the basis for any ' alternative scenario '. All the same, this book contains a lot of useful and interesting material, and is well worth reading and thinking about.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis. By Bard O'Neill. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press for the National Defense University; Folkestone, Kent: Dawson. 1979. 320 pp. £11·00.*

BARD O'NEILL sets himself the arduous task of analysing the Palestinian Resistance's ' strategic accomplishments and assessing its future in light of past and present capabilities '. The book contains a brief historical introduction; a methodological section outlining the author's analytic framework; a review of events in and around Palestine mainly in the period 1967-72; and finally a short chapter on the possible future of the conflict. There are some useful appendices on Israeli and guerrilla casualties between 1967 and 1971.

In his dense but valuable typology of guerrilla warfare (its methods, scope, prerequisites and antidotes) the author sets up a number of hypotheses drawn from the universal experience of insurgency against which the Palestinians' performance is tested. The ' inescapable ' conclusion he reaches is that ' the (Palestinian) strategy of protracted armed struggle has been a near total failure and fedayeen activity rates poorly in terms of all major strategic factors ' (p. 212). Do the realities of the situation in the Middle East justify such an emphatic assertion? I think not.

Part of the problem lies in the author's conceptual scheme. In comparing and contrasting the Palestinian experience with that of Cuba, China, or Vietnam, O'Neill neglects the specificity, indeed uniqueness, of the Palestinian case. There have, of course, been major political and military failures, and the ability of the PLO to project its organisational infrastructure into Isreal proper has been limited. But by measuring success in terms of miles ' Liberated ' and other such strictly quantifiable strategic factors, the author is led to drastically misread the Palestinian mood on the West Bank for instance, and after looking at some limited and rather dubious second-hand evidence comes to the conclusion that the PLO's claim to represent the West Bankers is ' mere assertion ' (p. 216). Another problem is that the PLO's parallel struggle against its Arab environment is not integrated into the author's overall strategic design.

Mr O'Neill's strategic evaluation breaks down because the PLO's success springs not from its military efficacy but rather its ability to act as a catalyst. The effect of one Palestinian raid on the Israeli, Arab and international scene is out of all proportion to the actual military results obtained. The PLO's true strategic achievements have been its very durability, its safeguarding of Palestinian independent political will and its ability to thrust itself into the centre of the Arab-Israeli conflict as the necessary component for its resolution. A ' near total ' strategic failure would not have elicited the grudging recognition by Mr O'Neill himself, among many others, of this last fact.

Although the book was published in 1978, events after 1973 are only given cursory treatment. The guerrilla order of battle given dates from 1970. A rudimentary knowledge of Arabic or the usage of the *nom de guerre* by Palestinian leaders would have revealed that ' Abu ' is not ' Abu-Mahir's ' first name (p. 138). Similarly less reliance on Israeli or pro-Israeli sources (*New Middle East*, Harkabi, etc.) for a reading of Palestinian attitudes and positions would have been preferable. However Mr O'Neill's book remains one of the few serious attempts to study the Palestinian movement from a strategic viewpoint. There is room for more.

St Antony's College, Oxford A. S. KHALIDI

Palestine in the Arab Dilemma: By Walid W. Kazziha. *London: Croom Helm; New York: Barnes and Noble. 1979. 111 pp. £6·95.*

WHILE Palestine has generally occupied a central place in the rhetoric of Middle Eastern politics, the reality has sometimes been very different. Walid Kazziha seeks to explore this paradox in four essays which examine the relationship between the Palestinians and the Arab world since 1967.

The first, on the political and ideological impact of the Palestinian movement after the June war, is stimulating. It explores the impact of a new Palestinian radicalism on an Arab world which Kazziha sees as increasingly conservative, a tension which underpins the book. Friction was inherent from the start. To a world which still saw them as ' refugees ', Palestinians could only assert their nationality through vigorous, often brutal, actions. But the 1967 defeat also forced Arab regimes into a revaluation of their affairs, which led them increasingly towards politics of accommodation. A further complicating factor has been the PLO's extra-territorial nature, which has placed it in the resented position of ' overmighty subject ' in several of its host countries. These tensions are usefully analysed in the opening chapter.

The second recounts the Palestinian impact upon the Lebanese civil war. Kazziha identifies the origins of the crisis in an alliance of deprivation between the Palestinians and a growing Shi'i community which was crowding into the poorer quarters of Beirut, threatening the Maronite-Sunni compromise. He explains the seeming contradictions in the Syrian intervention, which far from automatically helping the Muslim-Palestinian side, led to a considerable reduction in the PLO's power and prestige. In keeping with Kazziha's thesis, Syrian action is seen as aimed at the frustration of any developments which would disturb the status quo and might question a hegemony they were intent on retaining.

The final chapters, on the peace process, are less satisfactory, partly because they were written before the Camp David ' Frameworks ' and subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. We miss an analysis of the PLO's reactions to these events and how they regard the maximalist Egyptian position in the current negotiations over the West Bank and Gaza from which they are excluded. Nonetheless, observations of value remain.

The New University of Ulster, Coleraine T. G. FRASER

Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development. By Fouad al-Farsy. *London: Stacey International. 1978. 220 pp. £9·50.*

THERE is a noticeable dearth of books and source material on a country which has become one of the most influential states not only in the Middle East but in determining the nature and the extent of the whole world's economic and financial stability and well-being. The energy crisis has catapulted Saudi Arabia into unparalleled prominence, and bestowed on it wealth and leverage for which the Saudis have not been prepared. Yet, observers of the Saudi scene remain baffled as they gain but an impression of how the kingdom is governed, politics conducted, and the economy managed. Saudi Arabia has stayed an enigma to the outside world; and because of that Saudi affairs are difficult to fathom and explain. It is often the case that the abstruse attracts adverse comment. In many ways the effect of this has been to increase Saudi caution to such a degree that the country appears to be living behind a purda.

Dr Fouad al-Farsy, a well-known Saudi columnist, and Assistant Deputy Minister of Information, has written a book which is obviously aimed at redressing the balance. His overt intention is to present Saudi Arabia as a developing polity, enjoying a thriving economy under a political system which has proved its resilience, and which has been completely overhauled and modernised in order to grapple with the problems of rapid economic transformation in a highly traditional society. In so doing, Dr Fouad al-Farsy is over-anxious to project the country into an image which it is difficult to accept and many assertions which he takes for granted lack adequate analysis and assessment.

The book offers a general introduction to Saudi Arabia in which every aspect is briefly covered. It presents descriptive accounts of many features of Saudi life from the rise of Islam to the role played by the Stanford Research Group, which acts as consultant to the Central Planning Organisation of the Planning Ministry. A great deal of space is devoted to charts showing the hierarchical structure of various government departments, but there is no indication of how effective an administration these provide. Quotations from the laws governing these institutions do not always mean that they have indeed performed the functions assigned to them.

The author could have told his reader much more about the alliance between the Saudi household and the Wahhabi movement, and of the manner by which the Saudis have consolidated their domain. His account is too brief for a most fascinating episode in the modern history of Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, Dr al-Farsy provides interesting

insight into the part played by ex-patriot and other migrant workers in the development of Saudi Arabia. Though acknowledging the inherent threat which such an influx could pose to the social fabric because of the different cultural background of these workers, he concludes that the risks are worth taking for the sake of the kingdom's future prosperity.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London ABBAS KELIDAR

AFRICA

The Trade Union Movement in Africa: Promise and Performance. By Wogu Ananaba. *London: Hurst. 1979. 248 pp. £9·00. Pb: £3·60.*

THIS book represents an attempt to do the almost impossible. A survey of trade union affairs in a large, fragmented and rapidly changing continent is a daunting enterprise whose chance of success would depend either on a very high level of abstraction allowing generalisations to be derived from some powerful analytic apparatus, or on the systematic representation of certain basic ' facts ', providing a kind of source book. Unfortunately this book falls firmly between these two stools.

What passes for analysis in this book has no discernible framework and certainly will not help anyone to a more profound understanding of the difficulties of African labour movements. The discussion is pervaded by a feeling expressed most succinctly by Omer Becu, ed-General Secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), in the Foreword when he writes that ' many of us have probably felt frustrated that, not withstanding good advice and assistance in many forms, we have not as yet reaped the so much expected fruits ' (p. xii). This frustration surfaces constantly in the author's discussion which consists essentially of a lengthy and repetitive listing of the well-known litany of problems which have confronted the attempt to build trade unions in Africa, interspersed with countless comments deploring their state of affairs and wishing it were otherwise. Unfortunately, when it comes to analysing why such similarity of experience should characterise such diverse situations the author offers little except a ' deep rootėd intolerance of opposition ' which is said to be ' a basic weakness of most African leaders ' (p. xii). There is little serious exploration of the possibility that the way in which trade unionists perceive the political context may substantially divide them with respect to their definition of trade union functions. Splits are generally discussed at the level of personalities, and even the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) split from the ICFTU does not appear to have any political roots. All is to be encompassed by increasing, largely unqualified, references to the need for strong and free trade unions and workers' solidarity.

Nor is there any historical or international perspective against which to measure these ' failures '. Industrial-country unions appear occasionally as ideal foils to highlight African weaknesses, but when the African unions are deplored for having organised less than 50 per cent of the trade union potential (p. 224) it will, therefore, not be obvious to the uninformed reader that such a level of unionisation must be the dream of American trade unions. Nor is there any indication of the author's awareness that certain economic difficulties have been associated with similar trade union problems in most parts of the world.

The factual basis of the book, which occupies the first section (pp. 9–140) is extremely uneven and unsystematic. The subject discussed, the time periods covered, the facts provided for each country are so diverse as to defy any possible summary. When one adds that the facts are not always correct (there are two rather significant

errors in the Tanzanian section, which I was in a position to assess) it is difficult to know what purpose these studies could serve. The very restricted sources of reference unfortunately disqualify them even from being used readily as ' ports of entry ' for a deeper study.

Not surprisingly Chapters 6 (more extensive Case Studies of Lesotho and Liberia) and 7 (Continental Trade Union of Organisations) will prove the most useful to most readers. The first because it presents some interesting material in sufficient detail to make it comprehensible; the second because it provides a quick sketch of a complex subject for the uninitiated. Even in this, however, the touching ICFTU bias of the author must be carefully borne in mind.

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex MANFRED BIENEFELD

The Growth of East African Exports and their Effect on Economic Development. By Leslie Stein. *London: Croom Helm. 1979. 272 pp. £11·95.*

PROFESSOR STEIN'S volume is a rather good summary survey of the structure and course of the economics of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania from 1960 to 1971. It describes the main features of their export patterns and sectors and underlines how unfortunate their opening export mix was because of the poor performance of coffee, tea, and, *a fortiori*, sisal during the decade.

The theoretical content is rather slight—the potted summaries on common-market and trade and development theory are good for an undergraduate text but make no breakthroughs. The discussion of the problems of measuring and correlating export instability is much more interesting. Beyond being a handy survey article, it brings out probable differences in the form and nature of relationships among countries and over periods of time.

The econometric analysis is interesting—albeit hardly very conclusive. It strongly suggests that public policy measures dampened the impact of export stability—totally in Kenya where it was smallest—on most components of gross domestic product (GDP) other than private consumption. Ironically—and perhaps a warning on what to make of other correlations—a highly ' significant ' relation emerged between above-trend exports and employment in both Uganda and Tanzania. Alas, it is negative and—as the author agrees—must be ' static ': not an analytical breakthrough.

It would be interesting to have 1972-79 data for Tanzania processed in the same way. Since 1966 Tanzania's constant price exports have been virtually static. However, GDP growth has not greatly declined; presumptively the 1964-71 relationships no longer held for this period. That, one fancies, is a stronger demonstration of the variation of forms and functions than the author anticipated or would welcome.

Professor Stein's claim (p. 253) ' nevertheless it is submitted that in spite of the limited time horizon, this study has contributed towards some understanding of the region's export sector and its significance for each economy ' is justified at least for 1960-71. A successor volume examining change and continuity in the 1970s would be a welcome addition.

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex REGINALD H. GREEN

Ivory Coast: the Challenge of Success. By Bastiaan A. den Tuinder. *Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 1978. 445 pp. £17·50. Pb: £5·50.*

Interdependence in Planning: Multilevel Programming Studies of the Ivory Coast. By Louis M. Goreux. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 1978. 413 pp. £15·75. Pb: £4·00.*

THE first of these publications is a World Bank country economic report by the Mission sent to the Ivory Coast in 1975. It appraises the economic performance of the country from its independence in 1960 and includes an econometric model making projections for 1976–85 to show the infeasibility of the official investment plans current in 1975. Dr Goreux's volume presents a system of mathematical models applied to the Ivorian economy over a planning period extending from 1975 to 1990. Seven sectors are modelled, and simplified representations of them become the components of a central model through which the effects on the sectors of alternative policies can be analysed. Although both books are the work of the World Bank's staff, neither refers to, or appears to have drawn on, the other.

While the planning volume is a highly specialised work and makes a narrow appeal, *The Challenge of Success* will interest anyone who is aware of the Ivorian ' economic miracle ' and the controversy surrounding it. Nobody disputes the rapidity of economic growth in the country (averaging over 7 per cent p.a. since 1960), but a school of neo-Marxist critics has represented this growth as unaccompanied by a development of indigenous resources such as will foster national autonomy, reduce economic inequalities and enable the growth to be indefinitely sustained.

The World Bank's Mission holds that the right policy choices were made at the time of independence. The decisions to exploit current comparative advantage, remain within the franc area and encourage inflow of foreign capital, enterprise and labour were better than their alternatives. And the value of continuity in these policies is emphasised. The Mission's report nevertheless dwells on certain ' upcoming constraints ' on Ivorian economic growth that have obvious affinity with the ' contradictions ' discerned in the neo-Marxist analysis.

Income differences are one such impediment, though it is not made clear *how* they threaten growth, and the body of the report suggests that the poorer sections of the population are making absolute gains and that income distribution is less unequal than in many other developing countries—not surprisingly since over half of the gross domestic product is contributed by commercial farming in which hundreds of thousands of households participate. A second postulated constraint is diminishing returns from export sales. This rests in part on an unexplained assumption (p. 190) that the commodity terms of trade will deteriorate after 1978; partly on the logging out of the more accessible areas of the forest; and partly on the government's policies of diversification which involve shifting resources towards export goods in which current comparative advantage is less than in coffee, cocoa and timber. The imminence of this constraint might have been (and, indeed, was) foreseen throughout the last fifteen years, but the diminution of returns is not yet evident. Third, is the reliance on foreign factors of production. About 30 per cent of Ivorian residents are of non-Ivorian origin; non-Africans predominate in the best-paid private employments; and capital in manufacturing, forestry and commerce is largely foreign-owned. The Mission recognises that remittances abroad of the earnings of foreign factors are not *ipso facto* a drain on the Ivorian economy but believes that ' the government needs to find a better way to mobilise more of its own (*sic*) resources and to integrate these resources more fully into the national economy ' (p. 7) and that the economy needs to be ' Ivorianized in the true sense of the word ' (p. 10), whatever that may be. These precepts seem to be based on an apprehension of social tensions arising from substantial foreign participation in the economy rather than on economic grounds. According to the Goreux models, the effects of departing from free-market options with respect to import of foreign factors and goods would be inimical to the economic welfare of Ivorians in the aggregate.

The fourth and most tangible constraint is a growing burden of external debt. This results not from private investment, which is made on equity terms, but from increasing recourse for the finance of public investment to foreign aid, the terms of which have stiffened as the Ivory Coast has prospered, and to foreign commercial credit. Foreign finance has been increasingly required because of government welfare provision made at arguably inappropriate standards, notably in education (the Ivory Coast is said to spend a larger proportion of its budget on education than any other country) and housing, and because of a proliferation of public enterprises apparently beyond both the power of the government to control and the World Bank's Mission to document. This particular contradiction has not figured in the neo-Marxist exegesis but it is one with which bourgeois economists are familiar, and not only in the Ivory Coast.

Inevitably, given their provenance, these books represent economic development as a kind of game played by governments, in which other actors in the economy are more or less willing pieces on the board, to be induced or deterred by farsighted policy decisions. Readers may question the realism of this approach to Ivorian economic affairs. But the World Bank has put us in debt for an abundance of quantitative economic information on the Ivory Coast, and *The Challenge of Success* will be a standard work on the country for some years to come.

University of Birmingham DOUGLAS RIMMER

Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability. By Theophilus Olatunde Odutola. *New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. 1978. 179pp. £10·25.*

THIS book is based on a doctoral dissertation submitted in 1973. Other than a very short postscript, where we learn that ' several events ' have since occurred in Nigeria, there is little sign of subsequent revision. This is the more unfortunate as publication coincides with the present moves to return power to civilian governments in Nigeria and Ghana.

Interest in the book is likely to focus on the comparison the writer makes between the performance of civilian and military governments in Nigeria in the ill-defined but important areas of political and economic development. This was the aim of the original research and Dr Odutala's central thesis is that, at the time it assumed power, only the military was capable ' of laying the basis of national integration and political stability in Nigeria ' (p. 144). A critical dimension of his argument is the contention that coercion is not only ' an indispensable prerequisite of any government ' but that it is particularly necessary in countries undergoing rapid modernisation and social differentiation. Like others before him, he is clearly impressed by the apparent ability of some military regimes, as in Brazil and Nigeria, to ' deliver the goods ' to help create conditions for the elusive goals of political stability and economic growth. He is even more impressed by the evidence that in Nigeria at least, under military rule, coercion ' does not automatically imply dictatorship, but may serve the purposes of democratising as well as industrialising a society ' (p. 157).

In successive chapters Dr Odutola shows how the military in Nigeria ' made highly significant constitutional and political breakthroughs '. In particular, the creation of new states in place of the old regimes, at the outset of the civil war, is rightly hailed as a major step towards achieving a reconciliation of the many and diverse peoples that constitute Nigeria. Again the emphasis by the military on the strengthening of the state, the centralisation of policy and fiscal powers tempered by a readiness to decentralise administration to the states, and, under General Gowon, a preference for

political bargaining rather than outright confrontation, have, in the author's view, led to the creation of new and viable political structures and administrative agencies.

Finally, in relation to economic development, the military has made an even ' greater breakthrough ', whether measured in terms of economic indices of growth, or in terms of structural changes such as a switch from consumer to heavy industries, or the concern with promoting ' a greater economic nationalism ' through measure of indigenisation. While critics of the Nigerian military have been quick to attribute the prosperity and relative stability of the postwar Gowon years to the country's booming oil revenues, Dr Odutola is at pains to indicate that, on the basis of the available data, the contribution of the military to economic development would have been visible and significant even in the absence of royalties from oil.

By means of the Nigerian case-study Dr Odutola seeks to refute the Nordlinger thesis that the military is ill-suited to govern, that in office it is unlikely to promote social or economic development but is usually to be relied on to advance its own corporate interests at the expense of other social groups. In the case of Nigeria the author reminds us that the parties of the first republic were scarcely less ' corporate ' than the military given their narrow political base.

If, indeed, the military has been as instrumental, as Dr Odutola contends, in promoting national integration, constitutional harmony and economic development in Nigeria—what are the prospects for civilian rule in that country, as in Ghana, later this year? Here the author is somewhat ambivalent. We are told that ' military organisational values are, in general, converging with those of the rest of the society ' (p. 153); that ' the institutions being built in the Nigerian case study are those that will outlast the military ' (p. 153). And that ' even if the civilian party system were to be reinstated soon, the situation that existed before 1966, whereby the military was alienated from society, cannot be repeated ' (p. 154). But we also learn that ' the prospects of a party system of government are fraught with dangers ' (p. 154). Dr Odutola concludes: ' our argument is not to show that the democratic multi party system cannot succeed in ruling, but that the task of building political and administrative instruments has not been as adequately performed by them as by the military in Nigeria ' (p. 155).

It is interesting to see a distinguished Nigerian sociologist such as Dr Odutola writing positively about the performance of the military in government—albeit with some qualifications. Interesting, too, is his contention that military governments ' are essentially suited for short periods, especially when civilian party systems break down '. As the Ghanaian experience suggests, ' it is quite possible to have a civilian-military-civilian-military typology in developing nations ' (p. 157). Are we to conclude that in Nigeria at least the main political impetus will continue to come from the military while civilian interludes should be seen as offering the military the opportunity to rediscover its military virtues and renew its leadership?

University of Warwick IAN CAMPBELL

Von Deutsch-Südwest zu Namibia: Wesen und Wandlungen des völkerrechtlichen Mandats. By Michael Silagi. Ebelsbach: Gremer for the Faculty of Law, University of Munich. *1977. 165 pp (Abhandlungen zur Rechtswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung, Vol. 29.) DM 42.00.*

MUCH has been written on the international mandate and South West Africa/Namibia, as shown in the very useful bibliography to this study. The author is a young German historian and jurist with two doctorates and publications in both fields. The present treatise requires both disciplines; first the complex historical developments must be disentangled before a determination of the legal status of Namibia can be made.

Silagi focuses on the origin of the League of Nations mandate of December 17, 1920, which confirmed South Africa's administration in the South West, which it had exercised as a belligerent occupant since the German surrender of July 9, 1915. On the basis of official documents and *travaux préparatoires* Silagi cogently develops his thesis that sovereignty had been conferred upon South Africa at Paris by the Council of Ten as early as January 1919, which step became fully effective with the entry into force of the Versailles Peace Treaty on January 10, 1920. The author argues that South Africa's right of administration in Namibia could never be deduced from the mandatory agreement by scrutinising the formal character and material contents of the *mandatum juris gentium*, which was a new instrument of international law. Moreover, the mandate is shown to have stipulated nothing but duties to be observed by South Africa in the administration of the territory. Therefore, the right of administration granted to South Africa almost two years before was a precondition to and not a consequence of the mandate, which, as a matter of course, left South Africa's sovereignty over South West Africa unaffected. Silagi's presentation thus forces the reader to rethink some of Quincy Wright's conclusions in his classic *Mandates under the League of Nations*.

In his final chapter Silagi offers a well documented case history on the International Court of Justice's reasoning concerning questions of judicial competence. The exposure of the intrinsic contradictions of the Court's affirmation of its own jurisdiction in its 1950 advisory opinion and then in the South West Africa cases of 1962 and 1966 conveys the impression that the Court adapts its reasoning to meet the politically expedient result. It is regrettable that the author restricted his examination to procedural questions without going into the merits of the ICJ decision.

This book should cause argument and controversy. An English translation would be welcome. Here the author provides a short but useful English summary as well as an index.

University of Göttingen ALFRED M. DE ZAYAS

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbours and the Great Powers. Edited by Lawrence Ziring. *New York, London: Praeger. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 238 pp. £13·50.*

THIS collection of essays, containing much well-informed comment and intelligent speculation, is the work of four American scholars and an American diplomat, and two Indians teaching in the United States. Its focal point is the growing importance of India in south Asia. The Carter administration, it is pointed out, has placed more stress on relations with Delhi; and scholarly interest is likewise turning away from Pakistan, so long an American obsession, towards India. The editor, well known in this field (who contributes an introductory and two other chapters) is very conscious of the swing. One of his studies is of Pakistan, but is concerned with its weaknesses and internal divisions, especially the problem of nationalities. ' If Pakistan is to be saved from itself ', he concludes, ' Pakistanis throughout the country will have to adjust their perceptions and behavior ' (p. 111).

L. H. Rose, in an instructive survey of India's frontiers and policies in the Himalayan borderlands in particular, doubts whether the ' decision-making elite ' would see a disintegration of Pakistan as being to India's advantage (p. 65). He sees since the mid-1960s ' a solidification of India's position as the dominant power in South Asia ' (p. 85). Baljit Singh, too, thinks of India as aiming at great-power status.

If so, it may appear a pointless ambition, though no sillier than British hankering for ' a seat at the high table '. Stronger means of self-defence, it must be allowed, were a need forced on India; today it may be asked whether they are being pushed too far. Onkar Marwah, formerly a civil servant in India, draws an impressive, even in a way frightening, picture of the build-up of military potential. Since the war with China at least back-room planners have been steadily at work to mobilise resources and achieve self-sufficiency. By 1977 India had the world's third biggest standing army, and the Third World's biggest arms industry—which now has second place in the whole industrial economy. It has apparently been decided to enter the export market for armaments on a grand scale. This, above all, must seem a sad falling away from the preachings of Gandhi and Nehru; virtuous idealism it would seem is only for the weak.

It cannot be pretended that the West has set India a virtuous example, a point which comes out luridly in Ziring's study of two other relevant countries. There was no secret about ' the Shah's desire to resurrect the Persian empire ' (p. 161), yet the United States had no scruple about assisting him with arms and training for his huge, fortunately useless, military machine. On the contrary, ' the indefinite stationing on Iranian soil of highly skilled American technicians' betokened a ' deepening commitment ' (p. 147). The Shah's fall has done the United States good by rescuing it from this dangerous intimacy. But in Saudi Arabia in 1977 about half of the thirty-thousand Americans were army trainers or technicians. Ziring seems to put the blame on ' anarchical forces of nationalism ', and pities the super-powers for being ' swept along and back and forth by the tides of national self-indulgence ' (p. 160). This is loose thinking, and throws a veil over the motives of both Western arms-dealers and Eastern autocrats. By comparison the Soviet Union seems to emerge from R. H. Donaldson's minute analysis of its naval activity in the Indian Ocean as pursuing fairly limited aims, to which Washington should not over-react.

University of Edinburgh V. G. KIERNAN

India's Political Economy 1947–1977: The Gradual Revolution. By Francine R. Frankel. *Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979. 600 pp. £21·90. £7·90.*

THIS book describes how the central Congress leaders sought, within the framework of representative politics, to ensure that economic growth brought with it a transformation of the conditions of the rural poor. Professor Frankel argues that Nehru, as Prime Minister and Chairman of the Planning Commission, aimed to do this by ensuring that the underprivileged groups in Indian society were sufficiently organised, in such institutions as village councils and co-operatives, to exert pressure for reform from below. He was also concerned that this revolution should be gradual and non-violent and that the Congress Party should work to integrate all groups in Indian society within a political consensus. He failed, in Professor Frankel's view, because the ' dominant landed castes ' had sufficient local power to act as ' intermediaries in relationships between the village and outside authorities in both the administration and the ruling party ' (p. 201).

Nehru's strategy was embodied in the first three Five-Year Plans; but a change of policy occurred after his death in May 1964. Lal Bahadur Shastri reduced the influence of the Planning Commission and his government embarked on a new agricultural strategy of concentrating resources in irrigated regions, a policy which was continued by Mrs Gandhi. However, this was not accompanied by the expected substantial gains in food crops, other than wheat, and caused little improvement in the conditions of the rural poor.

By 1969 Mrs Gandhi, who was in conflict with the older Congress leaders (the so-called Syndicate), had accepted an alliance with radical groups in the party. When this conflict led to a party split, she claimed that she was defending the poor against

reactionary interests and went on to win the 1971 Lok Sabha elections with the slogan of *garibi hatao* (get rid of poverty). Although her new government returned to the policies of the Nehru period it was unable, even during the emergency regime (1975-77), to use its considerable power to bring about radical changes at the village level, and the newly formed Janata Party was able to win the unexpected Lok Sabha elections of 1977 with the promise of ' both bread and freedom '. Professor Frankel explains the failure of radical agrarian reform largely in terms of the resistance to it of the ' dominant landed castes ', whose interests were represented by the Chief Ministers and Congress leaders at the state level. She argues that Congress, by organising the poor at the local level, could have used their superior numbers to support a national leadership in carrying through radical economic changes, especially in the land system. However, such a claim takes insufficient account of the political importance of the middle layer of cultivating castes (such as Jats, Ahirs, Kurmis, and Yadavs in Uttar Pradesh) who are numerous, have a tangible stake in the system of individual peasant proprietorship and could be expected to resist demands from lower castes for radical land reforms, increased agricultural wages, and further positive discrimination in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes.

At times the narrative would benefit from a fuller treatment of policies initiated by individual Cabinet ministers (particularly those of Finance, Industries and Commerce, and Food and Agriculture) in the period before 1956. To give one example, the return to state-trading in foodgrains after 1956 is discussed without reference to the preceding period of controls (1948-54) and to the important role of Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, as Minister for Food and Agriculture from 1952 to 1954, in effecting the return to free-market conditions.

These, however, are minor criticisms of a book which is a considerable achievement and adds much to our knowledge of recent Indian politics.

University of Sussex B. D. GRAHAM

Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese 1947-1976. By Janice Jiggins. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979. 189 pp. £9·50.*

IN recent years, students of politics in the new states of Asia and Africa have tended to turn away from conventional topics such as constitutions, parties and structures of government. As coups, revolts and disintegration have overtaken regimes and constitutions, political analysts have grown increasingly interested in the social and economic forces which influence and sometimes destroy political structures. This shift in interest has come rather late to Sri Lanka, partly because variants of the Westminster model have been so resilient there.

Dr Jiggins's book is a major step in this new direction. She provides an introduction to the society and politics of Sri Lanka, a description of caste among the Sinhalese majority, a case study of one province and a discussion of caste and politics at the national level. This is followed by a chapter on the family in politics and another on the insurgency of 1971 which, to a limited extent, deals with the role of caste.

The author has managed to uncover a great deal of information on topics about which Sinhalese are often loath to speak. After much effort, she has pieced together a valuable informal census showing the approximate size and location of various caste groupings. The strength of the book is its wealth of detail and its many interesting and vivid examples of the role of caste and family in politics.

Unfortunately, weaknesses also flow from these same details and examples. The author tends to provide examples where explanations are required (e.g., pp. 96-111 and 120). The examples are often fascinating, but they seldom provide explicit, exhaustive answers to questions which emerge from the material. The wealth of detail sometimes obscures general conclusions. For example, we get no clear overall

judgment on whether (and if so, how and at what level) caste is becoming less important and politics more 'modern' as some writers have suggested.

Finally, difficulties arise in the analysis and definition of caste. No reference is made to the seminal work of Patrick Peebles on the structure of the Sinhalese caste system(s). 'Caste' refers to large categories (*Goyigama, Karava,* etc.) without adequate discussion of internal divisions within them. The literature on caste in South Asia (and on 'tribes' in Africa) indicates that smaller units of social organisation (families, clans, religious sub-divisions, endogamous and other sub-castes) are often more real to people as units of social interaction and political organisation than are larger 'caste' categories. But as large political arenas develop, the larger 'caste' categories—which are in some ways new aggregations of people—often acquire more meaning and substance over time. The author may well be justified in her pre-occupation with the larger categories, but her pre-occupation requires substantiation and her categories require internal analysis.

Despite this, some of which arises from the need to compress an important longer study, this volume is to be welcomed. It will help to enliven the study of politics in Sri Lanka which had gone rather stale.

University of Leicester JAMES MANOR

Rural Employment and Manpower Problems in China. By Curtis Ullerich. *White Plains, NY, London: Sharpe, Dawson for the Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg. 1979. 130 pp. £6·50.*

THIS stimulating study provides a review of one particular aspect of China's overall development policy: the mobilisation of rural labour. The importance of the policies pursued, both for the provision of employment and security and for capital formation and expansion of production, is clearly shown. The book demonstrates how the mobilisation of rural labour has contributed to the remarkable achievements of China in raising mass material welfare in a country where man/cultivable-land ratio was already high in the 1940s, and which was at the same time poor in terms of both financial and real capital. Many of the basic elements of China's rural-labour mobilisation policies since 1949 are already known from the work of Sigurdson, Riskin and others. However, this study both elaborates upon the basic principles underlying China's rural labour mobilisation policies and provides a substantial amount of data, much of it not previously readily available, to illustrate how these principles have operated in practice.

Ullerich does not attempt any international comparisons in the study but the manner in which the data are presented and analysed should encourage such comparisons at various levels. First, this study prompts the question whether policy-makers and analysts in other underdeveloped countries (UDCs) view the role(s) of labour in the development process in the same way as the Chinese have done. If not, would a changed perception of the potential roles of under-utilised labour in development be sufficient to generate policy design and implementation in other UDCs along more productive, as well as more egalitarian lines? If, as seems likely, the answer to this question is also negative then what would be the nature and extent of the wider changes in policy and, indeed, what political philosophy would be necessary before a changed perception of the role(s) of labour in development could be effectively incorporated into policy design and implementation in other countries. What, one wonders, were the similarities and difference between Kenya and China which led Kenya to generate a remarkably dynamic rural self-help movement much of which focused upon labour mobilisation for the construction of socio-economic infrastructure by labour intensive methods but which has benefited predominantly the better-off? Again, why has Tanzania been much less successful in rural-labour mobilisation than

a superficial comparison of the ruling party's political philosophy with that of China might lead one to expect. To answer such questions, further analysis and research is necessary. What Ullerich has done is to prepare the ground by presenting a concise but thorough basis for comparing other labour-mobilisation policies with those of China. Finally, another major area of comparison prompted by the study is that of the concrete forms which labour use has taken in rural China: i.e., the production techniques in which it has been employed and the products which it has produced and is producing, the pattern of temporal change that has emerged in these respects, and the reasons for these changes. Other underdeveloped economies may be able to learn from the Chinese experience in the development and use of relative, labour-intensive techniques.

In conclusion, at each of these levels this is a study that provides food for thought not only for professional 'China Watchers' but for development analysis and/or policy-makers in general.

University of Sussex DIANA HUNT

P'yongyang Between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958–1975. By Chin O. Chung. *University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press. 1978. 230 pp. £10·50.*

THIS book describes and analyses the policies pursued by the Communist government of North Korea towards Moscow and Peking during the years 1958 to 1975. In so doing it throws new light on certain aspects of the Sino-Soviet conflict itself and also on the internal power struggles within the North Korean regime. At a fundamental level it shows how a relatively small power, to some extent under pressure from the two large powers, is able to exploit differences which arise between the large powers: this, even when all three participants in the struggle claim to be the true heirs of Marx and Lenin.

The book as a whole uses exhaustive material, both written and oral, drawn from North and South Korea, China and Japan. It is lucidly written and, more important, is a substantial work of historical and political analysis in a field which tends to be dominated by partisan, political propaganda.

Of particular interest is the opening historical chapter which both integrates the Korean War and its impact into the overall complex jigsaw and at the same time helps to illuminate the seeds from which the Sino-Soviet conflict sprang. Not least it demonstrates how 'The Beloved and Respected Marshal, Comrade Kim Il-Sung', was able to defeat his rivals in the Communist Party of North Korea and to achieve a position which today makes both the cult of Stalin and the deification of Mao a decade ago look like savage criticism.

From 1958 onwards the author traces the competition for influence in Pyongyang between Moscow and Peking and the various steps and stages at which Pyongyang either had to yield or was able to take substantial advantage of the great power rivalry. There is a meticulous chronicling of the exchange of messages and delegations, of trade agreements, economic aid and the supply of military hardware.

Not the least merit of this book is that it helps to clear the mind and focus attention when attempting to assess the Far Eastern perspective for the 1980s. The Korean peninsular remains a potential flash-point and danger to world peace. South Korea, whose economic achievements have by their sheer scale forced international recognition, continues to be subjected to much ill-informed and prejudical criticism from those who are, whether in ivory towers or elsewhere, comfortably ignorant of what lies north of the thirty-ninth parallel. Is it too much to hope that somewhere among the staff and outside advisers and consultants of both the State Department and

the Foreign Office there will be a few people who will make time to read this important book?

University of Sheffield K. W. WATKINS

China: The People's Republic, 1949–1976. By Jean Chesneaux. *Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press. 1979. 255 pp. £12·50. Pb: £5·50.*

THIS is the third and final volume of the series of three covering the history of modern China from c. 1840. The first two have already become established texts for introductory courses on modern Chinese history. This volume is the work of a team, directed by Professor Chesneaux (Dubois, Le Barbier, Olivier, Peemans and Wang), which was originally published in France as *La Chine: Un Nouveau Communisme 1949–1976.*

The format follows that of the two earlier volumes presenting the history in digestible slices with just the right amount of detail to enable the general reader and the serious student to follow the story with enjoyment. Each chapter is devoted to one of the main stages of development since 1949 and is supported with brief extracts from primary sources and suggestions for further reading in texts in French and English. Romanisation of Chinese terms, names and places is in *pinyin*, as in the earlier two volumes, and this gives the series an advantage over earlier published established texts. There is a useful glossary of Chinese terms and names in both characters and *pinyin*, together with five useful maps. The translation from the French text has created a few obscurities and there is an odd mixture of quaint English (e.g. ' the countrysides ') and some American colloquialisms.

The selection and analysis of the evidence follow the favoured French stress of ideas as the moving forces at both the intellectual and popular levels. The drama of the history centres on the conflict between supporters of the revisionist and revolutionary lines of development which are seen ' not simply as schools of thought ' but as ' manifestations of class struggle '. Although the work covers the death of Mao and the fall of the Gang of Four in the autumn of 1976, and is acknowledged to be history written with the benefit of hindsight, later evidence indicates that the generally favourable treatment of the supporters of the revolutionary line needs substantial qualification. The statement that economic production was not damaged during the Cultural Revolution does not accord with subsequently published evidence. Concentration on the conflict between the two lines tends to conceal the enormity of the problems which have still to be faced in ensuring adequate agricultural and industrial production for the exploded population. The historical presentation also stops short of the major problems of Chinese international relations.

Within its own terms however this is a most enjoyable volume to read.

University of Leicester M. HOOKHAM

Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. Ezra F. Vogel. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 1979. 256 pp. $12.50.*

EZRA VOGEL has written a book in praise of the Japanese—not a panegyric to their economic achievements, but a thoughtful look at the institutions that have fostered this economic efficiency and cultivated a commitment to national goals. There is much in the institutional inner workings of Japan—its companies, bureaucracies, schools—that has bred success, and much that could contribute to the success of America and other Western countries, if we could see through the web of false rationales (Japan Inc., cheap labour, no defense budget) and past the chauvinistic certainty that little can be learned from this far-off and far-different country in the Far East. This is the lesson Vogel sets out to teach us. He has a concern—for the decline of the United States; a

brief—to explain Japanese success; and a purpose—to encourage the Americans to learn from the Japanese. On top of that he has the experience of two decades' research on the sociology of Japan and the chairmanship of the Council on East Asian Studies at Harvard, to back him up. Institution-grafting across cultures is somewhat out of fashion these days, and Japanese practices, may seem about as unacceptable in America as European ones in Africa, but a core of shared values about the merits of the market economy and the need for a vital free-enterprise system link the United States and Japan. If Vogel's book is somewhat less applicable to European concerns this is partly the reason.

In spite of the prescriptive intent of this work, the diagnostic exercise is more interesting. Japan's institutions have served it well in the past: they have also pioneered in coping with post-industrial problems such as scarce resources, urban congestion, and trade policies, problems that are still new to the United States. Vogel selects a set of six of these institutions—the state, politics, the large company, education, the welfare system, and crime control—and looks for the mechanism that makes them work, for the spirit that dominates them. The state he describes as a blend of meritocratic guidance and private initiative. A bureaucratic elite—rigorously trained, competitively disciplined, in the French mold, unchallenged by the vicissitudes in government leadership and freed from subservience to political appointees—acts as a seasoned and sound guidance system. ' The bureaucrat conceives visions, but whenever possible, passes the implementation to the private sector '. That, he explains, is how MITI, (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) works. Like the ' Kyoiku mama ' (the over-anxious mother who prods her children to study) MITI pushes her companies. By encouraging sibling rivalry the aim is, not to reduce competition, but to create the strongest possible companies with the greatest competitive potential.

In another discerning aside he compares the MITI to the National Football League—which establishes rules about the size of the team, recruitment and rules of play, in order to come up with a set of equally matched teams of great competitive abilities. MITI, emerges from his analysis, not as the juggernaut of Japan Inc., but as a rational way of organising the common concerns of Japanese business and society. It is of course, the conjunction of an almost unchallenged national priority (economic growth) and a fortuitous national characteristic (the dedication to consensus in problem solving) that oils the machinery of these institutions.

Some of Vogel's best insights are on the subject of what is loosely called in the West ' consensus building '—a facile phrase, with which he dispenses in favour of his own more literal translation—' root binding ', a gardening term that describes the careful untangling and binding of the roots of a tree before it is moved. All parties to a policy talk and take time to adjust to change so that all, even the disadvantaged, have time to have their ' roots bound ' before the move. In contrast with the Carter energy policy which, however thoughtful and well argued, went unimplemented, the Japanese bureaucracy consulted closely with everyone from the oil companies to private citizens before the conservation programmes were put out. The result—Japan basically has kept petroleum imports constant while maintaining economic growth.

In politics, groups are able to aggregate interests to a higher level, that is, to see sectarian interests in the broader- and longer-term context. This stems partly from the Japanese commitment to communitarian values (which Vogel says echo New England village traditions), and from the determined and imaginative efforts to maintain that cohesion. This wouldn't work for long though if it were not coupled with a commitment to equity. In politics the emphasis is on ' fair share ', rather than ' fair play '. Unlike the American system where the winner expects all the spoils (e.g. the Presidential primary race) in Japan, even before the game is ended they'll look for a way to expand the pie, or try to cut it more ways. Elections to the lower house of the

Diet are designed so that each district selects three to five members, ensuring that some opposition factions are bound to get a chance. One result—most bills pass the parliament unanimously. In industrial relations broad levels of agreement about equitable share mean fewer strikes because special interest groups know they're not likely to receive more than their fair share no matter what—an easier proposition to accept all round when income-distribution statistics suggest that the Japanese gap between the highest and the lowest quintile is the smallest in the world.

Vogel offers the Japanese model to Americans, but not without a few words of warning. Every Japanese success brings to mind its failures—in housing, women and racialism—and every Japanese virtue has a vice on its reverse side. Deference to experienced leadership can thwart creative impulses; the aggregation of interests often ignores the small and the voiceless; individuality loses itself in the community. These are the enduring questions of political philosophy, Japan has found one set of answers—can they continue to work for her, under the certain strains of curtailed economic growth in the coming decade and, moreover, can they or should they work for the United States?

Vogel's book is thoughtful and thought-provoking for those who are interested in taking Japan out of the shadows of suspicion and in taking the discussion of American-Japanese relations out of the conflict-ridden trade arena. By raising that discussion to a level devoid of national antagonisms, this book contributes to a constructive analysis, for Japinologists, sociologists and students of international relations, of why the Japanese do so well what America once did and would like once again, to do better.

Chatham House MAUREEN WHITE

Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. By William Shawcross. *London: Deutsch. 1979. 467 pp. £6·95.*

Cambodge: La Massue de l'Angkar. By Boun Sokha. *Paris: Atelier Marcel Julian. 1979. 256 pp.*

IN the first place, *Sideshow* deserves to be considered and remembered as a pioneering, substantial work of research on the Nixonian Executive in time of war, notwithstanding inevitable overlap with some other ' Watergate ' literature. Secondly, it is a study of the rise and fall of America's client, the Khmer Republic (1970–75), written from afar but with great sensitivity to its moral and institutional decline and the roles and varied attitudes of a succession of American officials posted there. The skilful integration of the Washington and Phnom Penh dimensions will help clarify to a wider public the political dynamics of detente, Nixon Doctrine and the ' decent interval ' principle, together with their impact on a country whose leaders learned only dimly and belatedly to understand the name of the game. Simultaneously, a pithy, colloquial prose and range of journalistic artifice propel the story towards a conclusion in which some distinguished readers (to judge from publisher's publicity) have already found a compelling logic. This is that Nixon and Kissinger, by first destroying Cambodian neutrality and then refusing, after 4½ years of destructive and counterproductive bombing, to restore the status quo ante, must bear the historical responsibility for the victory of the world's most radical communist movement. However, the ' Destruction ' of the title seems to refer to the bombing itself, not the communist genocide, and the careful reader will find that Shawcross is not as simple-minded as to argue crudely that ' Nixon caused Pol Pot '.

In relation to Kissinger, Shawcross is a writer who prefers to be wise before, not after, the event. Why sneer about Kissinger's ' cold war ' attitudes in the late 1950s if not to cast some kind of shadow over his ' sincerity ' or lucidity about detente? Why ridicule Kissinger's belief that the Western democracies are poorly equipped to meet the totalitarian challenge, if not to prepare the emotional ground for the condemnation

(not praise, of course) of secret decision-making which follows? But if Kissinger can be categorised so smugly and all his ' sins ' foreseen in the light of his earlier intellectual development, Shawcross's reactions are no less predictable, for he positions himself self-consciously on the side of American investigative journalism against those who were ' bought over ' by Kissinger's charms and the illusion of ' access '. The Briton, Shawcross, will no doubt enjoy a certain immunity as critic of the abuses of American Executive power by two men of ' flawed morality ', since he is at pains to point out that he is not criticising American democracy, and never hints at the complicity of the American people in the manipulation of the Cambodian front to save American lives and honour in Vietnam. Yet they returned Nixon to office with massive support in 1972.

Prince Sihanouk also gets off lightly. If Kissinger can be attacked for ' opening the door ' to Cambodian Communism, did not Sihanouk hold that door wide open by joining the Communist side and supporting it to the bitter end? The logic behind such selective criticism is, of course, that it was the Americans, not the North Vietnamese, who first violated Cambodian neutrality; or at least that North Vietnamese violations were morally neutral, being ' a fact of both geography and revolutionary warfare ' (p. 165); or alternatively that the Vietnamese penetration beyond the immediate border area was forced on them by the bombing of the sanctuaries. But how does this explain or justify the taxation of Cambodian citizens and the printing of counterfeit currency? The book lvaves several such questions unasked, let alone answered.

Boun Sokha's is the sixth work on the revolution to appear in France, by my reckoning, and the first by a Cambodian. It is the autobiographical account of a student formerly involved in United Front activities in Phnom Penh, who escaped to Thailand with his sister early in 1978 after two and a half years of collective labour and an oddysey across Cambodia. I can only urge other readers to test for themselves whether *La Massue* does not have qualities of a work of literature. It is my impression that it does. Comparisons with *Dr Zhivago* spring constantly to mind. But by the same token it is not precisely a documentary work, and the use of didactic dialogues for recounting the history of Front and Party seems stilted. The book offers no basis for a definitive moral judgment—unlike *Sideshow*—and does not hesitate to blame Cambodians for their present predicament, where blame is due. Some will attribute this to the author's naïveté but others may see it as a sign of depth and dignity. There are significant personal insights: as, for instance, the importance of executions by clubbing as a form of revolutionary socialisation for the executioners. The history of the Party is detailed and contains so many elements previously unknown or seemingly improbable (such as the moderation of Pol Pot relative to Khieu Samphan) that I wondered how far Thai intelligence officers may have had a hand in the author's briefing as well as debriefing. At all events, a remarkable *récit* which M. Charles Meyer has performed a service in bringing to our attention.

University of Kent ROGER KERSHAW

The Truth of the Matter. Gough Whitlam. *Harmondsworth: Penguin; Ringwood, Victoria: Allen Lane. 1979. 191 pp. Pb: £1·25. A$3·50.*

Matters for Judgment: An Autobiography. By John Kerr. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 468 pp. £8·95.*

Stability and Change in Australian Politics. By Don Aitkin. *Canberra: Australian National University Press. 1977. 301 pp. Pb: A$9.50.*

NO two Australians will ever quite agree on the rights and wrongs of Sir John Kerr's action as Governor-General in dismissing Gough Whitlam from the premiership in November 1975. The events of 1974–75 provoke intense differences of opinion on

whether what was technically legal was also legitimate. The two principal protagonists have now given their versions of what happened. Sir John Kerr's autobiography was serialised in Australian newspapers in November 1978, an event which determined Gough Whitlam 'to set the record straight'. Both accounts appeared fairly soon after the publication in 1977 of Don Aitkin's masterly survey of Australian political behaviour, dedicated to David Butler and Donald Stokes whose *Political Change in Britain* to a large extent provided the model. Kerr and Whitlam write to justify their actions; Aitkin to apply the techniques of social-survey analysis which he first began to consider in detail while at Oxford and Ann Arbor in 1964–65.

This coincidence of 'participant' and 'behaviouralist' literature has the value of lending support to Aitkin's major thesis that a steady agenda, continuity in politicians, and a simple and basic cleavage in society—the haves and the have-nots—all made for stability in Australian politics. Disputes between 'the professionals ' in Canberra did not threaten political order. In spite of the violent demonstrations against the Governor-General by Labour Party supporters, the verdict of the polls was respected. The main reason why the intensity of feelings in 1975 did not overthrow the system of politics was the range of opportunity presented at the state and local levels in a federal system for both Labor and the anti-Labor combinations to exercise power. The federal government in Canberra has grown enormously in expenditure, staff, and functions since the party system took its present form, but in spite of Liberal Party habits of control at this level, it is still vulnerable to another period of Labor administration.

Gough Whitlam's account of his stewardship as the first Labor Prime Minister, after twenty-three years of the party in opposition, finishes with an appeal that Australia should adopt a republican constitution 'to exclude forever the exercise of reserved or inherited powers in a manner contrary to the will of the elected government' (Whitlam, p. 181). At the heart of his case in the future position of the Senate. A striking difference between Kerr and Whitlam in their surveys of the same events is the latter's emphasis on the behaviour of the Liberal Party senators. Kerr's book barely mentions Senator Reginald Withers whom Whitlam cites as the organiser of a campaign to bring the Labor government down. The Senate's determination to withhold supply—one of the major differences in interpreting 1975 is about what the Senate in fact determined—led constitutional lawyers to make comparisons between Australia in that year and Britain in 1910. Lord Hailsham's preface to Kerr's book reinforces this analogy. Both Hailsham and Senator Eugene Forsey of Canada who contributes an epilogue believe that Kerr had no option but to act as he did. Kerr's side of the story is that the Senate had a constitutional right to refuse or defer supply; Whitlam's side is that it behaved illegitimately, even if it was within the law of the Constitution. Whitlam believes that only a fundamental switch to republican forms of government within the Commonwealth will make it possible to restrict action of future Senates, but he wants a republic without an executive Head of State. It is almost as if the best reform for the benefit of the Labor Party would be turning what is exceptional—the double dissolution of Senate and House of Representatives granted only three times: 1914, 1951, and 1974—into the norm. If the whole Senate had to fight at the same time as the House, it might have the same party complexion. Labor in 1975 had to face the humiliation that in the House of Representatives—to use Australian language—it had only one ball. In addition, the judiciary seemed likely to favour the Liberal side. Whitlam reserves his most blistering attack for the Chief of Justice who without consulting him as Prime Minister advised the Governor-General that 'a government having the confidence of the House of Representatives but not that of the Senate . . . cannot secure Supply . . .'.

Sir John Kerr's account (pp. 342–44) shows that the Chief Justice's opinion rested on an interpretation of the British constitution. It is the fact that the British House of Lords is not elected which provides the British Prime Minister with his authority to

secure Supply from the Lower House alone. Kerr's book, which is an autobiograp which the events of his Governor-Generalship are given a disproportionate amo space, is full of his own experience as a judge of arguments based on British prece One reason why Labor could so easily construct 'conspiracy theories' about th between the Liberal Party opposition and the judiciary was the Liberal propens use British examples. Kerr's case rests in large measure on the evidence he ma to raise doubts 'whether the proper attitudes were being adopted to the Gov General and his functions' (Kerr p. 227). An important incident in the crisis wa loan affair', a meeting of the Executive Council in December 1974 which authorised in the Governor General's absence the negotiation of a loan fron United States. Labor saw Liberals 'manipulating the powers of the monarchy'; Lil saw Labor 'adopting a rubber stamp approach' to the Governor-General's office.

Which vision is the more convincing? The answer to individual Austr depends on their party identification, which Don Aitkin meticulously describe had the good fortune to undertake the research for his book during the six yea spent at ANU in Canberra, 1965-1971, a period which counted towards La return to power at the federal level in 1972. The elections of 1966 were the disastrous for Labor since 1931, and yet the three years from 1966 to 1969 crucial in building up its fortunes (Aitkin p. 215). Aitkin's survey, using questions which had already been administered in Britain and the United States based on two sets of questionnaires and interviews in 1967 and 1969. The tech which he employed most successfully was the Automatic Interaction Det developed in the University of Michigan (Aitkin p. 110). This measures the ext which one attribute of a respondent can be considered a substitute for another. branching of the different relationships which emerge from a comparison of attri is called 'tree analysis'. The value of this approach in Australia is that it bring very clearly the different class, religion, and occupation elements in Labor support. The party system has never been 'just the expression of an underlying cleavage' (Aitkin p. 268). Although Labor Party identification is part of 'the situation' broadly conceived, the party can never make a permanent majority working people because of other attributes which encourage anti-Labor combinat Voters change their allegiance but the balance between Labor and non-Labour for roughly equivalent. It is part of Aitkin's thesis that this stability stems fron creation of the federal system itself. The federation in 1901 reduced the importan differences based on protection versus free trade and forced all those who object Labor's class appeal 'to place greater emphasis on ideology' (Aitkin p. 11). It w keeping with this inheritance that Whitlam should deny that the Constitution continue to be a vehicle of reform.

Birkbeck College, London J. M. L

NORTH AMERICA

State of the Nation III. By William Watts and Lloyd A. Free. *Lexington, N Lexington Books. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 23 £11·00.*

THIS is the third book in a bi-annual series. *State of the Nation III* presents a pict the United Sates in 1976. The objective is ambitious; 'we have tried to giv readers a glimpse of the entire fabric of America's public life, both at home abroad' (p. xi). Topics covered include the economy, the environment, internat

affairs, defence, and social concerns. An opinion poll, designed by the authors and conducted in May 1976, provides the basis for much of the book. Each chapter contains a section, usually entitled 'The People Speak', in which the results of the opinion poll are presented and analysed. In addition there is usually a wide-ranging review of developments in the areas under consideration which is presented as 'The Record Speaks'.

The opinion poll and the careful analysis which accompanies the presentation of the results are impressive. Useful insights are given into the mood of the American public in 1976 concerning domestic and international problems. That there are considerable differences in the way Democrats and Republicans wish to spend tax revenue is not surprising, but the fact that the preferences of Independents are closer to those of Republicans rather than Democrats may be of considerable electoral importance. The poll also provides a salutary reminder of the low priority given to international issues by the American public: in 1976 the ten major issues of most concern to Americans were all domestic problems. Indeed, few international issues were regarded as more important than 'Collecting and disposing of garbage, trash and other solid wastes' (p. 10) which was ranked nineteenth. But, at the same time, Americans exhibited almost exceptional confidence in their military leadership and an increasing willingness to spend more tax dollars in support of national defence and overseas bases. Overall, Watts and Free conclude that the American mood in 1976 was characterised by introspection and growing self-interest.

However, the authors' attempts to present a book that does more than simply analyse their opinion-poll findings is not successful. Reviews of American foreign policy (14 pages) and defence policy (18 pages) are long enough to be regarded as padding, but too short to stand as serious efforts to analyse these vast topics. Presentation in the form of 'The Record Speaks' is also irritating and misleading. Quite understandably the authors present their own perspective of, for example, the American record in foreign policy. But it is not the only interpretation possible. Their views should not be camouflaged under a pseudo-objective heading. At times the authors lapse into journalese; 'Detente, 1972, was still a form of containment, but it was to be containment without tears' (p. 110). An eye-catching sentence, no doubt, but what does it mean?

This then is an unsatisfactory book. The opinion-poll findings are worthy of careful study; the rest of the book is not. A pamphlet analysing the opinion-poll results would have been more appropriate and could, no doubt, have been produced more quickly than this book.

E. J. HUGHES

A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy. By Lloyd S. Etheredge. *Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1979. 178 pp. £8·75.*

U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy. By Robert M. Price. *Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California. 1978. 69 pp. (Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 8.) Pb. $2.25.*

DR ETHEREDGE'S strangely titled work (explained in a compressed paragraph on p. xv) is an elaboration and explanation of a large mass of statistical material recording a detailed sampling of the cognitive systems and emotional attitudes of certain middle-level career members of the Department of State and (as controls) the (former) National War College and the Office of Management and Budget. The author's purpose is to test the 'impact of personality traits' in the conceptualisation and implementation of foreign policy; and he concludes that it is 'very large' (p. 46). The practising historian is likely to respond that even if such a formulation is not self-

evident it scarcely requires the massive battery of statistical data provided by Etheredge. The author is happy to agree: 'It is the mark of good social science research that it clarifies and explicates experience, that people will, upon reflection, say, "Of course" ' (p. 68).

The longest chapter discusses particular actions and policy decisions of twentieth-century presidents, secretaries of state and very senior advisers (such as E. M. House and G. F. Kennan) to test concretely the general theory. Here the less numerate reader can feel greater confidence in challenging the author's analysis of personality and policy clashes; yet Etheredge, with scholarly honesty, explains the basis of his own individual evaluations—an example of legitimate recasting of the 'data base' (see e.g. on William Jennings Bryan, especially p. 73). From this historical survey Etheredge establishes a typology of leadership, a quadripartite matrix consisting of High Dominance Introverts (such as Dulles and Acheson); Low Dominance Introverts (Coolidge and Kellogg); High Dominance Extraverts (the two Roosevelts and Kennedy); and Low Dominance Extraverts (like Harding and Eisenhower). (Tables 6:1 and 6:4, pp. 72, 95. I have chosen examples arbitrarily among the thirty-six subjects.)

Etheredge's purpose is made quite clear: to shift the 'burden of proof' on to 'foreign policy-makers' generally but, Americans in particular, 'of establishing that their future decisions for war or peace are fully based only on truly national and objective considerations, rather than expressing mere rationalizations of private emotional predispositions' (p. 100). A reader may be permitted to match one hypothesis with another, namely that we find it easier to impute rationality to ourselves than to our opponents. Etheredge's opponents are (he admits) the American perpetrators of the Vietnam War (his shorthand) and the Bay of Pigs debacle (p. 67). He wants them to advance spiritually and perceptually; yet his own analysis of the 'lock-in' (p. 67) circularity of cognition and attitude makes exhortation the only possible diagnostic response of the critic.

Thus the fundamental conceptual weakness of Etheredge's powerfully constructed statistical study of attitudes and perceptions is that it lacks *both* an epistemological theory which permits self-correction in line with the objective conditions of the world *and* a political theory which shows the objective interest maintained or at least pursued by such allegedly irrational planners and policy-makers.

Robert Price's long essay is equally concerned to re-direct American foreign policy towards the 'national interest'. Like Etheredge he deprecates 'isolationism' (the bogey of American critics of their state's foreign policy); unlike him, Price advances his political argument by detailed study of historical specifics: a footnote on Western intervention in Zaire in contrast to 'Soviet/Cuban involvement in Angola' is a model of theoretical extrapolation (p. 58); his discussion of the formula 'minority rights' in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia shows his sensitivity to the particular coding of general principles, to the contextuality of political language (pp. 41–50).

Price's thesis is clearly presented. America's African policy is dominated by a number of mutually-reinforcing fears: a Soviet global military threat is exploiting political and economic 'radicalization' movements in Sub-Saharan Africa and will culminate in the choking of oceanic communications paralleled by the withholding of strategic minerals from a dependent United States. In the short space available it may be more useful to draw attention to certain formal problems which Price unwittingly reveals rather than register the details of this large debate. Assuredly his model of the state in post-colonial Africa is too determined by implicit reference to the United States. Yet against this unconscious lapse (though the paradox may require a volume on liberal political theory in the United States for explanation) Price moves from the touchstone of national interest in the opening pages to a less nationalistic gauge of political acceptability in the main, middle section. One final if totally unrelated point: surely even an exploratory essay on the geopolitical role of Africa in the age of the

super-powers (though the Soviet 'emergence' is dated decades too late p. 34) must include a discussion of China—a staggering omission.

These two works of such apparent dissimilarity in form and content are united in their call for a policy of national interest. Neither comes forward with an explanation of this basic concept; and, since they reject any suggestion of isolationism in their programme, they perhaps will not think it useful to re-read Charles Austin Beard's, *The Idea of National Interest*—not for the answer but for some of the preliminary questions.

University of Sussex MICHAEL DUNNE

Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. By Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Blackwell, Oxford.) 584 pp. £15·00. Pb: £6·50.*

THIS is an important study of the use by the United States of military force short of war for political objectives. It identifies 215 incidents where this has occurred from 1946 to 1975. By specific reference to a sample of 33 of these incidents, and detailed case-studies of ten separate incidents, the authors seek to determine the nature of the military involvement and to evaluate the effectiveness of the armed forces as a political or diplomatic instrument.

The result is what one might expect of a Brookings publication; it is thorough, comprehensive and authoritative, but a trifle dull. The concluding chapter, however, makes some useful points about the mixed blessings of military activity abroad to protect American interests or secure certain foreign-policy objectives. The evidence suggests that positive outcomes were not related to the use of any particular type or level of military activity. Favourable outcomes occurred more frequently when the objective was to reinforce rather than modify behaviour.

Evaluation, of course, depends very much on situational factors, and careful account is taken of these, especially in the detailed case-studies written by specialists. A surprising, if worrying, conclusion is that outcomes in the short term were 'proportionally most frequently positive when the President's popularity was lowest' (p. 120), indicating that short-term expectations condition many decisions to use the military. The implications of this emerge from the valuable case-studies, almost all of which suggest that the long-term effects of intervention are less happy than the initial effects. The case-studies permit comparisons to be made between the attitudes of different administrations, and the different situational factors in different areas of the globe (i.e., Europe and the Western Hemisphere). For example, as Philip Windsor points out, American reactions in response to Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe 'is bound to be qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from that undertaken anywhere else in the world' (p. 441).

The authors make several tentative suggestions for future behaviour. They suggest that the application of military power can be quite successful in encouraging a friendly state to remain friendly and a hostile state not to become more hostile. Military action must therefore be consistent with prior policies and should not be seen as a substitute for skilled diplomacy in affecting or modifying the behaviour of other states. One conclusion of note is that there is little evidence that the United States has been less successful since the Soviet Union has closed the American lead in strategic nuclear weapons, but on the other hand the type of situations where some action is possible seem to be those *between* nations, hence increasing the possibility of super-power confrontation. Moreover, the evidence suggests that a delicate balance must be struck between unambiguous commitment and the possibility of one's bluff being called, and if nuclear-type weapons are involved then the risks are high indeed.

In the end, the wisdom of using the armed forces as a political instrument depends on the circumstances, and the authors suggest particular areas of the world where such action still seems possible. Policy-makers are advised to state in advance where, and in what circumstances, American armed forces might be used. Hence a clear strategy linking the deployment of the armed forces and a flexibility of response, depending on the area and the special situational factors, plus a recognition that such use should be a part of, not separate from, the normal patterns of diplomacy and policy-making, would maximise the utility of such an exercise—which would be an option to be used only in very special circumstances. This is a realistic conclusion, and it is made more plausible by the painstaking analysis on which it is based.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

Arms Across the Sea. By Philip J. Farley, Stephen S. Kaplan and William H. Lewis. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Blackwell, Oxford.) 134 pp. £6·50. Pb: £2·50.*

ARMS transfers, having occupied a central place in American foreign policy since Lend-Lease, are receiving increasing attention from policy analysts. Most of the resulting literature is hostile to the idea that arms transfers should be a major foreign policy instrument and this is a major argument also of this short but wide-ranging study.

In a firm, direct style, the book offers some ideas worthy of considerable attention but its arguments are not developed in detail; for instance, the value of Congress in the foreign-policy process is a theme of the work but only at the end do the authors mention, almost in passing, the parochial concerns of many Congressmen.

There are also some odd contradictions. The tone of the book is that, in recent years, American arms exports have been excessive: sales have been made for economic reasons and too much stress has been laid on arms transfers as a policy instrument. However, in the final chapter we read that 'the US role in supply of arms is in reasonable proportion to the United States' technical and industrial standing in the world . . . Nor does the United States foist arms on the needy' (p. 99).

A more disguised paradox is that, throughout the book, the authors make positive if debatable suggestions. They say that the United States should not offer credits for arms sales, that security assistance should be minimised, that America should avoid becoming any other state's sole source of arms, and that the economic advantages of arms sales should be discounted. The weight of these arguments is, however, offset by the authors' initial argument for deciding each case on its merits; 'long standing interests and objectives will not best be served by across the board policies' (p. 6).

The authors seem unaware of a central problem in American arms export policy being the sheer volume of arms requests received. This volume remains great despite President Carter's ending of a government role in promoting sales and his restrictions on American corporate activities. To deal with these requests in any reasonable time and to produce any coherent pattern of decisions is a persistent problem for the American government which the authors neglect. Instead, they resort to appeals for the application of political judgment and to simplistic guidelines: 'Sales will be useful to support US interests insofar as they serve to deter mutual antagonists or help to stabilise situations where conflict harmful to US interests might otherwise occur' (p. 5).

Finally, the timing of the book's preparation means that President Carter's policies receive minimal attention beyond the observation that his stated commitment to arms restraint has not been reflected in his practice.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TREVOR TAYLOR

The Future of United States Naval Power. By James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver. *Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press. 1979. 248 pp. Index. $15.00.*

THERE are several general reasons, and some particular ones too, why the last year or so has seen the publication of studies on the future of the United States navy. The first is that the United States surface fleet, especially, has been run down because of the block obsolescence of many of its ships: so, what is to replace them? The second is that whatever decisions are taken in this area will determine the utility and purposes of the fleet until well into the next century; and costs are now so high, and growing so fast, that there is a self-evident need, politically at least, to assess any shopping-list very carefully indeed. The third is that the growth and deployment of the Soviet Navy, apart from any other consideration, tempts both a reactive response and an automatic reliance upon this circumstantial validation of the eternal verities inherent in sea power. The fourth is that, politically as well as analytically, some of these verities are now under challenge; the sea may not be so open in the future, the flexibility may not be so great, the utility of demonstrative force may not be so easily sustained, and the vulnerability of forward-based units may become greater. These reasons are important in themselves, but they are bolstered by more specifically political considerations. Is American foreign policy going to need this sort of instrument in the future as it has in the past; if, objectively, it might, then can the United States government be willed to provide the resources, and would the climate of general opinion be content to allow the development?

If there was any extensive consensus within the Executive about these questions, it might have been possible to turn some of the critical analysis, even from the Congress, aside. But there is a range of professional debate inside the Navy, and between the Services, that stimulates the wider debate which now, in form, includes a challenge to naval planning criteria from the administration. The questions that arise in concrete shape may look like arguments about whether specific new vessels should be nuclear-powered or more conventionally powered; but the fundamental issue is what the United States Navy is likely to be used for. If that can be agreed, the size and the shape of what should be provided would follow: not automatically because there are lots of other expensive issues to be fought over the technical quality of the new ships, missiles and aircraft, but with less difficulty than now seems to be the case.

The interest that Messrs. Nathan and Oliver have in these problems is that of political scientists concerned with an issue area; their study is, therefore, more general in its scope than some of the other analyses that have recently appeared. They do not go so extensively into the Soviet challenge, or the range of technological options that is available, but they do chart what has happened in Naval-Congressional relationships and they try to assess what effect informed public opinion might have on any outcome. Perhaps most interesting of all, they present some arguments about the future ranges of foreign policies, and foreign-policy styles that the United States may be concerned with, and try to sum up, in a concluding chapter of great interest. It is, altogether a substantial contribution to an important debate. To some extent, of course, the discussion is artificial, in the sense that there is unlikely to be one, precise, agreed, correct solution; how much, or how little, is enough is a matter of fashion as much as it is a matter of analysis. In the late 1950s and 1960s, Rickover may or may not have been right; but he was fashionable where it mattered, and the United States Navy is still trying to cope with the consequences.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War. By Allan E. Goodman. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1978. 298 pp. $22.50.*

The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960–1968. By Gregory Palmer. *Westport, Conn.; London: Greenwood Press. 1978. 169 pp. (Contributions in Political Science, No. 13.)* £10·75.

THE memory, so clearly imprinted by television screens, of the tragic scramble of South Vietnamese refugees in the wake of North Vietnam's military victory in 1975, continues to linger with historians. Understandably they still ask how the immense power of the United States was unable to sustain its South Vietnamese ally. One new book, *The Lost Peace*, shows that successive administrations wished to extricate themselves from South Vietnam and so placed negotiation at the centre of their diplomatic and military strategy. But this policy had an unintended, indeed opposite, effect. The United States believed that its military strategy should be shaped around its desire to withdraw eventually and leave South Vietnam as a strong, independent nation. So about two thousand individual efforts to initiate talks were undertaken between 1965 and 1968, the period of the most intense military escalation. But America's very solicitousness convinced North Vietnam that it could achieve unification with the South by military means. Thus the protracted peace talks that began in Paris in May 1968 were essentially tactics of war for Hanoi, while for Washington they were a genuine bargaining process. Negotiating strategy changed somewhat when Henry Kissinger became Secretary of State. He tried to convince both Saigon and Hanoi that each of them would best secure its nationalist goals by political means, rather than by continued hostilities. Furthermore, he wished to pursue detente, and the conflict in Indochina was an unhappy impediment. Concessions, however, did nothing to bring the sides closer. Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's chief negotiator, saw the talks as an extension of warfare and protracted the conversations and accepted agreements only to secure advantage on the battlefield. Such tactics served to drive a wedge between Saigon and Washington. When an agreement was eventually signed in 1973 it represented the best each side could achieve toward its ultimate aims. The United States could complete its withdrawal and North Vietnam could proceed to push for a full military victory.

Goodman tells his story well. He has been careful to keep in focus the wider dimensions of great-power conflict and avoids dull expositions of the nuances of diplomacy. While there are few new revelations, the book is informed, sensitive, and discriminating.

Gregory Palmer's study, on the other hand, of the role of the Defense Department's Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) in the prosecution of the Vietnam War lacks both the literary grace and the wider vision of Goodman's book. He asks some important questions, but his answers are often either unconvincing or too general. He maintains that until the 1960s the military policy of the United States had been traditionally reactive; in the McNamara era it apparently became 'rationalist' in its initiatives. He sympathises with policies that are shaped by uncontrollable external forces but is critical of those 'determined by an ideology' (p. 4). It is perfectly arguable, of course, that ideology is shaped by outside forces too. Similarly, some decisions apparently arise from a 'choice between alternatives' while others originate from 'deference to habit or authority' (p. 4). Again the distinction is unhelpful as rational choice necessarily involves consideration of historic tradition.

According to Palmer, Robert McNamara belonged to the rationalist school and consequently he introduced a new system of military planning. He wanted to reduce considerations of budget levels and increase his options by specifying the potential of every decision of the defence establishment. This required him to scrutinise decisions at the lower levels of the bureaucracy and the PPBS enabled him to do this. But the effect of such centralisation was to prevent internal debate about alternative objectives in the Vietnam war. Indeed Palmer argues that the various stages in military

escalation reflected the increasing effectiveness of PPBS. Perhaps this is so. Nevertheless, the Pentagon Papers reveal that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations faced their main dilemmas in the fields of domestic politics, relations with the Soviet Union, inheritances from the past, and the sheer momentum of events. It is these phenomena that still need close examination—for presumably even bureaucratic committees were aware of them.

University of Keele ROBERT GARSON

The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. By Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1979. 387 pp. £12·95. Pb: £4·95.*

THIS is a superb book, at once very impressive and deeply depressing. Based on the now abundant documentary evidence about American policy-making over Vietnam since the Second World War, its thesis is that the successive Presidents accepted the increasing involvement with their eyes open: they were clear about their aims; aware of the growing costs and risks; without illusions about the hopelessness of their local clients or the slender chances of winning; and as candid as they dared to be with their own countrymen. Six administrations believed it vital to keep South Vietnam out of communist hands, and so did most Americans—in government, Congress or the electorate. Soldiers and bureaucrats were supposed to propose ways of achieving that shared aim, and did so for twenty years until the costs at last eroded the consensus in the late 1960s. The system thus worked as it was meant to, and its outcome was a disastrous policy.

Most of the book is devoted to showing in convincing detail how the minimum costs of containing the communists kept rising. Washington knew that it was fatal to rely on the French, for that would make the other side the champions of nationalism; but was unable to bring effective pressure on France for fear of the repercussions in Europe. Later, Washington knew that it was disastrous to rely on the successive corrupt and inefficient South Vietnamese regimes which were alienating most of the population; but was unable to insist on reforms for fear that their support would vanish, causing an immediate collapse. So the Americans were driven to take over themselves as the only way to avert imminent defeat—while knowing that a 'white man's war' could never be won. No advisers ever suggested it could, except by drastic measures which would risk either a wider war with Russia or China, or the loss of support at home, or both: risks which Presidents would not run, so that escalation was kept within limits which—as they knew—made it unlikely to succeed. But the White House aim never went beyond assuring the survival of a non-communist South, and bursts of official optimism were rare and brief.

The shared commitment went back to the Truman administration. Truman had at first meant to confine the policy of containment to Europe; he extended it to Asia only after the 'loss' of China, the war in Korea and the outbreak of McCarthyism in the United States. His successors, together with their subordinates and supporters and most of their opponents, took it for granted that the commitment to a non-communist Vietnam must be maintained, since the price of abandoning it would be too high both abroad and at home: at home in the revival of McCarthyism, abroad in the loss of American credibility and the crumbling of American alliances. Those assumptions were not examined or questioned, and the rare challenges were not taken seriously until after 1967; but where the casualty lists from Korea had produced Joe McCarthy's attack on Washington from the Right, those from Vietnam produced an almost equally divisive and turbulent response in the bitter extremist outbursts that accompanied Eugene McCarthy's campaign from the Left. (Neither revolt, it is now quite clear, had anywhere near as widespread public support as it was credited with.)

The main lesson to be drawn, in the authors' view, is the need to eschew rather than embrace consensual doctrines in foreign policy, so that problems can be judged on their individual merits, and dangerous policies corrected at an early stage. Consensual doctrines make it easier for the President to get his way with the minimum of trouble—but however carefully he seeks (as all six of them sought) to keep his options open, the consensus maximises his difficulties if he wants to change course. In this specific case, American misconceptions about the region went unchecked (because the Asian specialists in the Foreign Service had been hounded, intimidated or purged by Joe McCarthy) until the CIA reported in 1965 that a communist victory in Vietnam would have no repercussions beyond Indochina—after which its opinion was disregarded by a President convinced the world was full of dominoes. The authors plead for a pragmatic and unideological American foreign policy, but that might not overcome either the tendency of all policy-makers to judge the latest crisis in the light of the last mistake (the Munich analogy), or the propensity of American public opinion to over-react to momentary moods. That makes the book depressing. It is also impressive, however, because of its clear and pungent style, and its knowledgeable, sophisticated and balanced treatment of a bitterly controversial subject.

Nuffield College, Oxford P. M. WILLIAMS

Decision for the Democrats: Reforming the Party Structure. By William J. Crotty. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1979. 318 pp. £11·50.*

An Introduction to American Government. 4th edn. By Erwin L. Levine and Elmer E. Cornwell. *New York: Macmillan; London: Collier Macmillan. 1979. 309 pp. Pb: £5·25.*

SOME eleven years ago the Democratic National Convention was held in Chicago. It was one of the most memorable, if that is the appropriate word, conventions in the party's history, although undoubtedly most Democrats would like to excise Chicago in 1968 from their collective memory. The Convention, to put it bluntly, was a disaster. The feuding between the delegates in the convention hall combined with the rioting outside proved to be the electoral kiss of death to the Democratic presidential nominee Senator Humphrey. Thus, after Humphrey's eventual defeat, the Democratic National Committee created two commissions, one on party structure and delegate selection the other on rules, with the hope that 1968 would never be repeated. *Decision for the Democrats* chronicles the activities of these commissions and the surprising revolution they wrought on the party's procedures. The Commission on party structure and delegate selection, popularly known as McGovern-Fraser, was controlled by the reformers in the Democratic party. The reformers resented the power of the established hierarchy within the party. Furthermore, they believed that the party convention was unrepresentative of Democrats in the country and that Chicago had ended in turmoil because certain sections of the party, Blacks, women and young people in particular, were not given fair representation and had consequently been bitter and angry. Thus McGovern-Fraser set out to make the party more representative by abolishing those rules and procedures that sustained the authority of the traditional power brokers within the party and correspondingly impeded the representation of the aggreved minorities. The Commission, amongst its many proposals, suggested that such established practices as the unit rule and winner-take-all primaries should be ended and that racial and sexual quotas be instituted. Surprisingly the Democratic party acquiesced to these suggestions and so the 1972 Convention was organised under most of these new rules. Unfortunately the Miami convention proved to be less than a resounding success. The convention was divisive and the presidential

nominee and ex-chairman of the Commission, Senator McGovern, received his lowest percentage of the vote for a Democratic presidential candidate in any general election since 1924. Inevitably there was a backlash against the reforms, but by and large they remained intact, which immeasurably helped the candidacy of Jimmy Carter. Under the pre-1972 rules, Carter's campaign for the nomination, almost certainly would have foundered on the opposition of the party's traditional power brokers such as the labour unions. But, under the reforms, the influence of the unions and the remaining urban political organisations was severely curtailed and so Carter was able to pull off one of the major upsets in American political history. Interestingly, since the election, Carter and his political associates have attempted to dilute the reforms in order to make the party convention more amenable to the voice of authority. Now that Carter is in the White House and is no longer a political outsider he has discovered certain qualities in those vested interests which he pilloried in his campaign for the nomination. It is interesting how incumbency can change a candidate's perspective.

Decision for the Democrats recounts these events ably and in considerable detail. The book is well researched and documented, if written in a somewhat laborious style. However, it does suffer from a rather substantial defect. It ignores one of the most interesting aspects of the party reform movement. It ignores the ideas of representation that lay behind the proposals for reform. The reformers, for instance, identify representation with statistical parity. They believe that women can only be represented by women. But Crotty instead of embellishing and examining these notions, tends to accept them unquestioningly. He points out, and correctly so, that before 1972 the composition of Democratic conventions did not mirror the social and sexual make-up of the population at large and then concludes that the pre-1972 conventions were unrepresentative. Obviously these conventions did not reflect the heterogeneous composition of the American populace. But whether they were unrepresentative is a much more vexed question. Undoubtedly the concept of representation put forward by the reform elements in the Democratic party has gained currency in the United States over the past few decades. The American Supreme Court decisions on legislative apportionment, for instance, drew on the same series of ideas. But there are other theories of representation, some of which are historically far more significant. Crotty ought to have pointed this out and spent some time on it rather than the scant four pages tacked on at the end. If he had examined the development of party reform within the context of ideas about representation, *Decision for the Democrats* would have been a better book.

An Introduction to American Government is a sound and well-balanced text on the subject. It has the advantage of being up-to-date but because it is designed for the American market, it is not quite as suitable for non-American students as J. D. Lees's, *The Political System of the United States*, or M. J. C. Vile's, *Politics in the U.S.A.*

University of Keele RICHARD MAIDMENT

Believing Skeptics: American Political Intellectuals, 1945–1964. By Robert Booth Fowler. *Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood Press. 1978. 317 pp. (Contributions in Political Science 5.) £13·50.*

Communist Cadre: The Social Background of the American Communist Party Elite. By Harvey E. Klehr. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1978. 141 pp.*

ROBERT FOWLER'S *Believing Skeptics*, is a better book than appears at first read. Occasionally somewhat ponderous in style and infelicitous in expression, with the customary academic dispersal of words and phrases that signal erudition, it nonetheless marches through the labyrinth of American political thought with increasing authority. Fowler ends with the election of 1964, because here he finds a

break in the general consensus of thinking about the nature of American liberalism that is the theme of his investigation. There have been earlier critics to be sure, and prominent among Fowler's radicals are Erich Fromm, Russell Kirk and Herbert Marcuse, but these are seen as 'outsiders looking in', men who had in common 'their non-American intellectual origin' (p. 273); intellectuals had, in the main, been trying to defend 'old liberal values by new means and in a realistic framework' (p. 215). Scepticism about ideologies, and temptation towards radical change, stopped short when confronted by the all-persuasive nature of the American liberal tradition. The 'New Democratic Theory', with its emphasis upon polyarchy and pluralism harkening back to Madison, was merely 'the best practical expression of the age-old human aspiration for democratic government' (p. 209). Despite the multiplicity of new political science approaches, most were united in their belief that, although there could be various interpretations of how the American system of democratic government worked, it generally worked well and was to be applauded. There was, therefore, an air of conservatism about American intellectual political thinking that touched on complacency. Sheldon Wolin's complaint that political activity and political thought seemed to have sunk to the level of inter necine conflict between particular selfish interests, in a society devoted to the maintenance of an accepted status quo, is one to which Fowler seems sympathetic.

Those who have tried to teach American political thought will be only too well aware of the difficulties of conceptualising arguments that too often seem to be devoted more to empirical methodology than to substantive debate about fundamentals. This difficulty perhaps partly explains the structure of this book, which too often becomes a catalogue of thinkers, from Fiedler to Schlesinger, if indeed that is a progression, via Hofstadter, Banfield, Bell *et al.* and with a little Niebuhr thrown in. It is, however, a book that in its explication and exposition will carry the student through the often confusing sequence of post-1945 political thinking with great benefit. It has merit, and considerable utility.

Communist Cadre is a different exercise. It is a statistical analysis of the leadership of the American Communist Party (CPUSA) in terms of identifiable membership of the Central Committee. The data is often sketchy, and Klehr's study is restricted to a total of 212 individuals over a period of forty years. He examines the percentages of immigrant-born members, Jews, Blacks and Women in order to give a biographical profile of the party leadership, relates such data to career mobility within the party, and explores the differences between party members and the party cadre. He shows how the early dominance of men with Eastern European Jewish backgrounds was moderated as the party tried to Americanise its image, and how the number of Blacks on the Central Committee rose from none in 1921 to over 28 per cent in 1961. Representation of women, interestingly, rose to a peak of over 20 per cent in 1940. As Theodore Draper notes in his Foreword, Klehr has made a useful contribution to the already considerable literature on American communism.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

A Dangerous Place. By Daniel Patrick Moynihan. *London: Secker and Warburg. 1979. 297 pp. £6·95.*

THIS book is a personal and highly readable account of the author's brief but eventful term, from July 1975 to February 1976, as American Ambassador to the United Nations. The first four chapters form an autobiographical prelude to the main narrative. They describe Moynihan's earlier spells in official life, including his two years (1973–75) as ambassador to India. Concurrently, they provide a rather sketchy outline of the evolution of his ideas on the modern world, and on the place and role of

the United States within it. Moynihan went to the United Nations with a clearly articulated and firmly held set of views on what the United States should try to accomplish there, and on the methods and tactics that it should use in doing so. Much of the interest of the book arises from this fact: it records one man's attempt to influence both the conduct of American policy and the ideas and purposes underlying it.

In highly summary form, Moynihan's creed can be described as a modern restatement of some themes of Woodrow Wilson. He believed that it was in the interests of the United States to appear on the international scene as an active and consistent protagonist for liberty. As a corollary, it should try to hold the United Nations as a body, as also its individual member countries, to the ideals and principles set out in the UN Charter; and in particular, the idea of human rights should be established as a central and permanent element in American policy. At the same time, the United States should be readier to speak its mind and to defend its interests within the United Nations, and less concerned with 'damage limitation' and with the semblance of agreement for its own sake. These two related notions, that foreign policy should be based on explicitly stated ethical principles and that its conduct should be characterised by a high degree of openness and candour, are in general more attractive to professors such as Moynihan (and Woodrow Wilson) than to professional diplomats. It is clear from the book, and hardly surprising, that Moynihan's conception of what the situation required did not always have the support of State Department officials, including the staff of his own mission in New York.

As usual in the American administrative system, what he could attempt was to a large extent left to him to decide, while what he could hope to achieve would largely depend on his own skill and resourcefulness and on the maintenance of his personal standing in Washington. It is instructive for a British reader to compare this system, with its wide scope for personal initiative, its informality and unpredictability, and its endemic atmosphere of drama and intrigue, with its British counterpart—orderly, methodical, centralised and furtive. For the student of comparative foreign-policy administration, the various references to instructions or lack of instructions from Washington (pp. 82–83, 91–92, 178, 197, 250 and 261) are especially interesting. The connoisseur of intrigue is referred to the bizarre subject-matter of Chapter 10, in which Moynihan's British counterpart makes a surprising appearance.

How far did Moynihan succeed in his objectives, and—more important—how far did he deserve to succeed? The first question is easier to answer: despite the fact that his position as ambassador became untenable after no more than six months, so that there was clear reason to regard him as having failed, there is a lot to be said for his claim at the end of the book (p. 278) that 'we had changed the language of American foreign policy'. Such an achievement overshadows the various incidental errors of judgment and tactics—which in the British system his Private Office could have saved him from—which eventually made him a political liability to the administration.

Whether the change in language is in every aspect a change for the better, and how far Moynihan's perception of the international scene and the role of the United States can be accepted, are more debatable issues which go beyond the scope of a brief review. They are not considered in this book in a systematic way: Moynihan has given us a discursive though absorbing chronicle, in which his underlying view of the world is presented only incidentally as an element in the narrative. If and when his duties as US Senator permit, perhaps he will write a revised and extended version of his justly famous 1974 article on 'The United States in Opposition'. It would be a welcome complement to this lively and interesting personal story.

University College, London P. D. HENDERSON

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis. Edited by Harold Eugene Davis and Larman C. Wilson. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1975. 470 pp.*

According to its editors, the purpose of this study is 'to examine Latin American international and foreign policy, country by country, analyzing the problems the nations confront, their policies for dealing with these problems, and the positions they assume in their relations with one another, with other countries of the world, and with international organizatons' (p. ix). Professors Davis and Wilson entrusted this task to sixteen other scholars in addition to contributing chapters and 'some conclusions' themselves. These specialists were asked to follow 'four closely interrelated lines of analysis . . . What are the major international problems confronted by the nation? What are the historical antecedents—the major problems confronted in the past that have produced settled doctrine or policy positions? How do the forces of domestic politics, including those of interest groups, affect the formulation of foreign policy, and what is the process of formulation in the nation studied? How does the nation view her position today in relations with other nations, regions, and international organisations? (pp. 6–7).

This has proved to be an over-ambitious assignment within the space available, and Professor Davis declares that 'the authors have usually concentrated on the first two lines of analysis' (p. 13). In fact, most of the chapters on individual countries (and regions such as Central America and the Commonwealth Caribbean) amount to little more than necessarily brief considerations of major foreign-policy objectives and problems against their historical backgrounds. These chapters, which form the bulk of the book, are preceded by an introductory essay from Professor Davis and four others on 'general and background aspects'. Of the latter, two—the more notable by Professor Wilson on 'multilateral policy and the OAS'—actually address themselves to *Latin American* policies. The remaining two chapters do not relate to Latin American policies at all, but describe Spanish and Vatican diplomacy in the region. The incongruity of their inclusion is underlined by an admission on the part of their distinguished author, Victor Alba, that the diplomacy of neither Spain nor the Vatican is significant in the international life of Latin America (pp. 98, 112). 'Relations with Communist States', in contrast, are dealt with in an appendix of just over two pages.

There are a number of topics, some of which appear in Professor Wilson's main contribution, worthy of much greater attention. The role of Latin American countries within the inter-American system deserves a chapter of its own, as does their participation in the United Nations. Such matters as Latin America's growing self-identification with the Third World, with its involvement in the North-South dialogue and the Non-Aligned Movement, likewise merit detailed examination. However, the main criticism of the book as it has been constructed must be that it has not—and, for reasons indicated, could not have—fulfilled its editors' ambitious prospectus. On the other hand, it must be noted that the chapters have been used by the contributors who teach at the American University in Washington DC as the major text in a course on the international relations of Latin America—and doubtless with success. Indeed, the dedication reveals that the book derives in large part from that course. Yet one must regret that there is not more here for students of Latin American foreign policies at a higher level.

University of Hull GORDON CONNELL-SMITH

Employment in Latin America. (Regional Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC).) *New York; Praeger for the International Labour Organisation. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 193 pp. £13·50.*

THIS is a book for planners and politicians rather than academics. It starts with a rather brief discussion of the 'employment problem' in Latin America, pointing out that almost half the labour force in the area, thirty-five million people, are 'underutilised'. This section is presented in terms of the usual categories—open unemployment, unemployment equivalents, hidden under-employment—all of which are, of course, euphemisms for poverty. The definitions of these terms, the methodologies for their estimation and the tendency for statistical aggregation are all unhelpful for the analyst concerned with causes. However, it serves as a succinct introduction to the main core of the book which is a detailed discussion of policies for the reduction of under-employment (poverty).

The next section provides an evaluation of some employment policies in Latin America, notably those of Brazil and Colombia who together account for almost half the labour force in the region. Mention is made of many well-known problems: the difficulty of raising agricultural productivity; the inequalities in income and employment which are often introduced by land-reform programmes; the absence of policies oriented towards the urban informal sector; the need for control of capital-intensive technology; and the vulnerability of all public-sector policy programmes to slow growth in exports. Then comes a warning: the results of a simulation model predicting economic trends to the year 2,000 show that poverty and unemployment will increase vastly unless policies can be found to reduce it.

The next half of the book provides a detailed set of plans which could be implemented to this end. Three different alternatives are discussed: first, massive modern-sector growth based on first world technologies; secondly, modern-sector growth with new technological patterns; and thirdly, concentration on the less productive sectors of the economy. The Regional Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC) plan involves a mixture of all three but with emphasis on the second. There is a detailed discussion of the various instruments of policy and guidelines for their use.

The attraction of this book is that it confronts the problem of under-employment at the level of productive structures, with as much emphasis on the raising of productivity within existing exterprises as on the creation of new sources of employment. The authors are sensitive to the linkage effects between different sectors of the economy, distinguishing also between short-run and long-run consequences.

The main problems are of course political, for the plan requires substantial power and legitimacy for the state, and support from different pressure groups, who should if necessary be able to make short-run sacrifices in the interests of the common long-run good. In short, what is required is a 'spirit of national compromise'. The question is whether such a compromise can be achieved voluntarily.

University of Essex ALISON M. SCOTT

The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategical Perspectives. 1959–77. By Jacques Lévesque. Trans. by Deanna Dredel Leboeuf, *New York: Praeger. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 215 pp. £12·25.*

LIKE Herbert Dinerstein's *The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962*, which was published in the same year (1976) as the original, French, version of this book,

Professor Lévesque's study is based essentially upon Soviet publications (Dinerstein also examined Cuban journals). Lévesque's purpose is 'to present the Soviet Union's ideological and strategic perception of the Cuban Revolution and the actions flowing from this perception' (p. v).

In his conclusion Professor Lévesque declares: 'It is often heard said that since 1959, Cuba traded one dependence for another. This is an oversimplification' (p. 195). His study makes very clear how complicated Soviet-Cuban relations have been over this period. The titles given to the three parts into which the book is divided indicate the fluctuating nature of those relations: 'From Prudence to Enthusiasm (1959–63)'; 'From Enthusiasm to Disenchantment (1963–68)'; 'From Disenchantment to Accommodation (1969–77)'. In Lévesque's judgment, the years from 1959 to the end of 1962 undoubtedly constitute the most significant and the most complex period as far as the implications of the Cuban revolution for the Soviet Union's international position are concerned. For during these years the revolution became increasingly radical—as well as anti-American—finally proclaiming itself socialist in April 1961 and recognised as such by the Soviet Union the following year. Thus, after displaying considerable initial caution, the Soviet leaders became committed to the Cuban revolution even to the point of involvement in a major confrontation with the United States (the missile crisis of October 1962).

Clearly the prize of detaching Cuba from the United States' sphere of influence and bringing the island into the socialist system was deemed worthy of the considerable risks involved. But the latter were by no means confined to East-West power relationships. Fitting the realities of the Cuban revolution into current communist ideology presented serious problems to the international revolutionary movement. These problems were aggravated by the Sino-Soviet dispute and posed particular difficulties for Soviet policy towards Latin America as a whole. Castro often opposed the Soviet Union on major issues in what Lévesque calls the period of 'disenchantment'. In the latter's account, the Soviet leaders appear very forbearing during these years: a forbearance which, Lévesque says, paid off in the end. In the final period of 'accommodation', a movement of Cuba towards reintegration in Latin America brought the Soviet leaders satisfaction, as did the institutionalisation of the Cuban revolution. Towards the close of his book, Lévesque sees a coincidence of interests between Castro and the Soviet Union demonstrated by Cuba's role in Africa.

This is a fascinating story, but also, of course, an unfinished one. Cuba's role in the Non-Aligned Movement, which Lévesque mentions briefly, has become more significant since his book was published. Cuba's reintegration in Latin America has proceeded more slowly than he appears to have anticipated. And American reaction, in the autumn of 1979, to the presence of Soviet troops in the island reminds us how potentially dangerous the alignment of Cuba with the Soviet Union still remains. But these developments serve only to enhance the value of Professor Lévesque's interesting study. It is much to be regretted that the book lacks an index.

University of Hull GORDON CONNELL-SMITH

Export Promotion: The Case of Brazil. By José Augusto Arantes Savasini. *New York: Praeger. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 141 pp. £13·50.*

Brazil's Multilateral Relations: Between First and Third Worlds. By Wayne A. Selcher. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1978. (Distrib. by E. Benn, London.) 301 pp. £11·95.*

THESE two books deal with different aspects of Brazil's external policies. *Export Promotion: The Case of Brazil* is mainly a theoretical study, dealing in particular with

the effects of export subsidy and tax exemption on production, the domestic resource cost of foreign exchange, and exports and labour absorption. The introduction is the most useful section for the general reader, with excellent historical overviews between 1947 and 1972 and brief notes on the effects of export-promotion policy on the composition of Brazil's exports. In Chapter 2, there is a succint summary of the export-promotion regulations; and throughout the book there are a number of valuable statistical tables. In general, however, this book would only seem to be of interest to economists with a theoretical bias. A comprehensive study still has to be written on Brazilian export-promotion policy for the informed general reader. It is a very important subject: Brazil is doing all that is possible to boost exports (especially of manufactures, which are the most heavily subsidised) to generate sufficient foreign exchange to ensure the prompt compliance of external debt commitments.

The second book is a study on Brazilian foreign policy since the March 1964 revolution. It is sound and scholarly in content and is written in an easy limpid style. The first three chapters cover Brazil's images and strategies as an upwardly mobile power; its multilateral relations in perspective; and the access issues of resources, energy, transfer of technology and trade. Brazil's stance in international commodity agreements and its relations with international financial institutions are dealt with; and the country's record at the United Nations and relations with African countries are then examined. The concluding chapters cover Brazil's participation in the Inter-American system and its relations between First and Third Worlds. All the sections of the book throw detailed light on the country's recent foreign policy, perhaps to a fuller extent than any other publication in English. Of particular interest are the sections on relations with the International Monetary Fund (pp. 148–60) and with the Latin American Free Trade Association (pp. 258–60); the former shows how successful economic management has maintained the confidence of the country's creditors for the past fifteen years and the latter demonstrates Brazil's crucial role in a still thriving organisation. The chapter on bilateral relations and multilateral goals in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 213–44) is fascinating and is of particular value: it must be the most comprehensive study on this yet to have been published, at least in English. Throughout this study the flexibility and pragmatism which is the hallmark of Brazil's foreign policy is continually brought out. All in all, this a most successful book: it will serve as a work of reference on the subject for some time to come; and it is written in such a way as to be entertaining and informative to the general reader.

ROBIN CHAPMAN

Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil. By Peter Evans. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1979. 362 pp. £12·50. Pb: £3·75.*

BRAZIL'S economic miracle of the 1960s and early 1970s has, like less spectacular examples of economic progress in the developing world, been shadowed, internally by a rising tide of inflation and externally by a rising tide of foreign debt, both in large degree the direct or indirect results of increased prices for oil, one of the few natural resources in which Brazil is seriously deficient. Nevertheless, it is probably safe to say that a new phase of the miracle is likely to begin in Brazil sooner than any marked economic development is likely to be resumed in most other parts of the developing world.

It is, therefore, useful to have this well-researched and, no less important, well-written, study of Brazil's progress from a state of classic dependence as a producer of raw materials in return for, primarily British, manufactured goods and capital to her present state of dependent development, defined by the author as 'a special instance of

dependency, characterised by the association or alliance of international and local capital' in which the state is an active partner (p. 32).

Against the background of a survey of the relationships developed between multinational corporations, local private entrepreneurs and state-owned enterprises, particularly in the last decade, the author examines the nature of their alliance, their different roles in the process of industrialisation, the areas of collaboration and of conflict between them, all as reflected in such specific industries as pharmaceuticals, textiles and petrochemicals. A concluding chapter discusses the implications of this pattern of industrialisation for other developing countries.

The author, by virtue of his position as Associate Professor of Sociology at Brown University, writes as a sociologist rather than as an economist. As such he points out that despite the economic successes achieved by industrialisation in Brazil it has not, as yet, achieved any comparable social impact, leaving some 80 per cent of the population with no direct benefit from it.

Whether this situation will change is, in the view of Professor Evans, at least open to question. 'International capital', he writes is [now] an integral part of the domestic Brazilian economy and representatives of international capital are an integral part of the Brazilian political and social order. Foreign capital . . . shares with local capital, both private and state-controlled, an interest in the further development of local industry (p. 9). Hence 'the state is constrained by the necessity of fostering the enthusiastic participation of both the multinationals and local capitalists . . . in a way that makes it extremely difficult to adopt a developmental strategy that would spread the benefits of industrialisation more widely. Even if there is substantial support within the state apparatus for more welfare-oriented policies, adopting such policies would threaten the whole elite consensus on which industrialisation itself is based)' (p. 12). However, the author makes clear his own view in the dedication, in Portuguese, of his book 'to Brazilians who refuse to abandon the vision of a just, free and egalitarian society'.

N. P. MACDONALD

Peru 1890–1977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy. By Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Pertram. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 475 pp. £15·00.*

PERU is a notoriously difficult country in which to conduct academic research, both because of the tremendous diversity of its economic and social structures, and the lack of well-organised sources of data. Yet the very complexity constitutes an attraction and a challenge for the variety of models of development available for analysis and policy formulation. Recently the attempt of the Velasco government to break out of the familiar pattern of Third-World dependency, by choosing a road that was 'neither capitalist nor communist' attracted much attention. However, given the problems of diversity and data, the prevailing pattern of research has been to focus on questions that are regionally, historically, or subject-specific. There has been a crying need for an authoritative work which would synthesise and interrelate the various processes which, have during the course of time, contributed to the general pattern of development in Peru.

This synthesis is now available in Thorp and Bertram's book, which is a masterpiece of scholarship and will be much used by people of widely differing interests. It is based on an extensive range of primary sources, with much attention to detail and providing extremely useful compilations of long-run, time-series data. Yet such is the mastery of the information that it never congests the well-written prose, nor does it obscure the analysis of underlying trends and processes. The mode of analysis is theoretically informed; continually alert to questions such as: to what extent

did processes of economic growth contribute to greater or lesser autonomy and distributional equity? Would alternative policies have led to different outcomes? Were realistic alternatives available?

The results are fascinating: at various points in its history Peruvian entrepreneurs have demonstrated a capacity for local accumulation, technological innovation and sectoral diversification, but this capacity has been subsequently erased by a relapse into dependence on international finance leading to increased dualism, a worsening distribution of income and economic vulnerability. This pattern is found at the turn of the century, after the depression of the 1930s, and aspects of it are repeated in the 'revolutionary' experiment of 1968–75.

Peru clearly provides an interesting case study for the evaluation of dependency theories, yet the detailed analysis of crucial sectors and key firms suggests many deficiencies in such theories and demonstrates the dangers of oversimplification. It is shown, for example, that the returned value provided by foreign firms varied immensely, that local firms did not always behave in the 'national interest', and that the weakness of indigenous capitalism was as much the result of internal preferences as of pressure exerted by foreign companies. One of the lessons arising from this study is that the causes of underdevelopment cannot be traced merely to issues of property ownership, as the Velasco regime discovered to its cost.

In discussing the complex factors involved in producing particular outcomes, predominance is given to the role of market forces: the interaction between local and international markets, price policies and relative profitability. However, the authors also display sensitivity to social and political factors such as class interests, ideology and traditional forms of production, although specialists in these areas may well be dissatisfied with their coverage.

Perhaps it is inevitable that in a book which is primarily concerned with growth and accumulation, sectors which are marginal to such processes should receive little attention. Yet this should not imply that these sectors were not affected by the patterns of growth—as the stress on increasing dualism and the overall distribution of income might suggest. In fact there was considerable growth in income amongst some sectors of the peasantry, in small provincial towns and in the urban shanty towns. The mechanisms whereby this happened are not yet altogether clear, yet they are important for the analysis of the response of the non-export sectors, particularly traditional agriculture, to changing market conditions.

However, to cover all such processes in this major effort of synthesis would be a truly monumental task. The important contribution of this book is that the sectors which were most important in determining the overall pattern of growth have now been systematically analysed. For almost every person working on Peru, this book will therefore provide an invaluable framework, with a wealth of interesting hypotheses to enrich their own work.

University of Essex ALISON M. SCOTT

Dictators Never Die: A Portrait of Nicaragua and the Somoza Dynasty. *London: C. Hurst. 1979. 180 pp. £6·95.*

GIVEN the brutality of the struggle over the last year, the moderation with which the Sandinistas have celebrated their victory is notable. Revenge has been neither indiscriminate nor institutionalised, the Frente has maintained the appearance of unity, and the policy stress is on the pragmatic management of some form of mixed economy. This is unlikely to last but it does reflect some longstanding traditions.

The first, is the anti-imperialist (and specifically anti-American) heritage. The list of filibusters who have sought to exploit Nicaragua's impotence is legendary, from

Alvarado to Teddy Roosevelt by way of Nelson himself. But it was only with the full-scale takeover of Nicaragua by American Marines in the early 1930s that a national response—headed by Sandino—emerged. Sandino was more of a mystic than a socialist but his influence over the collective national memory has been immense. Up to then political struggle had been a question of factional fighting between spoils-seeking oligarchies for American support. After Sandino it broadened into an identification of opposition to the regime with opposition to control by the United States.

The second, is the dominance since the mid-1930s of the Somoza clan—first Tacho, then the elder son Luis, and finally the younger son Tachito. Based initially and, as it turned out, ultimately on control of the National Guard, Somoza power soon extended into every area of national life. By the 1970s the state and the national economy had become the virtual patrimony of Somoza, his relatives, and a few allied families. This was critically important for it enabled broad sectors of Nicaraguan society—businessmen, small landowners, retailers, peasants, workers, and student *guerrilleros* to unite around the simple goal of defeating the dictatorship.

But the future is less clear. The economy needs to be restructured, a new political system built, and some agreement reached with the United States, and all this in the context of business chaos, mass immiseration, and ideological cleavage within the Frente. For the time being euphoria has sufficed but like Cuba before it—and the parallels in the revolutionary processes are remarkably close—Nicaragua will shortly have to make some very hard choices. The likelihood of avoiding further violence seems slim.

The role of the United States in this is central. As Crawley notes, over the years the Somozas have cleverly played on American willingness to accept the 'bulwark against Communism' card, specious though it has generally been. This was rarely without reservation (Cordell Hull is said to have described the first Somoza as a 'son of a bitch, but *our* son of a bitch') but bipolarity, Cuba's aid to armed struggle throughout Latin America in the 1960s, and the lobbying of American business and military interests have together been enough to stem any new initiative. Eisenhower and Nixon were especially eager to embrace Somoza but during the recent crisis the United States vacillated (as it did in Cuba in 1959-60) and the chance to support the moderates in the Opposition was missed.

As the title implies, this book seems to have gone to press shortly before the Sandinistas took over. But any Schadenfreude would be unfair for the resigned title is misleading. It is not an apologia for Somoza, nor does it offer a theory of dictatorship. It is a simply written contemporary history of Nicaragua. The history could have been more contemporary than it is but this remains a timely book that will be especially useful to all those who would have been hard pressed until recently to say just where Nicaragua was.

University of Liverpool WALTER LITTLE

The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention. By Piero Gleijeses. Trans. by Lawrence Lipson. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1979. (First publ. Milan: Barraia for the University of Geneva Institute of Advanced International Studies, 193.) 460 pp. £15·75.*

United States—Latin America: A Special Relationship? By Edmund Gaspar. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution 1978.) 90 pp. Pb:$2.75.*

THE 'first overt American military intervention in the Western Hemisphere since Franklin D. Roosevelt's proclamation of the "Good Neighbour Policy" more than

three decades before' has, in the United States as elsewhere, been subjected to 'conservative', 'liberal' and 'radical' criticisms. In so far as *The Dominican Crisis* is the product of an associate professor of American foreign policy at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, it does indeed wear many of the signs of being a product of one of these 'schools' of interpretation. However its merits are so obvious as to make it the new standard against which the others must be judged.

To begin with, it is most painstakingly researched and thoroughly documented. Where it gains, above all, is in the systematic exploration and use of Dominican sources, including private and official papers, interviews, publications and newspapers. In his search for evidence Professor Gleijeses has reached well back into the era of Trujillo, he has found there casts a very different light on the personalities and policies of the early 1960s from that which the actors would no doubt have desired. None of those who worshipped that idol with feet of clay have failed to get their faces smeared with mud; least of all, fairly or unfairly, those who took part in his assassination.

Secondly, in his analysis, the author has made a most penetrating study of the many political factions that emerged after 1961. He shows how and where each received its backing, why factions emerged and how 'minor parties' were formed, why leaders rose and how they fell. The study of coup and countercoup in a background of frenzied political activity is masterly, and in itself forms a most useful addition to the literature. Then comes the intervention by the United States, and here as elsewhere he allows the actors, where possible, to speak in their own words. Those who read them now may well wish that they were protected from themselves by some sort of literary Fifth Amendment.

It is in fact a deeply saddening book, painful alike in its stoical acceptance of cynical 'realism' and in the outrage which its author so evidently feels at the events he describes. Though his personal sympathies lie more with the 'radical' school than with any other, and like them he is thoroughly critical of Kennedy as well as Johnson, he differs from them in being able realistically to accept that Johnson's policy was successful in achieving the ends it set out to achieve, that the far Left have been 'beautiful but inherently unsuccessful', and that the real winners have been the opportunists, the corrupt and the speculators in human misery. So much does this view seem part of the pattern of traditional American morality that it may come as a surprise to realise that the greater part of the text was originally written in French and published in 1973 by the University of Geneva. The author and the translator are alike to be congratulated at the success of their collaboration—though they should not be surprised at the vividness of the writing, the vehemence with which the author doubts the motives of virtually every actor, and the vigour of the language, alienate those who still believe that to be truly academic books have to be grindingly dull.

In today's Caribbean, intervention remains a possible American option, of course, but the arena now includes the smaller islands as well as the larger. Edmund Gaspar, a former member of the Hungarian diplomatic service, has some interesting parallels to draw between the American sphere of interest in the Caribbean and that of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. They are not consistently applied, unfortunately, nor are the implications of such an approach carried through into the conclusions. Mr Caspar's proposals for American policy in the region are based on the belief that Latin America does and should belong to the First rather than to the Third World and that a close relationship with the United States remains an option once American policy is purged of objectionable elements. Relinquishing a visible grip on the Panama Canal would be the first and most important indication of a desire for change.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

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African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopedia. By Ian Brownlie. *London: C. Hurst; Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press. 1979. 1355 pp. £60·00.*

THIS is a massive reference work dealing with an immensely complex subject of great political and legal significance. Each of the boundaries of mainland African states is studied, with the exception of those where negotiation are still in the early stages—as in the case of the boundary between Egypt on the one hand, and Israel and the Gaza strip on the other. Each boundary study includes a general historical introduction, followed by a detailed analysis of geographical, legal and political evidence, supported by texts of treaties and agreements, with statement and date of ratification. At least one sketch map precedes each section; in addition there are two general maps of Africa 1926-1946, and 1978, reproductions of maps and sketches used during the discussions dealing with particularly intricate boundary problems, such as the river boundary between Zambia and Botswana at the confluence of the Zambezi and Chobe rivers. A general select bibliography is complemented by specific bibliographies which accompany each section. There is a chronological table of the documents reproduced textually, in whole or in part, in the body of the work.

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THIS is the 10th Anniversary volume of this series. The formula is similar to the preceding volumes. Part one includes authoritative articles on such topics as the crisis in the Horn of Africa, and Afro-Arab relations after the Cairo Summit. Part two is a country by country review and Part 3 lists texts of documents arranged by subject, as well as economic, demographic and foreign-aid statistics. The comprehensive coverage of national and international situations makes this series an essential reference tool.

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OFFSHORE BRITAIN: TODAY AND TOMORROW

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IT is now some fifteen years since Sir Alec Douglas-Home's government passed the Continental Shelf Act, bringing the sea bottom resources of the British continental shelf under government ownership and initiating the first period of exploration for offshore energy resources—a period which seems for the time being to have come to a temporary halt, or at least a slow-down compared with the high fever of the mid-1960s or early 1970s. In that fifteen years the whole pattern of British energy resources has changed out of all recognition. Town gas, coal gas, after more than a hundred years of lighting Britain's streets, heating its homes, cooking its meals, and driving its industry—and incidentally polluting its air—is, temporarily at least, a thing of the past. Natural gas from the great fields of the southern North Sea, carried by a national grid all over Britain, has replaced it. Not only that, whereas only twelve years ago the Arab oil boycott, imposed on Britain at the end of the Six Days War, could threaten petrol rationing and seriously damage the British economy, Britain is now approaching self-sufficiency in oil supplies. Each turn of the price screw by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) adds to the potential of Britain's North Sea oil province, bringing more and more of the forty or more smaller oil fields already discovered closer to profitability. In fact, Britain's oil wealth has already become a political embarassment when contrasted with the energy-deficient economies of our principal partners in Europe: France, Germany, and Italy. Voices are heard calling for a more intensive exploitation of North Sea oil resources, alleging that the present policies of the oil internationals are grossly under-representing the scope of these resources and producing an artificial scarcity. Disputes over the division of revenues embarrass government-oil company relations, while the presence of the oil itself exacerbates all kinds of particularism: Shetlands against Scottish nationalism; Scottish nationalism against British or Whitehall nationalism; British nationalism against the European Community.

In the last six years developments at sea stemming from the general international framework which gave rise to the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) have extended the division of the

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resources of the continental shelf to cover the resources of the circumambient waters. Defeated in successive cod wars, and excluded from the greatly extended fisheries jurisdiction of the North Atlantic and the Arctic, Britain's fishing fleets have been forced back into the offshore arena. The Fisheries Limits Act of 1976 extended British fisheries jurisdiction two hundred nautical miles from Britain's coasts and, coupled with the urgent need to conserve the dwindling fish stocks of those waters, has brought Britain into direct conflict with her European partners.

The vast development of Britain's energy resources in the North Sea raised four new sets of problems: the growth of a native offshore services industry and of British participation in the new technology necessary for the exploitation of oil reservoirs in up to six-hundred-feet depth of water in some of the stormiest seas in the world; the provision of skilled manpower necessary to meet the demands of this task; the provision of capital to cover the ever-escalating costs of exploration and exploitation; and, finally, the problems of protecting and policing these new enormously valuable sources of power and wealth against all the various threats and disorders to which they are vulnerable. In addition, there is the question of research and development not only to meet the problems presented today but for the next generation when Britain will have to look for oil in much deeper waters, weighing the cost of this against those of alternative energy technologies—coal and nuclear; pre-industrial forms such as wind, wave and water power; or more unconventional forms such as geothermal or solar power—so as to find the best mix for the twenty-first century, which seems now to rush on us with the speed of a runaway railway train.

All these developments have necessitated changes in the organisation of British government; extension of official activity into fields hitherto unoccupied; changes in the tax structure; reorganisations of industry; and changes in the direction of scientific research and training. Whether these have gone anything like far enough is a very much disputed issue. The advent of a new Conservative government, with an economic and political philosophy advertised as differing considerably from that of its predecessor, makes this not a bad moment to reflect on the present position Britain has reached offshore, and on its ability to face the foreseeable future.

It is perhaps best to discuss this under the following heads: the development of and future of Britain's offshore energy; offshore technology and supply industry 'spin-offs'; fisheries; pollution control; the research and development effort; and the defence-police-enforcement spectrum.

Offshore energy

The energy bonanza afforded Britain by the North Sea discoveries cannot be considered apart from the general picture of British energy policy. Here no amount of political oratory can conceal the fact that Britain has no energy

policy as such—only a battlefield where nationalised industries, each backed by its own powerful lobby drawn from the trades unions or the scientific establishment, battles it out with each other like seventeenth century armies of rival condottieri ravaging the countryside of central Europe. The Department of Energy, with its unhappy Cabinet minister, is supposed to co-ordinate and preside over coal, gas, electricity, nuclear power, and oil, over the National Coal Board, the various Gas Boards, the Central Generating Board of the Electricity industry, the Atomic Energy Authority and its various commercial offshoots, and the oil industry together with the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC). All of them are quasi-monopolies distorting the market so greatly that market economics is an almost meaningless guide to price or investment policies. Each represents an enormous financial investment, some a very considerable social investment too. Some, as with the mineworkers or the electricity-workers, can mobilise a political clout no government has so far been able to resist. Others, the Atomic Energy Authority for example, can mobilise a lobby power behind the scenes almost as potent in its way as the mineworkers. Each is fiercely partisan, demanding of its supporters an almost feudal loyalty. Each has dedicated partisans within government. No government can formulate an energy policy which is not a mix of all the various types of energy. No government has yet succeeded in jelling an energy strategy which is acceptable to all.

Under these circumstances the position of the offshore oil industry would be fairly desperate save for one factor. Its disadvantages are plain. The offshore oil industry has very little voice in the energy battlefield. It is multinational and therefore starts with a distinct handicap in the internecine Whitehall battle over energy policy. Its relations with the BNOC are far from happy. It is dependent on government tax policy for its profits and a government licensing policy for its ability to operate at all. One factor alone makes it powerful. Other energy sources can only provide fixed energy. Coal as a source of automotive energy was phased out years ago, even on the railways. Oil alone provides automotive power—diesel fuel for the railways; oil for the merchant marine; and petrol for the lorries, the vans and the private cars, the heating and agricultural machinery. Oil-powered electricity-generating stations can be reconverted to coal. But coal as a source of automotive power is dirty in itself and still much too expensive as a source of synthetic automotive fuel unless (as in South Africa) oil is simply not available. All governments have, therefore, to include a significant oil component in their energy mix.

However, in relation to the future, this position of strength conferred on the oil industry by the present relationship of oil to other sources of automotive fuel is deceptive and misleading. Oil prices are a product not of cost plus profit but of an international political monopoly, OPEC, for most of whose members oil is their single source of foreign exchange and a rapidly exhaustible asset, unless prices are charged at a level such as to curb the inexhaustible demand for oil of the heavily industrialised states. But OPEC alone does not fix the

prices of oil products on the European domestic market. There are, in addition, very heavy consumption and production taxes levied on both consumer and producer. Up to 75 per cent of the price of a barrel of North Sea oil is made up of royalty payments, company taxation and Petroleum Revenue Tax. Petrol and fuel oil products are subject to VAT and can be used to raise revenue by extra taxation in the same way as cigarettes or alcohol. At the same time the economics of high energy costs have hardly begun to take effect. Decades of low energy costs have produced habits of use and consumption, patterns of incorporation into industrial production, distribution, construction, and marketing that may well take a decade, if not a generation, to eradicate.

Under these circumstances the prospects of oil exploration in deeper waters are unusually clouded. It used to be axiomatic in the oil business that as much new oil should be discovered each year as was produced from existing discoveries. This is no longer the case in the North Sea—and yet if there is oil, as the geological evidence would seem to indicate, in the waters west of Shetland and spreading out into the deeper waters of the British continental shelf, someone should begin looking for it soon.

Calculations as to the cost of finding it, and, if it is found, of recovering it, have to cope with a variety of uncertainties. On the one hand, there is the steadily narrowing gap between the cost of oil and the cost of alternative types of automotive energy (which would also involve massive development costs usually unmentioned by their advocates). On the other, there is the rapid escalation of the costs of extracting the oil already discovered, and the possibility that recovery of secondary or tertiary oil reserves in fields already located could prove a more profitable source of investigation than the prospects of oil around Rockall or St Kilda. Small wonder that at the moment prospecting in the western approaches or on the English mainland seems more attractive than the licence blocks on offer west of the Shetlands. Yet no country can afford for very long to neglect the potential oil-bearing areas that lie in deeper waters. This need is national rather than industrial. The major internationals, who alone possess the knowhow and can command the resources necessary to investigate these areas, do not have to put their main effort into the British continental shelf. There are many promising offshore oil provinces elsewhere—offshore Africa, offshore Southeast Asia, offshore Mexico, for example. The British continental shelf offers a degree of political stability, it is true, which other offshore oil provinces cannot always match. But the oil companies, and, still more the investment banks—which alone can mobilise capital on the scale necessary to bridge the gap between the first successful drilling and the field in full production—are governed by profitability and return on investment alone. High taxation and uncertain prospects of repatriating profits could well draw those investment funds elsewhere, especially as oil scarcity will soon reduce the monopoly element in crude oil prices and substitute a genuine scarcity and non-substitutability cost pattern, on classic market economic-theory lines.

Addressing the Fourth Greenwich Forum Conference in October 1978, the chief scientific adviser to the Department of Energy, Sir Hermann Bondi, said that the kind of order of magnitude of energy costs that he was having to face over the next ten years was a shift of some 5 per cent of the gross national product into energy to add to the 15 per cent or so they already absorbed.[1] This is a change of staggering dimensions. As yet nothing has emerged from the Department of Energy or from either political party which bears any relationship to, or shows any consciousness whatever of the scale of the problems this will involve. In such a development, offshore energy resources obviously have a major part to play. It is not easy at the moment to produce any evidence that the offshore oil industry is being encouraged to look this far into the future or that serious thought is being devoted to providing them with the supportive environment most likely to secure that they need to do so. The industry's leading figures have had more immediate problems to cope with these last two years; and their warnings have often been set aside as mere manoeuvres in the continuous bargaining process between industry and government.

Labour energy strategists used to envisage the BNOC acting as the pacemaker in such forward planning and exploration if the commercial multinationals proved unwilling to act. The present Conservative administration has still to reveal (or perhaps to evolve) its conception of the role BNOC should play in the more market-oriented approach to government intervention in the economy favoured by the Prime Minister's ideological advisers. It is to be hoped that the new Secretary of State for Energy and his deputies can soon evolve a policy which places BNOC and the multinationals firmly in the picture of Britain's future energy policy and which defines the role that new offshore oil resources are expected to play in it.

Offshore technology

One of the major lessons of the development of Britain's North Sea oil province in the last decade has been the immense number of technological problems which had not been anticipated and the need for a whole ancillary group of industries to provide means of meeting these problems once the answers to them had been found. In the process, Britain's offshore supply industry has moved more and more from the simple provision of supplies and minor ancillary services into the technological mainstream. Much of the field, of course, remains the monopoly of national or international industries which are not of British venue. Submersibles remain a field dominated by the French; heavy lifting gear by the Dutch. The British share of the oil rigs or pipeline-laying business remains small. The structure of the British underwater and

1. D. C. Watt, ed., *Britain and the Sea: Deepwater Exploration and Development Ten Years On.* Proceedings of the Fourth Greenwich Forum Conference, Oct. 1978 (London: Institute of Marine Engineers for the Greenwich Forum, 1979.)

offshore technology business remains a welter of medium- and small-sized firms, with one or two affiliates of large-scale established engineering and shipbuilding firms. It is far from clear that they will be able to meet the technological needs of deep-water oil exploration and recovery. Without some serious thought being devoted to this both at government (Department of Industry) level and in the industry itself, the technological support necessary to develop deep-water recovery may simply not be there on an adequate scale when it is needed. This is not a matter of research and development alone (of which more later); it is a matter of production facilities, skilled manpower, supplies of the necessary metals and plastics, etc., and of finance. The oil companies believe that the basic technology for deep-water exploitation (which essentially means complete sub-sea operation) is already known and available. But it is a far cry from prototypes to full-scale operation and there is an enormous range of problems involved in establishing deep-water, sub-sea facilities, maintaining and servicing them, and in bringing the oil ashore once a sub-sea well head has been established.

In a paper presented to the Fourth Greenwhich Forum Conference[2] the former managing director of Bowring (Offshore) Limited, Don Lennard of D. E. Lennard and Associates, now also director of Eurocean, argued that the scale of the problems likely to be encountered was such that only the development of a considerable degree of inter-European co-operation in the engineering field could meet it. These views have not, as yet, received any wide-scale comment in British offshore technology circles, despite their subsequent publication in *Offshore Services Magazine.*[3] If his views are correct, there is good reason for the present protectionist policy followed by the Offshore Supplies Office towards would-be European entrants into the field to be relaxed, at least in so far as Anglo-European co-operation should be encouraged. Nationalism and technological rationale will, of course, be at odds on the issue. (Nothing enhances nationalism so much as a whiff of that disparity between demand and resources which drove Malthus to his gloomy prophecies.) When the sea-bed of the North Sea was first being divided in the 1960s, nationalism eliminated any talk of joint ventures, save from West Germany, and then only when her representatives realised how little of the sea-bed would fall to their lot under the conventional established procedures. The technology necessary for secondary and tertiary recovery and the technology necessary to exploit resources in deep water will almost certainly be beyond the resources of the industry of any single European power to develop.

Spin-off and export possibilities

Among the considerations which led to the setting-up of the BNOC and the Offshore Supplies Office, and which inspired the report on offshore technology

2. D. E. Lennard, 'Implications of Deep-Sea Exploration for the Development, Restructuring and Redevelopment of British Industry', in Watt, *op. cit.*

3. March, 1979.

of the Engineering Committee of the Science Research Council,[4] was the fear that the exploitation of the oil in the British sector of the North Sea would come and go without leaving British industry any the wiser. The expertise, the technology, the research and development technology, the skilled manpower would all be imported, as were the oil rigs. Once the best of the fields had been skimmed, they would move on elsewhere, leaving Britain no better off than the Oklahoma Indians. Five years of Labour policy went a long way towards erecting a British offshore supplies industry and technology, and towards laying fears that were always more based on ideology than on actuality. But the need for the industry now in existence to move out of the national into the international market is still there. This can only be done by tendering for a share in the offshore oil provinces—as yet not fully developed—off Mexico, China, Indonesia, or West Africa.

Some aspects of this work have already been earmarked by the international specialisation of labour developed in the oil industry before North Sea oil became a reality. There is little point in trying at this stage to compete in a big way in the drilling-rig business, though there might be a case for BNOC to be allowed one experimental drill ship to enter into the deep-water drilling business at as early a stage as possible. But there ought to be a market for a package deal with any state with an offshore oil province once oil has been discovered. The package will, however, need to be complete: including platform, modules, storage and distribution system, landing-point and transport to refinery (if necessary), communications from shore to platform, helicopter, supply ship, and policing system. It will also need to be tied in with the education and training of native operators, co-operation in scientific research, and the whole transfer of technology game. The need to secure this package carries implications for the organisation of government-sponsored exports of a kind which may not exactly be welcome to the ideology of Mrs Thatcher's government. But trading with a state which is itself officially corporativist, as most Third-World states and all self-styled socialist states are, can only be left to industry where there already exist active trans-industry export organisations, which is simply not the case in Britain; and even then there is a defence export aspect to these kinds of package deal which cannot be integrated into an otherwise commercially-orientated package without official direction and authorisation.

In this context it is surprising that there has been so little attempt to discuss or analyse what went wrong with Britain's first effort in this field, the visit of the Minister of State for Energy to Mexico. It would make an excellent subject for one of the new parliamentary select committees—presumably the trade or energy committees would be the most appropriate ones—to investigate. Pending their recommendations, it has been suggested that the Offshore Supplies Office has its export branch strengthened; that an interdepartmental

4. *Marine Technology: The Report of a Task Force of the Engineering Board* (London: SRC, April 1976).

committee, under a senior civil servant if not a Minister of State as its chairman, be entrusted with the investigation and promotion of export opportunities; and that overall responsibility for the preparation of package offers be entrusted in each actual case to some figure equivalent to the head of the Defence Sales organisation.

Fisheries

Nowhere in the whole offshore tapestry is Malthusianism more in evidence than in the sphere of fisheries. This is perhaps the worst area to which the nineteenth-century liberal theories of economics preached by the ideological wing of Mrs Thatcher's government could be applied. Traditional market economics regard each actor as driven by the desire to maximise profits, cutting costs as far as possible, and increasing output until the limits of demand are reached. The efficient producer is the one whose individual costs are lowest at the common price at which demand is satisfied. Inefficient producers who cannot control their costs go bankrupt and are driven out of the market. If demand then increases so that prices rise, they or others re-enter the market and bring the price down again. The economics of fisheries do not work like that.

The first difference is that fisheries production is not limited by economic but by biological forces. Since the fishery stocks are limited, new entrants increase costs for all engaged in fisheries production. If individuals try to beat the game by increasing the efficiency of their catching efforts the same effect is manifested. If the stock begins to fall as a result of over-fishing these processes are accelerated. Increased effort does not cut costs, it increases them and thus diminishes profits. As a result the market can only work by management and control. Competition destroys it.

This lesson has been a long time in the learning; and it is still not fully accepted. The failure of the various North Atlantic Fisheries Conventions to solve the problem of management encouraged the Malthusian nationalism already observed in the energy business. The 200-mile exclusive (or virtually exclusive) fisheries zones have driven British fishing fleets back into the North Sea. The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Communities, an attempt at pseudo-management, motivated by the absence of viable fish stocks in the waters of the original signatories of the Treaty of Rome, accentuated the problem of excess fishing effort and falling stocks in the North Sea. The British proclamation of a 200-mile fisheries zone should theoretically have opened all the waters included to all the fishing fleets of the Nine—soon to be enormously extended in size by the fishing fleets of Spain, Greece and Portugal. And the whole issue has become entangled in the 'anti-market' campaign of the left-wing of the Labour Party and the Anglophobia of the 'Gaullist' element in the original six members of EEC. Under this impetus the fisheries industries of Britain have developed a political 'clout' that was entirely lacking ten years ago. It should be noted, however, that it remains a 'lobbying clout' as yet

untested in any election or by-election, and working only where the door is already open—as was the case with the pro- and anti-Community fight within the last Labour government. (By contrast, no amount of lobbying has done anything very much for the port of Fleetwood, or won the industry the kind of financial support that Clydeside or the Rolls-Royce Bristol aerospace complex have been able to command in the past. Nor was it able to prevent Britain's 'surrender' in the last 'Cod War' with Iceland.)

Negotiations with the other members of the European Community are complicated by the normal system of linked bargaining by which the Community settles its internal inter-state problems. In this Britain starts with few cards in its hands, given that it is also opposed to the budget system and the Common Agricultural Policy and has refused to enter the European Currency circle. Britain's only major asset lies in its self-sufficiency in automotive energy (and in the longer term, in its enormous coal reserves, an asset of uncertain value given the French and German drives for nuclear generated electricity).

The principal difficulties in the British position are biological and psychological. In terms of marine biology, even a 200-mile exclusive fisheries zone, limited as it would have to be in the North Sea by the claims of the other littoral states to something like the present median line, cannot prevent the over-fishing of the major pelagic fish stocks, whose life cycle takes them out of British waters at certain biologically significant stages. Conservation and stock management for these species must be European. Marine biology makes nonsense of Malthusian economic nationalism.

The psychological difficulties are just as great. In a time of general economic depression when the principal maritime communities in Britain are already suffering from the slump in shipbuilding and the general fall in international trade (though Britain's east-coast ports are an exception here) they feel themselves trapped in a permanently declining industry. The prospects of decline in the major fishing fleets and ports enhance the nationalist and bitter views of those who see themselves condemned at least to an artificially low level of economic activity for the foreseeable future by the fishing practices of others (the fact that under the laws of fishing economics they are inducing the same effects on the fishery fleets of other nations is ignored or disbelieved).

The launching of an international research effort into the solution of the problems of fish ranching, restocking, control of predators, close fisheries management, etc., might help to alleviate this mood of pessimism. But such experiments as have been carried out over the past twenty years or more have been condemned to failure by their limited scale, their inability within a small scale experiment to control natural predators, and by a general degree of scepticism about the economics of such an operation. This scepticism is understandable: but it is born of the comparatively minute sums of money with which fisheries research has so far been honoured in Britain, compared with that poured out on the various megalo-technological projects of the aerospace industry. It would be interesting to see whether the fisheries lobby today could

raise the kind of research money that the megalo-technologies—most of whom could not mobilise anything like the electoral voice the fisheries organisations claim—manage to obtain without effort.

Marine and maritime pollution

The control of maritime pollution emerged during 1978 as one of the most contentious and politically glamorous threads of the whole offshore tapestry. Successive and highly publicised incidents of pollution from sea-borne sources, the *Amoco Cadiz* off the French coast, the *Eleni V* off the coast of Essex, the *Christos Bitas* and the *Utopia* off the Welsh coast, and the *Esso Bernicia* in Sullum Voe in the Shetlands, dramatised the issues, filled the television screens and led to two direct confrontations between parliamentary select committees and the Department of Trade. Two reports by select committees were published, highly critical of government policy and organisation,[5] two defences of government policy in reply were issued,[6] and in March 1979 the Department of Trade unveiled its new Marine Pollution Unit at a one-day conference held in London.[7] The new Merchant Shipping Act was rushed through parliament in time to become law before the dissolution of parliament and the General Election—thus robbing members of the House of Lords, where the scientific anti-pollution lobby has many well-briefed friends, of the chance to continue that fight. But the defensive complacency radiated by Department of Trade spokesmen has by no means been adequate to counter the cries of their critics.

In essence the issue still lies between the Department of Trade's institutionalised preference for a world-wide approach to the problems of ship-based pollution and the increasingly important preference for unilateral port-state or regional schemes of pollution control—to be enforced by legal action, heavy penalties and, where necessary, arrest of the offending ships at sea. The Department has traditionally been the civil department of state most concerned with maritime affairs. In British parlance and practice, foreign trade, for several hundred years, has not only meant maritime, shipborne trade, but trade carried in *British* bottoms. Though the British Merchant Marine has slipped to third or fourth place in international ranking, it is still enormously important to Britain as a source of foreign exchange and world influence. The Department of Trade is most concerned (obsessed, its critics maintain) not to establish a precedent or to encourage the principle of unilateral state action. Its arrangements for identifying and punishing ships which contravene the various

5. *Fourth Report from the Select Committee on Science and Technology, 1977-78,* HC-684 (London: HMSO, 1978); *Second Report from the Expenditure Committee, 1978-79,* HC-105-6 (London: HMSO, 1979).

6. *Eleni V,* The Government Reply to the Fourth Report from the Select Committee on Science and Technology, 1978, Cmnd. 7429 (London: HMSO 1978); *Measures to Prevent Collisions and Strandings of Noxious Cargo Carriers in Waters Around the United Kingdom.* The Government's Observations on the Second Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1978–79. Cmnd. 7429. (London: HMSO, 1978).

7. See, *Improved Arrangements to Combat Pollution at Sea* (London: HMSO, 1979).

international agreements designed to prevent deliberate pollution of the sea by ships are still far from ideal. If an offence takes place in British territorial waters (which are still limited to three miles) then the offender can be investigated by the Marine Survey Service, if it is rash enough to enter a British port. But such investigations depend on whether a record book, as required by the 1954 Convention, has been kept, and kept up to date. Without it, legal action is unlikely to succeed. If it does, fines are rarely large by current standards and have frequently been reduced on appeal. If an offence takes place outside the three-mile limit, and the offender can be properly identified then it is reported to its flag state.

In all this, the Department of Trade has chosen to make the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) its main instrument and pins its hopes to the new requirements in tanker design laid down in the 1978 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Convention; in the attempts to improve seamanship internationally included in the 1978 IMCO Convention; and in the extension of traffic control schemes. Its concentration on IMCO is naturally welcome to that United Nations special agency—which has had far less than its fair share of the limelight in the past. But one cannot help feeling that, in other respects, the advice the Department of Trade has been tendering the government is as strongly reminiscent of that given by the courtiers, in another marine context, to King Canute—as was the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's resistance to the 200-mile zone concept in the first two years of UNCLOS III.

The truth is that the twelve-mile limit on territorial waters is now as firmly established in the minds of all those attending UNCLOS III as the 200-mile fisheries zone. Indeed the French government's reactions to the *Amoco Cadiz* trauma was to introduce into UNCLOS III a series of amendments to the draft text (on which negotiation is based), greatly strengthening the powers of the coastal states to control pollution, and to secure a wider degree of international support for these measures. As the legal adviser to the French Chamber of Shipping succinctly put it, in March 1979: France now realises that coastal interests should prevail over general maritime interests.

There is also reason to believe that the Department of Trade quite misapprehends the directions from which British shipping interests are threatened. The threat from the Third World to British shipping does not come from piratical statelets intent on exploiting their strategic situation athwart main shipping routes to extract tolls from all who pass. It lies, rather, in the feeling of the so-called Group of 77 (actually the number is over 120) that the domination of the world's shipping by some four or five industrial powers is another symptom of the continuation, in the field of economic and financial relationships, of the colonial status from which they have escaped in the political sphere. Put crudely, they do not want to tax the shipping fleets—they want a piece of the cake. Following the Soviet and East European example, Third-World countries want to invade and take over at least that part of world

shipping which is involved in trade between themselves—first, by getting into the flag of convenience racket, and second, by building up—and owning—their own fleets. The danger lies not at UNCLOS III but at UNCTAD VI. The temporary collapse of the Fifth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, where these plans have already been aired, should not delude anyone that they will not be revived. So starved for orders are the shipbuilders of the major industrial nations that once any single member of the Group of 77, or more likely a consortium of them, raises the money to start placing orders, there is no prospect whatever of some, at least, of the major shipbuilding nations not falling in with their plans. This is particularly true in the case of Japan, where the governing elites still tend to identify themselves with the cause, now championed by the Group of 77 and the Soviet bloc, of finally ending the pre-1914 domination of the world by European and American industry and finance. What the Callaghan government did, in its handling of the Polish orders, to aid the East European fleet's ability to challenge Western shipping, can only too readily be done again by Norway, or Japan. It is true that the nations of the Group of 77 are divided, lack know-how, are short of the skills marine operators require, and even shorter of the managerial skills. But they can and will acquire them, as the members of OPEC are doing in the oil business and as the Egyptians did in the management and pilotage of the Suez Canal after 1956.

Moreover the typical reaction of the Group of 77 to attempts by Britain, or other nearby industrialised states, to use United Nations agencies to maintain or raise international standards is to see this as a restrictive device hypocritically urged to maintain the predominance of those states which benefit most from the status quo. Reliance on IMCO is admitted by those who defend British policy as involving a slow, lengthy process of arriving at an international consensus, and an even longer route to ensuring that this consensus becomes so strong that individual states out for short-term advantage are constrained by it. But there is good reason to argue that they have not come to terms with just how long that process could take; with how all the factors at present at work in the various international forums are combining to lengthen it; and how even the movement to conserve the world's resources, once the domain of Third-World elder statesmen intent on criticising the heavily industrialised nations, is fast being seen by the emerging generation of the Third-World spokesmen as yet another hangover from the years of European intellectual domination. Those Third-World experts who are genuinely concerned with Third-World pollution are determined to insist on coastal and port-state jurisdiction. They note, for example, how the world's tankers on the Cape route wait until they are out of South African waters before washing out their tanks at sea and fouling the coastal waters of Mozambique or Malagasy; and they are determined to stop it as soon as they can. In advocating the rights of coastal states Britain would for once be getting out of the heavily industrialised states league it so often finds itself in at world

conferences today; but it would also be bowing to the inevitable and recognising here, as it was forced to do in the matter of deep sea fisheries, that when the old order is changing the wise man goes along with it.

In the matter of detection and cure, the principal weakness in the new scheme set up by the Department of Trade is the absence of any method or organisation to detect pollution at sea *before* it hits the coast. The second is the continuing vulnerability of ports, estuaries and enclosed waters to accidental near-shore discharges. The first weakness is the more striking in that the new Marine Pollution unit envisages the maintenance, on standby, of both what could be called a Department of Trade navy and airforce—equipped with pollutant dispersal chemicals and other anti-pollutant gear (some of it of a markedly Heath Robinsonian character). Yet there are sea and air patrols maintained by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force as part of their fisheries and oil rig protection service. Why the detection of sea-borne pollution and identification of its source could not be added to the role these vessels and aircraft play is a question that has not so far been properly answered.

Defence, policing, enforcement

This failure to co-ordinate the marine patrolling activities of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force on behalf of the Departments of Energy and of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, with the marine pollution survey work of the Department of Trade, underlines once again the strength of the arguments advanced by those who feel that there is a need to rationalise the various sea-borne activities of government. The logical way to do this is to evolve a single new civilian sea-borne and, where necessary, air-borne force which would act essentially as the survey and enforcement arm of government at sea. Defence is for the armed services; but fisheries protection, oil company installation surveillance, aid in accidents at sea, traffic regulation, coastguard work, pollution surveillance and so on, it is argued, should be the work of a single 'blue lamp' navy whose ships should be specially designed for the role and not have to double as warships, with all the enormous increase in sophisticated equipment and expense involved at present in defence requirements procedures.

At present the apparatus of government is riddled with 'private' navies. Not only does the Royal Air Force have sea-borne vessels (as the Royal Navy has aircraft): the Departments of Trade, Environment, Energy, and of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland; the Customs and Excise Waterguard; the Coastguards; and various port authorities—all have separate sea-going services with their own vessels on permanent hire or charter where they are not part of the service. Their activities are co-ordinated, at least in so far as fisheries and oil rigs protection is concerned, by the Joint Tapestry Coordination Committee, whose members are drawn from the Department of Energy, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland on the civil side; and from the Royal

Navy (Flag Officer Scotland and RN Fishery Protection service) and the Royal Air Force.

Debate within government hitherto has focused on the enormous expense that would be involved in the establishment of a new service with career grades, training facilities, etc. A rather cursory investigation of the United States Coastguard Service, sometimes proposed as a model for such a service in Britain, has been used in intra-governmental debate, to strengthen the case against it. The Royal Navy and Air Force are ambivalent: some factions welcome fisheries and oil installation protection as something which gives their junior officers and small ships something to do all the time; while to others it is simply an unwelcome distraction from the main tasks of the armed services—the containment of the Queen's enemies. As a result the uniformed services have tended to emphasise the expense involved (which they fear would react unfavourably on their own budgets) while refraining from taking a definite position, in principle, either for or against the idea.

These arguments would be the more convincing if there had ever been a serious feasibility study of how such a service could be put together, how much duplication of effort in the existing plethora of departmental navies it would replace, how much of its work could be done either by secondment from the Royal Navy or by contract vessels and crews (drawn perhaps from the laid-up vessels and crews of the distant fishing fleet), how administrative services could be thinned down *ab initio* and so on. (If ever there was a chance to introduce Marks and Spencer-style management into government service this is it.) It goes without saying that no such study has been made as yet. Perhaps there is a task here for the Cabinet Office 'Think Tank', the Central Policy Review Staff—though it is to be hoped that should such a study be undertaken, it will be carried out with staff somewhat more intellectually prepared for their task than those who produced the recent report on overseas representation. That there is an active role to be played can be seen from the 1978 figures of Fisheries Protection activities: 1,136 foreign and 249 British fishing vessels boarded and 20 prosecuted in the first nine months of 1978 out of total sightings of 12,000 non-British vessels, a proportion of roughly 10 per cent boarded.

Research and development

Consideration of such an investigation inevitably brings us back to the question of the framework of government and the relationship between government and industry. The most difficult of all areas here is that covered by research and development. The recent revamping of the structure of scientific advice within Cabinet has given the Cabinet Office a Chief Scientist attached to the 'Think Tank' to ask fundamental or innovating questions and to promote 'projects best led from the centre'.[8] The Cabinet at the same time was provided

8. *Review of the Framework for Government Research and Development*, Cmnd. 7499 (London: HMSO, 1979).

with a committee of chief scientists from all the departments of government chaired by the Secretary to the Cabinet—one of the three most senior members of the Civil Service. The Lord Privy Seal, who, in addition to chairing the committee for co-ordinating marine and maritime policy noted above is also generally responsible for co-operation and co-ordination between the research and development activities of the various government departments was also provided with an Advisory Committee on Applied Research and Development.

Beneath this Cabinet Office structure each of the departments concerned has its own chief scientist and requirements boards, the SMTRB for industry, the Offshore Energy Technology Board for the Department of Energy, the Research Requirements Committee for the Department of the Environment, the Fisheries Research and Development Board for the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Scottish Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. Parallel with these boards are the great government laboratories and industrial research establishments.

So much for the governmental research and development structure. Government funds also go very far in academic research and development, being funneled through the four Research Councils (attached to the Department of Education and Science, and of which departmental chief scientists are members) to the universities—where five 'centres of excellence' or consortia of university departments and institutes of science and technology, two in Scotland, two in the North, and one in London lead the university research effort.

The principal weakness in this system lies in the subordination of long-term research to customer-oriented policy-related research which is inevitably of a somewhat short-term nature. Theoretically, university departments can approach either the Requirements Boards (which are supposed to be customer-oriented) or the Research Councils (which are supposed to be more long term in their view). In practice the distinction is greatly blurred by the much greater research budgets of the Requirements Boards and the presence on the Research Councils of departmental chief scientists who cannot but be influenced toward customer-oriented research by the needs of their own departments. General financial stringency in the universities will greatly accentuate this bias, since research teams and facilities can only be kept together by frequent and increasingly massive injections of money, and their directors tend to be governed in their applications very much by their sense of where the financial interests lie at the moment.

In this structure the genuine inventor or innovatory idea can only too easily be lost, along with long-term research—that is, with more than a 3–4 year pay-off at the outside. It is difficult to see how the present system can meet the need for research and development directed to deep-water hydrocarbon location and exploitation. Nor are the great commercial laboratories or the research and development efforts of the major industrial companies likely to fill this gap.

They are, after all, constrained by the commercial and profit-making *rai d'etre* of their parent organisations. Devices which can be patented, market and manufactured under licence provide them with funds to pay their staff a amortise their capital. Principles, new ways of thinking, new areas a methods of investigation (which cannot be protected by patent) are not. To : this is not to belittle or underestimate the skill, scientific integrity managerial ability of their staffs. No academic sneering is intended. It is just note that here too the pay-off on a research effort has to be counted in mon rather than years, in a few years rather than a decade—and that they cannot more than a few marches ahead of their sponsors.

What we do not as yet understand is how innovation and invention cor about, or how the technological needs of the next decade can be anticipat What is clear is that the present system must militate against research wit high risk of failure and in favour of research generated by the technolog needs of the moment. In a sense, since all research takes time to matu researchers are always answering the questions of yesterday rather th anticipating those of tomorrow. Perhaps much closer liaison between indus and independent research might provide part of the answer. Perhaps indust like government, needs a structure of scientific advisers closely linked to areas of forward policy discussion and planning. Perhaps we need a pro comparative research programme based on a science policy unit such as tha Sussex University, looking at the experience of other countries and of vari British industries to see if anything sensible can be deduced from the differ experience of other industries (medical research, for example) or ot countries (Japan, the United States, West Germany, France). It is surely cl that the less money we have the surer we must be that it is not wasted.

By way of conclusion

In her offshore resources Britain possesses the wherewithal for an indust and technological recovery, and for resources of energy and protein which going to be in increasingly short supply as the twentieth gives way to twenty-first century. Britain has always been dependent on the sea for tr and wealth, and she has always been most vulnerable to attacks on maritime basis of that wealth. Many of the lessons learnt in the past have b forgotten in this century by a population and a government overloaded w other preoccupations: the promotion of social welfare; the defence of institutions against external attack; and the world-wide recession of Europ power and influence after two world wars. What is now the issue is whet these marine and maritime resources will be properly understood and used, a whether the machinery of government and the national outlook of our peo is properly adapted to such understanding and use. The first fifteen years offshore activity have demonstrated the considerable strengths of the Brit system; they have also shown up considerable areas of weakness and

ineffectiveness. Most of all is this true in an area upon which this paper has hardly touched—the supply of trained manpower. Our present system of education gives us two million unemployed and thousands of vacancies unfilled for lack of the skilled trained manpower. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the world offshore. More and more it is becoming clear that the fault lies in our primary schooling, in the orientation of the teachers and the effectiveness of their teaching methods—which produce an academic elite of arts graduates and pure scientists/mathematicians at one end, and a myriad of near unemployable illiterates at the other, few if any of whom think of the sea as anything more than a background to bank holiday outings or something to be flown over *en route* to the annual holiday at Benidorm.

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN ISRAEL

Avi Shlaim and Avner Yaniv *

ISRAEL'S foreign policy since 1967 has been unsystematic, lacking a clear sense of direction and singularly reactive. The decade which followed her overwhelming military victory in the Six Day War was characterised by diplomatic deadlock and immobilism. As an actor on the international stage, Israel exhibited none of the qualities of boldness, initiative and willingness to accept risks which characterised her performance on the battlefield. On the contrary, the marginal changes in foreign policy which did take place were the consequence of painful adjustment to external pressures rather than of positive calculation and planning. This is not to say that Israel's foreign policy has been totally devoid of generous offers, imaginative plans, or major initiatives in her relations with her neighbours.[1] But even if allowance is made for such initiatives, the most conspicuous element in Israel's foreign policy remains, it would appear, a tendency to react to events, and particularly to crises, by a maladroit admixture of military activism and diplomatic immobility.

The record of Israeli foreign policy 1967-73

The record which supports this view of Israel's foreign policy is compelling. Soon after the guns fell silent in June 1967 it was announced by the Prime Minister of the day, Levi Eshkol, that Israel would not relinquish any of the Arab territories she now occupied until the Arabs agreed to negotiate directly with Israel a formal peace treaty incorporating secure and recognised boundaries.[2] This formula, which served as the basis for Israeli diplomacy for the next six years, simply stated Israel's maximal demands for perfect peace and perfect security. It did not represent a realistic strategy for initiating a dialogue with Israel's adversaries. In fact, it amounted to a virtual abdication of

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1. Abba Eban, the former Israeli Foreign Minister, emphatically denies that the period between 1967 and 1973 was one of deadlock in Israeli policy and claims that there was a more intensive quest for peace after 1967 than in any other period in the country's history. *An Autobiography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), pp. 453-54.

2. *Divrei ha-Knesset* (Proceedings of the Knesset), June 12, 1967.

the capacity to initiate and to manoeuvre in the diplomatic arena. In fairness, it should be pointed out that initially a much more accommodating and generous attitude lay behind Israel's public pronouncements. On June 19, 1967 the Eshkol Cabinet reached a dramatic decision which was communicated in great secrecy to the State Department for transmission to Arab governments, indicating Israel's willingness to sign peace treaties with Egypt and Syria based on the former international boundaries, but subject to the demilitarisation of the evacuated areas and a special agreement for Sharm-el-Sheikh. But in August the Cabinet changed its mind and annulled the decision,[3] possibly as a reaction against the Arab rebuff and insistence on unconditional evacuation which was followed by the famous 'three nos' pronounced at the Khartoum summit conference: no peace, no recognition, and no negotiation with Israel.[4] Thereafter, the Cabinet had no agreed position on the terms of a peace settlement. Moshe Dayan, who was Defence Minister at the time and one of the leading opponents of Israel taking the initiative in opening a peace dialogue, frankly admitted in October 1967 that the reason for the government's reluctance to state its position on peace proposals was that it had no policy in this regard.[5]

Lacking an agreed initiating policy of its own, Israel found itself in the position of having to react to the initiatives of her Arab adversaries and of the international community. Since these ideas were somewhat indiscriminately perceived as prejudicial to her interests, her reactions ranged from coolness to vehement hostility. The most important initiative, representing the broadest international consensus on the subject, was the Security Council's resolution 242 of November 1967, which called for an Israeli withdrawal 'from territories occupied in the recent conflict', and a recognition of the right of all the parties to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries. The second point met Israel's principal demand, yet her acceptance of the resolution was so unenthusiastic, so hedged with qualifications and so slow to come, that even among her friends some doubt developed as to the sincerity of her repeated assurances that all the territories were negotiable.[6] And these suspicions were inevitably reinforced by the formal annexation of East Jerusalem and by the cool reception of the United Nations mediator, Dr Gunnar Jarring.

When, in the spring of 1969, the Four Powers began informal negotiations with a view to elaborating proposals for an Arab-Israeli settlement, the

3. Eban, *op. cit.*, pp. 435-36, and Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), pp. 105-106.

4. The British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, the Middle East, Sept. 4, 1967, ME/2559/A/2. On the Khartoum conference and its implications for the Arab position, see Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 137-40, and A. I. Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World* (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 52-53.

5. *Haaretz*, Oct. 11, 1967.

6. For a survey of the controversy surrounding resolution 242 and Israel's clarification of her position see Bernard Reich, *Quest for Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1977), pp. 131-33.

government of Mrs Golda Meir vehemently challenged their right to engage in such an exercise and explicitly stated that it would not even consider their recommendations.[7] When, following the breakdown of the Four Power talks, the American government launched the Rogers Plan in December 1969, it ran into immediate and categorical Israeli opposition. The second Rogers Plan of June 1970, which, unlike the first, did not spell out the terms of a settlement, but merely proposed a ceasefire and the reactivation of the Jarring mission, nevertheless precipitated a major governmental crisis which was only resolved when the hard-line Gahal bloc led by Manachem Begin left the national coalition in protest against the cautious affirmative reply favoured by the majority.[8] Later, however, when Egypt violated the standstill agreement, Israel responded by suspending her participation in the Jarring talks. To break the deadlock, Jarring sent a questionnaire asking Egypt for a declaration of readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel and asking Israel for a commitment to withdraw from Sinai in exchange. Set against the background of a generation-old refusal to recognise Israel's legitimacy, Egypt's positive response represented an important breakthrough in the conflict. Israel, however, charged Jarring with exceeding the terms of his mission and stated bluntly that it would 'not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines'.[9] This negative reply sealed the fate of Jarring's mission.

In 1971-72 efforts to defuse the conflict focused on the search for an interim agreement consisting of a partial Israeli withdrawal in Sinai and the reopening of the Suez Canal by Egypt. The idea was first floated by Dayan but, characteristically, the inability of his colleagues in the Cabinet to agree on a specific proposal left the initiative to others. When President Sadat took up the idea in February 1971, Mrs Meir hastened to denounce his proposal as a ploy designed to secure Israeli withdrawal without a peace treaty. But she left the door slightly ajar for further exploration, thereby enabling the United States government to step in as an intermediary. The talks, however, eventually broke down because of the rigid Israeli posture and refusal to withdraw more than nine kilometres from the water-line—or allow the presence of a symbolic Egyptian military force on the East Bank of the Canal. Some years later Dayan admitted that Israel's terms had been unrealistic and that the responsibility for missing this major opportunity to de-escalate the conflict lay with her.[10]

Israel's posture was even more inflexible on the Jordanian front. The decision of June 19, 1967 applied only to Egypt and Syria and made no reference to the future of the West Bank. Five weeks later Israel's Deputy

7. The *Jerusalem Post*, 31 March 1969, published the full text of the statement issued by the Israeli Cabinet just as the talks began. Mrs Meir's statement, the first of many, was reported in *Haaretz*, April 13, 1969.

8. See Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), ch. 8.

9. 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East', U.N. Document S/10403 (A18541), Nov. 30, 1971, Annex III.

10. Interview in *Maariv*, March 21, 1975. Eban regretted Dayan's failure 'to show his usual tenacity in support of this imaginative proposal which could have averted the Yom Kippur War'. Eban, *op. cit.*, p. 476.

Prime Minister, Yigal Allon, submitted to the Cabinet a comprehensive plan for a solution based on the retention by Israel of the strategically vital strip of land along the Jordan River and the return of the populated areas of the West Bank to Jordan.[11] The Cabinet, however, torn by disagreement over possible peace terms between Israel and Jordan, took no decision, preferring to keep all its options open. Thus, although secret talks with King Hussein were held on a number of occasions, the Israeli representatives could only put forward private ideas along the lines of the Allon Plan—not an official peace plan. Faced with a growing Palestinian challenge, in March 1972 King Hussein launched a plan of his own for the creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation which would include the West Bank and conclude a formal peace agreement with Israel. Having tried in vain to dissuade Hussein from joining Egypt in the 1967 war, Israeli misgivings about allowing Jordan to regain control of the West Bank should not be dismissed as trivial. But with the Palestinians challenging the legitimacy of the Hashemite Kingdom as well as of Israel, Hussein's offer should have been, from the point of view of Israel's own interests, very carefully considered. Yet, as in previous instances, this does not appear to have been the case. Mrs Meir's response, from the rostrum of the Knesset, was negative, defensive and muddled.[12] In general, the effect of this Israeli policy—or rather non-policy—of shunning political risks, eschewing serious diplomatic initiatives and seeking to consolidate the existing territorial status quo eventually convinced even the few moderate Arab leaders that the deadlock could not be broken without a resort to force.

There can be little doubt that Sadat's decision to launch the October War was inspired by such a view of Israel's attitude and the outcome of the war did indeed create the preconditions for genuine bargaining and compromise in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, it seems that in so far as Israel was concerned, the main effect of the October War was to aggravate further its deep-seated anxieties and thus to stiffen the resistance of its government to any change in the status quo. It took an unprecedented degree of involvement by the United States and the relentless pressure applied by Dr Kissinger throughout his shuttle diplomacy to secure the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement of December 1973 and the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement of April 1974.[13] To keep up the momentum for peace—and, incidentally, to undermine the position of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and strengthen that of King Hussein—Kissinger proposed in October 1974 an Israeli-Jordanian disengagement agreement for which Israel was asked to pay the modest price of relinquishing Jericho. But Yitzhak Rabin, who had succeeded Golda Meir as Prime Minister in June 1974, rejected the proposal

11. Yeroham Cohen, *Tokhnit Allon* (The Allon Plan), (Habibutz Hamuechad, 1972), pp. 19–22.
12. *Divrei ha-Knesset*, March 16, 1972.
13. Edward R. Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976); Reich, *op. cit.*, pp. 241–68; and William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 207–252.

out of hand.[14] Rabin's entire strategy was designed to gain time for rebuilding Israel's military strength and eschew serious bargaining with the Arabs until Israel could once again deal from a position of unquestionable strength.[15] Consequently, his conditions for an Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement were so unyielding that Kissinger's efforts to promote such an agreement came to naught in March 1975. It took an American threat to reassess the special relationship with Israel, and another intensive round of pressures and bargaining for the interim agreement to be eventually concluded in September 1975.

The defeat of the Labour Party in the May 1977 elections ended twenty-nine years of uninterrupted Labour dominance and brought to power Menachem Begin's hard-line Likud bloc. Begin and his party asserted the political indivisibility of the area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River and were committed to the promotion of Jewish settlement and Jewish control in the West Bank. Begin inaugurated the new phase in Israel's foreign policy with a much publicised declaration that the future of the West Bank was not negotiable since it is an integral and inalienable part of the historic Jewish homeland. At the same time, however, Begin sent out secret feelers to President Sadat which helped to prepare the ground for Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem.[16] In a remarkable reversal of his predecessors' policy, he agreed to restore the whole of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty and even to uproot Israeli settlements there in exchange for peace. But when the peace process got under way his government displayed an unyielding approach on the question of Palestinian autonomy and Jewish settlements on the West Bank. It was particularly uncompromising in its refusal to link the idea of Palestinian autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza (which had been proposed by Begin in his original peace plan and subsequently incorporated in the Camp David agreements) with the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. President Carter's personal involvement in the detailed and protracted negotiations after Camp David, and the unremitting pressure which he brought to bear on Israel, eventually ensured the conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of March 1979. But once again the strident tone, the contradictory statements and stone-walling tactics of the Israeli negotiators projected the Israeli government as the inflexible and intransigent party and deprived it of its share in the credit for this achievement.

The intrinsic constraints of the international negotiation process were partly responsible for this adverse effect on Israel's image. It is natural in such a process for each party to reject loudly the demands of the other and dig its heels

14. Shulamit Aloni, 'The Great Missed Opportunity', *Haaretz*, Oct. 19, 1979. Mrs Aloni was a minister in Rabin's government at the time. Eban was strongly opposed to Rabin's decision and criticised it for subordinating international needs to domestic considerations. Eban, *op. cit.*, p. 583.

15. Rabin indiscreetly disclosed the assumptions that guided his policy and prompted him to work for a new period of immobilism in a background briefing which was published as an interview in *Haaretz* on Dec. 3, 1974.

16. See Shmuel Seguev, *Sadat: ha-Derekh la-Shalom* (Sadat: the Road to Peace), (Jerusalem: Masada, 1978), pp. 42-44; *Maariv* (special supplement on the peace treaty), March 23, 1979; and interview with Begin, *Maariv*, April 11, 1979.

in. The dual aim of such tactics is to put pressure on the other party to make further concessions and to reassure the domestic public about the toughness of their respective governments. What was remarkable in Israel's case was the liberty taken by individuals and groups within the government in making declarations, leaking plans and resorting to actions which greatly complicated its task abroad and placed enormous strain on the evolution of peace negotiations. Nevertheless, the Begin government did achieve a fundamental goal of Israeli foreign policy—peace with Egypt. The lesson is, perhaps, that a severely constrained and reactive foreign policy, while not conducive to success in attaining national goals, is not doomed to perpetual failure either.[17]

Domestic factors in Israeli foreign policy

The reactive character of Israeli foreign policy has often been noticed. It is usually explained in terms of the allegedly inescapable constraints imposed by the external environment. Israel is pictured as a small country surrounded by implacable enemies committed to its destruction and it is, therefore, compelled to react to their hostile initiatives in its struggle for survival. This explanation has been consistently employed by Israeli decision-makers, and by sympathetic commentators since 1948, although the peace agreement with Egypt has recently deprived it of much of its credibility and appeal. Its basic assumption, however, that the reactive nature of Israeli foreign policy is not of her own making, but rather congenitally preordained in the uniquely hostile regional environment in which the state finds itself, still pervades a very substantial body of Israeli opinion.[18]

The aim of this article is not to deny the relevance of the external constraints to the understanding of Israel's foreign policy—although the authors believe that the importance of this factor has been greatly exaggerated and that its elevation to the status of an unchallenged paradigm has served to obscure instead of illuminating the complex dynamics of Israeli foreign policy. Their purpose is rather to explore the domestic conditions which give rise to Israel's reactive international behaviour. It is not their contention that domestic constraints are the only determinant of Israeli foreign policy. But it may well be argued that these constraints are a decisive factor in the making of Israeli foreign policy and that, indeed, many of the most salient features of Israeli foreign policy can only be understood when seen against the backdrop of domestic politics. Moreover, concentration on this factor, which is admittedly one among many, is justified not only by its intrinsic importance, but by the

17. For a general discussion of the relationship between domestic political structure and performance in the world arena, see Avner Yaniv, 'Domestic Structure and External Flexibility: A Systemic Restatement of a Neglected Theme', *Millennium—Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 1979.

18. The leading proponent of this explanation of Israel's reactive behaviour is Yehoshafat Harkabi. He has expounded this view in various publications in Hebrew and English and most recently in *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response* (New York: The Free Press, 1977). The title of this book is revealing. So is Harkabi's conceptualisation of the range of national opinion about Israel's political problems into three schools, for he explicitly states that 'They are all *reactive, i.e.* their policy prescriptions are derivative of or deduced from their assumptions about the Arab position and threats'. p. 127, (emphasis in the original).

tendency to neglect it which is evident in the extensive literature on Israel's foreign policy.[19]

The thesis here advanced is that the principal reason for the deadlock and immobilism of Israeli foreign policy in the last thirteen years can be found in the breakdown of the domestic national consensus in the aftermath of the 1967 war and the development of a deep internal cleavage on the issues raised by the war, the most important of which concerned the future of the occupied territories. What happened was not so much the adoption by the various parties of conflicting foreign policy stands, but the emergence of deep divisions of opinion *inside* each of the major parties. This new polarisation into hawks and doves, cutting right across the existing party lines, deprived successive coalition governments of a workable consensus and prompted them to avoid decision—thereby preserving the unity of their ranks but, at the same time, forfeiting the possibility of a mobile, long-range and initiatory foreign policy.

To gain a full understanding of the causes and consequences of this breakdown of national consensus on the central foreign policy issues confronting the state, it is necessary to grasp the complex multi-party system and to explore the social undercurrents that ultimately determine the structure and functioning of the political system. It has been said that 'the beginning of wisdom in Israeli politics lies in recognizing the political party's pre-eminence'.[20] But it may be argued that the beginning of wisdom in the politics of Israeli foreign policy lies in recognising not just the pre-eminence of the political parties, but also the complex and changing relationship between the country's social system and its politics.

It is a pertinent question whether in these terms Israel is *sui generis* or part of a universal, or at least Western, pattern. But there can be little doubt that at their inception the social and political sub-systems of the nascent Israeli state were highly unusual. Normally, political cleavages tend to develop from pre-existing societal division as various groups organise themselves politically in order to defend and promote their interests. In the pre-independence Jewish community in Palestine, however, the reverse took place. Political divisions preceded the existence of organised society. They involved ideological differences on such matters as socialism versus capitalism, religion versus the state, and activism versus moderation in dealing with the Arabs, and the British Mandate authorities. These conflicting ideological positions were articulated in the mainly East European diaspora, transported to Palestine by emigrants and gradually translated into institutional realities. A primary function of these institutions was the absorption of immigrants. As the British Mandate authorities restricted their own role to the maintenance of law and order, these political parties took it upon themselves to provide the newcomers

19. Two notable exceptions are Rael Jean Isaac, *Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); and Nadav Safran, *Israel: the Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1978).

20. Leonard J. Fein, *Politics in Israel* (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), p. 67.

with housing, education, health services and para-military protection. The new immigrants were thus absorbed into a thoroughly politicised milieu even before an independent polity had come into existence.[21]

The establishment of the state in May 1948 was followed by two contradictory trends. Under the leadership of David Ben Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister and a most relentless centraliser, the authorities of the new state fought tooth and nail to nationalise as much as possible of the non-political (but highly politicised) services provided by the parties. Defence was the first sector to be nationalised, following a bitter struggle which brought the country to the verge of a civil war. It was soon followed by the take-over of other functions such as education and the absorption of immigrants by the central government.

The second trend which followed the establishment of the state added up to a consolidation of some of the pre-independence habits under a loose umbrella of nationalisation. No party emerged with a majority of the seats in the 120-member Knesset or parliament. The political system was characterised by extreme multi-partism with Mapai as the dominant party. (For the distribution of seats in the Knesset since 1948 see Table 1.) Coalition governments thus became inevitable, and in order to maximise its own payoffs Mapai invariably

Table 1

Distribution of Seats from the First to the Ninth Knesset, 1949-1977

Party	*1st 1949*	*2nd 1951*	*3rd 1955*	*4th 1959*	*5th 1961*	*6th 1965*	*7th 1969*	*8th 1973*	*9th 1977*
Mapai	46	45	40	47	42				
Achdut Ha'avoda	—	—	10	7	8	45	Labour Alignment		
Mapam	19	15	9	9	9	8	56	51	32
Rafi	—	—	—	—	—	10			
Democratic Movement for Change	—	—	—	—	—	—			15
							Gahal	Likud	
Herut	14	8	15	17	17	26	26	39	43
Liberal	7	20	13	8	17				
Independent Liberal	5	4	5	6		5	4	4	1
United Religious	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
National Religious	—	10	11	12	12	11	12	10	12
Agudat Israel	—	5	6	6	6	4	4	5	4
Poalei Agudat Israel						2	2		1
Communist	4	5	6	3	5	4	4	4	5
Citizens' Rights	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1
Arab lists	2	5	5	5	4	4	4	3	1
Others	7	3	—	—	—	1	8	1	5

21. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Miyishuv le-Medina (The Origins of the Israeli Polity)* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977), pp. 104-107.

formed coalitions that were larger than was necessary to win.[22] Since M was intent on maintaining a quasi-monopoly in the realm of foreign defence policy, the payoffs distributed to her coalition partners had to be in domestic field. The concessions accorded to the religious parties concei primarily the role of religion in the state, while other coalition partners v given control of various civil ministries. The upshot was a quasi-theoci status quo in a society which was predominantly secular. Another result the enshrining of long-term control of particular government agencies particular parties, who used them as a matter of course for the maintenanc their traditional clientele and, with the massive influx of immigrants in early 1950s, for the further expansion of these electoral 'estates'.

Such, in broad terms, was the nature of the interface between the social political systems during Israel's first decade of statehood. Since then, this s of affairs has changed almost beyond recognition. During the intervening y the population was swollen by post-independence newcomers and young *sa* (Israeli born) whose attachment to the fiercely ideological ethos of the foun fathers, was tenuous and ambiguous.[23] These now form the overwheln majority of Israeli citizens and the weakening of their attachment to poli parties has, paradoxically, been encouraged by the cult of *etatism* to wh most of the mainstream parties and especially Mapai, were committed. On the results of this process has been the fragmentation of nation-wide p constituencies (which normally should act as intermediaries between the r and file and the party centres) into increasingly powerful and assertive l branches, pressure groups and other secondary centres of power. This shi the relationship between the centre and the periphery in favour of the latter affected all the political parties, but it was particularly pronounced in the cas the Labour Party.[24] In the aftermath of the October War this proces disintegration within the parties proceeded apace and reached its climax in Labour Party under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin. The ability of the par to discharge their traditional function of co-ordinating the secondary po centres, allocating resources, aggregating demands and articulating positi (both in foreign and domestic policy) was seriously impaired. At the same ti and largely as a result of the weakening of the parties, there was a steep dec in the ability of the political system itself to work through the secondary po centres according to the normal rules of bargaining and compromise.[25]

The progressive emasculation of partisan national centres and simultaneous decline in the ability of the government to formulate policy in internal or external spheres, was undoubtedly enhanced by the evident dec

22. David Nachmias, 'Coalition Politics in Israel', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Oct. 19

23. Amos Elon, *The Israelis: Founders and Sons* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), ch. 11.

24. Myron J. Aronoff, *Power and Ritual in the Israeli Labour Party* (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1977).

25. Itzhak Galnoor, 'Changes in the Israeli Political System Since the Yom Kippur War', *Medina, Min ve-Yabasim Bein-leumiyim*, Vol. 11, Winter 1977 (in Hebrew).

in the stature and influence of national leaders.[26] Ben Gurion had exercised a leadership of towering dimensions and he commanded supreme authority in the foreign policy and defence fields—but even he was ultimately rebuffed by his party and forced to resign in 1963. Levi Eshkol, who succeeded him, was a highly skilled manager of the economy, a popular party leader and the best Cabinet chairman in Israel's history. But he was forced to relinquish the Defence portfolio to Dayan during the political crisis which preceded the Six Day War and he never succeeded subsequently in rebuilding his authority or in leading the government in the moderate direction which he was known to favour. Golda Meir, who was recalled by her party from retirement upon Eshkol's death in 1969, immediately collected the reins of power into her own hands. Her position within the party was immensely strong and she presided over the Cabinet with unchallenged authority. But her highest priority as party leader was the maintenance of party unity even if it meant avoiding decisions and as Prime Minister she was inclined by temperament to resist external pressures on Israel rather than plan a positive long-range foreign policy. Her premiership, in the words of her Foreign Minister, was 'primarily an exercise in crisis management'.[27] In a very real sense her personal immobilism was translated into a national posture which makes her period of office one of the most sterile and stagnant chapters in the annals of Israeli foreign policy. Yitzhak Rabin's rise to power in 1974 was attended by widely shared hopes that he would reform and revive his party, effect the changes which were long overdue in the foreign policy of his predecessor and formulate new national goals in line with the new postwar circumstances and an active strategy for pursuing them. But he has turned out to be a weak and uncharismatic leader, lacking and unable to build any real power base, presiding over a bitterly divided party and a precarious coalition government. Faced with a host of conflicting demands and an open challenge to his own position, his strategy was to play for time and avoid actions which would antagonise any significant element of his shaky coalition. It has been said, without much exaggeration, that if *unwillingness* to make decisions and incur the risk of divisions characterised the pre-Rabin configuration, *inability* to make decisions—because of a particular pattern of political division in the country, the government, and dominant party—was the hallmark of the new configuration.[28]

One of the most surprising aspects of a period of otherwise exceedingly rapid change in Israel was how relatively little change took place in the basic composition of the main competing political camps. The social bases of the political system had changed completely from a mainly East European,

26. For a detailed and illuminating treatment of the Israeli high policy elite see Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).
27. Eban, *op. cit.*, p. 597.
28. Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

ideologically-oriented order to a colourfully heterogeneous mixture of Orientals, *sabras*, and newcomers from Eastern Europe, who were all held together by a common tradition (Judaism), a common enemy (the Arabs), and a commonly shared ethos of extreme pragmatism. While this melting-pot was simmering, many splits and mergers, fissions and fusions took place in the party system (whose hallmarks had always been fragmentation manifested by the multiplicity of parties; fractionalisation marked by the predominance of small parties; and polarisation marked by the ideological distance between the parties).[29] But essentially, the three basic blocs of the left wing, the right wing, and the religious parties persisted and in some cases even consolidated their formal unity. Significantly, the two most notable attempts to 'update' the party alignments, namely Ben Gurion's split with Mapai in 1965, and the formation of Professor Yigal Yadin's Democratic Movement for Change prior to the 1977 elections ended in dismal failure. Ben Gurion's party, Rafi, which gained only ten seats in the 1965 elections re-joined Mapai in the Labour Alignment which was formed in 1968, while the remaining obscurantist populist faction eventually found its way into the Movement for Greater Israel and the Likud. The Democratic Movement for Change did not survive as a united party outside the traditional blocs even for one year after the 1977 elections. In 'morphological' terms, then, the political landscape had changed considerably. In 'geological' terms, however, the formations remained essentially intact.

Two factors militated against a basic realignment of the party system. First, most big parties possessed well-established organisational infrastructures, joint assets and often extensive liabilities. Breaking them up has, therefore, been regarded a legally difficult and a materially expensive operation. Hence intra-party differences of opinion were seldom pressed to the point of a rupture. Secondly, the multiple and cross-cutting cleavages on major policy issues also inhibited a realignment of the party system. As has been noted above, during the pre-state days, the main divisions revolved round three axes; (1) socio-economic orientations on a European-type left to right continuum; (2) religious-secular differences; and (3) moderation versus activism in foreign policy. The first two decades of statehood saw a marked decline in the salience of the first division, and the emergence, following the 'ingathering of the exiles', of a new ethnic cleavage between Ashkenazi Jews and Oriental Jews.

The religious versus nonreligious division continued to be fairly accurately reflected in party structures through the existence of specialised religious parties such as the National Religious Party (NRP), Agudat Yisrael, and Poale Agudat Yisrael, and the interests of the religious minority continued, despite recurrent controversies and crises, to be very effectively served by the compromise known as 'the religious status quo'.[30] The impact of the Ashkenazi-Oriental cleavage on the existing party system was minimal as a

29. Emanuel Gutmann, 'Parties and Camps—Stability and Change', in Moshe Lissak and Emanuel Gutmann (eds.) *Hama'arekhet Hapolitit Hayisraelit (The Israeli Political System)*, (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977).
30. Ervin Birnbaum, *The Politics of Compromise: State and Religion in Israel* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970).

result of the successful policy of co-opting into the Ashkenazi-controlled parties a few Oriental notables and thereby projecting the image of equality and participation, while in effect depriving the Oriental masses of potential leaders and the possibility of organising themselves effectively into independent ethnic parties.[31] Some ethnic parties were formed, but they did not command much support or remain for very long on the political map.

The foreign policy schism within Mapai between the activists led by Ben Gurion and the moderates led by Moshe Sharett, which was very acute in the early 1950s and led to Sharett being ousted from the Foreign Ministry in 1955, became progressively muted. Although latent differences of opinion persisted, a practical consensus of opinion developed on the aims and methods of Israel's foreign policy in the decade of relative stability and tranquillity which followed the Suez War. The same trend towards consensus and the middle ground could be discerned in the changing foreign policy programme of the right-wing and traditionally hawkish opposition. Even after the conclusion of the armistice agreements of 1949, Begin's Herut party clung to its traditional motto, 'Israel on both sides of the Jordan' which staked a claim to the historic boundaries of ancient Israel. But this claim was dropped following Herut's merger with the General Zionists which led to the establishment of Gahal in 1965. There was no reference to the historic boundaries of *Eretz Yisrael* in Gahal's electoral platform for the 1965 election which committed the party to 'a constant striving for peace with the Arab peoples'.[32] Thus in the second decade of independence, a national consensus began to crystallise in favour of a pragmatic foreign policy and the acceptance of the 1949 armistice lines as the permanent boundaries of the state.

The domestic factor after the Six Day War

This consensus was shattered by the Six Day War, in the course of which Israel occupied the Golan Heights, the whole of Sinai and, most significantly, the West Bank of the Jordan, a territory which arouses powerful ideological and emotional undercurrents in Israeli society on account of being a part of the 'historic homeland'. In this new situation, the latent foreign policy divisions were powerfully reactivated, along with conflicting interpretations of the territorial and demographic imperatives of Zionism. The controversy engulfed all parties and was conducted with unprecedented intensity.

Basically, the debate boiled down to whether or not, to what extent, and in return for what, should the territories occupied in 1967 be returned: complex and vital questions to which no mainstream party was able to provide a clear and unambiguous answer. Six basic positions gradually emerged, however, on this cardinal question of policy, all of which cut across the formal party lines and all of which were represented, in varying degrees, within the Knesset.

31. Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).
32. Brecher, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-74.

The 'activist' extreme embodied by the Greater Israel Movement consisted of *unconditional hawks*, who opposed the return of any territories as well as a recognition of any Palestinian rights even in exchange for peace with the Arabs. A slightly less intransigent position was held by the *militant hawks*, who agreed to concessions in Sinai and the Golan Heights, but insisted on the river Jordan as Israel's political boundary on the eastern front—this, in effect, precluding any recognition of political rights for the Palestinians unless they were offered at Jordan's expense. The *moderate hawks*, subscribed to substantially the same views as the previous group, except that they were willing to settle for the recognition of the river Jordan as Israel's *strategic* boundary rather than its political boundary. The distinction implied preparedness for a functional division whereby Jordan would resume its rule over the population of the West Bank, while Israel would retain military control over the area. Sharing this more central zone on the militant/moderate continuum the *moderate doves* were ready for far-reaching territorial compromise over the West Bank and insisted only on such minor changes in Israel's previous border with Jordan as were necessary to safeguard the security of the state. Next in line, the *militant doves* were prepared to go still further: in exchange for 'real' peace, they were prepared to return all the territories to Arab hands and agree to the establishment astride Israel of a Palestinian state (possibly within a confederal framework with Jordan). Finally, at the opposite extreme to the *unconditional hawks*, were the *unconditional doves*—mostly members of the predominantly Arab New Communist List, who called for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories and favoured the establishment of an independent PLO state.[33]

The various viewpoints encapsulated by these somewhat arbitrary labels did not remain frozen, nor did the strength of each position remain unchanged in terms of the parliamentary representation that it enjoyed. The October War brought in its wake not only collective national soul-searching, but also genuine changes of opinion on the part of some individuals. Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem weakened substantially the two main props beneath the traditional hard-line Israeli policy—the deep-seated conviction that the fundamental Arab aim was the destruction of the state of Israel, and the contention that there was no one to talk to on the Arab side on the basis of even remotely acceptable terms. A shift in the entire spectrum of opinion in the direction of greater pragmatism and greater willingness to make concessions was the result. But no new national consensus emerged and the basic positions outlined above are still represented in the Knesset, albeit in modified, updated, and ever-changing permutations.

Four of these categories from the hawkish pole towards the centre are represented within the ruling Likud bloc, and four are represented within the

33. This typology is presented in greater detail and the degree of parliamentary support for each position is assessed in Avner Yaniv (with Fabian Pascal), 'Hawks, Doves and Other Birds of a Feather', *The British Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming).

Labour opposition. Within the Likud there are unconditional hawks, such as Ariel Sharon and Haim Landau, militant hawks, such as Begin himself, Yitzhak Shamir and Moshe Arens, moderate hawks such as David Levi and moderate doves such as Simha Erlich and Ezer Weizman. Within the National Religious Party there are militant hawks, such as Yehuda Ben-Meir and Zebulun Hammer, moderate hawks, such as Avraham Melamed, and moderate doves, such as David Glass.[34] Within the Labour Party there are militant hawks, such as Amos Hadar and Shoshana Arbeli-Almozelino, moderate hawks, such as Gad Yaakobi and Shimon Peres, moderate doves, such as Yigal Allon and Haim Barlev and militant doves, such as Yosi Sarid and Naftali Feder. Finally, and perhaps most illuminating of all, the attempt in 1977 of the Democratic Movement for Change to capture the electoral centre with its platform of social and economic reform, while deferring the formulation of a clear-cut foreign policy position, led to a break-up of the Party within the first post-election year along the lines separating the hawkish from the dovish halves of our continuum.

It may thus be correct to argue that no conceivable governing coalition can be formed in present-day Israel which does not encompass within its ranks at least four of the six possible positions. Moreover, these same groups are themselves divided 'horizontally', so to speak, by the other two cleavages: namely, religious/non-religious, and socialist/capitalist. Consequently, even assuming that a complete reshuffle of the party system is technically possible, the result in terms of effective concentration of power is likely to be negligible. If the new parties are to embody a foreign policy consensus they will still be hopelessly split by the other two fundamental policy questions and vice versa.

The upshot has been a situation in which coalition governments are based on very vaguely defined programmes and they are subject to the pressures of varying combinations of parliamentary forces and extra-parliamentary pressure groups, such as *Gush Emunim* (the Bloc of the Faithful) and *Peace Now* that invariably cut across the formal party lines. Consequently, on both foreign policy and many domestic issues, a curious situation has developed. The majority of post-1967 governments have enjoyed a sufficiently large parliamentary majority to feel secure in office. However, these governments invariably encountered great difficulty in securing the approval of their own members for foreign policy actions which involve clear choice. If a seemingly dovish stance is adopted, the hawks within the government's own ranks abstain or even vote against the move. In the debate on the ratification of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, for example, the two abstainers and eleven out of the eighteen Knesset members who voted against belonged to the Likud and National Religious Party—the central parties in the coalition. If a clearly hawkish move is proposed, the moderates can, and do, make similar threats:

34. On the conflict over foreign policy issues within the National Religious Party, see Yael Yishai, 'Party Factionalism and Foreign Policy: Demands and Responses', *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Fall 1977.

the government's controversial decision to set up a Jewish settlement in Elon Moreh, for example, was vigorously opposed by Defence Minister Ezer Weizman, who not only voiced his protest publicly, but also hinted at the possibility of resignation.

Furthermore, supporters of certain positions (whether dovish or hawkish) are often prompted into vociferous activism by the statements or proposals of politicians who share their position, but belong to a different party. As a leading dove within the Labour Party explained, when members of the Knesset from Sheli—who are militant doves according to our formulation—criticise official policy, as a supporter of very similar views he has little choice but to make his own voice heard, since one of his main sources of influence is his clear identification with such views.[35] The extremists thus yield a very strange kind of influence over the centre. In fact those members of the Knesset who belong to the dovish half of the continuum and those who belong to its hawkish half basically act as 'conduits' of modified versions of the 'pure' extremes. Moreover, the centre of the spectrum consists of pragmatists who, owing to their pragmatism, have relatively easy access to, and certainly substantial control over the ministerial level. In different terms it might be argued that all ministers, being elected by their colleagues in the parties and not by the Prime Minister, themselves act as transmitters of factional views to the Cabinet level. The extraordinary publicity given to Cabinet discussions and the complete absence of secrecy facilitate pressures, since parties can observe their representatives hewing to the party line. Cabinet debates over foreign policy issues are, therefore, modified versions of the parliamentary and even public debates on the same set of questions. That is why they are usually so lengthy, polarised and inconclusive. That, too, is why most Prime Ministers chose to make their most cardinal decisions alone or together with a small informal 'kitchen cabinet'.[36] That, finally, is why a short-term perspective, slowness in response, lack in initiative and basic inflexibility have been so pronounced in Israel's policy since 1967.

The experience under Likud rule

The Likud-led government of Israel reflects as powerfully as its Labour predecessor had done the decline of social cohesion, the political fragmentation and factionalism, and the adverse effects of these long-term trends on the functioning of the Israeli polity and on the quality of national policy-making. The Likud's rise to power in May 1977 was in no small measure due to the

35. Interview with Yossi Sarid, a Labour Party Member of the Knesset, July 1977.

36. Lewis Brownstein, 'Decision Making in Israeli Foreign Policy: An Unplanned Process', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 92, No. 2, Summer 1977. For a critique of the Israeli system see also Avi Shlaim, 'Crisis Decision-making in Israel: The Lessons of the October War', in Peter Jones (ed.), *The International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. II (London: Croom-Helm, 1975); Avi Shlaim, 'Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War', *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 3, April 1976; and Avi Shlaim and Raymond Tanter, 'Decision Process, Choice and Consequences: Israel's Deep-Penetration Bombing in Egypt, 1970', *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 4, July 1978.

widespread disillusion of the Israeli electorate with the ineptness, muddle and corruption of the Labour government. Begin's promise of decisive leadership and a 'government capable of governing' held considerable appeal to a nation which had lost its confidence in the ability of the Labour leadership to manage the country's internal and external affairs. His request for a six months' period of grace during which he would make the necessary changes, free from constant sniping, fell on receptive ears and for a while it looked as if he might indeed be capable of providing the 'government capable of governing' for which his countrymen yearned. Half-way through the government's four-year term of office, however, it became patently clear to the majority of Israelis that they were being led by the most incompetent government that the country has known in over thirty years of statehood.

It would be a gross oversimplification to attribute this dismal state of affairs exclusively to a leadership failure on Begin's part. As has been seen, the very nature of the contemporary Israeli polity is not conducive to the formation of united and homogeneous governments or to the effective pursuit of consistent policies. The highly developed, one might say over-developed, multi-party system with which every leader has to contend is the product of long-term social and political forces, which no one individual, however strong and determined, can realistically be expected to hold in check. Begin presides over a carefully balanced coalition of the Likud, the Democratic Movement, the National Religious Party, and the ultra-orthodox Agudat Yisrael, each of which is in itself a coalition of personal and ideological factions. His own Likud party comprises four groups—the ultra-nationalist Herut, the middle class Liberals, the ex-Labour La'am, and Ariel Sharon's Shlomzion—which fought the 1977 election as a separate party and won two seats before rejoining the Likud. The Prime Minister has to accept the ministers chosen by his coalition partners to represent them in the Cabinet: he has no voice in their selection and no power to dismiss them. His dependence on these partners is such that when eight out of the fifteen Knesset members of Professor Yadin's Democratic Movement for Change split the party and went into opposition, Begin had no choice but to leave Yadin's rump party with three ministerial posts. Even inside the Likud, it is not the leader, but the four groups who have the decisive say in the appointment and replacement of their ministers.

Under these circumstances it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate an integrated and comprehensive national strategy which meshes together the various strands of diplomatic, military, economic, scientific and educational policy. Specific areas of policy tend to be controlled and managed by individual parties or groups with little regard for the collective responsibility of the Cabinet. Ariel Sharon, for example, who—as Minister of Agriculture and the chairman of the Cabinet's Settlement Committee—is responsible for Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, treats this sensitive area as his private fiefdom and pursues a provocative policy which frequently embarrasses Israel's peace negotiators and tarnishes the country's image abroad. The senior

economic portfolios and the task of managing the economy were originally assigned to the Liberals, led by Simha Erlich who became Finance Minister. Within two years, however, the Liberals' free market policies produced a situation verging on anarchy and an economic crisis of monumental proportions with runaway inflation, a massive trade deficit, and declining investment. This economic record not only destroyed the confidence of the Israeli public in the ability of the government to manage the country's domestic affairs, but also entails growing dependence on the United States and hence greater vulnerability to American political pressure.

Paradoxically, it is this highly incompetent government which has to its credit the most remarkable achievement in the annals of Israeli diplomacy: the conclusion of the peace treaty with Egypt. The goal of peace with the major Arab country which eluded premier Begin's five predecessors was ironically attained by this ultra-nationalist proponent of Revisionist Zionism. His Cabinet, which was uncharitably described when it was first formed, as a combination of hawkish generals and reactionary rabbis, proved itself to be more realistic and certainly more dogged in the pursuit of peace than the leaders of Labour Zionism had been. Propitious external circumstances played a major part in securing the peace treaty, but the government's own single-minded and unrelenting concentration on the peace process also brought its reward. During its first two years in office, out of 162 meetings held by the Cabinet, 117 were devoted either entirely or principally to the peace negotiations and to political matters connected with them.[37] Whatever one may think of its record in the field of domestic policy and whatever limitations and faults one may perceive in its foreign policy, the charge of not devoting sufficient attention and effort to the vital objective of peace cannot be levelled against the Likud government. Yet, in the course of the two arduous and gruelling years which led to the conclusion of the peace with Egypt, the government lost such internal harmony, cohesion and *esprit de corps* as it had to begin with. Poise and confidence gave way to anxiety and suspicion, co-operation was replaced by bitter arguments and angry recriminations, and the Cabinet became an arena of verbal warfare instead of serving as a forum in which national priorities were determined and collective responsibility for them was shared. Permanent engagement in the peace process placed considerable strain on Cabinet unity because difficult decisions had to be made all along the road and these brought to the surface the latent, and not so latent, differences of opinion between the different parties and the different factions which make up the coalition.

The necessity of engaging in direct negotiations with the Egyptian representatives and the American mediators posed a particularly acute problem for a Cabinet which straddled such a wide range of views. Initially, Begin and Dayan formed an effective team, with the Prime Minister in charge of the substance of Israel's bargaining position and the Foreign Minister acting as his

37. Statement by the Secretary to the Cabinet, reported in *Maariv*, June 22, 1979.

principal adviser on tactics and chief negotiator.[38] But Dayan, who had promptly defected from the Labour Party after its defeat in May 1977, remained an outsider in the Likud administration. He did not trust his colleagues and his colleagues did not trust him. They suspected him of deviousness and were reluctant to place Israel's fate in his hands. Dayan was sent in a strait-jacket to the Camp David talks in early March 1979. A restrictive and hard-line directive was issued to him in advance and Israel's chief negotiator was given little latitude for negotiation and no scope for accepting proposals without obtaining Cabinet approval first. The system became known as 'ad referendum'. One commentator suggested that it had degenerated to 'ad absurdum'.

Dayan received some support from Ezer Weizman, who, as a frequent participant in negotiations, also chafed under the yoke of his suspicious and exacting colleagues. But the two ministers did not always see eye to eye and even when they did, a Dayan-Weizman axis could only carry the Cabinet when it had the support of Begin. During the negotiation of the Egyptian peace treaty the two on their own frequently failed to carry the Cabinet on the detailed commitments they sought to clinch the treaty. Weizman resents both the restrictive mandates with which Cabinet representatives were sent to conduct the international negotiations and the hectoring cross-examination to which they were subjected upon their return to report on the progress of the talks. The temperamental and highly popular Defence Minister frequently walks out in anger from Cabinet meetings. On one occasion his parting words, before slamming the door behind him were: 'I am going to prepare the army for war'. The government, he argues, antagonises by its behaviour the Israeli public and world public opinion and he has been critical of Begin for not enforcing order and discipline. But he himself hardly sets a good example by protesting publicly and loudly against collective decisions with which he happens to disagree. One of the most difficult tasks facing Begin is that of restraining all the ministers—the civilians as well as the insubordinate former Generals—in a government which through feuds, rivalries and constant bickering, has lost its credibility in the eyes of its supporters as well as in the eyes of the general public. For this task, however, Begin seems to lack the determination and the will-power. His failing health may have been partly responsible for the evident relaxation of Prime Ministerial control over Cabinet proceedings. But, as has been argued throughout this article, the sources of discord and strife within the Cabinet are much more fundamental and cannot be easily eradicated.

For this reason, the adverse impact of domestic politics on Israel's international behaviour is likely to increase rather than decrease. If internal differences were pursued to such extraordinary lengths during the negotiations of the Egyptian treaty, which is the relatively easy phase of the peace process, the negotiations on autonomy for the West Bank and the Gaza strip may strain

38. Amos Perlmutter, 'Begin's Strategy and Dayan's Tactics: The Conduct of Israeli Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 2, Jan. 1978.

Cabinet unity to breaking-point. For whereas the principle of concessions to Egypt in the Sinai was challenged only by a small group of unconditional hawks, a similar process of give and take as regards the West Bank is opposed as a *matter of principle* by the latter as well as by the militant hawks, who in turn may be supported for security rather than ideological reasons by many moderate hawks too. This is the case because concessions to whoever it may be in the West Bank, threaten at once cardinal security needs and the integrity of *Eretz Yisrael*—a sacred article of faith in the political creed of Begin and his Herut followers. Withdrawal from Sinai and the dismantling of Jewish settlements there, however painful, did not compromise the integrity of the historic homeland. In fact, it may well be that one of the main reasons behind Begin's willingness to restore the Sinai peninsula to Egypt was his hope that in doing so he would split the ranks of Israel's Arab adversaries, remove Egypt from the confrontation coalition and thus weaken it so dramatically that a war would become unlikely even if Israel continued to hold the West Bank indefinitely.

Because the stakes in the autonomy talks are perceived to be so fundamental and the risks so enormous, Begin seems determined to maintain control over Israel's policy and to supervise closely the progress of the negotiations by keeping people he trusts in key positions. He was not prepared to allow Dayan to call the bids. Dayan has forfeited Begin's trust in the later stages of negotiation of the treaty with Egypt by presenting him with *faits accomplis* and in the autonomy talks the gulf between the latter's fundamentalist approach and the former's pragmatic approach was bound to widen. Consequently, it was the Director-General of the Prime Minister's office, not the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, who was appointed as chairman of the committee of senior officials convened to draw up autonomy proposals. Begin himself became the chairman of the eleven-man Cabinet committee on autonomy. More revealing still, was the appointment of a six-man negotiating team headed by Dr Yosef Burg, the leader of the National Religious Party and Minister of the Interior. Burg was proposed by Begin in preference to the Foreign Minister, who was the natural candidate for the post, not least because the National Religious Party leader shares the Prime Minister's conviction that 'Judea and Samaria' (the West Bank) belong to Israel by virtue of divine promise.

The Cabinet accepted Begin's proposal, despite Dayan's observation that such a forum would be unwieldy and cumbersome and that three representatives would make a more effective team. In defence of the six-man team, it was said that it represents all shades of coalition opinion. Apart from Burg, Dayan, and Weizman, the original team included Ariel Sharon, Samuel Tamir, the Justice Minister and the Minister without Portfolio, Moshe Nissim—who consistently fought against concessions in the last round of bargaining. The Cabinet also gave its approval to Begin's twenty-point autonomy plan, the chief objective of which is to limit the scope of self-rule by

the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, making sure that it will not evolve into an independent Palestinian state. With this as a guiding policy line, coupled with continuing Israeli settlement on the West Bank and refusal to recognise the PLO even if and when it recognises Israel (which has yet to happen), it is not surprising that Dayan became dissatisfied with the conduct of the autonomy talks and doubted whether they could be successfully concluded at all. He considered this policy line as a recipe for deadlock and the Israeli team, given its composition, to be incapable of exploring boldly and imaginatively the possibilities for coexistence with the Palestinians. His resignation from the Cabinet revealed both his frustration with the manner in which these crucial talks are being handled and his deep pessimism concerning the prospects of success.

Prospects for the relaxation of domestic constraints on Israel's foreign policy after Begin leaves the political stage cannot be rated very high. It is not impossible that the present government will collapse before its four-year term of office expires in 1981. Nor is it unlikely that the Likud will be defeated at the next election and forced to make way for a Labour-led government. In public opinion polls it is running significantly behind Labour. But the Labour Party, at present, is hardly in a position to offer a more promising alternative government. Indeed, it is in a state of disunity and disarray not dissimilar to that of the present day parties of government. Its leader, Shimon Peres, has failed to put his house in order and precious little has been done to develop a set of relevant and credible domestic and foreign policies. Like the Bourbons of France, the Labour Party's leaders seem to have learnt nothing and to have forgotten nothing during the enforced period of their exile from power. Instead of concentrating on the essential tasks of providing effective opposition and preparing for a return to power, the party is hopelessly bogged down in a quagmire of personal feuds and vendettas. An astonishingly virulent row broke out inside the party when Rabin, in a volume of memoirs, depicted Peres as an 'unrelenting subverter' who is unfit to lead the Party or the country. This publicity only served to focus attention on the blatant opportunism which reigns supreme in the higher echelons of the Labour Party and did nothing to enhance its image as a potential party of government. If Labour is returned to power at the next election, it will probably owe its victory more to the widespread disenchantment with the Likud than to its own positive appeal. Moreover, while not resolving its own internal divisions it will probably re-enter office with a slender parliamentary backing in which the ever present National Religious Party will inevitably constitute an even more indispensable component than at any time in the past. Such a state of affairs will guarantee, once again, a situation of near deadlock—similar to that over which Mr Begin has so ingloriously presided since May 1977. Indeed, on matters of foreign policy, such a combination may even be worse than Mr Begin's in so far as the Likud itself, with a larger hawkish faction within its ranks, will return to its pre-1977 role of activating like-minded elements within the National Religious

Party and within the Labour Party itself. For if Begin could be outflanked on his right by the unconditionally hawkish Revival Movement, there is no reason to assume that the latter will not join forces with the militant hawks of the Likud against any attempt of a Labour-National Religious Party government to deal effectively with the vexed set of problems involving Jordan, the West Bank, the Palestinians, and the PLO.

All the indicators, then, suggest that this complex multiple fragmentation of all mainstream political forces in Israel which results from the compounding of intra-party divisions by inter-party ones will continue to operate on Israeli foreign policy in the foreseeable future. That it will cost Israel dearly in terms of her already shaky international status can be taken for granted. That Israel's own citizens will be made to pay a heavy price for their leadership's ineptness can also be assumed. It is only to be hoped that it will not lead to a serious reversal in the budding peace process which has been under way since 1977.

JAPANESE ENERGY POLICY

*Yujiro Eguchi**

JAPAN'S concerns about energy in the next decade are focused on two tasks. The first is to secure enough oil to ensure the steady growth to which the economy is accustomed. Japan in her search for oil walks a diplomatic tightrope between the oil producing countries and her allies in the West. The second task is to diversify the sources of energy. This has to be done to guard against the destabilising effects of production cut-backs, of oil embargoes and of revolutions. The diversification process is a two-stranded strategy. It means the diversification of the geographical sources of energy, particularly away from the Middle East and into the Asian Pacific Region. It also means a diversification of energy types, away from petroleum and into coal, nuclear power and natural gas.

The oil conundrum

In accordance with the Tokyo summit import target, Japan can increase petroleum imports to a level between 6·3 and 6·9 million barrels a day by 1985. Her present import level is about 5·4 million barrels. Although the Tokyo summit target works in Japan's interests—it allows her alone of all the Western nations to actually increase her consumption, since an increase is vital if she is to sustain her growth rate—it still presents other problems for Japan.[1] The chief concern is to find the additional 1 to 1½ million barrels of oil. Finding this oil will be difficult. There is little hope that the oil producing countries will increase their production to keep up with the demands of the industrialised countries. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the projected oil supply figures for 1985 are around 58 million barrels per day. At the same time the oil demand for the free world is between 59·8 and 60·4 million barrels per day.[2] This leaves a gap in supply of about 1·8 to 2·4 million barrels per day. Japan, like most of the world, fears the vicissitudes of oil production. There may be unpredictable political changes, such as the Iranian

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1. The oil import targets set for 1985, at the summit of the seven leading Western industrialised countries in July 1979 at their Tokyo meeting were as follows:

	1985 target	*previous level*
United States	8·5	8·5 (1977)
Japan	6·3-6·9	5·8 (1979)
EEC	10	9·5 (1978)

2. *Nikkei Shimbun*, Nov. 7, 1979.

revolution, and there may also be policy changes in OPEC's production strategy. Unrest could break out in any of a number of countries—Iraq, Libya—and lead to a sharp cut-back in world supplies. And OPEC has recently been moving away from being simply a price cartel towards becoming a production cartel. Production control is now as important as price control. Iran insists that production will not increase in the next few years. Saudi Arabia will keep its production level at 9·5 million barrels per day until April 1980, and most countries are inclined to respond to increased Western demand for oil by raising prices rather than production.

Japan's other main concern in securing oil involves the fear that however much oil is produced she will not have easy access to it. This is the fear that oil will flow, via the major companies, to the other Western states. Japan feels particularly disadvantaged because she has no major oil company of her own. In fact, Japanese based oil companies supply only about 10 per cent of the country's oil imports. The Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC), the country's national energy company, which was set up to mind the country's interests, cannot really compete with the Majors. Until 1978 the Majors supplied nearly two-thirds of Japan's oil (see Table 1). But they are unreliable suppliers and have shown a tendency, when the situation became difficult, to divert supplies away from Japan and towards their own home markets. Thus in the spring of 1979, when the Iranian crisis cut back world supplies, Exxon, BP and Shell decided to cut back their shipments to Japanese oil refineries.[3]

Table 1

Imported Oil by Suppliers

(% of total)

	April–Sept. 1979	1978	1977
8 Majors	55·7	65·8	68·0
US Independents	1·8	3·6	4·7
Other Independents	0·1	—	—
DD, GG[a]	32·4	20·7	19·5
National Oil	10·0	9·9	7·8

Source: Nikkei, Nov. 1, 1979.
a. Direct deal (DD); government to government (GG).

3. *Financial Times*, Oct. 23, 1979.

These factors—the fear of a shortfall in the global supply of oil, and the feeling of being disadvantaged in relation to other Western industrial country consumers—are reflected in the controversial role played by Japan in recent months in the so-called 'spot' markets for oil. These are the oil markets in places like Rotterdam, where oil not already contracted in longer-term deals can be sold, usually at a price somewhat above the officially set OPEC price. During times of shortage or crisis, more oil is diverted to these markets and sold at even higher prices. The size of the spot market is changeable, depending on supply and demand. If, for example, the size of the Rotterdam market was between 2·0 and 2·5 million barrels per day, Japanese buying might be in the range of 0·5 million barrels per day. This would amount to about 10 per cent of her total imports, but about 20 per cent to 25 per cent of total spot market deals. As a result Japanese buying has a strong impact on price.

In 1979 Japan was buying on the spot market at prices far above official OPEC levels. The price of spot oil was forced up to $38 per barrel in the early autumn.[4] There was an international clamour for a halt to this, and a call from the French for regulation of the spot market. The Japanese Agency of Natural Resources and Energy was forced in a unique move to caution Japanese companies against such extensive buying action.[5] At the same time, European oil corporations continued to buy spot oil and built up their store of emergency oil, while Japanese buying held off. Japanese buying had been precipitated by the cut-back in her supplies: by October 1979 Japan's oil cut-back, as a result of the reductions in supply from the major oil companies, was about 1 million barrels per day. Naturally, it was in order to make up for this shortage that the Japanese were buying, even at such high prices, on the spot market.[6] The fact is that in the 1980s, with the tight oil supplies, a certain amount is bound to be sold in the spot markets. An inter-governmental setting of a target price for the IEA is needed. A detailed control of transactions on the spot market would be difficult, but it would be a step forward in the development of an international oil distribution system.

Beyond these fears and suspicions, for the Japanese the most worrisome aspect of the energy crisis relates to the achievement of high growth rates with constrained energy supplies. Japan was accustomed to double digit growth rates throughout the 1960s. Since the 1973 oil crisis and the resulting world recession, her growth rate has been cut back to 3·7 per cent between 1974 and 1978. Japan had hoped, once again, to attain levels of growth near to 6 per cent through the early 1980s. That now seems quite impossible. Two

4. *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1979.

5. *Japan Economic Journal*, Sept. 18, 1974.

6. Again in the autumn of 1979 the United States called a halt on imports of Iranian oil in response to the takeover of its embassy in Teheran. America's efforts to force the hand of the Ayatollah Khomeini were thwarted by the Japanese buying of Iranian crude oil. This is a case where Japan's own policy towards the United States was unclear. It had to decide whether, as an ally, she would stand by America. It was a difficult decision, considering that her only option was to revert to more spot buying which brought its own problems. But Japan did decide to bring purchases of Iranian oil down to 0·62 million barrels per day, which was its import level before the takeover of the American embassy.

problems present themselves. The first is that there has always been a very close link in the Japanese economy between energy consumption and the growth rate. If Japan is to decrease her energy consumption rate—and the Tokyo target would mean decreasing it to an annual rate of approximately 3–4 per cent per year, it seems very unlikely that she will be able to have her economy grow much more rapidly than that. Japan would have to break sharply the link between growth and energy consumption or move very rapidly to alternative energy sources.

The growth rate may well be affected by the cost of oil as well. Even if Japan is able to secure the energy needed, she will probably only be able to do so at very high prices. In order to avoid the inflationary impact of this, the government will have to pursue policies of restraint in terms of fiscal and monetary policy. This does not bode well for growth prospects. So at this point many forecasters say it is more reasonable to predict that Japan's growth rate in the early part of the 1980s will be somewhat lower than the government's official target of 5·7 per cent, and closer to 4 per cent.

Officially, though, the government is aiming for the higher growth rate and has published an energy guideline to steer the economy in that direction. The guideline, published by the Overall Energy Council of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is officially known as the Long Term Energy Plan (see Table 2). According to the MITI plan, Japan will be able to meet the growth target of 5·7 per cent and the Tokyo import target by following a two-pronged strategy. The first is the development of alternative energy—coal, nuclear power, Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) and Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG). The second prong is the promotion of conservation. Here MITI suggests an energy saving of 12·1 per cent up to 1985.

Prospects for coal

With regard to alternative energy, Japan has good prospects, but some problems as well. Coal has attracted much attention lately. The aim is for coal to provide 16 per cent of total energy needs by 1985 and to meet well over 5·6 per cent of the electricity demand. The main attraction of coal is its plentiful supply in the Pacific region and close proximity to Japan: China, Australia and Canada are rich in the resource. In fact the area loosely defined as the Pacific basin has 31·5 per cent of the world's total coal output.[7] The negative aspects of coal are the well-known environmental ones and the problems of building an infrastructure. Converting the economy to use more coal means building the port facilities for imports, and developing the roads and carriers to move the coal, and the electric power plants for coal-fired generation. This is a heavy burden on Japan's privately owned electric utility companies. The main obstacle to the greater use of coal in Japan is not the availability of coal, but the

7. Nomura Research Institute, 'The Search of Japan's Comprehensive Policy Guideline in the Changing World' (Tokyo, 1978).

Table 2

Long Term Energy Plan (tentative)

Overall Energy Council of MITI

mtoe[a]

	1977		1985		1990		1995	
Demand before Energy Conservation	355·5mtoe		571·3mtoe		709·4mtoe		839·7mtoe	
Energy conservation ratio			12·1%		14·8%		17·1%	
Demand after Energy Conservation			502·3mtoe		604·1mtoe		696·1mtoe	
	supply[a]	% of total	supply[a]	% of total	supply[a]	% of total	supply[a]	% of total
Hydro	17·1	4·8	23·6	4·7	27·8	4·6	32·0	4·6
Geothermal	·1	0·0	2·0	0·4	6·0	1·0	12·5	1·8
Domestic Oil & Natural Gas	3·2	0·9	7·0	1·4	8·5	1·4	11·8	1·7
Domestic Coal	11·3	3·2	12·6	2·5	12·1	2·0	12·5	1·8
Nuclear	7·1	2·0	33·6	6·7	65·8	10·9	99·5	14·3
Imported Coal	41·2	11·6	68·3	13·6	94·2	15·6	114·9	16·5
of which steam coal	·63		18·33		35·6		53·7	
LNG	10·3	2·9	36·1	7·2	54·4	9·0	60·6	8·7
New Energy	·3	0·1	4·4	0·9	33·2	5·5	52·9	7·6
Sub Total	90·7	25·5	186·3	37·1	302·1	50·0	396·1	56·9
Imported Oil	264·8	74·5	315·9	62·9	315·6 (302·1)[b]	50·0	315·9 (300·0)[b]	43·1
of which LPG	7·7		20·0		26·0		33·0	
Total	355·5	100·0	502·3	100·0	604·1	100·0	696·1	100·0

[a] Quantities have been converted into millions of tonnes of oil equivalents from the original Japanese units of measure—kilolitres, kilowatts and tonnes. Totals may not add due to rounding.
[b] Oil import demand parenthesised.

acceptance of the costs and burdens—including those on the environment—of constructing coal-fired electricity generating plants.

To increase coal use, the government has relied on two policies. A coal import policy has been developed, promoting direct Japanese participation in overseas coal development and long-term contracts for imports. The purpose of the policy is to guarantee a stable supply of coal for as far into the future as possible. The reason for this is that Japan has very little domestic coal. Real reserves are estimated at 8 billion tons. But the coal tends to be located in very deep mines and very often, the seams are quite thin. Technically and economically recoverable reserves are closer to 1 billion tons, according to the

IEA.[8] Japanese coal is much more expensive to produce and to buy, in spite of government subsidies for those who use domestic coal. If Japan is to go further towards coal use it will be dependent on imported coal. Whereas domestic coal use will increase by only 2 per cent between 1977 and 1985, imported coal consumption, according to the MITI forecast, will increase by 42 per cent (see Table 1). With this in mind, Japan's co-production ventures with China are very important. China is estimated to have 99 billion tce (tons of coal equivalent) or 15·5 per cent of the world's recoverable reserves, and China is most likely to turn to Japan for assistance in developing it. Parallel to this runs the Japanese interests in Soviet coal.

The Japanese government would like long-term deals that allow the Japanese to put up the capital, in return for a commitment from the Russians, the Chinese, the Australians or any other country, to supply the coal. This is the kind of scheme that has been worked out with the Soviets. Japan has extended more than $490 million in credits for use in developing Siberian coal deposits in South Yakutia and expects repayment in 6 million tons of coal a year for the next twenty years. Japan feels itself to be in the same vulnerable position with coal as with oil. Many of the coal developments, in Australia for example, are under the control of the major oil companies, and this is leading many Japanese companies to invest for themselves in coal mines abroad. This includes the nine regional electric utility companies as well as the state-owned Electric Power Development Company. The Export-Import bank provides guarantees for private loans for overseas coal development.

In order to expedite the import of coal, the government has one big project under consideration called the 'Coal Centre'. This would be a port equipped to handle the incoming coal, accommodate the large ocean carriers and store the coal. The cost of the Coal Centre is estimated at between $125 and $250 million (in 1975 prices) and the government has yet to make a definite decision.[9]

The second policy line on coal, is the promotion of coal use in the industrial and electrical sectors. The government offers subsidies to partially compensate for the cost differential between coal and oil, and it provides preferential loans for the construction of newly planned coal fired stations. This last point is important because the Japanese authorities will not allow oil-fired stations to be built after 1985 and the cost of a coal-fired electricity generating plant of 1 million kilowatts is between $1·6 and $1·9 billion—i.e. more than double the cost of an oil-fired station of the same size. The electric utility companies feel that the financial burden of this shift to coal is pretty heavy, even with government co-operation. Air pollution regulations are cost-boosting too.

Liquid Natural Gas

With regard to LNG, Japan plans to increase LNG imports from 8·25 million tons in 1977 to 29·0 million tons in 1985. This is a key element in

8. IEA, *Steam Coal: Prospects to 2000*, (Paris: OECD, 1978), p. 119.

9. IEA, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

Japan's substitution policy, especially useful for electricity generation and the manufacture of town gas. Japanese imports of LNG will increase to 44·1 million tons in 1985, as foreseen in present import contracts. This is about 11·9 per cent of Japan's present total demand of energy. However, quite a number of obstacles remain. The first is the lack of LNG tanks. At present there are tanks capable of holding 1·5 million tons of stock. If imports are increased to 44·1 million tons, as contracted, then tank tonnage capacity must be increased to at least 11 million tons. (Storage capacity should be equal to 3 months supply.) The burden for such a construction task weighs heavily on the LNG industry, in terms of time pressures—LNG projects have very long lead times—and in terms of financial constraints. Construction rates run at $83 million for every 160,000 tons. If 11 million tons of tank are to be constructed, the total cost would be $5·7 billion. Much would have to be done quickly in order to overcome the technical problems involved in liquefaction. The environmental fears—fire, explosion, leakage—are enormous. Developing the appropriate infrastructure and finding sites for the receiving terminals present a number of basic physical difficulties which hinder Japan's expansion of LNG use.

Nuclear energy

Nuclear power offers, for Japan, the greatest prospects but also the greatest number of problems. It has the twofold task of overcoming popular opposition to nuclear power and the bureaucratic confusion over the type of programme to follow. Both of these difficulties are exacerbated by the extremely long lead times for the completion of nuclear projects—with the attendant temptation to defer decisions. It is now estimated to take up to ten years from the initial proposal to the first operation of a plant. Because of the difficulty in getting momentum behind the nuclear strategy, MITI has had constantly to revise its nuclear power projections downward. According to the revised programme, nuclear capacity will rise from 10,000 MW (as of October 1978) to 30,000 MW in 1985, instead of 49,000 MW, as was originally planned.

Difficulty in finding sites on the compact Japanese islands is the main problem. Public opposition is usually expressed by local groups such as fishermen who feel their livelihood will be affected by nuclear industry, rather than large-scale environmental groups. These small groups have to be more or less bought off through heavy compensation payments. Local government officials who carry much of the weight in the decision-making process (almost like the German Länder) often insist on time-consuming environmental impact studies.

With regard to nuclear technology, Japan is almost wholly dependent on foreign techniques. Of Japan's nineteen existing nuclear power plants, nine are from Westinghouse and ten from General Electric. Most operate at very low load factors because of Japan's strict safety precautions (the nuclear fear still

lingers since 1945). Plants tend to be closed down for long periods of time for routine checking. Proposals to shorten this process have been abandoned since the accident at Three-Mile Island.

There is some feeling about the need to develop a 'Japanese' nuclear technology and this feeling has been strengthened by the American accident. Three-Mile Island served to reinforce Japan's dissatisfaction at being dependent on foreign technology and on foreigners for safety. Within the government there has been an ongoing struggle between the Japan Nuclear Development Corporation, which would like to promote Japanese technology, and MITI, which would like to shop around for the best and most quickly available of the foreign technologies. The decision against the import of CANDU, the Canadian developed reactor, was made by the AEC on the advice of technical experts in April 1979, and against the recommendation of MITI. The AEC favoured the advanced thermal converter reactor (ATR) being developed in Japan. MITI presumably saw the advantages of a tie with Canada on nuclear technology—thus strengthening links on coal and uranium.[10]

Where Japan has made the greatest strides towards developing its own technology is in the area of uranium reprocessing and enrichment. In the meantime, Japan's main task is to try to speed up the 'siting' process. Siting in the future will become more and more difficult and it may even bring into question, yet again, Japan's nuclear targets for the 1980s.

Japan's diversification programme

We must return to oil again for, even with alternative energy, in ten years Japan will still depend on oil for fifty per cent of its total energy needs. The underlying motif of Japan's oil import policy has been diversification. This has meant diversifying the geographical sources of her oil imports and the channels through which oil imports flow. With regard to the latter Japan has made in the past year some significant progress in changing its oil distribution channels. Her past dependence on the Majors was noted above. However, the Majors' share of Japanese imported oil declined sharply—from 65·8 per cent in 1978 to 55·7 per cent in the first half of 1979. This was largely because the government followed a policy of increasing government to government (GG) and direct deal (DD) oil. GG and DD oil rose to 33·4 per cent of the country's total oil imports in the first half of 1979, and is likely to rise to nearly half by the end of the year. Throughout the 1980s the foreign oil companies' share of Japanese oil will decline even further.

This indicates that the Japanese oil trade will, in the future, be increasingly dependent on direct government to government arrangements. This type of arrangement has some particularly attractive aspects for Japan. In the first place it offers the possibility of making long-term contracts for oil for up to as many as ten years. Often Japan can link these energy-supply contracts to

10. *Japan Times*, April 26, 1979.

development projects, taking advantage of the hopes for quick industrialisation in the producing countries. This has been one strong line in Japanese petro-diplomacy since the 1973 oil crisis. Such arrangements give Japan the opportunity to pursue simultaneously oil security policies, and broader diplomatic objectives. This seemed to be the case when Prime Minister Ohira, and the Indonesian President Suharto discussed Pacific energy policies.[11] A Pacific fuel area tied in with broad economic interests in the region is an idea that appeals to the Japanese leadership.[12] And finally, such arrangements give Japan some national control over her oil imports. Because of the absence of any Japanese oil company presence in the world oil management system Japan has been forced to live without much national influence over this vital factor during the past decade.

Now Japan has been able to add some diversity to her oil import picture. Table 3 shows how the countries of origin of imports have changed in recent years. The most remarkable change has been the drop in the Iranian input

Table 3

Japanese Oil Imports
(by Country of Origin)
% of total

	1972[a]	*1977-78*[b]
Saudi Arabia	16·7	30·1
Indonesia	16·3	13·8
Iran	37·3	17·0
UAE	9·3	16·7
Kuwait	8·9	8·2
Iraq	0·1	3·1
Oman	—	3·6
Neutral Zone	8·4	3·6
Qatar	—	1·5
China	—	2·9
Other South East Asia	0·1	4·9
Others	2·9	0·7

Source: (a) Yuan-li Wu, *Japan's Search for Oil*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), p. 25. (b) MITI, in *Financial Times*, Feb. 15, 1979.

11. Ohira and Suharto set up a 'Japan-Indonesia Energy Co-operation Committee' in June 1979. See *Japan Economic Journal*, Aug. 27, 1979.

12. The idea of a Pacific Community was mentioned by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohiera in December 1978. The details of the energy advantages in the Pacific Community are spelled out by Jiro Toruyama in *Look Japan*, Jan. 10, 1979. The advantages lie in the oil, coal, and uranium to be found in Vietnam, China, Indonesia, and Australia and they might take form in a Pacific Energy League to co-ordinate a Pacific nuclear cycle, stockpiling, joint ventures, etc.

from nearly 37·3 per cent in 1972 to just 17 per cent in 1978, and down to less than 10 per cent by the end of 1979. This meant that Japan was somewhat cushioned against the impact of the Iranian revolution. The supply problem that did occur in 1979 was made up for largely by an increase in imports from Indonesia: there was a 40·5 per cent jump in shipments of Indonesian oil in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1979 compared with the same period in 1978.[13] It is estimated that Indonesian oil compensated for 50 per cent of the 8 million kilolitre cutback in Iranian supplies. There are also quite a number of new suppliers who will appear in the Japanese picture. These include Mexico and China.

Japan became interested in Mexico once it was discovered that the country had immense hydro-carbon resources (oil and gas) with proven reserves totalling 40 billion barrels, probable reserves of some 44 billion barrels, and potential reserves of up to 200 billion barrels. Mexico will begin in the spring of 1980 to export 100,000 barrels per day to Japan, as a result of an agreement in principle (though not a contract) between Mexico and a Japanese government mission. Behind the agreement was a $500 million soft loan from Japan; and the Export Import Bank of Japan is discussing another $500 million loan for Pemex, the Mexican state-owned oil company. Mexican willingness to supply oil to Japan comes together with an interest in Japanese investment. Although industrial projects are not tied to the oil shipments, it is known that the Mexicans are interested in, and will in fact need help in building deep water ports on the Pacific coast, and in electrifying its railway system. Japanese firms are involved in negotiations on these projects.[14]

In the Far East Japan's options range from some minor prospects off her own shores to high stakes in China's oil. Joint exploration for oil on the continental shelf between Japan and South Korea began in October 1979. Estimates of the amount of recoverable oil in the zone range up to 2·5 billion barrels which is not significant, considering that Japan alone needs about 1·96 billion barrels a year and that whatever oil is produced will have to be shared between the two. China offers the most promise for Japan partly because China has so much oil to start with and also because there seems to be a natural ground for co-operation between the two countries. There is the geographical proximity, the historic trading ties, Chinese capital needs, and Japanese technical expertise which make this relationship mutually advantageous. Their trade grew by a record 56·3 per cent in the first half of 1979, to a total of $3·33 billion. In the same year twenty-two plant contracts were signed, and China opened its doors to Japanese companies—allowing fifty of them to establish offices in Peking. Japan is a logical participant in Chinese oil exploration and is so far involved in two separate oil development schemes: near the Pearl River in Canton, and further north in the Yellow Sea, with a third scheme—exploration in the Bohai Bay—still under discussion. In all

13. *Japan Economic Journal*, Aug. 28, 1979.
14. *Financial Times*, Oct. 23, 1979.

these schemes Japan has been represented by the state-owned JNOC, and its financial backing has been very important. Japan is now buying about 153,000 barrels per day from China or about 2·8 per cent of total inputs. Japan and China signed an agreement in 1978 to increase Japan's oil imports to 300,000 barrels per day in 1982.

Nevertheless, in spite of these efforts, Japan was dependent in 1978 for 70 per cent of her oil on the Middle East compared with a proportion of 65 per cent for the EEC and 33·5 per cent for the United States. As there is a limit on how much Japan can do to lessen this dependence, the alternative is to increase her leverage in the Middle East with the Arab oil producing countries. Without a political role in the Middle East or the influence that comes from armaments contracts, Japan lacks some of the options that the Europeans have—for example, the sale of French aeroplanes to the Arab countries, or Europe's potential 'go-between' role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Trade relations do give Japan some importance in the area, but it is concerned to build permanent links which will endure irrespective of trade flows. One way to increase that leverage is to increase direct investment in the Middle East. Japanese direct investment has tripled from $334 million in 1970 to $976 million in 1975. The investment level projected for 1985 is $5,108 million, according to the Japan Economic Research Center. This represents an annual rate of increase of 18 per cent.[15] Only in Africa and Oceania will Japan's direct investment be increasing at a faster rate.

Much of Japanese direct investment is in the petro-chemical industry. Mitsui and Company and Mitsubishi, for example, both have petrochemical complexes in Iran and Saudi Arabia. These, it should be pointed out, were originally undertaken for ordinary commercial reasons, not directly linked to an energy strategy or under inducement from the government. The oil security link, however, was quickly established. Mitsubishi, for example, was on the verge of reconsidering its plans for a petro-chemical complex on the Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia, after gloomy feasibility studies on the profitability of an export oriented ethylene plant.[16] However, in 1978 MITI stepped in, encouraged Mitsubishi to keep the negotiations going, and offered to finance one half of the Japanese side's equity obligation.[17] The scheme is priced at over $1·5 billion and would apparently carry entitlement of 160,000 barrels per day for Mitsubishi and the other companies involved.[18]

The Japanese style of 'petro-diplomacy' has usually involved whirlwind tours of the Middle East by MITI, after each oil crisis. This was true in 1974 when the Tanaka government sent out a series of special envoys to Syria, Egypt, Algeria, the Sudan, Morocco and Jordan. By the middle of the year the

15. Sueo Sekiguchi, *Japanese Direct Foreign Investment* (London: Macmillan, for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1979), p. 76.

16. Louis Turner and James Bedore, *Middle East Industrialisation* (Farnborough, Saxon House for the RIIA, 1979), p. 148.

17. *Financial Times*, July 18, 1979.

18. *Ibid.*

total amount of economic aid promised reached $563 million and resulted in a number of projects including such diverse plans as Japanese financed improvements to the Suez Canal and industrial complexes in Iran.[19]

Conservation

The final plank in the Japanese energy policy is conservation. Conservation tends to be focused on waste-eliminating measures in the industrial sector. This is because the bulk of Japanese energy consumption, about 45 per cent in 1976, was and still is in industry—as opposed to 25·2 per cent for industry in the United States, 36·7 per cent in Britain and 34·7 per cent in France.[20] There is considerable controversy about the scope for conservation that remains in the Japanese economy. This is because, ironically, Japanese industry has shown itself so remarkably successful at conservation in the past. Between 1973 and 1978, while real GNP increased by 22 per cent, imports of crude oil and total crude consumption actually decreased by 6 per cent and 4 per cent respectively—and as a result energy consumed per unit of GNP has actually declined by 4·6 per cent per annum.[21] Japanese investment in energy-saving measures for industry is one of the main reasons for this. There is on the one hand, some optimism that industry can in the future make conservation gains comparable to those made after 1973. On the other hand there is doubt that much further scope for conservation remains. To put the burden for conservation on industry raises the old fears about growth. There is essentially a fear that more emphasis on conservation will cut industry's output. The tendency has been to rely on the natural cost-cutting instincts of Japanese industry.

In other sectors as well, Japan has relied on voluntary measures. In 1979 the country accepted the IEA conservation target of 5 per cent, or more than 94·4 million barrels. Fully half of this (46·5 million barrels) saving was to come from adjusting room temperatures (air-conditioning and heating). Another large saving (3·1 million barrels) was to come from cut-backs in government and company owned cars. For the future the task will be more demanding, as MITI has set the target for energy saving (over what would otherwise be consumed) up to 1985, at 12·1 per cent, and there is a still higher target of 17·1 per cent up to 1995. The debate in Japan, loosely divided between politicians and businessmen on the one hand, and technocrats on the

19. Yoshi Tsurumi, 'Japan', *Daedalus*, Vol. 104, p. 124, Fall 1975.

20. Energy Consumption 1976 (% according to section)

	Energy	*Industry*	*Transport*
Japan	11·9	45·0	17·6
U.S.	10·7	25·2	30·0
U.K.	9·4	36·7	19·2
France	9·1	34·7	20·8
Germany	8·3	35·1	17·1

Source: OECD, *Energy Statistics* (Paris: OECD, 1976)

21. Shinzo Katada, 'Japanese Companies are Recovering Confidence', Nomura Research Institute (London: private paper, 1979).

other, is about whether or for how long Japan can continue with simply a voluntary conservation programme.

The failure to achieve a comprehensive energy policy

As is apparent from the above discussion of Japan's approaches on alternative energy and oil imports, she has a variety of options in each sector. There is some manoeuvrability and some serious thinking on each sector's strategy. Japan does, however, lack a comprehensive energy policy. This is surprising when one considers the pivotal position of energy in the economy. One problem with Japanese energy is that the locus of responsibility for energy policy making has never been clearly defined. Japan does not even have a Department of Energy. Attempts to establish one, under the Fukuda government, were opposed by MITI. In energy matters, MITI plays the key role, but not the sole role. In regulating the oil industry, MITI shares power, although more often is at odds with the Fair Trade Commission (FTC).[22] In developing energy technologies, MITI tends to search for the best options at home or abroad, while bureaucratic rivals like the Nuclear Energy Commission (NEC) press the case for domestic technology. In setting energy goals MITI's Overall Energy Council forms the guidelines. The Council compiles the Long Term Energy Outlook (see Table 1) which is a massive compendium spelling out the sectoral energy needs and goals. These are, however, half prediction and half expectation. Above all it is a guideline not a programme. The assumption is that with the government's presentation of the most hopeful, yet reasonable goals, the private sector will be able to bring it to reality. That cannot always work.

Japan shares, together with the other Western industrialised countries, the impossibility of controlling all the variables of an energy policy. These include price and production levels. There are in Japan, however, some particular difficulties in establishing a comprehensive energy policy—in spite of the country's well known previous successes with planning. Energy eludes comprehensive planning for at least four reasons. First, an energy policy would involve disparate sectors of the economy—private utilities, trading companies, mining companies, local governments' planning departments. These are not only structurally different, but they are under the umbrellas of different government ministries. These ministries operate autonomously and often in competition with each other. The fiefing out of territories of jurisdiction in the economy to different ministries means a compartmentalisation of interests and a segmentation of the decision making process.

Secondly, an energy policy demands political-strategic thinking that takes into account political variables as well as economic ones. This is the kind of planning for which the Japanese system seems ill-suited. The third reason why

22. This idea, especially as it relates to the post-1973 conflict resulting from MITI's attempt to tighten control over petroleum pricing and production and the FTC's effort to curb cartelisation, is developed in Yoshi Tsurumi, *Daedalus*, *op. cit.*

an energy policy is so difficult to put into operation is that there is a traditional Japanese tendency to rely on the strength of the private sector. Private business may be informed, encouraged and shown the way, but it is not usually interfered with. The initiative and, most of all, the money is to come from ordinary market incentives. An energy policy means interference that is broader than sectoral policies and more substantial than loans and a few subsidies. It needs financing from the central government. Japanese leaders have been fighting a battle with their budget deficit. It is, in 1979, running at 6 per cent of gross national product. The promise to balance the budget is an important election issue. In a country with a low tax base, and no sales tax (Prime Minister Ohira's plan to introduce a value added tax is considered one of the main reasons for his party's poor electoral showing last September), raising revenues to fund an energy policy is very difficult. For energy development and planning, MITI was actually budgeted just $2·3 trillion, against the opposition of the Ministry of Finance. MITI wanted to issue energy bonds and had proposed tax and utility rate increases—all of which would have been inflationary, according to the Finance Ministry. At a time when the reduction of the budget deficit is a crucial goal of the governing Liberal Democratic Party, substantial increase in energy spending is a hard political point to sell. Financing energy-saving policies is one of the government's most difficult dilemmas.

By way of conclusion

In assessing Japanese energy policies in the 1980s, several points should be noted. It seems that Japanese plans are ambitious and will be fairly difficult to achieve, looking at it from the present situation. Above all it will be difficult to secure 6·3 million barrels of oil per day, the minimum needed, in 1985. By most accounts, OPEC supplies will be restricted, even if a world recession does offer some leeway. The distribution of target-amounts to the OECD will not be increased and there will be additional demands for oil coming from other consumers—the newly industrialising countries (NICs) and the developing countries. Even with additional imports from China, Mexico and elsewhere, Japan will find it very difficult to satisfy her energy requirements. As a result Japan will have to move quickly into alternative energy sources, and accept at least in the medium-term future a slower growth rate.

Secondly, Japan has to take political as well as economic objectives into account when choosing which policies to adopt in the complex world of international energy politics. It must be sensitive to its Trilateral partners—the United States and the Europeans—whilst at the same time operating independently in relation to the energy producing countries of the world. (Japan, for example, has much to offer by way of economic aid to the Middle East.) The balance of power in the Far East poses further problems for Japanese policy-makers: it could be awkward for Japan to be involved in Chinese energy

development projects at the same time as investing in Siberian development. Yet the synthesis of economic and political considerations necessary to cope with these vital issues is hampered by the seeming inability of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MITI to collaborate satisfactorily in the formulation of appropriate policies.

In many ways, Japan's energy position resembles that of France. With no oil, natural gas, and very little coal of its own, France relies on imports to meet some 75 per cent of its energy needs—and it is heavily dependent on electrical power. This dependence on electricity has encouraged the French government to decide in favour of nuclear power—a source of energy which also appeals to the Japanese. France, however, pursues a far more independent policy toward the Arab oil producing countries. It avoided joining the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974 because of its American bias, which France feared would offend OPEC. Instead, France proposed the North-South talks in Paris, and again recently called forth the Euro-Arab dialogue.

Japan has, by contrast, found its security in international energy matters within the organisations of the industrialised world—the IEA and the economic summits. In the first place, Japan lacks the kind of traditional and historic links with the oil producing nations that France has with some Arab countries. Contacts have however grown rapidly since 1974 with the increase in trade. Although Japan still runs a trade deficit with OPEC, exports have increased in the past five years, and they have jumped from \$1·2 billion in 1973 to \$7·9 billion in 1977.[23] Yet Japan's strongest links are with the United States, and Japan is conscious of the implications of its actions for American diplomacy in the Middle East. Japanese policy in the area remains discreet. Japan has not recognised the PLO, although it was allowed to set up an office in Tokyo. The character of Japan's petro-diplomacy has been limited to the efforts mentioned above, directed to establishing economic co-operation ventures. Moreover, as long as the oil companies were a key determinant of the supplies and directions of energy flows, Japan's interests have been best served by remaining on good terms with the industrialised countries, and relying on energy sharing schemes as outlined by the IEA.

Japan, however, risks upsetting her allies among the industrialised countries on some very sensitive points—as we saw in discussing the question of spot markets. In the short term there is a dilemma over paying the high price for oil. Japan has proved capable of coping with the increased cost of oil. This was demonstrated first in 1973, when Japan alone among the industrialised countries actually increased her imports of oil that year, and then again in 1979. This has been possible for two reasons. The first is related to Japan's strong external payments position. Japan has an internationally competitive export sector that has led to a balance-of-trade surplus for several years. At present Japan's payments position has gone into deficit again, but this is widely

23. Louis Turner and James Bedore, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

believed to be a very temporary phenomenon. The Japanese economy : healthy and her goods are competitive on world markets—so it is mo: probable that Japan will be able to sell enough to pay for the oil she has t import.

The second reason that Japanese seem capable of dealing with oil pric problems is due to the ability of Japanese industry to absorb price increase: One of the best examples of this is the steel industry's changeover after 197: Nippon Steel, the world's as well as Japan's largest steel-maker, set out i 1974 to cut its energy consumption per ton of production by 10 per cent b 1980. By the first half of 1978 they had achieved this goal through increase in efficiency (also labour cut backs). As a result they saved 40·8 million barre of oil in four-and-a-half years.[24] While steel companies in Britain, Americ: France and Germany are struggling to stay afloat, rationalisation is proceedin apace in Japan. Many other companies show a similar length of investmer vision and strength of financial position to invest as well. A sampling (Japanese conservation investment in some internationally sensitive sectors– cars, textiles, steel—is shown in Table 4.

Table 4

Japanese Energy Conservation Investment
1973–1978

	Investment Y billion	*Decrease in Energy Consumption* per unit of production
Nipon Steel Corporation	160	10%
Toyota Motor Corporation	6	16%
Japan Cement Corporation	4	19%
Toyore (synthetic fibre)	5	20%

Source: *Zaikai Kansoku*, May 1979

There is, as mentioned above, some concern about whether industry will b able to repeat this performance, but it is interesting to note, that by as early a the summer of 1979 Japanese industry was reporting that the effects of th post-Iranian price increases had been dealt with and industry was lookin forward to profitable years on the horizon.[25] When one considers the scope fo industrial rationalisation in terms of new technology—microprocessor: numerically controlled machinery, etc., and the established Japanes

24. Shinzo Katada, *op. cit.*
25. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., Economic Research Division, Aug. 1979.

proficiency in these areas, hopes seem justified that Japanese industry will be healthy enough to meet the higher energy prices.

Will this be true of the other Western industrialised countries? The fact is that Japan's longer term energy policy may well unsettle her relations with her Trilateral allies. Japan's sound economic status makes it an attractive partner for aid and development projects with the oil producing countries. Japan may succeed—at the expense of other Western countries—in expanding her economic influence among them, with all the beneficial trade and possibilities of favourable market access implications this might bring.

There is certain to be competition in the coming years amongst the oil importing countries, not only to secure oil, but for access to the markets of the oil producers. If oil is linked to capital exports and the Japanese are at the front line in the competition, it does not bode well for the Americans and the Europeans. Last summer, at the same time that the MITI head was tying together an oil guarantee from the Mexicans, Count Otto Lambsdorf, Germany's Economics Minister, was also in the country and also expressed a wish to buy Mexican oil. By then, though, Pemex had already committed all its immediate oil exports. A deal with Germany would have required an increase in production which the Mexicans appeared unprepared to take at that juncture. But Japan had been successful.

One final option for Japan, which would lessen the likelihood of conflict with the West and improve its energy position, would be to lay greater emphasis on overall policies in the Asian Pacific region. Much of its energy imports are from this region, and there has been considerable trade expansion in the area lately. A concerted policy might encourage overall independence and, specifically, energy interdependence with the Pacific rim countries in the 1980s.

HONG KONG AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: PAST AND FUTURE

Gordon Lawrie *

'BUT what will happen when the lease runs out?' is the question most frequently raised when Hong Kong is discussed. This is natural enough, for amongst many peculiarities Hong Kong appears to have a terminal date for its existence as a British colony.[1] This paper does not attempt a definite answer to this question but tries to throw some light on it by an approach that has been neglected and by shifting the emphasis of argument from China's interests and capabilities to her past behaviour.

By the treaties of Nanking (1842) and Peking (1860) the island of Hong Kong and a small section of mainland territory usually referred to as Kowloon[2] were *ceded* in perpetuity to Britain by China. A further treaty which entered into effect on July 1, 1898 provided that '[this] British territory shall be enlarged under lease . . . the terms of this lease shall be ninety-nine years'. This extension of territory was stated to be 'for all proper defence and protection of the Colony' but today the New Territories can afford no military protection to the colony and the original colony could not provide a livelihood for its population without the Territories. In places the New Territories are now as highly industrialised and as thickly populated as any of the ceded parts of Hong Kong. A bay (Plover Cove) and a strait (High Island) have been dammed and emptied of sea-water to provide essential fresh water storage; shipyards and industries have been created on an island (Tsing Yi) joined to the mainland by a massive bridge; a new campus for the Chinese University of Hong Kong has been built; the old town of Shatin is being converted into a modern city; and public works and private enterprises have been developed with, at least recently, little or no regard to the distinction between leased and ceded territory.[3] Indeed this distinction is only perpetuated in an administrative

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1. The word 'Colony' is used in two senses in Hong Kong. First to mean all the territory under British administration and second to mean that territory but excluding the New Territories. The word is, as far as possible, avoided in official usage in Hong Kong. It is retained here as it expresses the difference between the ceded and leased territories and also Hong Kong's status in British constitutional law. 'Hong Kong' itself has three meanings: (a) The island of that name, (b) the administration district which includes the Kowloon peninsula on the mainland and (c) the whole territory under British administration.

2. Again there is lack of precision as today the administrative boundaries do not exactly coincide with the treaty boundaries.

3. On March 29, 1979, the Chairman of the Hong Kong Land Company Ltd. reported to shareholders: '1978 marked the first move in Hong Kong Land's history into major ventures in the New Territories. We have taken a 15 per cent. share in a joint venture in Tsuen Wan principally with partners representing Peking interests for the development of 4,000 flats for sale', *Far East Economic Review*, June 8, 1979, p. 22 (advertisement).

division that brings a slight element of federalism into Hong Kong's governmental structure, and in the granting of leasehold title to land in the New Territories only until 1997.

Thus the New Territories and the ceded Colony stand or fall together and 1997 seems to loom as a crucial year for the already five million Hong Kong belongers[4] and for the refugees who continue to arrive and whose local status often remains undetermined for long periods.

This is how the situation appears from an ordinary reading of the treaties and lease. But it leaves out of account the Chinese view of these agreements—for the Chinese contend that 1997 is irrelevant since its significance depends on a lease the validity of which they deny. Moreover, political actions affect—and to a limited extent are affected by—these legal contentions, so that the apparent clarity of 1997 is obscured by a cloud of speculation in which not only British and Chinese words and deeds are assessed but also their silences and inactivities.

The British[5] attitude to 1997

Superficially the British position is simple and clear. The treaties of 1842 and 1860 and the lease of 1898 are valid international agreements. They are unaffected by the fact that the government of China today is successor to the government of the Chinese Empire by which they were negotiated and signed. This is beautifully simple but the beauty is only skin deep. For it is logically impossible to rely on the validity of the lease without accepting the terminal date it specified. That of course has implications for the British which they are at pains to avoid.

The British dilemma is reflected in the studiously vague replies their spokesmen give to those who ask awkward questions about Hong Kong's future. British diplomacy is often at its best when doing and saying as little as possible and it probably finds these journalistic probings more troublesome than the infrequent pronouncements that come from the government of the People's Republic of China. For in a curious roundabout way Chinese and British views coincide on the *handling* of the Hong Kong problem even though they differ fundamentally on its legal basis.

The Chinese attitude to 1997

The position of the People's Republic is also superficially simple, and it is one which allows Peking to keep all its options open. Hong Kong is part of China, and the treaties and lease that purport to affect Chinese sovereignty were forced on her when she could not resist. Hence all the treaties are void. At this point, however, Chinese subtlety intrudes. The government of the

4. This is the term used in the Hong Kong Immigration Ordinance—it has prompted the comment that the Ordinance is the last repository of 'pidgin' in Hong Kong.

5. British here is used to mean the government in London. Later in this article the distinction between government in London and Hong Kong will be made and the implications considered.

People's Republic—so Peking argues—is far too wise not to recognise th accident of history has placed Hong Kong under British administration. \ the time comes that it is in the interests of the Chinese people for government to resume control of this fragment of Chinese territory, this w done.

If the lease of the New Territories is void then the year 1997 ha significance. This is the obvious conclusion to be drawn from the Ch position. And it is at this point that the British and Chinese positions even though this meeting is only tangential. The British wish for cloud about the terminal date and this is what the Chinese contention provides. action and non-speech suit both sides and so the minimum of action is t and the minimum of words spoken.

What makes the situation awkward is that the coincidence of intere reached by mutually exclusive arguments. And this is especially so when outside event or action by a third party demands a positive statement. V this happens a strange *dialogue de sourds* ensues. Both British and Ch address a common audience but in a fine display of dramatic irony ne hears what the other is saying. The best example of this was in March when the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism sought to di Hong Kong and Macao and so forced the Chinese to break their pref silence. The Chinese permanent representative at the United Nations wrc the Committee:

> The questions of Hong Kong and Macao belong to the catego questions resulting from the series of unequal treaties which imperialists imposed on China. Hong Kong and Macao are pa Chinese territory occupied by the British and Portuguese authorities. settlement of the question of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely w China's sovereign right and do not at all fall under the ordinary cate of colonial territories. Consequently they should not be included in th of colonial territories covered by the declaration on the grantin independence to colonial countries and people. With regard to questions of Hong Kong and Macao, the Chinese Government consistently held that they should be settled in an appropriate way v the time is ripe.

The General Assembly duly deleted Hong Kong and Macao from the l non-self-governing territories. This relieved Britain of the duty of reportii the Special Committee on Colonialism and of the embarrassment that ensu debates on such reports. But the deletion by the General Assembly provided the British government with an opportunity to reply to the Chi without directly addressing them. So on December 22, 1972 the Bı delegate told the United Nations that 'The action of the General Assemb no way affects the legal status of Hong Kong . . . [Her Majesty's Governn are unable to accept any differing views'.

Chinese self-interest?

It is not so much that the British and Chinese agree to differ as that their differences bring them to a single point of agreement and that for the time being this is sufficient to enable them to avoid conflict over Hong Kong. That Britain should wish to avoid such conflict is entirely understandable, for she stands pat on the status quo. Why the Chinese should be so accommodating is more difficult to explain. By any calculus of capabilities China could at any time initiate action to assert her self-declared rights. No one in London or Hong Kong believes that Chinese initiatives could be frustrated or more than very briefly delayed. All options of time and method are open to Peking.

But to speak of options is to imply choice and rational calculation of costs and benefits and, as in all political decisions, this in turn means a comparison of factors that are not in strict logic comparable. Any analysis of the costs and benefits of Hong Kong to Peking cannot be complete if it merely sets out a list of the objective factors involved. The relative weight and importance of each factor must also be assessed. And since this is an assessment based not on the analyst's values but on the values ascribed to the Chinese government, the result is little better than guesswork.

It is this 'double subjectivity' that bedevils attempts by commentators to estimate the debits and credits of Hong Kong's importance to China. Economic benefits, foreign exchange earnings, and an outlet for dissident citizens have, inter alia, to be balanced against national prestige, doctrinal purity and security of regime and state. And these must be seen through the eyes of leaders in Peking who are involved in intra-party struggles only dimly discernible by the foreign observer.

Nevertheless, many writers have attempted this and not surprisingly they have found themselves forced to avoid all but the most nebulous conclusions. From amongst many writings two books by political scientists in Hong Kong may be selected as epitomising the difficulties inherent in forecasting Hong Kong's future from an assessment of its value to Peking.

Dr Norman Miners in *The Government and Politics of Hong Kong*[6] devotes a chapter to 'The Presence of China' in which he concludes: 'thus it seems that the colony of Hong Kong is allowed to continue its anachronistic existence because of a rational calculation by the Chinese government that the wider interests of China are best served by the present *status quo*.' He then asks 'But can we rely on continuing rationality in Peking?' The first edition of Miners's book was published in 1975 and there he goes on to speculate that 'a particular time of danger will occur at the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung . . . when an insecure successor to Mao might seek to bolster his personal authority by taking over Hong Kong no matter what damage this might do to China's wider interests.' As a new edition is due to be published it will be

6. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1975. A second edition (1977) was overtaken by Mao's death and the passages quoted remained unaltered. A third edition was in course of preparation at the time this article went to press.

interesting to see how Miners now evaluates the chances of continuing rationality in Peking.

Professor Peter Harris in *Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics*[7] is even more tentative than Miners. In a chapter on 'The International Future of Hong Kong' he asks why the Chinese Communists do not use the power they undoubtedly possess and has the honesty to reply that 'the answer can only be a guess'. He then reviews the Hong Kong scene and concludes:

> That Hong Kong is a valuable asset is plain to see, but it is not economics alone which has permitted Britain to retain its control as we have already suggested. The clue to this is to be sought in the laws of power politics and to some extent, in the simple fact of personality. Mao Tse-tung ruled China for twenty-seven years and Hong Kong was secure during that period. It may very well be then, that even before 1997, the situation may change. As of 1977 Peking appears satisfied.

That Hong Kong continued to exist while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ruled China is indisputable but at times (as in 1967) its position was anything but 'secure' and how far this security depended on Chairman Mao is impossible to demonstrate. To attribute so much to Mao's personality pre-empts argument and obscures more than it illuminates; and a simple statement that Mao 'ruled' China subsumes too many life-and-death struggles to be convincing.

Nevertheless, Professor Harris is right to direct our attention to the plain fact of continued British rule of Hong Kong during thirty years of Communist Party power in China. Indeed one might go further and emphasise that Hong Kong has remained British for one hundred and thirty-seven years (and Macao Portuguese for much longer), and has survived the decadent last years of the Ching dynasty; the Revolution of 1911–12; the turbulence of the war lords; the great Civil War; and the totalitarian regime of the People's Republic. The sole interruption of British rule came not from China but from the Japanese during The Second World War and even then Macao was protected by Portuguese neutrality—a remarkable instance of Japanese forbearance.

But if we go back no more than thirty years we still have a striking phenomenon. A British Crown Colony is in itself an anachronism in the postwar world, but in Hong Kong one has been permitted to exist in what is claimed as part of its metropolitan territory by the most populous state in the world ruled by a party that loudly proclaims revolutionary Marxism and Chinese nationalism. It is impossible not to believe that China must have been tempted to take over Hong Kong during the past thirty years. There have also been occasions when this temptation must have been close to irresistible either because of turbulence within China or because of provocation from outside or a coincidence of both.

7. Hong Kong: Heinemann (Asia), 1978.

In the rest of this article the author examines (a) the readiness of the People's Republic to use force in the past in situations comparable to those of Hong Kong and Macao; (b) the provocations that must have tempted Peking to take over the British colony; and (c) the occasions when turbulence in China and in Hong Kong have led to a breakdown in CCP and government control. The argument behind this examination is that since Chinese restraint was maintained in these conditions it can be expected to be maintained in the foreseeable future. This contrasts markedly with Professor Harris's contention. For him the period of Chairman Mao's rule was one of security for Hong Kong. Whereas, the argument here is that if Hong Kong could survive the turbulent years of Maoism it can survive, if not anything, at least any combination of events that can now reasonably be foreseen; and finally, that too little is made of the British position. Compared to Peking, London may have few options but it retains the capability of withdrawing. This could still be a power play—although of a negative kind and not without problems of its own.

The contrast with Chinese actions elsewhere

The argument starts with the incontestable fact that Hong Kong and Macao still exist although the Chinese at any time and with a minimum of effort could have ended their separate existence—as the saying goes in Hong Kong, a telephone call from Peking to London is all that would be required.

Since the Communists achieved power in China in 1949 they have shown themselves quite prepared to use the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for the 'carrying on of politics by other means'. In Korea in 1950, on the Indian/Tibetan frontier in 1962 and in Vietnam in 1979 the PLA has been committed to fight where fighting brought with it a very real danger of the conflict escalating into all-out war. Hong Kong and/or Macao could have been overrun in hours rather than days at any time and with no more risk than some hard words in the Western media. Moreover even this limited military action could have been avoided had Peking relied on diplomatic démarches instead.

The circumstances of the Korean war were very particular. Too much must not be implied from the Chinese decision to intervene militarily when United Nations (in effect United States) forces crossed from South Korea and drove towards the North Korean/Manchurian border. The PLA intervened in strength though this intervention was disguised as action by 'Chinese People's Volunteers'. This need simply be noted here as an example of China's readiness to take military action with all the attendant risks. Chinese intervention in 1979 in Vietnam is also best merely noted until Chinese motives and the circumstances surrounding the decision to intervene have been more fully assessed. But at the very least it can be recorded as another example of readiness to employ the PLA where escalation of the conflict was a possibility.

But even if these two examples must be treated with caution, China's action against India in 1962 contrasts starkly with Peking's tolerance of a colonial presence in Hong Kong and Macao. Peking had no ideological quarrel with New Delhi, the disputed border areas in the Himalayas (particularly the McMahon Line) could have been blamed without loss of face on British imperialism, the only substantive threat of any strategic importance was to the Sinkiang-Tibet road and this could surely have been settled by an agreement on troop limitations in the frontier zones. Yet the Indian occupation of some obscure posts and villages provoked a powerful armed reaction by the PLA, while continued British and Portuguese administration of cities with populations of some five million Chinese has not only been tolerated but supported by essential supplies of water and food.

Hong Kong as a provocation

Had they chosen, the Chinese might well have seen the use made of Hong Kong by the United States as provocative. The United States opposed the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations, it placed an embargo on Chinese goods and allied itself with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government in Taiwan. The foremost instrument of this policy was the American Seventh Fleet which was interposed between the two Chinas in the Taiwan straits in 1950 and used to break the blockade of Quemoy in 1958—these two instances being additional to its general deterrent role. Yet ships of the Seventh Fleet were victualled in Hong Kong (it can be surmised that this included food supplied from China) and crews used the colony for rest and recuperation. Even when China and America were at war in all but name, first in Korea and again when the PLA deployed support troops in Vietnam, Hong Kong continued to be used by the Americans. Nor was there anything surreptitious about this use. Anyone crossing the Star Ferry from central Hong Kong to Tsim Sha Tsui (one of the busiest ferry routes in the world) passed within a few hundred yards of American naval vessels lying on moorings that were in practice reserved for their exclusive use. If more colourful evidence of the American presence was sought it could always be found in the girlie-bars of Wanchai.[8]

Today, in 1979, the position is very different. The People's Republic and the United States have normalised diplomatic relations, and Peking is more preoccupied with the threat of Russian hegemony than with American imperialism. As they are urging the Americans and the West to stand up to the Soviet Union the Chinese government must draw some satisfaction from Hong Kong's role as a port available to the American navy without directly involving China.

8. On March 20, 1967, China protested to Britain over the use of Hong Kong as a 'Vietnam War Base': see *Far East Economic Review 1968 Yearbook*, p. 47. This is also recorded in *The Times* index but the reports indexed do not appear in *The Times* editions available in Canberra.

Not only the Americans but also their allies the Chinese Nationalists and supporters of the Kuomintang (KMT) are a standing provocation in Hong Kong. The Colony remained—and to a limited extent remains—the sole place on the Chinese mainland where supporters of Chiang Kai-shek continued openly to display their loyalties. On October 10 ('the double tenth') each year blue and red flags of the Chinese Republic are flown in clear defiance of the red regime some fifteen miles away.[9] Some areas—Rennies Mill, for example—were virtually KMT enclaves where Chaing Kai-Shek's supporters substituted pictures of the Generalissimo for those of the Great Helmsman. The Royal Hong Kong Police keep a watchful eye on the situation and discourage—or if need be forbid—more active demonstrations by KMT supporters; but there can be little doubt that the People's Republic has enjoined restraint on its own much more numerous supporters. The Taiwan flag carrier, China Airlines, flies frequently in and out of Hong Kong and Taiwan maintains a travel agency there which, to those unversed in the minutiae of protocol, appears very like a consulate.

Moreover in the years before 1949 when the KMT was still in power in Canton, the Communists themselves had used Hong Kong as a link between their forces in the north and their supporters and guerrillas in Kwantung—so they were well aware of the use Taipei could make of it. This must have been a special cause of concern when socialisation—the transfer of land and industry from private to collective or state ownership—was running into many difficulties in Canton.

Quite apart from the use made of Hong Kong by the Americans, and the role of the Nationalists there, the mere fact of the British presence in Hong Kong must surely be regarded as an irritant to Peking—unless we see the Chinese as somehow escaping the nationalistic ardour that bedevils the modern world. Of this there is little evidence and in addition nationalism in China is allied to an aggressive revolutionary ideology. The British, it is true, avoid as far as they can any deliberate acts which might antagonise Peking or be interpreted as anti-Chinese; but a medium power not yet completely divested of its international and colonial role cannot be entirely passive.

Hong Kong is a listening post for China not only figuratively but literally and openly. Foreign correspondents and China watchers abound and many consulates-general are much larger and better staffed than embassies elsewhere. But besides this any observer can easily see—though he cannot visit—the masts and antennae of the British establishments monitoring Chinese communications. So obvious are these that it can be surmised that the Chinese on occasions deliberately use them to 'signal' their intentions to the British and their allies when more public direct communication is undesirable.

The outward trappings of imperialism are also still exhibited and play an undefined but important role in symbolising British rule. British regiments

9. Some restrictions have been imposed by the Hong Kong authorities. Until 1973 Nationalist flags were flown on the 'double tenth' from the prominent Lion Rock. Since then this has been forbidden.

beat the retreat; Ghurkas and British soldiers mount military parades and tatoos; the Royal Hong Kong Police Band—complete with bagpipes and a (Chinese) pipe-major—entertains the populace; Her Majesty the Queen visits her colony and is greeted with a fireworks display when the local population are forbidden traditional Chinese crackers; local Chinese dignitaries are created Knights of the British Empire—the list could be extended indefinitely. Above all, capitalism flourishes with a colourful gaiety and panache that make the socialist achievements of nearby Canton dull and drab by comparison.

Many Chinese make this comparison and opt for Hong Kong. Refugees from the People's Republic are a serious problem for Hong Kong but they are also a continuing rebuke to Peking. Voting with one's feet is a sadly common feature of the modern world, but nowhere over such a long period have so many faced such hardships to escape hard living conditions and a harsh regime. Unlike the current exodus from Vietnam the flight from China to Hong Kong has no taint of ethnic persecution. Chinese flee other Chinese from one Chinese environment to another. This cannot be interpreted except as an affront to the policies and practices of Peking. Legal (i.e. permitted by the Chinese and accepted by Hong Kong) and illegal (i.e. escaping and either granted asylum or simply merging in the local population) immigrants have reached Hong Kong in thousands each month over the past ten years. The earlier numbers were huge but not easy to determine. At times the stream has become a flood. This was especially true after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, when approximately 120,000 refugees crossed the border in May 1962.[10] Many were returned by the Hong Kong authorities but their attempt to escape, even when unsuccessful, was recorded by the world's press and other media, and it helped to publicise the harsh conditions in the province of Kwantung and even beyond.

Even today many Chinese swim across Mirs Bay and Deep Bay using plastic containers as improvised floats and at the risk of arrest by frontier patrols and attacks by sharks. That thousands of their countrymen and women are so alienated as to take these risks must be galling to the government and Party in Peking—and must have been even more so in the past when the regime was less secure and this evidence of disaffection was welcomed and exploited by Kuomintang propagandists.

Hong Kong and the Cultural Revolution

It is when revolutionary fervour in the People's Republic is greatest that the temptation to end the anomalies of Hong Kong and Macao must become

10. This figure is calculated from *Hong Kong—Report for Year 1962*, p. 212-13. A figure of 140,000 for the month of May is given by A. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michagon Press, 1975), p. 21 who cites E. E. Rice, *Mao's Way* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) p. 193. Rice seems to rely on the *Hong Kong Report* figures which do not exactly justify the higher figure. Only the figures of those apprehended and those returned to China are reliable. 60,000 are estimated to have escaped detection. On the other hand, an unknown number made repeated attempts and were arrested and re-arrested. The Hong Kong authorities were dealing with an unforeseen and unprecedented crisis and statistics were their lowest priority.

urgent in Peking. This fervour reached a climax during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It is beyond the scope of this paper, and of the author's competence, to try to disentangle the course of the Cultural Revolution or to analyse Chairman Mao's motives in destroying the structure of the Communist Party on the principle of 'put destruction first, and in the process you have construction'. But the effects on Macao and Hong Kong were clear enough.

In October/November 1966 Deng Xiaoping, then Secretary-General of the CCP Central Committee, was 'purged' and the duties of the Party Secretariat were taken over by the Cultural Revolutionary Group which included those who are now known as the 'Gang of Four'. Almost immediately after this the local Communists in Macao staged riots and confronted the Portuguese authorities with demands to which they capitulated. It has never been established whether this confrontation was directed from Peking or Canton or whether the Macao Communists merely emulated the revolutionary turbulence across the border in Kwantung province. But what is remarkable is that although humiliating and peremptory demands were made of the Portuguese, they stopped short of claiming the return of Macao to China. Indeed a persistent rumour still maintains that the Portuguese subsequently signalled to Peking their intention to withdraw but were given to understand that this would be an unfriendly act!

Be that as it may, across the Pearl River estuary in Hong Kong the effects of the Cultural Revolution were soon felt. At first there was no more than increasingly bitter confrontation between industrial employers and labour, but in early May 1967 the local Communists initiated industrial action which made police intervention unavoidable. The resulting riots and protests were the most serious disorders in Hong Kong's history and Peking manifested its involvement when on May 15 a statement[11] was handed to the British Chargé d'Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleging Hong Kong police atrocities which were 'a component part of the British government's scheme of collusion with United States' imperialism against China' and making demands for apologies and amends. After this there were further demonstrations in Hong Kong in which personnel from the New China News Agency and the Bank of China joined—being easily distinguished from other demonstrators since they were driven to the gates of Government House in their black Mercedes Benz motor cars.[12]

The Hong Kong authorities refused to capitulate and were supported from London. The police dealt firmly with the rioters and protestors. Troops were available and were used to cordon off one section of Hong Kong from another. This facilitated police control; but it was the police who confronted the rioters

11. The distinction in diplomatic practice between a 'statement' and a 'note' relieved the British of the need to reply.

12. A good account of the 1967 disorders is given in E. E. Rice, *op cit.*, Chap. 23. Rice has researched the period thoroughly and as United States Consul-General at Hong Kong in 1967 personally observed the events.

and as the vast majority of the police, including virtually all non-commissioned ranks,[13] were Chinese, a direct British/Chinese ethnic clash was avoided. This was probably an element in the support the authorities received from the local population. By the end of September Peking's support for the local Communists had clearly waned and although sporadic terrorists' bombings still occurred Chinese registered ships were discharging cargo in Hong Kong harbour and conditions were approaching normal again.

The events of 1967 clearly imperilled Hong Kong's existence. The local Communists may well have begun their confrontation with the authorities in emulation of the violence of the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic but they soon received support from Peking. And in Peking events ominous for Hong Kong had occurred. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was occupied by Red Guards and Premier Chou En-lai was fighting for his political life—and would not add to his difficulties by espousing Hong Kong's cause against the extreme Left even when he had recovered an insecure control of the situation.

The Cultural Revolution brought Chinese/British relations to their lowest point since the establishment of the People's Republic. In August 1967 the British Chargé d'Affairs and members of his staff were assaulted in Peking and the embassy offices destroyed. In London, staff of the Chinese embassy demonstrated violently in a clear attempt to provoke police retaliation. Only when the People's Liberation Army began to assert its power over the Red Guards did matters improve. Yet even when the Red Guards and the Cultural Revolutionary Group were in temporary control of government and Party no demand that the British should quit Hong Kong was actually made.

In summary, my argument is that since 1949 there have been numerous occasions when China could have been expected to insist that the British leave Hong Kong. During this time Peking has always had the means to enforce its demands; there is evidence of China's readiness to use military force in situations of much greater risk; Hong Kong has frequently been the site of provocations to the Chinese by Americans, Kuomintang and British; and there have been revolutionary struggles in China when forces have gained control whose tolerance of an imperialist outpost was *a priori* extremely unlikely—and these have coincided with anti-British violence in Hong Kong itself. It does not seem unreasonable to deduce from this that a calculated Chinese initiative to end Hong Kong's existence is unlikely in the foreseeable future—for, say, the next twenty years—and that an irrational spasmodic movement to 'free Hong Kong' is even less likely.

The option for Britain

In the peculiar situation of Hong Kong all potential positive moves are in Chinese hands. Nevertheless, the British do have a role and cannot be left entirely out of account. British weakness in Hong Kong is both real and

13. An insignificant number of Pakistani other ranks remains from an earlier recruitment policy.

apparent. In a paradoxical sense it may even be a source of strength in that it is probably because of it that the Chinese tolerate a foreign presence. A perceptive Hong Kong Chinese undergraduate explained this to me by saying that if Hong Kong had been an American colony China would have had to recover it merely to demonstrate that she was able to do so. Apart from this consideration of prestige, a Britain that has to respect Chinese wishes is clearly more acceptable to Peking than one that could resist or flout them. However the argument is only valid up to a point. The British writ *does* run effectively in Hong Kong—although sometimes the authorities are very discreet. The 'walled city' of Kowloon where some Chinese jurisdiction was reserved under the New Territories lease, Sha Tau Kok, a frontier town cut in two by the border, and Tai O, a village which until recently could only be reached by sea and by passing through Chinese waters, are examples of areas where the police and other authorities are constantly aware of Chinese susceptibilities and act accordingly, but these are exceptions. The British presence is certainly not flaunted, but neither is it played down to insignificance as is the Portuguese presence in Macao. As already pointed out, the essential symbols of colonial rule are displayed and local Chinese are involved in this display. Except in times of crisis and the breakdown of governmental and Party control the governments of the People's Republic and of Hong Kong treat each other with respect. The most striking evidence of this was the official visit of the Governor of Hong Kong to China. The description of events given earlier in this paper should serve to make clear the significance of such a visit in the normalisation of relations between the Colony and Peking. The symbolism of Hong Kong's Governor being the official guest of the government of China would be lost on no Chinese and there can be no doubt whatever that this was intended by Peking.[14]

The respect shown by Peking to the Hong Kong authorities is a major factor in making the Colony governable. Without it the expatriate officials' position would be virtually untenable unless they were prepared to accept the low profile of the Portuguese in Macao; and that they should so behave seems very improbable for many reasons, an important one being that it could bring right-wing politicians in Britain to call for British abandonment of Hong Kong, thus aligning them with left-wing colleagues who dislike British possession of Hong Kong for quite different reasons.

In brief, Britain holds the negative trump card of withdrawal and could conceivably play it.

This statement is to some extent inconsistent with what was said earlier about development and investment in the New Territories and the implication that a British presence in Hong Kong would extend beyond 1997. Here it is necessary to enquire more closely into what we mean by 'British' in the Hong Kong context. In a broad constitutional sense it is acceptable to conceive

14. Those interested in the careful attention paid by the CPR to diplomatic wording, symbolic gestures and other formal and informal ways of 'signalling' their intentions should read Whiting, *op. cit.*

'British Government' as embracing both the sovereign government of the United Kingdom (itself subsuming a number of concepts of government) and the colonial government whose powers and jurisdiction are derivative. But a closer examination reveals a very different schema. Occasionally London directly affects Hong Kong by legislation, veto or instruction, but this is rare and becomes rarer. In the vast majority of cases the Hong Kong government has almost complete autonomy.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has little time to devote to a colony that seems quite capable of running its own affairs. In other colonies local financial stringency and consequent financial control from London were much more real restraints on colonial governments than was the direct use of constitutional powers. But Hong Kong prospers and pays its own way. Indeed far from receiving financial support from Britain, in the days of the sterling area the boot was on the other foot. For until 1972 when London *did* exercise the right to order Hong Kong to keep its foreign exchange reserves in sterling, these formed as much as 35 per cent of the Bank of England's total assets. In this situation—and more so when her exchange reserves were diversified—Hong Kong was not only free of the harness of financial control but could 'talk back' to London with considerable force and freedom. The relationship with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has become more and more one of diplomacy between equals and less and less hierarchical. Whatever may be the position in strict constitutional law, few decisions affecting the Colony are taken in London without prior discussion with Hong Kong and, when taken, these decisions are open to local interpretation and application. London may have the last word but in practice the last word is reached only after negotiations with officials who are in no real sense subordinate and who in due course decide what the last word means.

Hong Kong's capital developments in the public sector, whether undertaken directly by government departments or by public utility companies, are financed from Hong Kong's own resources. Private developments rely on capital attracted by the local conditions that make investment profitable. There is virtually no public debt and public works are either paid for from current revenue or are expected to be revenue-producing and self-amortising. The few exceptions have been financed by loans raised by the Hong Kong authorities on their own responsibility without London's assistance or guarantees. This is emphasised to make the point that developments in Hong Kong are independent of London and so do not imply a British commitment to Hong Kong's future.[15] It is probably going too far to say that London does not care what Hong Kong does so long as it does it with its own money, but it is not far wide of the mark.

The Hong Kong government on the other hand *does* have a commitment to the Colony's future but it is a commitment of a peculiar kind. Hong Kong is

15. An exception may be the new service barracks and headquarters constructed at HMS *Tamar* and RN base. These, however, have simply enabled the army to leave the old Victoria Barracks.

ruled by Britain but governed by civil servants. In the higher ranks these are predominantly British (or at least expatriate—for one of the most powerful, the Financial Secretary, is an Australian) and they combine administrative and political roles in the crown colonial structure of Hong Kong government. Their careers may have begun in a more general and widespread colonial service but events since the Second World War have focused their hopes and ambitions on Hong Kong. An end to Hong Kong would probably not be an economic or financial disaster for them as individuals, but they have a professional interest in its continuance. To this can often be added emotional attachment and pride in their achievements. At the very least they are placed in a position where they have to act on the assumption that Hong Kong's future is assured, whatever may be their hidden misgivings.[16]

Their Chinese colleagues may reach high rank in the politically less sensitive sectors such as public health and housing. They have the same commitment as the expatriates, together with a greater personal stake in the status quo. That they may have personal contingency plans for the eventuality of Hong Kong's status changing is obvious, but their preference for its continuance is also clear.

But it would be unjust to the civil servants of Hong Kong not to credit the vast majority with a very real concern for the welfare of the people whom they govern. If one had to pass judgment on Hong Kong's achievement one would no doubt have to give first place to the material economic successes that have been attained with so few resources. But it would be unjust not to pay tribute to the quality of the governing civil servants. Critics have been quick enough to complain of a lack of response to public needs and demands, but in general what is surprising is that civil servants who are to a very large extent their own political masters should remain so responsive to the public welfare and have allowed the public great freedom of expression. This is not the place to examine the reasons for this in detail, and all that need be said is that the Hong Kong government is not unmindful of the future of the five million Chinese of Hong Kong and that the decision-making elite in that government will do what they can to maintain the Colony's existence. That this is partly in their own interests need not detract from their very real concern that the people of Hong Kong should either continue to enjoy the anachronistic colonial status for which so many have deliberately opted or, if change cannot be avoided, that it should change to a status which would make transition easy and by means that cause as little hardship as possible.

Official thinking on these lines has not been made public but in an interesting article 'New Thoughts on the Future of Hong Kong' in the *Pacific Community*[17] Dick Wilson urges that it should be undertaken and suggests

16. Exceptionally the Governor and the Political Adviser came from outside the ranks of career administrators. The governors in the past came from the colonial service but not directly from service in Hong Kong. The present Governor is an ex-ambassador. The Political Adviser is a Foreign Office official seconded to the Hong Kong government and usually experienced in London–Peking relations.

17. 1977, Vol. 8 (4), pp. 588–99.

that preparations must be made now to prevent 'the arrival of the 1997 deadline [introducing] a legalistic inflexibility into a situation which all parties will by then wish to preserve as flexible'. For reasons explained earlier the present author would disagree with Wilson on the importance of 1997 to the Chinese; but Wilson is undoubtedly right that the future of Hong Kong should be considered not simply as an exercise in academic speculation but with a view to examining practical alternatives. Wilson's own suggestion is that formal agreement could be reached between London and Peking using as a precedent the 1930 Convention for the Rendition of Weihaiwei. By this the British concession of Weihaiwei was returned to China subject to various safeguards and conditions. One may have many reservations about this convention between a powerful Britain and a weak Republic of China serving as a precedent for an agreement between today's Britain and the People's Republic, but the idea certainly has attractions—although an essential condition would be London's wish to continue its responsibilities in Hong Kong even if these were altered in form and perhaps reduced in substance.

To analyse United Kingdom attitudes to one of the last, and the most important, of its colonies is impossible here. It is an aspect of the Hong Kong problem that has not been thoroughly studied and considerable research would be required if an adequate account were to be given of official opinion in London, of parliamentary viewpoints, of the effectiveness of the Hong Kong lobby at Westminster, and of the influence of Britain's allies. In a short chapter on 'British Colonial Rule' Miners concludes that 'the "nation of shopkeepers" would soon cut its losses and move out if Hong Kong became an economic liability'. This seems to overdo the *realpolitik* somewhat, for there are still elements of sentiment and prestige that weigh in British political decisions. Moreover, a serious economic recession in Hong Kong could well be a reason why the government of the People's Republic would *not* want it returned to China: if Peking can resist the temptation to take back this piece of its territory when it is a flourishing asset it is not likely to welcome its return when it becomes an economic inconvenience to Britain. In quite marked contrast to Miners, Wilson assumes 'that the British are ready and willing to continue their slightly awkward and thankless custodial role in Hong Kong indefinitely', but confesses that this may be a dangerous premise to work upon.

Clearly the side of Hong Kong's 'unequal equation' that has been least adequately researched and evaluated is that of the British and their power to withdraw.[18] This merits scholarly attention but in the meantime assessments have to be made by examining the Chinese position. The very limited conclusion of the present article is that the People's Republic has exercised remarkable restraint over Hong Kong since 1949 when events within and outside China and the Colony could have precipitated a Chinese take-over. Rational decision making has prevailed in Peking on this question when

18. Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19 devotes five paragraphs to Hong Kong's critics in Britain but much more needs to be done.

opportunity, capability and provocation for precipitate action were all present and even at a time when hierarchical control within the CCP had broken down. That rationality on Hong Kong was maintained in these circumstances argues for its continuance in all but extreme conditions, and this is an assurance that Hong Kong's position will continue to depend on Peking's careful assessment that the status quo is in Chinese interests. There is no reason to believe this assessment will change in the near future and certainly no justification for the belief that it will be affected by the shadow of 1997.

THE INTERNATIONAL BAUXITE AGREEMENT: A COMMODITY CARTEL IN ACTION

Isaiah A. Litvak and Christopher J. Maule *

THE international bauxite-aluminium industry has been characterised as an international oligopoly with the potential for cartel-like behaviour being undertaken both by the firms and certain countries which produce bauxite. The International Bauxite Agreement (IBA) is the industry's counterpart to OPEC and some have suggested that the IBA's success for the eleven member countries [1] is second only to that of OPEC. Success is, of course, a relative term, relative to what happened before, or to what would have happened in the absence of the IBA or in the event of some alternative agreement. Success can be measured in various ways, and the degree of success may differ for each member country of the IBA as well as for those affected by the IBA—producing firms, customers and bauxite-consuming countries.

Several years have passed since the establishment of the IBA in 1974, and it is now possible to evaluate in some degree what success has meant to the bauxite-producing countries and what has accounted for these results. Professor R. Mikesell has stated that

> The principal factors governing the ability of an association of producers of raw material to raise or sustain its price by means of collusive action for an extended period of time include:
>
> (1) the share of the world market supplied by the members of the association;
>
> (2) the elasticity of world demand for the commodity;
>
> (3) the elasticity of the supply of the commodity controlled by non-members and the supply elasticities of substitutes for the commodity;
>
> (4) the structure of the world market for the commodity;
>
> (5) the financial positions of the members of the association; and
>
> (6) the cohesiveness and discipline of the members of the association in carrying out a joint policy.[2]

These factors will be used to examine the degree of success achieved by the member countries of the IBA. In so doing, it will be shown that certain ownership and contracting features of the industry are changing in a way

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1. Australia, Guinea, Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana, Yugoslavia, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Surinam, Haiti, and Ghana.
2. R. F. Mikesell, *Nonfuel Minerals: U.S. Investment Policies Abroad* (London: Sage, 1975), p. 28.

which distinguishes the events in this industry from those resulting from OPEC. As a result, it is suggested that the approach to examining international industry arrangements needs to become more micro-oriented in order to capture some of these developments. Writers who have evaluated the transnational relations framework for analysing international affairs have proposed that there should be increased emphasis on sectoral studies as well as political studies of individual markets. The approach taken in this article conforms to this suggestion.[3]

Production process

The international bauxite-alumina industry consists of five stages of production: bauxite, alumina, primary aluminium ingot, fabricated aluminium products, and end-products containing aluminium. The focus will be mainly on the first three stages where the industry is one in which a small number of large companies have become vertically integrated and exercise considerable control, and where there does not exist anything approaching a free market for either bauxite or alumina.[4] In the fourth stage, fabricated aluminium products, the same large companies have also been involved, but in addition there exist a number of independent fabricators and suppliers of scrap metal—so that at the primary aluminium-ingot stage a market does exist and prices of ingot are published.

At the first stage, the production process involves mining, crushing, washing, and calcining crude bauxite near the site of the deposits; the second stage, the production of alumina, involves a chemical process and further calcining, and takes place both at the site of the deposits and at the location of the smelter, where the third stage, production of primary aluminium ingot, is undertaken. Smelting requires extensive use of energy for conversion of alumina into metal and is usually located near the source of cheap energy supplies.[5]

The production process as described is based on the use of bauxite as the raw material. The end product at the aluminium stage can be considered a homogeneous product in terms of physical characteristics, although service differentiation exists in the form of the terms, conditions and services which relate to any particular transaction. Alternative aluminium-bearing raw materials are available and considerable research is being undertaken to develop production techniques to make these alternatives economically

3. See Susan Strange, 'The Study of Transnational Relations' *International Affairs*, July 1976, pp. 333–45.

4. Charles River Associates, *An Economic Analysis of the Aluminum Industry* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), p. 105.

5. An important exception to the foregoing is a second type of bauxite known as calcined bauxite, which is used largely for abrasives and for producing refractory bricks and linings. The technology used for processing calcined bauxite varies according to the end product required, and does not involve the processes controlled by the major aluminium ingot producing companies. In the remainder of this paper reference to 'bauxite' will mean 'metal grade bauxite', unless otherwise noted.

Table 1

World Consumption of Aluminium (Short Tons)

	1977	1976	1975	1974	1973	1972	1971	1970	1969	1968	1967	1966
United States	6·4	6·1	4·8	6·4	6·8	5·8	5·1	3·7	3·8	3·9	3·3	3·3
Canada	·3	·2	·2	·3	·3	·3	·3	·2	·2	·2	·2	·2
Other America	·4	·4	·4	·5	·3	·3	·1	·2	·2	·1	·1	·1
Total America	7·1	6·7	5·4	7·2	7·4	6·4	5·5	4·1	4·2	4·2	3·6	3·6
France	·6	·5	·4	·5	·5	·4	·4	·5	·4	·3	·3	·3
Federal Republic of Germany	1·0	1·0	·8	1·0	·9	·8	·8	·7	·7	·6	·5	·5
Italy	·4	·4	·3	·4	·4	·3	·3	·3	·3	·2	·2	·2
Netherlands	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	*	*	*
Norway	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	*
Spain	·3	·3	·2	·2	·2	·2	·2	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1
United Kingdom	·6	·6	·5	·6	·5	·5	·4	·5	·4	·4	·4	·4
Yugoslavia	·2	·2	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1
Other Europe	·7	·8	·7	·8	·8	·5	·3	·4	·4	·5	·3	·4
Total Europe	4·0	4·0	3·2	3·8	3·6	3·0	2·7	2·8	2·6	2·3	2·0	2·0
Japan	1·7	1·8	1·4	1·5	1·8	1·3	1·1	1·0	1·0	·7	·6	·5
Other Asia	·6	·6	·5	·4	·4	·3	·2	·2	·1	·1	·1	·1
Total Asia	2·3	2·4	1·9	1·9	2·2	1·6	1·3	1·2	1·1	·8	·7	·6
Total Africa	·2	·2	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	*	*
Australia	·2	·2	·2	·2	·2	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1
New Zealand	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Sub-Total	13·8	13·5	10·8	13·2	13·5	11·2	9·7	8·3	8·1	7·5	6·4	6·3
Centrally Planned Economies[a]	3·2	3·2	3·0	2·8	2·7	2·5	2·3	2·2	1·9	1·7	1·6	1·5
World Total	17·0	16·7	13·8	16·0	16·2	13·7	12·0	10·5	10·0	9·2	8·0	7·8

* Less than 45,000 but included in total

[a] Centrally Planned Economies include: USSR; Bulgaria; Cuba. Czechoslovakia; Germany; Hungary; Poland; Rumania; China; and Other Europe.

Source: American Bureau of Metal Statistics. *Non-Ferrous Metal Data*, 1977 and earlier years.

attractive. A major consideration in using aluminium-bearing clays is the high-energy content of the known production process. Consequently, increased energy costs tend to discourage the use of these substitute raw materials. One estimate suggests that the annual operating costs per ton of alumina is 85–100 per cent higher using clay or anorthosite instead of bauxite as a raw material.[6]

One attraction to the principal consuming countries of the use of aluminium-bearing clays is that they can be found in areas of the world which have a lower level of political risk than is the case with some bauxite-producing countries. The costs associated with extracting aluminium from alternative raw materials represent an important consideration to be recognised by existing members of the IBA in introducing policies which affect the price of bauxite. Another major factor affecting the IBA is the production of bauxite taking place by non-IBA members such as Brazil, and certain East European countries.

Principal users of aluminium

In 1977, world consumption of aluminium was estimated at 17·0 million short tons: the United States consumed 37·6 per cent; Europe 23·5 per cent; the Soviet Union 11·2 per cent; Japan 10·0 per cent; and all other countries 17·7 per cent (Table 1). Based on the pattern of demand in the United States, the industries which are the principal users of aluminium are building and construction; consumer durables; and machinery and equipment. These industries are subject to different degrees of cyclical fluctuation with general economic conditions: building and construction and consumer durables are the more volatile. While the income elasticity of demand for aluminium is positive, like a number of other raw materials it is probably less than one in the more industrialised countries. On a global basis the estimated demand for aluminium is 31 million short tons in 1985, and 60 million short tons by 2000, compared to the production of 15·5 million short tons in 1977.[7] Even if the 1985 estimate is too high by 50 per cent, the demand for aluminium, and thus for bauxite, from the bauxite-producing countries will be substantially higher than at present. Thus, the opportunities for bauxite suppliers, including certain developing countries, to supply this expanded demand will be significant. A recent study which forecasts the world demand for raw materials uses an intensity of use (I-U) method whereby

$$\text{I-U} = \frac{{}_iD_t}{GDP_t}$$

(${}_iD_t$ = demand for mineral i in time t and GDP_t = gross domestic product in time t.)

6. R. S. Pindyck, 'Cartel Pricing and the Structure of the World Bauxite Market', *Bell Journal of Economics*, Autumn 1977, pp. 357–59.

7. US Bureau of Mines, *Mineral Facts and Problems*, 1975 edn, p. 60. Other estimates are as high as 73·6 million short tons.

If I-U is plotted against GDP per capita for aluminium then the relationship is positive but the increase is at a decreasing rate.[8] Thus with increasing income as measured by GDP per capita, the intensity of use of aluminium increases at a decreasing rate. The study shows aluminium as the only raw material for which this relationship holds; for other materials I-U increases at first and then declines with higher GDP per capita. The favourable position of aluminium is attributed to the 'widening scope for further displacement by aluminium for iron ore, nickel, tin, and zinc in metal production, and for steel and copper metal goods'.[9] While the production of aluminium consumes considerable amounts of energy, the weight characteristics of aluminium are such that it provides a means of energy saving in products such as automobiles, so that higher energy costs do not necessarily harm the future demand for aluminium. These observations reflect the inter-industry competition which aluminium has with other metals and the factors which will affect the price elasticity of demand for aluminium and thus bauxite.

One structural characteristic of the international aluminium industry is consumption concentration, which can be viewed in terms either of countries, industries or individual customers (firms). The four largest consuming countries accounted for 65 per cent of total consumption in 1977, namely the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and West Germany. In the case of the United States four industry-groupings (building and construction, containers and packaging, transportation equipment, and electric) accounted for 75 per cent of total industrial demand in 1976, and within each grouping there are some large purchasers such as automobile, aircraft, electrical and can manufacturing firms.[10] Overall industrial consumption concentration is high, although within any industry-grouping this need not be the case—depending on the number and size of individual purchasers. Consumption concentration is one important characteristic of the buyer side of the market and can affect the derived demand for aluminium, alumina and bauxite.

In sum, while the demand for aluminium is price-inelastic in the short run, there is no reason to believe that this would be the case in the longer run—given the many other materials with which aluminium competes. While aluminium use is confined to a relatively small number of industrial sectors, there are a large number of firms which are end-users of aluminium and few of them are integrated backwards into aluminium production.

Producers of aluminium

In 1977, primary aluminium production was estimated to be 15·5 million short tons, of which the four largest producing countries had 60·0 per cent of

8. W. Malenbaum, *World Demand for Raw Materials in 1985* (McGraw-Hill Mining Information Services, 1978), p. 57.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
10. US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, *Aluminum*, MCP-14 Mineral Commodity Profiles, May 1978, p. 16.

the total: the United States 29·0 per cent; the Soviet Union 15·5 per cent; Japan 8·4 per cent; and Canada 7·1 per cent (Table 2). This is in contrast with the 60·8 per cent share of total consumption undertaken by these four countries. While production of ingot in the main producing countries tends to balance consumption, there is, of course, no such balance between bauxite production and ingot production.

In the Western world, production is concentrated in the hands of a small number of large producers which are surrounded by a fringe of smaller producers. The International Primary Aluminum Institute (IPAI) reports on some fifty companies responsible for the operation of about 135 aluminium smelters representing substantially all of the Western world's primary aluminium capacity. In 1976, the IPAI reported primary aluminium production of 11·1 million short tons (12·3 in 1977) and capacity of 13·9 million short tons as of December 31, 1976. North America had 44·7 per cent of the 1976 production and 46·3 per cent of capacity, while Europe had 31·4 per cent and 28·0 per cent respectively.[11]

The six largest producing firms—Alcan, Alcoa, Kaiser, Reynolds, Pechiney and Alusuisse (see Annexe below)—have 8·0 million short tons of primary aluminium production capacity, which is about 57 per cent of the Western world's total capacity in 1976: producer concentration among the largest four firms was 44 per cent. The bauxite requirements of the six are estimated at 31·6 million short tons, which represents about 35 per cent of total world, or 40 per cent of total Western world, bauxite production in 1977. In fact Australian bauxite production could alone satisfy 91 per cent of the bauxite volumes required at present by these six companies, if it operated at full capacity. In 1972, it was estimated that the same six largest producers controlled 76 per cent of the total primary aluminium capacity in the Western world, compared to 57 per cent in 1977.[12] Thus in the space of five years, while the West's production capacity increased by about 21 per cent, there had been a substantial reduction in concentration at the primary aluminium-production stage.

On the basis of producer concentration this might suggest that the industry is becoming more competitive, but the degree of concentration alone is only a crude indicator of competitiveness, and overlooks the fact that these six companies have part interests in aluminium projects which alter the significance of the measure of concentration. Thus, the United States Bureau of Mines, which estimates the Big Six as operating 45 per cent of world aluminium capacity (compared to the authors' estimate of 57 per cent of Western world capacity) also notes that one or more of these (six firms) are involved in virtually all of the major aluminium projects of international significance in the free world.[13] The nature of the competitive process is likely

11. *IPAI Statistical Summary*, 1977.
12. I. A. Litvak and C. J. Maule, 'Cartel Strategies in the International Aluminum Industry', *The Antitrust Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Fall 1975, pp. 641–63.
13. *Aluminum, op. cit.*, p. 4.

Table 2

World Production of Aluminium (Short Tons)

	1977	1976	1975	1974	1973	1972	1971	1970	1969	1968	1967	1966
United States	4·5	4·3	3·9	4·9	4·5	4·1	3·9	4·0	3·8	3·3	3·3	3·0
Canada	1·1	·7	1·0	1·1	1·0	1·0	1·1	1·1	1·1	1·0	1·0	·9
Other America	·3	·1	·2	·3	·3	·3	·2	·1	·1	·1	*	*
Total America	5·9	5·1	5·1	6·3	5·8	5·4	5·2	5·2	5·0	4·4	4·3	3·9
France	·4	·4	·4	·4	·4	·4	·4	·4	·4	·4	·4	·4
Germany F.R.	·8	·8	·8	·8	·6	·5	·5	·3	·3	·3	·3	·3
Italy	·3	·2	·2	·2	·2	·1	·1	·2	·2	·2	·1	·1
Netherlands	·3	·3	·3	·3	·2	·2	·1	·1	·1	·1	*	*
Norway	·7	·7	·7	·7	·7	·6	·6	·6	·6	·5	·4	·4
Spain	·2	·2	·2	·2	·2	·2	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1
United Kingdom	·4	·4	·3	·3	·3	·2	·1	*	*	*	*	*
Yugoslavia	·2	·2	·2	·2	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1	·1
Other Europe	·5	·5	·5	·6	·4	·4	·5	·4	·3	·2	·3	·2
Total Europe	3·8	3·7	3·6	3·7	3·1	2·7	2·5	2·2	2·1	1·9	1·7	1·6
Japan	1·3	1·0	1·1	1·2	1·2	1·1	1·0	·8	·6	·5	·4	·4
Other Asia	·5	·5	·5	·4	·4	·3	·2	·2	·2	·2	·2	·1
Total Asia	1·8	1·5	1·6	1·6	1·6	1·4	1·2	1·0	·8	·7	·6	·5
Total Africa	·4	·4	·3	·3	·3	·3	·2	·2	·2	·2	·1	·1
Australia	·3	·3	·2	·2	·2	·2	·3	·2	·1	·1	·1	·1
New Zealand	·2	·2	·1	·1	·1	·1	*	*	—	—	—	—
Sub-Total	12·4	11·2	10·9	12·2	11·1	10·1	9·4	8·8	8·2	7·3	6·8	6·2
Centrally Planned Economies[a]	3·1	3·2	3·1	3·0	2·8	2·7	2·5	2·2	1·9	1·8	1·7	1·6
World Total	15·5	14·4	14·0	15·2	13·9	12·8	11·9	11·0	10·1	9·1	8·5	7·8

* Less than 45,000 but included in total.
[a] Centrally Planned Economies include: U.S.S.R.; Czechoslovakia; Germany; Hungary; Poland; Rumania; China; and Other Europe.

Source: American Bureau of Metal Statistics. *Non-Ferrous Metal Data*, 1977 and earlier years.

to be affected by these intercorporate linkages, some of which involve governments as partners.

Sources of raw material

Aluminium is produced from alumina which in turn is extracted from bauxite. Some bauxite is processed as calcined alumina for making refractory bricks and some is used for chemical purposes, so that aluminium is extracted from metal-grade bauxite and alumina. In 1977, world production of bauxite was 91·3 million short tons: the four largest countries accounted for 65 per cent of production: Australia 31·4; Guinea 13·7; Jamaica 11·8; and the Soviet Union 8·1. The eleven members of the IBA accounted for 74 per cent of world production (Table 3).

Western world metallurgical alumina production totalled 25·7 million short tons in 1977, distributed 29 per cent to Oceania (mainly Australia), 27·2 per cent to North America, 16·4 per cent to Latin America, 15·6 per cent to Europe and 11·8 per cent to the rest of the Western world.

The sources of bauxite and alumina for the big six producers are shown in the Annexe to this article. One assessment is that,

> From the viewpoint of the developing countries arrangements with these six multinational corporations have had greater advantages than if their bauxite and alumina reserves could be divided among smaller or unintegrated enterprises. The small enterprises would have had higher production costs, less ability to finance infrastructures of railroads, ports and townsites and social services to workers, less profitability and less revenue for government to share.[14]

The principal aluminium producers are vertically integrated. However, the form of vertical integration includes wholly-owned or partially-owned subsidiaries, membership of consortia with firms and governments and long-term contractual arrangements. The presence of the six major aluminium companies in the member countries of the IBA illustrates some of these arrangements (Table 4). The six majors are represented directly in all countries, except Guyana, Yugoslavia and Indonesia, where bauxite is mined by government-owned enterprises: in three other countries, Guinea, Jamaica and Ghana, governments are represented in joint-ventures. One or more of the six majors is present in eight of the countries, and in the cases of Australia, Guinea, Jamaica and Ghana, the six have some type of joint-venture arrangements. The three major producing countries—Australia, Guinea and Jamaica—are host to four or five of the big six companies, and in all three countries there are joint-venture arrangements, either with the host government (Guinea and Jamaica) or with private firms in the host country.

14. S. Moment, 'Long-Term Associations of Developing Countries With Consumers of Bauxite, Alumina and Aluminum'. Paper given to UNIDO Seminar, Budapest, May 3-12, 1978, p. 14.

Table 3

Production of Bauxite
(Short Tons)

	1977	1976	1975	1974	1973	1972	1971	1970	1969	1968	1967	1966
IBA Countries												
Australia	28·7	26·6	23·1	22·0	19·4	15·9	14·0	10·2	8·7	4·8	4·7	2·0
Dominican Republic	·6	·6	·9	1·3	1·2	1·1	1·2	1·2	1·2	1·1	1·1	1·0
Ghana	·3	·3	·4	·4	·3	·3	·4	·2	·3	·3	·3	·3
Guinea	12·5	12·5	9·3	8·4	4·2	3·0	2·8	2·8	2·3	1·8	1·8	2·1
Guyana	3·7	3·4	4·2	4·0	4·0	4·1	4·7	4·9	4·8	4·1	3·8	3·7
Haiti	·8	·6	·6	·7	·9	·9	·8	·7	·9	·5	·4	·4
Indonesia	1·4	1·0	1·1	1·4	1·4	1·4	1·4	1·4	1·0	1·0	1·0	·8
Jamaica	10·8	11·4	12·4	16·8	14·9	14·3	13·8	13·3	11·6	9·3	10·3	10·2
Sierra Leone	·9	·7	·8	·8	·8	·8	·7	·5	·5	·5	·4	·3
Surinam	5·3	5·1	5·2	7·6	7·6	7·5	7·4	6·7	6·9	6·2	6·0	6·1
Yugoslavia	2·4	2·2	2·5	2·6	2·4	2·4	2·2	2·3	2·4	2·3	2·4	2·1
IBA Total	67·4	64·4	60·5	66·0	57·1	51·7	49·4	44·2	40·6	31·9	32·2	29·0
Other Western	11·3	11·3	11·4	11·8	12·4	12·3	12·4	11·6	10·2	9·3	9·1	9·0
Centrally Planned Economics	12·6	12·5	12·2	14·0	13·2	10·6	9·5	9·3	8·8	8·7	8·1	7·2
World Totals	91·3	88·2	84·1	91·8	82·7	74·6	71·3	65·1	59·6	49·9	49·4	45·2

Source: American Bureau of Metal Statistics, *Non-Ferrous Metal Data*, 1977 and earlier years.

Table 4

Selected Characteristics of Firms in the Bauxite-Aluminium Industry of Member Countries of the International Bauxite Association

Country	*Approx. Bauxite Capacity 1977 1000 Tons per year*	*B*	*Ala*	*AL*	*Alcan*	*Alcoa*	*Alusuisse*	*Kaiser*	*Pechiney*	*Reynolds*	*Other*	*Joint venture with private host country firm*	*Joint venture with host country government*	*Government ownership*
		Products												
Australia	28,000	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		
Guinea	13,000	X	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	
Jamaica	12,700	X	X		X	X		X		X	X		X	
Surinam	5,000	X	X	X		X					X			
Guyana	4,200	X	X											
Yugoslavia	3,000	X	X	X										X
Dom. Republic	1,300	X	X			X								X
Indonesia	1,260	X												
Sierra Leone	800	X					X							X
Haiti	790	X								X				
Ghana	500	X		X				X		X	X		X	

Source: IBA Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, Dec. 1977, pp. 18-21.

The IBA lists almost ninety mine and plant expansion projects in various stages of planning in 1977, thirteen of which are mine expansions. By far the largest are mine projects in Guinea (about 33 million short tons [mst] of bauxite); Australia (12·4 mst); Brazil (3·7 mst); and Greece (3·3 mst). In all four countries, it is a consortium of companies and/or governments that is involved in the mining operations.[15] The existence of consortia and contractual arrangements for the production of bauxite means that traditional measures of concentration and vertical integration have to be interpreted with care, and that the focus of economic analysis of the IBA needs to be more on the activities of firms, in order to define the boundaries of the firms in terms of the types of transactions in which they engage.

Producer country association and the aftermath

One observer concludes that the IBA, along with OPEC, is a success in that both cartels have been able to maintain a significantly higher price than would have been possible in the absence of agreements.[16] Success in terms of price, however, has to be modified by considerations of production levels and the division of revenues, and it is here where it can be seen that the benefits derived by members of the IBA are quite different, and that in fact over a long enough period of time some member countries may actually conclude that for them the IBA was a failure.

The eleven member countries of the IBA accounted for 69 per cent of world production in 1973 and 74 per cent in 1977. However, over the same period Australia's share of world production has increased from 24·5 to 31·4 per cent; Guinea's share increased from 5·1 to 13·7 per cent; while declining shares were registered by Jamaica 18·0 to 11·8 per cent; Surinam 9·2 to 5·8 per cent; and Guyana 4·8 to 4·0 per cent. In addition, the absolute level (volume) of production declined for these last three countries.

Total bauxite exports by the eleven member countries increased by almost 9 per cent in volume terms from 1973 to 1976, but again Australia and Guinea were the major gainers with increased exports, while Jamaica, Guyana and Surinam experienced reduced exports.[17] In value terms, total IBA exports rose about 50 per cent from 1973 to 1976 and all countries experienced an increase except Guyana where the price increase of bauxite did not offset the declining volume of bauxite exports, and the value of exports declined as well as the volume of exports.

American and Canadian imports of bauxite and alumina show the same trend—namely, the Caribbean bauxite producers supplying a declining share of American and Canadian imports, and Australia and Guinea supplying an increasing share. In 1973 and in 1977, the United States imported 98·7 per

15. *IBA Review*, Vol. 3, No. 4, June 30, 1978, pp. 19-25.

16. See R. S. Pindyck, 'The Cartelization of World Commodity Markets', *American Economic Review*, Papers and Proceedings, May 1979, p. 154.

17. See IBRD Commodity Paper No. 24, *Market Structure of Bauxite/Alumina/Aluminum and Prospects for Developing Countries*, March 1977, Annexe 5.

cent of its bauxite and alumina requirements (with bauxite converted to alumina equivalent figures) from the member countries of the IBA. However, Australia's share of American imports rose from 24·0 to 26·3 per cent, Guinea's from 1·0 to 16·3 per cent, while the Caribbean producers' share fell from 73·7 to 55·8 per cent.[18] A similar situation prevails in the case of Canada, another major importing country, where IBA member countries' share of total bauxite and alumina imports have risen from 75 to 77 per cent: Australia's share has risen from 12·6 to 26·3 per cent, Guinea's from virtually nothing to 25·6 per cent, while the Caribbean producers' share has declined from 49 to 19 per cent.[19]

Since 1974, therefore, the members of the IBA have remained substantial world exporters of bauxite, but certain members have benefited more than others by way of increased market shares. This situation is a result of the agreed-upon method for pricing bauxite, which allowed each member to decide on what action it should take. Guinea and Australia did not increase their prices as much as the Caribbean producers, in part because of the transportation-cost disadvantage which Guinea and Australia have in servicing the American market. Transportation costs are estimated at $1 to $6 per metric ton for Caribbean bauxite and $11 per metric ton for Australian.

In a 1978 paper delivered by a Director of the IBA, five achievements of the IBA were listed: four concerned the extent and nature of discussion and exchange of information which take place between the members on a variety of topics connected with the production and marketing of bauxite, while the fifth noted that,

> There has been agreement on the complex issue of a pricing policy for bauxite. This must be recognized as a major achievement of the organization after only three years of operation, especially when considered in the light of the complex nature of the problem and the multiple technical ideological variants that had to be harmonized. In this connexion, it is pertinent to note that, consistent with the Association's respect for sovereignty, the precise manner in which each member country is to achieve the minimum price is not stipulated. This is in recognition of differences inherent in the legislative processes within each member country; each is therefore afforded the flexibility of structuring its internal policies and legislation in order to achieve this price, in the best possible manner. This level of understanding between members and the mutual respect for each other's integrity are factors that will help to ensure the longevity of the Association.[20]

In effect the members have agreed that rather than negotiating a common minimum price of bauxite, each member country determines how an agreed price should be reached. This is hardly evidence of a tightly operating cartel.

18. *IBA Review*, Vol. 3, No. 4, June 1978.
19. Canadian trade data, Statistics Canada, *Imports by Commodities*, various years.
20. *IBA Review*, Vol. 3, No. 4, June 1978, p. 34.

At the December 1978 meeting of the IBA Council of Ministers in Surinam, the countries did agree to establish a minimum price for bauxite during 1979 at 2 per cent of the average list price of aluminium ingot during 1979. At these current prices, this resulted in an American delivered price of bauxite at $24.69 per metric tonne, which was below the price at which bauxite was actually being imported into the United States.

The case of Jamaica

The Jamaican situation is illustrative of how one country has had to make adjustments since the formation of the IBA. In addition to imposing a bauxite levy in 1974, the Jamaican government has negotiated new arrangements with the major foreign bauxite and alumina companies in the country. The most recent arrangement (September 1978) is with Alcan, which provides for the government to acquire 7 per cent of Alcan's bauxite mining and alumina-refining assets in Jamaica, and for these assets to be placed in a new joint venture called Jamalcan which will be owned 7 per cent by the Jamaican government and 93 per cent by Alcan. The Alcan assets are to be purchased at book value for $4·4 million to be paid over ten years with interest at 8½ per cent. In addition, the government will acquire all the mineral lands owned by Alcan, and will grant Alcan a special mining lease, covering forty years of bauxite requirements.

The rate of royalty to be paid by Alcan on all bauxite mined under the special mining lease will be 50 cents Jamaican per long dry ton until December 31, 1983. Alcan will also pay a production levy fixed at 7½ per cent of the annual average price of aluminium ingot until December 31, 1983. The Jamaican government will be entitled to 7 per cent of maximum annual output of alumina for disposal for its own account. In practice, Alcan will exchange this alumina for an equivalent amount of aluminium metal and will market this metal as agent for the Jamaican government if so requested. An additional provision will permit the government to acquire a 7 per cent interest in Alcan's agricultural operations.

The agreement with Alcan follows earlier agreements with Kaiser (1975), Alcoa (1976) and Reynolds (1977). The agreements with Kaiser and Reynolds were similar, with the Jamaican government taking 50 per cent equity interest in each case, while the Alcoa agreement was similar to the terms of the Alcan agreement. The Jamaican government also tried to negotiate an agreement with Revere Copper & Brass Inc., but this firm closed down its operation and presented a claim to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation for $64 million; it was awarded $1·1 million by the American Arbitration Association, a sum that was only twice the annual premiums. Revere responded by filing a court proceeding 'to correct or vacate that part of the arbitration award' dealing with the sum of $1·1 million.[21]

21. *Iron Age*, Oct. 9, 1978, p. 71.

In August 1979, it was reported that five bauxite and alumina companies operating in Jamaica were negotiating with the Jamaican government to reduce the bauxite-production levy of 7½ per cent on the annual average price of ingot.[22] This step was being undertaken in order to bargain with the companies to undertake further investment in bauxite-mining facilities at a time of high unemployment and limited foreign-exchange reserves in Jamaica. While Jamaica has increased its revenues from bauxite production, this has come at the expense of reduced output and no new investment. The action by the Jamaican government is being taken independently of the other members of the IBA, and can be viewed as a way of Jamaica restoring some of the production share lost to other bauxite-producing countries—both those within the IBA and elsewhere.

Concluding observations

The members of the IBA at present supply 74 per cent of the world market for bauxite. However, potential new sources of supply include Brazil, with conventional supplies of metal grade bauxite; a number of non-IBA member countries with non-conventional supplies—providing the technology can be developed; and secondary suppliers of scrap metal. The elasticity of supply on the part of non-member countries is likely to be quite high, and the timing for expanding supplies will be influenced by decisions of the IBA.

The projected demand for bauxite is substantial: a doubling of demand in 1985 over that in 1977, and a further doubling between 1985 and 2000. Part of this demand is due to the attractiveness of the weight properties of aluminium when energy costs are high. However, the fact that aluminium can be substituted for many other materials also means that there are substitutes for aluminium, and this accounts for the fact that, in the long run, aluminium demand is likely to be relatively elastic.

The structure of the world market is still characterised by the operations of large vertically integrated firms, but a changing feature is the fact that these firms are becoming increasingly involved in joint-venture arrangements with each other and with the governments of bauxite-producing countries. In this way the host governments are becoming drawn into the corporate systems of the major multinationals as a means of securing outlets for their bauxite.

The financial positions of the IBA member countries differ markedly, with the prosperity and level of economic development experienced by Australia and Yugoslavia being in sharp contrast to conditions in Jamaica, Guyana, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. The importance of the industry to the countries as earners of foreign exchange also differs, with this factor being very important to a country such as Jamaica. Sharp ideological differences also exist between the member countries. The recent moves by Jamaica attest to the need to take unilateral action in the face of severe domestic economic conditions. The

22. *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto, Aug. 2, 1979.

cohesiveness and discipline of the group appears strong where it does not matter and weak where it does. For example, the IBA reports that there is a high degree of liaison and exchange of information, but when it comes to setting prices each country can act independently.

Thus, the IBA illustrates the combination of economic and political factors which will determine the willingness of countries to engage in producer country associations, aimed at increasing the export price of the commodity from the host country. At the economic level, the main issues concern the price and income elasticity of demand for the product, and the supply elasticity or the extent to which alternative sources, which are cheaper than those of the producer country association or are less risky, are available. A further issue is the importance of the industry to the country by way of foreign exchange earnings and employment. At the political level, a major concern relates to the commonality of interests of the countries which are parties to the association for example, whether they view their best interests as being part of the group or outside it.

The operation of the IBA so far, supports the view that a producer-country association enhances the opportunity for improving the information available about a product or industry. At the same time, the formation of an association sets in motion other forces, namely tighter liaison between the companies affected by the association and responses on the part of governments individually and collectively, which are similarly affected. Since the bargaining tends to involve three parties—producer countries, consumer countries, and multinationals—various coalitions between the parties can be expected to form especially where state-ownership is involved. Even within the association coalitions can form—as they have done—between the Caribbean countries of the IBA, as well as between member and non-member countries. For example joint venture arrangements between Jamaica and Mexico, and between Surinam and Venezuela have in the past been proposed. Such sub-group bargaining and external bargaining tend to weaken the cohesiveness of the association.

The IBA can be regarded as a mixture of success and failure, depending on the criteria used and from which country it is viewed. Certainly the price of bauxite has risen, as has the tax take of the member countries. But some countries—notably Australia and Guinea—have benefited substantially, while others, such as Jamaica, Surinam and Guyana, have reduced output and lowered market shares. In 1979 the major multinationals appeared to be negotiating concessions in the case of Jamaica, and a number of joint-venture arrangements for the provision of additional supplies of bauxite. For the future, the multinationals are likely to favour joint-venture arrangements as a way of spreading the commercial and political risks. For example, Alcan has an 800,000 tonnes per year alumina joint venture in Ireland with Billiton (Shell) and Anaconda (Arco), which is projected to open in 1982; an 800,000 tonnes per annum alumina plant and a 180,000 tonnes per annum smelter in Spain

with Spanish partners; and a 19 per cent membership in the Trombetas bauxite-mining project in Brazil which is a consortium of aluminium producers projected to ship 3·4 million tonnes of bauxite a year.

The negotiation of joint-venture agreements may offer the best prospects for individual bauxite-producing countries, but this may be at the expense of IBA cohesiveness and discipline because it draws the countries into the corporate system of the firms as a way of obtaining assured markets for bauxite. Thus, one difference between OPEC and the IBA is that, in the case of OPEC, the countries appear to have captured the corporate systems of the multinational enterprises, and have used the companies as the exporting arms of the countries. In the case of the IBA, the companies have extended their joint-venture arrangements to include investment by the countries, and in so doing have drawn them into their corporate networks, perhaps capturing the countries in the process. Guinea is a particular case in point, where the government's partnership with the companies will permit it to have market access to smelter facilities owned by the companies.

If joint ventures and agreements are the trend in the bauxite-alumina industry, then this is where the study of the international industry needs to focus. While market structure is an important factor to consider, the success of bauxite-producing countries in improving their bargaining position will be dependent on their ability to negotiate contractual arrangements which are satisfactory to themselves and to private investors. The terms of the contracts will have to deal with conditions relating to the dependability of supply; the adequacy of return to the investor; the participation of the host government by way of ownership and taxation; the duration of the agreement; the arbitration of disputes; the requirements for using local labour and local suppliers; the protection of the environment; and the provisions for waivers and declaring force majeure.[23] This focus on agreements and joint ventures within international resource industries requires a detailed analysis of individual transactions as a supplement to the traditional structure, conduct and performance paradigm in order to understand the recent developments.[24] It will be necessary to analyse not only individual commodity markets, but the details of the institutional arrangements involving countries, companies and the contracts which tie them together.

23. See R. F. Mikesell, *Trends in Foreign Investment Agreements in Resources Industry*, paper delivered at the Resource Policy Conference, Oxford, England, March 22, 1978; and S. Moment, *Long-Term Associations of Developing Countries with Consumers of Bauxite, Alumina and Aluminum*, paper given to UNIDA Seminar, Budapest, May 3-12, 1978.

24. The transactions cost approach is central to O. E. Williamson's work in industrial organization, see his *Markets and Hierarchies* (Free Press: New York, 1975).

Annexe

Six Principal Aluminium Producers

Alcan Aluminium Limited (Alcan)

Primary Aluminium Capacity	Bauxite Requirements	Sources of Bauxite
'000 short tons	million short tons	
1,637	6·6	Jamaica, alumina, 100% subsidiary Brazil, alumina, 100% subsidiary Guinea, bauxite, 13% of consortium India, alumina, 55% of joint venture Malaysia, bauxite, 87·5% ownership Australia, alumina, 21% of consortium France, bauxite sold to others Brazil, bauxite, 19% of consortium, under construction Ireland, alumina with bauxite from Guinea, 40% of consortium, to be built Guyana, Surinam, Sierra Leone, purchases from other parties

Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa)

Primary Aluminium Capacity	Bauxite Requirements	Sources of Bauxite
'000 short tons	million short tons	
1,962	7·7	Jamaica, bauxite and alumina, 94% subsidiary Surinam, bauxite and alumina, 100% subsidiary Dominican Republic, bauxite, 100% subsidiary Brazil, alumina, 50% subsidiary Guinea, bauxite, 13% of consortium United States, bauxite, alumina, 100% subsidiary Australia, alumina, 51% subsidiary

Source: S. Moment, *Long-Term Associations of Developing Countries With Consumers of Bauxite, Alumina and Aluminium*, Paper given to UNIDO Seminar, Budapest, May 3-12, 1978.

Kaiser Aluminium & Chemical Corporation (Kaiser)

Primary Aluminium Capacity	Bauxite Requirements	Sources of Bauxite
'000 short tons	million short tons	
1,175	4·4	Jamaica, bauxite, 49% subsidiary Jamaica, alumina, 36·5% joint venture Australia, bauxite and alumina, 45% joint venture

Reynolds Metals Company (Reynolds)

Primary Aluminium Capacity	Bauxite Requirements	Sources of Bauxite
'000 short tons	million short tons	
1,340	5·5	Jamaica, bauxite, 49% subsidiary Jamaica, alumina, 36·5% joint venture Haiti, bauxite, 100% subsidiary USA, bauxite and alumina, 100% Brazil, bauxite, 5% of consortium Ghana, bauxite, 46% subsidiary France, bauxite, 46% subsidiary Australia, bauxite, purchase option, 50 million long dry tons Australia, bauxite-alumina, 35% of joint venture in formation

Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann (Pechiney)

Primary Aluminium Capacity	Bauxite Requirements	Sources of Bauxite
'000 short tons	million short tons	
1,097	4·4	Australia, alumina, consortium Guinea, bauxite, 10% of consortium Guinea, alumina, consortium France, bauxite, alumina, 100% Greece, bauxite, alumina, 77% subsidiary

Swiss Aluminium Ltd. (Alusuisse)

Primary Aluminium Capacity	Bauxite Requirements	Sources of Bauxite
'000 short tons	million short tons	
733	3·0	Sierra Leone, bauxite, 100% subsidiary Australia, bauxite, alumina, 50% subsidiary France, bauxite, 99·98% subsidiary Guinea, alumina, 5% of consortium Guinea, bauxite, 50% of project in formation

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT AND COMMUNITY LAW *

Dear Sir,

May I be allowed to comment on the extended letter from Mr Stephen George!

I made clear in my original article for *International Affairs* (January 1979) that, although I was not writing a technical essay on constitutional law, I believed that the propositions I advanced were sound in law. I still do, and nothing in Mr George's letter has shaken that view. Even at the level at which I was writing, it is an inadequate response to plead that one is a layman while purporting to argue constitutional law as such by simply stating preferences not backed by any examination of sources.

The argument is not simple, and a number of strands must at least be separated, among them some of the senses in which the word sovereignty is used—e.g., when it is used to describe an attribute of a State, when it is applied to Parliament (this does not coincide with the former usage) and in the latter case whether the use is intended in a legal or political sense. To these matters I will return, but first may I say that I am, of course, familiar with the article by F. A. Trindade to which Mr George refers[1] but that I feel that it both misunderstands and misconstrues what I have written—though adding little to the debate.To illustrate, it is manifest that the Acts which create a legislature differ from the legislation of that body. In fact if Mr George or anyone else will read my *Constitutional Law*, he will see that I analyse closely those parts of the Acts of Union which could be fundamental (and not just constituent), particularly at pages 72-73. I deal expressly with the issue of the Universities (Scotland) Acts and with the position of Professors and of the Westminster Confession of Faith. In short, one might hope that people would read what one writes (and the sources one cites) and not simply deal with an argument on the basis of what others have said one has written.

The point is not immaterial. I was, and am, insisting not that the Acts of Union were, *in toto* fundamental, but that they were constituent and called into being a new legal order, that of the United Kingdom. That being so most of Mr Trindade's argument against me in the article upon which Mr George relies simply falls to the ground. It is perhaps one mark of 'sovereignty', in the sense related to a State, that it implies possession of the *Kompetenz-Kompetenz*—the power to create or to enter into a new legal order which changes the ground rules within which judges work. No judge in 1715 or 1745 without 'going out' could disregard the United Kingdom legal order although that order retained that same plenitude of power which had belonged to its constituting parts, through the exercise of which that new order was created. What happened in 1707 happened in 1973 with Accession to the European Community—in which Parliament played its part, but not, essentially, through the European Communities Act, which was derivative and drew necessary lessons for judges from an existing state of affairs. This, among other instances, is demonstrated by both German

* A response to Stephen George's letter in the January 1980 number of *International Affairs* commenting on Professor Mitchell's article on 'The Sovereignty of Parliament and Community Law: The Stumbling-Block That Isn't There' (January 1979).

1. F. A. Trindade, 'Parliamentary Sovereignty and the EEC', *Modern Law Review*, Vol. 35, 1972, pp. 375-402.

and Belgian experience—in neither of which there is a 'primacy' Act. Admittedly the 'Constitution' of the Communities is not entire, and for that reason the phrase 'new legal order' may have advantages. In either case the favourable Opinion of the Commission which indicated the essential conditions of Accession and which defined that legal order is fundamental to understanding what was involved in 1973. The legal and logical consequences for judges of entering such a constraining legal order are aptly illustrated by Lord Pearce in *Bribery Commissioner* v. *Ranasinghe* [1964] 2 All E.R. 785 at pages 790-791.

For the rest, it is certainly not true that the Federal nature of Germany helped. On the contrary, and especially as far as Directives are concerned, it complicated. As for the decisions of the German Constitutional Court, nothing stands still. In July 1979 that Court cast doubt on its earlier decision which Mr George cites. (To help him, the reference is 2Bvl 6/77). As to *Cafe Jacques Vabre*, Mr George is no doubt aware that in the next case of *Kempis* there was no reference to Article 55. Thereafter decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel provoke exegesis rather than enlightenment; those of the Conseil d'Etat add to confusion. As A. H. Clough put it, more elegantly than I, the dawn breaks slowly, especially for politicians—for reasons which Keynes highlighted.

From theory can one come down to practice. In real terms primacy of Community law is the precondition for any long-term success of the Communities, as was Marshall's proclamation of the primacy of the Constitution. It is perfectly possible to reject the Communities and our Membership. What is irrational is to accept both and reject the conditions on which they might have a chance of success, when those conditions were accepted by perfectly constitutional means.

I hesitate to add that a longer exploration of these topics will appear in the next issue of *The Cambrian Law Review*.

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BOOKS

BRANDT: WHOSE COMMON INTEREST? *

Michael Lipton **

North-South: A Programme for Survival. Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues ('Brandt Commission'). *London: Pan Books. 1980.*

> WE *face . . . the crisis of relentless inflation and increasing energy costs, the crisis of dwindling energy availability, the crisis resulting from mounting financial requirements, and the crisis posed by constraints on world trade and on the growth of export earnings to meet increased debt service commitments . . . It is far from certain that the process of recycling mainly through commercial lending can continue . . . Any disruption in financial flows . . . would seriously affect banks and other major institutions . . . [Recent further] oil price increases [have] led to a new spate of oil revenue surpluses [while non-oil] developing countries . . . face very serious debt management problems . . . [Their] current-account deficits grew . . . to $45 bn. in 1979. Commerical banks were under pressure to restrain further lending . . . It becomes a matter of urgency . . . to ensure that the surplus funds are re-lent to borrowers who are willing to spend them. The alternative would be a further decline of world economic activity and the threat of a serious crisis in the capital markets . . . We require a set of measures . . . to sustain effective demand in the world and promote an expansion of world trade (Brandt Report, pp. 239–41).*

> *I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.*
> *George Canning, in the debate on the King's Message, Dec. 13, 1826.*

ANALYSIS has improved since 1826, although both arrogance and wit have declined. But how different are the structures of Brandt's economic, and Canning's political, problem? Brandt and his colleagues advocate the use of OPEC's reinvested surpluses to secure massive reflation of Third World demand for exports from rich countries. The Commission has, on the whole, got it right; on the other hand, the extreme monetarists, internationally as in Britain, offer only assertions and hopes. They *assert* that monetary reflation can raise only prices or imports, not production. They *hope* that monetary squeezes in IMF client countries (whether Britain in 1976 or Turkey in 1980) may kill inflation rather than production. But, behind these alleged alternatives to Keynesian methods, there lies little more than a

* The author is grateful to Stephany Griffith-Jones, Merle Lipton and Hans Singer for valuable comments on an earlier draft. I remain responsible for the content of the paper.

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rhetorical readiness to dismiss opponents as 'not real economists', and a track record of almost unrelieved failure.

But is it enough that Brandt is right about the shared North-South interest in planned reflation? Between 1815 and 1848, a few European statesmen had the power to impose a view of 'commonality of interest'. By today's standards that view was simple; and the area on which it was imposed was relatively small, economically non-interventionist, simple and non-multipolar. Nowadays there is no framework through which to *implement* even such a simple approach, let alone Brandt's complex, interventionist package. To this package the North and the South, each many-headed, would have to offer negotiated and free assent, not an agreement 'called into existence' after a Congress of Vienna or before a *Pax Britannica*.

What is being done to secure such assent? The numerous, distinguished, but mostly out-of-office statesmen who served on the Commission are making brave efforts. Their Report has been presented to the United Nations through Dr Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General; only Britain has contrived to respond by promptly cutting aid. Meanwhile, both the French President, Giscard d'Estaing, and the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, have shown interest in the proposed '1980 development summit', whilst in the United States, Robert McNamara and Cyrus Vance have briefed the World Bank and the State Department (one hopes respectively) to prepare a detailed response to Brandt's recommendations. However, there is no formal schedule for follow-up or implementation.

Most of the package—massive cash transfers, international demand reflation, a retreat from protectionism—is courageous even if sometimes vulnerably reasoned in detail. But how, in a squabbling world dominated by muddled monetarist contractionism, is it to be made real? Two necessary conditions are: (a) to satisfy powerful interest-groups that could block alleged 'general interest' deals—e.g. Western firms and trade unions with good reason to fear Third World textile sales, even if these do raise GNP in the buying and selling country alike; and (b) to select priority or emergency areas for progress, and to be satisfied (in the first instance at least) with much less than universal participation. Even these conditions are not sufficient to ensure success, as Western governments look increasingly inward. But they could guide a 'loyal opposition' of neo-Keynesian internationalists, to build upon this Report a set of policies that is implementable and not merely right. They will be needed when the intellectual bankruptcy of current nostalgias (for monetarism, combined with non-interventionist free-marketry at home, but with protectionist gadgets abroad) becomes obvious to all. Whether neo-Keynesian alternatives can satisfy the 'radical opposition', outraged by mass poverty and by exploitation across race and 'First-Third World' lines, is more doubtful.

Limits to enlightened self-interest: hunger

Indeed, on the core question of poverty, there is limited scope for the 'common interest' approach: for the sensible view that 'negotiations should look for joint gains, rather than slowly wresting uncertain "concessions" ' (p. 263). Some scope does exist. The Commission rightly stresses (pp. 79–80) that extreme poverty compels its victims to damage the *world* environment with respect to water, soil and forest resources. Moreover, extra agrochemicals produce more extra output, and do less harm, on the nutrient-starved soils of the Third World than on the saturated soils of the First. However, Brandt's argument that food-security stockpiles will benefit the developed world by reducing 'inflation of food prices' is weak in itself,[1] inconsistent with the Report's recognition that farmers (a group that includes most of the Third

1. Weak, because where is the inflation involved in cheapening non-food relatively to food?

World's poor) need price incentives, and even if true unwelcome to developed food exporters like the United States.

Much stronger is the Report's alternative case for abolishing hunger by the year 2000. First, it is well within the scope of known technology. Second, it is very cheap, offering huge returns on capital, though often (e.g. in the international crop research institutes) in ways that private investors cannot appropriate. Given both these facts, it is morally intolerable to deny the world's poor the means towards self-reliant food production. This case rests on common humanity, not common interest.

Scope for common interest: international reflation

As the opening quotation from the Report makes clear, it is the twin areas of debt and trade that most strongly support the Commissioners' case. North and South share an interest in Northern and OPEC transfers to, plus imports from, the Third World to redress the balance between OPEC and the North. In these matters, Brandt's talk of 'crisis' and of the need for a global solution—both phrases at times overdone and counter-productive—is justified. In 1960, 'of the total flows to the developing countries . . . 60 per cent came from . . . aid. By 1977, more than two-thirds was commercial, mainly from private bank loans, direct investment and export credits' (pp. 222). This trend, alongside ever-increasing oil prices, creates fearful risks.

The supposed need for the banks to mediate, between almost limitless OPEC surpluses and severely limited investment opportunities,[2] has provoked an ever-riskier expansion of the role of private lending. The search for a 'vent for surplus' in the Third World has involved increasingly unsound banking practice:

(a) 'defensive lending' to prevent (or delay?) default—what used to be called throwing good money after bad; and/or

(b) short views: 'show we can push out our Bank's money at 1½ per cent above LIBOR; by the time the chickens come home to roost (on the musical chairs) our Board will have been replaced, by younger men or take-over bidders'; and/or

(c) musical banks: 'The Government of ——— will allow a lot more borrowing yet; new loans will repay old, and we shall get out in time, leaving the subsequent lenders to burn their fingers'; and/or, above all,

(d) succour = sucker: 'let aid donors refinance *their* aid debt, or soften its already concessional terms (ideally retrospectively) to country X (careful!), so that we get *our* so-called 'risk' capital and its high interest repaid in full, disguised as aid, by the donors' taxpayers'.

It is (d) that has, in the past, rightly outraged all honourable radicals and conservatives alike. Some (like this author) ask, 'Why thus pervert aid?' Others say, 'Aid is always thus, and hence itself a perversion', whether of radical Third World self-reliance or of the 'free' operation of capital markets. Of course, it is 'wrong' for so-called risk capital to earn high interest while aid donors ensure repayment. Measures are required to correct this in the long run. But in the short run donors must take the rap; for the enormous risks of a debt crash preclude complacent moralising.

Some commentators still underestimate these risks. For the World Bank, developing countries' debts grew more slowly in real terms in 1973-77 than in 1969-73; are concentrated on 'few countries, most [with] good growth prospects and reasonably sound economic management'; and are used in part to build up reserves. Such a hopeful view is caused by aggregation of good and bad risks, and by neglect of

2. S. Griffith-Jones, 'The Growth of Multinational Banking, the Euro-currency Market, and the Effect on Developing Countries', *Journal of Development Studies*, 16(2), Jan. 1980.

the massive 'musical chairs' and 'musical banks' lending, often to permit imports of consumer durables that create few repayment prospects for the borrower. The World Bank concedes that 'Peru, Sudan, Turkey, Zaire and Zambia . . . encountered significant problems of debt management' in 1976 and 1977;[3] and that there is enormous concentration of transactions upon a very few countries and banks:

> Seven countries (Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Spain and Yugoslavia) accounted for over half the [developing-country] debts outstanding to private creditors at the end of 1977. Among US banks, about three-fourths of the total claims on developing countries are held by ten large money-centre banks.[4]

Yet it is seldom the banks, but much more often the creditor countries that are forced to reschedule, refinance and soften debts—of *public aid*—in 'ad hoc meetings to prevent imminent default threatened by bunched repayment obligations'.[5] Such obligations are mainly to private 'risk' lenders—the lenders whose expanding share of development debts, on hard terms and with short and bunched maturities,[6] caused the problem in the first place:

The rain it raineth every day
Upon the just and unjust fellow
But chiefly on the just, because
The unjust has the just's umbrella.

Brazil, in mid-1979, owed foreign commercial banks $35.7 billion (of which its reserves held in such banks covered only $9.0 billion). Of this debt, 28 per cent matured by mid-1980. By January 1980, Brazil's hard-currency debts totalled $50 billion; $14 billion of interest and principal falls due in 1980. The trade deficit was already $2.5 billion in 1979 (and debt-servicing added a further burden, comprising about 60 per cent of exports); in 1980 the import bill will be swollen by at least $2 billion due to oil price increases.[7] This growing mountain of debt is heavily concentrated on a few American money-centre banks. What happens if international trading conditions—coffee markets; developed-world quotas on manufactures; oil prices—turn against Brazil too severely for the IMF's compensatory facility to cope; or if one or two big American banks, worried about their over-exposed positions, refuse extension of debt? Bankruptcies would echo, not perhaps around the world's banks, but around businesses (and other 'third party' countries) relying on loans from them. Recall that many developing countries have far higher ratios of debt to gross national product (GNP), less internal capacity to repay, and much worse short-term bunching of debt-maturities than Brazil; and it is at once obvious that serious and *timely* discussion of default risks, and their *pre-emptive* management, is a sober necessity, not a 'scare scenario'.

Nor, as Brandt fully recognises, will either of the two obvious escape-routes suffice. First, it is unhelpful simply to reduce the volume of private lending. Much of this, in effect, refinances old debts; some is genuinely developmental. Certainly the quality of private lending must improve; 'musical banking' usually financing imports, whether tractors or television sets, that do little or nothing for development (or the capacity to

3. *World Development Report 1979* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, Aug. 1979), p.29.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

6. At 30th June, 1979, commercial bank loans from the Group of Ten (plus Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Ireland) to developing countries in Latin America totalled $110 bn., of which over 40 per cent was to mature by 30th June, 1980, and a further 10 per cent by mid-1981; for Asia (excluding the Middle East and Japan), the corresponding figures were $36 bn., 55 per cent and 8 per cent. *Maturity Distribution of International Bank Lending*, Bank of International Settlements, Jan. 1980.

7. *Ibid*, and F. Ghiles, 'Brazil's Debt Looms Even Larger', *Financial Times*, Feb. 18, 1980.

repay) must give way to 'development banking'—which lends for genuinely productive investments or current producer inputs. Second, while waiting for this improvement, we cannot ask the Third World to refinance debts mainly by reliance on bailing out by the IMF. This imposes ever-tighter deflationist 'conditionality' upon the borrower, to the virtual neglect of poverty, income-distribution, development, and, therefore, ultimately of political stability and long-run debt security. What, then, can be done?

If deflationism continues to reduce, at once, the West's capacities to buy from and to lend to the Third World, while oil prices rise in real terms, a major default is odds-on before the end of 1983. It will involve a large developing-country debtor (almost certainly not Brazil) and a small number of big Western banks. It will have the echo effects outlined above. Everybody—except anarchists, and moralists seeking to punish dubious lenders (and borrowers?) at any cost—shares an interest in limiting this risk.

Brandt's approach is fourfold: to raise the share of Third World debt consisting of relatively safe—because long-term, concessional and re-negotiable—aid; to stimulate appropriate forms of recycling of OPEC surpluses; massively to improve Third World export conditions in rich countries, both via stabler (and higher?) commodity prices and via a turning back of the protectionist tide; and to reduce assorted uncertainties in the world system.

This is, of course, international neo-Keynesianism. Is this not 'dead'? Well, imperfect Keynesian management and Bretton Woods gave the world economy 1945–73; imperfect monetarist management and Milton Friedman have so far supplied 1920–32 and (admittedly with unwelcome outside help) 1974–80. Reports of the death of neo-Keynesianism are, therefore, grossly exaggerated.

However, Brandt's fourfold path to neo-Keynesian reflection must be judged by four criteria. Is it 'right', i.e. (in conjunction with appropriate plans for food and energy) can it induce resumed expansion of world output and employment, while reducing poverty, and without unacceptable inflation? Does it *potentially* mobilise a wide spectrum of supporting interest-groups? Is it argued in a way that will command maximum support, as regards both intellectual content and presentation? Has the follow-up for proper implementation been clearly specified? In the opinion of this author, Brandt scores A on the first and most important issue; A on the second; B on the third; but Z on the fourth. To some extent, this is because the Commission has turned this final issue over to a rather loosely specified 'audience'. Yet Brandt challenges this audience with four main issues, the response to which, in terms of practical policies and prompt action, is of fundamental importance. These are: aid; debt and recycling; trade in manufactures; and commodity policy and the reduction of risk.

The role of aid

Aid comprises only 12–15 per cent of recipients' investment, and pays for a similar proportion of their imports. There has been a major shift of emphasis, during the 1970s, away from aid towards other development issues. UNCTAD's search for 'massive transfers', now backed by Brandt, seeks to place aid in the broader context of total development finance, public and private. Yet, for all this fashionable downgrading, old-fashioned aid (concessional flows) will have to increase substantially, in absolute terms and relatively to private capital movements, both to mount a successful attack on world hunger and to stave off the risk of a debt crash. Hence the Commission advises that aid should rise by 1985 to the United Nations target of 0·7 per cent of the donors' GNP. Similar advice was given in 1969 by Lester Pearson's 'grand assize' on aid. Yet, in fact, the ratio of OECD aid to its GNP fell steadily from a peak of 0·54 per cent in 1961 to 0·35 per cent in 1968 and 1975 and to 0·31 per cent

in 1977.[8] Just like the Pearson Report, the Brandt Commission tends to substitute rhetoric for evidence when linking aid to growth; to the reduction of poverty; and to the capacity to meet foreign debts. This is a pity, for such evidence is readily available. Regarding aid and growth, G. Papanek has shown that, of the variation among developing countries in growth rates, about 10 per cent is associated with variation in previous aid receipts.[9] As for aid and poverty, high-yielding cereal varieties, due in the first instance to aid-financed research in Mexico and the Philippines, were adding at least 6 per cent to foodgrain output in India alone by 1970–71,[10] and perhaps 10–12 per cent by 1977–78; and it was precisely in those parts of India with rapid agricultural growth (due in part to this aid-funded research) that the proportions in poverty had been reduced.[11] As for aid and the capacity to repay debts, private bank loans to developing countries—on hard terms and with maturities often crowded into the very short term—contrast sharply with the increasing concessionality, and with the geographical spread of risks, of most aid. Of course aid could assist repayment even better than it does, and more lastingly, if it did more to improve the recipient's savings capacity, and/or obtained higher social returns.

The Commission rightly stresses the role of aid in ending hunger for the poorest people in the poorest developing countries.[12] 'Rural development' can achieve high returns; indeed, increased agricultural output in the Third World since 1960 has, on the whole, required barely half the investment needed for non-agricultural growth.[13] However, the Commission has not fully appreciated that aid projects in this area are menaced by a wave of groundnut-scheme-type failures, and consequent disillusion. Massive improvements in monitoring and evaluation, which must be based on independent institutions in the developing countries themselves, are essential to meet this menace. The physical progress of work on an aid-financed Indian steel mill can perhaps be overviewed from Delhi, or even (with 'visiting experts') from Washington; but it is dangerous folly to seek to monitor widely spread, software-intensive projects aimed at the rural poor without a continuing, trusted and competent presence in the field.

Four brute facts remain. First, the United States is increasingly contracting out of bilateral aid. Second, several other rich donors either have a pathetically low aid/GNP ratio (e.g. Japan and Italy) or else (like the United Kingdom) are increasingly reluctant to maintain, let alone increase, their aid ratios. Third, there is a major switch to multilateral aid; this is endorsed by the Commission, but in the case of the European Development Fund (EDF)—and perhaps parts of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank too—it means higher personnel costs, slower disbursement, and no less uncertainty about funds, than prevail with bilateral funding. Fourth, those donor countries with a balance-of-payment deficit (e.g. the United States and Britain) are likely to place even more emphasis on the tying of aid to

8. World Bank, *op. cit.*, p. 156; M. Lipton, 'Aid Allocation when Aid is Inadequate': consequences of the non-implementation of the Pearson Report', in T. Byres, ed., *Foreign Resources and Economic Development* (London: Cass, 1972).

9. G. Papanek, 'Aid, Foreign Private Investment, Savings and Growth in LDCs', *Journal of Political Economy*, 81 (1), 1973; see also Lipton, *op cit.*, pp. 159-68. This '10 per cent' figure compares with the 15 per cent of developing countries investment that was financed externally in the 1960s: L. Pearson *et al.*, *Partners in Development* (London: Pall Mall, 1969), p. 30.

10. C. H. Hanumantha Rao, *Technological Change and Distribution of Gains in Indian Agriculture (Delhi: Macmillan, 1975), esp. p. 8.*

11. M. Ahluwahlia, 'Rural poverty and agricultural performance in India', *Development Studies*, 14 (3), April 1976.

12. This is the main remit of the International Fund for Agricultural Development, rightly praised by the Commission; it is, however, essential for this Fund to develop field representation. Its present Charter compels it to rely for project preparation and evaluation on the services of other agencies—chiefly the World Bank and regional banks—for which its priority will inevitably be low.

13. M. Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor* (London: Temple Smith, 1977), Ch. 8.

the uncompetitive exports of their 'lame duck' companies. The Commission's plans to shift aid towards automaticity, untying, and programme lending, to finance it by taxes on foreign trade, arms sales, and energy consumption—while all perfectly reasonable—clash against these crude realities.

In its treatment of aid, the Commission has been logical and imaginative, picking an approach (sound debt structures, and adequately fed and growing economies that can help to expand world trade) likely to mobilise support. But, unfortunately, it fails to follow this up with evidence that aid will do what is hoped. Too often, rhetoric and 'Unctalk' are preferred. Moreover, it is not at all clear who is to monitor the response to these aid targets, and to apply effective pressure to the laggards.

Oil surpluses: tri-cycling or recycling?

The main task for international capital markets, as the Commission sees it, is to ensure that Third World countries retain the capacity to underpin world growth by imports from the industrial world. This capacity has two sources: Third World export incomes (threatened by instability of earnings from commodities and by Western protection of manufactures) and capital flows. The latter must come, not only from aid, but also from the reinvestment in the South of trade surpluses, above all those of OPEC. That is why, of two ways in which capital flows can adjust to oil price rises,[14] the Commission prefers 'tri-cycling' to plain recycling.

In 'tri-cycling' (i) OPEC lends to the Third World: (ii) thus enabling the Third World to expand imports of manufactures from the North; (iii) hence providing the North with the capacity to buy OPEC exports.[15] On the other hand, in recycling (i) OPEC reinvests its surpluses in the North; and (ii) the North uses this foreign exchange to buy more oil. In this latter sequence, OPEC surpluses are not lent to Third World borrowers. Indeed, such borrowers compete for OPEC surpluses with Northern spendthrifts such as the United States and Britain.

Apart from avoiding the moral evil of allowing the worst damage from dearer and scarcer oil to be inflicted on the poorest—as the Commissioners put it, on farmers' pumpsets in India, rather than on private cars in the North—'tri-cycling' is better than recycling because of the impact on world trade and hence on income and employment in North and South alike. The major contribution of Third World imports to Northern employment is most effectively documented in the Report. But the present maturity structure of Third World debt—and the fact that 'tri-cycling' has taken place through intermediaries that have often been rapacious, short-sighted and incompetent—threatens that contribution. Bankrupts cannot import; and their bankrupters will not export to them.

A new institution, supporting those of OPEC (and greatly widening the geographical scope of their lending), may be needed to steer the new round of OPEC surpluses directly into Third World activities (i.e. without excessive intermediation by 'musical banks'). Of course, Western financial institutions—insurers, merchant bankers, shipping brokers, consultants, even some banks—have an expert, and profitable, part to play in ensuring that 'tri-cycling' is reasonably safe and rewarding for all parties, including OPEC lenders. As the Commission says, 'Rising OPEC revenues should provide enlarged scope for triangular arrangements . . . linking projects in developing countries with finance from [OPEC] and technology from industrialised or other developing countries'. There is a new chapter of the history of

14. Note that both comprise ways for the non-oil developed North to convert an unmanageable financial (current-account balance) problem, into a perfectly manageable real problem: a 1·3 per cent GNP reduction spread over a period of years.

15. Even at new and more realistic prices, at least if the North conserves energy.

international finance here, waiting to be written.[16] But (as the Commission does *not* say) 'history has many cunning passages, contrived corridors'. The risk is that Western financial institutions will go on taking, until it is too late, the alternative route of musical banking: short views leading to short loans, embodied in dubious investment (or luxurious consumables), maturing together, and in the case of tri-cycling likely to destroy the confidence of the key OPEC depositors.

By 1985, the Brandt Commission appears to envisage that aid and private flows (at present in a 40:60 ratio) will each contribute an extra $30 billion to Third World finance. This would only slightly improve the ratio. Therefore, unless OPEC flows ceased to be routed largely via the banks, the extremely dangerous concessionality and maturity patterns of Southern debt would persist. The ratio might even decline further, for aid is unlikely to increase so quickly. Nor can the ratio safely be increased by cutting down on private flows; 'if the developing countries outside OPEC had cut their imports of manufactured goods to meet the increased oil prices of 1973-74, there would have been three million more unemployed in the OECD' (p. 238), so that *less* tri-cycling (of the 1979-80 rises in OPEC surpluses) would be as disastrous as more flows at high risk, low quality and quick maturity.

The need to build the institutions for improved tri-cycling is therefore urgent, if the Scylla of echoing default and the Charybdis of inadequate cash for Third World imports from the North are both to be avoided. If private flows are still to comprise around half the South's external resource inflow in the mid-1980s, they must be publicly supported or intermediated to avoid a Kreditanstalt-Herstatt-Zaire scenario. This surely implies a public, and joint North-South, overview of the *quality* of activities supported by such private lending.

Once again, the Commission has gone to the heart of the problem. Almost nobody (not even the bankers, who are badly frightened) would vehemently oppose action, once initiated. However, the argument is rather muffled, and scattered around the Report, perhaps in part because none of the interests represented by the Commissioners could be too openly attacked. No follow-up is specified, except perhaps at the proposed 'summit'.

Protection causes inflation and unemployment

It is above all through trade that North and South either expand or contract together. The Report (p. 176) cites abundant evidence that Third World exports have destroyed a negligible number of Western jobs—but have helped *create* many more Western jobs by enabling the South to import, maintain and use vastly greater volumes of Western manufactures. Moreover, 'a 1978 survey of all [US] consumer goods, except food and automobiles, found that [Asian and Latin American imports averaged] 16 per cent [cheaper] than domestic products of the same quality' (p. 178). Third World exports thus reduce not only Northern inflation, but thereby also the governmental response to it: the contraction of demand and the consequent destruction of jobs.

Again, the Commissioners are not only right but rather original. They defend North-South trade, and attack the new protectionism, not just with familiar liberal arguments that consumers gain from freer trade,[17] but by arguing that the volume of

16. Such a chapter would have four sections: loans from private sector to private sector; from private to public; from public to private; and from public to public. The first section will not be the longest. Intermediation by 'the banking system' ought to be a footnote only—either because it is smooth and sensible, or else because it is replaced by direct transactions.

17. As usual, these familiar arguments lose force, for want of clear proposals as to how the gainers are to compensate those particular workers who do lose their jobs when imports increase. This is where 'taxes on foreign trade', skimming off some of the consumers' benefits from cheap Third World imports to re-employ or compensate, e.g. the Western shoe producers, make most sense.

employment in the importing North also benefits indirectly. Since there is such clear net gain, why the new protectionism? The Commissioners seek, where the GATT's Tokyo Round miserably failed, to persuade the North to accept 'safeguards against safeguards'. These are restraints on its capacity unilaterally to restrict Third World imports on the pretext of material injury to a vocal sector. But why are 'safeguards against safeguards' resisted if there is a clear, overriding loss to the Northern economy from such restrictions? The main reason is that 'loss of jobs [due to Third World imports] has tended to emphasize existing difficulties for economically weaker [Northern] regions', and that 'movement of labour out of declining industries is not always easy' (p. 176). Unemployment, and inadequate adjustment assistance to retrain workers, worsens these problems; and both will suffer from Governmental non-interventionism, in the North's 'real world' of private monopolies and cartels. The OECD states, by moving domestic policies back towards non-intervention, paradoxically *reduce* the prospects of freer international trade. Conversely, at international level, feer trade must be planned; left to itself, private enterprise tends to restrict, not to enhance, competition.[18]

It has always been the case that powerful groups, even small ones, try to insist on a specific quid pro quo for reductions in protection. The general contribution of such reductions to GNP interests them little. But show a potentially jobless EEC producer of textiles, shoes or cutlery a rewarding and reasonably *secure* chance to make equipment, with which India or Korea can then produce what he produced before; and his assent to freer trade is more likely, as is the assent of his trade union or employers' organisation. However, this requires international *bilateral* negotiations seeking, more or less, bilaterally balanced trade expansion, via monitored sectoral targets; and representation of 'potential loser' and 'potential gainer' interests, from (say) both EEC and India, at such negotiations.

Since the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, and especially after the 1979 oil price rises, North-South trade expansion through the familiar multilateral routes looks unpromising. Such negotiations have in the past produced agreements to reduce barriers to trade but, even prior to Tokyo, agreements were confined largely to trade among Northern countries. Small-group deals within and between the EEC, EFTA, COMECON and the United States have further damaged the *comparative* access of Third World exports to these wealthy markets.

American objections to bilateral dealings with the Third World are familiar. Third parties do matter, and such objections, therefore, have some justice, in theory as well as in self-interest. However, such objections must be accommodated—perhaps by a planned *group*, in series or in parallel, of bilateral dealings—and not simply allowed to prevent a determined effort to roll back neo-protectionism. The Commission has spelt out the arguments, and the goals. Can multilateralism get us towards them? Or is there a better approach via bilateral or small-group negotiations, with direct representation of potential 'loser interests' within nations so that they can press for compensation beforehand, rather than exercising protectionist vetoes afterwards? As in 1974–76, an Indo-EEC type of 'package deal' may well be the most promising way forward.

Commodities and risks

Trade in manufactures exemplifies one central theme, and one rather hidden implication, of the Report. The theme is that Northern and Southern nations share

18. 'People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.' Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of of the Wealth of Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976 edn., edited by R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd), Vol. 1, p. 145.

common but complex interests. The implication is that, to make use of these overlaps, powerful sub-national interests must be taken into account in good time, and hence that—to make the complexity manageable—progress is likelier to involve two nations than 117. Trade in commodities raises another central theme: that reduction of risks, fluctuations and unanticipated events, can benefit even those involved in an apparently zero-sum conflict—such as a single buyer and a single seller of a commodity. The two themes combine in the Commission's case for increased commodity processing in the South—raising at once its capacity to afford imports of Northern exports, and (because value-added in processing is more stable than in the raw commodity) the predictability of the South's receipts.

With regard to exports of unprocessed commodities, the Commission appreciates that commodity price stabilisation may destabilise earnings if it is supply, rather than demand, that fluctuates;[19] that receipts from stabilisation funds should often be used to diversify production out of Third World commodities, not to increase their supplies and thus cut their prices; and that many important commodities are produced mainly in rich countries. Nevertheless, Brandt blesses both international commodity agreements for price stabilisation (mainly under the auspices of UNCTAD's new Commodity Fund) and expanded compensatory financing by the IMF. This complex mixture[20] involves effects— on stability and output, in North and South—that cry out for systematic economic analysis.

Clearly, however, the Commission is right to stress that the reduction of risk can benefit North and South alike. This implies longer-term automatic programming of trade, of aid, and of private investors' obligations and rights. It is noteworthy that the imposition of radically risk-reducing policies on private investment in developing countries drew the united support of Commissioners ranging from Peter Peterson (a distinguished American Republican banker and businessman, ex-Secretary of Commerce and aid expert) and Edward Heath, to socialists such as Amir Jamal (Tanzania's Minister of Finance and Planning) and Layachi Yaker (Algeria's Ambassador to the Soviet Union and ex-Minister of Commerce). One might disagree about whether particular proposals, such as more stable exchange-rates, would in fact reduce uncertainty; but nobody can doubt the massive, trans-ideological interest in achieving such a reduction revealed in this Report. The question which now begs an answer is: what follow-up action will there be?

Arms, food, energy

The Pearson Report was rightly criticised for excessive concentration on aid. The Brandt Report will be criticised for scattering its fire all over an, admittedly vast, target. I have considered a few major issues around its central theme of joint North-South planning for joint interests. But in three other areas the Report's sub-title, 'A Programme for Survival', has special force: arms, food, and energy.

The stress on ambitious but generalised disarmament proposals, or rather appeals, is in itself fully justified but in context probably mistaken. North-South relations are hard enough to turn to joint advantage, without saddling them with East-West issues also. Instead, a systematic analysis of how arms-control proposals—for example affecting India and Pakistan; or Algeria, Morocco and Mauretania—might reduce both death

19. Without stabilisation falls in supply (e.g. for climatic reasons) can be compensated by rises in price, and *vice versa*: M. Lipton, 'Farm Price Stabilisation in Underdeveloped Agricultures: some effects on income stability and income distribution', in P. P. Streeten, ed., *Unfashionable Economics: Essays in Honour of Lord Balogh* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970).

20. It is especially complex alongside STABEX, which is confined to some African, Caribbean and Pacific exports to the EEC.

and waste in particular Third World arenas, and of how developed-country actions would have to change in such a context, would have been useful.

Adequate food for the world's poorest people is *the* survival issue. It depends mainly on their command over income from, and rights in, land; and on technologies to enable them to exploit it. Aid can help, in conjunction with redirected domestic development efforts, if it is made available (a) to compensate those who lose out from drastic, redistributive land reform programmes; and (b) for massive 'research and development' on improved water management for users at the tail-end of irrigation canals, and on crop improvement and water control in unirrigated areas. The Commission hints at such proposals, but does not develop them. They do not depend mainly on common interest. They are needed because near-starvation, cheaply preventable, in a rich world is wicked.

Recent trends in energy use and discovery, if continued for twenty-five to forty years, will impose upon the West's present life-style adjustments so drastic as to carry risks of disastrous responses—economic or military. The Commission points out that 'drilling density in prospective oil areas in industrialised countries is about 40 times that in those of the oil-importing developing countries' (p. 164). It strongly argues, in the common interest, for much greater stress on prospecting in the South. Who could quarrel? Who will act?

And then what happened?

Academics can, and will, find many flaws in the Brandt Report.[21] However, it is the best Brandt Report that we have; and it has got the essentials right. The probable alternative is dwindling North-South flows of trade and capital, leading to chronic slumpflation in the world economy. This will not be cured by chanting the monetarist mantras, whether at poor countries stricken by bad harvests and oil price explosions, or nearer home.

In some cases analytical deepening of the Commission's proposal is needed. But what is now essential is the sustained follow-up and implementation of the central thrust of the Report: of its major, linked proposals on aid; tri-cycling; trade; reduction of uncertainty; food and energy. But will the essential happen? Already the West's Treasuries murmur about simplistic proposals, about realism; and they return to reinforcing one another in OPEC-assisted cost-inflation and IMF-assisted demand-deflation alike. The South could indeed be the catalyst that changes the reaction, among Northern and OPEC countries, for the better.

If Brandt is unimaginatively shelved, it is more likely that major defaults, starting in the South, will catalyse the Northern-OPEC 'world system' in a different way entirely. And monetarist Tweedledum, protectionist Tweedledee, and 'realist' Scrooge will all be eaten by the Monstrous Crow; and serve them right. But us? And the wretched of the earth?

21. For example, its presentation is often unfortunate, as with Herr Brandt's own "I"-intensive and sentimental introduction; the gaps in the evidence on such matters as the effect of aid; and the frequent lapses into Unctalk.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

America and Western Europe: Problems and Perspectives. Edited by Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz. *Lexington, Mass: Lexington. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough, Hants.) 448 pp. £12·50.*

THE twenty-two essays in this volume, written by academics, businessmen, diplomatists, and foreign policy analysts, were produced for a conference held under the aegis of the German Society for Foreign Affairs in late 1976–early 1977. The separate section-headings sound impressive and exciting: Opinions, Culture and Elite Relations; the Western Economic System; Dimensions of Security; Structural Problems in the West—but in the aggregate the essays are repetitious and none offers a critique of any other.

The theme of the work is the passing of the 'Bretton Woods' international economic and political framework; the need to reconstruct a substitute; and the tasks facing the Western elite architects of this new system—notably the external threat from the Soviet Union and the internal threat from the Left. Indeed the second danger is seen to be the more imminent and deadly; and a reader with a wider historical perspective than the authors articulate will recognise a right-wing tradition of political analysis and programme which long antedates October 1917.

There are exceptions in quality and rallying-cries. It is surely not *pietas* to praise Andrew Shonfield's, 'The Trend toward a Mixed Economy'. His comments on the paradoxical demands (in the mixed economy) for more state intervention in spite of increasing state incompetence are subtly formulated—if not novel, as he would doubtless admit. Economists of a different persuasion (and not the monetarists Shonfield strongly rebuts) speak of 'contradictions'—but that category is absent from the book. Remarkably, Part II on the Western Economic System manages to cover nearly a hundred pages with scarcely a mention of capitalism and profit. Competition and the market are the preferred terms: creatures of nature and functions of rationality, with politics unnatural and irrational.

There is, in truth, a certain coyness about much of the writing. For example, though elite relations are discussed in Part I, we have no study of the role of such bodies as the sponsoring German Society for Foreign Affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, or our own Royal Institute of International Affairs. Ulrich Littmann's tightly written essay, 'Academic Exchange and its Impact', is first-rate but it reads rather like a report for the Fulbright programme (in which he is involved).

Trilateralism itself is alluded to in a number of the essays (otherwise the occasional discussion of Japan would appear even more eccentric) but its conceptual shape and validity is not adequately explored in Wilhelm Grewe's promisingly entitled, 'Western Europe, the United States and Japan—Structural Problems of an International Triangle'. This omission is all the more puzzling, since a volume such as this demands vigorous attention to theory. Martin Hillenbrand ('The Future of the European

Community as a Problem of American-European Relations') calls explicitly for it; yet though his paper is one of the better contributions, his own terminology (and even simple nomenclature) is imprecise. The following chapter, 'The American World Power and the Western European Powers', by Pierre Hassner, offers the nearest approach to developed political theory: a schema reminiscent of James Madison's *Tenth Federalist Paper* (pp. 344-45).

Hassner's greatest merit lies in honestly addressing the Allied Powers' commitment to German partition (an element in Klaus Ritter's 'The Evolution of East-West Relations: The European Context': see pp. 238-39)—a painful truth which Uwe Nerlich's essay on 'Washington and Bonn' carefully avoids. Nerlich prefers to cite banalities to support a vision of secular American-German (i.e. *Bundesrepublik*) harmony (p. 370) and makes silly remarks against 'neo-marxists' (p. 395, note 57)—small but revealing clues that complex prose and heavy footnoting do not guarantee faultless thinking.

However, Nerlich's essay has far greater significance than this. After Hans-Peter Schwarz's 'Atlantic Security Policy in an Era without Great Alternatives' Nerlich's contribution is the longest in the collection; and both are directed to the real concern of the book—not the Eastern, Soviet threat across borders, but the danger of internal collapse before a burgeoning Left. Schwarz reverts to this primary element in his concluding essay on the 'Future Tasks of American-European Policy': 'national socialism' is on the march in France, Italy, the United Kingdom—even in Germany (pp. 402-403). The substantive limits of pluralism, pragmatism and diversity (the explicit values of the essayists in general) are clearly demarcated: elites must protect themselves; capitalism, with its economic and political inequalities, must be preserved; 'distribution battles' (p. 402) must cease. Thus the contradiction of the work as a whole is at last fully expressed: democracy must be defended by its leaders against those who would use democratic means to remove social ills. (It is crucial to note that the authors' attack is directed at the parliamentary Left in Western Europe.) It was just such a contradiction which Madison failed to resolve theoretically nearly two centuries ago.

University of Sussex MICHAEL DUNNE

The Effective Management of Resources: The International Politics of the North Sea. Edited by C. M. Mason. *London: Frances Pinter; New York: Nichols. 1979. 268 pp. £10·00.*

Resource Management at the International Level: The Case of the North Pacific. By Oran Young. *London: Frances Pinter; New York: Nichols. 1977. 252 pp. £8·00.*

THERE is much to be said for the study of maritime problems in a specific area, particularly when parochialism is eschewed in advance. The Scottish branch of Chatham House has produced a valuable collection of essays under the able editorship of C. M. Mason which combines clarity of thought, particularly in the definition of fundamental concepts, with extensive research into the practical aspects of the subjects under review. The unity of the theme is defined as residing more in the nature of the international politics to be found in each of the issue areas than in the single geographical setting provided by the North Sea. The state is given a queenly role since it is the principal actor in the regulation of resource exploitation and cannot be bound save with its own consent, but due allowance is made for external and internal restraints, including the necessity of the support of those citizens who are required to implement its decisions. Support for the role of the state sometimes comes from

unlikely quarters: the oil companies, for example, 'insisted on the establishment of national zones on the continental shelf, because they wanted the sort of legal security for their operations which only states were willing and able to provide'.

The issues discussed include oil and gas (regimes national and international; governments and companies; the EEC); the changing regimes of North Sea fisheries; regulation of marine pollution; and security and policing.

Writing on the international regime of oil and gas, Mrs Birnie and Mr Mason skilfully plot the particular political circumstances in which the various bilateral agreements between the coastal states were reached. The oil companies were pressing for legal clarification, Britain was not yet in the EEC, oil and gas were under-valued assets, and OPEC had not yet shown its formidable claws. It is not surprising, therefore, that negotiations were concerned with the assignment and the extent of jurisdiction rather than the allocation of resources. There were few precedents or guidelines on the question of partition and the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was that delimitation is essentially a political matter 'in which due weight must be given to legal considerations'. Hence international law in this field has in effect been created by agreements between states rather than on customary international law. As to the endurance of these agreements the authors rightly say that much may depend on the formulation of a satisfactory European energy policy within and outside the EEC.

The international theme is sustained in the essay on domestic oil and gas regimes by Professor Daintith and Mr Gault. The policies of the British and Norwegian governments are contrasted in that Britain had to display more sensitivity to the attitudes of other oil-producing countries (since it imports from OPEC), and to the oil companies in order to encourage investment. In his essay on government and the oil corporations Mr Park shows how international complexities and interdependence are compounded by the different structures, markets and commercial objectives of the great companies themselves—including the state-owned—and the differing (sometimes contradictory) needs and aims of governments. An unexpected warning is sounded that interstate competition for scarce technical expertise may induce Russia to offer more attractive terms to the oil companies than Western countries are prepared to do. Mr Mason, on the EEC, defines the areas of collision between municipal and Community law and the obstacles to the emergence of a Community energy policy.

The high quality of the essays is maintained in the section on fisheries policy, a more openly contentious area where the fears of hearing the sound of shots fired in anger is never far away. Mr Driscoll shows how the conservation policies of the NEAFC, based on the principle of parity of sacrifice, were hard to implement and enforce because of the stubborn bargaining positions of its individual members, not to mention the difficulties of detection and prosecution (policing is well described in later chapters). The 200-mile limit imposed by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gave more rights to coastal states but these were soon to be challenged in the courts of the EEC where the enshrinement of the concepts of 'historic rights' and 'non-discrimination' were construed as a peril both to conservation and to our own domestic interests. Nevertheless, since policing is now in the hands of the coastal states prospects may be more sanguine. Refreshingly, Mr Driscoll does not fail to suggest the possible commercial advantages of an emerging Common Fisheries Policy.

The problems that beset the North Sea regime are largely inchoate in Beringia, the region comprising the marine areas around the Bering Straits together with the coastal littorals of eastern Siberia and western North America. The Arctic, Mr Young reminds us, is one of the last frontiers of the earth. Until recently the level of human activity in the area was so low that problems of government were virtually non-

existent, but since it possesses a variety of marine and land resources, including hydrocarbons, this situation—almost a frozen paradise—is unlikely to persist. It presents unusual problems in that it has the characteristics of both land and seas and yet is totally unlike both.

The author studies the patterns of resource usage, including possible military ones, and problems of disputed sovereignty and jurisdiction involving not only the adjacent states (the United States, Russia and Canada) but also countries with commercial interests such as Japan (distant-water fishing). Mr Young has a formidable armoury of analytical tools at his disposal and he deploys them with impressive effect as is shown, for example, in his distinction between renewable and non-renewable resources. It is good, too, to see exposed the fallacy that coastal fishermen are somehow more virtuous than their long-distance brothers.

His purpose is prophylactic in that he wants to avoid the horrors that have befallen the Baltic and the Mediterranean. To this end he drafts some scenarios for the exploitation optimum of Arctic resources (zonal; functional authorities; a regional authority rather like the NEAFC). In this he displays an enviable fertility of ideas. The work is exhaustive—although a comparison with the regime in Antarctica might have been useful, as might a comparison of an autonomous Beringian regime with the ISBA proposed at UNCLOS.

Both these books are essential for the mastery of a theme so thorny and so topical.

AUDREY PARRY

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

International Perceptions of the Superpower Military Balance. Edited by Donald C. Daniel. *London, New York: Praeger. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 198 pp. £13·50.*

THIS book provides one of the first serious attempts to investigate a concept that has recently crept into strategic studies. There has been growing concern over 'perceptions' of the military balance. The argument has been that subjective impressions of the super-power strategic relationship, no matter how erroneous, can have an important impact on international behaviour. This follows from the old sociological axiom that if something is believed to be real it is real in its consequences.

Unfortunately, this collection of essays tends to take the significance of these perceptions for granted. The introductory essay by the late Herbert Goldhammer makes the notion of perceptions more of a methodological issue than it seems to deserve. Edward Luttwak follows this with a typically iconoclastic piece discussing the various ways in which the United States could maximise the political benefits of its military forces by considering 'the perceptual effects of their configuration, structure and modes of deployment'. One method of doing this is then discussed, before moving on to a series of case studies of American, Soviet, West European, French, Japanese, and Arabian perceptions.

These studies provide the most valuable part of the book. With a variety of interesting national variations, on the whole they indicate a lack of consensus on which super-power is militarily 'ahead'. The relevant issues appear to be treated with great commonsense and perspective and a minimum of wholly uninformed fantasy. Many respondents believed that the question of military superiority had little point because the two powers could so readily destroy each other and, most important, there

was little disposition to take radical political steps on the basis of marginal shifts in super-power capabilities.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Air Power in the Next Generation. Edited by E. J. Feuchtwanger and R. A. Mason. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 151 pp. £10·00.*

THIS book is a collection of papers first presented at a symposium organised by the Royal Air Force, and the University of Southampton, Adult Education Department in 1977. Unfortunately, it lacks both an introductory and concluding chapter to offer a context for, and an overview of, the papers, and the reader is thus left in considerable doubt about the intended scope and purpose of the volume. The papers comprise a far-ranging initial chapter by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Neil Cameron; two chapters on the future economic resources that might be available to the United Kingdom defence effort, one of which, by David Greenwood, attempts to argue that budgetary restrictions should be seen as an opportunity for recasting RAF priorities and objectives; a slightly indigestible chapter by John Erickson on the structure and weapons of the current Soviet Air Force; two chapters on 'lessons' to be drawn from recent air combat experiences in South-east Asia and the Middle East; two, more technical chapters on the configurations and potential tactical capabilities of future combat aircraft; a chapter discussing the future of air power on Nato's central front; and a final, vacuous chapter on the possible future shape and capabilities of the RAF. There is also a bibliography which appears to have originally been appended to the paper on the Soviet Air Force, as it only contains literature relevant to it.

This reviewer would have preferred to see the book addressing its topic in a more analytical and imaginative fashion, and focusing on issues such as the ground-based missile/attack aircraft relationship; the future roles of cruise-missiles and Remote Piloted Vehicles; the role of aircraft in maritime warfare; whether piloted aircraft have any future for air combat in the Nato guidelines area; and whether the RAF should seek to maintain a balanced capability, or specialise in specific roles as part of a Nato-wide plan. Such an imaginative and broad approach is displayed by Sir Neil Cameron in his initial chapter, but few of the issues he raises are treated systematically in the remainder of the book.

In conclusion, therefore, this book demonstrates that the leadership of the RAF includes men of considerable intellectual strength and vision, and it contains a number of sound individual chapters, but few, if any, positive ideas on 'air power in the next generation' (whatever that may mean!). Finally, would editors please convert conference papers into a standard literary format before they are published. I suspect few readers wish to be offered a written invitation to the symposium by Sir Neil Cameron (p. 1), or to be told of the National Service experiences of contributors (pp. 38 and 136).

University of Southampton JOHN SIMPSON

Burden Sharing in NATO. By Gavin Kennedy. *London: Duckworth. 1979. 117 pp. £8·95.*

BURDEN sharing, in the broadest political sense, is both the raison d'être and the secular problem of Nato—most recently and vividly illustrated in the effort to reach a

common decision on theatre nuclear-force modernisation. The temptation to be a 'free rider'—to benefit from the efforts of others at little or no cost to oneself—is stronger in the nuclear field than anywhere.

The problem is no less important in the narrower sense of the equitable sharing of the financial and resource costs of the common 'public good' of defence. For all that has been achieved in common programmes like infrastructure on the basis of agreed criteria, they are a small fraction of overall spending, and even the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) project, in terms of its financing, comes close to being one of what Mr Kennedy calls 'partial, and sometimes purely expedient, solutions'. The pattern has too often been that when some acute situation has arisen over offset, balance of payments, or national economic crisis, considered long-term action has been impossible; otherwise the sleeping-dog has been left to lie.

Consequently, too little attention has been paid to academic or other contributions on an improved approach (and in this connection Mr Kennedy's bibliography is valuable in itself). His Chapter 8 deserves serious attention, even though he rightly says that a frontal assault on this difficult issue is not on the cards at present and that simple solutions are not in prospect. Some rational consideration of the subject is, however, the only alternative to the kind of spasmodic treatment it has received in the past. It is also the only sensible approach to the future shape and size of the British defence effort.

This said, it is hard work to arrive at Chapter 8 by way of the preceding chapters. Although they admittedly only seek to examine economic theories as a basis for a critical appraisal of the Alliance effort, the plain fact is that the Alliance never has been, and is most unlikely ever to be, moved by economic theory. This is not just a matter of an atavistic preference for pure pragmatism, but a recognition of the impact of political factors, only some of which Mr Kennedy identifies. There are deeper ones also, such as the geographical fact that, no matter who pays, a disproportionate amount of men and hardware needs to be stationed in the Federal Republic. Not to mention the difficulty of reconciling the global role and effort of the United States, as a super-power in a global relationship with the Soviet Union, with its strictly Nato-related contribution. The latter is probably about 50 per cent of the former, but in today's complex world the two are politically, increasingly difficult to unscramble.

This is not to detract from the value of Mr Kennedy's book. These political complications should not be an excuse for inaction; other, at times dormant, political factors argue no less strongly for an attempt to arrive at the mixture of broad principles to govern burden sharing which he advocates. It is true that Nato will never 'pool all defence resources and run the Alliance from the centre'. But might Mr Kennedy, or somebody else, consider whether there is not a role for the EEC in improving the co-ordination and equitable sharing of resource allocation to defence among the European Allies? His reference in Chapter 6 to one EEC example offers some promise; progress towards Monetary Union might surely have a beneficial effect on defence procurement and the defence effort more generally. Fear not, gentle reader, there is little danger of tank or aircraft mountains, with surpluses being sold off, like EEC butter, at subsidised rates to the Russians!

JOHN KILLICK

Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict. Edited by Michael Howard. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1979. 173 pp. £6·50.*

AS Michael Howard notes in his introductory essay to this lively book, far from being hopelessly uncontrollable 'military activity . . . carries an intrinsic imperative towards

control'. However, as this control is often intended for the purpose of maximising military efficiency it does not necessarily coincide with the aspirations of those who would seek to impose control to minimise its destructive consequences. From the perspective of an anti-militarist persuasion there is the tension between measures designed to make wars impossible and those to make them less awful should they occur. The arrival of nuclear weapons turned all these debates around as it became argued that the new destructive capabilities made war so awful that this offered the best hope of preventing its occurrence. On the other hand as a certain amount of conflict appears endemic to international affairs the fear of a small incident sparking off a nuclear holocaust has concentrated minds wonderfully on means of limiting wars in their scope and intensity.

The lecturers brought together by Michael Howard for a course in Oxford in 1977 covered the development of ideas on restraints in war from Grotius to RAND. The book is divided into two. After Professor Howard's introduction, restraints on war by land, at sea and in the air up to 1945 are discussed by Professors Best, Ranft and Watt respectively. Then we enter the nuclear age with John Garnett on limited 'conventional' war and Laurence Martin on limited 'nuclear' war, followed by Professor O'Connell on limited war at sea since 1945 and Professor Draper on Wars of National Liberation.

It is hard to quarrel with the surveys of Garnett and Martin (except that I would not attach as much significance to the Schlesinger doctrine as does Martin), but the ground they cover may be more familiar to modern students of strategy than the pre-1945 search for restraints on war. There is often an unspoken assumption that the attempt to 'control' arms is a wholly postwar phenomenon, and that in previous years there was just a crude push to disarm in the naïve belief that less arms meant less wars. It is therefore immensely useful to have short, lucid accounts of the serious attempts that were made, in the first half of the century, to establish generally accepted rules for, and limits to, war. These reveal similarities with later attempts at arms control, including the awkward relationship with the strategic theories current at any time and the problems caused by the rapid rate of technological change.

The major criticism of the book is that in none of the essays purporting to bring the analysis up to 1945 is there any serious assessment of the experience of the Second World War, which demonstrated the validity of some types of restraint (e.g. gas) and the falsity of others (e.g. submarine warfare).

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Progress in Arms Control? (Readings from *Scientific American*). Edited by Bruce M. Russett and Bruce G. Blair. *San Francisco, Calif.: Freeman. 1979. 238 pp. £10·00. Pb: £4·60.*

Postures for Non-Proliferation: Arms Limitation and Security Policies to Minimize Nuclear Proliferation. By Enid C. B. Schoettle. *London: Taylor and Francis for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1979. 168 pp. £6·50.*

THESE two volumes highlight the limited possibilities that now seem to exist in the area of international activity labelled arms control. *Progress in Arms Control* comprises reprints from *Scientific American*, grouped together under the general headings of SALT I, SALT II, and Non-Proliferation. The articles are mainly concerned to explain and illuminate the technological background to these arms control concerns, and explore the implications of evolving technologies for them. The exceptions are the articles on Non-Proliferation by Rose and Lester, and by Epstein,

which display a much greater sensitivity to the political element in arms-control activities. Each section starts with a lengthy introduction by Russett and Blair, whose central theme is that with the exception of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty progress in arms control has been slow, and possibly illusory, and that arms-control activities have frequently been overtaken by the pace of technological change in weaponry. The combination of introductory articles and detailed, and authoritative exposition of current arms-control concerns makes this an excellent (and cheap) introduction to the field for statesmen and students alike. It comes complete with texts of the major treaties and a useful bibliography, and is one of the better illustrations of how a reader can be effectively edited so that the whole is much greater than the sum of the parts.

The contents of this volume once again bear witness to the emphasis placed by United States scholars on nuclear arms control to the exclusion of all else. If the reader seeks information on the biological weapons convention, on chemical disarmament, and on controls over conventional arms transfers he will be sadly disappointed. Also omitted is any reference to nuclear testing bans and limitations. and the technical problems which have bedevilled discussions on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Postures for Non-Proliferation is a rather different book, not least because it is written by a single author, Dr Enid Schoettle, and presents the case for a particular type of nuclear non-proliferation strategy. It argues that by the year 2000 some thirty to forty states will have the technical and industrial capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. The boundary between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states is becoming blurred as computer simulation replaces the necessity to test weapons publicly, and the only restraints on extensive nuclear proliferation will thus be political, rather than technical. Dr Schoettle argues that it is necessary to explore the types of comprehensive arms-control regimes that are claimed to limit proliferation in such an environment.

Two such regimes are investigated in this book, the High and Low Posture doctrines, which the author places at either end of a spectrum. The High Posture doctrine implies that the super-powers will not only continue their qualitative arms race and extend their nuclear lead over all other states, but will also acquire weapons which would enable them to offer positive, nuclear security guarantees to their allies, and possibly to other, non-nuclear states as well. The Low Posture doctrine emphasises the belief that there is a positive correlation between the super-power nuclear-arms race and the propensity of non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire nuclear arms. It 'rests on the assumption that one major incentive for NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons is to protect themselves against the nuclear weapons of existing NWS under present and future governments' (p. 41). The policies flowing from this doctrine include the active pursuit of a reduced level of super-power strategic armament, the setting up of nuclear free zones, and the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Dr Schoettle then proceeds to offer an incisive and persuasive analysis of the political and security dimensions of these two postures, and the literature supporting them. She concludes that the basic flaw in the High Posture doctrine is that it is directed more towards maintaining the security of the super-powers than limiting proliferation. Indeed a number of writers have emphasised that the costs and risks of proliferation under this strategy would fall mainly upon non-nuclear-weapon states involved in regional conflicts while experience to date indicates that America's alliance policy considerations have always outweighed arms-control ones. In contrast, the author believes that the Low Posture doctrine has no such inherent contradictions and 'propounds a comprehensive range of major, mutually compatible policy instruments' (p. 68). Her conclusion is that this modified Low Posture doctrine is the

one that the international community should follow in developing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

The remainder of the book comprises a very comprehensive and detailed account of the attitudes and arguments of the states involved in negotiating the NPT between 1965 and 1968, and an account and analysis of the arguments and disagreements that emerged from the NPT Review Conference in 1975. The main function of these sections appears to be to demonstrate that the modified Low Posture strategy is compatible with the views expressed by many of the non-nuclear weapon states at these conferences, and that it would have an excellent chance of being accepted by them.

This is a book that deserves to be read carefully, for it makes an outstanding contribution to the Non-Proliferation literature due both to the clarity and comprehensiveness of the analysis in its first parts and the lucid and scholarly exposition of the NPT negotiations in the second. One wonders to what extent the High Posture doctrine is something of a straw man, however, as although it has clearly been propounded in the strategic studies literature, it appears to be an unlikely policy option, given the situation of mutual super-power defencelessness against a third power nuclear attack, created by the ABM Treaty. Equally, the Low Posture doctrine does not really differ appreciably from the state of the existing Non-Proliferation regime. Most states are agreed on the desirability of measures such as a CTB and greater reductions in SALT: the problem appears to be how to convert aspirations into end product. Finally, the modification to the Low Posture doctrine proposed by the author poses major problems if it is not to be implemented until a crisis is well advanced, for it will not stop the crisis developing, and that in itself might be sufficient to cause a state to go nuclear once such a crisis has subsided. Despite those reservations, this is a book which fulfils a clear need to tease out in a logical and systematic manner the strengths and weaknesses of Non-Proliferation regimes in order to provide a sound base for future policies.

University of Southampton JOHN SIMPSON

Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. By Strobe Talbott. *London: Harper and Row. 1979. 319 pp. £7·50.*

Arms Control and SALT II. By W. K. H. Panofsky. *Seattle, London: University of Washington Press. 1979. 75 pp. £3·95. Pb: £1·45.*

STROBE TALBOTT's book *Endgame* describes the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union leading to the signing of the second treaty to emerge from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), in June 1979. It is something of a publishing achievement for this well-produced book to have appeared some five months after the summit—in hopes of influencing the course of the US Senate's debate on the ratification of the Treaty.

The obvious comparison is with *Cold Dawn*, the history of SALT I written by John Newhouse. Now an official himself, Newhouse was unable to prepare a sequel (which would have established him as the Theodore White of SALT). Talbott has followed the Newhouse model by describing the negotiations as they appeared from inside the American government.

As a reporter for *Time* magazine, he had an opportunity to interview many of the leading actors which he obviously used to good effect. We, therefore, have a reliable account of the pressures that shaped American policy, illuminating a phenomenon

frequently observed in the past—the most difficult arms control negotiations are those over the formulation of the American position rather than the consequent search for agreement with the Soviet Union. The desire of the administration to appease the hard-line critics of SALT comes over particularly strongly.

SALT II negotiations began soon after the signing of SALT I in May 1972. They appeared to have been successful when Presidents Ford and Brezhnev initialled an *aide memoire* at Vladivostok in November 1974, but then it proved impossible to turn the outline agreement into a full Treaty. By the time President Carter came to office an agreement was not too far away, but the new administration wished to impose its own personality on SALT and came up with a wholly new set of proposals that alarmed and infuriated the Russians. After this dismal start, it took until October to get the negotiations back on course and the two sides to agree on a new framework. Everyone then waited for the dénouement, but, as before, the tidying up of the final details became a prolonged and difficult process, eventually occupying just under two years.

This 'endgame' takes up the bulk of Talbott's book, apart from a valuable discussion of the shambles of the comprehensive proposal of March 1977 and the quick recovery to the outlines of the new agreement. Stopping in June 1979 means that he does not touch upon the *real* endgame, of Senate ratification, still being played.

The concentration on the bureaucratic (rather than Congressional) politics of this limited if intense period in the negotiations, while fascinating in itself, has certain disadvantages. One needs to know a lot about SALT to keep a sense of proportion. The chapter on the period up to 1977 is sadly incomplete; the critical failure to follow up the breakthrough at Vladivostok is left for another historian. The discussions of the strategic rationale for arms control and the arguments surrounding this in Washington are, frankly, garbled—making it difficult to understand what all the fuss was, and still is, about. While the discussion of matters such as encryption of telemetry, provisions for the introduction of new ICBMs, and other notable sticking points is lucid, the impression can be created that these were the be all and end all of SALT.

The overriding impression left by *Endgame* might be amazement that anything ever emerged from all these conflicting pressures, to the credit of the key figures in the American administration who saw it through (which is presumably why they chatted so readily to the author). There is no assessment at all of the merits of the treaty, or even some basis for personal assessment or considered reflections on where if anywhere SALT is going. Thus, apart from reminding armchair diplomats of the difficulties of actually conducting negotiations and despite the claims on the back cover, this book is of very little value 'for anyone who wants to follow, and participate in, the number one foreign policy debate of the year'.

For that purpose, one could do worse than turn to a sharp little book by Wolfgang Panofsky, a distinguished scientist and an effective partisan of arms control. His book provides a clear and concise statement of the arms control position—at a time when this position is about as popular as undiluted Keynesianism amongst economists—and a balanced discussion of SALT as well as other related issues such as the neutron bomb. He complains of the current tendency to dwell on perceptions rather than physical reality in assessing the workings of deterrence and the impact of either new arms control measures or new weapons, thus pulling 'the rug out from under any rational substantive discourse'. His determination to stick to the substance means that political factors appear as intrusions and examples of muddled thinking, offering a striking contrast to Talbott's preoccupation with politics but perhaps explaining why the arms control position has lost so much ground in recent years.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

L'Humanisme de l'Islam. By Marcel A. Boisard. *Paris: Albin Michel. 1979. 436 pp. Pb.*

Militant Islam. By G. H. Jansen. *London, Sydney: Pan Books. 1979. 224 pp. Pb: £1·25.*

THESE two books, very different in scope, character and authority, are to some extent complementary. It is difficult to imagine anything like either of them being written a generation ago, when it was assumed in the West that if Muslim states were to achieve real independence and exercise any influence internationally they had no alternative but to imitate Atatürk in a policy of laicisation and modernisation, reducing Islam to a matter of private conscience. Both these authors understand that this would be incompatible with the teaching and historical traditions of Islam itself, and they posit the existence and importance of millions of people practising Islam and aspiring to organise society in accordance with its tenets.

M. Boisard, who has had experience of Muslim countries as an official of the International Red Cross, is concerned with international law and more immediately with the formulation of a universally acceptable morality which it could reflect. He argues, surely irrefutably, that the present system was elaborated by European states which were able to ignore cultural and religious traditions other than their own, and that if that system is to secure general acceptance in the circumstances prevailing now it must be modified so as to take account of, among others, Islamic concepts of man and society, law and justice. His book is reflective and discursive. He relies principally, though not exclusively, on modern Muslim exposition and supports his contentions with frequent quotations from the Koran, much less often with references to the traditions of the Prophet, which are the real source of much Muslim law and are regarded as constituting an authoritative explanation of the Koran itself.

He naturally and properly emphasises the Muslim conception of the Divine Law. 'La règle est divine, l'obligation impérative, la sanction eschatologique' (p. 66). It is thus understandable that for Muslims 'la justice est la motivation religieuse essentielle et l'altruisme la base morale principale de l'ordre social' (p. 124).

> Dans l'Islam, le pivot est la justice, et la miséricorde fournit la limite empêchant qu'une 'vengeance' légale trop stricte devienne injustice. Pour le christianisme, le pivot est la charité, et la justice se pose en obstacle afin d'éviter qu'un excès de générosité ne conduise à l'inéquité. Les bases de la moralité sont donc essentiellement divergentes, quand bien même les manifestations pratiques extérieures paraîtraient quasi similaires (p. 128).

He is optimistic about the future of Islam, 'une croyance dynamique et potentiellement très souple parce que intégrée totalement à la vie' (p. 343), and about the possibility of achieving some international moral consensus. In a short review it is not possible to do justice to this thoughtful book. It is not always easy reading; it demands and repays careful study by anyone interested in the very important question with which it is concerned.

For the author's purpose the beliefs of Muslims about their own past are more relevant than the theories or even the discoveries of scholars, few of whom would agree that the life of Muhammad 's'est déroulée sous les pleins feux de l'histoire' and that 'son existence nous est connue dans le détail' (p. 42), or that we have been able to determine with precision the chronology of the revelations embodied in the Koran (p. 53). Such evidence as there is contradicts rather than confirms the allegation that the Caliph Mu'awiya I 's'inspira du luxe et de la pompe byzantine' and became 'un autocrate absolu' (p. 147), which he certainly was not. M. Boisard seems unaware of

the extent to which Islam incorporated pre-Islamic Arabian concepts and practices. No one acquainted with Professor R. B. Serjeant's writings, which are not mentioned in the bibliography, would aver that 'la nation musulmane est née du rejet de la coutume et de la tradition' (p. 167). Islam and Christianity are not the only religions that have 'dépassé les limites du contexte traditionnel dans lequel elles ont vu le jour' (p. 163). Is this true of Buddhism, extinct in its homeland and flourishing in Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand and Japan?

There are a number of misprints in the book but not many of them are likely to cause trouble except in the bibliography, which disguises an eminent medievalist as David Knowles (p. 426), lists the same author in different places as Strange, G. (de) (p. 409) and Le Strange, Guy (p. 426), and another as Gabrielli (p. 407) and Gabrieli (p. 416), and credits Gaudefroy-Demombynes with a book entitled *Maurice Mohamed, l'Homme et son Message* (p. 407).

Militant Islam is concerned with more than the Tehran ochlocrats. It is about those thinkers and movements whose aim is to reconstruct society on the basis of Islamic principles. It is disfigured throughout by misprints and factual errors. A *mihrab* is not a pulpit (p. 31), but a niche indicating the direction in which Muslims face when praying. Bursa was not the capital of the Seljuks (p. 114); it was never in their possession. Shamyl was some forty years older than Jamal al-din al-Afghani and was not his pupil (p. 99). The work of Snouck Hurgronje is described as 'to a very large extent buried in the unimportant west European patois that is Dutch' (p. 81). Even if Mr Jansen is unaware of the considerable imaginative literature written in the language, he ought to know that anyone unable to read it is in no position to study seriously the history or culture of south-east Asia. Besides, some of Snouck's most important work was not written in Dutch but German. Absurdities like these are regrettable because the book has some merits. Though Malaysia is oddly neglected, it is unusual and salutary to find so much attention paid to Indonesian Islam in a work of this kind. The theme is important and some of the information collected is useful; it should however be used with caution.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London C. F. BECKINGHAM

Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison. *Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1978. 394 pp. £14·50.*

THIS stimulating study by three American academics from the universities of Harvard, Chicago and Iowa is part of the Cross-National Program on Political and Social Change designed to test behaviourist theories advanced by various American scholars—in this particular case by Professor Verba and others. The book examines political participation in such diverse countries as Nigeria, Austria, Japan, India, the Netherlands, the United States, and Yugoslavia. The effect of economic, social, and educational factors on political participation in these countries is subjected to close scrutiny and the resulting analysis throws new light on democratic and elitist participation.

In order to test previously defined concepts, four categories of political participation are constructed: campaigning activity, voting activity, communal activity, and individual activity. Each country is then subjected to vigorous analysis and comparisons, and meaningful results are obtained even from Yugoslavia in which country only one political party is permitted, but where political participation can be effected through non-political organisations: in fact a whole chapter is devoted to political participation in this unique Communist model of government. The massive

appendices contain the tools used in this comparative participatory exercise: the modes, scales, sampling design, sample weights, and basic tables. It is a most impressive intellectual effort and challenge to European political science.

University of Manchester JOHN F. N. BRADLEY

Human Rights: Problems, Perspectives and Texts. (A series of lectures and seminar papers delivered at the University of Durham in 1978, with supporting texts.) Edited by F. D. Dowrick. *Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House. 1979. 223 pp. £8.50.*

THIS volume reproduces nine lectures or papers given at Durham University in 1978, usefully supplemented by seventy pages of documents.

All the chapters are short, clearly written and interesting in their own right. As a whole, the book is instructive for what it reveals about present British attitudes. On the one hand, there is scepticism about the possibility either of listing what human rights ought to be protected by governments or of establishing a criterion for distinguishing rights akin to Rawls's priority to liberty. On the other hand, there is not even a reference to Rousseau's argument for 'the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community'. In consequence, there is no sympathy for the deliberate Russian and East European subordination of law and rights to the will of a party or class. The exception, a sensitive piece by Professor Milne, proves the rule in that he does not go to the root of the controversy.

The Introduction, by F. E. Dowrick, is a good example of the virtues and faults of the narrowly informed legal approach. For sources, he looks to authoritative pronouncements by governments and authors, bracketing Locke and Rousseau together. He offers a series of definitions, including the historically absurd claim that the Natural Law tradition should be called Natural Right. He outlines possible future extensions of rights but is not interested in the problem taken up by A. J. M. Milne of why such edicts ought to be obeyed. Milne's chapter, which might be called 'Two Cheers for Human Rights', is good on the dangers of ascribing universal connotations to specifically Western views. Professor Whitehouse's chapter is a valuable source for the work being done by the Protestant and Catholic churches, although he does not discuss the possible Christian objection to rights, expressed in the words, 'whose service is perfect freedom'. Gower's philosophical contribution is unduly concerned with three types of claim to absolute rights.

By way of a comparative perspective, P. J. Rhodes describes some Greek and Roman views on the problems of natural and conventional inequality, although I thought it odd that he had not used such standard works as Carlyle and Foster in preparing it. Janet Townshend, a geographer, writes colourfully of her own experiences in Latin America.

Colin Warbrick is concerned with the number of European countries which have invoked emergency legislation curtailing established rights in situations where such restrictions of liberty are not obviously justified by the need to preserve liberty. The Director of the British section of Amnesty International outlines region by region how they arrived at the figure of half-a-million prisoners of conscience. Finally, Professor Fawcett, in his capacity as President of the European Commission of Human Rights, gives a layman's guide to the powers and procedures of the Commission and Court. He raises the question of the utility of using such international instruments both in domestic affairs and in the conduct of foreign policy. But the reader will not find answers as to the rightfulness of their use.

University of Keele C. BREWIN

The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Pb. edn. 4 vols. Edited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. Vol. 1: **Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration.** (*130 pp. £2·00.*) Vol. 2: **Europe.** (*227 pp. £2·75.*) Vol. 3: **Latin America.** (*216 pp. £2·75.*) Vol. 4: **Chile.** (*140 pp. £2·75.*) *Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1978. (Hardback single vol. edn. forthcoming at £24·50.)*

READING four volumes on the breakdown of democratic regimes is a rather daunting, and saddening process (perhaps, in compensation the editors should produce a matching set on the breakdown of authoritarian regimes or on the birth of democratic ones). To succeed as an exercise in comparative historical and political analysis the contributors must, first of all, attempt to answer common questions, and, more difficult, to provide reasonably convincing interpretations of the crises they are examining. On both counts, these four volumes are very successful.

The common approach (followed more closely by some contributors than by others) involves concentration on political analysis rather than the adoption of sociological or socio-economic explanation (with the associated risk of making every crisis seem inevitable, or determined by forces outside political control). In effect, most contributors put to themselves the following question—was there, at the time of the crisis, a viable political option with a reasonable chance of success? Some contributors argue strongly that indeed there was. Stepan, for example, in his chapter on Brazil writes that 'What brought the regime to breaking point was the quality of political leadership of President Goulart, whose acts in the last months of the regime crucially undermined existing supports' (p. 111). Valenzuela, who has a whole volume to himself on Chile concentrates on the political breakdown in Chile (rather than on the activities of the Americans, or the revolutionary demands of the working class), and argues that a successful outcome of the talks between the Christian Democrats and Allende might well have averted the coup. Peter Smith refutes the notion that the crisis in Argentina in the interwar period was the result of the World Depression.

There are some dangers in this approach. It is of course very difficult to measure such an elusive concept as the quality of political leadership. Although Juan Linz writes with his customary insight on Spain, it is difficult to avoid the impression that his argument in the end becomes that the crisis could have been avoided if only the politicians had been more reasonable (which may well be true but is not very helpful). Only Julio Cotler in his chapter on Peru seems to reject entirely the general starting-point of the analysis and locates the 1968 breakdown in that country firmly in the socio-economic sphere. Two chapters, by contrast, look at countries where crises were successfully avoided—Finland in the 1930s (though the reasons here seem to be basically socio-economic) and Venezuela in the 1960s (where the explanation is more in terms of the quality of political leadership than the wealth produced by oil).

All four of these books repay careful reading. Linz's introductory work contains enough ideas for a book four times the length, though in the context of the enterprise, as a whole it might have been more appropriate to have had a concluding volume, rather than an introductory one, to attempt to tie the analysis together. Volumes Two and Three examine cases from Europe and Latin America, and the final one examines the crisis in Chile that led to the coup in 1973.

While this final volume is concise and well argued (and very well informed) there are two areas where the analysis might be questioned. One is the meaning of the political *Centre*. In what sense were the Christian Democrats a Centre party? I find the concept rather elusive. If it means moderate, then perhaps the Communist Party (in Chile at least) could join them in the same category; if it means multi-class, then the Socialist Party could make a similar claim. The policy of the last Christian Democratic government was basically capitalist in direction, though with a strong mixture of social justice. If the model of the parties in the Popular Unity was opposed to this, as it clearly

was, then was alliance or agreement really possible between the two camps, as Valenzuela argues? Secondly, Valenzuela argues that the fact that the trade unions made economic demands during the Allende years meant that they were reformist and economistic rather than 'revolutionary'. But what sort of demands does he expect trade unions to make, especially when most industrial employment and output remains in private hands? This approach underestimates the extent to which the Chilean working class did intensify its political commitment and radicalism during those years.

Valenzuela's contribution to this series, along with the others, invites argument. No doubt this is the response that the editors hope for. These lively, stimulating contributions to one of the central political problems of the twentieth century deserve to become the focus of the debate on why democracies fail.

St Antony's College, Oxford ALAN ANGELL

Where the Grass is Greener: Living in an Unequal World. By David M. Smith. *Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1979. 386 pp. Pb: £2·25.*

INEQUALITY, in its various forms, is an issue which straddles most of the academic disciplines concerned with the organisation of contemporary human society. David Smith's attempt to offer a 'geographical perspective' goes well beyond the limits of the author's own discipline, drawing on a wide variety of sources in a rapidly growing literature. The book's intended audience is sixth-formers, undergraduates studying geography, and the general reader. It succeeds in meeting the differing requirements of all of these. Written in admirably clear language which avoids the jargon and the superfluous technical complexity of much recent writing on the issue, it nevertheless retains the academic virtues of discipline and care in the use of evidence. For the most part, with the exception of the concluding chapter, it avoids most of the traps into which specialists all too easily fall when writing for a general public.

The book examines inequality at various levels, between nations, within nations, and within cities and smaller communities. At each lėvel, it relies heavily on case studies, both of developed and of developing countries, the former being drawn mainly from the United States and Britain, the latter mainly from Peru. One advantage of this approach is that it enables the reader to examine the characteristics of developed and developing countries side by side, and to consider their similarities and dissimilarities. That is a useful corrective to the current tendency to think that developed and developing countries are so different that there are no common lessons to be learnt. Another useful feature is the inclusion, at each level, of some discussion of the available data from socialist countries, where again similarities as well as dissimilarities emerge.

The author starts by setting the limits of what a geographical appproach can achieve. While he is careful not to pitch his claims too high, he clearly believes strongly that an awareness of spatial relationships is essential to an understanding of inequality. In trying to substantiate that point, he is less successful than in his performance of the descriptive task of the traditional geographer. Again and again, after discussing various measures of inequality in spatial terms, he falls back on human organisation and historical processes as explanations. (It should be said that he is himself clearly aware of the problem, e.g. in his opening discussion of Peru on p. 142.)

Clearly there is a spatial dimension to inequality, if only in the trivial sense that two unequal people cannot occupy the same physical space: and some aspects of inequality may have a spatial explanation, for example, access to services (though not always, as

the author's example of aborigines in Sydney demonstrates). But are the geographer' concepts in general useful for very much more than good description? The autho rejects the traditional geographer's environmental determinism, but in spite c leanings towards Frank's concepts of centre and periphery he does not succeed i putting anything in its place. In the concluding chapter, world inequality is essentiall laid at the door of the villainous multinationals, which may be right, but does nc constitute a particularly geographical insight. So the reader is left hanging.

Nevertheless, at the level of patient collection of evidence in a comparativ framework, which is the book's main value and takes most of its physical space, *Wher the Grass is Greener* achieves what it sets out to do. It is a useful discussion both c what to measure and how to measure it.

JOHN WHITE

World Population Policies: Edited by Jyoti Shankar Singh. *New York: Praeger fo the United Nations Fund for Population Activities. 1979. (Distrib. in UK b Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 228 pp. £11·75.*

AS the Director of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) say in the Foreword, this volume is a compendium of documents which has been collate and published by UNFPA as a service to everyone studiously concerned witl developments and trends in the population field. The field of population, however, i open and vast with many gates and types of activity. Some work is individual, som collective; some areas are intensively tilled, others lie fallow or neglected. In thi context the volume under review represents the output of the rarified atmosphere c the manager's office nestling in one of the lusher meadows. It is all about master plans consultations, trends, checks, policies and budgets on the grand scale—not the sort c thing to enthuse the tillers of the soil. It seems more directed to United Nations an government officials than the man in the field, and it tells them much of what is goin on at top level.

The editor has gathered together several documents prepared by UNFPA an several by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs including the World Population Plan of Action; results of regional consultation subsequent to the World Population Conference (held in Bucharest in 1974); concis reports on monitoring population trends and policies; priorities in the future allocatio of UNFPA resources; and recent trends in international population assistance Together they provide a useful summary of what people at international level thinl about population growth and policies at the macro-scale; their deliberations recommendations and expenditures. For them it is big business. Total annua international assistance for population activities rose from about $2 million in 1960 t $350 million by 1977, when UNFPA, the largest multi-national donor, was operatin at an annual programme level of $100 million. In all this, the United Kingdom is no one of the main donors, contributing only about $7 million in 1977, and is wel outdistanced by the United States, Sweden and Norway, the last of which spends higher proportion of its development assistance programme on population assistanc than any other donor country.

Although the reports contain much interesting and authoritative information, th average reader about population will no doubt find them rather indigestible, referrin as they do to a welter of international conferences and organisations whose initials ar meaningful to the initiated but seem to isolate them from reality. This is perhap reflected in the set of criteria which UNFPA use to allocate their resources: per capit

national income below $400 per annum, and two or more of four demogra threshold levels (population growth 2·75 per cent; gross reproduction rate 2·75; in mortality rate 176; population density 2·2 per hectare of arable land). On this b lists have been established of forty 'priority countries for population assistance' fourteen 'other countries to be given special attention' which, however statistic accurate, manage to exclude Egypt and Zaire altogether; relegate Nigeria Indonesia to the second category; and include six countries said to be in 'Europe, Mediterranean and the Middle East', though none is actually in Europe. One has feeling that the lists will mean more to their creators than to the recipients or n recipients of assistance.

University of Durham JOHN I. CLARK

Appropriate Technology Directory. By Nicholas Jéquier. *Paris: OE Development Center. 1979. 361 pp. £11·00.*

European Community and Acceding Countries of Southern Europe. *Ber German Development Institute. 1979. 168 pp. (Occasional Papers of the G No. 54.) Pb: DM 8.00.*

Government Intervention in the Developed Economy. Edited by P Maunder. *London: Croom Helm. 1979. 226 pp. £9·95.*

Post-Industrial Society. (Proceedings of an International Symposium March 22- 1977 to mark the 500th anniversary of Uppsala University.) Edited by Gustafsson. *London: Croom Helm. 1979. 238 pp. £9·95.*

THE need for new types of technology is obvious—in the less-developed count because traditional technology imported from the West has failed to gene employment and to eradicate poverty on any significant scale; in the advan countries because of the increasing constraints imposed by pollution and exhaustion of natural resources. The question is to what extent these social needs h so far called forth a response on the supply side. Historically, when a new industry (the automobile industry in the first decade of this century, or the micro-electro industry now) emerges, there are many contenders in the field, and a state of disor and apparent confusion reigns until the industry matures and successive shake-o establish a clearly recognised industrial structure. The appropriate, or intermediate. alternative technology movement is at such an early stage. The *Appropri Technology Directory* is a useful guide to the movement. It was compiled by Nic Jéquier, who edited *Appropriate Technology—Problems and Promises* published 1976, also by the OECD Development Center. Compared to some other directori this one has a number of features which enhance its attractiveness. It is published book form; has an index; and the information on the 279 organisations in 79 count is standardised and homogeneous. The directory also takes a fairly broad definitio 'appropriate' technology: low investment cost per workplace, low investment per u of output, organisational simplicity, small scale operations, adaptability to social cultural environments, sparing use of natural resources, or very low cost of the fi output. Because of this, the directory covers not only the well-known instituti working in the field, but also universities, private-sector companies, agricultu research centres, etc. with an interest in the area. There is, however, a major omissi in the directory; the sources of funding for the organisations. Was this because information could not be obtained?

Standardisation and homogeneity are not the strong points of the other thre volumes under review here. Perhaps this is inevitable, given their 'collective' natu (they are collections of individual papers). Personally, however, I am not very happ with the increasing tendency, when faced with a new or uncertain topic, to gather number of papers from individual contributors and make a quick publication out them. This detracts from the painstaking conceptual and empirical background wo which is needed if we are to make real progress in understanding the important issu of the 1980s.

The European Community and the Acceding Countries of Southern Europ consists of eight essays: four on industry, and one each on agriculture, regional polic labour mobility, and the Mediterranean policy. Those in Britain who are appalled b the lack of firm answers concerning the effects of the next round of enlargement will b reassured to find that the serious Germans do not have the answers either. The pape do, however, have the merit of being very frank in their criticisms of existin Community policies and in raising the possibility that membership could have seriou negative effects for the acceding countries. It is refreshing, for example, to read th 'for a short time, priority should be given to the semi-industrialised countries' polici for national industrialisation as against the trade policy interests of the industri countries. The latter should renounce trade-reciprocity . . .' (p. 49). How widesprea are such views in Germany?

Government Intervention in the Developed Economy consists of seven pape dealing with Japan, Australia, the United States, Sweden, Britain, West Germany, an France respectively. The aim of the book is to give the reader 'a better understandin of the style of government in countries with which he is not familiar' (p. 11). The boo is certainly more readable or educational than an official catalogue, such as, fo example, the OECD's *Industrial Policies of Fourteen Countries* (1971), partly becaus many of the chapters give the historical flavour of government policies. However, th challenge of making a systematic comparative assessment is 'to be faced at a late date'.

Post-Industrial Society is based on the proceedings of an international symposiu held in Uppsala in March 1977. There is a paper on 'economic politics and politic economy in China' by Charles Bettelheim, one on 'recent developments in Ea European economics' (economic theory) by Alec Nove, and a brief paper b Wlodzimierz Brus on economic trends in the East and the West—the other, mai stream papers are about the growth of service industries, white-collar employment an the public sector in the industrialised West and in Scandinavian countries i particular. While each of the papers is interesting in its own right, what have they i common? Nothing, it seems, apart from the fact that the authors were present at th symposium. 'If some readers regard this collection of essays as too heterogeneou compared to the title, I can only say that this is an unavoidable, although no necessarily undesirable, side effect of any international symposium on any subject' (7). Apart from an attempt to point at some of the social or sociological implications the growth of the tertiary and the public sectors (by Karl-Gustaf Hildebrand in h paper on 'the new industrial structure—the Scandinavian experience'), the pape concentrate on the causes of the developments, they leave us hungry on the 'so what questions. What is needed is some speculation about the political, economic, and oth implications of the drift towards the post-industrial society, and of their inter-actions.

Chatham House YAO-SU HU

Will the Wells Run Dry? (Report of a Seminar held at the RUSI in conjunction with the British Atlantic Committee in February 1978.) *London: RUSI for the British Atlantic Committee, London. 1979. 80 pp. Pb: £2·50. (£2·00 members.)*

Oil Politics in the 1980s: Patterns of International Co-operation. By Øystein Noreng. *New York: McGraw-Hill for the 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations. 1979. 171 pp. Pb: $5.95. £4·50.*

BOTH books are generally concerned with international co-operation, interdependence and the finite nature of mineral resources. The first book is a report of a seminar at the Royal United Services Institute in February 1978 entitled 'What are the Threats to the Raw Materials of the Atlantic Alliance'. This, in fact, is what the discussion covers, and anyone searching for an answer to the question 'Will the Wells Run Dry?' will be disappointed as the question is not directly addressed, although it is suggested that they will not in the foreseeable future. In addition, speaking generally on mineral resources, Sir Kingsley Dunham refers to those which may not be economic to produce at present but may become so with future technology and values. The book primarily covers the degree to which both mineral and non-mineral requirements of Nato, and probably the rest of the world including COMECON, will be increasingly difficult to meet and rapidly increasing in cost particularly in view of the ceiling on production of oil which will now be reached years before alternatives are developed on a sufficient scale. Geoffrey Chandler, speaking almost a year before the Iranian revolution, illustrates why such a ceiling could be envisaged in the medium term. The effects of the Iranian revolution have merely brought this forward to the immediate future.

In discussing ways to overcome the problem, rapid development of alternatives, greater international co-operation and conservation are put forward. Events of 1979 have taken away the breathing space (but not the need) for the first and both other speakers emphasise the need for more intensive use of energy to produce the basic materials and foods required, making overall conservation more difficult. Thus, although no concrete proposals are put forward, international co-operation, not only in the energy field, is shown to be necessary, to prevent import dependency becoming vulnerability (as outlined by Professor Adler-Karlsson) and to avoid conflict over limited supplies of energy, raw materials and foods.

This theme of international co-operation is developed in detail in the second book, written as part of a series of studies for the United States Council on Foreign Relations. In promoting interdependence and co-operation, the book identifies areas of common ground between oil importers and exporters, which Dr Noreng, a Norwegian, is well placed to do, being able to combine the interests of an OECD consumer and producer country.

The book is well researched and provides a clear explanation of the problems confronting producer and consumer nations. The suggested solution, however, is idealistic and unrealistic. Dr Noreng describes three 'Oil Regimes': the first, now past, a time of low-priced oil, integrated commercial company operations, and a consumers' market; the second a time of fairly high-cost conventional oil, a 'disintegrated' operating structure and a producers' market; the third, a period of very high prices to justify synthetic oil development, with unknown market structure. He describes the collapse of the second oil regime giving three probable causes, one of which seems particularly perceptive remembering that it was written prior to the events of 1979: 'oil producing countries will supply the quantities of oil demanded, but at sharply increasing prices, provoking a new recession in the OECD area' (p. 28).

Dr Noreng proposes a negotiated oil agreement covering oil price and supply, investment of oil revenues in consumer-country energy industries, development of

trade between OECD and OPEC, and transfer of technology to OPEC countries. Besides suggesting that OPEC should expand production to meet the OECD's requirements and allow OECD countries to defer the 'impact of paying for oil' (p. 146), he suggests oil prices increase with demand growth until the level of the cost of substitutes is reached—raising more questions than he answers on the mechanics of such a formula and apparently ignoring the problem of sufficient lead times to develop such alternatives (it could be said that prices of some supplies are currently above costs of alternatives, but the alternatives are not immediately available).

One interesting observation early in the book is the dismal failure of the International Energy Agency (IEA) which, according to the author, was set up 'to solve the energy problems of the OECD countries', 'to mold the OECD countries into an institutional framework controlled by the United States', and 'to preserve the position of United States-based multinational oil companies in supplying OECD countries with oil' (p. 25). Other simple assumptions flawing a study, nevertheless well worth reading, are the presupposition of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the implied virtual freezing of the current status quo—i.e. that OECD countries remain the industrialised consumers; OPEC countries remain non-industrialised suppliers; and LDCs remain less-developed. Although a global solution is sought, to the extent of compounding the almost naïve idealism with 'good reasons for keeping the agreement open to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China', scant attention is paid to the LDCs.

On the positive side, however, Dr Noreng explains thoroughly the development of the problem and the pressing need for some sort of co-operation to stop the spiral of rising prices/economic recession/falling prices. Even more today than when he wrote the book, we appear to have a choice: global agreement or prolonged recession.

ELIZABETH BARRETT

Development and the Problems of Village Nutrition. By Sue Schofield. *London: Croom Helm for the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex. 1979. 174 pp. £8·95.*

Organization for Rural Development: Risk Taking and Appropriate Technology. By Allen D. Jedlicka. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 170 pp. £11·55.*

EACH of these books is concerned with making aids to economic development more effective. Both are based on a great breadth of research and personal experience in less-developed countries. Both focus attention on problem solving within the local community. Each has many sensible ideas which are likely to be of greatest interest to experts in development rather than to laymen.

Sue Schofield's book is based on research conducted as part of the Village Studies Programme undertaken at Sussex. It draws attention to the serious problem of nutritional deficiencies which may be less dramatic than outright starvation but leads to avoidable disease, under performance, and early death on a massive scale. The book argues that a selective approach to improved nutrition by concentrating aid on identified, vulnerable groups, is more efficient than mass coverage of poor populations. To do this requires a reliable way of indicating poor standards of feeding in the villages. The book makes use of a wide range of existing survey material relating to less-developed countries. The adequacy of this methodology is discussed and lessons drawn both for future survey work and for implementing nutritional programmes at a local level.

Despite predictable problems in utilising surveys designed for another purpose to the needs of this study, some important points are clearly made. For example it is shown that the incidence of malnutrition varies among different types of village, at different times of year and among members of the same family. Predictably the book ends with a plea for more information about the nutritional problems of the village community. Whilst problem identification is vital, it is not enough. To improve nutrition requires measures which reach vulnerable groups and individuals. The possibilities are discussed but such steps may be incompatible with existing cultural and social patterns. To impose new values implies confidence in one's own judgment, a confidence which is evident if not always explicit in Sue Schofield's book. It also implies some device whereby doubters may be converted to new ways and the cautious made bold in pursuit of a better life.

Allen Jedlicka's book shares the same assurance about its own underlying judgments but is specifically concerned with how to persuade those who live in less-developed countries to apply 'appropriate' technology. For a work concerned with communication it is sad that it should be so saturated with jargon. Jedlicka argues that the key to the more rapid uptake of appropriate technology is the application of 'humanistic, democratic, participative management', or as he calls it, for short, HDP. He cites a wealth of sociological and management literature and draws upon his own experience to make some telling points. Put rather too simply he seems to suggest that those who advise others should first, listen to them. Only so can they understand the aspirations and constraints which characterise the community they seek to help and, jointly with those involved, establish workable plans in which all parties may have confidence. Jedlicka discusses the role of small groups in transferring technology and includes a thought-provoking chapter on how group decision taking influences the willingness of people to take risks.

For those who can overcome a tendency to make obvious points obscure by using 'scientific' language, there is much to be learned. The book is well organised, excellently printed and rich in bibliographical reference. The relevance of its message will be evident to those who have seen broken machines, misused seeds or mismanaged irrigation in the wake of development programmes. Perhaps its greatest weakness is too little examination of the availability of 'appropriate' technology to be transferred. The scientific institutions which have given rise to the technical advance which has transformed farming all over the world are to an important degree dependent upon the inspiration, energy and determination of key individuals. Such people do not always fit readily into managerial compartments and may not easily participate in humanistic, democratic debate but their contribution is vital.

University of Aberdeen JOHN S. MARSH

Distortion or Development? Contending Perspectives on the Multinational Corporation. By Thomas J. Biersteker. *Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1979. 199 pp. £12·25.*

IN the last two decades both economic and political science have been challenged by the emergence of the multinational corporation (MNC) as a new and strident force in national and international affairs. Our perception of the world economy has been transformed by the operations of a small number of very large businesses whose economic power confers great political strength in their relations with governments particularly in the Third World. Attitudes to the functional role of the MNCs in development have been strongly polarised. Whereas liberal theorists tend to see the

corporation as a positive agent of growth by mobilising resources and acting as the prime vehicle for technological transfer; the dependence theorists argue that MNCs actually inhibit national development: their activities result in capital outflow, inappropriate technology and the perpetuation of inequality. The resolution of this argument though of great practical importance seems unlikely because protagonist and antagonist each work within different paradigms or theoretical perspectives.

However Dr Biersteker's study is an attempt to evaluate these perspectives using Nigeria as a case-study. The first two chapters present a coherent account in propositional form of each of the two 'contending perspectives'. Critical propositions are drawn usually from the work of Cardosa, Dos Santos, Sunkel and Amin. Pro-MNC literature, characterised as 'neo-conventional' is exemplified mainly by the work of Vernon and his associates at the Harvard Business School. In each case, the theory is broken down into 'mechanisms' (i.e. a view of MNC behaviour) and 'first order' (i.e. direct) and 'second order' (i.e. indirect) consequences with respect to aspects of the balance of payments, technological transfer, income distribution and social conflict. In the third chapter there is a confrontation and it is shown how some critical propositions are 'matched' by directly conflicting neoconventional propositions whilst other apparently conflicting propositions are 'mismatched' in the sense of being based on different definitions or categories, a third set of critical propositions are ignored or 'non-addressed' by the neoconventional school. The author shows how important to each school is their view of the counterfactual of how the economy would work in the absence of the MNCs. The critics assume MNC activities would be undertaken by indigenous producers whereas the neoconventional assumption is that indigenous economy is not capable of replacing the MNC. In a later chapter, the author uses the Biafran experience to indicate his preference for the former assumption. These three chapters are well written and provide a clear and concise clarification of the now voluminous literature on the MNC and development.

In the remainder of the book, the author applies his categories and distinctions to the Nigerian case, evaluating and testing a large number of propositions. His argument is mainly based on the results of multiple regression analysis of official survey data of foreign and domestic analysis of official survey data of foreign and domestic firms in representative industries. His use of pooled cross-sectional and time-series data is rather suspect as are some of his operational definitions. Indeed, 'multinational corporation' itself is nowhere defined and seems at times to be synonymous with 'foreign firm'. However, some of his more important conclusions seem to be derivable directly from the data. As might be expected these do not give unambiguous confirmation to one school rather than the other: there are differences in and within industries. Nevertheless, on the whole Dr Biersteker does favour the critical approach to MNCs though he is careful to emphasise that this conclusion flows from his assumption that 'feasible (although not directly comparable) alternatives to multinational investment are present in Nigeria' (p. 157). This condition may not be satisfied in all underdeveloped countries. One critical proposition about MNCs is that their presence encourages the formation of a comprador class with interests allied to those of the MNC itself. Dr Biersteker, in an interesting chapter, discusses this phenomenon with particular reference to the Cement Scandal of 1975. There are other instances where this book illuminates recent Nigerian history as well as contributing to the important problem of evaluating the consequences of MNC investment.

University of Bath E. HORESH

The International Division of Labour and Multinational Companies. Farnborough, Hants: *Saxon House for the Centre for Study and Information on Multinational Corporations (ECSIM), 1979. 152 pp. £8·50.*

AN attempt to cover the role of multinational companies in the creation of a new international division of labour (or the progressive shift in the pattern of economic activities between regions and countries) is a mammoth task for a short book. However, this volume consists of the summary of a symposium organised by ECSIM in Brussels (June 1978) and 'A survey of Alternative Views' by P. K. M. Tharakan, rather than a presentation of new research in the field. Inevitably, the summary of discussions on the 'International Division of Labour and Multinational Companies' is more informative about the discussants than it is enlightening on the issues involved, despite a valiant attempt by John Robinson to organise the individual contributions. The forty-five pages devoted to the Symposium could have been far better used in extending the survey by Tharakan, or presenting a well-researched single point of view on the topic.

Tharakan, in less than a hundred pages, attempts to distil the relevance of the whole of the literature on multinational enterprises to the 'new' international division of labour. It is doubtful that someone not already familiar with at least a portion of the literature could follow the survey. The issues emerge in a disjointed way and not all the most up-to-date literature is included. Tharakan's attempt to divide the theoretical literature into neo-classical, revisionist (neo-technology theories, 'eclectic', and internalisation approaches), radical, and Marxist is interesting but the approach allows little detailed treatment of any of them. Consequently, in some areas only a caricature emerges.

The review of empirical evidence is devoted almost entirely to multinationals in developing countries. It covers the literature on general trends, factor intensity, sourcing policies and offshore production, mechanisms of transfer, and the incentives offered by less-developed countries to multinationals—all in twenty-six pages. The section on sourcing, offshore assembly, and subcontracting is a good, brief, summary of the literature in a relatively under-researched area. A major disappointment, however, is the lack of attention paid to the implications of shifts in production for the advanced countries in view of the recent complementary literature on de-industrialisation.

The final section on costs and benefits of the multinational enterprise and its place in a new economic order does not reach any welfare predictions. The reader is left with the doubt that the problem of defining precisely what is meant by the new international division of labour has been only treated obliquely. Tharakan's conclusion that more studies of multinationals in less-developed countries are necessary seems to be at variance with the feeling, which arises from the literature survey, that a more precise definition of problem areas and improved works of synthesis are necessary to prevent further disintegration of the literature on developments in the international economic order.

University of Bradford PETER J. BUCKLEY

Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. By Anthony D. Smith. *London: Martin Robertson. 1979. 257 pp. £12·00. Pb: £3·95.*

Tides Among Nations. By Karl W. Deutsch. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1979. 342 pp. £13·45.*

THESE two books both have nationalism as their focus; but they are quite different treatments and reflect quite different conceptual notions of nationalism. Karl Deutsch

is primarily concerned with the role of the nation in world society and means of co-operation and integration. Anthony Smith is concerned with nationalism as an expression of identity and as evidence of the upsurge of ethnicity. The two reflect different stages of development in the study of international relations, perhaps different fashions. The nation-state has been the focus of attention and the unit of analysis. International institutions have been regarded as the means of co-operation and integration on the model of a state in which conflicting interests are mediated through controlling institutions. More recently the conflictual problems of international relations have been perceived more as the outcome of internal tensions and demands on authorities, especially demands for recognition and identity springing from ethnicity. ('Ethnicity' is being more and more widely defined to cover group behaviour of which ethnic attitudes are but one case.) The implication is that domestic policies may be more important to international co-operation than international institutions. The state model of central authorities with a controlling capability may have been misleading to international relations: central coercive power may be of no avail if there are identity problems to be resolved. It would follow that international institutes cannot be expected to promote law and order at the international level when the international society comprises state units that attempt to suppress ethnicity claims. These are the issues raised directly and indirectly by these two books.

Deutsch's book is a collection of essays and chapters from books written throughout his long academic career. They are placed in historical sequence so that he can trace the development of nationalism before and after the two world wars; race and national relations and other sources of tension; and attempts at integration. His concluding theme is the need for 'strategies of reconciliation' in order to effect changed patterns of thinking and feeling about world society. He is not wholly optimistic: 'Eventually, with luck, I think reorientation will come.'

Smith, on the other hand, argues that 'cosmopolitan hopes for an early withering-away of nationalism are doomed to disappointment, for they are based on a failure to grasp the importance today of the conjunction of ethnic sentiments, secular ideals and changing elements of modernisation and its social concomitants.' Indeed, as a conclusion he goes further: 'the very attempt to eradicate nationalism actually helps to entrench it further, and to provoke its periodic resurgence.'

Smith includes an extensive bibliography—based primarily on writings on nationalism by International Relations scholars. Others, with different backgrounds, would have focused on the growing inter-disciplinary literature on ethnicity as a human need. What is of interest is that Smith has pointed International Relations in the same direction using International Relations source material. It will be the more persuasive for this reason.

University of Kent at Canterbury J. W. BURTON

Administrative Secrecy in Developed Countries. Edited by Donald C. Rowat. *London: Macmillan for the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Brussels, 1979. (First publ. Paris: Editions Cujas, 1977.) 364 pp. £10·00.*

The Darker Reaches of Government: Access to Information About Public Administration in the United States, Britain and South Africa. By Anthony S. Mathews. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1979. 245 pp. £15·75.*

DONALD ROWAT has edited a collection of essays on administrative secrecy in twelve countries in Scandinavia, West and East Europe, and North America. The author is

clear in his own mind that the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act and the United States's Freedom of Information Act provide the essential yardsticks of comparison for other countries. All the essays, by writers within the country of study, follow a generally comparable framework and they do provide useful information on legal rights of access in the twelve cases. But alas, they seldom rise above summaries of the appropriate legislation, and that hardly provides the basis for genuine comparisons. What is lacking in most of these pages is an explicit analysis of the *context* and *practice* of legislation in each case. Some of the contributions hint at these issues, but in truth, some could almost be government hand-outs. How are we to react to thoughts that, 'Yugoslavia has a self-managing society' (p. 265); that conditions have 'given rise in Belgium to a legal system of ably and carefully measured compromise which is, in short, typically Belgian' (p. 150); or that Hungarians enjoy access to information through 'the constitutional right of citizens to take part in public and political activities' (p. 242)? And how are we benefited by an account of British Parliamentary Select Committees which merely observes that their reports are available to the press and public (pp. 199–200); or an inconclusive passage on the Swedish ruling that documents are accessible only when they are considered to be 'finished' and the matters to which they relate 'finally settled' (p. 36)? In his general survey the editor is aware of the acutely political issues which these essays raise, but he can do no more than mention them. The overall effect, sadly, is that this is not a book of advanced political comparisons so much as the raw material for one.

This cannot be said of Anthony Mathews's excellent study of administrative secrecy in the United States, Britain and South Africa. In a lucid, thoughtful and intellectually impressive book he examines the importance of information and the growth of secrecy in modern politics, he compares the relevant laws of the three societies in an interesting survey of many statutes, and he then sets them in a comparative political context. While not particularly original, this context is nevertheless illuminating and leads him to a conclusion in which he suggests practical reforms. Anthony Mathews is no less committed than Donald Rowat to the benefits of open government, but he argues the issue through. He sees open government as, at best, a partial political virtue, whose achievement is elusive and dependent upon very diverse circumstances and he does not see the greater pressure for disclosure in Western countries as, in itself, evidence of more favourable conditions. If anything, conditions are becoming less favourable, not least because detente (which Rowat assumes is conducive to relaxation of secrecy) has developed hand in hand with an increase in civil violence and undeclared war. Thus news management, heightened intelligence activities, modern technology in the handling of information, and the shroud of secrecy which foreign policy carries with it into the domestic sphere, are all contributing to the conditions out of which openness must somehow emerge and be maintained. Perhaps the most telling point in favour of openness, running as a motif throughout this work, is not that it is an essential prerequisite for democracy, but that it is becoming a prerequisite for more *efficient* government. 'Confidentiality', he observes of Britain, 'is less a pre-condition of effective co-operation than a consequence of it' (p. 181). Quite so.

This book is replete with interesting ideas, but its main thrust is to examine the gap between Britain and the United States on the one hand, and South Africa on the other. South Africa, he says, belongs to the democratic camp 'in the aspirational sense' (p. 7), and indeed its statutes are modelled on, and still similar to, those of Britain. But the practical differences are startling and cannot be explained only by reference to the statutes themselves. True, procedures of classification (probably the most vital aspect of administrative secrecy) are themselves classified in South Africa; true also, it is an official secret under the Republic's Defence Act to know about the forces of any *other*

country. But the chilling reality is hammered home by the South African information scandal, which has resulted not in a lifting or reappraisal of secrecy legislation, but in a large extension of it. In the section in which he tries to suggest politically realistic reforms of each country's information procedures, the author is frankly stumped in the case of his own state. Open government is indeed a delicate flower and well worth the sensitive treatment it here receives.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne MICHAEL CLARKE

LAW

The Creation of States in International Law. By James Crawford. *Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. 1979. 498 pp. £18·00.*

WE are told not once but twice that this is a condensed version of Dr Crawford's doctoral thesis. It must have been some thesis because what remains is a formidable book, not merely in sheer length but in sustained organisation and perception. Here is not only a masterly compilation of state practice and a minutely detailed review of the literature but a thoughtful analysis of one of international law's most perplexing problems. There is hardly a page without some enlightening observation. The intensity of his purpose and of Dr Crawford's style, which no-one could say was over-elaborate, scarcely make this a book to read for pleasure. It is without doubt a book to read for great profit and one which will be in constant use.

In the first section of the book, Dr Crawford argues that statehood is a question of law and not, as has sometimes been claimed, usually by aspirants to statehood, purely a matter of fact. Nonetheless, effectiveness within a territorial area and independence are among the legal criteria. Statehood is objective, that is to say, it is independent of recognition. It is, he says, a claim of right based on a certain factual and legal situation. The claim is to have the benefit of the prerogatives or presumptions of statehood for the government of its territory and its relations with other international legal persons. Dr Crawford examines the application of this conclusion in the next two sections: the 'Creation of States in International Law', by which he principally means consensual independence (which he calls somewhat unhappily, devolution) and secession; and the 'Creation of States in International Organisations', in which he includes the progress to statehood of mandates and trusts and non-self-governing territories. The final section is on problems of commencement, continuity and termination of states.

Dr Crawford's great achievement is to avoid the mechanical operation of a rigid concept of statehood to the diffuse practice and yet, by careful analysis of the situations calling for determination of statehood, to show that there are legal rules which apply to and which explain the practice of the states. He is especially good on the question of secession. There is a very interesting section on legality and statehood, perhaps the area where the most difficult legal problems must be resolved. Dr Crawford must be relieved he finished his book before the Rhodesia question is determined. It is to be hoped that those charged with solving it have a good understanding of the issues which this book so ably canvasses.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

How Nations Behave. 2nd edn. By Louis Henkin. *New York: Columbia University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1979. 400 pp. $31.25, Pb: $8.75.*

WITH the publication of so many new works about various aspects of international law,

it may seem somewhat unusual to review the second edition of a work originally published twelve years ago. When *How Nations Behave* was published for the Council on Foreign Relations in 1968, it was widely regarded as an excellent re-evaluation of the role of international law in the foreign policy decision-making process. The thesis of the book was that both the nature and the extent of the role played by law in influencing the conduct of international relations is frequently misunderstood and hence underestimated by those inclined to take an unduly cynical view of international law. The value of Professor Henkin's book lay not only in its realistic appraisal of the international legal order, delineating the strengths as well as the limitations of international law, but in its lucid style and analysis. Whilst the thesis of the second edition remains unchanged, the new edition merits attention for the considerable revision and expansion contained therein.

Those familiar with the first edition can approach the second expecting to find re-organised and re-titled chapters, with new subheadings and notes. Earlier references have been updated where appropriate. Moreover, the amount of new material which has been provided is substantial. Not only has the author expanded earlier passages and incorporated further examples drawn from the 1970s, but consideration has been given to the by no means insignificant recent changes which have occurred in international society and international law. In this regard, greater emphasis has been given to the continuing emergence of new states in the international political system, the dissatisfaction of these developing states with the traditional international legal order, and the attempt by such states to revise and develop international law. Particular reference is made to issues related to economic sovereignty and development, self-determination, and the elimination of racial discrimination. However, in emphasising the impact of developing states on the international legal order, the interest of developed states in the revision and development of international law is not ignored. In fact, Third-World priorities are juxtaposed with those of developed Western states, such as issues related to international security, human rights, foreign investment, the environment, population control and the dissemination of information. After defining these competing agenda for new law, the author looks into some of these issues in greater detail, devoting fresh chapters to the attempt to establish a new international economic order, the attempt to formulate a new comprehensive law of the sea, and the continuing development of the law governing human rights. In addition, the last part of the book, consisting of case studies of the role of law in shaping decision-making during political crisis, has been supplemented by an analysis of the American involvement in the Vietnam conflict.

The occasional slip is regrettable, such as a reference to the 'Conference on Security and Trade in Europe' (p. 116) rather than its proper title; UNCLOS-III in the past tense (p. 121); and the UN Charter 'outlawing war' (p. 313) rather than proscribing the threat or use of force not legitimised by the well-recognised exceptions. In addition, there is room for disagreement on some substantive points, such as whether Article 2(4) of the Charter 'may have the effect of superceding the laws of war' (p. 140n), and whether, with respect to the concept of anticipatory self-defence, 'the argument is unfounded, its reasoning is fallacious, its doctrine pernicious' (p. 141). Nevertheless, the value of the book clearly overrides any of the foregoing reservations and this new edition should ensure that *How Nations Behave* will continue to occupy a prominent place in the literature of both international law and international relations.

London School of Economics and Coudert Brothers RICHARD KENNEDY GUELFF

HISTORY

Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945. By Robert Dallek. *New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1979. 657 pp. £11·50.*

PROFESSOR DALLEK'S is the first review on this scale of Franklin Roosevelt's work in foreign policy during his entire presidency. It is a large task, admirably carried through, and the book at once becomes the necessary starting-point for any further work. The view is firmly that from the White House, or at least Washington, and the only non-American primary sources used are those in the Public Records Office. But within those limits the range of research is impressive, the author having used the resources of the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park and many other collections, with cosmopolitan understanding. Equally remarkable is Professor Dallek's skill in organising his complicated story. He can strike a phrase—Cordell Hull's 'vindictive evangelism' on behalf of free trade (p. 33) sticks in the mind—but so large are his themes that even a book of this length must be tightly packed. It cannot be made easy reading, but a direct approach and workmanlike prose to match are major assets. Every sentence tells. The empty, the repetitive, the merely apologetic, are not there.

Nor is the *parti pris*, and in the end that is perhaps the great merit of this work. As he must be, Professor Dallek is an admirer of Roosevelt, though by no means an uncritical one; but on the whole he states the facts and lets the reader judge. On this subject that is not common. The recent past is always particularly difficult to judge justly, because it is so intimately linked to our own discontents. We know—or most of us do—that *we* face complex problems with no easy or complete solutions; but ah!—if only our immediate predecessors had been more far-sighted, unselfish, energetic, or courageous, how much easier our situation would be! Because it seems obvious to us what they should have done, we resent them for not doing it, and invent large general explanations for their inadequacy. When the periods in question are as critical as those of the great Depression and the Second World War, this tendency is intensified. Roosevelt, his advisers, and his country, have suffered ingenious but misguided attacks from both Left and Right—each trying to explain what hardly needs explanation other than the force of necessity. Professor Dallek tells us what Roosevelt did, and, so far as the record allows, why he did it, always alert both to the limits of Roosevelt's knowledge and foresight, and to the constraints on him—domestic and foreign. Save on one or two well-known occasions, few men knew better than FDR when, to paraphrase Vice-President Garner, he hadn't got the votes; but he also recognised the different purposes of other world leaders whom he might sometimes influence but could not coerce. Again and again he had to say, as he said to Admiral Leahy about the Polish settlement at Yalta (p. 515), 'it's the best I can do . . . at this time'.

Here and there Professor Dallek may yield too much to modern critics. For example, the argument that Roosevelt, by misrepresenting American-German naval encounters in the period of armed neutrality, sowed the seeds of the misbehaviour of Johnson and Nixon, can be overdone. (Indeed Professor Dallek appears to repent in his concluding summary.) Even he, moreover, cannot always avoid loose ends. Thus, describing de Gaulle's visit to Washington in July 1944 in terms which make clear the deep personal and policy divisions between the two men, he concludes (p. 463), 'Nevertheless, the visit temporarily eased problems with de Gaulle', leaving the reader to wonder how and why. Any reader will find points of detail on which to take issue with Professor Dallek, but any reader who takes issue with the whole will be on the other side of a great divide. The ideologues will certainly regroup and strike again; but for the time being at least, Professor Dallek has recaptured this province for history.

University of Birmingham A. E. CAMPBELL

The First World Disarmament Conference 1932–1933: And Why It Failed. By Philip Noel-Baker. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon. 1979. 147pp. $15.00. £5·00.*

ARTHUR BALFOUR greeted Churchill's publication of a study of the First World War with the words: 'I see that Winston has written a book about himself and called it *The World Crisis*'. Lord Noel-Baker's present work evokes a similar reaction. For though he has had the aid of 'well-qualified students of international affairs' (p. x) and makes occasional reference to primary sources such as Cabinet Minutes, he has certainly not written a book which will be at all widely accepted as a dispassionate contribution to scholarship. It is essentially a memoir that future historians of the World Disarmament Conference will need to evaluate as primary source material.

The present reviewer is struck by two unusual aspects of Noel-Baker's account. One is his belief that during one month in 1932 Great Britain single-handedly prevented the achievement of world disarmament and a guarantee of permanent peace among the Great Powers. For good measure he maintains that the British Cabinet, notwithstanding the existence of six million unemployed in Germany, could by a mere declaration have prevented Adolf Hitler's rise to power. Apparently, all that John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, had to do was to proclaim British endorsement of President Herbert Hoover's arms-control proposals. Instead, in a Commons speech on July 7, 1932, Simon politely launched an alternative plan. Noel-Baker sees this single event as among the most historic the world has ever known. It is an interpretation of monumental Anglocentric eccentricity. For Great Britain, though clearly an important partner in the negotiations, simply did not have so pre-eminent a role as our inverted jingoists supposed. If the British had given unconditional endorsement to the Hoover Plan there is in fact no certainty that they would have been followed by the French (with their insatiable and entirely reasonable appetite for security guarantees which Hoover, of all men, was in no position to arrange); or by the Japanese (then somewhat inconsiderately actually at war in Manchuria); or by the Russians (still adhering to Leninist doctrines on the inevitability of war with the capitalist World). Nor would the Hoover Plan, even if universally accepted, have changed the world to the extent that Noel-Baker imagines. For no arms control agreement can entirely eliminate the role of force from international affairs or guarantee in perpetuity that sovereign states will not come into violent conflict with one another. It is no doubt regrettable that an arms control arrangement could not be reached at Geneva in 1932, but the failure did not, in itself, make the Second World War inevitable. Moreover, success in 1932 would not have made an eventual armed conflict over, say, the future of Abyssinia or Danzig an impossibility.

A second striking feature of Noel-Baker's outlook is his tendency to pillory named individuals for allegedly preventing that total transformation of the international system which he so ardently desires to see. He does not accept that the stubborn survival of armed sovereign states in a condition of 'international anarchy' has profound causes of a largely impersonal character. Instead he implies that the world is in its present deplorable condition because half-a-dozen people—most of whom turn out to be Englishmen personally known to him—did not happen to agree with Noel-Baker in 1932. John Simon, Robert Vansittart and Maurice Hankey are, for example, thought to have been so crucial in preventing the coming of the Reign of Perpetual Peace as each to merit a full chapter of reproofs. Nor does Noel-Baker hesitate to question the integrity of those from whom he differed. 'Two-faced' Simon's conduct did not apparently spring from genuine disagreement with Noel-Baker but because 'at all costs' he 'must remain Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs' (pp. 133, 135). A French friend is quoted as saying that Simon 'seemed to have no principles except the principle to have no principles'. Noel-Baker adds: 'Perhaps that was unfair. For at least

he was guided by the principle that, at every cost, John Simon should remain the Foreign Secretary' (p. 77).

At one point Noel-Baker writes:

> *De Mortuis, nihil nisi bonum.* Do I do right to assault the memory of men who were honest, who believed that they were patriots . . . ? Yes, I do right. It is a duty to the future to tell the truth about the errors, the follies, and the perverted moral values of the hawks' (p. 53).

Whether 'the future' will endorse Noel-Baker's 'truth' about the failure of the World Disarmament Conference seems to this reviewer somewhat less than certain. But his book certainly does serve as a reminder of the absence of a major, up-to-date study of the Conference. With the relevant archives of most of the Great Powers now open, it is to be hoped that some scholar may soon undertake the task.

Polytechnic of North London DAVID CARLTON

Mussolini and the Jews: German-Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy 1922–1945. By Meir Michaelis. *Oxford: Clarendon Press for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London. 1979. 472 pp. £15·00.*

THE question of the Jews in Italy falls into two parts, before and after the formation of the Axis. Historically, and from the march on Rome until the early 1930s, they presented no particular problem. In 1931 they accounted for only one in a thousand out of a population of some 42 million (by the outbreak of the Second World War the influx of refugees from Germany and the Balkans brought their numbers up to around 50,000). They had become completely assimilated into the Italian nation, a number had intermarried with Italians, and several held high posts in the universities and the services. There were even some among the upper reaches of fascism. Supplementary legislation issued in 1930-31 after the conclusion of the Concordat with the Vatican gave Italian Jewry, as by far the largest of the 'admitted cults', a constitution which was praised by some Jewish writers as a model of enlightenment. True, the alleged 'Jewish' associations with Bolshevism and Freemasonry prejudiced some ardent fascists against the Jews; but the few notorious Jew-baiters, Farinacci and the journalists Preziosi and Interlandi, were kept severely in check during the first decade of the regime.

Even after the rise of Hitler, though Italo-German relations became increasingly intertwined, there was at first no question of Italy's following the German model with regard to racial policy. Mussolini was, after all, in those days the 'senior' statesman, preoccupied with preserving good relations at home and with the Vatican and with his Abyssinian and Spanish enterprises abroad. It was not until nearly two years after the conclusion of the Axis Pact that, in July 1938, with his 'Manifesto of the Race' he openly took up a position against the Italian Jews.

Mussolini's conversion to racialism was seen by many commentators at the time as a sudden volte-face, to be explained by his increasing subservience to Hitler or even, more far-fetchedly, as a counterblast to the anti-Italian implications of Hitler's Nordic racial claims. Neo-fascist apologists after the war generally admitted that the persecution of the Jews had been a deplorable error, repugnant to the Italian temperament. Mussolini himself could not have foreseen that that costly error would culminate in the 'final solution' under which 7,682 Italian Jews died in German concentration camps, deported from the Italian Social Republic which by then was under German occupation.

Dr Michaelis himself concludes (p. vii) that 'Mussolini's anti-Semitic legislation, though undoubtedly an Italian variant of Hitler's Nuremberg laws . . . was not the result of *direct* German interference.' His book reconstructs the complex story of indirect German influence in the light of Mussolini's opportunism, a constant thread running right through. This scholarly work is the fruit of fifteen years of research, based largely on unpublished documents in Germany, Italy, England and Israel. The Appendices include one on the controversial subject of Pope Pius XII and the Third Reich. There is a very full bibliography covering unpublished and published documents, diaries and memoirs, and secondary sources. Among the latter are, of course, several books by English historians dealing with Axis relations. But no book in English has so far dealt in such detail with Italian Jewry under fascism, and students of the subject will find it and its wealth of documentation very valuable.

MURIEL GRINDROD

SECOND WORLD WAR: ITS ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH

The Advent of War 1939–40. By Roy Douglas. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 167 pp. £8·95.*

ONE of the virtues of this book is the author's choice of period. Many other studies deal with the origins of the Second World War down to September 1939 as one continuum and the progress of the war thereafter as another. But Dr Douglas bestrides the two, taking as what he terms his 'markers' the demise of official appeasement in mid-March 1939 and the genuine commitment to all-out war in mid-May 1940.

From many points of view this makes good sense. It highlights, for example, the attempts made first to contain and then to defeat Hitler by a series of diplomatic manoeuvres and thus reveals the direct line from the somewhat ambivalent effort to form an eastern alliance, including Russia, to the rather half-hearted bid to exploit the Finnish-Soviet war as a means of bringing Norway and Sweden into the fray. Logically, perhaps, Dr Douglas's narrative should have included the fall of France; but the invasion of the Low Countries certainly reduced the supply of potential allies to virtually nil and put paid to this particular aspect of British policy.

From another point of view the choice of period makes even better sense. Dr Douglas's concern is as much with the politicians as with the policies, with the gradual retreat of Neville Chamberlain and the eventually dramatic rise of Winston Churchill, on whose coming to power his book ends. His reconstruction of the intimate politics of these intriguing months is thorough and informative, and includes the influence of the Chiefs of Staff. To produce it he draws fully on the Cabinet and Foreign Office files of the time and on the main collections of private papers.

Unfortunately, his book remains essentially an account; the 'Advent of War' is an accurate title. The final chapter contains a useful analysis of British behaviour in particular, but many demanding questions are avoided. A phrase such as 'one may now speculate idly . . .' (p. 54) is not untypical.

Unfortunately, too, Dr Douglas concentrates just a little too much on Britain, or at least on British sources. To evaluate British policy it is essential to look rather more closely at the policies of other states and, in doing so, to avoid relying over much on British political and diplomatic papers. Particularly concerning alliance negotiations there is now quite a lot of accessible European materials. Yet in the end, his account is basically sound, readable and brief.

University of Glasgow WILLIAM V. WALLACE

Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939–1945. By R. J. Moore. *Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. 1979. 152 pp. £7·50.*

THIS is a pleasantly written and attractively printed little book, and is practically worthless. It is unsatisfactory in its conception, amateurish in its basis of research, and often muddled or banal in its judgments.

Anyone who has read the published documents on *The Cripps Mission* in *The Transfer of Power* series will find that much of the central portions of this new monograph amount to little more than a summary of material from that earlier volume, the one additional source of value being the diary of R. G. Coupland, who was in Delhi during Cripps's visit in 1942. For the rest, what the reader is offered is, in essence, a series of simplistic assertions or statements by implication. Within the British government of the time, for example, Churchill and the Conservatives are lumped together as being on one side of the constitutional argument over India, Cripps, Attlee, Bevin and their Labour Party colleagues on the other. The differences and tensions between the Prime Minister and his Secretary of State for India, Amery; Attlee's suspicions and hesitations over those wealthy Indian industrialists—a 'brown oligarchy'—whom he feared might come to dominate a Congress regime; the view of Churchill as 'a disaster' over India taken by Halifax from the Washington embassy; the strong differences of opinions within the Washington administration and State Department over the role the United States could or should seek to play on the matter; the dilemma and wide variation of opinion among Indian nationalists concerning the Second World War: all these might never have existed. Bose, for one, receives not a single mention in the book.

Had the author glanced at some of the remaining relevant sources, he might conceivably have been able to come within hailing distance of the subject, at least. In Britain, no use appears to have been made of, for example, the private papers of Halifax, Cherwell, Dalton, Dorman-Smith, Attlee, P. J. Grigg, Kingsley Martin or Leonard Woolf; the material contained in the Prem. 3 and 4 files in the Public Record Office seems to have been ignored; even, it appears, the entire unpublished papers of the Viceroy in 1942, Linlithgow, have not been used, as important marginal notes by him figure in the book only where they have been printed already in *The Cripps Mission* volume.

As for considering the relevant factors beyond the Whitehall-India axis, and especially the interplay of pressures across the Atlantic which helped bring about the Cripps mission, the author's basis for his thoroughly inadequate presentation amounts to no more than the documents published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes, the standard biography of Harry Hopkins and, again, *The Cripps Mission*. Even if the focus is kept on London, the strong disagreements within official circles over the American element in the India equation are again entirely missing: in this respect, no use has been made of the papers of the Foreign Office's North American Department, nor of the Interdepartmental Committee on American Opinion and the British Empire. Officials in Delhi who had a special concern for such matters are ignored, Olaf (now Sir Olaf) Caroe being another who receives no mention at all.

There is clearly little point in taking up more of the journal's space by going on to discuss the judgments offered in so slight and superficial a book. One question, however, does force its way to the fore. What exactly are the criteria for publication currently employed by the Clarendon Press, a house whose name one had always taken to be synonymous with quality, not least of the scholarly kind?

Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study CHRISTOPHER THORNE

Churchill and Eden at War. By Elisabeth Barker. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 346 pp. £7·95.*

POLITICIANS' reputations, like those of writers and composers, tend to rise or fall as the perspective of history lengthens. Few remain constant. When the achievement and personality are as massive as Churchill's, they stand up pretty well to sniping by assorted generals, politicians and medicos. The reputation of Anthony Eden, a slighter figure in both respects, and over-shadowed by the tragedy of Suez, is a good deal more vulnerable. However, Elisabeth Barker rightly remarks that one must dismiss the simplistic view that, because of Churchill's dominant position and prestige, Britain's wartime foreign policy, in effect, was Churchill's policy. It is quite clear that Eden sometimes dissented from Churchill, as did other members of the War Cabinet—Attlee, Bevin and Chandos, for example. It is equally clear that Churchill did not always get his way, though he usually put up a long delaying action before yielding.

It was in his relations with de Gaulle and on policy towards the Free French and Vichy that Eden most often differed from Churchill. In many ways this section of the book—about one third—is the most interesting. The author describes in detail Churchill's progress from general, though limited, support for de Gaulle to extreme exasperation and readiness to throw him over. Eden was generally more tolerant towards de Gaulle, supported by the Foreign Office, which was looking ahead to the need for a strong and friendly France in the postwar era. Eden was able, with the support of the War Cabinet, to restrain Churchill from a complete breach with Free France; but unable to overcome American resistance—prolonged beyond the bounds of reason—to full recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation, partly because Churchill was unwilling to embarrass his 'great friend'. In summing up these matters, the author poses the question whether Churchill was not right in thinking that a tough line with de Gaulle was sometimes necessary. Eden himself is quoted to the effect that de Gaulle's behaviour had improved considerably after one occasion, in 1942, when strong measures were applied (p. 55). She argues also that Churchill has not been proved exactly wrong in his judgment that a postwar France dominated by de Gaulle would probably be anti-British. Not every reader, therefore, will agree with the final conclusion that 'this (Anglo-French) relationship shows Eden and the Foreign Office at their best, Churchill at his worst' (p. 97). But the author supplies ample material on which to base a judgment.

The two other sections of this book are less interesting, in the context of Churchill and Eden, simply because they differed less often on most other issues. In the last section, Miss Barker covers fairly familiar ground in discussing Anglo-Soviet relations, demonstrating that Eden was sometimes ahead of Churchill in the pursuit of an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement—for example, in relation to Soviet territorial demands in 1942, and a 'working arrangement' for the Balkans in 1944. Churchill in fact came to similar conclusions fairly quickly. Both men were over-optimistic at times in their hopes for lasting amity, and their belief, for a time, that Stalin could be won over to friendship with the West.

The middle section of the book, dealing specifically with Churchill, Roosevelt and Eden, is perhaps the least satisfactory. Anglo-American relations pervaded virtually all aspects of foreign policy, so the division is a little artificial: in practice this section deals mostly with Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, with surprisingly little on Anglo-American policy towards Germany: Eden's main function here was usually to check Churchill's tendency to kow-tow too much to Roosevelt.

This is an interesting and useful book, though one would have preferred less narrative and more analysis of the relationship. The author throws out a number of interesting questions at the beginning, in the middle and at the end of this book, which she is clearly well-equipped to answer—but, in fact, does not very fully.

University of Reading KEITH SAINSBURY

Mobilizing Women for War: German and American Propaganda 1939–1945. By Leila J. Rupp. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1979. 243 pp. £7·90.*

'THE United States succeeded in mobilizing its women while Germany did not'. Why this was so, is the subject of Leila Rupp's fascinating study. Its relative brevity has nothing to do with any paucity of information, but is instead, the product of a lucid style and an admirable organisation of her material. Her research is first-rate, and clearly original in those sections dealing with the pre-war debate in the Nazi party and its press upon 'woman's place' in Germany, and the 'selling' of the war to American women by the Office of War Information (OWI). The graphs, tables, and illustrations—which include that archetype of Amazonian cuteness, 'Rosie the Riveter'—are relevant and illuminating.

American women were mobilised belatedly, reluctantly and none too efficiently, after the existing pool of unemployed proved inadequate to meet the needs of the military and war production. Reflecting Hitler's war preparations, the total number of women in the civilian labour force was higher in Germany than the United States in 1940. But from 1940–44 the female labour force in the Reich increased by only one per cent, although constituting throughout the period, a greater *proportion* of the civilian labour force than did American women. The reason for this, as Professor Rupp shows, was the disproportionate burden of agricultural labour which fell upon German (and Russian) women. The remarkable *rate* of increase of 'Rosie's' share in the civilian labour force in 1941–45 resulted in a 32 per cent rise in the number of American women working, with commensurate increases in their participation rate (the percentage of *all* American women over fourteen who worked). The statistic which altered most dramatically for German women was the proportion which they comprised of the *German* civilian labour force; or to put it another way, the overall force declined, and conscripted German males were replaced, not by German women, but by 'foreign labour'.

The comparisons and contrasts—including the ironies—between the organisation, nature and effectiveness of American and German mobilisation propaganda are excellently detailed and analysed by Professor Rupp. She concludes that 'propaganda in both countries was less important in persuading women to take war jobs than it was in adapting public images (of women) to the wartime situation without challenging basic assumptions about women's roles in society'. The prewar assumption, she convincingly suggests, was that 'the ideal woman in both countries was above all a mother with duties and functions radiating from this central role'.

Thus Rosie 'was always a housewife in the public image'. Her cosmetic grease-smear could be wiped away with skin-cream from Ponds, whose advertisements saw her as 'adorably pretty, adorably in earnest about her war job'. The OWI discovered not only that 'women can stand a lot and actually they are workers by tradition', but that the 'poor are more willing to take a war job than the prosperous'. Clearly the government 'paid no attention to women already employed', those who had to and would have to work. The 'new woman' was a temporary phenomenon. For public consumption, the 'Janes who make the Planes' could still wear their hair *à la* Lake, until the War Manpower Commission prevailed upon Veronica to change her *coiffure* (presumably to prevent her devotees from being yet further pinned-up, this time by a rivet-gun). Rosie, it was understood by all, was there 'only for the duration'. 'Do the job he left behind', the poster exhorted. And when he came back?

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

Stalin Embattled 1943–1948. By William O. McCagg, Jr. *Detroit, Mich: Wayne State University Press. 1979. 423 pp. $18.95.*

THE lack of a responsible Soviet perspective amongst the mountain of historiography upon the Second World War and the origins of the cold war, has long been evident. What we have known of Soviet policy in relationship to these events has been a compound of the fragmentary, the dogmatic, the inferred, the impressionistic and the outrageous. Professor McCagg's superb study is, in my view, the first attempt to get inside the skin of the Soviet political system during the period and to provide an integrated analysis of its decision-making process in the light of Soviet perceptions of *then*-prevailing domestic and external stimuli.

His basic methodology, founded upon a clear awareness of the importance in studying this period, of accurate chronology, is supplemented by remarkable linguistic gifts, and assiduous original research into contemporary, as well as latter-day Soviet and East European sources. A talented writer and a courageous and provocative historian, McCagg has thrown down a gauntlet to the champions of *all* simplistic interpretations of Soviet behaviour.

This eulogy is very much a 'second revised edition', and I remain an admirer of, rather than a total convert to his findings. McCagg's study requires, if not more than one reading, at least one slow, painstaking, notetaking reading. His arguments could have been presented more cogently, the contents of the book might have been more rigorously organised, while a few extra pages given over to an 'easy-reference' chronology would not have come amiss. Moreover, given a subject and an analysis of great complexity, where a large body of evidence has been relegated to footnotes, the publishers ill serve their author by compressing these into over seventy, tightly printed pages at the end of the work, rather than providing them in the text.

Paul Winterton wrote, with specific reference to this period of Soviet history, that 'there are no experts upon Russia, merely varying degrees of ignorance'. Space forbids me to detail the areas where, even from relative ignorance, I would still challenge Professor McCagg on points of fact and of interpretation, or where I think loose-ends and contradictions have been cosmetically obscured. Even without the handicap of a short review, I would doubt the profitability of such a 'localised' approach. On a 'global' scale McCagg's theses cannot be refuted, nor need they be. Those who find comfort in the conventional wisdoms will ignore his work. Those, who, like myself, have been both stimulated and educated by his monumental achievement, will be grateful, when attempting to rebuild, that Professor McCagg has provided such extensive foundations and so much of the bricks and mortar.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

The British in Germany: Educational Reconstruction after 1945. Edited by Arthur Hearnden. *London: Hamish Hamilton. 1978. 335 pp. £8·50.*

A NUMBER of papers, mainly memoirs by former officials of the Education and Religious Affairs Branch of the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany, were presented to a conference held in Oxford in 1975. These, amalgamated with specially researched British and German contributions, useful appendixes and an excellent glossary, constitute the present volume. The end-product can only be welcomed by those with a current interest in Germany under quadripartite occupation, and I suspect that in the longer term this study will also be an important source for any brave scholar, who can spare a decade to write the definitive multi-volume history of *Deutschland unter Allies*.

Such judgment is assayed, because this collection of papers performs two important functions. It provides new material upon that shamefully neglected topic, the administration of the British Occupation Zone of Germany; and it offers insights into 'the German Question' from a perspective, which too often has been ignored, that of a unique form of public administration. Viewed from this angle, we are presented with a detailed picture of the Occupational hazards encountered by a large sector of, what was to all intents and purposes, Germany's Ministry of Education.

'I think that we may ignore the Education Committee of the Control Council' (p. 47). This is the stark opinion of the first Educational Adviser to the British Military Governor, on the degree of inter-allied synchronisation in educational reconstruction policy. In this area, as in most, if not all, of the initial arousals of the German body-politic, the heterogeneous zones were stimulated to divergent responses by the national proclivities of the four occupying powers. In the British Zone, a small but dedicated band of Education Control Officers and Youth Officers tackled stupendous material destruction, exacerbated by dislocation, shortages and the intellectual and moral wasteland produced by Nazi rule and military defeat.

'The three Rs', one ECO recalls, 'would have made more progress had the three Ps been available—pens, pencils and paper' (p. 76). They 'denazified' the teachers, which left them a profession with an average age of sixty years, trying to teach average classes of seventy pupils, while by autumn 1946, 'not one new teacher had been trained' (p. 139). They 'democratised' textbooks, and faced the partisan issues of confessional schools and comprehensive education. Youth work, vocational training, administrative decentralisation, and adult education, all provided further headaches. The 'high priests of mysticism' (p. 293), the professors, caused most university reform to founder.

The contributors chart their successes and failures in all these spheres of educational reconstruction, eschewing 'the horrible word "re-education"' (p. 46). Unsurprisingly, they remain divided in their overall assessment of the results of the British approach. Was it 'one of remarkable vision', or one 'lacking any concept of change'? (pp. 43, 281). This does not, of course, exhaust the conclusions at which future historians might arrive.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

WESTERN EUROPE

The European Parliament and the National Parliaments. Edited by Valentine Herman and Rinus Van Schendelen. *Teakfield, Farnborough: Saxon House. 1979. 304 pp. £9·50.*

The Future of the European Parliament. By David Coombes. *London: Policy Studies Institute. 1979. 136 pp. (PSI Studies in European Politics, I.) Pb: £3·95.*

THE fact of direct elections to the European Parliament opens, or re-opens, a number of debates. Two are indicated by the titles of these books: the nature and functions of the Parliament itself, and the relationships between the two parliamentary levels. The books themselves are very different in nature. That edited by Herman and Van Schendelen is in essence a print of papers given at a Workshop in April 1978; Coombes's is the result of his own exploration. The origin of *The European Parliament and the National Parliaments* marks the book: it remains a collection of individual essays. As one of the editors remarks 'the lack of a common approach or

framework makes it impossible to make a comparative evaluation' (p. 279) of findings. Moreover, because of its shape there is unevenness. There is a chapter on 'Labour in Europe', but it is the only party thus treated. The Danish system of generalised parliamentary control of government alone is examined. Perhaps, as the extreme, there is justification, yet one would have preferred the extreme to be put in context. There is an attempt to systematise: the first part looks at the issue from the standpoint of the European Parliament, the third from that of national parliaments; the second attempts to look both ways—but is limited to Dutch and Irish experience. Yet within this framework other (and useful) matter is slotted in—such as the article on Committees in the European Parliament, and one which is a synthesis of treatment of Community matters in national parliaments. A great deal of the material is the result of questionnaires and interviews. No doubt it is useful to know what the actors think they are doing, yet the end result tends to be descriptive of attitudes and thus to be light on substance. Hence it tends to be interesting but perhaps of limited value in formulating proposals for what should be. This is apparent, for example, in the survey of the scrutiny of Community legislation in the United Kingdom. It might have been more helpful to examine more closely the substance and utility of the Reports coming from each House—why, for example, those from the Lords are generally worth reading and why so many from the Commons are almost a fraud on the purchaser. Certainly there are some general conclusions that stand out, and in particular that the virtues of the dual mandate are greatly exaggerated. It will be interesting to observe the progress of the 125 Members who have retained that mandate, a number substantially higher than here predicted. Equally the book emphasises elements which are important to bear in mind—that for example 'The European Parliament has neither been the cause of, nor the beneficiary of, changes in the general shift of powers from the national to the European level' (p. 272). Undoubtedly the book is useful, as a background to thought, but it is clearly not a full treatment of the subject-matter designated by its title.

The Future of the European Parliament, on the other hand, has the advantage of being one man's work. He does not define what the future of the European Parliament should be, but, in a relatively short compass, sets out many of the theoretical considerations which could govern that future. In particular he discusses (though briefly) the contemporary role of surrounding Parliaments and rightly distinguishes between a parliament and a legislature. He makes other points which are important such as (p. 110) that the simple educative role of the new Parliament should not be too easily accepted, but that powers are essential to legitimacy. There are occasional inconsistencies. At page 86 we are told, 'It is the principle of responsible government therefore, and not that of parliamentary supremacy, that is central to the idea of parliamentary democracy.' Yet elsewhere (p. 104) he commends the model of Congress. There is perhaps much to be gained from a study of Congressional behaviour, but the inconsistency is there. No government is responsible to Congress, and probably a weakness of the existing powers of the European Parliament would militate against the real efficacy of using the behavioural pattern of Congress. Such are minor matters. The quality of the book is a reasonableness. It draws upon a substantial body of literature and presents argument clearly and succinctly. If there is no great originality of thought, present circumstances are to blame rather than the author. What he has done is to present clearly lines upon which the reader could start to think about the new-born institution, not least its members.

University of Edinburgh J. D. B. MITCHELL

Political Parties in the European Community. Edited by Stanley Henig. *London: Allen and Unwin for the Policy Studies Institute. 1979. 314 pp. £10·00. Pb: £4·95.*

In 1969 Henig and Pinder edited *European Political Parties.* A decade later, under the same auspices, Henig has edited *Political Parties in the European Community.* The section dealing with the European (i.e. transnational) dimension has been expanded, while Austria, Scandinavia (except Denmark) and Switzerland have been dropped—which goes to show that the Common Market is not only affecting what we may eat and the weight of lorries that may drive on our roads, but even what we can conveniently teach in comparative politics courses. The party systems of Austria and Sweden have features (the success of socialist parties, for example) which it is a pity to lose.

The other difference is that the new volume is some 250 pages shorter, which allows a reasonable paperback price, though the £3·25 for its 565-page hardback predecessor illustrates the rate of inflation only too well. The slimmer size does not mean short value as regards contents. The 1969 book covered the historical background and the student should still refer to it for that: it is now complemented rather than replaced. Its purpose is to recount the party political history of the last decade and update relevant information. The prime focus, says the editor, is the operation of each party system, its interaction with the electoral system and its impact on government in the countries concerned. It also examines the way in which parties are gearing themselves to European integration.

Although we already have good accounts of party systems in books dealing with the government and politics of particular European countries and a few works on the party system of a single country, the present volume will be found very useful—not only because of its handy format but also because of the standard of its contents. Some of the contributors are carried over from 1969: Steed on France, Chubb on Ireland, Allum on Italy, Henig on the UK; new names are equally well known: Lorwin on Belgium, Burkett on Germany, Daalder on the Netherlands.

As Henig notes in his Conclusion, only Germany and Ireland among the European Nine have avoided any change in the broad contours of their party system over the last decade. The changes are not the same, however. Belgium and the United Kingdom have seen the emergence of national parties dedicated to federalism, if not the break-up of their unitary states. New 'radical' parties have had an impact in Denmark and the Netherlands. In France and Italy changes in the configuration of parties have been overshadowed by relatively stable alignments which have, however, posed questions about the ability of these systems to ensure the democratic alternation of governments (as the issue is seen by some) or whether liberal democracy can survive if the other side wins (as the issue is seen by others). The last decade provides not only new material but also new trends and new problems. Individual chapters can, therefore, be read to complement study of the countries concerned, or the book as a whole used as background to more comparative courses. The Conclusion usefully draws attention to matters of general interest.

While the selection (and exclusion) of countries shows that the book is partly intended for European (i.e. Community-based) programmes of study, it brings together a set of countries that also makes it a more fruitful base for comparative politics courses than some volumes which range around the world. The countries of Western Europe are comparable in many ways: they are liberal democracies with many similar socio-economic characteristics and many problems in common. At the same time, they have distinctive historical traditions and thus rather different political cultures: their party systems, for historical and other reasons, are also dissimilar; different political problems face them (e.g. democracy versus communism, unitary state versus

federalism). Variations in party systems and their operation are surely more amenable to explanation through comparison if some of the environmental factors, at least, are constant.

My only concern about the use of textbooks such as this, with their accounts of party and electoral developments up to the time of publication, arises from reservations about the pedagogic value of teaching current events in such detail. It really is very difficult to explain to students how, for example, French conservatives, radicals and Christian Democrats have grouped and regrouped, or the bewildering array of meaningless party labels which French parties use to disguise themselves. It is equally difficult, taking another example, to trace the shifting membership of coalitions in Italy, even though changes at the margin have been important for the formation of governments. Too much time is easily spent in this way and students, who prefer to note 'facts', may as easily get bogged down by such details when they should be trying to understand the significance of trends or discussing the practical political questions they pose.

But my hesitation is more fundamental. Because political science is not a vocational subject, most graduates fail to update later in life the sort of knowledge contained here. My feeling, indeed, is that they do not in later years read even those new books on European countries which fall between the categories of academic popularisation and quality journalism. The danger, therefore, is that the information they acquire as undergraduates, in so far as it is remembered at all, will be what they carry through life—so that, if for some reason they think about France, Germany or Italy, it will be in terms of outdated facts and ossified pictures. In which case, courses on European politics might do better to emphasise history rather more (that, at least, cannot change) or concentrate on the discussion of political, as distinct from political-science, issues as a training of the mind.

This slight scepticism about the value to students of such study as Henig's volume entails in no way detracts from its intrinsic merits. It hardly needs a favourable review, anyway: its convenient format will establish it as a standard text.

University of Liverpool F. F. Ridley

Eurocommunism: Myth or Reality? Edited by Paolo Filo della Torre, Edward Mortimer and Jonathan Story. *Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1979. 359 pp. Pb: £1·95.*

Eurocommunism: The Italian Case. Edited by Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartori. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1978. 196 pp. $10.75. Pb: $4.75.*

The trickle of books on Eurocommunism has at last turned into a flood and two books under review here are but a small part of the whole. Unfortunately publishing has lagged behind to the extent that the prospect of a communist party going into government in Western Europe has receded into the infinite future. This immediately raises one contrast between these books. The first, and ostensibly least academic of the two books under review, is the most analytic and stands far enough back from events to permit some perspective, whereas the Ranney/Sartori book, with its impressive line-up of professors, is pervaded with a sense of 'something imminent' (which never comes).

Eurocommunism: Myth or Reality? is probably, for the general reader, the best book yet on the phenomenon of the 'new' West European communism and the Editors are to be congratulated on the balance and range of the work. There are three parts to this study and a short editors' conclusion. In Part One Arrigo Levi analyses

the term 'Eurocommunism' and Neil McInnes reviews the history of West European communism in some thirty pages. This chapter is an excellent introduction to the evolution of communism and will no doubt be a reference for teaching purposes; it is a pity that it stops at the end of the 1960s. Part Two contains chapters on the Italian, French, Spanish and Portuguese Parties as well as a stimulating essay by Stuart Holland on Eurocommunist economics. More is available in English on Italy and France than on Spain and Portugal or on that much neglected aspect of communism, economics—so this part is particularly to be welcomed. Part Three is devoted to international aspects of Eurocommunism in chapters on the Vatican's response, the American response, and the challenge which 'Eurocommunism' presents to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The reservation, however, must be made by this reviewer, that the conclusion overestimates the homogeneity of 'Eurocommunism' and tries to pin down the essence of the phenomenons although this remains remarkably elusive.

The second book is devoted to the 'Italian case' although the international referents come thick and fast. The book, which is the product of a conference, is divided into four parts. Part One deals with the 'opening to the left' in Italian politics of the 1960s: a policy which shows some similarities to contemporary problems (some valid, some not). In this part there are contributions on American as well as Italian domestic politics. Part Two, probably the best section of the book, is an analysis of communism in today's Italy in its electoral, societal, and strategic-philosophical aspects. This material is well-known but it is well stated although there are conflicting implications which are not drawn out. Part Three analyses the current political situation in Italy and its three chapters are by Italian politicians (one a Christian Democrat, one a Communist). Part Four is a kind of conclusion in which Henry Kissinger and Giovanni Sartori peer into the future and try to assess the implications of Italian developments. This part is particularly weak and shows every sign of having been hastily put together, the overviews which these two authors present are too generalised, they conflate the different Western Communist parties, and have the appearance of *obiter dicta*. However the Kissinger statement has since become very well known and is worth reading for that fact.

University of Leeds DAVID SCOTT BELL

Economic Politics of the Common Market. Edited by Peter Coffey. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 212 pp. £12·00.*

THIS book examines most of the important economic policy areas of the European Community. The eight chapters on agricultural, industrial, social, fiscal, trade and monetary, transport, regional, and energy policies provide the reader with a basic theoretical introduction to each policy area followed by a description of what constitutes Community policy in each case. As such it is a useful textbook for students of the Community's economic policy and a good starting-point for those wishing to study the individual policies in greater depth. In the case of the more complex policy areas such as trade, agriculture and industrial policy the inevitable generalisations are compensated by discussions of the direction in which the contributors feel the Community's policy should go. The chapters on transport, regional, and energy policy are comprehensive in their coverage but this is more a reflection of the relatively underdeveloped nature of Community policies in these areas than a criticism of the more ambitious chapters on trade and industry.

In many cases the accomplished combination of theory with a description of Community practice enables the student to understand the role of the Community in

these areas of economic policy, provided he is acquainted with the basic textbooks in the field. One area not covered in the various contributions is the impact of the differing national economic structures—apart from a rather abstract treatment in the chapter on trade and monetary policies. Community policy has always been, and is likely to continue to remain, dependent on the interplay of differing national approaches to economic policy and the reader will have to augment his reading, by drawing on further works which discuss the role of the different national positions in each field, if he is to understand why Community policies have developed as they have. This is of particular importance in the areas of trade, industrial, regional, and social policies. If the Community is to move towards an open non-protectionist policy rather than supporting ailing industries, an objective the contributors fully support, the Community must attempt to break out of the immobilism which presently reigns supreme in this area. In order to do so a compromise must be found for the divergent national policies which are presently blocking any progress towards a Community policy.

Chatham House S. WOOLCOCK

Welfare and Efficiency: Their Interactions in Western Europe and Implications for International Economic Relations. By Theodore Geiger. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 149 pp. £12·00. Pb: £4·95.*

THE unprecedented growth of international trade in the postwar world made possible two other features of modern Western economies. The expanded market helped to sustain high growth rates for the nations and this, in turn, supported a rapid expansion of welfare services which came to form part of a general, and steady, improvement in living standards. The argument of this book is that there are now signs that this trend is in danger of killing the goose that has laid such golden eggs for there comes a point at which 'too much' welfare adversely effects economic efficiency and this in turn reacts upon a state's international trading position. To counteract this effect governments are resorting to devices, such as exchange-rate manipulation or subsidies to exporting industries which themselves help to destroy the international system which is a necessary precondition for welfare.

Of course, in recent years the international economy has experienced other hard knocks. These include the recession, the constant OPEC price rises and the competition of rising industries in Latin America and the Far East. All over Northern and Western Europe textiles, shipbuilding, steel, and footwear are in decline and are having government monies poured into them. But of all the factors impeding a reconstruction of the international economy Professor Geiger considers welfare to be the biggest villain.

Welfare in this sense is a very broad term. It includes not only health, and social security, housing and educational services but subsidies to agriculture and industry as well as legally required benefits which fall on private industry such as redundancy pay and paid holidays. Also included are the implications of industrial democracy.

Welfare demands growth in government expenditure and in a bureaucracy to administer it. Whether we are considering transfer payments, services in kind, industrial subsidy or forms of public ownership the effect is the same—namely, the growth of the non-market sector which can now account for half of the gross national product. This sector requires money which can only come from business activity and from individuals, but this necessity brings about a new set of problems. The removal of profits and business incentive means less investment and lack of innovation; high individual taxation brings loss of the work ethic. More lame ducks and more

unemployment result which require more subsidies, benefits and retraining and thus more taxation which brings. . . .

The balmy days of the 1960s allowed other expensive ideas to get a hold in the form of distributional socialism. This brought the argument for the natural right to a civilised existence irrespective of an individual's contribution to production and pushed new ideas about industrial democracy. In its most radical form of worker control this would transform the nature of the Western economy by breaking any remaining link with profitability but its rigidities would require considerable protection against the rigours of international competition. Such trends are discernible in all six of the countries studied (Sweden, Britain, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway) although with individual variations, and from the mid-1970s all have been making attempts to bring the non-market sector under some sort of control. However, the three beneficiaries of the North Sea are finding it the most difficult to pull in the reins.

Professor Geiger has to determine when the interaction between welfare and efficiency is positive and when negative. He believes that much welfare has the former effect but that at some point it becomes counter-productive and to determine when this stage has been reached he has in mind the use of criteria such as tax rates, productivity growth, subsidies, rate of investment in the market sector and level of unemployment.

Unfortunately it is not self-evident that we all agree on what constitutes a positive or negative welfare/efficiency relationship, upon the right balance to aim for or the methods to achieve it. His point that we are only beginning to think about welfare in this way and lack basic information to develop the concept of the interaction is well-founded. In the absence of such knowledge, of hard definitions of 'welfare', 'efficiency', the 'international economy', the 'liberal idea' and so on many of his points can be no more than interesting speculation.

University of Leeds DOREEN COLLINS

International Labour Migration in Europe. By Robert E. Krane. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 250 pp. £15·25.*

Trade in Place of Migration: An Employment-Oriented Study with Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain and Turkey. *By U. Hiemenz and K. W. Schatz. Geneva: International Labour Office. 1979. 118 pp. Sw. frs. 17.50.*

THE migration of labour from less-developed to advanced countries is widespread. In some cases the direction of movement is based on historical links, as in the case of the entry of Commonwealth citizens to Britain. In other cases the labour requirements of advanced countries have led to new links being forged, as, for example, in the movement of Turkish workers to West Germany. The social problems created by this migration is the subject of the first of the books here under review. There are chapters which deal separately with the situation in each of six host countries and six labour-exporting countries.

The host countries all face the same basic problems. Are the immigrants permanent settlers or are they planning to return to their country of origin? If they are permanent settlers, are they to be integrated into the host community or is cultural pluralism to be accepted? While host countries generally prefer the idea of rotation (immigrants returning to their own country and their places being taken by other 'guest workers') the immigrants often plan to stay.

Labour exporting countries benefit from the reduction in unemployment and also from the remittances of their citizens working abroad. Remittances always improve the

balance of payments, but in Turkey an attempt has been made to channel these remittances, together with the savings of workers returning from abroad, into special development funds. Migration, however, is not an unmixed blessing to less-developed countries, especially when it is the more skilled workers who choose to emigrate.

The chapters on individual countries are necessarily short. The method of treatment results in repetition in the treatment of general issues and a failure to give adequate consideration either to the general issues or to the special problems confronting each country. The economic factors in migration receive relatively little attention. The reasons why workers leave less-developed countries are clear enough: employment prospects are better and wages higher in the advanced countries. It is less clear why immigration has been accepted by the advanced countries. Certainly it has been the case that immigration has been associated with economic growth and there have been periods when some employers have recruited abroad. There have also been signs of some reluctance on the part of native workers to take the lowest level jobs. On the other hand, the idea of the need for an industrial reserve army which is readily accepted by several contributors would not generally be accepted by economists.

Since 1973 immigration has been restricted in most host countries. Little attention is given to the consequences of this or to the likely course of future events. This is the subject of the second of these books. It is concerned with the possibility that, in the future, developing trade between advanced and developing countries will take the place of migration. It looks at the pattern of trade in terms of revealed comparative advantage for various categories of commodities and reaches the conclusion that for many goods the comparative advantage is shifting towards the less-developed countries. The advanced countries will not be able to maintain an advantage merely because the production of a commodity is capital-intensive. Where they will retain a comparative advantage is in those commodities which require a high input of educated manpower. As the comparative advantage in many commodities shifts towards the less-developed countries, the authors see West Germany faced with declining industries and increasing unemployment. As in Britain there will be a problem not just of unemployment but also a problem of regions which are relatively depressed.

This book provides much food for thought, even though one must largely take on trust the trade projections on which its argument rests. It is, however, unfortunate that the basic concept of revealed comparative advantage is inadequately explained in Appendix 1 and the formula given, one which cannot lie within the stated limits of —100 to +100.

University of Dundee J. M. JACKSON

Le Pouvoir et la Science en France. By Pierre Papon. *Paris: Editions du Centurion. 1979. 315 pp.*

SCIENCE policy implies active government involvement in the orientation of publicly funded research. In France the ***Délégation Générale à la Recherche Scientifique et Technique*** (DGRST), the agency responsible for evaluating and co-ordinating research activity, has in recent years repeatedly commented on the failure of French science to maintain its international position and above all to transform research investments into industrial gain. Pierre Papon in his review of French science policy since 1800 also laments this contemporary failure noting its stark contrast with the early nineteenth century when French science directly assisted the state in its quest to secure European influence. At that time the ideology of progress, quickly modelled to military requirements, had tied rational pursuits to practical ends putting human needs and the state's service before purely theoretical achievements.

The autonomy of science, never a hallmark of revolutionary times, only became a reality in the mid-nineteenth century after the universities had successfully incorporated the new learning into their curriculum and had attributed professional status to the researcher. A strong corporate sense developed among scientists during the nineteenth century, a sentiment which today encourages resistance to state intrusion into the community's affairs. Responsible for funding scientific research, government authorities have begun to challenge the privileged status of the researcher and above all to curtail the near feudal authority of certain key personnel and also to combat the growing egalitarian spirit among young scientists. Pierre Papon, a member of the *Comité consultatif de la recherche scientifique et technique (Comité des Sages)*, warmly supports such measures, but argues that they are insufficient. Without a steadfast and co-ordinated policy directed from the Prime Minister's office French science will continue to diffuse monies and talent rather than concentrate human and material resources on projects of industrial worth. In Papon's opinion the current weakness of French science lies not only with the gap between university research and industrial innovation, but also with the consistent failure of recent political authorities to appreciate the potential commercial rewards to be derived from well-defined research. The postwar generation of political leaders, concerned with recovering French prestige and securing independence from an overbearing Atlantic partner, sponsored large-scale investments in nuclear power and aerospace. Abundant returns now reward such foresight which kept research personnel and engineering teams employed during earlier periods of low productivity. A major feature of science policy throughout the postwar period emerges from Papon's analysis. French political leaders, particularly those of Gaullist inspiration, have consistently refused to collaborate with European partners in projects which are not complementary to French interests. Any inkling of supranational control or competition, as is the case with Euratom, cools French enthusiasm. By contrast Eurodif, the nuclear fuel enrichment consortium, provides evidence of French willingness to join with foreign powers in co-operative ventures when they help finance an essential component of a local programme.

While unsparing in his criticism of government neglect, Papon fails to examine French industrial structures which actually impede the introduction of innovative processes. Also lacking is any discussion of the failure of the *Agence Nationale de Valorisation de la Recherche* (ANVAR) to carry out its task of assisting smaller firms, gather and use technical information pertinent to their sector. Thus while offering a competent examination of government involvement in the more prestigious industries closer attention could have been given to how firms integrate new knowledge into the industrial process. As it stands the author argues for a science policy which would encourage innovation yet his analysis, while critical of the administrative and university procedures with which he is familiar, neglects to reveal those patterns which block or encourage innovation where it must take place, within the firm itself.

American College in Paris TERENCE MURPHY

Finland in the Twentieth Century. By David G. Kirby. *London: C. Hurst. 1979. 243 pp. £9·50.*

THIS latest addition to Messrs Hurst's series of publications on Nordic subjects comprises a readable and well-researched survey of Finnish history—political, economic and social—over (in effect) rather longer than the present century, since as the author observes the beginnings of modern Finland, in terms of national self-

consciousness, can in some ways be more conveniently dated back to the 1870s. One does not have to share Mr. Kirby's approach in all respects to acknowledge the value of having such a compendium of information readily available, especially perhaps the first half of the book, dealing with the period down to the end of the First World War. When he comes however to the controversial years of the Second World War, and those immediately before and after it, Mr Kirby's treatment strikes at any rate one contemporary witness of these events as showing a certain lack of 'feel' for actuality (*wie es eigentlich gewesen*), and in particular an insufficiently critical assessment of Soviet policy. The reviewer may therefore, it is hoped, be excused for concentrating on that aspect.

Mr Kirby tends to imply that if there *were* any ultimate Soviet threat to Finland's integrity, it could have been averted by a policy more 'democratically' conducted, and less 'hostile', 'obdurate' and 'unrealistic' than that actually followed by its leaders. This may no doubt be a tenable thesis, indeed under conformist influences in Finland itself it is on the way almost to attaining orthodoxy. Yet there remain strong arguments against it.

To have expected any Finnish government in the circumstances of 1938 to cede territory and bases was surely quite impractical, on political if not military grounds. But, in any case, when Soviet demands were renewed in the autumn of 1939, the situation had been transformed by the Nazi-Soviet Pact (and the resultant outbreak of war in Europe). Under this, of course, Finland, together with Eastern Poland and the Baltic States, was assigned to the Soviet Union, whose subsequent behaviour was to make plain a determination to exact its full share of the bargain. It was thus no longer a question of limited concessions—even if Stalin did elect to proceed in two stages where the Finns, and the Balts, were concerned. After the fall of France, however, and the final incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, pressure on Finland was intensified in nearly every sphere, so that no responsible government could have simply trusted in Soviet forbearance, of which there were no signs whatever—quite the contrary, in fact. Thus the sole hope for a Finland cut off from its Western friends must have appeared to lie in accepting the measure of protection that Germany, with its attitude towards the Soviet Union changing, was now prepared to afford. But it was the urgent need for security, not 'revanchism' as Mr Kirby seems to suggest, that essentially impelled the fateful choice.

Striking vindication of that need is to be found in Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940, of which we possess a full account, and where Finland proved to be one of the main stumbling-blocks to any agreement that might conceivably have emerged. After Hitler had explained that Germany had no long-term interest in Finland but did not wish to see the Scandinavian balance upset while the war lasted, he asked Molotov point-blank what the Soviet Union really wanted there, receiving the reply 'a Bessarabian solution', i.e. total absorption, in line with the provisions of the Pact which Germany was accused of obstructing.

Heavy as was the price to be paid for Finland's involvement in Germany's war, immediate independence had at least been preserved. And the radically altered configuration of postwar Europe brought with it a significant shift in Soviet preoccupations, duly (if not without vicissitudes) to be codified in the present relationship with Finland: a relationship by no means ideal for the latter, but infinitely better than the fate of the Baltic countries. The crucial point being however that it was made possible by changes in Soviet, quite as much as in Finnish, policy and perceptions, so that we cannot legitimately argue back from it to a like contingency existing in 1939–40, had there been no German invasion of Russia (any more than, say, in the case of Poland).

If this reading be correct, history may yet give the same credit to Ryti, Tanner and

other victims of the enforced 'war-guilt' trials of 1945-46 as it now does to Paasikivi and Kekkonen, faced as all of them were with a challenge to their country's survival in the circumstances prevailing at the time.

MICHAEL F. CULLIS

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Bear and Foxes: The International Relations of the East European States, 1965-1969. By Ronald Haly Linden. *New York: Columbia University Press for the East European Quarterly, Boulder. 1979. 328 pp. (East European Monographs, No. L.) $21.90.*

Foreign Policy Making in Communist Countries: A Comparative Approach. Edited by Hannes Adomeit and Robert Boardman. *Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House. 1979. 164 pp. £8·50.*

THOSE who teach political science, and international politics in particular, are always glad to hear of innovations which make their teaching tasks easier. In political science the American invention of comparative government is now well established and serves the teaching purposes quite nicely. In international politics comparative foreign policies as a methodological innovation is more recent, though in the United States it has also reached a stage of high development, if not sophistication. Both of these books are the result of research in the comparative line, though the first stresses theoretical innovation, while the second uses the comparative approach in concrete case studies.

Dr Linden's book is in fact an enlarged version of a doctoral dissertation, in which he set himself three tasks: to increase the substantive bases of knowledge of the international relations of the East European states; to offer suggestions relating to the concepts and methods used in the comparative study of foreign policy; and to do the same regarding the study of international regional integration. He uses the frequency principle to devise statistical codes, which, when applied to the four years on which his analysis is concentrated, demonstrate as scientifically as possible international interactions, attitudes, consensus, and consistency in Eastern Europe, especially within the Warsaw Pact. However, perhaps the most valuable part of the book is the analysis of Romanian foreign policy during this period—much of the research for which was done in Romania itself. Copious footnotes and substantial appendices make clear the theoretical foundations on which the book rests.

The second book—an Anglo-Canadian effort—edited jointly by H. Adomeit and R. Boardman is the last of three in a series on foreign policy making, edited by Dr William Wallace. The editors of this volume outline foreign policy making in the Soviet Union and China while Dr Laux and Mr Marsh deal with Romania and the East German Democratic Republic. Comparisons are made in the concluding chapter: the similarities and differences are highlighted between small and big; more or less developed; differing ideological bases; nationalisms, and political cultures. Although this is an excellent international effort it still remains a comparatively modest one, even when compared to Dr Linden's volume. Surely other East European countries could have been covered, especially since Canadian resources in this field were available. Still both books will prove extremely useful for the teaching of the subject and may stimulate students to carry on with researches along the comparative line.

University of Manchester JOHN BRADLEY

The Soviet Union 1976–77: Domestic, Economic and Foreign Policy, Vol. Edited by Wolfgang Berner *et al. New York, London: Holmes and Meier. 19* *270 pp. $24.50.*

THIS is the fourth volume in an ongoing series of (approximately) annual overview developments relating to the Soviet Union. The series is primarily the product c research team at the German Federal Institute for East European and Internatio Studies in Cologne; with one or two minor exceptions, however, neither the cont of, nor the language in, this excellently translated book would reveal that the writ were anything more specific than 'Western'. One definite improvement on earl volumes is the fact that the authors of the individual chapters are now identified; t makes it much easier to enter into correspondence over details and interpretatio Another improvement is the inclusion of a lengthy overview chapter at the beginni of each section, which helps to fit the subsequent, detailed discussions into a wi framework.

The book divides into three basic sections: 'Domestic Politics'; 'The Econom and 'Foreign Policy'. In earlier volumes, there was also a fourth section on Forei Economic Policy; on balance, the inclusion of information on this subject in both t economic and foreign-policy sections of the current volume has produced a better, l repetitious format. Readers of this journal will be interested to know that the forei policy section is by far the longest. It is wide-ranging and largely accurate, althou there is too little on Soviet policy towards Latin America and South-east Asia. T first two sections, too, are reasonably comprehensive; but it was a mistake to omit t chapters on education, cultural policy and nationalities policy that earlier volum included.

Although the dust-jacket claims that the authors have used an analytical framewc 'which emphasises the tension between the ideology of political decision-makers a the reality with which that ideology must be reconciled', this notion is genera implied rather than considered specifically. Moreover, the reader will learn mu about decisions, but little new about the decision-making process itself; this is mor reflection of the level of openness of the Soviet political system than a criticism of t authors, however.

Most of the contributions are very detailed, and presented in a scholarly mann this very wealth of detail precludes a discussion of individual chapters here. Howev one feels compelled to take issue with P. Hübner, whose chapter on the civil rig movement is both highly partisan and presented in an unacceptable manner. His is t only specific (i.e. as opposed to general introductory) chapter to contain no referenc to sources of information—which must put many of his already questionable assertio in further doubt.

Another point concerning accuracy of information is that there are several seric printing errors in the book; perhaps the most glaring example can be found in footn 106 to Part III and the accompanying text. Particularly since this is basically reference work, one should not expect to have to check figures in other sources.

There are several very useful appendices; it would be helpful if future editio contained, in addition, abbreviated listings of the major legislation passed during t period covered. And 'the period covered' should be more clearly indicated in futu editions; anyone hoping to find a detailed discussion of the 25th Congress of the CPS (which was held in February and March 1976) will be frustrated, since this book starting-point is later in that year.

These criticisms notwithstanding, *The Soviet Union 1976-77* is a valuab comprehensive, lucid and largely accurate survey of Soviet developments, and a serious student of the Soviet Union will want to collect the series for his referenc shelf; a paperback edition would make this much more feasible.

University of Kent at Canterbury L. T. HOLMES

How the Soviet Union is Governed. Rev. edn. By Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1979.* (1st edn. by Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, publ. 1953.) *272 pp. £12·95.*

IT seems a little odd to a British audience that a textbook written in 1953 on contemporary Soviet government is worth revising, however good it is, or indeed is capable of being revised. It is hard to imagine the same process occurring in the highly independent world of British universities. However, the result reads reasonably smoothly. Professor Hough has rearranged the historical material in chronological order and added several new chapters covering most of the last fifteen years. Much more attention is paid in this edition to the formation of policy. A student of Soviet Russia may well wonder how a text that was often attacked as an exposition of the totalitarian model could be transformed into quite another animal. In fact, the 1953 edition of *How Russia is Ruled* did not neglect conflict in the Soviet political process, even with regard to the period before the death of Stalin. Professor Fainsod paid scant attention to the lower levels of politics and society, but he has been unjustly accused of being over-rigid.

Hough maintains a good balance between detailed scholarship and broad generalisations. Chapter 13, dealing with provincial and local politics, on which Hough is an acknowledged expert, is an example of the former, whilst Chapter 14, entitled 'The Distribution of Power', should be read by all undergraduates for its lucid treatment of the various political models that have been applied to the Soviet system. Hough observes on page 559 that 'By concentrating on the organising principles of the system as we have seen them, we have neglected many phenomena that do not fit the model.' He has thus successfully detached himself from the worst errors of the model makers, which has left him free to add many subtle contours to his analysis of, amongst other things, the individual and the policy process, and the relationship between the leading party organs. In the final chapter he is tempted into undertaking a discussion of the future of the Soviet system, despite the fact that on page 575 he concludes that the job of the scholar is not to predict, but to understand. If this is the case, it is hard to understand why he has treated us with a whole chapter on the subject. Presumably it is a sop to those many Americans, both in his academic and political audience, who are usually agog for applied and 'useful' information of this type.

In sum, this is a mountain of a book (679 pages in length) which may tax the intelligence of the undergraduate, just as a reading of E. H. Carr's *History of Soviet Russia* does. This book is full of individual nuggets of gold from both Fainsod and Hough. Sometimes they are not as well co-ordinated as they might be, but the volume remains a valuable mine of accurate and well-judged information.

University College of Swansea ROGER PETHYBRIDGE

Soviet Science. By Zhores A. Medvedev. *Oxford: Oxford University Press; Toronto: McLeod. 1979. 262 pp. £5·95.*

TWO important axioms underlie the writings of Zhores Medvedev. In the first place he conceives of socialism as a potentially humanitarian and economically efficient social system whose natural development was seriously distorted in the Soviet Union during the Stalin period, a traumatic experience, which still casts its shadow over contemporary Soviet institutions. Secondly, he views science as a politically neutral activity which in responsible and rational hands contains unique possibilities for solving human problems and promoting international understanding. The two axioms

are closely related and colour decisively his interpretation of Soviet history and his relatively optimistic prognostications about the future.

After the terror and deprivations of the Civil War, Soviet scientists passed through what Medvedev calls the 'golden years' of the 1920s. Appreciating the dependence of the country on scarce technical expertise the political leadership under Lenin's guidance was flexible in its attitude towards the 'bourgeois specialists'. Financial support was willingly granted, some foreign travel was permitted and political neutrality was tolerated. Under these relatively relaxed circumstances scientific activity flourished. Medvedev, of course, is inclined to interpret this as the beginning of a long-term trend rather than a temporary tactic which would have come to an end with or without Stalin's assistance. Historians will doubtless continue to debate these various 'alternatives' but indisputably, the trials of engineers in the late 1920s heralded a much tougher political line and Stalin's personal role in the proceedings was paramount. The general tendency towards repression and international isolation hit scientists with particular ferocity during the purges of the late 1930s and opened up all sorts of possibilities for broad ideological attacks, the effective liquidation of whole fields of scientific enquiry and the emergence of cranks posing as ideological angels and practical miracle workers. This is a legacy from which the Soviet scientific system has only falteringly disengaged itself.

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, and the dawning of the nuclear age, Soviet scientists enjoyed a sharp increase in income, status and financial support. Under Khrushchev's leadership a limited liberalisation occurred, based on the strategy of duplicating Western technology as a first step to eventual and inevitable technological superiority. But the unexpected technological dynamism of the West meant that without a strong indigenous capacity to innovate the Soviet Union would be condemned to the permanent role of an imitator, forever in pursuit of a moving target. After Khruschev, therefore, the Soviet leadership embarked on a co-operative phase which, in Medvedev's view, has been helpful not only to the Soviet economy but, more importantly, provides an opportunity for returning to the path of social development so rudely interrupted by Stalin in the late 1920s.

Medvedev argues that detente is a consequence of Soviet strength rather than backwardness. On the Soviet side is the self-confidence derived from a sophisticated and powerful military machine combined with technological parity in some branches of heavy industry (which?). Conversely, Western self-confidence has been sapped by reverses in Vietnam, Angola and Mozambique and at the same time there is a growing understanding that a technological embargo cannot prevent the build-up of Soviet military power owing to the imperviousness of a centrally planned economy to the competing claims of consumer demand, and its, capacity to concentrate resources in priority sectors. Detente, therefore holds out mutual commercial benefits to both sides. With the lessening of the external threat it also holds out the prospect of drawing Soviet scientists once more into the international community, a gradual process leading to greater understanding and goodwill and culminating perhaps in a sympathetic rapport between Soviet liberal Marxists and Western social democrats.

Medvedev's account of detente is typically coherent and persuasive. Critics might argue, however, that he overestimates the overall economic strength of the Soviet Union and correspondingly underestimates the degree to which the declining rate of Soviet economic growth, combined with increased consumer expectations, have imposed severe constraints on the government when it tries to reconcile competing claims on resources. Military technology is itself the most expensive and most rapid-moving target. To what extent have successive injections of Western technology brought about the parity in Soviet heavy industry that Medvedev talks about, and how far has the achievement of parity by these means eased internal pressures to adjust the balance of investment between the military and civilian sectors? Another important

element of doubt must be the very marginal effect which detente appears to have had on the freedom of Soviet scientists, let alone on the ordinary Soviet citizen; minor improvements in foreign travel and access to foreign scientific journals would certainly not suffice to convert the 'one way street' brigade, especially when these liberalising trends are counterbalanced by more vigorous political controls over university entrance, higher degrees, and the more prominent role of party secretaries in research institutes.

These are elusive issues which will continue to be debated. One can say with confidence however that Medvedev's lucid and honest book has considerably assisted our understanding of them. Some may disagree with the case which he presents but all will respect it.

University of Birmingham RONALD AMANN

The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis. By Edward L. Warner III. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 314 pp. £12·50.*

EDWARD WARNER has two objectives in this study. The first is to use interest group analysis and similar approaches to illuminate the role of the military establishment in the formation of Soviet policy. The second objective, to be achieved in the pursuit of the first, is to bring together available information on the organisation of the Soviet military, the forces at its disposal and the views held by its senior officers on the profession as well as the various issues that concern them such as strategy and arms control.

The application of political science theory is not the book's strongest point, though Warner has little trouble in demonstrating that the military is an active and assertive participant in all Soviet policy-making with distinct views of its own. In this he provides few surprises. The analysis of the importance of the monopoly of information and expertise is useful in illustrating the institutional advantages enjoyed by the military. The real value of this book lies in the impressive manner in which Warner has scoured Western and Soviet sources for relevant information.

The growth of military capabilities, arguments which have surrounded their development and the strategies governing their use, persistent debates on the danger presented by 'imperialism', the likelihood of nuclear war, and the utility of arms control are all described lucidly and in detail. So rare is unsubstantiated speculation that the occasional lapse stands out—as for example on page 150 where he suggests an interest in controlled strategic attacks of the sort publicised by James Schlesinger when American Secretary of Defence, despite a lack of evidence of such interest, and, as Warner notes, 'frequent denials'.

In general for those concerned as to the views of the Soviet military, this is a welcome addition to a literature too often short on facts and long on polemics.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War. By Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1979. 138 pp. Pb.*

ONE result of the growing disillusionment in the West in recent years over detente and the SALT process has been the gradual recognition that Soviet strategic doctrine is not the same as (nor necessarily inferior to) American strategic thought. A number of

authors have attempted to show the contrasts in thinking and the consequences of the asymmetries in policy which have resulted. This short monograph by Douglass and Hoeber fits into this category by purporting to highlight Soviet thinking (and Western misunderstanding) about *one* specific but important area of strategic planning: that concerned with the initiation and conduct of nuclear war.

On the basis of their study of a limited range of (translated) Soviet political and military texts (particularly the journal *Voyenna mysl*, the official military-theoretical organ of the Soviet Ministry of Defence and the Soviet General Staff) the authors point to the distinction between pronouncements made by Soviet leaders for Western consumption and the ideas which circulate in private amongst senior Soviet military personnel. The main burden of the argument is that the Soviet Union believes that total nuclear war is not an inconceivable event and that despite the tremendous level of destruction which would result, such a war is winnable. This gives rise, they point out, to the emphasis in Soviet strategic doctrine on a wide range of military and non-military preparations to win such a war. Despite the claims by Soviet leaders to the contrary, the authors argue that the critical aspects of this preparation include achieving 'both quantitative and qualitative superiority in military capability, beginning with nuclear capability; developing and implementing war survival measures to ensure rapid recovery of the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union; and establishing measures for post-war occupation and control of each of the probable theatres of military operations both continental and intercontinental' (p. 3).

The fact that Soviet military leaders emphasise the 'war-fighting' and 'war-winning' aspects of their strategy is, of course, hardly new. Douglass and Hoeber do, however, provide some useful (if narrow) interpretations of the Soviet search for superiority as well as their thinking about the conduct of a nuclear war, particularly the conditions leading to victory. They emphasise Soviet concern with achieving and maintaining the strategic initiative and especially the importance of surprise. Indeed, in their opinion, 'Surprise is perhaps the single most important factor in Soviet military thought' (p. 3). Because Moscow fears a repeat of 1941 and believes that the United States itself plans a sudden nuclear attack (p. 105) the authors argue that Soviet *military planners recognise that significant, indeed decisive, advantages are to be* gained from a surprise first-strike at the right moment. Douglass and Hoeber are, therefore, worried by the West's failure to appreciate this danger: 'Based on the Soviet literature, we believe that the common Western perception that a surprise attack is the least likely of unlikely possibilities is false' (p. 105).

The emphasis in Soviet strategic doctrine on superiority and surprise is clearly of concern to the West and thus, as far as it goes, this book provides what some will see as a timely warning on the nature of certain aspects of Soviet military thinking. The study is rather weak, however, when it comes to setting Soviet views within a wider context. Very little detailed discussion, for example, is provided on Soviet views about such things as the circumstances which might lead the Soviet Union to initiate a nuclear war. Even less satisfactory is the treatment of Soviet views on the prevention of nuclear war. The authors point out that Soviet leaders recognise the dangers of nuclear war and the need to prevent it but they then fail to provide anything like an adequate discussion of Soviet attitudes towards deterrence or war prevention. There may well be some asymmetries between American and Soviet conceptions of deterrence, and Soviet views may also have 'strong, aggressive, action-oriented overtones' (p. 9), but this does not mean that deterrence (albeit of a national variety) is not an important component of Soviet strategic thought. The Soviet emphasis on a 'war-fighting' and 'war-winning' strategy may be dangerous, and destabilising (from a Western perspective) but it provides an efficient deterrent to American military power and an effective capability should deterrence fail (from a Soviet viewpoint).

The book, therefore, provides a useful survey of Soviet doctrine and planning for nuclear war which will be of interest in the West. The failure to deal with some of the important issues in detail and to deal adequately with certain crucial aspects of Soviet strategic doctrine, however, limits the book's value. Nor is the study helped by the rather extreme and largely irrelevant forward by Eugene Rostow.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth JOHN BAYLIS

Soviet-American Trade Negotiations. By John W. De Pauw. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 180 pp. £13·50.*

THE way towards signing a large commercial contract is hardly ever straightforward and easy, but in the realm of East-West business the difficulties may seem insurmountable. Such difficulties and the techniques applied in the process of overcoming them are the subject of this book. Drawing on experience gained when serving as an expert on Soviet economic affairs at the Department of Commerce as well as on well-researched published and unpublished material (interviews with executives and a questionnaire posted to major American firms dealing with the Soviet Union) Dr De Pauw provides a rare insight into the intricacies of Soviet-American business negotiations.

The introductory chapter is followed by an outline, in Chapter 2, of the structure of the Soviet foreign trade system and by a discussion of the principles which stood at its foundation in the post-revolutionary period. This is supplemented by useful figures giving a clear idea of the organisational complexity of the Soviet foreign trade bureaucracy. Particularly valuable is the figure 5, on page 33, which by illustrating the procedure of a typical Soviet purchase of Western technology shows this unwieldy colossus in action. Chapter 3 focuses on the difficulties encountered by American executives during negotiations with Soviet officials such as the time factor (negotiations with Soviet bureaucracy are exceedingly lengthy and costly in terms of time devoted to them by top executives) and the difficulty in establishing personal relationships. The chapter also deals with various techniques applied by the Russians—for example, in intensifying competition among the Western bidders for Soviet orders.

In addition to facing the obstacles posed by the Soviet side, American businessmen have to negotiate their contract through another system of bureaucratic channels as every American seller of equipment to communist states has to obtain a special 'validated licence' the issuing of which takes further time and effort. The difficulties encountered in this respect are discussed in Chapter 4. The American bureaucracy too is quite impressive (figures are reproduced) and, as the author suggests, even in the best cases the mere existence of such an apparatus is ipso facto a cause of delay (p. 69). In some cases such as computers the seller also has to satisfy the requirements of the Department of Defence and Nato's organ COCOM by showing that exported goods will not be used by the Soviet Union directly for military purposes. Provision of hard currency credits to Russia is the last but not the easiest hurdle to be overcome, largely due to the Congressional restrictions imposed on the Eximbank in 1974 and 1975 (this American weakness has been happily exploited by the EEC countries and Japan).

An example of how all the difficulties can be overcome is presented in the final chapter in a case study of the USSR-Control Data Corporation negotiations leading to a general agreement on co-operation in R and D and joint production of computer peripherals and soft-ware. John De Pauw's book is of interest to academics, trade officials, and executives. The latter will find it a useful guide to what to do and what to

beware of when dealing with the Russians, but as De Pauw writes there is no recipe for success and every successful contract was shaped by unique circumstances.

St Antony's College, Oxford V. SOBESLAVSKY

The Kremlin's Dilemma: The Struggle for Human Rights in Eastern Europe. By Tufton Beamish and Guy Hadley. *London: Collins and Harvill. 1979. 285 pp. £5·95.*

EASTERN Europe attracts less attention in the West than it deserves except when the lid blows off, as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A well-researched book on Eastern Europe by two such well-qualified authors is timely.

The book's recurring theme is 'Human Rights post-Helsinki'. The demand for them is 'in the Soviet Union still a relatively innocuous germ which can easily be rendered harmless, but in the satellites it is an infectious disease which is active and spreading' (p. 41). Pointing thus to human rights as the crux of the Kremlin's Dilemma, the authors present a country-by-country study of the pursuit of individual freedom.

Looming behind the authors' concern with human rights are strong views about the power struggle between the Soviet Union and the West, with the lesser countries of Eastern Europe lying uneasily between the two. The authors cut through the ectoplasm of detente to assert that the Soviet Union is still true to its Stalinist assumptions: that the world is divided into two camps and that the Soviet camp should do everything possible in its power to shift the balance of power in its favour. Well-chosen quotations from Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev illustrate the continuity of Stalinist fundamentalism.

The West should beware, as President Kennedy put it, of 'being nibbled to death in a state of nuclear stalemate'. It should not cocoon itself in comfortable illusions about Soviet ultimate aims, and should uphold the freedoms which have been lost in the Soviet bloc.

The lesser countries of Eastern Europe receive most of the authors' attention. Their dilemma in pursuing liberal aims likely to provoke Russian retaliation if successful is sympathetically discussed. The book usefully points to the diversity of the countries lumped together in most people's minds as component parts of the Soviet Union's defensive glacis. Most of these ancient peoples are indeed held together only by Russian force, and the knowledge that attempts to escape from the bloc, or outside efforts to prise them loose and roll back the Soviet Union's perimeter, will be met with all the force which a super-power, long dedicated to guns before butter, is capable of wielding.

The Poles, rightly, are shown to have the best record of tolerance since Helsinki. But the Romanians, though regarded as independent-minded in foreign affairs, appear to be as repressive domestically as the Russians, and East Germany and Bulgaria are shown to be, for different reasons, the closest to Moscow.

The book perhaps understates the interdependence of Communist governments with patriotic, non-Communist peoples. In Poland and Hungary, for example, there is a good deal of interdependence between Communist governments and largely Catholic populations. Gierek and Wyszinski plod along together, two oxen in one plough, not caring for each other but both devoted to Poland, as *The Times* once put it before there was a Polish Pope.

The book, briefly, upholds those in the lesser countries of Eastern Europe who are persecuted for upholding the rights enshrined in the Helsinki documents; and it restates the *realpolitisch* facts of life in the age of super-powers. But in the background

is a gloomy feeling that unless there are major and dramatic changes in the Soviet Union itself, the liberals in Eastern Europe will not get very far. The final chapter suggests that the West can help by being more positive in exploiting its cultural agencies, and increasing visits and contacts of all sorts.

NORMAN REDDAWAY

Romanian Foreign Policy since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy. By Aurel Braun. *New York, London: Praeger. 1978. 217 pp.*

THIS is a scholarly work. It has a ten-page bibliography, an adequate index, and both a Preface and an Introduction. Reference Notes—675 of them—are grouped conveniently at the ends of the relevant chapters, and thirty-six footnotes are scattered among the pages of the text. The language is generally clear, in spite of occasional lapses into jargon (e.g., 'go-position'), of obscure words (e.g., 'fastigium'), or of expressions not readily located in dictionaries (e.g., 'conationals', 'river forgings').

Dr Braun's thesis, briefly, is that Romania, during the Ceausescu regime has enjoyed a limited autonomy in foreign policy. The limits for the 'southern tier' of states in the Soviet bloc, Romania and Bulgaria, have been less rigid than the limits constricting the autonomy of the 'northern tier', the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Romanian autonomy is protected to a considerable degree by 'passive defences' whose elements are determined in Moscow alone, and by 'active defences' originating in Bucharest. 'The two, interacting in action-reaction syndromes, added new elements to the defence network. In turn the defence network would have had the potential to enlarge, to constrict, or to maintain the limits for Romanian divergence from Soviet policy.'

Romania's autonomy in foreign policy is indicated by: her premature recognition of West Germany in 1967; her refusal to follow the rest of the Soviet bloc in severing relations with Israel in 1968 at the time of the Six Day War; her refusal to participate with the other Warsaw Pact countries in the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia; her insistence in maintaining good relations with China, contrary to Eastern bloc policy, during the period under review; her refusal in 1974 to permit Russia to construct a broad-gauge military railway from Odessa to Varna in Bulgaria through Romanian territory, or to permit Russian troops to move through Romania for Warsaw Pact manoeuvres in Bulgaria; her adoption, in 1972, of a Defence Law, modelled on that of Yugoslavia rather than following Warsaw Pact models, and in particular greatly expanding the paramilitary or guerrilla forces and adopting an 'all horizons' defence strategy to discourage invasion from any direction, including the East.

These divergencies from Soviet policy, or 'challenges' as Dr Braun calls them, are carefully analysed, together with the 'defences', active and passive, employed by Romania to minimise the provocative aspect of the challenges, and to secure their somewhat grudging tolerance by the Kremlin. There is clearly a limit to this tolerance.

Dr Braun points out that 'The American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 demonstrated that both superpowers were willing and able to take unilateral military action if they perceived threats to vital national interests (political and military) within their clearly delineated spheres of influence.' It is just possible, however, that the somewhat Byzantine defences assumed to have been employed by the Romanians were unnecessary; that Moscow never perceived, in the aberrant behaviour of her Romanian ally, any real threat to the vital interests of the Soviet Union, and therefore saw no pressing reason for intervention. Enver Hoxha in his recently published *Reflections in China, 1961-1978*, reports a Chinese suggestion for a tripartite Balkan

alliance of Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia aimed at the Soviet Union. Such an alliance, if its remote possibility had been realised, might have constituted a 'perceived threat' to the Soviet Union. Anything less threatening could be safely ignored.

Dr Braun believes that 'While many Romanians—perhaps the vast majority—resented Ceausescu's government, they had to acquiesce to it', but he gives little indication of the nature or the depth of the supposed resentment. Admittedly there has been, and still is, in the Romanian Communist Party, a pro-Russian faction opposed to the nationalistic policies of Ceausescu and his predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej. Typical of this faction is Constantin Pirvulescu, a founding member of the Party and once a member of the Politburo. He was briefly expelled from the Party in 1960, but was re-admitted and was elected to the Party Revision Committee in 1974. In the 1979 Party Congress in November, he opposed the re-election of Ceausescu, but this faction has been consistently in the minority for the past twenty years and seems to offer no threat to the present government. It is difficult to gauge what degree of popular opposition may exist, but the government has confidently 'armed the people', trained and equipped paramilitary popular forces 700,000 strong, while maintaining an ill-equipped regular army of only 30,000 men—surely a dangerous policy if 'perhaps the vast majority' of the population resent their government.

C. S. BURCHILL

MIDDLE EAST

Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues. Edited by Edward P. Haley and Lewis W. Snider. *Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 1979. 323 pp. $18.00. Pb: $7.95.*

IT is extremely difficult to understand and analyse the causes and ramifications of the Lebanese civil war. There were so many protagonists motivated by widely differing aims that many commentators fell back, in what seemed like desperation, on a simple distinction between 'Muslim-left' and 'Christian-right'. At least it was a manageable conceptualisation and not altogether a distortion of a very complex conflict. But how can one go beyond such oversimplification to explain the inter-relationships and conflicts between Lebanese social classes, religious communities, regional groups, political parties, private militias, and the political machines of city bosses and neo-feudal lords? Secondly, how can we analyse the relations of these classes and groups to the Palestinians, Israel, Syria and other Arab states, the United States and the Soviet Union? Thirdly, how can all these be tied in with Arab nationalism, Lebanese nationalism, socialism, liberalism and all the other 'isms'—including gangsterism—represented in one way or another in the various groups which made up the so-called 'mosaic' of forces in the war?

Lebanon in Crisis attempts this enormous task. It starts out by asking, 'Why did the explosion occur when it did? How and why did those directly involved in the war become involved? What was the fighting about? . . . Why is it still continuing?' (p. ix). But although we are promised 'an understanding of Lebanese society and politics' (*ibid.*), the book is mainly concerned with international aspects of the war. There are essential and informative articles on Syria and Israel's roles in the fighting (respectively by Itamar Rabinovich and Lewis Snider *et al.*) and on the wider Arab-Israeli conflict (Fred Khouri) and inter-Arab relations (Lewis Snider). There are also articles on the roles of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, the UN, and the Arab League. There is much useful information and

some insights in these papers, but a number of them seem rather peripheral to the stated concerns of the book and could perhaps be better included, in a modified form, in a collection on international relations in the Middle East. One wonders why two members of Abbott Associates, Inc. were brought in to write a piece on Jordan when, on their own admission, 'Jordan's limited role had no appreciable impact on the fighting in Lebanon' (p. 159); and why there is an article by one of the editors (P. Haley) on 'Britain and the Middle East' with more to say about trade with the Gulf and Egypt than about any British role in the Lebanese war. If one of the aims in this paper was 'to examine Britain's role in Lebanon and the Middle East as an example of the international behaviour of medium-sized powers' (p. 250), then a far more appropriate choice would have been France, which has a long and close association with Lebanon that goes back at least as far as the early nineteenth century. There are also other, more surprising gaps. There is nothing, for example, that specifically deals with the Iraqi and Libyan regimes which played crucial roles in arming some of the 'Leftist' and Palestinian militias.

The main problem, though, is not the gaps in the discussion of international relations, but rather a lack of balance between the latter and events internal to Lebanon itself. Out of a total of fourteen papers, Halim Barakat's on 'The Social Context' and John Cooley's on 'The Palestinians' are the only ones to deal with the socio-economic and political background of the conflict. (Lawrence Whetton's history of the fighting—'The Military Dimension'—is not as useful as, and adds little to, Cooley's own account.) In the space allowed him, Barakat cannot do much more than provide a check list of the cross-cutting cleavages in Lebanese politics and society. One of these, the conflict between the Palestinian resistance movement and the Maronite Catholic Right, is developed further in Cooley's paper, which also includes interesting information on the socio-political structure of the different refugee camps, as well as a competent history of Palestine involvement in Lebanese politics. What is missing from the book is a systematic and analytic treatment of Barakat's other 'causal and contributing forces' (p. 3) which led to the outbreak of war in 1975. In particular, there is no attempt to break out from the constraints of the 'mosaic' model, which simply states that there were many social conflicts in Lebanon and a lack of developed institutions to deal with them. We need to have more about the country's socio-economic history and its modern political economy in order to understand the complex relationships between the service-based economy, class structure, religious conflict, and the 'mafia style' of political machines and social control. Only then can we explain why the latter control broke down and failed to prevent a bloody and protracted civil war.

University of Sussex MICHAEL JOHNSON

Arab Education in Israel. By Sami Khalil Mar'i. *Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 1978. 209 pp. $15.00.*

'EDUCATION of Arabs in Israel' would have been more descriptive of the contents of the book. As the author says (p. 64) the education of Arabs is entirely controlled by the government of Israel—'budgets, goals, policies, teachers' appointments, curricula and textbooks'. But whilst containing valuable information, *Arab Education in Israel* is not a systematic educational treatise dealing with every step of the educational ladder from the first year in the primary school to the last year in the university. There are omissions of important questions (*e.g.*, female, vocational and technical education) which are only incidentally mentioned in economic, sociological, psychological and other contexts. Nowhere is there, for example, a picture of any typical school. The

strictly educational substance is slight and is diffused unevenly throughout a relatively short book. A notable exception is chapter 4 on the curricula. It reveals in detail how the minority is being ruthlessly indoctrinated by the majority which nevertheless fails in its object!

The brief section on the Ottoman and British periods is marred by factual inaccuracies: the very first paragraph in the book, consisting of some six lines, has four. A work by the reviewer on education during the mandatory period is misquoted, and in none of the half dozen references to it is the page number given. Almost all other references are similarly treated: the full title, name of the author and publisher and year of publication are given, but seldom the page!

To the educationalist this book leaves much to be desired, but to the student of contemporary politics it provides a telling justification of the cynical definition of democracy as the tyranny of the majority over the minority. Here is spelled out how the Arab minority is depressed politically, economically, socially and educationally. The expressions: discrimination, inequality, domination, alienation, expropriation, second-class citizen and the like are to be found on almost every page. It is indeed a miracle that, according to the author, the Arabs survive these onslaughts unconverted and very much conscious of their national identity. The following illustrate just some of the ways in which they are discriminated against:

(1) A book issued by the Ministry of Education, and written by the director who controls the education of Arabs, frankly states that Arab students are not admitted to the departments of physics and engineering in Israeli universities because of 'security reasons' (p. 23).

(2) Another book by an author with an Arabic name maintains that the department in charge of the education of Arabs in the Ministry of Education is 'political in nature and function'. It exercises general political pressure, particularly in the appointment and dismissal of teachers (p. 64).

(3) The Hebrew language and literature are given more time in the syllabus than the Arabic language and literature and the disproportion increases as the pupils proceed to higher classes (544 hours for Hebrew and 366 for Arabic). 'Only 120 hours are allocated to the Koran and, strangely enough, 256 hours are spent on the Bible, Mishna and Agada' (pp. 82-83, 85). The author states that the Koran is used as literature, not a holy book. But he might have added that certain portions of it are excluded from the syllabus in all schools.

(4) Arabs constitute 15 per cent of the population, and yet of the student population at Israeli universities only 3·5 per cent are Arabs. (Before 1974 only 2 per cent.) The author conducted research in the occupied West Bank of Jordan and found that the ratio of university students to the number of population was higher than in Western Europe, and is surpassed only by that in the United States (pp. 106, 109).

(5) Research conducted by Jewish scholars found that 'Arab high school seniors who majored in science considered their chances of future socioeconomic success practically nil' (p. 137).

The author is an Arab Muslim and a citizen of Israel.

A. L. TIBAWI

Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya. By Omar I. El Fathaly, Monte Palmer and Richard Chackerian. *Lexington, Mass.: Heath. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 122 pp. £9·50.*

THE historical section of this book (Chapter 2) describes Libyan society and its traditional structure from the Ottoman period to the earlier years of the independent

state when the discovery of oil put tremendous strains on the country. The decade after oil began to flow saw Libya suffering all the problems of a 'rentier' state. The dangers of this system soon became apparent, and Colonel Qadafi's government introduced a programme of modernisation which proposed a diversification of the economy, developing agriculture and alternative industrial enterprises. To ensure that these ideas were put into practice the traditional elites were replaced by a new bureaucracy.

The rest of the book analyses the change in administration brought about by these plans and local reaction to them. The method used was an oral questionnaire put to sections of the population in seven 'municipalities' in the province of Zavia. 'The sampling strategy was to identify major social and geographic clusters (government employees at work, farmers on their farms, small businessmen in their shops, and bedouins in their geographic area) and randomly select a quota from each cluster. The size of the sample from each of these clusters was based on the zone administrator's estimate of the relative size of the group in the zone' (p. 5). The rather pompous statistics produced from the very small and geographically unrepresentative sample are used to draw conclusions about the difficulties encountered in modernising Libyan institutions. If the work had been put forward simply as a study of one province it would have been an interesting contribution to the very small corpus of work on Libya, but the attempt to universalise its conclusions for the whole country on so little evidence decreases its value for the historian and political scientist.

University of Aberdeen ANN WILLIAMS

Algeria 1960. By Pierre Bourdieu. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for Editions de la Sciences de l'Homme, Paris. 1979. 158 pp. £7·95.*

Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria 1954–1962. By Martha C. Hutchinson. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1978. 178 pp.*

IN their differing ways these two books attempt to get beneath the surface of Algerian society at the time of the revolution to explain what tensions existed under colonial rule, and why the revolution took the course it did. Pierre Bourdieu's long essay 'Algeria 1960; the Disenchantment of the World' is a translation of his already classic study *Travail et Travailleurs en Algérie*, published in 1963. Unfortunately the methodological and statistical apparatus of the earlier French edition has been omitted from this publication, and instead two short essays on the Kabyles, 'The Sense of Honour' and 'The Kabyle House, or the World Reversed', have been included to indicate the author's methods and approach. A straight translation of the book in its entirety would probably have given a more satisfactory taste of Pierre Bourdieu's work, and would have met the aims of the publishers in presenting important works on social change more exactly. But these essays are well worth translating and reprinting, for they raise issues of cultural transmission and assimilation that go far beyond the Algerian experience.

M. Bourdieu shows that the peasant and the 'sub-proletarian' in the city were so bound within the system in which they lived that they could not dissociate themselves from it to form even a concept of another society. 'For what is practically given in daily experience is concrete inequalities and particular conflicts; the colonial system is grasped only through its manifestations. And so the structure and objective mechanisms of the system, above all the system as such, are bound to escape the grasp of minds absorbed in the immediate difficulties of daily life: revolt is primarily directed against individual persons or situations, never against a system requiring systematic

transformation' (p. 58). Pierre Bourdieu, developing this idea, shows how complex are the cultural obstacles to economic development and that the 'subject of economic acts is not *homo economicus* but the real man who is made by the economy'. The last two essays in the book are interesting analyses of two aspects of Kabyle mythology.

Martha Cranshaw Hutchinson in her book on revolutionary terrorism in Algeria, attempts a structural study of the subject. She suggests that 'terrorism is a specific strategy, a distinctive pattern of violence that can be understood and analysed in terms of logical objectives and observable consequences' (p. 130). The FLN tried to direct their attacks very carefully to exact the required response from each section of the population, Algerian and French. They were not always successful because of the poor supply of arms, and because of the organisation of their cadres, who were frequently out of touch with the central party and with each other. Ms Hutchinson's method inhibits her from showing the development and change of the terrorist movement in the course of the war. Only in her last pages does she move in this direction by saying that the first targets of the FLN were sub-groups within the Algerian population, rural elites, the disobedient, or overt supporters of the French. 'Only in 1956 when the European audience showed itself to be unanimously opposed to any compromise did the FLN leaders, who had also learned from August 1955 that mass-casualty terrorism against Europeans earned international attention, focus on Europeans as a stereotyped enemy' (p. 140). Without criticising the author for not having written another book, it would have been interesting to have had a concluding section on whether or not terrorism had had a deep effect on Algeria from the perspective of nearly two decades of independence.

University of Aberdeen ANN WILLIAMS

AFRICA

Intergroup Accommodation in Plural Societies: A Selection of Conference Papers with Special Reference to the Republic of South Africa. Edited by Nic Rhoodie. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 482 pp. £8·95.*

THERE are twenty-seven separate (not to say disparate) papers in this book. Even a listing of their individual titles would take up half the number of words allocated for this review. Another eighth would be required to mention the various authors' names. So it is impossible to consider the subject-matter in the sort of detail normally expected in this journal.

All the contributors are eminent in their different fields—academic, administrative or political. Most of the papers, but not all, were delivered at the International Conference on Pluralism held in Cape Town in 1977. The papers are co-ordinated by little more than their common concern, direct or indirect, with the South African problem. One of them makes a valiant plea for a precise terminology; the rest seem to thrive by the use of 'operational definitions' somewhat peculiar to themselves.

Most of the contributions are from Southern Africa. These are primarily concerned with the immediate problems of their own region: all see hope in the liberalising policies which seem to have been followed by the South African government recently, but there is an obvious fear that these changes may be 'too little, too late'. We have, in fact, a number of examples of 'middle-of-the-road' South African thinking, while the extreme conservative and radical approaches are unrepresented. Nothing is said that would cause the authorities in Pretoria any loss of sleep.

All the papers are short, which may help to explain why they break little new ground. The nine or so contributions on what might be called 'theory' are *résumés* of

what the same, or other, writers have said more fully elsewhere. There are five 'case-studies' of the operation of plural societies elsewhere, but these seem to have been chosen because of their availability rather than their special relevance. More profound analyses of these and other plural societies are readily available elsewhere for those who are interested in them.

Doubtless, there is a readership which would find this confusing collection more valuable than the other books they might find on library shelves, but anybody with a specialised interest would have to read more widely and more deeply before they could form worthwhile views—either on the problems of pluralism in general, or those of South Africa in particular.

Many years ago, Sir Henry Maine reminded us that civilised politics is war without the city transmuted into war within the city, but mitigated in the process. In Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the reality of war has brought the various groups to the conference-table. Modern communications have meant that those who will not consent to a given settlement can expect to receive money, arms and training from sympathisers inside or outside the country. None of the papers considers the realistic choices which actually face groups in South Africa. How far can those holding power impose a solution by coercion? How far, if necessary, can an unacceptable formula be thrown out by strikes, riots or more protracted forms of violent opposition? When Rhodesian guerrillas shot down airliners and then disappeared into the bush, it was a reminder that governments can no longer maintain themselves by their monopoly of sophisticated equipment. In Vietnam, the men on bicycles humiliated those with helicopter gunships. Sharpeville marked the end of an era in South Africa, and the beginning of a new age when discussions such as that in this book became not only possible but necessary. That era began less than a century ago, when a few determined Boers, skilled in the use of simple weapons and in the arts of survival in the *veldt*, imposed the political solution which Sharpeville showed to be no longer workable.

The South African Defence Forces are devoting large resources to preventing arms and subversives from being smuggled into the country. To give true perspective to any symposium on South Africa, we need an assessment of the probable outcomes of violent alternatives to a rational solution. This consideration provides the *ultima ratio* for the acceptance of any such solution. Any enduring accomodation would have to satisfy all the parties involved that they might obtain more real benefit from it than they might hope to salvage from the ashes of conflict.

University of Dundee PHILIP WHITAKER

Nigeria's Leadership Role in Africa. By Joseph Wayas. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 132 pp. £10·00. Pb: £4·95.*

Nigeria and the World: Readings in Nigerian Foreign Policy. Edited by Bolaji A. Akinyemi. *Ibadan: Oxford University Press, Nigeria for the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1979. 152 pp. £10·50.*

NIGERIA became formally independent in 1960, but for fifteen years after that the giant of Africa continued to act, internationally, rather like a diffident youth. Under the leadership of both Balewa and Gowon Nigeria sought to avoid confrontation with the 'great powers', operated within the OAU, and generally pursued a 'low profile' approach to international relations. But then came the real 'coming of age', the trauma of the Civil War, the acquisition of the oil wealth, and the replacement of Gowon by the more assertive Murtala Mohammed. Surely now, at last, Nigeria had

acquired both the self-confidence and the economic independence to begin to assert itself as the leader of Africa. Indeed, the new government seemed to be moving in this direction when in 1975 it broke the traditions of Nigerian foreign policy: it announced its recognition of the MPLA in Angola without waiting for the OAU to make up its collective mind, and assertively rejected American attempts to interfere in African affairs on this issue. Was this to be the start of a new era in which Nigeria would act as the spokesman for Africa and the defender of African unity against imperialism and neocolonialism?

This is the scenario—and the question—which provide the starting-point for both books. Dr Akinyemi's book is a collection of papers delivered at a foreign-policy conference in Lagos in January 1976, all of which are by academics and most of which seek to examine the constraints on foreign policy. Dr Wayas's book is, by contrast, more polemical than academic and asserts, rather than argues, Nigeria's right and capability to 'take Africa's leadership mantle' (p. 20). Both, in different ways, assume that Nigeria is a giant, ought to act like one, and needs to discover the style and goals which correspond to that status.

Dr Wayas's main concern is to show that the OAU has failed to defend Africa against her internal and external enemies, and that, therefore, Nigeria must take the lead in reviving, revising, or ideally, replacing, the OAU. The OAU has failed partly because it is 'so structured as to guarantee that very little will be accomplished that does not satisfy every member's bent' (p. 14), but primarily because it contains within itself Black Africa's new enemies, the Arab states. The OAU has become 'the most potent single instrument of the propagation of Pan-Arabism' (p. 88) and thus unwittingly 'joins the West in thwarting the aspirations of the masses of Africa' (p. 38). He argues that the potential political power of Black Africa, which has the 'greatest concentration of mineral wealth in the world' (p. 15) can be harnessed only if Nigeria uses her dominant economic position and her role in both the OAU and OPEC, to defend Africa against Arab and Western imperialism.

There are obvious problems in linking OPEC's oil policies, pan-Arabism, Islam, and Western re-colonisation efforts, in the way that Dr Wayas attempts, but beyond that there remain doubts, which he never really examines, about Nigeria's ability to formulate and maintain such an active, interventionist, policy. It is here that Akinyemi's book is a useful antidote. There is no consensus either in the papers themselves, or in the brief commentaries which follow each paper (part extracts from conference discussion and part editorial comment), but crucial issues concerning the internal economic (and to some extent political) constraints on foreign policy are discussed in a lively way. Can a conservative, neo-colonial regime in fact pursue an anti-imperialist foreign policy? Is there any evidence from Nigeria's participation in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or in the Chad Basin Commission that she is willing to look beyond her immediate economic self-interest? Is there sufficient economic interaction in Africa to make efforts at economic co-operation, let alone moves towards political integration, viable?

The discussion on such topics does serve to show that Nigeria's oil wealth has not given her any great degree of political independence. She is now more reliant on Western imports than ever before; her economic involvement in Africa remains minimal (1·2 per cent of imports and 1·8 per cent of exports in 1974); and there is little evidence that the oil wealth will produce any shift from 'under-development' to 'development'. A Nigerian public, and regime, which is primarily concerned with problems of internal economic distribution is unlikely to be very enthusiastic for an interventionist foreign policy, and the country's involvement in OPEC and ECOWAS reflects the concern of a relatively wealthy nation to defend its own interests against those of its poorer African neighbours.

Both books are thought provoking, and Akinyemi's book does contain useful data on how Nigeria has been behaving internationally, since 1975. Neither book provides much ground for optimism that Nigeria can translate what will probably be a brief period of relative prosperity and economic power, into a position as the political and moral leader of Africa. For better or worse, that vacuum remains unfilled.

University of Birmingham DAVID BROWN

Mozambique: A History. By Thomas H. Henriksen. *London: Rex Collings; Cape Town: David Philip. 1978. 276 pp. £8·50.*

THE name Mozambique, we are told, is said to be derived from that of an ancient Sheikh, Musa al Bique. In 1498 when Vasco da Gama anchored there he found quays and well established stone buildings, which he duly bombarded, an augury of things to come.

This history takes us from Khoisan times to 1975. The author says it does not claim to be definitive and the period 1907-1975 is dealt with in greater detail than the earlier centuries. Whether the future will see it as so important is doubtful and although it is valuable to have a recapitulation of these unsettled years, they are not much more inspiring than Guelphs *v.* Ghibellines or the early Merovingian kings. Till about 1960 there were only a few thousand Portuguese living in Mozambique and their impact was not greater than that of other invaders. Their most lasting gift was probably the introduction of crops such as cassava, maize, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, and tobacco.

At first the Portuguese merely intended to establish trading posts on their way to India and it was not until some eighty years after Da Gama that they ventured far into the interior, where they came up against powerful kingdoms, controlling, it was rumoured, the gold of Ophir. The trading posts, Sofala, Quelimane and Mozambique, were no more profitable than the illusive mineral wealth of the interior; and the Portuguese, having superior firearms but fewer desirable trade goods than their Muslim rivals, tended to resort to naval skirmishes rather than attempt to plant a colony in the Greek or Roman sense.

Lord Salisbury described Portuguese claims in east Africa as 'archaeological', but he might more justly have said they were boundless. Traces of abandoned 'fairs' may be seen 400 miles up the Zambesi, occupied when Lacerda passed by on his way to Kasembe's lands, but it was not till the scramble for Africa and after the Berlin Conference that Mozambique's boundaries were settled—and by other powers. Then for the first time various peoples from the Rovuma to the Maputo and from Chinde to Zumbo were lumped together and the foundations of the Mozambique of 1975 laid.

This history contains four useful maps, copious notes and references and two Appendices, the second being President Machel's message at his investiture, outlining the 'correct' line to be followed. Professor Henriksen has a final chapter 'The Future against the Past' which might well have been expanded. Although a policy of austere socialisation and self-sufficiency has been introduced, the government has not despised a measure of economic pragmatism in its relations with capitalist and even racist countries and an interesting electoral system provides a bulwark against direct universal suffrage. If a period of live and let live is dawning, Mozambique could develop into a happy socialist state. Utopia, however, enjoyed the advantage of being an island cut off from the outside world.

JAMES MURRAY

Multinationals and Development in Black Africa: A Case Study in the Ivory Coast. By Jean Masini, Moises Ikonicoff, Claudio Jedlicki and Mario Lanzarotti. *Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House for the European Centre for Study and Information on Multinational Corporations. 1979. 181 pp. £9·00.*

THIS short and expensive book is the work of four economists at the *Institut d'étude du développement economique et social* of the University of Paris-I. Its text may have read clearly in the original French but inexpert translation and poor proof-reading have created much obscurity and the book does not reflect credit on its publisher and its sponsor.

The authors' aim was to study the relations between the subsidiaries in the Ivory Coast of three multinational businesses and the surrounding economy. The firms are SIVOA (Air Liquide), producing industrial gases since 1949; SIEM (Carnaud), manufacturing metal containers since 1959; and CAPRAL (Nestlé), producing instant coffee since 1962 and soup cubes since 1976. The parent firms established capacity in the Ivory Coast for straightforward reasons—Air Liquide because costs dictate production of gases close to markets, Carnaud because one of its major customers began production of pineapples for canning in the Ivory Coast, Nestlé (a purchaser of Ivorian coffee) in response to pressure from the Ivorian government. CAPRAL has evidently been very successful in creating an expanding market for both its products, thus disrupting traditional consumption patterns and causing the authors some anguish on what they term psychosocial grounds. Much of the production of instant coffee is for export (to countries outside the International Coffee Agreement where it can be sold at prices based on Ivorian costs) and most of SIEM's output is an input into exports. Public institutions in the Ivory Coast are a minority shareholder in all three enterprises.

The authors approach their aim by relatively lengthy accounts of the economic structure of the Ivory Coast, the industrial policies of its government, and the history and operations of the three multinationals. Their breakdown of Ivorian industries brings out a positive correlation between foreign ownership and importation of inputs, but this is not a sufficient basis for their conclusion (p. 54) that foreign capital limits 'the development of intermediate exchanges and the degree of industrial integration', since they have not shown for each industry the difference (if any exists) between the importing propensities of foreign-owned and indigenous firms.

The last eighty pages focus on the three subsidiaries themselves and include conclusions on the part they play in the Ivorian economy. Repatriation of profits by these enterprises and payments of licence fees to their parent companies are represented as subtractions from capital accumulation in the Ivory Coast. It is noted that the enterprises employ little labour directly, and hence do not assist (again, directly) in a dispersion of incomes that would widen markets for local production. Finally, the technologies imported are for the subsidiaries' own use and have not (or not yet) become disseminated in the Ivory Coast. These features are said, puzzlingly, to be both distortions of a rather underspecified model of development and inevitable consequences of the model itself. The reader is left with the impression that the multinationals are failing the Ivorian economy, mainly because they are 'unable to create a greater number of jobs than elsewhere' (p. 167). Presented as fruits of an analysis of the interaction of the three firms and the rest of Ivorian economic life, these strictures are disappointingly familiar.

University of Birmingham DOUGLAS RIMMER

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

Peasants and Politics: Grass Roots Reaction to Change in Asia. Edited by D. B. Miller. *London: Arnold. 1979. 218 pp. £8·50.*

THIS book contains papers presented to the first annual conference of the Asian Studies Association. Understandably, but perhaps unwisely, the editor claims our attention with bold statements about the novelty and importance of the venture. He quotes Anthony Low to the effect that 'We in Australia have a more open window on to the Asian world than our like elsewhere'. He claims that villages and peasants have been neglected by scholars, except for anthropologists such as himself, but that some of his colleagues have now 'delved deep into the archives to create a perspective hitherto ignored by historians'. In fact, such assertions are undermined by his colleagues, who show themselves to be properly aware of previous work in this field.

This volume is indeed worth our attention, as it contains some papers based on serious and scholarly research, although it also contains a few of a different type. J. A. Mills surveys 'Burmese Peasant Response to British Provincial Rule, 1852-1885', and finds similarities in peasant reactions to the demands of central governments in traditional, colonial and independent Burma. In a paper on 'Peasant Movements and the Communist Party in Kerala, 1937-1960', Robin Jeffrey argues that peasant militancy was stimulated by the existence of big landlords in an area and was liberated by the collapse of social and religious restraints: there was less militancy both in Roman Catholic and in Muslim areas. Dennis Shoesmith, on the other hand, shows how rural discontent has taken the form of religious revivalism of a heterodox type in the Rizalian movement in the Philippines.

There are also papers characterised by similar assumptions and vocabulary. Christine Pelzer White shows how in recent years party 'cadres' have persuaded peasants to support the Communist Party in Vietnam—perhaps preparing the way for those policies of social adjustment for which the government of Vietnam has become world famous, or notorious. Neville Maxwell shows how one of Chairman Mao's slogans—'In agriculture learn from Tachai'—was disseminated among the peasantry of China and attempts an assessment of the consequences. He has, however, to depend on statistics supplied to him by the authorities, and has some difficulty in elucidating what precisely were the errors of 'capitalist roaders', not to speak of the Gang of Four. The editor, for his part, strives manfully to argue that the findings of his various contributors all go to show the evils of 'international capitalism'.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London KENNETH BALLHATCHET

Politics Mainly Indian. By W. H. Morris-Jones. *Bombay: Orient Longman. 1979. 392 pp. Rs. 60.00.*

W. H. MORRIS-JONES has been studying Indian politics for thirty-five years. He began with the Indian Army, editing a newspaper for Indian soldiers, and then looked after mule transport in the Khyber Pass. After five and a half years with the army in India and a short return to the London School of Economics (as teacher instead of student), in 1947 he was asked to join Mountbatten's staff for the last two months before the transfer of power to independent India. During the subsequent thirty years, through visits to study or teach, he has remained close to India and Indians in mind and heart.

His long involvement in Indian politics, which he describes as 'the dialectic of immersion and detachment' (p. x) has somehow enabled him to develop a special empathy, leading to imaginative leaps in the identification of meaningful patterns

structuring the Indian scene. The intuitional dimensions he brings to bear on Indian politics continually astonish.

Morris-Jones is never pedestrian, but there is a vintage champagne sparkle to his articles on India in this volume, which is lacking in his other contributions. He is unique on India; on other political matters he is among his peers.

This reviewer regrets learning that he is engaged on 'a cross-national comparative legislative study' (p. xi). Indianists must hope that he will quickly return to an Indian subject on which his almost telepathic skills as a participant observer will be fully extended.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London HUGH GRAY

China's Oil Future: A Case of Modest Expectations. By Randall W. Hardy. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press; Folkestone: Dawson. 1978. 148 pp. £9·50.*

THIS is one of the most concise accounts of a difficult and controversial subject. Randall Hardy, who for many years was associated with Departments of the American administration on matters of energy resources, devoted two years to the study of China's oil industry and its prospects. The result is this slim volume of hardly 150 pages—a revised and updated version of the author's original 'exposé' which was issued by the Center for Strategy and International Studies at Georgetown University. The volume consists of two almost equal parts, the first of which provides the reader with the essential facts of the Chinese oil situation, which the author puts in the wider context of the country's relations with its neighbours Japan and Russia. The other half of his study contains statistics and other background information, which is supported by half-a-dozen maps.

Unlike some other earlier writers on the subject, the author is cautious in his judgment which he presents in a crisp style. The uninitiated reader can enjoy this literature without being forced to consult technical textbooks. The author is fully aware of some of the special problems of China's mineral oils which have a high 'pour point' and a high wax content and thus tend to clog the pipelines and foul the refinery equipment. Yet, in the maze of technological problems, Hardy never loses sight of the wider economic and political issues.

On two counts the author stands to be corrected. As the volume of China's foreign trade has increased at about twice the rate at which its overall economic product has grown, the share of these overseas activities cannot have remained 'almost unchanged' (p. 47); it must have increased. On the question of joint ventures (p. 51), the author's scepticism has been overtaken by events. Of course, the acceptance of the concept of joint ventures—as that of 'buy-back' trade—is implemented less readily than it is conceived. Even so, the Chinese leaders have moved away from the principle of self-reliance which was holy writ not so long ago. The author's overall judgment can be accepted as sound. He draws the conclusion from his analysis that oil is only one of the increasing number of arrows in China's quiver and that it will complicate but not control the politics of East Asia.

St Antony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

International Straits of the World. Vol. 2: Malacca, Singapore, and Indonesia. By Michael Leifer. *Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff.* 1979. 217 pp. Fl. 70.00. $35.00.

THIS admirably concise, clear, and many-faceted study will be essential reading for anyone interested in contemporary Indonesian foreign relations as well as for those

concerned with the problems of passage through some of the world's most heavily-travelled and strategic straits. Beginning with an account of the historical importance of the Malacca straits, the author develops a discussion of the recent political, legal, economic, and military factors affecting the waterways of the area. His main focus is on Indonesian attitudes and policies, both because of that country's predominant importance in the region and because it has asserted the right to restrict passage through the waters separating its own islands on the grounds that, as an archipelagic nation-state, it must view such sea areas as internal.

Although Indonesia's assertion of the 'archipelago principle' as the basis for jurisdiction over the waters separating its island components has perhaps the greatest ultimate significance for international law, the questions which have caused the most international concern until now have related to passage through the Strait of Malacca. Here Malaysia and Indonesia have co-operated to assert authority over passage through the waters, to the discomfiture of Singapore and the major powers whose economic and military interests are served by the preservation of the principle of free passage. Dr Leifer portrays fairly the aims and attitudes of the nations involved and shows how rapid change in technology and in the larger international order have greatly affected calculations concerning the use of the Straits.

A series of six maps shows the principal sea passages dealt with in the book. All are helpful except the first, on which many of the place names are so small as to be illegible without a glass—just as well, for they contain several spelling errors.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London RUTH MCVEY

Chroniques de Guerre . . . et d'Espoir. By Norodom Sihanouk. *Paris: Hachette/Stock. 1979. 303 pp. Pb.*

Hanoi: Combats pour un Empire. By Roger Holeindre and Marcel Marsal. *Paris, Jacques Grancher. 1979. 211 pp.*

PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK'S first exile in Peking, 1970-75, received literary commemoration in two books written under his name but not precisely by his own hand: *L'Indochine vue de Pékin*, a series of conversations with Jean Lacouture (Seoul, 1972); and, in very tight harness with Wilfred Burchett, *My War with the CIA* (Penguin, 1973). Following upon three years in Phnom Penh (1976-78) as the captive of his former allies the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk was once again the guest of the Chinese government, between February and May 1979. In this short period he set down, without ghosting or prompting by any interested party, the fruits of three years' observation of the galloping megalomania of his Phnom Penh 'hosts', together with his reflections on the failure of American policy in Cambodia (1970-75), the nature of Vietnamese politics and expansionism, and the chances of a Sihanouk-led government of Cambodia as an internationally acceptable alternative to the domination of Hanoi. The result is a work of originality and profundity, a historical source-book as well as a mine of interpretation beside which other recent writing will be counted something of a 'sideshow'.

Chroniques de Guerre . . . et d'Espoir extends scant hope to those who have tried to find a thread of rationality in Democratic Kampuchea's assaults on Vietnamese territory, or have simply asserted that these assaults never happened or that Vietnam must have taken the initiative. Nor, clearly, does Sihanouk see justice in Democratic Kampuchea's demand for the exclusive right to propose frontier adjustments to Vietnam (which Stephen P. Heder has lately identified as a Sihanoukist posture dating from the 1960s). As for the Cambodian phase of the Second Indochina War (the early 1970s), Sihanouk gives us Khieu Samphan's word for it that despite the alleged

misbehaviour of Vietnamese forces on Cambodian territory they did hand over to the Khmer Rouge in 1972 all the Khmer personnel trained in North Vietnam after regroupment in 1954, and the units recruited in Cambodia after 1970. This appears to contradict the common view that Hanoi intended to use these elements to divide and dominate the Cambodian revolution—though undoubtedly once the majority of them had been liquidated, Hanoi's attitude towards the Khmer Rouge was bound to change for the worse. Again citing Khieu Samphan, Sihanouk confirms the figure of 'Hanoi Khmers' at the conventionally accepted level of 5,000; here, however, the sceptic may turn to the Khmer Rouge's own *Livre Noir* (1978), which leaves all the Khmer-Vietminh 'in situ' in Cambodia from 1954. *Chroniques de Guerre* and *Livre Noir* are in agreement on one point: that American bombing did the Khmer Rouge themselves little harm; but not on the constant role of Hanoi's forces in the Khmer Rouge rise to power (not even the sapper work inside Phnom Penh was carried out by Khmer Rouge: thus Sihanouk 1979, p. 66, in bald contrast to Sihanouk and Burchett 1973, p. 180!).

Regarding his own contribution to the victory of the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk admits the cool cynicism with which they exploited his name but excuses his collaboration as a kind of duty imposed on him by Lon Nol's 1970 coup and the wishes of Chou En Lai. The coup received help from the CIA but was abhorrent more particularly as the work of a greedy clique insensitive to the necessity of a co-operative relationship with the Vietnamese Communists. (Sihanouk is silent on Nixon's secret bombing of 1969 and thus does not reveal whether he disliked it, and whether he believes it forced the Vietnamese more into the open, turning their presence in Cambodia into the political liability which provoked the coup, as William Shawcross has argued.) From the stand-point of present political relevance, Sihanouk's new book must be understood as an attempt to draw on the credit which he ought to have accumulated with Pham Van Dong and colleagues as their ally against the United States, either tacitly or overtly, up to 1975. He is lucid about the likely reluctance of Hanoi to surrender its recent gains to him, but no less insistent on the madness of trying to achieve anything by force. Would that the Prince's latest initiatives, with China's support, had honoured that precept!

Generations, even centuries, of Chinese violence against Vietnam are simultaneously the prescription and prospect offered by two journalists in their emotionally anti-Vietnamese, up-to-the-minute excursus, in which the seeds of Vietnamese conquest throughout Indochina are sought not merely in the Testament of Ho Chi Minh but initially much further back, in the eclipse of Champa and other milestones on the forward march of the Vietnamese race. Trickery and treachery are the watchwords. The new Cambodian President, Heng Samrin, is identified as a 'Hanoi Khmer' and Vietnamese agent because his official biography is silent on his whereabouts between 1954–70. On the other hand we are assured that the last Khmer Communists with a Vietnamese connection were purged in 1977. Inconsistencies like this may prompt questions about how competently the writers have analysed interview material collected in Thailand, or their 'intelligence' about divisions in the Hanoi Politbureau which mysteriously delayed fateful moves against the Khmer Rouge, and what General Giap supposedly said to Leonid Brezhnev in the Kremlin in June 1978 to win his support for a military adventure against Democratic Kampuchea. The writers do not so much race, as zig-zag, through the modern history of Indochina, making copious use of the *futur historique* to anticipate steps in their great teleological drama. In short, a confusing, unsatisfactory book. Its thirty-three photographs are less informative than Sihanouk's dozen in *Chroniques de Guerre*.

University of Kent ROGER KERSHAW

Government Administration in Australia. By R. N. Spann. *Sydney, London: Allen and Unwin. 1979. 524 pp. £17·95. Pb: £8·50.*

Elites in Australia. By John Higley, Desley Deacon and Don Smart. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1979. 317 pp. £9·50.*

A POLITICAL scientist who started working for the Whitlam government in 1973 found that he already knew half the other personal staff: 'it's in the discovery of so many connexions that one realises what a small country this is, and how important face-to-face groups are' (Spann p. 279). The art of describing and explaining Australia lies in being able to combine this sense of smallness with an appreciation of the relationships between the six states of the Commonwealth in a continent larger than Europe but with only 14 million people, 60 per cent of whom live in large cities.

These two recent books do not quite complement each other in a way that enables the reader to hold together the large and the small. Dick Spann has abandoned trying to revise yet again his *Public Administration in Australia*, and instead, with the help of several colleagues, he has put together a compendium of eighteen chapters under almost the same title as that used by the Coombs Royal Commission (1973-76)—'government administration'—which also enables him to describe the 'process' as well as the 'structure' of politics. The result is a rich plum pudding of a book with all kinds of fruit to extract and chew on. Part Four on 'some problems of policy and management' includes a lot of material on recent developments in planning and budgeting as well as an appraisal of administrative reform itself. This part reflects the investigations undertaken on behalf of the Coombs Royal Commission. Parts Two and Three are more orthodox descriptions of structure and procedure, based upon, in some cases, original drafts by other authors, such as T. H. Kewley on non-departmental agencies, A. J. A. Gardner on administrative co-operation between the states, and Ruth Atkins on local government. The whole work is suffused with colour from Professor Spann's knowledge of Britain, and with his sense of the difference between Washington and Westminster. Indeed (if outsiders are permitted to comment) it betrays precisely that 'metropolitan provincialism' which he recognises (p. 39) has dogged the federation. Dick Spann shows that he belongs to Sydney and New South Wales. Adelaide and Perth are not mentioned in the index; Melbourne and Brisbane are barely recognised! Part of the charm of the book lies in the forays made into British and American debates—the occasional reference to the Fulton report or to American models of 'the policy process'.

John Higley's book, in contrast, is more severe, and tied much more closely to a definite intellectual influence—that of G. Lowell Field in Connecticut, whose approach to the theory of elites strives to avoid the emphases of either Marxism or structural functionalism. The result is a summary of replies to a series of interviews with 370 people conducted in 1975, with some follow up in 1977. But the overall picture presented lacks the sense of smallness which can readily be used in understanding 'the policy process', partly because the author and his collaborators are a little mesmerised by the concept of a fourth stage in social development—'a generalised bureaucratic culture' with a 'consensual unified elite', and partly because they use a network analysis of the interactions of influential people which gives little indication of space. Where are the meeting places that matter? If Dick Spann basks in a Sydney provincialism, John Higley looks more towards the United States. Higley and his collaborators are based on the sociology department in ANU's Research School of Social Sciences.

The difficulty of relating these two books is symptomatic of academic syndromes in Australian studies. John Higley does not really pause to explain the essential feature of what he calls (p. 144) 'the hallmark of consensual unified "elites" '—the fact that 'elites oppose each other publicly, consistently and sharply on current issues' without

allowing these conflicts to jeopardise the stability of existing institutions. He wants to place Australia within some wider pattern of elite behaviour. Dick Spann begins with the stability of existing institutions without paying much attention to the sociological factors, apart from occasional bits of organisation theory (*e.g.*, pp. 94 ff). He would like to keep in the forefront of his studies some reference to the Westminster model and colonial constitutions. It is not surprising that 'the working of federalism at the official level is still a relatively unexplored subject' (Spann, p. 37). It looks as if Australian academics still need to build bridges across the gap between public administration and sociology. Higley's hypothesis (p. 179) that 'policy making processes are structured in such a way that elite persons have disproportionate influence in them' is an apparent tautology which needs examination.

In the meanwhile, Dick Spann's new book is clearly an important starting-point for the outsider to begin with. Its bibliography and footnotes are a useful guide to the existing literature. It would, incidentally, have been easier to use for regular reference if its Contents page had included the crossheadings of each chapter, as does that of John Higley's book. The non-Australian may also wish to use the Index to overcome ignorance of special Australian features. Some things are mentioned before they are properly explained (e.g., the Public Service Acts). This weakness may of course originate from the use of drafts by other hands. Higley's book is also the product of at least three other researchers besides the three on the cover.

Birkbeck College, London J. M. LEE

NORTH AMERICA

American Multinationals and American Interests. By Fred C. Bergsten, Thomas Horst and Theodore H. Moran. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1978. 535 pp. $18.95. Pb: $8.95.*

AMERICAN multinational corporations account for half the world's foreign direct investment which is now worth more than two hundred billion dollars. Some of these investments are in parts of the world and in industrial sectors which are of particular importance as far as American interests are concerned. This substantial book examines in some detail the domestic and foreign policy issues raised by this offshore activity engaged in by the United States. It is a comprehensive volume (over 500 authors are cited in footnotes) and draws widely on the experience of countries other than the United States. As one would expect from the principal author who has had experience of both academic research and national policy formulation, the study blends economic and political considerations in a lively and at times provocative manner. It concludes with proposals for new American policy initiatives on the subject which although they may be considered by some as too interventionist, deserve to be taken seriously.

The rise of the multinational corporation (MNC) as a means of producing and transmitting wealth across political boundaries is a very well-worked subject. There seems little shortage of effort in the 1960s to produce evidence for use in castigating the MNC for its lack of patriotism or responsibility to someone, somewhere. This critical literature evoked a predictable response in the early 1970s with studies expounding the world-wide economic benefits of foreign direct investment. Few if any of the general charges originally made about multinational corporations have been shown to have any general validity. Of course every student of the subject can add

some notorious exceptions to the normally high standards of international commercial behaviour by which the majority of companies do business; the imminence of agreement on a code of practice covering the principal causes of conflict testifies to the slow but clear realisation that foreign (private) direct investment and its main agent, the MNC is economically beneficial to both the host country and investing country alike. This book reinforces this conclusion in the case of American-owned corporations but goes on to raise different issues concerning conflicts of policy between corporations and nation states.

The authors point out that whereas there are certain accepted concepts undergirding international trade and international monetary relations, no such consensus exists regarding foreign direct investment. It is to try and clear a way through the conflicting rhetoric of the last two decades and reach some firm ground, at any rate with regard to American policy, that this study (which took five years) has been undertaken.

The lack of any agreed norm of behaviour results in competitive bidding by potential host countries for the investments of MNCs. These take the form of tax breaks, subsidies, and a variety of schemes to protect the multinationals from the rigours of international competition. As a result American national interest may be at risk, not least because of lost tax revenues and reduced domestic job opportunities.

Domestic and foreign policy objects can also come into sharp conflict when a diplomatic dispute arises between a host country and an investing country—especially when economic sanctions are being considered as a lever. The US government, for instance, has little if any claim to tell an American subsidiary incorporated in a host country (or for that matter any country) how to behave, yet American citizens expect protection if they, or their property, are threatened. Chapter Thirteen sets out a way of tackling these sorts of problems. It consists mainly of listing issues where international agreement on policy and procedures between as many nations as possible should be sought. The authors recognise that to make progress on this a lead must be given by the United States. They warn that the scale and pace of foreign direct investment is bound to result in more international incidents, some of which could have serious impacts on international relations. This book is a constructive contribution to a world problem which can be masked all too easily by more dramatic events which consume the energies of our politicians.

British-North American Research Association, London SIMON WEBLEY

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Nicaragua: Dictatorship and Revolution. *London: Latin America Bureau. 1979. 50 pp. Pb: £0·75.*

El Salvador under General Romero. *London: Latin America Bureau. 1979. 270 pp. Pb.*

Britain and Latin America: An Annual Review of British-Latin American Relations, 1979. *London: Latin America Bureau. 1979. 189 pp. Pb: £2·50.*

THE Latin America Bureau, founded in 1977, now has some nine publications to its credit. Probably the best was Roger Plant's *Guatemala: Unnatural Disaster*. The rest are of uneven quality, but all are useful. There is a curious concentration on Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and Belize). One could wish that the

Bureau would pay some attention to the larger countries; and though it is right to unmask brutal dictatorships there would be value in doing similar studies of those countries which have achieved some success in attempting Western style democracy: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, for example. The condemnation of dictatorships, alas too often and for too long supported by the United States, gives the impression of stronger left-wing sympathies than is justifiable, not least in the light of the known political views of some of the sponsors (listed on the fly-leaf of the 1979 Annual Review), as, for example, Sir Bernard Braine and Lord Avebury.

Nicaragua: Dictatorship and Revolution is little more than a pamphlet; but on the whole it is a good one. It provides a straightforward account of the rise of the Somoza dynasty; the dastardly murder of the rebel General Sandino in 1934; the brutal use of the American-created and trained National Guard; the alienation of all decent and moderate men; the rise and growth of the Sandinista rebels; and their final success with the overthrow of Somoza in July 1979. New to me is the report that William Bowdler of the American State Department, who, together with a Guatemalan and a Dominican formed a Washington-sponsored mediation commission, seriously believed he could bring about a combination of anti-Somoza elements in the National Guard and civilian conservatives opposed to Somoza, as an alternative to the left-wing Sandinistas (p. 26). Can there really be such inept officials in the State Department? Less new to me is the story that the then Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, agreed in 1940 that Somoza was a son of a bitch, but added—'but he's *our* son of a bitch' (p. 18). I have heard it about a State Department official speaking of the Cuban dictator Batista. The pamphlet contains a great deal of background information and a number of appendices sensibly and usefully presented. There is no attribution of authorship so presumably it is the work of the staff of the Bureau.

El Salvador under General Romero is a much more ambitious and massive work. It is an analysis of the first nine months of the regime of President Romero. It is an interesting and painstaking analysis but far too detailed for the ordinary reader. Scholars may turn to it for background information. As it is, the fact that General Romero has been ousted inevitably detracts from the immediate interest of the study. What would now be of greater interest would be a close look at how the new regime is struggling, against the extremes of Right and Left, to restore order and at the same time achieve some measure of reform and social justice in a small country notorious for the misery of its poor and the luxury of its rich—the famous fourteen families. But it is fair to add that the conclusion of the study reveals some optimism: 'there is a nascent hope', it says, 'one that is fed upon heroism and reason' (p. 252).

The idea of an annual review of British-Latin American relations is a good one and I, at least, hope it will be persevered in, even though I do not think the 1979 review does the job satisfactorily. A number of disparate articles by different authors on subjects as wide ranging as whether there is a real 'return to democracy' in Latin America (pp. 9–27) and on the growing trade between South Africa and Latin America (pp. 90–117) does not present an intelligible and balanced picture of relations between Britain and Latin America. The article on political relations, which should perhaps be the longest, is in fact the shortest (pp. 50–56). In it Christopher Roper makes a point which cannot be denied when he writes of the 'appallingly low level of debate where Latin America is concerned inside the major political parties' (p. 51). On the other hand I cannot believe that the Hispanic and Luso-Brazilian Councils (Canning House) are quite as sinister as he paints them; nor do I think it fair to describe the Lords Chalfont and Montgomery (respectively president and chairman) as 'enthusiastic defenders of some of the ugliest and most repressive governments in the world' (p. 53). Ill-balanced though it is, this review yields some information normally difficult to come by, as in the article on the arms trade. There are some useful statistics; those on trade could well have done with some attempt to explain Britain's

poor showing. A table showing the amount of aid distributed by Britain to Latin American countries in 1977 (p. 178) shows that the sums are not large—just over £9 million in grants and £3-4 million in loans. But by far the biggest grant of over £2 million went to Pinochet's Chile—and this not so long after the media were headlining the brutal treatment suffered by Sheila Cassidy. This too might have been accompanied by some explanation. If this annual review is to make a serious contribution to an understanding of relations between Britain and Latin America it will need a firmer and more coherent editorial policy and control.

G. J. A. CAMACHO

Arise Ye Starvelings: The Jamaican Labour Rebellion of 1938 and its Aftermath. By K. W. J. Post. *The Hague, London: Nijhoff for the Institute of Social Studies. 1979. 502 pp. (Series on the Development of Societies, Vol. 3.) Fl. 80.00.*

KEN POST has undoubtedly written a book on the grand scale, both theoretically and empirically. His specific concern is with the workers and peasants of Jamaica and the actions they took in May and June 1938 in instigating the so-called labour rebellion. However, his approach to these events is not merely that of historical reconstruction: it is under-pinned throughout by Marxist theoretical categories. In the introduction, entitled 'The Problematic', Post declares his aim to be 'to develop a Marxist concept of political practice by showing its necessary relations to material and mental production' (p. 9). This is deemed to require an investigation, both in theory and through the writing of history, of the relationship between the political and man's other major practices, the economic and the cognitive. Thus the book passes through a number of levels in its three parts. Part I is an attempt to formulate a general theory of historical formations like Jamaica, utilising concepts like 'structure', 'articulation', 'contradiction' and 'determination'; Part II is an analysis of the levels reached by class formation in Jamaica on the eve of the labour rebellion; and Part III a more concrete description of the events which led up to, formed and immediately resulted from the rebellion. There is a general progression throughout the book from theory to data.

As such, it really needs a trained Marxist theoretician to review the first part of the book. Non-Marxists will find it difficult and many will feel that Post has engaged in 'overkill' in setting out his theoretical apparatus in such detail. There are times when it is not difficult to accept Post's own warning that some of this is 'perhaps rather arid, and certainly highly schematic' (p. 69). Having said that, it has to be admitted that at the end of the day the theory is 'cashed in' (to use another of Post's own phrases) in a most telling and illuminating way. There is no doubt that understanding of the rebellion is considerably extended by Post's earlier exposition of the contradictions, both antagonistic and non-antagonistic, of Jamaican capitalism in the 1930s. He demonstrates clearly the analytical power of Marxism when it is used in a subtle and sophisticated way. Yet, for those who are made uneasy by theorising, the narrative sections of the book still tell a gripping story in their own right—the story of 'Quashee' (the stereotype of the happy irresponsible Jamaican negro) standing up and resisting his oppressors. Post talks in the foreword of meeting the empiricists on their own ground and he does so in a formidably scholarly way. Even at this more prosaic historical level, therefore, the book is of value. The 1938 labour rebellion which it describes was a formative episode in the development of modern Jamaica, for it gave birth to the two movements of protest—the Bustamante Industrial Union and the People's National Party—which were to provide the polarities of Jamaican politics for the succeeding two or three decades.

No doubt Ken Post will divide reviews of his book into the bourgeois and the Marxist—as he does the works cited in his bibliography—and this will presumably fall into the former category. Nevertheless, I warmly welcome Post's book as a major contribution to the creation of a badly-needed school of radical Caribbean studies to match that which has emerged in this vein in the study of Africa.

Huddersfield Polytechnic ANTHONY PAYNE

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University of Bath E. HORESH

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FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE

*Rt Hon Lord Soames**

FROM the beginning, Britain's commitment in Rhodesia was hesitant and reluctant—the reverse of full-hearted. The British Colony in the lands deemed to be within Lobengula's allegiance began as a private enterprise venture inspired by Cecil Rhodes. It developed rapidly through the efforts of individual settlers and private capital attracted there by a locally responsible government. And over the last fifteen years of its life as a British Colony, this tradition of detachment from the metropolitan power reached its culmination in that ultimate act of political private enterprise—Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

There is consequently something of an irony in the fact that, in the end, Britain could only terminate her constitutional connection with Rhodesia by taking on a role—and attendant risks—that was more extensive and demanding than any which she had played at any previous stage in Rhodesia's history. In Rhodesia the drama of colonial history was played in reverse—metropolitan power having been very limited at the beginning, but with total responsibility being assumed at the end. Indeed one cannot help feeling that this end was somehow connected with that beginning by the obscure workings of nemesis: that the half-heartedness of the commitment accepted by the British Government at Cecil Rhodes's instance in 1889 was the first step down the road which led to a British Cabinet Minister going out to Salisbury almost a hundred years later, equipped with the full panoply of executive and legislative powers to return to the people whence they had come. Perhaps there is a lesson to us in this chain of events—that in politics, as in life in general, it is always wisest and most satisfactory in the long run to be full-hearted in any commitment we may undertake.

Nevertheless, whatever the chain of cause and effect, Britain's historic task of delivering Rhodesia to internationally recognised sovereign statehood under majority rule has now been honourably accomplished. My purpose here is to describe for the record how this was done, and then to offer some reflections, by way of conclusion, on the character of Britain's colonial experience and on its meaning for both the colonised and the colonisers.

The Conservatives take office

I turn first of all to the situation as it was when the present British government took office on May 5, 1979.

*Lord Soames, the last British Governor of Rhodesia, delivered this text as the Cyril Foster memorial lecture at Oxford University on May 19, 1980.

Under the so-called 'internal settlement' a constitution had recently been adopted within Rhodesia, under which, for the first time in the country's history, the Head of State, the Head of Government and most members of both Houses of Parliament were members of the majority race. The Black members of that Parliament had been chosen in an election in which an estimated 65 per cent of the population of the country took part. The Conservative Party had sent a team of observers to witness that election, and it had stated in its own election manifesto that it would 'aim to achieve a lasting settlement to the Rhodesia problem based on the democratic wishes of the people of that country'. The manifesto went on to say that, 'if the Six Principles, which all *British Governments have supported for the last fifteen years, are fully satisfied* following the present Rhodesian Election, the next government will have the duty to return Rhodesia to a state of legality, move to lift sanctions, and to do its utmost to ensure that the new independent state gains international recognition.'

On the other hand, the United Nations Security Council had adopted on March 8 a resolution which condemned the Rhodesian elections and urged member states not to send observers to them. Neither the member states nor the British Labour government sent official observers to the elections. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had declared on April 26, two days after the publication of the Rhodesian election results, that they were 'null and void'; and again on April 30—almost on the eve of the British General Election—the Security Council adopted another resolution which yet again condemned the elections in Rhodesia and called on member states not to accord recognition to any government set up in consequence of it. To its credit Mr Callaghan's government instructed Ivor Richard, at that time Britain's representative on the Security Council, to abstain from the vote on that resolution—as on the previous one. And in his explanation of the vote, Mr Richard stressed that the British government did not regard either resolution as binding or as circumscribing the freedom of judgment and action of the British Parliament in the exercise of its responsibilities.

As the Conservative Party's election manifesto had made clear, the essential question was how to ensure that Rhodesia, having been granted legal independence by Britain, would secure international recognition. For without international recognition there is no doubt that economic sanctions would have continued to be applied by the majority of states, and that the guerrilla war in Rhodesia would have continued to mount in intensity with growing support from outside. It was clear that Britain by herself could not impose a settlement which would automatically command international agreement leading to the termination of economic sanctions and the end of the war. It was necessary, therefore, to explore with our friends and allies in the European Community, in Nato, and in the Commonwealth what form of settlement would carry the degree of international support required for a legally independent Zimbabwe to begin life with a reasonable chance of stability and racial reconciliation.

It was in this spirit that, on May 15, the new Conservative Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, welcomed the major change which had taken place in Rhodesia as a result of the recent elections and the emergence of an African majority government, and defined the objective of her government as being to build on that change to achieve a return to legality in conditions that secured wide international recognition. She emphasised that the government must and would recognise the realities of the present situation in Rhodesia, but that it must and would also take into account the wider international implications.

International consultations

The stage was now set for the consultations on which the government had said they would embark. A major part in these was played by Lord Harlech, who was named by Mrs Thatcher as her special envoy to Africa. Perhaps it has been insufficiently recognised how wise and appropriate this choice was. In appointing to this task one who had not only served with distinction as a member of a former Conservative administration and as British ambassador in Washington, but who had earned a reputation for fairness and integrity in Rhodesia and indeed throughout Africa as Deputy Chairman of the Pearce Commission, the Prime Minister did much to demonstrate to opinion in Africa, with all the doubts and apprehensions it seemed to feel about the new British government's policy, that the outcome of the government's consultations could not—any more than the verdict of the Pearce Commission—be taken as a foregone conclusion.

The message which emerged from Lord Harlech's mission was clear and unambiguous. He found in Africa an encouraging recognition that major changes had indeed taken place in Rhodesia. But, as Lord Carrington told the House of Lords on July 10, Lord Harlech found also that there was widespread criticism of the new Rhodesian constitution—in particular of the blocking power given to the White minority in Parliament over a wide range of legislation, and also of the character and powers of the Public Service and other Commissions. There was a general feeling also that, in order to be acceptable to the international community, a solution of the problem must be seen to stem from the British government as the constitutionally responsible authority, and that some further attempt must be made to involve all the parties to the dispute in the search for a settlement. These views were clearly by no means confined to the radical end of the political spectrum in Africa. At the same time, it was also evident that this perspective was widely shared in Europe, in the United States, and throughout the Commonwealth.

The next step in the government's consultations was the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting which was to take place in Lusaka from August 1 to 7. Rhodesia was bound to be a major preoccupation at this meeting. The problem facing the British government was to seek to ensure that the legitimate interest of the Commonwealth in this problem was turned into a constructive channel—that Britain should retain the greatest possible freedom of manoeuvre to ensure that whatever momentum there was towards a

generally acceptable settlement was not dissipated and was if possible reinforced. There was no lack of foreboding before the Lusaka summit that this problem was not merely difficult but insoluble. Indeed, a leading British weekly (*The Economist*), writing before the British Election, had gone so far as to suggest that the Prime Minister should not attend the meeting at all. Mrs Thatcher herself had no intention of listening to these counsels of despair. She charted the course she had set herself for Lusaka very clearly in a Parliamentary statement on July 25, in the course of which she pledged that the British government would put forward firm proposals, after the Lusaka meeting, on the constitutional arrangements to achieve a proper basis for legal independence for Rhodesia—proposals which would reflect the Six Principles and would be comparable to the basis on which we had granted independence to other former British territories in Africa. She added that this would be addressed to all the parties to the conflict, and that the British government would never subscribe to a solution which sought to substitute the bullet for the ballot box.

The government's approach was unanimously endorsed at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, in a joint declaration which was almost as remarkable for what it did not say as for what it did say. Unlike previous Commonwealth declarations on Rhodesia, it contained no condemnation of the illegal regime. Unlike the resolution which the OAU had adopted on July 21, it contained no calls for the reinforcement of sanctions or for the recognition of the Patriotic Front as the sole legitimate and authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe. Nor did it lay down any conditions for the granting of independence to Rhodesia which were not already at least implicit in the position which the British government had already taken.

In all this the Commonwealth leaders showed wisdom. If they still had doubts about Britain's approach, they were evidently prepared to give us the benefit of them. Furthermore, by agreeing to a framework in very general terms they had compromised no principle to which any of them were attached, had safeguarded their own freedom of manoeuvre for the future—to which they no doubt gave as much weight as we did—and they had avoided a sterile confrontation which would have done neither Rhodesia nor the reputation of the Commonwealth any good. On the other hand, the declaration contained positive statements of the highest importance. It acknowledged that the future government of Rhodesia must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British government authority, and with Commonwealth observers. And it welcomed the British government's indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for it to call a constitutional conference to which all parties would be invited.

Lancaster House

Within a week of the close of the Lusaka meeting, the British government

sent invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and to the leaders of the Patriotic Front alliance (as it then was) to attend a constitutional conference which was to open at Lancaster House on September 10. At the same time, it published outline proposals for an independence constitution.

These proposals were quite deliberately framed in very general terms. They were very largely compatible with the constitution which had already been adopted in Rhodesia. But at the same time, they took account of the criticisms which had been made of that constitution in Africa and elsewhere in two crucial respects. They stated that the constitution would prescribe procedures to be followed for effecting amendments on lines similar to those contained in other independence constitutions granted by Britain—which implied that the representatives of the minority could not have a blocking power. And they made it clear that the power to make certain senior appointments in the public service and other services would be vested in the Prime Minister. No party to the conference was asked to commit itself to these proposals in advance. Nothing was said about how these or any other proposals would be implemented, or about how the military questions associated with a transition to legal independence should be solved.

This reticence in fact supplied the clue to the two essential elements in the strategy which the British government was to pursue throughout the months of the Lancaster House Conference. In the first place, the British delegation stuck firmly to the view that the order of discussion must start with the destination at which the conference was to arrive—the terms of the independence constitution. Only then should the Conference go on to deal with the route by which that destination was to be approached—the arrangements for implementation of the constitution. This was of fundamental importance. The previous British government's unhappy experience with the Anglo-American proposals launched in September 1977 had been that serious discussion of the independence constitution had never even started, while valuable time had been wasted in sterile controversy over the arrangements for the transition to independence. This was an experience which we were determined not to repeat. We wanted to decide first whether the Sunday School treat was to go to Bognor or Bournemouth. We could discuss later whether it should go by train or coach.

Second, the role adopted by the British government was always to guide the negotiations from the general to the particular. At every stage we sought to introduce—just as we had done before, during and after the Lusaka conference—statements of broad principle to which it was very difficult for the delegations themselves, or their supporters outside Lancaster House, to take exception. We then proceeded step by step to deduce the logical consequences which we argued had to flow from assent to these statements. Here again we were learning from the experience of the past, which strongly suggested that the introduction of too much detail too soon, however worthy the intention with which it was done, in practice led debate into side issues and enabled those

who were so inclined to evade the major questions which *had* to be settled
before a solution could be in sight.

This strategy might not in itself have been sufficient to ensure success in the Conference. The three months which it lasted were long enough—too long in he opinion of most of those taking part. But the procedures could no doubt ave been protracted indefinitely if the British government had not displayed oth inside and outside Lancaster House the quality which had already uggested itself immediately after it took office—a determination to implement vhat it believed to be right and defensible, once all the arguments for and gainst had been deployed, whether all the other parties to the Conference had ignified their agreement or not. At each point when the Conference reached a risis, the British government was ready to take convincing steps to show that would give no party a veto over the implementation of solutions which ought o commend themselves to reasonable men. At each such stage, it was of ourse condemned by some for its intransigence. But it stood firm, and its rmness was vindicated at every stage.

Firmness displayed in a vacuum, however, would have achieved little. We iust acknowledge that circumstances were working in favour of the overnment too. Both sides in the war in Rhodesia were weary of it as they had ever been weary before. So were the neighbouring states. Moreover, both ishop Muzorewa's delegation and the Patriotic Front were sustained by the vident conviction that their cause was just and could achieve victory through ie ballot box. Bishop Muzorewa's delegation was fortified by its success in inning the support of a large majority of the voting population in an election nly five months before the opening of the Conference. And the Patriotic Front elieved that history was on its side and that it was indeed, as it had so often old the world, the only authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe.

It was against this background that the Lancaster House Conference roceeded. There is no need for me to recount its course in detail. It is well nown that it was marked by three major turning-points. The first was in mid-October. Bishop Muzorewa's delegation had agreed to the British overnment's proposals for the independence constitution, and bilateral iscussion of the pre-independence arrangements had already begun between ritish officials and Bishop Muzorewa's delegation. It was only then that, on October 19, the Patriotic Front delegation indicated that it conditionally ccepted the constitutional proposals and that the conference as a whole was ble to move on to discuss their implementation. It was at this point that the ritish government revealed for the first time that it was ready to appoint a ritish Governor with executive and legislative authority to convey Rhodesia o independence.

Again the course of the Conference built up to another crisis almost a onth later. It was only on November 15—after a Southern Rhodesia Bill nabling the government to promulgate the independence constitution and to ake the arrangements necessary to bring it into effect had completed all its

stages in both Houses of Parliament—that agreement was reached on the transitional arrangements. And that agreement in turn was conditional on the successful outcome of negotiations on a cease-fire.

Now the Conference entered its final and most difficult phase. On November 26, Bishop Muzorewa's delegation accepted the British proposals on the principles of the cease-fire. But a week later the Patriotic Front delegation were still resisting important elements in those proposals. On December 3, an Order in Council was made providing for the appointment of a British Governor in Rhodesia. On December 5, the Patriotic Front accepted the British proposals, and a formal cease-fire agreement was tabled by the British delegation. Immediately thereafter a Zimbabwe Bill was introduced in Parliament to enable Rhodesia to be brought to independence on a date to be decided, and to make consequential provisions in the law of the United Kingdom. On December 7, my appointment as Governor of Rhodesia was announced.

The Lancaster House Conference had now lasted for nearly three months. The final details of the implementation of the cease-fire agreement still remained to be settled. But it was clear that the machinery for the implementation of the cease-fire could not begin to be set in place in Rhodesia until legality had been restored. There could be no question of deploying British or other Commonwealth troops in the territory while it was still in a state of illegality. It was also necessary to be in a position to move quickly from the moment a cease-fire agreement was signed. So the government took the difficult and audacious decision to ask me and my staff to go to Rhodesia before the cease-fire was finally concluded. I left for Salisbury on December 11, on the very day that Lord Carrington made his final presentation of the detailed British proposals for the implementation of the cease-fire.

When I arrived in Salisbury the following day, the local administration accepted my authority. Legality was restored for the first time since November 11, 1965. The basis for United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia automatically fell away, and all remaining British sanctions legislation was repealed.

In taking this course, the government was undoubtedly taking a risk. The war in Rhodesia was still continuing. As Governor I found myself in the position of being Commander-in-Chief of the forces of one side while it was still at war with the guerrilla forces which it was also envisaged should come under my authority. No one could guarantee that either Bishop Muzorewa's delegation or the Patriotic Front delegation would finally sign the proposed cease-fire agreement. Nor could we be certain that other members of the United Nations Security Council would accept the link which we saw between the restoration of legality and the termination of the effect of the mandatory resolutions of the Security Council concerning the application of sanctions. Nevertheless, we were convinced that our bold stroke was a necessary risk, enabling us to keep up the momentum, showing our determination that the

:hodesia question would finally be resolved, and enabling me to begin the ecessary task of taking control of the Rhodesian administration.

I cannot deny that in Salisbury as in London, the next few days brought ome anxious moments. Although on December 13 Bishop Muzorewa's elegation announced its acceptance of the British proposals for nplementation of the cease-fire, it was only after an additional assembly place or their guerrilla forces had been offered to the Patriotic Front that the roposals were accepted and the Conference report initialled by the Patriotic ront delegation on December 17. But then there was a hiatus while Bishop Iuzorewa sought further clarification from me regarding the cease-fire rangements, and it was not until December 21 that the Conference report id the cease-fire agreement were signed by the leaders of all those delegations i a ceremony at Lancaster House. Nevertheless, the British government's olicy of indicating clearly the line which it meant to pursue, and then llowing it meticulously step by step, had once again been vindicated. It now mained only to implement the Lancaster House Agreement—a task which I n sure few envied me and which I undertook with no illusions about its fficulties.

.t Government House

Every detail of the ensuing four months was subsequently observed, corded and commented on by hundreds of representatives of the world's ress, as well as by official and unofficial observers from the Commonwealth id from many Western countries. There is perhaps little I can add to what ey have said and will say about the stewardship which I exercised during that eriod. The problems which I and my administration had to face were difficult id complex, with many shifts of mood and atmosphere from day to day. But e way in which we had to deal with the problems we faced was dominated by simple consideration which was too often overlooked by critics of Her Iajesty's Government, from whatever point of view they spoke.

Although in law I was an autocrat, vested with full executive and legislative ithority, in practice I was also the representative of only one of the parties to i agreement to which the two other parties had subscribed as free agents. oth of those two parties, although accepting my legal authority, disposed of rces far larger than any at my disposal. Indeed, there were no 'forces' as such nder my direct control—only Commonwealth military personnel acting as ionitors of the established armies in the country. The fact is that no ttlement would have been agreed which gave the British Governor forces rectly under his own control.

The structure of the Lancaster House Agreement was thus built on a ilance of trust—or, if you prefer, of mistrust. Each party to the Lancaster louse Agreement undertook obligations which it had a duty to fulfil, as Lord arrington reminded them when it was signed. My duty was to establish and aintain as best I could the conditions in which a free and fair election could be

held—a task in which, I am glad to say, international opinion eventually held virtually unanimously that I was successful. But I could not do this by turning Rhodesia overnight into a humanitarian utopia. My responsibility was all-embracing—my real power was negligible. The only means available to me for influencing the development of the situation were political and psychological—matching the progress I made with the progress which others were prepared to make towards fulfilling their obligations. As the referee, I wanted to see the game played to a finish. But I could not simply turn a blind eye to malpractices going on in some of the scrimmages. Nor on the other hand did I want, if I could avoid it, to award so many penalty kicks to one side that the other walked off the pitch—as well it might. In short, the only way to see the game through to the end was to blow the whistle from time to time so that a measure of rough justice could be done—and be seen to be done.

I cannot deal with this chapter in the story without saying something of the way in which the military aspects of the Lancaster House Agreement were implemented. In the annals of the British Army and of the other Commonwealth armies which contributed to the cease-fire monitoring force, I do not think there can ever have been an operation remotely like this one. Within a week of the signature of the cease-fire agreement, over thirteen hundred men had to be deployed, with the invaluable assistance of the United States Air Force, to Rhodesia and inside it, with all their equipment and transport. Many of them had only a week to prepare in lonely outposts for the arrival of the Patriotic Front forces. No one knew how many could come in or even whether they would come in at all. But they did—over twenty-one thousand of them eventually—and then followed the delicate task of supervising a cease-fire on terms on which surely no two armies had ever agreed before. This challenge demanded all the diplomatic skill and organising ability of the British soldiers and their comrades from Australia, Fiji, Kenya and New Zealand.

Further study will, I hope, be given in the future to this uniquely successful exercise in peace-keeping. But I believe it will be generally agreed that its success depended largely on two factors: on the fact that the neutral troops were located *with* the opposing forces of either side, not *between* them; and because the exercise was conducted within a predetermined time limit. There was, therefore, no question of the monitoring force patrolling boundary lines between the Security Forces and the Patriotic Front forces, with all the problems that that would have entailed. Neither was there any question of an open-ended commitment—although this circumstance did not make the operation any less risky from the point of view of the brave men who performed it.

Ten anxious weeks were to pass between the final act of the Conference and the completion of the electoral process in Rhodesia. With the co-operation of the Rhodesian public service—to which I must pay tribute—much was achieved in those weeks. Border crossings were reopened, many thousands of

refugees were returned from neighbouring countries, increasing numbers of prisoners and detainees were released, maize shipments to Zambia were resumed, and an election campaign was conducted by all parties to the Lancaster House Agreement as exiled leaders returned and others emerged from years of confinement or forced inactivity.

Naturally, right up almost to the end of the election period, there was an atmosphere of intense suspicion on all sides. None of the parties to the Agreement was convinced that the others would finally honour it—until the passage of time and a carefully calculated momentum of events made the outcome suddenly seem as though it had after all been inevitable from the start. During this period, I found myself bitterly criticised on three counts in particular; and, although I feel that the outcome is in itself a sufficient refutation of those criticisms, I propose to say something now about them, because the answers bring out very clearly the peculiar character of the arrangements under which Rhodesia had to be governed during those final days of British rule.

One issue was that of the deployment after the cease-fire of the Rhodesian Security Forces. When the time allotted for the assembly phase of the cease-fire had elapsed, I took the view that, good as the response of much of the Patriotic Front forces had been to the obligations placed on them by the cease-fire agreement, those remaining in breach of the agreement posed a serious threat to law and order, and that this situation was beyond the capacity of the police to contain. I therefore authorised, as the Lancaster House Agreement permitted me to do, the deployment of the Rhodesian armed forces in support of the police in their task of maintaining law and order. I regretted having to take this decision. But I saw no alternative. I believe it was right. And whatever criticisms were voiced at the time inside and outside Rhodesia, the fact is that in the end no one was to claim that my decision had influenced the election result. I must also add, in response to those who criticised me for not deploying the Patriotic Front forces that had accepted my authority, that I did in fact make full use of the network of Patriotic Front liaison officers—who played a most valuable part in helping to lower the temperature. Beyond this employment of Patriotic Front elements it would plainly have been unwise to go.

A second issue was my decision to authorise the continued deployment of a small South African force guarding the northern approaches to Beit Bridge. Here it was necessary to weigh two conflicting pressures against each other. On the one hand there was the storm of international protest that I knew would follow my decision—and there was indeed a storm, including a debate in the Security Council. But on the other hand was the need to continue to reassure White opinion in Rhodesia, and in particular the Rhodesian military, that what they considered to be their vital security interests were not being put at risk in the run-up to the election. I took the view, I believe rightly, that—however ill-founded the feelings, both within Rhodesia and at the United

Nations, about the role of the South Africans at Beit Bridge—the essential need was to retain the full co-operation of all parties within Rhodesia. In the end the issue was resolved by South Africa's decision to withdraw its forces—from which, I might add, there flowed no ill consequences for Rhodesian security.

The third major focus of criticism concerned the action which I took in response to the intimidation and the inflammatory speeches which characterised the election campaign in certain areas. Twice in February I took legislative action on this question. On February 5 I took powers to enable me to suspend an individual from taking part in the election campaign, or to suspend a party from campaigning in a particular area, or to suspend all campaigning in a given area. And on February 12 I took the power to exclude an area from the election altogether if I was satisfied that it was impossible to conduct a free and fair election campaign there. I took action subsequently to exclude one candidate from the election campaign—although he was not prevented from standing—and to suspend one party from campaigning in two small districts. This action naturally exposed me to a cross-fire from opposite directions. On the one hand I was blamed for going too far, and on the other for not going far enough. The pressures from both sides were intense. But again I believe in retrospect that the action I took was broadly right. I am satisfied that the pressure of intimidation on the electorate eased in the closing stages of the campaign—let others argue whether this was *propter hoc* and not merely *post hoc.* And—most important of all—in the event no party withdrew from the election on the ground that it had been placed at an unacceptable disadvantage by intimidation by others.

And so, eventually, we arrived at polling at the end of February and the declaration of the Common Roll election result on March 4. It was not for me to concern myself about the result. It was for the people to make their choice. As it happened, and by the greatest good fortune, they spoke very clearly indeed. There could be no ground for anyone to contest, had they wished to, a result which was so clearcut and unequivocal. And the integrity of Britain's intentions and of my administration was demonstrated beyond question.

Zimbabwe now faces the future under the leadership of a man whom, by independence, I had come to know as a friend and respect as a statesman. He, his colleagues in government and his fellow countrymen, face many difficulties as they seek to overcome the divisions of the past and work for the creation of a more just and humane society. I wish them well in their task, in which they will have all the support which the British government and, I hope, the rest of the international community can afford to give them.

Above all, let us extend to Prime Minister Mugabe and his colleagues our understanding as they wrestle with the enormous challenge which faces them, and take the steps which it will be necessary for them to take in meeting it. And let us pray that elsewhere in Africa the lessons of Zimbabwe may be learned before it is too late.

Reflections on the colonial experience

For Britain, the end of her constitutional responsibility for Rhodesia marks not merely the end of a chapter—it marks the close of a whole book in the many-volumed history of our country: the book of Empire. Before we finally put this volume on the shelf and turn our hands to the still unwritten pages of the future that lie before us, it is right to try to reach some general conclusions about Britain's encounter with what used to be called the colonial world, and upon what lessons can be drawn from that experience for the future.

The new Zimbabwe is the heir of many and diverse traditions of thought and behaviour. After only four months as Governor in Salisbury I could not, as I would like, say anything with authority about the African traditions which must play an increasingly large and eventually a preponderant part in the life of the new state—traditions particularly of community, solidarity and dignity.

But what of the many ways of thinking and acting derived from Britain and from Europe which have woven themselves over ninety eventful years into the fabric of the new Zimbabwe? It is about these that I would like to say something as the last representative in Rhodesia of the governing power under whose auspices those ways and ideas have been introduced into that part of Africa.

The system of which the people and the government of Zimbabwe are the inheritors derives in large part from three features of the European nineteenth century. There is the principle of individualism and freedom of enterprise, which supplies the spirit which animates the modern sector of the economy in Zimbabwe as in most of the former European colonial territories. There is the principle of rationality, of scientific thought and technological prowess, which has supplied the means of economic progress and expansion. And there is the principle of law, order and impartial administration which has constituted the framework of the State.

The system which Zimbabwe inherits is built around these principles of economic and political individualism, of scientific reason and of lawful administration. But gentler influences have also played a most important part.

There has been the influence of Christianity which, in its diverse forms, has introduced new ideas concerning the individual soul, the spirit of fellowship or community, and the relationship of individuals and communities to a transcendant God. The Christian educational missions have been the instrument by which so many Africans have been introduced to the great treasury of Western learning and experience. The virtues and values which Christianity represents have become pervasive in the society which constitutes the new Zimbabwe.

And then there has been the influence of the English tongue and its literature. Zimbabwe inherits a language which provides a ready means of communication not only with the world outside the country but between all Zimbabweans themselves. They inherit a culture which is a many-rooted stock

from which authentic Zimbabwean arts are already blossoming, grafted together with the vitality of the vernacular traditions.

Over the past ninety years the forces of economic progress, science and the state, on the one hand, and education and the English language on the other, brought Zimbabwe and its peoples—like all the former colonial peoples—into an ever-widening circle of relations with the world outside. As the years passed, the people of Rhodesia were propelled further and further out upon the rough waters, the turbulent cross-currents and the storms of contemporary life.

The central element in this experience was the growth in Zimbabwe of a sense of nationality—of citizenship and its rights. This idea came to Zimbabwe along with the other European concepts which have laid the foundations of its new society—and it was powerfully reinforced by the experience of men and women of all races fighting under the British Crown in many parts of the world in the two great wars of this century.

Indeed, over the past ninety years the main theme of the historical development of Rhodesia—as of the whole former colonial world—was the ever-increasing pervasiveness of the idea of political rights, which is one of the central values of Western civilisation. In Rhodesia these were exclusively reserved at first to members of the White community. But eventually the sense of nationality and of the inherent rights of all citizens possessed the minds of the entire people: and it fuelled a struggle for recognition which, having for years been prevented from obtaining its object by peaceful parliamentary means, then took up arms; and which has now at last found fulfilment through a lawful constitutional process and democratic elections.

Zimbabwe has indeed passed through testing fires. Life has forced the leaders of its people to reflect upon the value and meaning of the whole complex of Western ways and ideas of which the country's modern society has been constituted. In particular, in Zimbabwe as throughout the Third World, there has flowed from the colonial experience a stream of radical thought directed against the cult of individual selfishness and materialism, which many have come to feel systematically underlies the system which grew up in the colonial world under the influence of the West.

It must be for all free peoples to work out their destiny for themselves. This is, indeed, a central concept of the civilisation of which Zimbabwe is the heir, and it is one which especially exemplifies what Britain and the Commonwealth stand for politically. Accordingly the people of Zimbabwe must form their own judgment about the traditions they inherit, whether from their African or their European past.

But, having after a fashion presided over the process by which the best principles of British colonial policy have at last been applied in bringing Rhodesia to lawful independence by a democratic process, I feel that I am entitled to commend, not only to Zimbabweans but to all those seeking to rebuild their society in the post-colonial world, the substance of the principles and values upon which the system they have inherited was built.

In the economic sphere, it must be acknowledged that the spirit of individual enterprise, and the opportunities offered by access to the open world markets, are of crucial importance for the continuing dynamism and progress of Zimbabwe's economy, as of the economy of every Third-World country. The energies of the broad masses of the people must be better focused: a great economic potential resides in them, together with important means for a better life for all. Those energies will be tapped by invoking new concepts of economic and social organisation. And this includes concepts of communal endeavour which must serve as a balance and corrective to the individualism which is the chief legacy of colonial rule in the economic sphere. But, in the instruments through which economic progress is pursued, diversity is possible and is certainly desirable. There are countless pathways to the future: true wisdom surely lies in refusing none of them.

The same wisdom also surely applies to the sphere of ideas—the world of spirituality, of culture and education. Intellectual progress depends upon rational discourse, which in turn depends upon openness in enquiry and debate—both at home and in relation to the wider world. It is true that from the moral point of view there is something restless and overweening in modern man's search for intellectual mastery of the material world. It is true also that in political life freedom must always be balanced by order, and individuality by respect for the claims of the community. Zimbabwe, like all other lands, must find her own balance between these inherently conflicting values. But one of the most valuable legacies of the colonial experience, I believe, will be a rational concern for that spiritual and intellectual pluralism which—like the economic diversity of Western enterprise—has shown itself to be such a potent and creative force in world history.

Law, order, justice and impartial administration are also concepts embodied in the colonial inheritance, upon which the people of Zimbabwe and other lands are moving towards their own original judgment as their state evolves. In any society constituted as Rhodesia and other colonies have been, there is inevitably a need to bring the people and the structure of the state closer together. The people progressively develop new political conceptions and a wider notion of citizenship; and the state must also adapt itself to a more popular understanding of the processes of justice and administration. So much is inevitable and right. But in this evolution it would be a mistake to forget both the humanity and the efficiency which resides in the system of government of which Zimbabwe is the heir.

Above all—and on this theme I conclude—it can surely be hoped that in Zimbabwe especially, anyone earnestly reflecting upon the meaning and ultimate reason of the tragedies of the past fifteen years will understand the importance of the principle of constitutionalism. This is in my belief the single most important legacy bequeathed specifically by Britain to this new country.

In a progressive country, change is constant. The principle of constitutionalism is that the change which is necessary should take place by an

orderly process, subject both to law and to consent ascertained by the means provided in the law. As I think the first Duke of Wellington put it—'if there must be revolution, let there be revolution under law'. In this way the scope of the wilful and the arbitrary, which is always a factor in human destinies, may be reduced; and time—that essential element of all politics—may be afforded to those who must learn new ways. In this manner the people may be carried with their government, assuring by their understanding and consent to what is required of them that popular foundation without which all policy is ultimately vain.

For, concealed within the forms and even the aridities of constitutional behaviour there is a subtle healing art—an art which closes wounds, which unites what has been divided, which subdues antagonisms, and which brings people together. We have only to look at the most recent months in the history of Zimbabwe to see into the heart of this great truth.

THE MIDDLE EAST: A CHANCE FOR EUROPE?

*Stephen J. Artner**

THE Palestinian economists Bisharah and Na'im Khadir wrote in 1975 that 'American and European interests in the Arab world are contradictory. Every step forward by Europe means a step back by the United States, whether it is on the economic or the political plane.'[1] It could be argued, however, that exactly the opposite is the case: commercial rivalries and political disagreements belie important interests in the Middle East shared by Western Europe and North America. Both Europe and the United States maintain long-standing political, cultural, and economic ties with Israel as well as with the major Arab states. Although in different degrees, they share a dependence on Middle Eastern energy resources, and thus have a vital interest in the security and internal stability of the region. The geopolitical position of the West as a whole would be gravely endangered by Soviet expansion beyond Afghanistan toward the oil-rich area of the Persian Gulf. Both for its bearing on these issues, and because of its own intrinsic importance, progress toward a settlement of the seemingly intractable Arab-Israeli conflict is of crucial concern to Western Europe as well as to the United States.

If European and American interests in the Middle East ultimately converge, it must also be admitted that they differ both in nature and degree. Until the 1960s, America's geographical distance permitted a degree of detachment from Middle Eastern affairs which contrasted with the physical proximity and direct involvement of the European states—and particularly of the former colonial powers, Britain and France. To be sure America pursued important and sometimes conflicting strategic, political, and economic interests in the region. In the 1950s it avoided overly close ties with Israel in order to enlist Arab assistance in the containment of Soviet expansion. Only after the Six Day War in 1967 did the United States become Israel's leading supplier of weapons, and only in the early 1970s did America's growing dependence on foreign energy supplies render it vulnerable to OPEC disruptions. The West Europeans, on the other hand, had previously controlled much of the Arab world; in particular, Britain's administration of the Palestine Mandate laid the groundwork for the creation of the Zionist state. Continental Europeans, tortured by memories of the Nazi holocaust, tended in the early postwar period to grant Israel unquestioning diplomatic and in some cases military support.

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1. Bisharah and Na'im Khadir. 'A Difficult but Necessary Dialogue'. *Eurabia*. No. 2. July 1975.

West Germany under Adenauer provided Israel not only with extensive reparation payments but with clandestine shipments of weapons; while France and Britain collaborated in, and supported Israel's attack on, Nasser's Egypt in 1956. Following Israel's territorial expansion in 1967, however, increasing numbers of Europeans followed de Gaulle in viewing with greater sympathy the moral and political demands of the Arabs. Less restricted by domestic pro-Israeli constituencies than the United States and apprehensive at being drawn into super-power clashes over extra-European concerns, European governments began to adjust their Middle Eastern policies in the direction of greater balance—or, according to the Israeli's, towards a decidedly pro-Arab tilt.

Europeans meanwhile were developing ever closer commercial ties with the Arab world. In part this resulted from Western Europe's high dependence on foreign energy sources, especially in the Middle East: while the United States imported approximately one-fifth of its oil supplies from the Persian Gulf states by the late 1970s, in the case of Western Europe the corresponding figure had for many years been close to 70 per cent. At the same time Middle Eastern countries were becoming major purchasers of European exports and, after the hike in oil prices in the mid-1970s, they turned increasingly to Europe for machinery and advanced technology. By 1977 Arab purchases from the European Community accounted for 44 per cent of all Arab imports and 13·5 per cent of the EEC's extra-Community exports—thus surpassing Community exports to Japan and the United States together. Forty per cent of exports from the Arab countries were sold to EEC countries, accounting for a fifth of Europe's extra-Community purchases.[2] Not only is Western Europe thus considerably more dependent upon Arab oil than is the United States, but the European Community and the Arab nations have become one anothers' leading trading partners.

Such differences in perceptions and interests have led to growing differences over the Middle East between Western Europe and the United States, further exacerbated by America's use of its Nato bases on European soil to resupply the Israelis in the October War of 1973. Yet the shift in European policy since 1967 in some ways prefigured the shift in American attitudes which followed the war of 1973, reflected in the negotiating approaches of the Nixon–Ford and Carter administrations. The new American diplomacy has led most recently to the Camp David accords of 1978 and the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, which appeared to promote common Western interests in the Middle East. Yet West European governments, sceptical of those agreements at the time of their signing, have grown increasingly concerned that the conclusion of what amounts virtually to a separate peace between Israel and Egypt precludes rather than promotes a comprehensive solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict—thus

2. 'Trade Patterns between the European Community and the Arab League Countries', European Commission information note VIII/534/77-E, revised September 15, 1977. Cited in Alan R. Taylor, 'The Euro-Arab Dialogue: Quest for an Interregional Partnership', *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1978, p. 429.

endangering Western energy supplies and hindering political and military co-operation with the Arab states. Independent European initiatives to promote such a comprehensive solution could, however, be seen in the United States as undermining the Camp David approach, thus further straining transatlantic relations seriously troubled by underlying differences of attitude to the crises in Afghanistan and Iran. The possible articulation of a new common European approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, foreshadowed in the communiqué of the European Council meeting at Luxembourg in April 1980, could therefore be an event of major significance. A brief examination of American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1973 will serve to place in perspective the concerns of the European countries, as well as their potential contribution to the eventual resolution of the conflict.

The United States and the Arab-Israeli conflict: 1973–80

The October War and the oil crisis of 1973 created the preconditions for a more active American diplomacy in the Middle East. The co-ordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on October 6 brought striking Arab successes; and, despite a rapid reversal in the tide of battle, it destroyed the myth of Israeli invincibility. Only the October 22 cease-fire kept the Israelis within their post-1967 borders and prevented further territorial gains—yet the Egyptian and Syrian armies had fought well enough to efface in the mind of the Arabs the humiliations of 1948, 1956, and 1967. Ironically, this relative military success on the part of the Arabs made negotiations with Israel for the first time conceivable, creating as it did among the Arabs a sense of psychological equality whose absence had favoured intransigence in the past.

The success of the Arab oil embargo which accompanied and followed this and the subsequent quadrupling of OPEC oil prices further bolstered Arab self-confidence and signalled a fundamental shift in geopolitical power with repercussions far beyond the Middle East. In addition, they strengthened the hand of the conservative oil-producing nations within the region and opened up the possibility of rapid economic and technological development through trade and other forms of collaboration with the West. The Palestinian question thereby appeared in a rather different light: while remaining a rallying point and a moral concern of all the Arab states, it necessarily came to be regarded not merely on its own merits but as an obstacle to the progress and peaceful development of those states.

This shift in Arab attitudes was evident at the Rabat summit conference in October 1974. The then American ambassador to Morocco, Robert Neumann, has noted that previous Arab feelings of inferiority and frustration had been completely dissipated and, significantly, that leadership was exercised by the 'moderate' governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the host country Morocco. Delegates from most of the participating countries indicated in informal conversations their readiness to accept the existence of Israel as given. In response to questioning by journalists, Morocco's King Hassan II, with the

General Secretary of the Arab League Mahmud Riad at his side, explicitly denounced the 'three No's' of the Khartoum summit conference of 1967, which had definitively rejected all contacts or negotiations with Israel as well as any diplomatic recognition of the Jewish state. Hassan's statement that 'Khartoum is dead' was contradicted neither at the time nor later by any Arab delegation, including that of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Yet the Western press focused instead on the conference's decision to recognise the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people—a decision which should probably be seen not so much as a radicalisation of the Arab governments, but rather as an attempt to bring the explosive and internally divided Palestinian movement under their more effective control.[3]

The American administration promptly recognised the new potential for progress toward a peaceful Middle East settlement which could satisfy the long-term interests of both Israel and the West. An immediate solution, to be sure, remained out of reach. But the United States enjoyed a unique position as the only external power able effectively to promote serious negotiations between the contending parties. It was precisely its special relationship with Israel which rendered America's intercession attractive to some at least of the Arab states: as President Sadat remarked, 'all the cards in this game are in the hands of the United States . . . because they are the only (one) who can exert pressure on Israel.'[4]

Such pressure had indeed induced Israel to accept the preliminary cease-fire of October 22, 1973, thus preventing further Israeli advances and a probable rout of the Arab armies. Dr Kissinger then negotiated a second, six-point cease-fire agreement between Israel and Egypt which military representatives of the two countries signed on November 11 at Kilometer 101 on the road between Cairo and Suez. A Conference at Geneva, convened in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, met for only two days in December and brought no concrete results; but Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy produced troop disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt (January 14, 1974) and between Israel and Syria (May 31, 1974). The United States and Egypt resumed diplomatic relations, which had been broken off in 1967, and the restoration of American-Syrian relations was proclaimed during President Nixon's Middle East tour in June 1974. After the breakdown of negotiations on a second Sinai agreement in March of the following year, the Ford administration announced a 'reassessment' of America's Middle East policy and suspended consideration of Israel's request for an additional 2·5 billion dollars in American aid. Further shuttle diplomacy and meetings between Presidents Ford and Sadat as well as between Ford and

3. These observations draw from a paper presented by Dr Neumann in Haus Rissen International Institute for Politics and Economics, Hamburg, West Germany, on Oct. 11, 1979. A condensed version appeared in the *Rissener Jahrbuch 1979/1980* under the title 'Der Nahe und Mittlere Osten im Spannungsfeld der Weltpolitik', pp. 63-69.

4. *Congressional Quarterly*, 'The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs' (Washington, 1977), p. 85.

Prime Minister Rabin then led to the conclusion of the second Sinai agreement in September 1975. In addition to pledging further limited force withdrawals, Egypt and Israel promised to resolve their conflict by peaceful means on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338. The United Nations Emergency Force was to continue its operations in the Sinai, and the establishment of an early warning system, including three watch stations in the Mitla and Giddi Passes, was entrusted to the United States.

Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy intentionally avoided grand designs for a comprehensive solution to the Middle East conflict. Such an approach, it was felt, would have had little chance of success, but would more likely have provoked a continuation of the oil embargo, a freeze in United States-Arab relations, a growth in Soviet influence, and the increased isolation of Israel. Instead, Kissinger aimed at bringing the paralysed diplomatic situation into flux by promoting initial contacts between Israel and the Arab states. It was hoped that concrete progress on limited, relatively simple problems could create a momentum that would eventually promote a resolution of the more intractable central issues in dispute. Kissinger described this approach in an address on October 19,1976:

> We chose to proceed step-by-step on those issues where room for agreement seemed to exist. We sought to establish a new relationship with the Arab world, to reduce the Soviet capacity for exploiting tensions, and to build a new sense of confidence in the parties directly involved so that overall solutions would someday be possible. We approached peace in stages but with the intention of ultimately merging individual steps into a comprehensive solution.[5]

American diplomacy, capitalising on the material and psychological consequences of the oil crisis and the October War, in fact brought the two sides closer than ever before. By the end of 1976 most of the Arab states were prepared to recognise Israel's right to exist in exchange for significant concessions on occupied territories and Palestinian rights. Not incidentally, therefore, Soviet influence in the Middle East reached its lowest point in over twenty years.

If the Carter administration found a relatively promising diplomatic situation in the Middle East when it took office in January 1977, it also resolved to renounce the methods and approach of its predecessors. Kissinger's diplomacy was regarded as inherently flawed and potentially disastrous, for it did nothing to eliminate the fundamental causes of the Israeli-Arab dispute. Further, its virtual exclusion of the Soviet Union from Middle East negotiations was judged to risk long-term instability for the sake of ephemeral unilateral gains. The new administration thus rejected the gradualist approach in favour of a comprehensive solution based on Security Resolution 242 of

5. Henry A. Kissinger, 'Moral Promise and Practical Needs', address before the Synagogue Council of America. State Department Bureau of Public Affairs documented dated Oct. 19, 1976, p. 5.

1967. This had called for Israeli withdrawal from the newly occupied territories as well as for the recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the region and of each nation's right to live in peace within secure and internationally recognised borders. The resolution envisaged the creation of demilitarised zones to assure mutual security, and it called for an equitable solution of the problem of Palestinian refugees.

Kissinger's efforts had not, of course, run contrary to these goals, but they had concentrated on piecemeal gains based on bilateral or trilateral negotiations. The Carter administration, on the other hand, initially favoured multilateral negotiations among Israel, the super-powers, and the Arab states in order to achieve simultaneous progress on each aspect of a comprehensive peace. As Alfred Atherton, at that time special envoy for the Middle East, declared as late as April 1978, Resolution 242 formed a single package whose various components could be implemented either together or not at all. In particular, the Carter administration devoted special attention to the Palestinian issue: the President called not only for Israel's withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, but for the establishment of a 'homeland' for the Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

The administration's preference for a comprehensive approach involving Soviet participation led to the joint statement of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Vance in October 1977, which reiterated commonly accepted principles for a Middle East settlement. More disturbingly to the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, it motivated American support for reconvening the Geneva conference under Soviet and American co-chairmanship. Sadat, who had expelled the Soviet military advisers from his country in 1972, was less than enthusiastic about a step which would expand and legitimise Soviet influence in the Middle East. In addition, such a multilateral conference would present serious intrinsic difficulties including the apparently insoluble preliminary question of participation by the PLO. And even if this matter could be solved, a Geneva conference in the spotlight of international attention would inevitably favour the most intransigent participants and their maximalist demands while severely impeding any attempt at serious negotiation and equitable compromise. Yet Egypt desperately needed peace, not least because of a catastrophic economic situation. At the same time Egypt's loss of Soviet weapons and spare parts deliveries, and the slowness of its transition to Western sources of supply rendered it unprepared for another full-scale war with Israel at a time when the fighting in southern Lebanon threatened to expand into a general conflict at any moment.

Sadat's response to these internal difficulties and external dangers was his spectacular visit to Jerusalem in September 1977, which effectively short-circuited the Geneva initiative and opened the prospect of rapid progress toward a definitive settlement. This historic gesture was by no means as

impromptu as many had assumed at the time. Sadat had extended cautious bu significant peace feelers shortly after his accession to power in 1970. He ha effected a virtual reversal of alliances through his expulsion of Soviet advisers i 1972 and his co-operation in Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy after the Octobe War. Further, he had resolved after his visit to Washington in April 1977 t act upon Carter's suggestion of direct contacts with the Israeli government The unexpected victory of the Likud bloc in Knesset elections the followin month seemed to postpone prospects for a significant breakthrough: Prim Minister Begin's entire political career had been based on support for Israel territorial expansion, and the Likud's programme clearly stated that 'Judea' 'Samaria', and Gaza could never be returned to Arab control. Washingto urged Sadat nevertheless to discount appearances and exploit the opportunit presented precisely by Begin's right-wing background: like de Gaulle i Algeria and Nixon in respect of Communist China, the previously intransigen Likud Prime Minister would perhaps be politically able to take bold initiative not open to his Labour Party predecessors.

During Sadat's state visit to Romania in October, the Prime Minister Nicolae Ceausescu, also helped to pursuade Sadat to enter into direc discussions. Secret contacts in Europe and Morocco between Egyptian an Israeli officials laid the groundwork for a direct encounter between the tw heads of government. In response to Carter's suggestion of receiving the tw leaders simultaneously during the autumn session of the General Assembly o the United Nations in New York, Sadat came up with a grandiose scheme t assemble the heads of government of the five world powers and himself i Jerusalem, where they would remain in continuous intensive negotiation wit the Israeli government until a comprehensive settlement had emerged. As thi proposal appeared too idealistic and impractical even for the early Carte administration, Sadat resolved upon his historic visit to the Jewish state.[6]

If Sadat was to a great extent moved by specifically Egyptian concerns, hi professed objective remained an overall settlement which would achieve peac between Israel and all its Arab neighbours as well as adequate implementatio of Palestinian rights. As Sadat declared to the Israeli Knesset, such settlement must entail an end to belligerence, appropriate security guarantees and the commitment to peaceful resolution of differences, but also an end t Israeli occupation of all territories acquired in 1967. He urged respect for th fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to establish a independent state.[7] Israel's objectives, however, were in many respect diametrically opposed: while Israel fully shared the goals of peace, mutua recognition, and security, it would under no conditions accept a return to th borders existing before 1967. Indeed, it had been promoting Jewis

6. For an account of the diplomatic manoeuvres preceding Sadat's voyage to Jerusalem. See Eric Rouleau 'La Pax Americana: Faute de règlement global . . ., *Le Monde*, March 25-26, 1979.

7. Cf. Alan W. Horton, *The Several Faces of Arab-Israeli Peace*, American Universities Field Staff Report 1979, No. 4.

settlements on the occupied lands precisely to hinder their return to Arab control. Israel desired nothing more urgently, however, than a separate peace with Egypt—its largest and most powerful Arab foe—which could reduce the strain of exorbitant defence spending on its troubled economy and free military forces for deployment on other fronts. To achieve this end, the Begin government was prepared to return the whole of Sinai, including Israeli-built oil wells and airfields, to Egyptian control. It was even willing to discuss 'autonomy' for the Arab residents of the other occupied territories. But its refusal to consider the evacuation of these territories—least of all the establishment of a Palestinian homeland—seemed to fall short of minimal Arab demands and thus appeared to preclude any possibility of a comprehensive peace.

Nevertheless, Sadat's initiative of September 1977 did bear fruit in the Camp David agreements of September 1978. These agreements profess the long-term objective of a comprehensive settlement based on Resolution 242, yet they amount—at least for the present—to a clear separation of bilateral Egyptian-Israeli concerns from the wider Arab-Israeli issues in dispute. Thus after a year of trilateral bargaining, the United States had dropped its insistence that all elements of the 'single package' of Resolution 242 be implemented simultaneously. Egypt had realised significant gains, but exposed itself to charges of betrayal of the Arab cause for having secured for the Palestinians no more than an eventual 'autonomy' whose nature was left undefined. And Israel had extended considerable concessions, but refused to budge from its position on ultimate sovereignty over the occupied West Bank, the Golan Heights, and Gaza.

With regard to these occupied territories, agreed principles for future negotiations were set forth in a 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East'. According to this a freely-elected self-governing authority would replace the Israeli military government and civilian administration for a transitional period not exceeding five years, during which the final status of the territories in question would be determined. Jordan was invited to join in negotiations to establish this self-governing authority, and it was provided that the Egyptian and Jordanian delegations might include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. During the subsequent transitional period, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza would then negotiate the location of boundaries, the nature of security arrangements, and the relationship of the West Bank and Gaza to neighbouring states. To be sure, no one thought to consult the Jordanian government—let alone representatives of the Palestinians or the other Arab states—until after publication of the Camp David accords on September 17. Yet this procedure was deemed necessary to put in train a negotiating process which the other Arab governments would sooner or later choose to join.[8]

8. Arnold Hottinger, 'Friedenspolitik im Nahen Osten', *Europa-Archiv*, No. 9, 1979, pp. 253-55.

This process threatened to come to a halt when the December 1978 deadline for an Egyptian-Israeli treaty provided for at Camp David elapsed with no sign of an agreement. For a time, a series of secondary issues obscured the central question of linkage between the two Camp David documents dealing respectively with Egyptian-Israeli issue and with the wider question of the future of the occupied lands. However, President Carter's trip to Israel and Egypt in March 1979 succeeded in bridging the remaining differences and secured a treaty embodying the principles which had previously been agreed. Israel pledged to withdraw from the Sinai over a three-year period; the two states agreed to exchange ambassadors ten months after the treaty was signed and to remove restrictions on travel and trade; and the treaty provided for zones of limited armaments and the maintenance of United Nations peace-keeping forces in a Sinai buffer area. Israel was guaranteed free passage through the international waterways and the right to purchase oil from the Sinai fields returned to Egypt. Yet the treaty made no mention of the occupied territories or of Palestinian rights. Instead, these questions formed the subject of a separate letter from Sadat and Begin to Carter dated March 26. Here the two leaders declared their intention to commence negotiations on full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza within one month of the treaty's ratification. They proclaimed the goal of completing the preliminary negotiations for the setting up of the self-governing Palestinian authority within one year, so that elections to that body could proceed as soon as possible, with the five-year transitional period referred to in the Camp David 'framework' agreement. President Sadat could thus claim not to have abandoned the Palestinian cause in his dealings with Israel and the United States. Yet unlike the treaty itself, the joint letter to Carter constitutes a mere statement of intentions with no binding validity under international law. It creates pressure on all three leaders to achieve substantial progress toward a solution of the Palestinian issue, but the subsequent lack of any such progress could not legally justify Egypt's withdrawal from its treaty commitments.[9]

The Camp David agreements and the resulting Washington treaty thus form far less than the comprehensive settlement the administration had originally pursued. It is questionable whether they represent even a first step in this direction, since practically all of the Arab governments as well as the PLO have voiced their vehement opposition. The treaty may, nevertheless, prove useful to American interests in several ways: in particular it confirms Egypt's alignment with the West and its rejection of Soviet military and diplomatic assistance, while rendering unlikely another large-scale conflict between Israel and its other Arab neighbours at a time of renewed unrest elsewhere in the Middle East. However, the lack of significant progress in the autonomy negotiations threatens to undermine the entire peace process and further to alienate conservative Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia—among

9. Jacques Vernant, 'Das Engagement der Vereinigten Staaten für den Frieden im Nahen Osten', *Europa-Archiv*, Folge 9/1979, pp. 266–67.

other things hindering efforts at defence co-operation in the Persian Gulf. As well as pledging an enormous amount of economic and military assistance, the United States has assumed grave political and military risks in staking so much on an Egyptian leader whose own political survival is by no means assured. Yet by declining to exploit Israel's rapidly growing economic and military dependence upon the United States to press even for minimal concessions in the matters of the settlements and of Palestinian autonomy, the American government only adds to Sadat's isolation in the Arab world and fuels domestic Egyptian discontent with his concessions to Israel.

It is becoming increasingly evident that a serious effort at progress toward a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot avoid coming to terms with the Palestinians and their self-appointed but widely accepted spokesman, the PLO. To secure Israeli agreement to the second Sinai accord in 1975, Henry Kissinger pledged that the United States would never negotiate with that organisation so long as it refused to recognise Resolutions 242 and 338—and hence Israel's right to exist. Domestic political constraints also preclude a direct approach to the PLO at present. But the administration has apparently recognised the necessity of PLO participation in any overall settlement, and it has extended discreet feelers through diplomatic channels in Vienna and elsewhere. Less discreet was the meeting between America's former ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, and the representative of the PLO, Zehdi Labib Terzi, in September 1979—which led to Israeli protests and to the ambassador's enforced resignation. While Young's initial version of the encounter bore only a strained resemblance to reality, his effort to find common ground for an Arab-American resolution supporting both Israeli security and Palestinian rights was thoroughly compatible with the overall thrust of administration policy.

American diplomacy will be forced to continue to seek a formula by which the PLO can be induced to recognise Israel's right to exist and thus become an acceptable negotiating partner for the United States. Constraints on exploratory contacts with the Palestinian organisation, however, combined with a reluctance to press for simultaneous Israeli concessions, has until now prevented any serious moves in this direction. The PLO, for its part, while overtly hostile to the United States as the principal ally of Israel, has been eager to establish contacts with other non-communist governments, particularly in Western Europe. For their part the countries of Western Europe, with the exception of Austria, have been unwilling officially to recognise the PLO as the exclusive representative of the Palestinians, but they have gone further than the United States in supporting Arab positions and in meeting essential Palestinian demands.

Sharing fundamental objectives with the United States in the Middle East, the Europeans have also developed independent interests and perspectives which could suggest a mediating function between the 'Camp David powers' on the one hand and the PLO and Arab rejectionist governments on the other.

European initiatives in this direction could effectively supplement American diplomacy, which is hampered by internal and external constraints; alternatively, they could undercut American efforts and contribute to further estrangement between Western Europe and the United States.

The West European stance

Close economic relations, combined with historical ties to the Arab world and the absence of significant Zionist domestic constituencies in Europe have led West European governments to strive toward what they consider a more balanced position than that of the United States on the Arab-Israeli dispute. In particular France abruptly shifted its policy after the 1967 war: terminating weapons deliveries and military collaboration with Israel, it openly supported Arab territorial demands and became a leading supplier of military hardware to the Arab states. Even the European governments most openly critical of Israeli policies have, however, remained committed to the survival of the Jewish state. In the last volume of his memoirs, published posthumously in 1970, former French president, Charles de Gaulle wrote with admiration of the Zionist enterprise as an expression of the sufferings and the greatness of the Jewish people. Yet he insisted that support for Israel's right to exist could not exclude, and indeed demanded, a policy of prudence toward the Arab people who are Israel's permanent neighbours and upon whose territory the Zionist state had been established:

> For this reason, when Ben-Gurion spoke to me of his project to settle four or five million Jews in Israel which, as it now exists, could not contain them, and when his remarks revealed to me his intention of extending Israel's borders when the opportunity presented itself, I requested him not to attempt this. 'Come what may', I told him, 'France will assist you in the future, as it has in the past, in assuring your survival. But it is not prepared to furnish you with the means to conquer new territories. . . . Rather than pursue ambitions which would throw the Orient into fearsome shocks and lose for you little by little the sympathy of the world, devote yourself to pursuing the amazing development of a formerly desert country and establish ties with your neighbours which, in the long run, can only be useful.'[10]

In May 1971 the foreign ministers of the six countries then belonging to the European Community accepted a report of their Political Committee which set forth a common position on the Arab-Israeli conflict within the framework of the newly-established system of European Political Co-operation (EPC). The report largely repeated the elements of Resolution 242: withdrawal from occupied territories (with, however, 'minor modifications'); modalities for secure and recognised borders (e.g. demilitarised buffer zones under international control; international security guarantees); the regulation of the

10. Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'Espoir: Le Renouveau 1958-1962.* (Paris, 1970), pp. 278-79.

Palestinian refugee problem and of shipping in the Gulf of Aquaba and the Suez Canal. While containing no substantive innovations, the report appeared to represent a European initiative aimed at pressuring Israel on the question of the occupied territories. It met with approval in the Arab capitals, but provoked a vehement Israeli denial of the Community's right and qualifications to involve itself in the Middle East dispute.[11] A further EEC declaration of November 6, 1973, called upon Israel to 'end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict in 1967' and pointed out that 'in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.'[12] The document is often cited as evidence of a new pro-Arab tilt by the Europeans in response to the October War and the oil crisis of 1973—but in reality, it was little more than a reaffirmation of the basic elements of previous United Nations and EEC declarations.

The oil crisis did, however, lead to closer contacts between the Arab oil producers and Western Europe in the form of a 'Euro-Arab Dialogue' between the Arab League and the European Community. Initiated in 1974, the dialogue has dealt with a number of economic issues including agricultural development, industrialisation, trade, finance, and scientific and technological co-operation as well as with cultural and social exchanges. Energy questions have been formally excluded from the dialogue. The Europeans have insisted that the Arab-Israeli conflict must not form an item on the agenda, but have expressed their position on that conflict in final communiqués following each of the General Commission sessions, held alternatively in European and Arab capitals at approximately one-year intervals.[13]

In the first such document, emerging from the May 1976 General Commission meeting in Luxembourg, both sides emphasised the necessity of a solution to the Palestinian question recognising the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as a prerequisite for a just and lasting peace. The EEC called attention to its Middle East declaration of November 1973, while the Arabs demanded PLO participation in all international efforts at a negotiated settlement. In subsequent communiqués the European side condemned Israel's settlements policy and opposed all unilateral changes in the status of the occupied territories including East Jerusalem. However, it has thus far refused Arab urgings officially to recognise the PLO and to endorse the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.[14] Indeed, the participation of PLO representatives formed a stumbling-block to the opening of the Euro-Arab Dialogue which was removed only by means of the 'Dublin formula' of February 1975. This established the principle of two homogenous regional delegations, thus bypassing the issue of PLO recognition by the European Community. Further, European criticism of Israeli occupation and settlements

11. von der Planitz Steinbach, and Sahlmann, 'Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und der Mittelmeerraum', in Steinbach, Udo (ed), *Europaîsch-Arabische Zusammenarbeit* (Bonn, 1979), pp. 30–31.

12. *Congressional Quarterly, op. cit.*, p. 79.

13. Cf. Taylor, *op. cit.*

14. Steinbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–34.

policies has not led to specific actions against the Jewish state: indeed, the EEC signed a preferential trade agreement with Israel in May 1975, just prior to the first plenary session of the Euro-Arab Dialogue's working committees in Cairo; and it has rejected Arab demands to suspend the agreement pending Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Thus the Arab participants must be less than fully satisfied with the political results the dialogue has thus far achieved, while Israeli and American critics are unable to point to European concessions to Arab positions exceeding those already extended in other forums.

Indeed, one could argue that what has changed between the 1950s and the present has been less the Europeans' fundamental attitudes toward Israel and the Arab states than Israel's territorial expansion in 1967 and subsequent policy in the occupied areas. The West European governments and the EEC have consistently combined their demand for Israeli withdrawal from these areas with support for Israel's right to exist within secure and recognised boundaries. More problematic, however, than the purely territorial issue is the closely related question of the Arab populations particularly in the West Bank and Gaza. Resolution 242, introduced in the Security Council by Great Britain after the 1967 war, addressed the problem of the Palestinians as refugees; six years later, in 1973, the EEC foreign ministers urged that account be taken of the Palestinians' legitimate rights. In a declaration of June 29, 1977, the European Council mentioned for the first time the necessity of establishing a Palestinian 'homeland'—the term used in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which led to large-scale Jewish settlement in Mandate Palestine and the eventual creation of the Zionist state. The EEC document stated *inter alia*:

> The Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.

At the same time the European leaders emphasised the need for negotiations among all the parties involved, leading to a lasting, comprehensive peace:

> In the context of an overall settlement, Israel must be ready to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; equally, the Arab side must be ready to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.[15]

This concern for Palestinian rights and a comprehensive settlement explains the reserved European reception of the Camp David accords and the resulting peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. On September 19, 1978, the nine foreign ministers congratulated President Carter on the 'great courage with which he initiated the Camp David meeting and brought it to a successful

15. *Congressional Quarterly*, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

conclusion' and expressed their 'appreciation for the great efforts made by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin'.[16] On March 26, 1979, they welcomed the peace treaty between the two erstwhile belligerents as a correct application of the principles of Resolution 242 to the relations between Israel and Egypt. At the same time the European foreign ministers took pains to point out that the treaty must not form a separate peace, but rather serve as a first step toward a comprehensive solution to the Middle East conflict; which could be achieved only through a multilateral agreement worked out by all parties affected, including representatives of the Palestinian people, and approved by the international community. The declaration of March 1979 emphasised the Palestinian right to a homeland and condemned Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.[17] In a further declaration on June 22, 1979, the EEC foreign ministers further distanced themselves from the accords midwived by American diplomacy: as bases of a comprehensive settlement they cited previous Security Council resolutions and Community declarations without even mentioning the Begin-Sadat treaty. They deplored 'any action or declaration which might stand in the way of the quest for peace', citing as examples Israeli occupation policies and settlements.[18]

If the European reception of the Washington treaty was cool, the EEC has nevertheless refrained from overt criticism pending the outcome of negotiations on West Bank autonomy originally scheduled for conclusion on May 26, 1980. Should these negotiations fail, however, the Community may well attempt a diplomatic initiative of its own. Logically this must turn on the question of the development of Resolution 242. Israel and the United States have consistently refused to deal with the PLO as long as that organisation refuses to accept Resolution 242—thus at least implicitly recognising Israel's right to exist. The Arabs, for their part, consider 242's characterisation of the Palestinian question as a 'refugee problem' to be inadequate. A European revision, if proposed, would recognise the Palestinians as a distinct people possessing the right to self-determination, while retaining Resolution 242's provisions for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and for the acknowledgement of each Middle Eastern state's sovereignty, political independence, and right to secure and recognised borders. Such a formulation, it is hoped, could gain the assent of the Arab parties as well as of Israel and the United States, thereby permitting negotiations between the latter and the PLO as well as the rejectionist Arab states.

While the Community as a whole will most likely await the outcome of the current autonomy negotiations before taking such an initiative, Britain and France have for some time been extending feelers in the same direction. Indeed, both countries have long gone beyond the common positions of the Nine in the Palestinian issue and made known their support for an appropriate

16. Text supplied by the British embassy in Bonn.
17. *Archiv der Gegenwart*, April 21, 1979, p. 22538.
18. *Ibid.*, June 22, 1979, p. 22647.

addition to Resolution 242. This support is in no way a consequence of Camp David and the stalled Israeli-Egyptian negotiations: Great Britain, the original sponsor of Resolution 242, has for several years suggested a supplement addressing the question of Palestinian rights. In a Security Council debate on January 15, 1976, for example, the former British ambassador to the United Nations, Ivor Richard, stated his government's belief that a Middle East settlement should be based on three considerations, only two of which—withdrawal from occupied territories, and acknowledgement of every Middle Eastern state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries—were enshrined in Resolution 242. The third consideration, not explicitly stated in that document, was the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to the expression of its national identity. Palestinian interests, Richard stated, must figure prominently in a Middle East settlement; and Resolutions 242 and 338 must be 'supplemented but not supplanted and not distorted out of shape or recognition' to take this into account.[19] On January 27 and again on June 29, 1976, Great Britain abstained from voting on draft resolutions which emphasised Palestinian rights but omitted the other two elements of an overall settlement. At the same time it expressed support for Security Council attempts to bring the two parties closer together by reaffirming the existing Council resolutions in addition to addressing the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.[20]

While insisting that the exact definition of Palestinian rights was a matter for negotiation between the parties directly involved, the British government has favoured the concept of a homeland for the Palestinian Arabs. In a speech in London on October 27, 1977 the Prime Minister of the day, James Callaghan, emphasised that the parties concerned must determine what form the homeland should take, but that it obviously could not be situated exclusively in Jordan: 'There are over a million Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who would neither be absorbed by Jordan nor would wish to be uprooted from their present homes. Most of these people are not refugees.[21] In the House of Commons on March 27, 1979, Mr Callaghan welcomed the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt as a first step toward a 'comprehensive settlement that will engage the other Arab states and give the Arabs in Palestine—the Palestinians—the opportunity of a secure future for themselves, as well as securing peace for Israel'. During the same debate David Owen, then Foreign Minister, went on to emphasise the imperative of a Palestinian homeland as part of a comprehensive settlement and described 'full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza' as the first step toward such a solution.[22]

The Thatcher government's position on the Arab-Israeli dispute appears

19. *Survey of Current Affairs*, Feb. 1976, pp. 67–69.
20. *Ibid.*, Feb. 1976, p. 69; Aug. 1976, pp. 318–19.
21. *Ibid.*, Nov. 1977, p. 421.
22. *Ibid.*, April 1979, pp. 91–92.

virtually unchanged from that of its predecessors. Like them, it has welcomed the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty but has called it 'only a partial step towards a comprehensive settlement and a solution of the Palestinian problem'. That problem, Britain's present Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, told the House of Lords on May 22, 1979, lay at the heart of the issue; and, if the momentum established by the peace treaty was to be maintained, negotiations on the future of the West Bank and Gaza must result quickly in full and genuine autonomy as a step toward determining their final status.[23]

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has, in the British view, underlined the urgency of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. On his tour of Middle Eastern countries in January 1980, Lord Carrington saw evidence of a strong Arab desire to co-operate with the West in the face of a common challenge, but was struck by the degree to which the Arab governments viewed the lack of progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement as an obstacle to such co-operation. According to one report, the conclusions reached on this visit have prompted Carrington to renew the project of supplementing Resolution 242 with a clause calling for Palestinian self-determination in the context of a negotiated settlement.[24] Douglas Hurd, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, affirmed to the BBC Arabic Service on March 5 that 'we are considering with our European partners whether there is some helpful way in which the countries of Europe can improve the chances for a fair settlement.' Such a European contribution could take the form of a supplementary resolution at the United Nations to fill the 'gap' in Resolution 242, which treats the Palestinian question merely as a refugee problem. 'The Palestinians have rights which go well beyond that and we consider that there is a case for the Security Council to recognize those rights'.[25]

Britain's leading partner in such an undertaking would most probably be France. More than the other EEC states, the French have long supported Palestinian participation in a Middle East Settlement and have openly expressed their scepticism toward the Camp David accords. The French Council of Ministers Communiqué of March 29, 1979, observed that a number of indispendable conditions concerning matters of both procedure and principle had remained unfulfilled in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.[26] The French Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, and his Foreign Minister, Jean François-Poncet, have expressed serious doubts as to the possibility of attaining a comprehensive solution by the route set forth by Carter, Begin, and Sadat.

During his tour of Arab capitals in March 1980, President Giscard d'Estaing affirmed that the Palestinian question was not merely a refugee

23. The author is indebted to R. F. Cornish of the British embassy in Bonn for the text of this speech and other extensive information on the current British position regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

24. *Financial Times*, Feb. 13, 1980.

25. 'Middle East Peace Initiative: text of an interview with Mr Douglas Hurd, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office', BBC Arabic Service, March 5, 1980.

26. Communiqué du Conseil des Ministres Francais du 29 Mars 1979, reprinted in *France Pays arabes*, April-May 1979, p. 10.

problem, as stated in Resolution 242, but the problem of a people which must enjoy the right of self-determination within the framework of a just and lasting peace.[27] Giscard's formulation, initially stated in the joint communiqué issued in Kuwait and repeated on the further stops of his journey, was treated in the Western media as a major shift in French and European Middle Eastern policy. This interpretation was, at best, only partially accurate. The term 'self-determination' was, to be sure, utilised for the first time in a diplomatic text signed by France; extending beyond insistence on a Palestinian homeland, it suggests support for an independent Palestinian state. France had, however, previously voted in favour of United Nations resolutions containing the same terminology—as Yassir Arafat has pointed out[28]. Further, West Germany has used the identical expression in its Middle East pronouncements for several years. Speaking in the name of the nine EC member states at the General Assembly on September 24, 1979, the Irish Foreign Minister, Michael O'Kennedy, had also supported 'the right of the Palestinians to determine their own future as a people'.[29]

However, as a French presidential adviser pointed out in Abu Dhabi, 'in politics, it is words that count'—also, he might have added, timing.[30] Giscard has appeared as the most 'pro-Arab' of the European leaders and the most critical of American (and indeed Egyptian) Middle East policy. This could hardly be of detriment to the various French–Arab economic agreements concluded during the presidential voyage, as the Israeli press took pains to point out. Most disturbing to the Israelis, however, was the failure of the French President in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Emirates specifically to endorse the necessity of secure borders and mutual diplomatic recognition of all Middle Eastern states as central elements of any comprehensive solution. Instead, the communiqués merely referred to the 'well-known points of view and positions of their countries regarding the Middle Eastern question'.[31] French officials denied, however, that this represented a major change in French policy or that France was 'about to sell Israel for barrels of petroleum'. Rather, the French initiative was designed to find common ground between Israel and the Arab governments. Indeed, during Giscard's stop in Jordan, King Hussein spoke in favour of an international settlement based on the Security Council resolutions and explicitly mentioned the principle most hotly debated in the Arab world, namely the 'recognition of the right of all the states of the region to live in peace within secure, recognized, and guaranteed borders'. This was the clearest affirmation of that principle yet delivered by an Arab head of state with the exception of Egypt's President Sadat. In return, King Hussein requested France to 'take an initiative on the level of the European Community and the international institutions so as to find the means to avoid further catastrophes and to open the way to a just peace.'[32]

27. *Le Monde*, March 4, 1980.
28. *Ibid.*, March 10, 1980.
29. 'Europe Stand Tips Balance at UN Assembly', *The Middle East*, Nov. 1979.
30. 'Giscard aux sources du pétrole', *L'Express*, March 15, 1980, p. 47.
31. *Le Monde*, March 5, 1980.
32. *Ibid.*, March 11, 1980.

In addition to raising the questions of Palestinian self-determination and a possible revision of Resolution 242, Giscard's Middle Eastern tour provoked further discussion of the role of the PLO. While resisting Arab pressures within the Euro-Arab dialogue and elsewhere officially to recognise the PLO, the European governments have increasingly come to view the latter as an indispensable factor in any negotiated Middle East settlement. Their assumption has been that the PLO would be prepared, within the context of an overall settlement, to renounce terrorist practices and rest content with some sort of a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus Lord Carrington stated in response to questioning in the House of Lords on March 17: 'I do not think that the PLO, as such, is a terrorist organization. There are some elements of the PLO which in the past have been associated with the terrorists, but it would be a great mistake to assume that it is possible to get a settlement in the area without taking into account the PLO.'[33] Similarly, France's Foreign Minister has argued that 'one cannot validly discuss a solution leading to a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace we desire for the Middle East without representation of the Palestinians and the presence of the PLO at the table.'[34] In his September 1979 address to the United Nations in the name of the European Community, the Irish Foreign Minister named the PLO as a participant in the Middle East dispute. Thus Giscard's insistence on PLO participation in Middle East negotiations during his tour of Arab capitals in March 1980 represented no new departure in French or European policy. It inspired, nevertheless, a wave of speculation as to diplomatic recognition of the PLO and a possible official visit of Yassir Arafat to Paris.

In fact, French officials repeated previous statements that an Arafat visit would pose no problems in principle but would appear inopportune at the present moment. In all likelihood, France would demand a major concession from the PLO: if not its recognition of Israel's right to exist, then at least the dismantling of guerrilla bases in southern Lebanon. Diplomatic recognition would appear to be more problematic, since the PLO is not a government exercising effective control over a specific territory. François-Poncet has drawn a distinction between juridical and political recognition: 'juridical representation results, as far as we Europeans are concerned, by the nature of things from a process of free elections which is hard to imagine at the present moment under the conditions existing in the Middle East. Politically, however, the PLO is a factor which cannot be ignored and with which France has long maintained relations.'[35] In his most recent statement, however, Giscard declined to accept the PLO's self-characterisation as the exclusive spokesman of the Palestinian people.

Two non-EC countries, Austria and Spain, have established more direct contacts with the PLO. In September 1979 Yassir Arafat visited Spain as a

33. Text from British embassy, Bonn.
34. 'A Propos de la Crise du Proche-Orient', *France-Pays Arabes*, Oct.-Nov. 1979, p. 13.
35. *Ibid.*

guest of the Spanish government and held discussions with the Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez, and the Foreign Minister, Marcelino Oreja. Spain reiterated its policy of refusing diplomatic recognition of Israel until the latter respects the rights of the Palestinian people. The Spanish Secretary of State for Information noted a species of 'intellectual race' to revise positions with regard to the PLO, to the extent that 1979 was becoming 'the year of Palestine in Europe'.[36] Spain did not, however, go so far as to recognise the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. This step was left to Austria's Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, who had already provoked Israeli ire by meeting with Arafat in July 1979. In March 1980 his government extended a 'new form of diplomatic recognition' to the PLO as the representative of a people without a government and without a state. While declining to specify the forms Palestinian self-determination might take, Kreisky has dismissed the argument that a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would endanger Israeli security and ultimately threaten moderate Arab states. In his view it is indispensable to a Middle East peace to approach those elements within the PLO that are prepared to negotiate a compromise settlement. If this is not done soon, the hitherto essentially politically-motivated Palestinian movement could well be overtaken by the kind of religious fundamentalism prevailing in Iran. Such a development, he argues, would not only exclude any Arab-Israeli settlement, but would promote instability throughout the Arab world, particularly in the Gulf states—where Palestinians comprise a major proportion of the skilled labour force and population in general.[37]

West German State Secretary, Klaus Bölling, insisted shortly after Kreisky's recognition of the PLO that the Austrian decision possessed no 'model character' for Bonn. In fact, West Germany has traditionally avoided a prominent independent role in Middle East policy, preferring to co-ordinate its stance within the framework of European Political Co-operation and leaving major initiatives to non-EC European countries and to France. Its military dependence on the United States has discouraged open criticism of the American efforts resulting in Camp David and the Washington treaty. Yet behind-the-scenes German initiative was by some accounts responsible for the EPC declaration of June 18, 1979, which not only repeated European support for a Palestinian homeland but condemned Israel's annexation of occupied territories, its West Bank settlements, and its bombing of civilian targets in southern Lebanon. During two tours of Arab capitals in 1979, Germany's Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, supported the principle of Palestinian self-determination; like Giscard in March 1980, he declined to call specifically for secure borders and diplomatic recognition of all Middle Eastern states, referring merely to his country's previously-stated position concerning the elements of a comprehensive settlement.[38] Such a settlement would be of

36. Spanish Diplomatic Information Office, *Spain '79*, Oct. 1979.
37. Cf. the interviews with Kreisky in *Die Zeit*, March 21, 1980, and *Die Welt*, Feb. 30, 1980.
38. Giscard did make such an explicit statement in Jordan, on the last stop of his Middle East journey.

vital concern to Europe, Genscher has stated, 'even if the Arab states exported nothing but water.'[39] Water not, however, being Germany's principal import from the Arab states, Genscher has gone so far as to demand Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem as well as from the other territories acquired in 1967.

Such German stands are particularly disconcerting to the Israeli government, which for many years received considerable reparations payments and (until 1965) clandestine weapons deliveries, as well as virtually unquestioning diplomatic support from the Federal Republic.[40] In recent years, however, German feelings of guilt for Hitler's holocaust of European Jewry no longer inspire automatic approval of specific Israeli policies, as opposed to the survival of the Zionist state: the remark is attributed to Chancellor Schmidt that 'a bad conscience cannot be the justification for the Federal Republic's support of Israel.' Further, West German leaders claim that their own country's division leads them to attach special value to the right of all peoples to national independence and self-determination. This latter term was first used by the Federal Republic's ambassador to the United Nations, Rüdiger von Wechmar, in November 1974, and it has remained a central element of Bonn's position on the Middle East.[41]

The Israelis, of course, point out that this German concern for self-determination appears less pronounced in the case of peoples such as the Kurds, Baluchis, and Basques. In addition, they charge that German connivance in France's pro-Arab machinations could weaken both Israel and Egypt *vis-à-vis* the rejectionist Arab states and undermine the Camp David negotiating process—the most promising peace initiative in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Former Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, voiced such complaints during his visit to Bonn in September 1979. On that occasion he pointed to a 'change for the worse' in German-Israeli relations, due primarily to the Federal Republic's one-sided criticism of Israeli policies and its insistence on Palestinian self-determination. In a clarification of this latter point, Genscher explained that the implementation of Palestinian rights must proceed within an overall settlement agreed to by all concerned parties, whence Dayan deduced an Israeli 'veto power' in this regard.[42]

Despite, or because of, Israeli criticism, the Federal Republic has been circumspect in its stance toward the PLO. The first EC state to come out in favour of Palestinian 'self-determination', it may well be the most reluctant to engage in direct dealings with the Palestinian organisation. Willy Brandt met with Yassir Arafat in July 1979 along with Austrian Chancellor Kreisky, but he acted on that occasion in his capacity as chairman of the Socialist International and in no way represented the German government. The Free

39. "Bonner Passepartout," *Der Spiegel*, June 11, 1979.

40. For an account of the diplomatic and domestic political crisis caused by the revelation of the secret weapons deliveries see Kramer, Thomas W., *Deutsch ägyptische Beziehungen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Tübingen and Basel, 1974), pp. 237-59.

41. Theo Sommer, "Punkte für Nahost." *Die Zeit*, Sept. 17, 1979, p. 1.

42. 'Nahostpolitik: Steckt Bonn zurück?', *Der Spiegel*, Sept. 17, 1979, pp. 19-22.

Democratic parliamentarian and defense expert, Jürgen Möllemann, also met with PLO officials during 1979, but the Foreign Ministry strongly denied that it had arranged or encouraged these contacts. By most accounts Herr Genscher initially opposed the EC decision to name the PLO as a participant in the Middle East peace process in O'Kennedy's September United Nations address.[43] The Germans did, of course, eventually acquiesce in the Community initiative, but any possible German rapprochement with the PLO was rendered still more unlikely in October by the revelation that the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (Federal Intelligence Service) had permitted Israeli agents to interrogate Palestinian detainees held in a Bavarian prison. More fundamentally, Germany's special relationship with both Israel and the United States prevents it from taking too exposed a position on the PLO question or indeed on most aspects of policy toward the Middle East.

European differences with Washington have been most pronounced in regard to the 'double crisis' of Afghanistan and Iran. With the exception of Britain, West European governments have been extremely reluctant to follow President Carter's lead in imposing economic and symbolic reprisals against the USSR and in initiating long-term countermeasures to guarantee the security of the Persian Gulf. Openly criticising the inconsistency, unpredictability, and absence of consultations that have characterised recent American foreign policy, they are fundamentally apprehensive of a return to the kind of cold war confrontation thought to have been superceded by detente. At the same time they fear that economic sanctions against Iran will be ineffectual or indeed counterproductive, further endangering Western energy supplies while accomplishing nothing to secure the release of the American hostages. The reluctant decision of European governments to support the Olympic boycott and the trade embargo of Iran, and similar measures, are borne less of their own conviction than of recognition of their continued military dependence on the United States.

According to a perception more widespread in Europe than in the United States, recent events in the Middle East constitute in reality a 'triple crisis' whose resolution or containment hinges upon a settlement of its third component, the Arab-Israeli dispute. In contrast to Europe's apparent diplomatic as well as military impotence in regard to Afghanistan and Iran, European initiative is expected to promote such a settlement by finding common ground between all parties to the Middle East conflict. A basic consensus on the outlines of such a Community policy toward the Middle East has been achieved. Whether that consensus can continue to bridge essentially disparate national positions, and whether that policy can overcome the imposing external obstacles, can be ascertained only by events.

As do the crises over Afghanistan and Iran, the Arab-Israeli conflict raises the basic question of the compatibility of European and American policies. This is obviously an issue not only between the European Community and the

43. See, for example *Die Welt*, Sept. 27, 1979.

United States, but among the various European governments themselves. The British have emphasised the importance of the Camp David accords as a major step toward a comprehensive solution; while they urge a direct approach to the Palestinian problem, they interpret such a move as an extension of the process already set in course by American diplomacy. France, on the other hand, has made clear its scepticism toward the Camp David agreements from the very beginning. It regards the Begin-Sadat treaty as a separate peace which has split the Arab world and retarded the search for a comprehensive solution. President Giscard's remarks on Palestinian self-determination and the essential role of the PLO could only undermine Sadat's position in the Arab world at a time when Israeli-Egyptian-American negotiations on West Bank autonomy were approaching a particularly critical phase. As over the Afghanistan issue, West Germany appears torn between its ties to Washington and Paris: officially supportive of the Camp David approach, it speaks of a European initiative which would not 'compete' with American policy but would overcome the latter's limitations to achieve more rapid progress toward a comprehensive peace.

European Middle East policy rests on the assumptions that PLO participation is essential to any viable settlement, and that, through appropriate concessions, the PLO can be induced to recognise Israel's right to exist and content itself with some sort of political entity in the West Bank and Gaza. If the first assumption appears realistic, the second is more open to question. To be sure, hints of a willingness to compromise have periodically emanated from the various groupings that comprise the PLO. Just as regularly surfaces the insistence on the long-term Palestinian objective of eliminating the Zionist state, which is viewed as an intolerable neo-colonialist affront to the Arab nation. PLO-representatives in Beirut, for example, have scorned recent European initiatives with the remark that 'we are not called PPLO—a "Part of Palestine Liberation Organization."'[44] Hence Israel's fears that the establishment of a Palestinian state, far from satisfying Arab ambitions, would constitute merely a first step in Israel's ultimate destruction.

Unless we are to be resigned to the inevitability of continued struggle, however, any possibility of flexibility on the part of the Israelis and the PLO must be explored by Western diplomacy. European efforts in this direction are certainly compatible with the long-term thrust of American foreign policy which, despite the Young affair and election-year promises, also appears to be headed toward further exploratory contacts with the PLO. Recognition of Israel, it is frequently asserted, is the PLO's only major asset, which it will surrender only in exchange for extensive and simultaneous Israeli concessions. While the United States remains bound by Kissinger's promise of 1975 not to negotiate with the PLO as long as the latter does not take this step, Western Europe is free to bargain with both sides in the search for a mutually acceptable

44. Peter Brünner, 'Zur Euphorie besteht kein Anlaß', *Vorwärts*, April 10, 1980, p. 12.

compromise. This European potential, however limited, must certainly not remain unused.

Ironically, however, the further West Europe distances itself from Camp David and from American or Israeli positions, the more doubtful becomes its potential as an independent force for peace in the Middle East. Its open criticism of Israel and its increasing identification with Arab positions are already explained in many quarters solely by its overwhelming dependence on Middle East oil. If the aim of the Europeans is to ingratiate themselves with Arab rulers and thereby assure future supplies of energy, they would do best to abandon any semblance of even-handedness in their utterances on the Arab–Israeli conflict. If, on the other hand, they seriously hope to promote a peaceful solution, they cannot afford to lose all influence on Israel and upon America's Middle Eastern policy. America's strengthened position in the Middle East following the October War derived from its leverage upon both sides: as Arab nations interested for the first time in a lasting reconciliation with Israel came to realise, only the United States was in a position to exert pressure on Israel and thus peacefully promote Arab demands. Without question, such Arab hopes have been disappointed by Camp David and its consequences. Just as certainly, however, Europe has already lost any significant independent economic or military leverage upon Israel and has dissipated much of the good will formerly existing between itself and the Jewish state. It can hope at best to set a pattern for American diplomacy, both complementing American efforts and exerting subtle pressure on the United States. Such a differentiation between European and American positions should be welcomed by leaders on both sides as one means of bypassing certain constraints on their own flexibility. A complete break between Europe and America would, however, serve only to illustrate Europe's relative economic and military vulnerability without improving the prospects for lasting peace in the Middle East.

IRAN'S REVOLUTION: PATTERNS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

*R. K. Ramazani**

THE global repercussions of the Iranian revolution continue. All around the world the revolution produces almost daily headlines referring to the tensions, strains, uncertainties and conflicts which it exhibits at local, regional and international levels. The increasingly polarised domestic politics of Iran, the mounting tensions on its borders with Iraq, and especially the rupture of diplomatic relations and start of economic warfare between the United States and Iran arouse worldwide concern. Beyond this the threat of unilateral American military action against Iran over the issue of the American hostages hangs like a storm-cloud—since few observers believe that the consequences of military intervention in the strategic Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz can be effectively contained. For these and other reasons worldwide interest in the development of the Iranian revolution has intensified.

The chief purpose of this article is to consider the nature of this revolution, and the prospects of its stabilisation. This task can be attempted, obviously, from a variety of perspectives; that which is adopted here is the perspective of Iran's own political history. The paucity of reliable information about current developments, and the short existence of the nascent Republic commend such an approach. Moreover the widespread belief among Iranians themselves in the relevance and importance of historical patterns of behaviour for the better understanding of the present and future developments of this revolution also supports this approach. 'Underlying patterns of behaviour are still the same', or *raval haman ast,* as goes the skeptical Iranian saying.

Cycles of crisis

Iran's current revolutionary crisis is the third of its kind in the twentieth century. Elsewhere, I have identified five general crises preceding the present one of which account must be taken for purposes of foreign policy analysis.[1] In

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1. See my study 'Iran's Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Projections', written for the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress in *Economic Consequences of the Revolution in Iran*, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 65-97.

this analysis the 1914-21 and the 1941-51 crises are excluded because they were sparked off by two world wars and consequent foreign invasions of Iran rather than by domestic convulsion. The 1961-63 crisis is also excluded because it did not result in a change of regime. What makes the 1905-11 Constitutional Revolution and the 1951-53 oil nationalisation crisis the most relevant historical precedents for the current revolution is the fact that they both represented popular domestic uprisings leading to the fall of one regime and the rise of another.

Iran's current revolutionary crisis shared, at its inception, four crucial factors with these two precedent crises. Most important, each crisis reflects a revolution of rising alienation from the monarchical regime and perceived foreign domination. This alienation developed essentially from the adverse effects of the previous domestic and foreign policy decisions of the ruling elite. In the period of the Constitutional Revolution, the economic policies of the Qajar monarchs dating back to the last quarter of the nineteenth century had resulted in an empty treasury, widespread corruption, financial disorganisation and foreign (British and Russian) economic domination.[2] The Qajar's arbitrary rule, political repression and, in particular, the maladministration of justice, also contributed significantly to the rise and spread of alienation.

Although opposition to the British appeared to be the primary cause of the uprising of nationalist sentiment during the oil nationalisation crisis in the early 1950s, dissatisfaction with the Shah's rule was also a major contributory factor.[3] The assassination in 1951, of his strong Prime Minister, General Ali Razmara, followed after a previous attempt upon the Shah's own life had failed two years earlier. Opposition to foreign powers has been a major factor in all three crises: in the 1950s the principal target was Britain, as contrasted with Russia during the first crisis and the United States in the third. But in the crisis of the 1950s the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was opposed as much for its close association with the ruling elite as for being an instrument of British interference in Iran's domestic and foreign policies.

In the current revolution popular alienation has displayed the same twofold pattern. Domestically, the adverse social, psychological, cultural, moral, and religious effects of the Shah's modernisation policies in the 1970s came to be felt to outweigh whatever material and economic gains had been made in the 1960s.[4] The massive and arbitrary infusion of spectacular new oil revenues into the economy after the explosion of oil prices in 1973-74, coupled with large-scale corruption and rapidly rising rates of inflation, fuelled the fires of widespread dissatisfaction. This trend became more and more articulate once the traditional political intolerance of the ruling elite was institutionalised in

2. See Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941, A Developing Nation in World Affairs* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966).

3. See Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975).

4. For greater details on this theme, see Ramazani, 'Iran's Revolution in Perspective', in Z. Michael Szaz, *The Impact of the Iranian Events Upon Persian Gulf & United States Security* (Washington: American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979), pp. 19-37.

the single, hated, Rastakhiz Party formed by the Shah in 1975. Externally the principal ingredients of the strong current of anti-American sentiments were Washington's close association with the Shah's regime since engineering the Shah's return to power in August 1953; and what was perceived as the imposition by the Pentagon of a 'capitulatory' regime on Iran in 1964—the same year that the Ayatollah Khomeini was exiled following the Shah's bloody suppression in 1963 of a national uprising, directed against his American-induced socioeconomic reforms (the 'White Revolution'). The Ayatollah at the time declared the agreement of the Shah's government to grant the United States exclusive criminal jurisdiction over its military personnel in Iran a 'document of the enslavement of Iran'.

Like its historical precedents, the current revolution has enjoyed the support of many disparate groups, classes and individuals. Modern factory workers, traditional shopkeeper, urban and rural street-cleaners, snow removers (*barfi*), kerosene peddlers (*nafti*), members of various guilds, and artisans as well as Bazaar merchants, dentists, lawyers, teachers, professors, intellectuals, civil servants, and shortly before the actual seizure of power by the revolutionary forces, even air force technicians and thousands of deserting soldiers—all joined hands in common opposition to the Shah's regime. However, university students, 'theological seminarians' (*tolab*), Bazaar merchants and intellectuals stood out in the current revolution as in the two previous uprisings. In terms of leadership, also, the role of religious and nationalist figures was paramount in all three uprisings—although both religious and lay leadership was more diffused in the Constitutional Revolution than in the uprisings of the 1950s and the 1970s. Coalitions between religious and nationalist leaders have been a feature of each Iranian crisis. For example, the Ayatollash Abolghasem Kashani and Dr Muhammad Musaddiq formed an *alliance de convenance* in the second crisis of the century, while the Ayatollah Khomeini forged a coalition with Musaddiq's successor to the National Front leadership, Dr Karim Sanjabi, in France. They jointly declared that the revolution marked the convergence of the 'religious and the national movements'. However, in the recent revolution religious leadership has predominated from the start.

Ideological diversity has marked the current revolution as it did the previous uprisings. There has at no stage been a monolithic ideological movement. Although the signs of Islamic resurgence are everywhere to be seen from Mauritania to Malaysia, the current of particularistic Shi'i Muslim fundamentalism as interpreted by the Ayatollah Khomeini,[5] and the lay Shi'i Muslim social and political radicalism expounded by the French-educated Iranian sociologist Doctor Ali Shariati (1934-77) which have been so prominent in the present revolution, have their special Iranian flavour despite their resemblance to the Islamic resurgence elsewhere.[6] Shariati, in particular,

5. See Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islamic Government* (A translation without publisher, date or place). For a recent compendium of the Ayatollah Khomeini's messages, speeches and interviews in Persian, see *Nedai-e Khalq*, Vol. 1, Paris (no publisher or date).

6. For a translation of samples of Shari'ati's lectures in English, see Hamid Algar, *On the Sociology of Islam*,

was attracted to the theories of the Algerian psychoanalyst, Franz Fanon—although the similarity between the Shi'i Muslim-based emphasis of the Ayatollah Khomeini on the uplifting of the 'down-trodden' (*mustaz'afeen*) and Fanon's 'Wretched of the Earth' is also intriguing.[7] This is perhaps why there has been a widespread, if mistaken, tendency to think of the current revolution as an ideological 'monolithic movement' to use the phrase emphasised in the new Constitution of Iran: the clergy dominated the 'Assembly of Experts' which approved this Constitution.[8] In fact, in the current revolution, as in the previous ones, modern liberal nationalism was a primary force. The clash between Muslim fundamentalism and democratic secularist conceptions of society and polity has been as real in this revolution as in the previous crises—although some leading modernists, such as Mehdi Bazargan, have argued persuasively that Islam and modernism can be made compatible.[9] Nevertheless, despite the fact of ideological diversity, the appeal of Islamic symbols to some modern-educated groups in the current revolution has surpassed that in historical uprisings. Alienation from blind Western-style modernisation has exposed many students and intellectuals to Islamic ideology as a 'third way', rejecting both the Western and Eastern models[10]—although others have embraced Marxism and Maoism instead. For the rural and illiterate masses and their fundamentalist leaders, however, Islam had always been '*the* way' and the only 'right path'. In neither of the previous uprisings was the participation of the rural and urban masses as extensive or were they so politically awakened. The intensely egalitarian, anti-establishment and communitarian aspects of Shi'i Islam have been marshalled against the tyrannical, agnostic, frivolous and iniquitous features of the rule of the elite. Sermons on the ancient martyrdom of the 'innocent' (*mazlum*) Imam Hussain—the third Shi'i Twelver Imam and the grandson of the prophet—at the hands of tyrannical Yazid have reached millions through the widespread use of the tape-recorder cassette, portraying the righteous struggle of the exiled Imam Khomeini against the Shah this is depicted as the ruthless modern Yazid.

Features of the present revolution

The forced departure of the Shah on January 16, 1979 and the seizure of power by the revolutionary forces on February 10–11, have been followed by

lectures by Ali Shari'ati (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979). There is a considerable literature by him and about him in Persian. For example, see Dr Ali Shari'ati, *Ali Tanha ast* (lecture), Tehran (Hussainiyeh-ye Ershad); *Besar e Aql Amadan-e Sarmayeh-dari* (no other information); *Haj* (Hussainiyeh-ye Ershad); *Pedar, Madar, Ma Motahemmeem* (lecture), Hussainiyeh-ye Ershad); *Shahadat* (lecture, Hussainiyeh-ye Ershad); *Yadnameh-ye Shahid-e Javid; Ali, Haqiqati bar guneh-ye Asatir; Az Koja Aghaz koneem?* (lecture); *Jahan-binv* (lecture); *Mazhab Alaih-e Mazhab* (lecture); *Shi'ah, Yek Hezb-e Tamam* (lecture).

7. See Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963).

8. For the phrase, 'monolithic movement', see the introductory section of the text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For the text in English with my introductory note, see *The Middle East Journal*, Spring, 1980 (forthcoming).

9. See, for example, Mohandes Mehdi Bazargan, *Rah e Tay Shodeh*, (Houston: Book Distribution Center).

10. See, for example, Ali-Reza Nobari (ed.), *Iran Erupts*, (Stanford: Iran American Documentation Group, Stanford University, 1978). In Persian see, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, *Naft va Solteh, ya Naqsh e Naft dar Tos'ah ye Sarmayeh-dari dar Pahneh-ye Jahan va Zaman* (Entesharat-e Mosaddeq, 1356).

the emergence in Iran of many power centres. Among these must be numbered the many free-wheeling revolutionary committees, which have often taken the law into their own hands; the secret Revolutionary Council; and, since the downfall of the Bazargan government, the militant students who have occupied the American embassy in Tehran. The Islamic Republican Party (IRP) which was formed by nine major clerical associates of the Ayatollah Khomeini must also be regarded as an independent power centre under the powerful leadership of the Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti, the Secretary of the Revolutionary Council and the new Chief of the Supreme Court. Finally, the recently-elected President, Bani-Sadr, and his close associates also constitute a centre of power.

The seizure of power by the revolutionary forces has been followed—as in previous crises—by the emergence of numerous rival religious and lay political forces.

Shared alienation from the Shah's regime unified the disparate political as well as social forces before the revolution; but as happened in the oil nationalisation crisis in the early 1950s the religio-national alliance in the recent revolution has largely broken down. The traditionalist-modernist dichotomy is reflected in every major political institution and sphere of activity, including the Revolutionary Council. But neither the traditionalists, nor the modernists, nor the secularists constitute a homogeneous group. For example, the secular communist Tudeh Party has consistently failed to forge a united front with other secular leftist or modern nationalist forces. Even the Marxist Fedayeen have defied the overtures of the Tudeh leadership. To cite another example, the two religion based parties, the IRP and the Muslim People's Republican Party (MPRP) were bitter rivals—until recently, the latter was, for all practical purposes, dissolved.

Another important factor of the revolution has been the resurgence of the efforts of tribal, ethnic and linguistic groups demanding various degrees of 'autonomy'. Although some 90 per cent of the Iranian population follows Shi'i Islam, most of the Muslim minorities believe in Sunni Islam of various Hanafi, Shafa'i, Maliki and Hanbali denominations. Since Iranian Kurds (numbering about two million out of a population of approximately 35 million)—as contrasted with the Baluchi tribesmen (600,000), Turkomans (500,000) and a large number of Iranian Arabs in the oil-rich province of Khuzistan—have posed the greatest challenge to the revolutionary authorities so far, their efforts require further attention.

Throughout the centuries the Kurds of Iran have been restless, but their demand for 'autonomy' has been revived, as always, in the face of the paralysis of the central government's military forces. The revolutionary authorities have wavered between negotiation and the use of armed force. The leftist orientation of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the interaction of the Kurds across the hostile frontiers of Iran and Iraq, and charges of Kurdish complicity with Russian, American, Zionist, Savakist and other alleged supporters of counter-

revolution complicate the deep-seated mutual distrust between the Iranian government authorities and the Kurds, who believe that prolonged negotiations are simply being employed by the central government for the purpose of delay.

Some progress, however, appears to have been made, in these negotiations—although fighting continues sparodically. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDR) has presented a new six-point programme to President Bani-Sadr, but the decisions have to be made by Majlis, which has not yet assembled. The secretary of the KDP, Abdolrahman Qasemlu, was reported to have said in March, 1980 that the party 'firmly believes that Kurdistan is an integral part of Iran and that there is no room for separation in its demand'.[11] The Kurdish claims include the right of autonomy of an Iranian Kurdistan to be incorporated in the Iranian Constitution; that Kurdistan should incorporate all Kurdish-inhabited regions; that apart from foreign relations, the army, national defense, and long-term planning, the Kurds themselves should resolve their own problems; that an elected Kurdish 'executive committee' should administer the region as an autonomous unit; that the Kurds should be responsible for maintaining their internal security; and that the Kurdish language be recognised on a par with the Persian language in all official correspondence.[12]

A major—if not a crucial—outcome of the seizure of power by the revolutionary forces has been the paralysis and demoralisation of the Iranian military. Consent and coercion are present in any kind of regime in varying proportions, but in the authoritarian traditions of Iran the element of compulsion has most often predominated. The surrender of the military to the revolutionary forces in Tehran did more than effectively destroy the Shah's regime; it undermined the core of the traditional power structure which was dominated historically by an alliance between the monarchy and the military. In the middle of the revolutionary uprising, the deposed Shah could still boast that 'nobody can overthrow me. I have the support of 700,000 troops . . . I have the power'. Ironically, it was within his favourite air force, equipped with some of the world's most sophisticated weapons, that loyalty to the Shah first broke down.

The military has been gravely undermined as a results of mass desertions, the wholesale dismissal of high-ranking officers and the series of summary trials and executions. The decapitation of the armed forces—partly out of fear of its counter-revolutionary possibilities—has proved to be counter-productive in many ways. It has been difficult to disarm the revolutionary elements who helped themselves to weapons from the Shah's vast arsenal during the seizure of power. Despite such efforts as the Ayatollah Khomeini's emphasis on the

11. Beijing in English, March 7 1980 as monitored by FBIS, in FBIS, *Daily Report, Middle East and North Africa*, V, no. 047, supp. 059 (March 7, 1980), p. 12.

12. See, *Tehran Times* in English, March 3, 1980 in FBIS, *Daily Report, Middle East and North Africa*, V, no. 051, supp. 063, March 13, 1980, pp. 18–19; and the source in footnote 11

importance of the army (he declared April 18 'Army Day'), the creation of the Revolutionary Guard (*Pasdaran*), the extension of amnesty to the security forces, and President Bani-Sadr's planned reconsideration of unjustified past purges, the paralysis largely continues.

Iran's economy is another victim of the revolutionary crisis. The authorities dream of cutting the Iranian economy off from the apron strings of foreigners, and particularly of the Western, industrialised world. This is, of course, a goal of many Third-World leaders. But the Iranian revolutionary leaders, particularly President Bani-Sadr, acknowledge that this goal will elude Iran as long as its economy depends upon the sale of oil. In the meantime, the flight of capital and managerial skills, frequent slowdowns and strikes, occasional sabotage and unmanageable worker intervention in management have reduced the productive capacity of the non-oil industry to half of what it used to be prior to the revolutionary seizure of power; and at least three million people—one third of the Iranian labour force—are unemployed. The revolutionary authorities' commitment to the uplifting of the standards of living of the poorer masses, to the increase of Iran's long-neglected agricultural production, particularly in food, and to the overall reduction of the nation's dependency through the processes of 'Islamisation' of the economy, yet remains to be fulfilled.[13]

The institutionalisation of power and authority

Faced with the continuing problems presented by the existence of competing power centres, by the proliferation and polarisation of political forces, the demands of ethnic groups for autonomy, and the reconstruction of the military and the economy, the revolutionary forces nevertheless take special pride in their attempts at political institutionalisation during the first year of the Islamic Republic.

Establishment of the Republic. After a two-day-long referendum at the end of March 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed April 1 to be 'Islamic Republican Day': 97 per cent of the electorate had voted for the Islamic Republic, out of the 98 per cent eligible to cast ballots. In his official proclamation of the Republic, the Ayatollah said that 'such a referendum is unprecedented in history—to establish a government of righteousness and to overthrow and bury the monarchy in the rubbish pile of history.'[14] As seen by the Ayatollah, even the referendum was superfluous, since by their uprising against the Shah's regime the people had already shown their desire to establish an Islamic Republic.[15]

However, as pointed out by many supporters of the revolution—including the influential Ayatollah Shariatmadari—the government offered the people no

13. See Ramazani, 'Iran's Foreign Policy', *op. cit.*
14. *New York Times*, April 2, 1979.
15. *Ettela'at*, April 3, 1979.

other choice than the 'Islamic Republic'. Although the debate appeared to centre around the designation of the new republic, the real divisions went deeper. The National Frontists, for example, believed that their coalition with the religious elements had been based on the prospective establishment of a republic in which liberal democratic and Islamic principles would equally guide and govern the construction of the new political order. They insisted on designating Iran as an 'Islamic Democratic Republic', and they characterised the whole revolution as a 'great national Islamic movement of the Iranian people' (*jonbesh-e bozorg-e melli-e Irani*). But the Ayatollah Khomeini rejected the very concept of 'democracy', either of an Eastern (Marxist-Leninist) or Western (liberal-democratic) variety. To him and his supporters, Islam provided the 'right way' which, in its insistence on the egalitarian principle and on the normative imperative of the triumph of the 'down-trodden' (*mustaz'afeen*) over the 'dominant elements' (*mustakbereen*) not only in Iran but throughout the world, included within it the superior principles of 'Islamic democracy' (*democracy-e Islami*). In such a democracy, according to the Ayatollah there is justice for all, and brotherhood, equality and unity for all strata of the society, founded on the superior value of individual 'spiritual righteousness' (*taqva*) rather than material or any other mundane privileges.[16]

Adoption of the Constitution. The failure of the liberal nationalists as well as of other moderate elements, both lay and religious, to persuade the fundamentalist clergy to offer the public a broader choice than the 'Islamic Republic' was a foretaste of what was to come. At the time of the official establishment of the Republic, the government promised elections for a 'Constituent Assembly' (*Majlis-e Muasisan*). It was estimated that such an elected body would consist of some three hundred representatives, providing a genuine opportunity for a representative public debate about the articles of the new Constitution. In May 1979, however, the Ayatollah decreed that the Constitution would be considered instead by an 'Assembly of Experts' (*Majlis-e Khebregan*).

The 75-member Assembly of Experts was elected during August 3-4, began its deliberations on August 19 and approved the Constitution on November 15. The document was then ratified in a referendum held on December 2-3. A wide variety of groups, including such notably liberal groups as the Bar Association and the National Democratic Party, and others such as the Kurdish and religious minorities, the Marxist Fedayeen, the Muslim Mujahedeen and a number of political parties expressed serious opposition to this process for both procedural and substantive reasons. For example, the National Front believed that 'an assembly of experts cannot be a substitute for a real constituent assembly representing the general will of the people because it lacks democratic character'; and it charged that threats, assaults and insults

16. *ibid.*

directed against the modernist and secularist groups by Muslim zealots created a 'stifling political climate'. However, the principal procedural reason for the dissatisfaction of the National Democratic Front, led by Dr Hedayat Matin-daftari, and the new Iranian Nation Party, led by Daryush Foruher—as well as the National Front—was that the difference between electing a Constituent Assembly and an Assembly of Experts was that the latter would be—as it was—a clergy-dominated assembly with far-reaching consequences for the substance of the Constitution.

The controversy centered on the single most fundamental issue of *Valayat-e Faqih* (the Twelfth Imam).[17] Although the concept is not specifically mentioned in the Constitutions it is stated that, in His absence, the Twelfth Imam would be represented by a qualified religious leader enjoying the confidence of the majority of the people.[18] Furthermore, the Constitution places the most extensive powers at the disposal of such a leader—at present, of course, the Ayatollah Khomeini.[19] The most eminent and consequential criticism of the extensive powers of the *Faqih* was voiced by the Ayatollah Shariatmadari. He reasoned that the grant of these powers is in contravention of the principle of the 'sovereign right of the nation' acknowledged in the Constitution.[20] The Constitution forbids anyone including—by implication, the *Faqih*—to 'take away this God-given right'.[21] In a nutshell, the Ayatollah Shariatmadari believes that sovereignty should rest with the people, while some provisions of the Constitution could result in a dictatorial government. He refused to vote for the Constitution and demanded its amendment.

There is little doubt that the Ayatollah Shariatmadari's protest partly contributed to the uprising in Azerbaijan, where he commands overwhelming

17. the Shi'is believe that there were twelve Imams (successors of Mohammed)—Ali, Hasan, Hussein, and nine in line of descent from Hussein—of whom the twelfth, Mohammed, born in 873 AD, disappeared mysteriously in 939 AD. They believe that the Imam is only 'hidden' and will reappear as the Mahdi (the rightly guided) to establish a golden age.

18. Principle 5 provides: 'During the absence of the Glorious Lord of the Age (the missing Twelfth Imam of the Shi'i sect), may God grant him relief, he will be represented in the Islamic Republic of Iran as religious leader and imam of the people by an honest, virtuous, well informed, courageous, efficient administrator and religious jurist, enjoying the confidence of the majority of the people as a leader. Should there be no jurist endowed with such qualifications, enjoying the confidence of the people, his role will be undertaken by a leader or council of leaders, consisting of religious jurists meeting the requirements mentioned above, according to Principle 107.'

19. Principle 110 provides: 'Duties and powers of leadership: 1. Appointing the jurists on the Council of Guardians; 2. Appointing the highest judicial authorities of the country; 3. Command of all the armed forces as follows: A. Appointing and dismissing the chief of the general staff, B. Appointing and dismissing the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, C. Organizing the High Council for National Defense which will be composed of the following seven members: president of the republic, prime minister, minister of defense, chief of the general staff, the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, two advisers specified by the leader, D. Naming the commanders in chief of the three armed forces at the suggestion of the High Council for National Defense, E. Declaring war and mobilizing the armed forces at the suggestion of the High Council for National Defense.'

20. Principle 6 and Principle 56 are at issue. Principle 6 provides: 'The affairs of the country should be administered in the Islamic Republic of Iran by relying upon public opinion, expressed through elections, i.e. election of the president of the republic, deputies of the National Assembly, members of councils, and the like, or by plebiscite, anticipated for cases specified in other principles of this Constitution.' Principle 56 provides: 'The absolute ruler of the world and humanity is God and He alone has determined the social destiny of human beings. No one shall take away this God given right from another person or make use of it to serve his personal or groups interests. The nation will use this God given right to act according to the manner determined by the following principles.'

21. *Ettela'at*, December 1, 1979.

support. To be sure, a variety of factors—ranging from historical grievances against the central government, to the revolutionary regime's disregard of the wishes of the Azerbaijanis to have a say in their own affairs (such as the appointment of religious leaders and the governor of Azerbaijan), and including a physical attack on the house of the Ayatollah Shariatmadari in Qom— contributed to this upheaval. It is clear that the Ayatollah's position on the Constitution enjoyed widespread support in Azerbaijan, was acknowledged as such by him, and was considered by the pro-Shariatmadari Muslim People's Republic Party (MPRP) to be the 'principal cause' of the clashes between some Azerbaijanis and government forces and Khomeini supporters.

The Ayatollah Khomeini charged that the turmoil in Azerbaijan was anti-Islamic, and was supported by both 'Zionism and imperialism'. The Ayatollah Shariatmadari publicly disagreed. In the end, however, discussions between the two religious leaders and between the Khomeini and Shariatmadari representatives (such as Hojat ol-Islam Shahabeddin Eshraqi and Hojat ol-Islam Sobhani, respectively) resulted in a negotiated truce. Nevertheless, the MPRP paid a heavy price in the end. Several ayatollahs, such as Rabbani Shirazi and Seyyed Abolhussain Dastghayb requested Shariatmadari to declare the MPRP dissolved, although he had repeatedly disavowed having sponsored the Party. By the middle of December 1979, without any attempt at intervention by Shariatmadari, the Party began to dissolve under considerable pressures from pro-Khomeini and Beheshti forces: 6,000 members of the Ardebil branch of the 2-3 million-member Party resigned *en masse*, and guilds, Bazaar merchants, Muslim students and others in Tabriz and other cities were induced to demand its dissolution. As a result, the field was largely cleared for the Khomeini-supported and the Beheshti-led IRP. It is important to note, however, that besides the Ayatollah Shariatmadari a number of other influential Iranian figures, including Abolhassan Bani-Sadr—subsequently elected President—and even the Ayatollah Khomeini himself, have acknowledged the need to amend the Constitution at a later date. For instance, in January, 1980, Khomeini approved a proposal to amend Principle 12 of the Constitution.[22] This proposal had been made by the representatives of the Sunni population of Baluchistan and Sistan to Dr Ibrahim Yazdi, then the Ayatollah's representative to the area, and had been unanimously approved by the Revolutionary Council. The relevant Principle provided that Sunni Islamic denominations would enjoy 'complete respect', while the Twelver Shi'i Islam was designated as the only 'official religion' of the country. The proposed amendment provided that where the followers of other Islamic religious

22. Principle 12 provides: 'The official religion of Iran is Islam, and the sect followed is Twelver Shi'ism (Ithna 'Ashari). This principle is never subject to change. Other Islamic denominations also, such as Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali and Zaydi, enjoy complete respect. The followers of these sects are free to perform their religious rites, based on their religious jurisprudence. They are also officially recognized as such in the courts, in connection with lawsuits dealing with religious teachings and personal affairs (such as marriage, divorce, hereditary disputes, wills, etc.). In any area where the majority of the population should consist of the followers of any of these sects, local regulations within the power possessed by the councils will be based on the regulations of that denomination.'

denominations have a majority they 'also should be official'. It is worth noting that Iran's first Constitution—that of December 30, 1906—had also to be amended, in 1907 and several times subsequently. (Except for the first amendment, however, the others enacted during the authoritarian rule of the Shah and his father were considered of dubious legitimacy.)

Election of the President. The election of the President followed the adoption of the Constitution. The landslide victory of Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the Finance Minister, was differently attributed to his own popularity as an 'Islamic thinker' (*mutefaker-e Islami*), as the son of a late religious leader, as an economist who could help restore the shattered Iranian economy and, above all, as a candidate who enjoyed the confidence of the Ayatollah Khomeini more than any other. His victory was variously viewed, within and outside Iran. The communist Tudeh Party disliked his perceived anti-communist and anti-Soviet attitudes, the Islamic Mujahedeen welcomed his willingness to engage in debate with their leader, Masud Rajavi, while the Marxist Fedayeen were critical of him. He seemed to enjoy the confidence of the Ayatollah Shariatmadari as well as Khomeini, while the powerful Ayatollah Beheshti was regarded as his staunch rival. Outside Iran, on the whole, some considered him as a political 'moderate', and others as a 'radical' economist. He himself resented the view supposedly held in the United States that his victory was a triumph of French-made, pro-Western liberalism over the Muslim clergy.[23]

The hostage crisis.

The limits to President Bani-Sadr's power have become sharply apparent in the continuing crisis over the American diplomatic hostages. The United States' principal concern was, and still is, the fate of these American hostages. President Bani-Sadr himself from the beginning accorded the resolution of this crisis a high priority, not so he said, to please Washington, but in order to get on with economic and other pressing problems facing the revolutionary regime. In this he was taking on the militant students who have occupied the American embassy since November 4, 1979. He embarked upon this course with good hope of success because, in addition to being the first popularly elected President of the Republic, he headed the Revolutionary Council and was temporarily appointed (on February 19, 1980) the Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian armed forces by the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The occupation of the United States embassy had been a major domestic political development, in addition to its far-reaching international repercussions and its adverse impact on relations between Iran and the United States. This international aspect of the crisis was probably of secondary importance to the militant students. Their capture of the embassy was not a spontaneous reaction to the arrival of the Shah in New York—he had, in fact,

23. President Bani-Sadr complained to Eric Rouleau in an interview published in *Le Monde* on February 11, 1980.

been admitted into the United States two weeks previously on October 22, 1979. The takeover seems rather to have been planned to coincide with the anniversary of the most destructive confrontation between the Shah's regime and its opponents at the University of Tehran. This had marked a turning-point in the revolutionary uprising as the opposition then, for the first time, called for the overthrow of the Shah's regime.

To be sure, the militant students demanded that the United States should extradite the Shah in return for the release of hostages; but they also had a more important, and less widely recognised objective—that of forcing the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan out of power. This seems clear from the militant students' own statements of November 4 and 8. When first appointed as provisional Prime Minister eight months earlier, Bazargan had told the Ayatollah Khomeini that he would adopt a 'gradualist' approach to the performance of his duties. During the entire course of his incumbency he had complained about the multiplicity of power centres, the disarray and chaos that engulfed the nation, the politics of extremism, the summary trials and executions, and the insufficiency of the support given him by the Revolutionary Council and, at times, even by the Ayatollah Khomeini himself.

The talks which took place between Bazargan and his Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Yazdi, with the American National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Algeria played into the hands of the militant students and their supporters. The meeting was used to attack the Bazargan government, which resigned after the takeover of the American Embassy. The militant students accused Bazargan afterwards of lack of 'revolutionary decisiveness', and treacherous failure to abrogate diplomatic, military and economic ties with the United States. He was also accused of leaving open the way for the influence of the United States and Israel by keeping 'westernised, liberal intellectuals' at the top of many executive organs of the country.[24] In his first supportive message to the militant students, the Ayatollah Khomeini told them that Iran was still in a state of revolution, 'a revolution greater than the first one'.[25] The fall of the Bazargan government marked a new stage in the radicalisation of revolutionary politics in Iran. Both the extreme Left and the Right welcomed the change.[26]

President Bani-Sadr has in fact been twice rebuffed in attempting to consolidate his authority by resolving the hostage crisis. The first occasion was when, the militant students refused to allow the five-man United Nations Commission to visit the American hostages, despite a momentary indication that they might do so.[27] Divided between various shades of traditionalist

24. See Tehran Domestic Service, 5 November, 1979 as monitored by FBIS, in FBIS, *Daily Report, Middle East & North Africa*, V, pp. R3-R4. 25. *Ibid.*, p. R-2.

26. The communist jubilation is well-exemplified by an interview of the Tudeh Party leader, Nuroddin Kianuri. He said on February 18, 1980 that the role of the militant students was 'very important' in defeating the attempts of the 'liberal bourgeoisie' under the government of Bazargan to divert the revolution from its 'anti-imperialist' path. For details of this revealing interview see, FBIS, *Daily Report, Middle East & North Africa*, V, no. 041, supp. 052, 28 February, 1980, pp. 24-28.

27. For the text of the militant students' statement see *New York Times*, March 7, 1980.

clergymen and modern lay elements, the Revolutionary Council finally referred the decision to the Ayatollah Khomeini who came down on the side of the militant students on March 10 by saying that if the United Nations Commission issued its report 'on the crimes of the deposed Shah and interventions of the invading United States in Tehran, it will be allowed to see the hostages'.[28] Faced with such a demand the Commission finally left Iran after a stay of seventeen days, to the embarrassed disappointment of President Bani-Sadr and the Foreign Minister who had worked hard to make the necessary arrangements for the Commission's visit.

Bani-Sadr's second rebuffal followed President Carter's decision at Camp David to proceed with economic and political sanctions against Iran if nothing was done to transfer the hostages to the hands of the Iranian government authorities—a decision which was communicated to Iran on March 25 with a deadline for an Iranian decision on the issue of transfer of hostages by March 31. In response to this President Bani-Sadr stated on 'Islamic Republic Day' (April 1) that action would be taken if, in effect, the United States made a broad and binding promise to withhold threats and hostile statements to gain the transfer of American hostages until the yet-to-be-elected Majlis had decided their fate—a solution which had previously been promulgated by the Ayatollah Khomeini himself after the arrival of the United Nations Commission in Iran.

Once again, the divided Revolutionary Council failed to reach an agreement, and once again the Council referred the issue to the Ayatollah Khomeini—who, as before, came down on the side of the militant students. He ruled on April 7 that the American hostages would remain in the custody of the militant students until a decision could be made by the Majlis. On the same day President Carter ordered the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Iran, announced the prohibition of American exports to Iran, except for food and medicine (such a sanction had been approved by ten members of the United Nations Security Council on January 13, but had been vetoed by the Soviet Union), gave indications of a plan to use frozen Iranian assets for the payment of outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against Iran, and instructed the Attorney-General to invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens and not issue new visas or renew old ones.[29]

Majlis elections. Yet another attempt to consolidate the revolutionary regime's power and legitimacy has been the Majlis elections. Held during the first half of 1980, the elections to the 270-member Parliament began amidst a continuing controversy between supporters of proportional representation which favoured small groups and parties, and their opponents who advocated election by absolute majority. Except for the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and its supporters within and outside the Revolutionary Council, few groups and leading individuals favoured the latter method. President Bani-Sadr also

28. For the text of Khomeini's statement see, *New York Times*, March 11, 1980.
29. For the text of President Carter's directive see, *New York Times*, April 8, 1980.

opposed it. Nevertheless, a two-stage, or absolute-majority, system was finally adopted—resulting in a clear majority for the clergy-dominated IRP in the elections held in March and May. President Bani-Sadr's so-called 'Office for the Co-ordination of the People and the President' has not yet, therefore, proved a match for the IRP.

Prospects for the future

Given the brief existence of the revolutionary regime, and the pace of events, speculation about its future is hazardous: it is still too early to identify the most significant emerging trends with any degree of confidence. Yet, in the light of the historical precedents, it is possible to suggest a few crucial factors relevant to the regime's prospects.

Both the Constitutional and the nationalist regimes survived for only a relatively brief period of the time. The Constitutional regime that was established in 1907 was removed in 1908, was re-established in 1909, and was destroyed again in 1911. The life of the nationalist regime of Dr Musaddiq was equally brief: it was established in 1951 and brought down by a coup in 1953. The two nationalist regimes of the past thus each survived less than three years—and for reasons that were broadly similar. In both cases their leaders were unable to stabilise conditions by consolidating and institutionalising their power and legitimate authority. They failed to transform charismatic leadership swiftly and successfully into acceptable and workable institutions. Consequently ideological, factional, personal and other divisions perpetuated unstable conditions until tranquillity was imposed by autocratic and authoritarian rulers. Further, the Constitutional and the nationalist regimes both failed to avoid being trapped in the conjunction between an hostile external environment and internal disarray and chaos. The Constitutionalists could not resist the pressure from both Britain and Russia, which was in turn a consequence of their pursuit of an excessively unrealistic foreign policy. The Musaddiq government fared hardly better. At first it tried to play the impartial, if not supportive, United States against Britain; but by the end it had lost the American card because of its inability to resolve the protracted oil nationalisation crisis. The combination of deteriorating domestic conditions and a hostile external environment paved the way for the American-supported coup that brought down the nationalist regime.

The most fundamental factor underlying the ultimate demise of these two regimes was, however, the inability of the nationalist leadership to temper ideological purity with considerations of pragmatic utility. Ideological preoccupations foreclosed the chances for any compromise settlement in dealing with the pressures of domestic and foreign policy. Seen in this light the emerging trends in the present Iranian revolution point to a basic fragility in the revolutionary regime—unless they can be reversed. Domestically, the remarkable efforts at institution-building since the establishment of the Islamic Republic are still challenged by a continuing concern with the ultimate shape

of the new constitutional order—particularly as it relates to the fundamental contradiction between the idea of the sovereignty of the people and the enormous powers granted to the religious leader or the *Faqih*. The nascent institutions are overshadowed by the spectre of unbridgeable divisions within the prospective Majlis and between the parliament and the President. The fear weighs heavy of a monopoly of power in the hands of the fundamentalist and often extremist Muslim clergy in the face of the mounting alienation of modern-educated groups and moderate religious figures—despite the Ayatollah Khomeini's own repeated exhortations for the participation of 'all strata of the society'. It seems to be impossible to settle the Kurdish and other ethnic problems within the framework of Iran's territorial integrity. And there are formidable problems of military reconstruction in the face of the pressing requirements of internal security and national defence, as well as sharpening problems of economic reconstruction in the context of declining productivity, rampant unemployment, and rising expectations for economic betterment.

The external environment of the revolutionary regime also seems to be deteriorating. Despite repeated official denials by the revolutionary authorities, fears regarding the export of the Iranian revolution continue to haunt Iran's neighbours—conservative and radical alike. The transnational claims of Iran's new foreign policy, reflecting what is perceived as a universal Islamic commitment to the support of all liberation movements, is believed to contradict the revolutionary regime's fierce opposition to foreign interference in Iran's own internal affairs. President Bani-Sadr's concern that failure to resolve the hostage crisis would weaken the revolution is justified, not only because, as he believes, it deters the nation from concentrating its energies on coping with mounting domestic economic and political problems—but also, in the view of the author, because it tends to aggravate Iran's relations with an increasing number of states, including the West European countries, Britain, and Japan. This must make it extremely difficult in the end for Iran to maintain equidistance from the East as well as the West, in keeping with the fundamental premise of its new revolutionary foreign policy.

In the light of its own historical experience, Iran must surely note the danger of a convergence between a polarised domestic political process and a hostile external environment. This is a lesson of the past that must be learned if the country is to give itself a decent chance finally to break out of the vicious cycle of the nationalist crises of the past. The failure to do so, historically, has always entailed the return of authoritarian regimes. And the fundamental reason for that failure, it is here submitted, was the inability of the leaders of the anti-autocractic regimes, Constitutionalist or Musaddiqist, to temper ideological extremism with pragmatic requirements. The friends of Iran hope that the new revolutionary leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran will recall that the glorious achievements of Islamic civilisation were always made possible by the ability of Muslim leaders to wed their faith to an accurate reflection of the real facts of life.

AMERICA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY: IS THE OLD-TIME RELIGION GOOD ENOUGH?

*Miles Kahler**

IN only fifteen years a revolution has occurred in the relationship of the United States with its principal allies. Despite concern over trends in the strategic and conventional military balances (expressed more persistently in the United States than in Europe or Japan), and renewed alarm evoked by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and now the revolution in Iran, the great strategic debates of the 1960s have faded. In the economic sphere, on the other hand, the once unchallenged predominance of the United States has come increasingly into question. To many, the United States seems a faltering giant diminished in stature when compared to Europe or Japan. Critics abroad complain loudly that the United States seems incapable of managing both its internal economic affairs and its external economic relations to the benefit of its partners and associates in the world economy.

Reaching a crescendo under the Carter administration, these criticisms must be taken into account in evaluating that administration's record in foreign economic policy. But the harshest critics ignore the constraints imposed upon the American government by the changes that have occurred in the international economy over the past decade. Not only have the European and Japanese economies assumed greater importance, but the devolution of economic influence has extended to new actors as well—in particular the dynamic Asian industrialisers in trade and the members of OPEC in international finance and energy. The United States has found it more and more difficult to shape its economic environment, either alone or in concert with Europe. With these shifts in relative economic weight has come a growing sensitivity on the part of the American economy to events outside the borders of the United States. For more than a century America, as a continental economy with a relatively small external sector, was not accustomed to taking account of its economic surroundings to ensure internal prosperity. Now the political consequences of this growing external sensitivity have increasingly complicated the task of the administration in managing American foreign policy.

America's relative decline in international economic importance and the increasing international exposure of its economy have both caused and

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accompanied a third feature of the world economy in the present phase—the erosion of the postwar arrangements that for twenty years successfully regulated economic relations among industrial countries and insulated those relations from overt political interference. Most dramatic were the changes in the international monetary system that followed President Nixon's closure of the gold window on August 15, 1971 and successive devaluations of the dollar. Equally significant, and perhaps most painful for the average citizen, were increases in the real cost of energy which began during the boom of 1972-73, were drastically accelerated by the co-ordinated action of OPEC in 1973-74, and, after a brief respite, have continued with the latest price increases of June 1979. Less noticeable, but linked to the other changes as a source of tension with Europe and Japan, have been the growing barriers to world trade that began to reappear in the late 1960s and are threatening to overwhelm earlier achievements in trade liberalisation. By the mid-1970s although the old international economic order had been eroded, it was not clear what new order, if any, would be born.

The choice of a resuscitated liberalism

The foreign economic policy of the Carter administration has represented a slow coming to terms with these changes in America's international position. In spite of the strategic trends, when it took office the new administration seemed to face few stark choices in managing American foreign economic relations. Both the economic setting and the predispositions of the new administration pointed to a revival of the American commitment to a liberal world economy, based upon free trade, free movement of capital, and flexible exchange rates reflecting underlying economic conditions. These tenets were coupled with a belief that such openness could be managed with a minimum of co-ordination among the principal economic powers and minimum constraint upon the country's freedom of action in economic policy. In the spirit of economic liberalism, the administration held to the assumption that reliance upon the market would produce co-operation and not conflict in the world economy.

This resuscitated liberalism—in itself hardly a partisan point of view—was reinforced by the particular economic circumstances of early 1977. After the crisis of 1972-75 there was general satisfaction that the world economy had met without catastrophe the strain of inflation, sharply higher energy prices, and disorder in international monetary affairs. The United States was in an economic upswing that in fact proved to be one of the most sustained in its postwar history. This 'boomlet' reinforced the American conviction that the worst predictions of economic disaster and nationalist rivalry would not be realised. This optimism was not wholeheartedly shared by the Europeans, whose economies did not show the same vigour in recovery, or by the Japanese—still deeply concerned by their economic dependence. For America's leaders, however, economic liberalism in international affairs seemed confirmed by a return to normalcy in world economic conditions.

Indeed, everything in the background of the leadership told in this direction. The new President was himself a businessman believing in the virtues of the untrammelled marketplace; a Southerner representing the traditional free-trade sympathies of that agricultural region; and a Democrat committed to the postwar system of alliances and economic co-operation. Like his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, he had been a member of the Trilateral Commission, campaigning against the Republican record of neglecting our European and Japanese allies.

Moreover, the balance within the American economy was still powerfully tilted towards attachment to the open world economy. The power of the multinational corporations—their era of greatest expansion now drawing to a close—and the more recent internationalisation of the banking sector overrode the growing protectionism in nationally based manufacturing and in the labour movement. Although the balance was evidently growing more delicate, no organised or systematic assault on the neo-liberal vision of the world economy had appeared by the late 1970s.

In short, the international economic policy of the Carter administration represented a return to the old-time religion of economic liberalism, based upon American optimism about the economic future—optimism that had hardly been dimmed by the bleaker climate of the 1970s. By the beginning of 1980 however, this faith had encountered several crises of conviction. Reviving the principles that had guided a world based on American predominance had proved to be more difficult than expected in the changed international circumstances of the late 1970s. To some, the liberal catechism seemed likely to be in for an even harder time in the next decade.

Monetary policy: floating, sinking, intervening

The experiment in floating exchange rates, undertaken of necessity since 1973, seemed in the mid-1970s to have performed well in conditions of great economic turmoil. Widespread satisfaction with this new international monetary system also fitted neatly with the free-market principles favoured by the Carter administration. Despite its recent vintage, the consensus was deeply ingrained: exchange rates, for the dollar and for other currencies, should be set by underlying economic conditions; government intervention for stabilisation should be kept to a minimum; the necessities of domestic economic management should not be constrained by balance-of-payments considerations. Autonomy in setting domestic economic policy seemed both desirable and attainable. What the administration neglected was the increasing international sensitivity of the American economy, on this front and on others, a sensitivity which made the international co-ordination of economic policy both more essential and more difficult than it had been in the halcyon days of the 1950s and 1960s.

The dollar's first slide began in late 1977, and from that time it has followed an annual pattern—rescue operations late in the year, a temporary recovery, a

renewed weakness in the summer and autumn. The cause of the first precipitous decline against the deutschemark and the Japanese yen was evident. In 1976 the industrial economies had recovered in tandem from the recession and in 1977 the American economy surged ahead. Oil imports in particular burgeoned, and the trade deficit grew enormously. The Carter administration at first took a relaxed attitude toward the dollar's decline, regarding it as an appropriate reflection of changing economic realities; but this complacency was eventually shaken by the sharpness of the attacks. Even on a narrow definition of 'disorderly market conditions', intervention seemed necessary. It came on two fronts: an expansion of the swap network, with which foreign currencies could be used to buy dollars; and a tightening of domestic monetary policy, aiming to buoy the dollar through attracting capital inflows and slowing the rate of inflation.

The administration's willingness to accept a decline in the dollar was sharply criticised by the Europeans, particularly the Germans. The Secretary of the Treasury, Michael Blumenthal, was accused of 'talking the dollar down' when his reported remarks led to renewed downward pressure on the dollar's rate of exchange. To the Europeans, the cause of the monetary disorder was clear: a gaping United States trade deficit, attributed to American petroleum gluttony. Their prescribed cure was a reduction in American oil imports through raising domestic petroleum prices to world levels. For the United States, the blame lay in part on the Germans and the Japanese, who persisted in accumulating large balance-of-payments surpluses. The Carter administration based its case on the elementary proposition that every nation could not pursue such a policy. With the OPEC countries necessarily in surplus as a group, the counterpart deficits should have been borne, in the American view, by the stronger economies of the North and not by those of the developing countries. The higher growth rate maintained by the United States, which added to the surge of imports and thus precipitated the pressure on the dollar, also assisted those weaker economies, North and South, that more than ever needed the American market for their exports to help pay their oil bills.

The quarrel over who was being greedy and who selfish, who virtuous and who profligate became heated in early 1978, as the United States pressed Germany and Japan to become 'locomotives' in lifting the world from lingering recession. By the autumn, however, the polemics were overtaken by renewed pressure on the dollar. The American consensus on minimal intervention came under even closer scrutiny as the exchange markets seemed to overreact to the 'underlying economic trends'. In October 1978 some detected a whisper of panic as the dollar dropped more swiftly on the exchanges. The American government decided, in the words of one Treasury official, that the point had come 'where Adam Smith has to be curbed'.

That curbing came on November 1, 1978 with a joint announcement by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve of even tougher measures domestically

(including the sharpest single increase in the discount rate since the 1920s), and of increased support internationally through enlarged swap arrangements with the central banks of Switzerland, Germany, and Japan. Despite the political unpopularity of higher interest rates, President Carter accepted these measures, which were strongly backed by the Secretary of the Treasury, Michael Blumenthal and the Federal Reserve Chairman William Miller. A new factor of critical importance in the President's decision was evidence produced by the Council of Economic Advisers that a substantial element in the mounting inflation could be attributed to the depreciation of the dollar, through increased import costs. In other words, the decline of the dollar *did* have a serious impact upon the domestic economy.[1] A second concern was the response of OPEC: with their oil revenues diminished by a depreciating dollar, it was feared that the oil-producing states would push for another round of price increases, ratcheting-up inflation still further. The circle had been closed: not only did the management of the American economy (or perceptions of its management) affect the dollar in the international money markets, but the plight of the dollar in turn affected efforts to reduce inflation. The insulation of the American economy, declining for many years, was being stripped away.

Each successive effort by the administration to curb the dollar's decline has included a larger domestic dimension. Eventually, in the drastic revision of American monetary policy announced by the Federal Reserve on October 6, 1979 no additional international support measures were announced. A new consensus was taking shape, at least at the Federal Reserve, that saw in domestic inflation the basic cause of a weak dollar and the persistent balance-of-payments deficit. The risk involved in these latest measures to arrest inflation and prop up the dollar—in an economy already dipping into recession—was the largest to date.

In three years, the Carter administration had moved (or been pushed) toward more forceful management of the dollar, a shift born of awareness that the dollar's decline could significantly affect the administration's other economic goals. Although the new activism included substantial intervention on the foreign exchange markets, the balance of the measures being taken tilted increasingly toward the concept of controlling domestic inflation in order to strengthen the dollar. No longer was it regarded as adequate to rely simply upon the market to set the dollar's exchange rate. Nor did it seem that greater freedom of action could be secured for domestic economic management: on the contrary, more than ever before the demands of the dollar seemed to determine the mix of economic policy. For better or worse, along with the rest of the world the United States had begun to feel the 'discipline' of its balance of payments.

The economic rationale of the new consensus, as summarised by Paul

1. Clyde W. Farnsworth, 'Action for the Dollar: Economic, not Political', *New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1978, D3. Evidence for the inflationary effects of a declining dollar is given in *The Economic Report of the President*, Jan. 1979, pp. 42–43.

Volcker in a public address before his appointment as chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank seemed as firmly grounded as that underlying earlier policies[2]—but its political and institutional assumptions are more open to challenge. Volcker disclaimed any attempt to keep the dollar or any other currency at an equilibrium rate; he argued instead for 'quiet mutual contingency planning' among 'a few leading nations'. But can such planning take place without some notion of acceptable bands for the key currencies? And what if there is disagreement on those levels, as there was between the United States and Germany throughout most of the period the Carter administration? In Volcker's view, in a situation of conflict the process of mutual adjustment would be more likely to succeed, through trilateral consultation (as symbolised by the economic summits) rather than within wider and more formal international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund. But without a strengthened international umpire the domestic pressures on either side or both may in fact prevent the compromises necessary in sharing the burden of adjustment. In the early 1970s, it was feared that countries would engage in competitive devaluations of their currencies to gain trade advantages; in 1980 a different sort of competition threatens: step-by-step increases in interest rates to *support* exchange rates in order to lower inflation and restrain import costs. Without international co-ordination this unregulated competition risks, in the short term a deeper world recession, and slower recovery in the longer term. By assuming away this sort of conflict or competition in national economic choices the new monetary gospel of intervention with international consultation rests upon a liberal faith in international co-operation as naïve as the previous liberal orthodoxy concerning the efficacy of the market.

In its support for the dollar the revised international monetary policy also takes for granted a particular set of domestic economic and political priorities. As Volcker puts it, international monetary policy was for some time regarded as the tail that could not be permitted to wag the demanding dog of the domestic economy. But since November 1978 the requirements of the balance of payments have played an ever larger role in setting the course of national economic policy. Proponents of higher interest rates argue of course that their remedy for strengthening the dollar will also curb inflation domestically. The latest dose of monetary medicine, administered by the Federal Reserve when a recession was in view, was hardly orthodox policy—if policy is determined by domestic needs. Although it is too early to affirm the existence of a new pattern of economic management, this growing reliance upon monetary policy to prop up the currency in the exchange markets is alarmingly reminiscent of British policy in the 1950s and 1960s. Ultimately, increased industrial investment—one long-term solution to inflationary bias in the economy—is retarded by such an overloading of monetary instruments. Apart from the economic wisdom of

2. Paul Volcker, 'The Political Economy of the Dollar', *The Banker*, Jan. 1979, pp. 41-51.

the policy, however, the unpopularity of high interest rates could draw international monetary policy into domestic politics for the first time. Although little criticism was voiced after the Federal Reserve measures of October 1979, the content of the monetary dimension in foreign economic policy could be dramatically affected if the international role of the dollar becomes a part of political debate within the United States.

Finally, until very recently the Carter administration has sidestepped the question of what role the dollar should play in the international monetary system. From the point of view of Europe or Japan, the so-called dollar 'overhang' is a major source of instability in the world's present arrangements. As central banks and other holders of dollars diversified into other assets in 1977–79 they induced some of the precipitous declines in the value of the American currency. Most American policy-makers have argued that as a cure is found for domestic inflation and persistent balance-of-payments deficits, the dollar overhang will take care of itself. Other specialists, such as Robert Triffin, have warned of the risks involved in permitting the dollar to continue as the linchpin of the world monetary system—a domestic economy managed to please foreign holders of dollars, an international economy plagued by instability as the demand for dollars rises and falls. No other national currency could assume the role of the dollar in the international economy, although the German and Swiss governments appear to be revising their opposition to the use of the Deutschemark and the Swiss franc in a reserve role. At some point in the future, the European Currency Unit might become a plausible alternative reserve component, more acceptable to the Europeans than the use of their national currencies.

An international solution that could be implemented more quickly is the proposed substitution account at the International Monetary Fund, into which foreign governments could transfer unwanted dollars in exchange for Special Drawing Rights. In the past the idea of a substitution account has met persistent resistance from the United States. After two years of monetary turmoil, however, the Carter administration signalled its acceptance of the account in principle, and the question was discussed without great enthusiasm at the meeting of the International Monetary Fund in September 1979. Little progress has been made, and the size of the proposed account seems inadequate to the task set for it, but the important point is that an American administration has admitted, however cautiously, that it no longer wishes to carry the burden placed upon the dollar by existing international monetary arrangements. Devising an alternative would, however, require time and a willingness by the other industrial economies to share the responsibility for managing the international monetary system.

Time seems in short supply by early 1980. The freezing of Iranian assets by the American government has had no dramatic immediate effects, since the payments positions respectively of the United States and the German and Japanese economies had shifted in 1979 as the American economic upswing

tapered off. Apart from the irritation in Europe over this exercise of extraterritoriality, the action taken against the Iranians seems likely to accelerate diversification away from the dollar by other holders, particularly in the Middle East. Another strain had been added to a financial system already burdened with the renewed demands of recycling in the wake of the 1979 oil price increases. Whether confidence in the dollar can be maintained by managed diversification combined with domestic instruments of limited effect still seems an open question.

Trade policy: protectionism at bay

On the trade front, the commitment of the Carter administration to maintaining an open system has been threatened, not by a coherent attack on the concept of free trade as such, but by the ceaseless search for exceptions by domestic industries complaining of 'unfair' competition. The clamour for protection is a sign of the growing vulnerability of the American economy to changes in the international division of labour—but here the position of the American government is not unique: all the industrial countries have faced similar complaints and pleas for help since the deep recession of 1974-75. However, the new administration has had to cope with conjunctural and political conditions which have weaked its stand against protectionist pressure. Just as the nation's strong economic recovery induced payments imbalances with other industrial countries, so it also drew into the American market the products of trading partners whose economies were growing more slowly (although at the same time it also alleviated some of the unemployment that could be blamed on foreign competition). Given the administration's bias against direct subsidies, and the virtual absence of any policy of industrial adaptation, most political demands for help came to centre upon the restriction of trade.

The Carter administration has fought the trade battle on a number of fronts. It has mounted a rearguard action against demands for import restriction, offering a concession here, refusal there, and limited help elsewhere. The principal concessions have been made in the negotiation of an orderly marketing arrangement for footwear, in a voluntary export restraint agreement concerning Japanese colour television sets, and—by far the most important—the imposition of a system of trigger prices on steel imports.[3]

The course of bargaining with the steel industry illustrates the weak position of the American Executive when protectionist pressure mounts. The force of such demands is amplified by the way in which trade policy is made in the United States. Unlike international monetary policy—streamlined, involving few Executive departments, insulated from Congressional pressures—trade policy is often a free-for-all: the Executive branch splits between those arguing for the threatened industry and those opposing trade

3. A summary of recent United States trade measures can be found in IMF Pamphlet No. 24, *The Rise in Protectionism* (Washington: IMF, 1978), pp. 28-29.

restrictions (usually the Treasury and State Departments), and Congress plays a central role as mouthpiece for the domestic industry and its workers. When confronted with a Congressional complaint about the loss of two hundred jobs to Danish imports of butter cookies, the President's Special Trade Representative, Robert Strauss, is reported to have exploded, 'I'm not running a butter cookie program, I'm trying to conduct a national trade policy.' For better or worse, more Congressmen are interested in their own versions of butter cookie policy than in national commercial policy.

In the autumn of 1977 the steel industry began closing plants, protesting that the closures were forced by imports of steel from Japan and Europe. Concentrated in the politically potent industrial heartland of the country from New York to Illinois, Congressmen representing the affected region quickly voiced the industry's arguments through a Steel Caucus, threatening to impose import quotas if the administration failed to act. The Carter administration had to consider not only the political clout of the Steel Caucus but also the need for Congressional backing on other administration programmes—energy, SALT II, or the Panama Canal treaties.[4]

A response to the steel industry—and others—was required for political reasons; but the industry and its Congressional supporters were nevertheless not given exactly what they wanted. The Solomon Task Force, established by the President, recommended the institution of a system of trigger prices, rather than the more restrictive (and inflationary) device of import quotas. Trigger prices were to be signals to the Treasury Department that an investigation of dumping by exporters should be instituted.[5] Other recommendations of the Solomon Task Force were directed towards modernising the industry and easing the adjustment of regions likely to lose steel plants. The Task Force tried to shift attention to the central issue: why segments of the American industry were no longer internationally competitive. Temporarily, the trigger price system worked—in spite of mutterings about its inadequacy, the industry and its Congressional backers did not push for more restrictive measures. But as the long-awaited recession took hold in the automobile and housing industries, complaints and threats have begun to mount once again.

Another aspect of the President's trade strategy, also directed toward the business and Congressional audience, has involved occasional tough talk to our trading partners when they have seemed to be engaged in 'unfair' trading practices—although simple efficiency has sometimes been viewed as 'unfair' in some quarters. The first year of the Carter admininstration was only one in a series of periods of tension with Japan over trade questions. As the Japanese trade surplus with the United States shot up, the American government

4. The power of the sugar producers in obtaining protection, for example, is not unrelated to the representation of sugar-producing states by Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Russell Long, chairman of the Finance Committee, which deals with trade legislation.

5. Dumping is usually defined as selling goods in a foreign market below their price on the domestic market. In the case of steel, however, the trigger prices were based upon the cost of production in Japanese steel companies, regarded as the most efficient producers in the world.

decided upon confrontation. Mission after mission was sent to Tokyo to tell the Japanese that these imbalances were 'simply unacceptable', urging the Japanese government to increase its rate of growth, to increase purchases of American imports and to let the yen appreciate to make Japan's exports more expensive. The Japanese were increasingly irritated at the detailed nature of the advice on their economic policy and at the overbearing manner in which it was being offered. By December 1977, when Japan's Minister of State for External Economic Affairs, Nobuhiko Ushiba, took the Japanese government's latest concessions to Washington, relations had reached a low point and a full-fledged trade war seemed possible. Although the December measures were labelled 'insufficient' by Robert Strauss, the United States chose not to argue its case further. In January 1978, during a visit to Tokyo by Strauss, the two governments managed to resolve their differences for the time being: Japan committed itself to reduce its trade surplus and made additional concessions on the sensitive question of American agricultural imports. The Japanese had managed to stave off the worst retaliation by the United States with limited concessions; the Geneva trade negotiations were spared and economic relations between the two countries improved.

These trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round, were yet another dimension in commercial policy—the liberal face that America presented to the world. While earlier negotiations, particularly the Kennedy Round in the 1960s, had concentrated upon tariff cuts, the United States was principally concerned in the Tokyo Round with non-tariff distortions to trade, obstacles as diverse as the imaginations of civil servants and politicians can make them. Deeply embedded in the political realities of each society, with trade effects that are difficult to measure, such obstacles are particularly resistant to negotiation.

When the 'final substantive results' of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations were agreed on April 12, 1979 progress had been made, at least on paper, towards regulating and reducing these barriers. Codes of conduct were negotiated for subsidies and countervailing duties, government procurement, standards, import licensing, and customs valuation. In addition, industrial tariffs would be cut modestly (by past standards) over eight to ten years. In agricultural trade the results, from the American point of view, were more meagre. The completed trade agreement promised insurance against a slide into protectionism, but the measure had to survive the legislative tangle that surrounds any trade question in Congress. Many predicted a hard battle in Congress, since the old coalition of free trade forces appeared to be unravelling—agriculture disgruntled at continuing protection of the European and Japanese markets, many industries seeing themselves threatened by international competition. The predictions of destructive Congressional opposition were unfounded: after hard bargaining in committee, the President was awarded a major victory with the passage of the trade legislation by the Senate on July 23, 1979.

The administration's international trade strategy has thus worked, in the

short term: but the test of the efficacy of the new international codes lies in the future. In the United States and elsewhere, the nibbling away at the edges of free trade seems likely to continue. Among the industrial countries, another recession means another surge in subsidies and in the various forms of trade-distorting assistance that will test the new understandings on non-tariff barriers. Even under favourable economic circumstances, governments are coming to play an increasing role in international economic relations, a role difficult to regulate or monitor. As a result, an increasing share of trade seems likely to be 'managed' in the future.

In particular the new agreements could prove insufficient to stifle demands for 'fair trade' from American industries. In December 1979 United States Steel announced 13,000 layoffs, renewing the tactics of political pressure begun two years earlier. These measures were followed early in 1980 by the initiation of anti-dumping suits against European producers, a course that threatened to disrupt their steel exports to the United States. At the same time, calls for curbs on Japanese automobile imports have grown more persistent as recession has again struck the American industry; and, from the other side of the Atlantic, European producers have argued that American manufacturers of synthetic fibres benefit unfairly from underpriced petroleum supplies.

These new conflicts, springing up at the outset of an American economic downturn, will be dealt with by newly-reorganised trade machinery in the United States. Reorganisation was a price extracted by Congress for the passage of the Tokyo Round agreements; it has notably awarded a larger role to the Commerce Department, particularly in anti-dumping complaints—thus, some have argued, widening the avenues for the exertion of influence by threatened industries. On the other hand, the augmented role of the United States Trade Representative could balance any new protectionist bias introduced under the new system.

Looked at in the light of the ups and downs of the business cycle, the chorus of pleas for protection point to a more significant shortcoming of the neo-liberal strategy. Emphasising the maintenance of openness in the world trading system by shoring up international agreement, the strategy has been almost exclusively directed *outward*. Although earlier liberalisation increased the competitive pressures on such industries as textiles and steel (and others will join the list in the future), the *internal* dimension of trade policy—assistance for adjustment and the creation of an industrial policy—continues to be neglected. The United States stands apart in the weakness of its strategy to deal with industrial adjustment to changes in the international division of labour. Given the resistance to government intervention, even in troubled sectors, and the liberal predispositions of the Carter administration, it is hardly surprising that the administration's principal initiative for encouraging industrial innovation (announced in October 1979) was restricted to technical and administrative proposals. The debate over assistance to the Chrysler Corporation, the tenth largest manufacturing company in the country, highlighted not only the

bankruptcy of the corporation but also the bankruptcy of the ad hoc manner in which the United States approaches industrial policy.

Economic co-ordination and energy: one step forward

The conflicts that have surfaced in monetary and trade policy have often had deeper sources: the payments imbalances were exacerbated by drastically higher energy prices after 1973 and by the lack of any international consensus on the parameters of economic management. The first steps towards the co-ordination of international economic management were taken by the Ford administration with the initiation of regular economic summits among heads of government, and the trilateralist enthusiasm of the Carter administration ensured that the economic summits would continue and be given even greater attention. However, the meetings held in London in May 1977 and Bonn in July 1978 represented only a small advance: they led to little more than the anodyne agreement that the nations represented should not move in protectionist directions and that certain growth targets—usually those already in any case decided by the national governments—should be pursued. The semblance of co-operation at the summits did offer the leaders some reinforcement against economic nationalism at home, but each government was determined to keep the management of its economy firmly within its own control. The importance of economic management to the political future of any elected leader, and the divergence in national economic goals, reinforced their reluctance to accept international supervision.

Nevertheless, renewed concern over world energy supplies gave the proceedings at the Tokyo summit in June 1979 a more urgent quality. The Carter administration had followed its predecessors in defining energy alternatives in purely national terms. At best, the international implications were perceived in a Middle Eastern context, particularly the reactions of Saudi Arabia to a weakening dollar or to peace initiatives in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The impact of American energy choices upon Europe and Japan was ignored; the differing choices of other industrial countries (such as the decision to develop the breeder reactor) were often misunderstood. Although from the beginning the Carter administration saw energy as a central element in its economic policy—perhaps *the* central issue—its importance in relations with the principal economic partners of the United States seemed to be hardly understood. American nationalism in energy policy could be blamed upon the baulkiness of Congress and its dismantling of Carter's first energy programme; there was also excuse for complacency in a comfortable world supply of petroleum in 1976–78 and in the lingering belief in America's long-vanished energy self-sufficiency. This concentration upon exclusively national policies was also mirrored in the other industrial countries: energy co-operation remained little more than a pious aspiration embodied in the International Energy Agency. Even the European Community had made only a few halting

steps toward a common energy policy, and Britain had indicated its resistance to any claims by the Community on its petroleum resources.

The turmoil in Iran, however, leading to the sharp increases in the price of oil in 1979, brought home the need for greater consumer co-operation to avoid competition for a shrinking supply. In the final communiqué of the Tokyo summit, the leaders of the industrial countries declared their agreement on 'a common strategy to attack these problems. The most urgent tasks are to reduce oil consumption and to hasten the development of other energy sources.' To back up this expression of concern, each country pledged itself to specific targets for oil imports in the years ahead: but, of course the success of these targets depends upon the ability of national governments to implement them.

The second Carter energy programme, announced in July 1979 to meet the Tokyo targets, was marked by a shift away from the emphasis upon conservation, which characterised the administration's first energy initiative, to concentration upon alternative sources of supply, particularly of synthetic fuels. Politically, the new programme was designed to be more palatable to representatives of the energy-producing states in Congress. Reduction in demand would be achieved by the gradual deregulation of petroleum prices, already under way, coupled with the imposition of a windfall profits tax on the revenues of the oil companies.

Scepticism seemed in order after the gutting of Carter's first energy programme by the maze of conflicting political interests that surround any legislation in this field. But by early 1980, however, there were some encouraging signs. The atmosphere of crisis which surrounded the holding of American hostages in Iran prodded Congress to approve parts of the President's programme, and the windfall profits tax emerged in recognisable form. In the final quarter of 1979, American consumption of petroleum seemed to have peaked—a trend that is likely to be reinforced by a recession. Nevertheless, the mounting political controversy that surrounds nuclear power and the administration's continuing reluctance to impose any sharp increase in gasoline taxes make a sharp reduction in oil imports unlikely in the short term.

So the resurgent energy crisis in 1979 has pushed the governments of the industrial countries towards more than a purely verbal commitment to the co-ordination of their economic policies; but great obstacles still remain to impede international oversight of what have always been carefully guarded preserves of national autonomy. Outsiders (OPEC) largely set the terms in energy policy; up till now the policies of the industrial countries have simply responded to OPEC decisions. Co-ordination is not costless: the hard bargaining at Tokyo demonstrated that no national government wants to bear the burden of adjustment, whether in balance of payments, trade, or energy. Even when a co-operative approach is agreed, national leaders must convert their constituencies at home to its implementation. In the sphere of economic

management, the tools at the disposal of government seem less and less adequate. With the advent of floating exchange rates, many policy-makers had hoped for increased autonomy in setting domestic economic policy. By the end of the Carter administration, ironically, more and more emphasis was being placed upon the international co-ordination of national economic policies to stabilise the world monetary system, to deal with trade disruptions, and to avoid self-defeating energy policies. Whatever the progress towards harmonising national choices in economic policy the ability of each country to attain the common goals that are being set must remain doubtful.

American foreign economic policy in the 1980s

The changed international position of the United States in the 1970s imposed two requirements upon any revival of a liberal foreign economic policy: intensified international co-ordination among the industrial countries—extending to the management of domestic economic policy; and increased government efforts at home to ensure political support for continued openness in an economy increasingly buffeted by force outside its borders. The Carter administration has endorsed intensified economic co-operation with Europe and Japan, and has taken steps to align American policy with them. But other patterns have competed with trilateralism: reluctance to intervene in support of the dollar until late in the day, thus drawing intense criticism for monetary mismanagement; unilateral and demanding postures in trade conflicts to satisfy political requirements at home; a national approach to energy policy that has seemed oblivious of the stake that others have in the choices made by the United States.

A fundamental problem is that the attachment of the American political elite to a fraying liberal ideology has obscured the need for intervention to ensure domestic support for a liberal foreign economic policy. The need for such intervention is a matter of equity as well as of political prudence. Just as international conflict surrounds the question of who will bear the burden of adjustment between nations, so this question arises also within American society. When steel mills close or energy prices increase certain groups and regions are inevitably more vulnerable than others.[6] As sensitivity to external economic influences grows, a policy that combines an outward face of liberalism—however diluted—with an inward face of laissez-faire is unlikely to succeed politically.

And if liberal dependence upon automatic market mechanisms, upon open boundaries in trade and investment, and on belief that co-operation is the norm rather than the exception in human affairs proves inadequate—what will be the alternative? The Carter administration inherited a system of government that had grown accustomed to the possession of a dominant economic power—a system that could reshape the international rules in its interest, but which was

6. The regional and social effects of the new trade agreements, for example, were criticised in reports by the Contressional Budget Office and the Senate subcommittee on International Trade.

unaccustomed to responding domestically to demands placed upon it by the international economy. Despite flaws in the neo-liberal strategy and growing concern over domestic economic malaise and its international consequences—low productivity growth, high inflation, a persistent trade deficit—alternative strategies have not emerged. Republican opponents of Carter, while disagreeing over the particular mix of orthodox and 'supply-side' economic prescriptions, hardly diverge from the Democratic administration in their attachment to liberalism and laissez-faire. Occasional endorsements of a return to the gold standard suggest, if anything, *greater* faith in automaticity, and a turning away from intervention in international monetary policy. Others have perceived a need for more activity on the part of government: Congressman Henry Reuss has called for structural reform in the American economy and criticises over-reliance upon monetary policy in economic management; Joseph Kraft has stated the need for 'a long-term strategy for the reindustrialization of the United States'. But these are isolated voices. In the absence of a socialist or social democratic party, intervention by government in the American economy has always excluded the concept of significant public ownership, and selective interventions in pursuit of a centrally determined objective have been shunned as well. Historically, intervention has assumed two forms: Keynesian management to set the parameters for economic activity, and regulation through legislative rule-setting. Given the present fashion for monetarism, and the deeply engrained distaste for any measures that smack of planning, the only likely alternative to neo-liberalism is nationalism. But since America's dependence upon the world economy is unlikely to decline, such a strategy of natural self-assertion and partial closure would be doomed to failure. Viewed within the international economy, then, the United States has at last come to look more like an 'ordinary country', and its economy has been to a degree 'Europeanised'. Internally, however, the political debate continues as if the changes of the last decades had never occurred.

Predicting American foreign economic policy in the 1980s would be far easier if one could assume an international economy in which change is gradual, one whose broad outlines will remain those which have existed since 1945. Two further elements that have been omitted from this analysis may render such assumptions obsolete. During the 1970s the developing countries began to appear and reappear like unwanted guests at a rather meagre feast. By accumulating debt, by exporting manufactures, by setting levels of oil production, the developing countries have become increasingly influential participants in the world economy. Yet they have not been granted equality with the rich nations in determining the outline of international economic institutions or policies. Whatever the shape of future relations among the Northern countries, it will be harder and harder to ignore the South.

The financial sanctions taken against Iran and the commercial reprisals imposed on the Soviet Union have rudely shaken the prevailing attachment to

economic relations free of overt political manipulation. For the last two decades or more the development of the world economy was not overturned by military conflict or severely distorted by demands of national security. As the 1980s opened, with a feverish flight from currencies to gold and promises of increased defence spending, those long-standing premises, and the economic order based upon them, may disappear.

MEXICAN OIL AND GAS: THE POLITICS OF A NEW RESOURCE

George Philip *

'I knew that we had made a major oil find and so I said to my superior, "There is enough oil here to make Mexico self-sufficient!" I did not dare say anything about exporting.' This statement, by a senior Mexican exploration geologist, is neatly mirrored in the remark made by a United States geologist, who in 1974 gave the *New York Times* its exclusive report on the large Mexican discoveries;

> 'the OPEC stranglehold is threatening the world economy. Psychologically it is not a bad idea to remind OPEC countries that there might be oil elsewhere. We just want to give them a gentle reminder that new oil fields can still be found.'[1]

However much those involved may seek to play it down, Mexican oil and gas does have major international implications. Some of these will be explored here.

The scale of the resource and its exploration

Any country with proven hydrocarbon reserves equivalent to 50 billion barrels of oil, and 'potential reserves' of 200 billion barrels, is already an international force in the oil market. It is a factor to be reckoned with that Mexico's output could reach 4 million barrels daily by the end of 1982 and as much as 7 million barrels daily by the late 1980s. Even if these targets are not reached, or even attempted, they influence expectations and therefore behaviour.

All prediction is hazardous but there can be some confidence in assessing the possible magnitude of future oil production in Mexico and the effect which this might have upon world trading patterns. An oil producing country probably becomes capable of influencing these patterns to a significant degree once its level of production reaches 2 million barrels a day; according to this criterion, Mexico has just arrived. One of the effects will be to reduce significantly America's reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Another will be to increase the world's potential production of oil and thus to make the high

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1. *New York Times* Oct. 20, 1974.

international prices prevailing at present increasingly dependent on various political factors and forms of institutional control of the international market.

If we take a high estimate of future Mexican oil output, these trends will be particularly apparent. If we were to assume that Mexican oil production reached a little under 7 million barrels a day in 1988—a high but not an impossible figure—of which it exported 5 million barrels a day, then probably around 3·5 million barrels a day would be sold to the United States. If we were further to assume that the United States had been reasonably, although not dramatically, successful with oil conservation measures and with stimulating domestic production, then total American import requirements might be put at 7 million barrels a day. In other words, Mexico might then be supplying one half of America's import needs, and the rest could almost certainly be secured from Venezuela, Nigeria and Indonesia, perhaps together with a few smaller producers—thus leaving the United States quite independent of Middle Eastern and North African oil. The degree of pressure this could put on the OPEC cartel would then depend on such factors as the import requirements of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the potential production from the North Sea, and the recovery (or not) of production in Iran. In any event, it would be most unlikely that the international oil market would actually tighten under such circumstances. The effect of such security of supply upon American policy would also be interesting; it might underwrite either a further withdrawal from the Middle East or a far more hawkish pro-Israeli policy, with the Arabs largely deprived of an oil card and the European oil importers left increasingly to their own devices.

All of this, of course, puts a spotlight on the question ot the rate at which Mexico can and will make its energy resources available. Here it seems clear that it will be very difficult for conservationists within Mexico to do more than slow down the rate of increase of oil and gas output. Postponements or delays in these plans will be heralded as a victory for the conservationists, but they are likely to lose the argument even if they win an occasional point. In practice, Mexican governments are likely to favour restraint in their rhetoric while continuing to build up production.

We have already seen this pattern in operation. In 1977 Mexico agreed with a number of private American companies to export up to 2 billion cubic feet daily of natural gas by pipeline to the United States. The price was fixed at $2.60 per thousand cubic feet. Everything was going smoothly until Washington put a stop to the deal on the ground that it was too expensive. This decision angered the Mexican government, and its spokesmen subsequently implied that Mexico would consume the gas itself. There had already been significant domestic opposition to the gas pipeline project and this suddenly became politically respectable. Nevertheless the national energy company Pemex continued to build a huge gasline from its southern fields to Monterrey, just south of the United States border and, although López Portillo read President Carter a stern lecture about 'American imperialism' when he

visited Mexico in February 1979, negotiations with the United States resumed in March. In September 1979 an agreement was announced that Mexico was willing to export a small amount of gas, 300 million cubic feet daily, to the United States at the higher price of $3.625 per thousand cubic feet. It was left to those reading the fine print to discover that the 300 million figure was only a first stage with quantities likely to increase substantially in time; and that the price of $3.625 represented some reduction in Mexico's earlier demand for a direct link between the gas price and the American diesel oil price.

None of this is to say that Mexico played its cards badly or that it gave up any real interest in reaching this agreement. On the contrary, since the gas to be exported was associated with oil and so needed to be produced at the same time, or else flared, an export pipeline to the United States was the only possible solution. Mexican demand was certainly insufficient to take up the full increase, and a liquid natural gas (LNG) terminal would have been prohibitively expensive. Moreover the price itself, even if falling some way short of what Mexico would have wished, was undoubtedly quite a favourable one. The key point is that while the rhetoric pointed one way, economic rationality and actual policy have gone a very different way.

The same can be seen with the decision which has so far been made over production levels. In 1977, at the beginning of López Portillo's term of office, Pemex's production was planned to reach 2·2 million barrels a day by 1982, of which one half would be for export. Such a target looks conservative in retrospect, but it probably reflected a desire on the part of Pemex to promise only what it could be sure of achieving. By late 1978, however, it had become clear that the 2·2 million barrels a day target could be met by late 1980.

The questions then arose, should production be stabilised at that level or increased further? Díaz Serrano, the head of Pemex, wanted a further increase. It is generally believed that he was opposed by the four senior economics ministers who were worried by the effect of an unchecked flow of oil wealth upon the Mexican economy. When no new target was set during the anniversary speeches in March 1979 it seemed as though the conservationists had won. In January 1980, however, there appeared a press report stating that Pemex was planning to increase its production to 4 million barrels a day by the end of 1982. It was then stated semi-officially that the various economics ministers had again opposed this target. When in March 1980 President López Portillo mentioned a figure of 2·1 million barrels a day, this was widely taken as a victory for the conservationists.[2] Closer analysis, however, reveals a very different conclusion.

In 1979 Mexico's average production level reached 1,616,301 barrels a day which, as a result of various technical factors, was some way short of what had originally been hoped. By March 1980, production levels were just touching 2 million barrels a day. If Pemex does reach a target of 2·7 million

2. See, for example, the leading article 'Mexico takes the Slow Road' in *The Times*, March 24, 1980.

barrels a day by the end of 1980, this will represent a 67 per cent increase over the 1979 average and a 35 per cent increase over the level of March 1980. It is most unlikely that such a target will seriously hold back the real potential growth of output. Moreover, the President did not rule out the possibility of a further increase in 1981 and 1982 although it is likely that future decisions, at any rate for 1982, will be taken with the consent of the man named to succeed López Portillo as President of Mexico. So far at least, Pemex has been allowed to continue to expand as fast as technical prudence permits, while the rejection of any explicit commitment to a 4 million barrels a day target makes it appear as if the decision had gone the other way.

Oil and gas in the Mexican economy

It is surely not surprising that Mexico should be interested in a rapid rate of growth of oil production. It is a country with a large population—at present some 65 million—and with a high rate of population growth. Although the birth rate is falling slowly, each of the next fifteen years will see between 800,000 and 1,000,000 new entrants into a labour market in which there is already a high degree of un- and under-employment. Moreover, despite some increase in real wages during the past twenty years, there remains a high degree of inequality even within the fully employed population. Finally, although the governing élite has been remarkably successful in limiting popular unrest without resorting to extreme repression, there are growing doubts as to how far this pattern can be maintained without significant economic and social changes; as we shall see below, the inevitable retirement of Fidel Velazquez from the leadership of the CTM (the trade union confederation) is only one factor working in this direction. Consequently, even if there are legitimate doubts about the extent to which oil wealth can actually solve social problems, Mexican governments are likely to conclude that these problems may become still worse if the oil is left in the ground.

If we then accept that the fact of these oil and gas discoveries is likely to generate a momentum of its own, then it is useful to ask why these took place at such an opportune time for Mexico. Was it purely a matter of coincidence? At one level the answer is probably 'yes'. It was always believed that Mexico had vast hydrocarbon potential even at times such as the 1960s when exploration disappointed. However, in the early 1950s, the Mexican government decided to de-emphasise oil exporting—which had been quite significant in the late 1940s—and to leave Pemex to concentrate on the domestic market. It would be interesting to know exactly why this decision was taken, but the weakness of the international market at that time and the growth in Mexican consumption were certainly key factors. Thus there was a period in which Pemex played down oil exploration in order to concentrate on developing refining and the petrochemical industry. For a time, the country's oil reserves seemed adequate to this new strategy but there were signs of growing unease after the mid-1960s. By 1968 it had become clear that much

more exploration was needed, and the renewed emphasis on this sector led to the major discoveries of 1972 and after.

Once the oil had been discovered, however, the pace of oil development was partly a matter of policy. One member of Echeverría's Cabinet recalled that the President had told him in 1974 that Pemex had made vast oil discoveries but that he did not intend the extent of these to become widely known. American press reports in October 1974 to the effect that the newly discovered reserves 'could be as high as 19 billion barrels' partly frustrated this strategy but also made the Mexican government even more determined to publicise as little as possible. Even so, oil production did increase substantially, from 525,000 barrels a day in 1973 to 896,000 barrels a day in 1976, and the Echeverría government did undertake a number of very large refining and petrochemicals ventures whose benefits are just beginning to be seen. It was, therefore, the economic crisis of 1976 and the inauguration of López Portillo in December 1976 which led to the major change in policy. Oil reserves were deliberately publicised in order to encourage financial confidence in Mexico—and the increases in production followed naturally from this. Indeed it is interesting that opponents of this expansionist policy have tried to prevent Pemex from increasing its reserve estimates on the ground that such estimates tend to have an independent effect on oil production policy.

Finally, no account of the change of Mexican oil policy can be complete without some reference to Díaz Serrano and Pemex itself. Díaz Serrano is himself a drilling expert and his sheer technical enthusiasm for the task of extracting oil from the ground shows through public statements such as the following from a survey he carried out in 1976:

> For many years, the Mexican oilfields were developed through drilling at short distances around the discovery well, 200 or 300 metres apart and expanding in a circular direction . . . This type of development led to very slow progress, with the expensive investment of a large number of wells and with a doubling or trebling of necessary surface installations such as tubes, separators and tanks, all of them small and in large quantity. All of this led, fundamentally, to oil operations taking place on the basis of low estimates while the real estimates were very large. This expensive and slow process led to the issuing of initial estimates of very small reserves while the full extent of the reserves would be known ten or more years afterwards.[3]

Technical changes in the operation of Pemex itself, therefore, also need to be mentioned. In fact Pemex has always done what has been asked of it, but in the years prior to 1976 the emphasis, at any rate in the exploration and production division, was on security of supply and self-sufficiency. Now the emphasis is on rapid development and it is only natural that this should be reflected within the organisation itself.

3. Diaz Serrano speech to the Chamber of Deputies *Linea Nacional de Distribucion de Gas Natural.* Oct. 26, 1977.

The impact on Mexican politics

When considering the future, however, the key factors in Mexican oil policy-making are likely to be the Mexican economy and political structure. In a sense the oil boom has already arrived. In 1978 receipts from Mexico's oil-based exports amounted to $1,800 million; in 1979, $3,900 million; and in 1980 they are expected to be around $9,000 million—thus making up more than half the value of all exports. Oil income has so far permitted an economic boom, with an economic growth rate of around 8 per cent for 1979, and this is almost certain to continue. Oil has also permitted an import boom. There is a problem with inflation, around 20 per cent in 1979 and probably higher this year, but this is probably due more to international factors than—so far at least—to the inflow of dollars. An 8 per cent growth rate is not, however, completely out of line with previous Mexican experience and although there are likely to be a few infrastructural problems, these will almost certainly be less than those faced by some of the less-developed oil-exporting countries.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that important members of the Mexican political elite regard oil wealth on such a scale with profound misgivings. They fear the effects of oil-fed indigestion both on Mexico's transportation system and its price level, and they fear also that oil will arouse expectations that cannot easily be fulfilled. Above all they fear the effects on the Mexican bureaucracy of a mentality of 'spend, spend, spend'. Indeed, the idea has been canvassed seriously that a special bank should be created for the oil revenue outside normal bureaucratic channels which could be used to finance projects of high social benefit.

There are, however, some grounds for believing that this is not likely to be the dominant current in Mexican thinking for long. In this context it is useful to stress the familiar division in Mexican politics between 'technocrats' and 'politicians'. The Echeverría government was essentially one in which political criteria were dominant. Its main objective was to repair the damage to Mexico's reputation and political system caused by the 1968 student massacre. Much of Echeverría's radicalism was purely rhetorical but he was able to co-opt a number of former student leaders into the Mexican bureaucracy and he did something to change Mexico's image internationally. Even though he left an economic crisis behind in 1976, it is perhaps a measure of his success that this involved a different set of problems than those he inherited in 1970. López Portillo, by contrast, began his Presidency facing the need to reassure domestic businessmen and foreign bankers, and his government has therefore taken on a marked technocratic orientation. At the beginning this led to an emphasis on the need to expand oil production, although voices have been heard more recently emphasising the need for caution. It is beginning to become apparent, however, that a new set of essentially political problems are coming over the horizon and will probably need to be faced in the next *sexenio* (1982-88).

For one thing, the López Portillo government has recently legalised the

Mexican Communist Party and taken some other rather limited steps aimed at partially increasing the extent of electoral competition in Mexico. This was no doubt logical in view of the Mexican elite's increasing concern at low electoral turnouts, but the government now stands to lose prestige either if the election results prove to be worse than expected or if the regime resorts to openly illegal methods to prevent this from happening. Under these new circumstances the governing party—the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)—itself is likely to have a more sensitive job than was previously the case, and it may demand more resources for patronage or local public works in order to do it effectively.

At the same time, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the trade union leader Fidel Velazquez is too old to remain head of the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) for very much longer. It is highly probable that the Mexican elite will eventually be able to find a successor able to combine support for the government at all crucial junctures with a limited degree of actual representation of the workers. But this will probably take time to develop, and a measure of at least verbal radicalisation is likely at first among the various union leaders competing for leadership positions. Moreover, as Mexicans become increasingly used to a high rate of inflation the 'money illusion' which has helped lower wage demands since 1975 is likely to erode and wage bargaining will increasingly take into effect the likely future rate of inflation.

For all of these reasons, therefore, political demands on the Mexican state are likely to increase just at a time when oil wealth may appear to provide a means by which they can be met. The Mexican government is already planning on a very large increase in public sector employment both to provide such essential services as education and health to a wider proportion of the population, and also to supplement the jobs created by private industry. It is quite likely that such measures will be stepped up and complemented by what is at least at the rhetorical level a radical approach, to help regain for the PRI some of the popular support which it is now losing. It would not be at all surprising to see such a change take place during the 1982-88 *sexenio*. It may be that a leftward shift in Mexican politics will have the further effect of encouraging a more pro-oil producer stance internationally; but it is also possible that a more radical Mexican President will feel the need of as much foreign exchange as it is possible to earn in order to counter capital flight and other forms of business opposition.

The international dimension

In future, the level of oil and gas production in Mexico will obviously be determined mainly by the country's needs, but the international dimension cannot be ignored. Mexico's main 'international relation' is clearly with the United States, and there have been cases where pressure from Washington has clearly influenced Mexican policy. The United States Trade Act of 1975 which denied trading benefits to OPEC members effectively killed off the idea

which was then being openly canvassed that Mexico should join OPEC. Similarly, as we have seen, the United States was able to negotiate a slightly lower gas price than the one originally agreed by Mexico and the importing companies. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that there are limits to the extent to which such pressure can be exerted without threatening a nationalist backlash within Mexico itself. Both countries are certainly more sensitive to the other in private than either wishes to admit in public. Indeed, it is probably only a matter of time before the Hispanics within the United States organise a Mexican lobby powerful enough to compare with their Irish or Jewish counterparts. There are some signs that this process has already begun.

One issue which commands a great deal of attention in this context is the openness of the United States-Mexican border. There are a number of interests on both sides of the border which would like in principle to see tighter controls imposed, but few are likely to welcome the practical consequences these would entail. As things stand, anything can be smuggled across the American-Mexican border and generally is: *braceros*, narcotics and currency move north while tourists and various luxury goods go south. Moreover lower gasoline prices south of the border encourage further, and illicit, cross border dealings—a fact to which Mexican officials have recently drawn attention. In general, the border economy is essentially a unit from which both sides do well and any attempt to break it up would be strongly resisted, highly unpopular and almost certainly unsuccessful: the border town of Tijuana, said to boast the most skilful forger of dollars in the world, is symptomatic of this border activity. In 1969 President Nixon's 'Operation Intercept' (a brainchild of G. Gordon Liddy) which aimed to check the inflow of narcotics had to be called off after several months owing to the disruption it caused and consequent protests of local businessmen. President Carter also tried to seal off the border, this time in order to keep out illegal immigrants, but he had similarly to abandon his efforts. It is occasionally good politics for various American pressure groups to complain about illegal immigration and for Mexican technocrats to complain about the exceptional degree of openness of the Mexican economy, but there is no real interest in the development of the massive police power that would be necessary to put an effective stop to border transactions.

The Mexican government is naturally keen to limit its dependence on the United States by attracting customers for its oil from as many places as possible. It has also shown itself to be receptive to various kinds of government-to-government arrangement in which high technology goods are provided in return for oil supplies. At the moment, Mexico is trying to place 40 per cent of its exports outside the United States and it has found markets in Japan, Canada and Europe. Even so, there can be little doubt that most of its oil will continue to be sold North of the border.

Mexico's relations with OPEC are more delicate. For reasons already indicated Mexico cannot join the organisation and must therefore take pains to show that it is not undermining it. Mexican production is just beginning to

reach a level where its pricing and output policies have international significance, and it will be interesting to see how Mexico behaves in the context of an international oil surplus. For example, Mexico's foreign policy is not yet fully clear with regard to the Middle East. Echeverria's pro-Arab vote in the United Nations 'Zionism' resolution of 1975 proved extremely costly to Mexico as United States Jews mounted an effective boycott of Mexican tourism. Now Mexico is a significant supplier of oil to Israel, while its limited welcome to the exiled Shah of Iran also shows clearly López Portillo's essentially pro-American orientation. Mexican officials argue that there is a danger that events in the Middle East may seriously threaten the world economy or trigger a drastic backlash within the United States which could put the position of all oil exporting countries at risk. In any case it is likely that, once Mexico does become a recognised international oil power, it will tacitly align itself with such relatively moderate OPEC members as Venezuela or Saudi Arabia—although there will certainly be limits to its moderation if it appears that OPEC's new world position becomes threatened.

As we have seen, the potential consequences for the United States of the growth of Mexican production are very considerable, and simply out of self interest it is not likely that Mexico will continue to expand its output indefinitely if its policy were perceived as putting intolerable pressure on the OPEC cartel. The Mexican government might be willing to help stabilise the world market and even to allow a small reduction in real prices from their current $35 a barrel, but it would surely not connive at a collapse of the market. For this reason alone Mexico is likely to become increasingly cautious in its production policy as its output increases. Even so, if we assume a production level of around 5 million barrels a day by 1988, which implies a significantly slower rate of output growth than in 1976–80 or even in 1973–76, this will permit export levels to reach around 3·5 million barrels a day—which still leaves Mexico as a major international exporter. If 2 million barrels a day of this total is exported to the United States this should at least allow some significant reduction in the volume of oil imports from the Middle East and North Africa.

Either of these estimates suggest that there will also be a significant source of oil supplies for countries other than the United States. Canada and Japan are obvious purchasers of Mexican oil, and some limited amounts may also be sold within Latin America; but Europe is also likely to find a minor, but not negligible, source of supply in Mexico. Spain and France are already making some arrangements to buy Mexican oil and other countries may well find it worthwhile to do so, both as a hedge against disruption from the Middle East and also in order to facilitate their own entry into the Mexican market. It is, in fact, by no means fantastic to believe that Mexico might earn $50 billion per annum (at 1980 prices) from its hydrocarbon exports by the end of the decade—thus becoming a major new market in an increasingly mercantile world. There will, therefore, be great interest in government-to-government

deals, and those countries which are prepared to encourage foreign investment in Mexico on various kinds of joint-venture bases to manufacture high technology goods are likely to find themselves in relatively strong positions. Mexico is likely to welcome the resulting reduction in its dependence on the United States while its partners are likely to find manifold advantages in trading with Mexico.

BOOKS

KISSINGER: THE PRIMACY OF GEOPOLITICS

*Hedley Bull**

The White House Years. By Henry Kissinger. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979. 1521 pp.*

WHETHER one is for Henry Kissinger's foreign policy or against it, *The White House Years* is a great book. It is not merely a source of information about American foreign policy during the first term of the Nixon administration, the period with which the volume deals (a second volume, dealing with the years 1973-76, during most of which Dr Kissinger was Secretary of State, is to follow). It is a profound study of international relations and of the history of our times.

There are brilliant sketches of the persons with whom Kissinger had to deal, from Mao, Chou and Brezhnev to Dobrynin and Burke Trend. There are magisterical surveys of the issues with which he had to grapple: the Vietnam War, America's relations with the Soviet Union and with China, the SALT negotiations, the Nato alliance. There are penetrating observations, about the nature of international crises, the techniques of negotiation, the limitations of summit conferences, power in international affairs, the working of the American political system, the differences between the philosopher and the statesman and the problems of writing contemporary history.

There is Kissinger's personal story—the induction of the Harvard professor into the world of policy-making; his progression first into a position of influence over the Nixon administration's foreign policy; then after the end of 1970 his achievement of a position of dominance. And there is the unfolding of the great theme of American foreign policy itself, especially of America's attempts to extricate itself from Vietnam, the diplomatic revolution brought about by *rapprochement* with China, and the enterprise to which Kissinger so much devoted himself in this period—but which (in deference to the current American mood, and surely to his discredit) is played down in the present volume—of bringing about a comprehensive detente with the Soviet Union.

Never profoundly original in his particular thoughts, Kissinger has always had a great capacity to synthesise—to master what has been said by the strategists, the Soviet experts, the China-watchers, the diplomatic historians—and weave all this material together into a total pattern in which nothing is left out and an order of priorities is clearly laid down. He has also had a great instinct for drama, not to say for grand opera: to the man who, even in his Harvard undergraduate dissertation, chose to write about *The Meaning of History*, the smallest events may be found to have universal significance, the most humdrum acts of policy to have the potential to send us hurtling towards Armageddon, the smallest setback to be evidence of the twilight of the gods. Kissinger's academic writings have sometimes seemed excessively, even comically Wagnerian. But in this book grand opera does not seem out of place: Kissinger himself is a real life *prima donna*, the policy-maker *manqué* has become the policy-maker, his grandiose prescriptions and portentous warnings do not seem contrived but clearly express the deepest of convictions: his conception of international

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politics has become part of the history of the United States and we are compelled to take it seriously.

'There is in America an idealistic tradition that sees foreign policy as a contest between good and evil', Kissinger writes. 'There is a pragmatic tradition that seeks to solve 'problems' as they arise. There is a legalistic tradition that treats international issues as juridical cases. There is no geopolitical tradition' (p. 914). By a 'geopolitical' perspective, Kissinger tells us that—with scant regard for established usage, in which the term connotes a concern for geographical factors in international politics—he means 'an approach that pays attention to the requirements of equilibrium' (p. 55).

When Kissinger became an 'apprentice statesman', he brought with him the conviction that, 'if history teaches anything, it is that there can be no peace without equilibrium and no justice without restraint' (p. 195). The theme of this book is the apprentice's attempt, along with his master (Kissinger pays full tribute to Nixon's knowledge of foreign affairs, courage in decision and responsibility for major policies, while not minimising his vindictiveness and meaness of spirit) to impose such a 'geopolitical' perspective on American foreign policy, and the resistance they encountered from a Congress, a bureaucracy and a public opinion to which this perspective was quite alien.

Kissinger is no crude 'realist' or Machiavellian: 'a calculus of power . . . is only the beginning of policy; it cannot be its sole purpose' (p. 130). For him, as for his heroes Matternich and Bismarck, foreign policy is the pursuit of the national interest, but the national interest points towards the development of a legitimate international order acceptable to others. The 'geopolitical' perspective does however, require 'an integrating, conceptual framework' (p. 130), and this does not arise naturally either from the traditions of the State Department, with its compartmentalisation into regional and functional bureaus, or from those of American academic research, with its heavy bias towards specialisation, or from that of pragmatic 'problem-solving'.

It also requires recognition of the principle of 'linkage' (Kissinger bears a heavy responsibility for giving currency to this hideous and unnecessary word), both in the sense of the policy of linking one objective to another in the course of a negotiation (the famous Nixon-Kissinger policy of linking progress on arms control in Soviet-American negotiations to progress on political issues), and in the sense of perceiving the *de facto* links that exist between policy on one issue or region and policy on another: (for example the links Kissinger perceived, but says other advocates of *rapprochement* with China failed to perceive, between this policy and the strengthening of America's hand in relation to Moscow and Hanoi).

The supreme application of the 'geopolitical' perspective was the so-called 'triangular diplomacy' which, by providing the United States with closer links with the Soviet Union and China than the two Communist powers had with one another, augmented Washington's strategic position in the world even at a time when, in terms of intrinsic strength and will, it appeared to be in decline. The 'tilt' towards Pakistan in 1971, so bitterly criticised by moralists, legalists and pragmatists in the media, and subject to virtual sabotage by the State Department, was necessary to save the opening to China, which Soviet and Indian policies were placing jeopardy: 'The issue', we are told, 'hinged on the geopolitical perspective of the White House as against the regional perspective of the State Department, and of the relative weight to be given to China and India in the conduct of our foreign policy' (p. 897). The geopolitical perspective in Chile dictated that Allende's victory in the 1970 election had to be seen as threatening a further accretion of Soviet power. In relation to Brandt's *Ostpolitik* it meant that the United States, by exploiting the links between German-initiated processes of detente and Soviet-American detente, could control the pace at which the former developed. In the Middle East, which in this early period was assigned to Rogers, the geopolitical perspective did not yet prevail, and the exercises in 'shuttle

diplomacy' that led eventually to Egypt's entry into the American camp await the next volume.

Above all, it was the 'geopolitical perspective' which is held to justify the manner of the Nixon-Kissinger exit from Vietnam. The object was to withdraw, but 'to withdraw as expression of policy and not as a collapse' (p. 298). The accomplishment of this objective required the prolongation of the war, its extension into Cambodia, the diplomatic isolation of Hanoi from Moscow, and Peking, and ultimately the 'Christmas bombing' of December 1972. The critics were not willing to acknowledge the necessity for any of these actions, in the face of adversaries whom Kissinger knew, from his direct dealings with them, to be implacable. The result—the peace agreement of January 1973—with which this book ends, and which was so soon to collapse—Kissinger says was not intended simply to achieve a 'decent interval' between the withdrawal of American forces and the fall of Saigon (I do not find this credible), but to achieve 'lasting peace with honour'. He argues that it would have done so had it not been for the weakening of executive authority as a result of Watergate (p. 1470).

Whether or not Kissinger was right in his judgment that the exit from Vietnam he chose was the only one possible, it is difficult not to feel that his position is at least morally superior to that of many of his critics. Themselves in many cases responsible for having brought America into Vietnam, but then caught up in the hysteria of the anti-war movement, they displayed in their opposition to the administration's policy the same conformism that they had shown a few years earlier in their support of it—demanding an unconditional withdrawal in complete disregard of America's obligations towards those who had thrown in their lot with her, or denouncing the measures by which Kissinger did succeed in the end in bringing about America's departure. Nor can one feel any sympathy for the ludicrous charge that Kissinger must now be held in some way responsible for the deeds perpetrated by the Communists in Cambodia, after they achieved the victory which he sought to prevent.

It must also be said that Kissinger was fundamentally correct in his belief that America stood in need of what he calls a 'geopolitical perspective', even if we can say in retrospect that his own perception of geopolitical realities was seriously flawed in these early years. His tendency (as in relation to South Asia and Latin America, and later in relation to Southern Africa) to see in the West's relations with the South only a particular theatre of struggle with the East reflected a failure to perceive the importance which Third-World states and movements were now assuming in world affairs. Like many others, he failed to perceive the widening agenda of international politics that brought economic issues to the fore, the power conferred by control of energy sources, and the declining ability of the great powers—even when united—to impose their will upon international society as a whole. In his period as Secretary of State much of his efforts had to be devoted to improvisations designed to remedy these inadequacies in his 'conceptual framework'. But as the Carter period has helped us to see, even an inadequate conceptual framework may be better than none at all; and equipped with it Kissinger rendered great services to American diplomacy—for which the many pygmies now yapping at the feet of this giant should show more gratitude.

The great failure of Kissinger's diplomacy was the one he himself recognises: that this exotic, European plant could find no roots in the native soil of the American political tradition. His ambition was to avoid Bismarck's mistake by bequeathing to his country an institutionalised foreign policy that would survive his own departure from office; but, as today we survey the debris of 'the era of negotiation', 'the structure of peace', the 'permanent interests' that were to bring to an end the tendency to oscillate between euphoria and panic, it is difficult not to feel—although it is too soon for final judgment—that Kissinger's years in office have left little trace. For this Kissinger himself—not merely because of his by-passing of established channels, his personal style and secretive methods, but more basically because of his lack of feeling for

American history and institutions, his inability to invoke American precedents and concepts in place of Metternich and the balance of power—must accept his share of responsibility.

Professors do not make good policy-makers, and it is ironic that Kissinger, the one recent exception to this rule, discourses at length upon the inherent tension between the perspective of the philosopher and that of the statesman. While in this book he is generous in his treatment of adversaries, he cannot conceal his bitterness at the treatment he received, when in office, from former academic colleagues. He recounts with distaste the visit he received from a Harvard deputation during the Cambodian crisis, and the later visit from Ivy League presidents, noting that the former completed his 'transition from the academic world to the world of affairs' (p. 513). He writes of 'the inexhaustible masochism of American intellectuals' (p. 112), and notes with foreboding the persecution by American universities of former servants of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

One may feel some sympathy for Dr Kissinger in making this painful transition, but what did he expect? Was he any kinder to those in office when he saw the world from an academic perspective? Is it not the role of an intellectual precisely to ask irresponsible questions, to state the absolutes to which in the nature of things statesmen can never approximate? It has often seemed to me that the career of this extraordinary man—who, in stepping so effortlessly into the world of high policy-making, acted out the secret dreams of countless academic experts on international relations—has provided a very unfortunate example to a profession whose business is after all, with thinking, not with doing.

REVIEWS

CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

Middle East Industrialisation: A Study of Saudi and Iranian Downstream Investments. By Louis Turner and James M. Bedore. *Farnborough: Saxon House for the RIIA. 1979. 219 pp. £12·50.*

LOUIS TURNER and James Bedore have tackled the difficult job of putting a moving target between hard covers. The core of the study concerns a handful of very large petrochemical projects: one in Iran, and two massive developments in Saudi Arabia.

Since this review is being written a year after the book was finished, some updating is called for. The Iranian project, the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Company (IJPC), was around 85 per cent complete at the time of the Shah's downfall and work has been at a halt since late 1978. Despite an apparent Iranian intention to resume work, and some billions of dollars already sunk, the partners (Mitsui leads the Japanese team) are having difficulty agreeing how this should be done.

In Saudi Arabia the projects are at Yanbu on the Red Sea, and Al Jubail on the Gulf. Although even now (March 1980) not all of the production plants are finally committed, but there has already been massive investment on infrastructure and related facilities and there is little doubt as to whether the projects will proceed. The Saudi projects, like IJPC, are intended to be joint ventures, with Exxon, Shell, Mobil, Dow, and again the Japanese. Generally each project involves only two partners, a Saudi agency plus the foreign partner. However there are linkages which have complicated the Pecten (US Shell) petrochemical project at Jubail. This will utilise currently flared ethane to make first ethylene, then various important chemicals. The project will also send ethylene 'over the fence' to Exxon to make polyethylene. The project also needs a benzene supply (to make ethyl benzene for styrene), and it is intended to draw this from a proposed refinery in which the Shell parent is involved. Thus there are two arms of Shell, Exxon, and two Saudi agencies (SABIC and Petromin)—effectively a total of five partners in the whole scheme.

Having documented the Iranian and Saudi projects, the book analyses foreign partner motives (i.e. access to crude oil in most cases) and also reasons why many more companies are not involved (actually there isn't room there for all the major oil and chemical companies). Then an attempt is made to present a 'regional focus'. This is one of the weaker parts of the book with inaccurate information on the status of projects in Algeria, Libya, and Iraq.

Since the Saudi projects are export-based and a long way from the home territory of the American companies involved, the book spends a lot of time discussing the reactions of the EEC and the United States in terms of possible trade barriers. A strong case is made for sensible accommodation by the industrialised West. If imports are inevitable, why fight them?

The book discusses Middle East export refinery projects as well as petrochemical projects. This is in some ways a more serious problem, and the book's treatment has been rather overtaken by events, as have some confident assertions re future oil price and Saudi oil production levels.

The authors state their book is 'to some extent a reaction against the high level of

rhetoric and generalities in the "New International Economic Order" debate'. Certainly they have themselves avoided rhetoric and have adopted a commonsense approach, even if the occasional generality slips in. For those in need of an introduction to the issues, this book is a unique source.

C. G. PEACOCK

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

International Relations in a Changing World. By Joseph Frankel. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1979. 218 pp. £4·95.*

THERE is a double strength in Professor Frankel's latest book, for while it is a fresh piece of work it is built on foundations that the author has been laying for many years. It is a short book—only 218 pages—but an ambitious one in that it attempts an overview of international relations. It is, therefore, useful in several ways. For those new to the field it offers a sound introduction (although as it is so tightly written it should be studied piece by piece), while for those who have been labouring for some time it is a valuable demonstration of how one scholar gives an order and intellectual coherence to international relations. One feature of particular interest in Frankel's case is trying to decide where he stands in relation to his fellow scolars—which 'school' does he fit into? The probable answer is that he does not fit any very neatly. He has always been catholic in drawing upon diverse approaches to the study of international relations, and one of his strengths is the ability to integrate them into his own views, and to express himself clearly. There is, therefore, no single central message, no one overriding mode of explanation. Frankel is describing and analysing a complex world and he needs diverse tools to help him.

Although Frankel argues that 'we face a major crisis of the territorial sovereign state in its traditional form' (p. 209) and recognises that states are experiencing diminution of their sovereignty (and in that sense challenges the state-centred approach to international relations), he still sees states as the major international actors and spends more than half the book describing and analysing their behaviour. He examines such concepts as the 'national interest', 'core values', and 'power'. However, in describing the relationships that are established he is satisfied neither with the 'balance of power' perspective, nor 'the cobweb models' of writers like John Burton. Frankel believes that these approaches undervalue the complexity of the situation. For the present and increasingly in the future, he believes that international relations will be subjected to 'mixed management' (p. 210), based on a plural situation in which the state retains a prominent position but shares the stage with other actors possibly including more international agencies, which, it is rather optimistically assumed, will be able to administer a number of non-politicised functions.

The book is enhanced by Professor Frankel's characteristic clarity of expression, his ability to categorise and analyse complex issues, and the use he makes of concrete examples.

The Open University JAMES BARBER

Political Theory and International Relations. By Charles R. Beitz. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1979. 212 pp.*

THIS book attempts to apply John Rawls's famous work, *A Theory of Justice*, to contemporary international relations which the author sees as being characterised by economic interdependence and transnationalism. His focus of attention for normative

theorising is *the individual*, and he is concerned to refute both the 'realist' views which regard international relations as analogous to the Hobbesian state of nature (Part One), and traditional international moral theory based on the personification of the state (Part Two).

The arguments in Part One is well-ordered, although, to some extent inevitably, familiar ground is revisited when the author tries to show the shortcomings of the state-of-nature analogy.

In Part Two Beitz re-examines traditional moral arguments about non-intervention, self-determination and economic dependence, and criticises them for having regarded the principle of state autonomy as basic, he asserts that the correct analogy of individual autonomy at the international level is not state autonomy, but what he calls the conformity of the state's basic social institutions with the appropriate principles of justice. (The word 'appropriate' is inserted by the author to suggest the possibility that different principles of justice may apply to different types of societies depending on, e.g., their levels of socio-economic development.) Thus, the morality of non-intervention, for instance, cannot be derived by analogy from a person's liberty to pursue his own ends, but must take into consideration the moral quality of the domestic institutions of the target state. A complete normative theory of international relations would, therefore, require an account of domestic social justice. Beitz, however, refrains from providing such an account and proceeds in Part Three to the area characteristically ignored by the traditional theory, i.e., the problem of international distributive justice.

Here Beitz criticises Rawls for having ignored the increasing extent of international economic interdependence, and argues that such a feature of the contemporary world makes it necessary to apply the Rawlsian principles of justice at the international level. Justice demands that the position of the globally least-advantaged person or group of persons must be maximised. The author, however, does not hold that such a cosmopolitan moral conception requires the political unification of the world. He maintains that states, the chief actors of international politics, may still be regarded as the primary subjects of international distributive responsibilities, although these derive from the more basic responsibilities that persons acquire as a result of their membership of the transnational economic system.

Given the relative lack of interest among the students of international relations in ethical problems, this book is a useful addition to the gradually expanding body of literature on the subject, and will serve as a good introduction for advanced undergraduates. It needs to be stressed, however, that neither the author's individualist perspective nor Rawls's theory of justice, upon which this book is based, can be taken for granted without some further justification on non-intuitive grounds.

University of Keele HIDEMI SUGANAMI

The New Nationalism: Implications for Transatlantic Relations. Edited by Werner Link and Werner Feld. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon Press. 1979. 165 pp. Pb: $6·95.*

THIS volume presents the papers given at the 1977 Annual Conference of the Committee on Atlantic Studies, and takes as its theme 'the new nationalism'; this term is understood as referring to 'that reorientation towards national welfare which has resulted from three international trends: (1) the expanding size and diversity of national aims . . .; (2) the increasing politicisation of the process of resource allocation; (3) the growing importance of the agencies and activities of national governments' (p. 1). This theme is examined from two perspectives—the new nationalism and external policies, and the new nationalism and sub-national regionalism—following an

introductory paper by James Caporaso. In his paper, Caporaso attempts to answer the questions 'What is the new nationalism?' and 'Is there a new nationalism?' After arguing that a new phenomenon, that of a shift of concern from defence, security and diplomacy to national economic matters, has occurred, he examines the theoretical implications of, and the empirical evidence for, this shift. As such, his paper is a very useful and concise presentation of the relevant material; however, the main thrust of the paper is that the phenomenon of the new nationalism is best understood as a form of nationalism. He stresses, therefore, the dangers, both for the academic community and for politicians, of treating it as a totally different and new phenomenon, thereby requiring new theory to understand it, and new policies to deal with it.

After Caporaso's introductory paper, the volume is split into two distinct halves; the first of these, dealing with the new nationalism and external policies, contains papers by Northedge, Hanrieder, Czempiel, and Morse—each of which relates aspects of the new nationalism to transatlantic relations. Of these papers, those by Northedge and Morse are particularly good. Northedge examines the relationship between the new nationalism and foreign policy, pointing out the effects of this reorientation towards economic factors on both the nature of foreign policy and the problems of co-ordinating the foreign policies of states. The main conclusion of his paper is that whilst the new nationalism does result in a widening of the concerns of foreign policies, and although an effect of this is to increase the level of interdependence in the international system, these factors do not mean that international relations will become more co-operative; indeed, there is both reason to suppose that the more pressing the need to co-ordinate foreign policies, the more difficult it becomes, and reason to expect conflict to be the outcome of increasing interdependence—as he points out, two armies on a battlefield are interdependent! Morse's paper deals with the relationship between the new economic nationalism of, and the co-ordination of economic policies between, advanced industrial societies. After tracing the nature of economic nationalism in the transatlantic area, he examines the attempts at co-ordinating economic policies. He concludes that attempts to co-ordinate national economic policies, whilst they must continue, cannot be formalised until the political and intellectual unknowns of the new nationalism are resolved.

The second section of the book is much less satisfactory than the first; it examines subnational regionalism with case studies of Quebec, Ulster, and Scotland. Of these papers, only that by Jackson and Dann is a detailed case study, the others being very short (four to seven pages). Finally, there are two concluding papers—one by Heraud on ethno-regional movements and Nato, and a very good paper by Goldstein which locates the new nationalism within the structure of the international economic system.

Overall, this is a very mixed volume; it deals with an important topic and yet, as is common in any collection of conference papers, does so in a rather uneven manner. Having said that, it is an important book.

University of East Anglia STEVE SMITH

National Interests and Bureaucracy Versus, Development Aid: A Study of United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance to the Third World. By Mahyar Nashat. *Geneva: Tribune Editions for Franklin Book Programs, Tehran, 1978. 213 pp.*

THE provision of multilateral economic aid in its various forms has been a central concern of intergovernmental organisations in the postwar period. The United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) was the first large-scale attempt by the Organisation and its specialised agencies to provide a collective programme of technical assistance for the developing countries. It is, therefore,

somewhat surprising that this book should be the first full-length study of EPTA. Dr Nashat's study is to be welcomed for filling a very important gap and for the detail that it adds to our knowledge of international efforts at development co-operation during the 1950s. However, the approach adopted in this study curtails its usefulness for the student of international relations. In adopting a legal approach to an inherently political question Nashat can only partially cover important aspects of the multilateral aid programme: such as the problem of co-ordination within the United Nations system; the provision of financing; the changing attitudes of the donor countries towards granting economic aid; and the changing interests of the recipient countries.

The book is divided into three parts. Part One is concerned with the origins of EPTA and begins by considering international action in this field prior to the birth of EPTA itself. It is clear that there was little precedent by which to formulate the objectives and to create an effective structure for the new body. Part Two describes EPTA's structure and looks at the reasons underlying the creation of the Pledging Conference, the intergovernmental body, The Technical Assistance Committee (TAC), and the intersecretariat body, the Technical Assistance Board (TAB). Part Three, which is devoted to a consideration of EPTA's procedures, examines the ways in which decision-making was conducted within the organisation.

As an analysis of the institutional framework of EPTA the book succeeds very well. Nashat has drawn widely on the available documents and he constantly relates the particular institutional feature under consideration to wider issues of international law and organisation. He is very critical of the structures and procedures of EPTA. The main defects that he cites are the lack of effective co-ordination between the various participating agencies; the tendency of the specialised agencies to protect their authority from encroachment by the United Nations; the dominance of the Western countries and the lack of effective participation by the recipient countries; and an ineffective system of financing which led to uneconomical and inflated expenditure on staff and administration and the provision of assistance in fields where it was of little benefit to the developing countries. Given that EPTA was merged with the Special Fund in November 1965 to create the United Nations Development Programme it is reasonable to suppose that the author would examine these defects in the light of this transformation of EPTA. Such an expectation would be unfulfilled because the constraints of Dr Nashat's approach prevents him from so doing.

University of Sussex MARC WILLIAMS

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

The Correlates of War: I. Research Origins and Rationale. Edited by J. David Singer. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1979. 405 pp. £13·45.*

THIS is a worthwhile book, but also an irritating one, starting with the title. Not only does the title imply, quite unjustifiably, that wars have correlates (statistically identifiable non-trivial features in common) it also misrepresents the book's contents. A more accurate title would have been the collected papers of J. D. Singer on deterrence, policy-making and war. Even that would be misleading since Singer in at least two instances has very obviously re-touched his originals, quite innocently, but spoiling what value the collection might otherwise have had as a record of the author's consistency, foresight and development.

The developmental pattern Singer means us all to detect is his progress from the study of warlike subjects using the traditional tools that were good enough for Clausewitz or T. C. Schelling, and which Singer himself once used brilliantly, towards

a more 'scientific' approach that looks for statistical evidence of relationships between events and their alleged causes, and puts a figure on the relative significance of contributory causes.

As a modern pioneer of this approach, following the earlier examples of Lewis Richardson and Quincy Wright, Singer deserves in my view every encouragement. The more the pity, then, that the culminating chapters of this book, which try to use statistical analysis to find out whether in the period 1815 to 1945 wars were more (or less) likely to occur after alliances had been formed, work so badly. The reason is that Singer is no statistician.

His first mistake is to expect the figures to speak for themselves. They never do, some kind of working hypothesis or pre-theory—more precise and more modest than his own rather vague allusions to 'balance of power'—is essential. Without it Singer has no answer to those who say alliances are only formed when war threatens, and sometimes they head war off and sometimes they do not.

His second mistake is not to check his figures. No less than eight tables of figures in Chapter 13 are wrong by a factor of one hundred; anyone who can miss such large easily spotted errors can miss other things too.

His third mistake is to be too optimistic. Alliance formation seems, statistically speaking, to preserve peace in the nineteenth century but to make for war in the twentieth. But Singer gets this result only by dividing his historical data into two *entirely arbitrary* parts, asking us somewhat in the manner of Old Moore to believe that some sort of cosmic saltation took place in the year 1900 precisely. Taking the whole period as one, there is really no statistically reliable connection between alliance formation and war at all. And even broken into his arbitrary parts the statistical connections are feeble, alliance formation on average never 'accounting for' more than 10 per cent of war occurrence in either epoch.

His fourth and possibly most serious mistake is to ignore McKinlay's law of the statistical analysis of political events. The law states that time spent in refining indices (of, for instance, the degree of alliance formation within any five-year period) is usually time wasted. If there is a statistical connection between X and Y, it is generally as good between rough estimates of X and Y as between precise estimates. Had Singer known this, his book would have been shorter, and perhaps his bearing less jaunty. The book shorter, because he wastes a lot of time refining his indices and even more time sharing his bemusement when he finds it does not matter. His bearing less jaunty, because McKinlay's law means that the insensitivity of statistical tests to refinement of indices means there is a limit to how well such tests can discriminate between one 'pre-theory' and another.

The early part of this collection, then, shows that Singer can use the analytical tools of the traditionalist as well as anyone but that he distrusts them; the later part shows a courageous faith in the new tools, but a rather surprising clumsiness and naïvety in their use.

University of Lancaster IAN BELLANY

Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age. Edited by Laurence Martin. *London: Heinemann. 1979. 233 pp. £9·95.*

THIS enjoyable book will be found valuable as a text book in courses on strategic studies. Laurence Martin has brought together a series of authors who have already distinguished themselves in writing about particular aspects of contemporary strategic thought and practice, such as Robert Osgood on Limited War, and Coral Bell on Crisis Diplomacy. Each has been allowed sufficient space to provide concise statements of their particular perspectives and, where necessary, to revise and amplify their theories in the light of recent developments.

The essays are readable and the coverage is wide. One possible line of criticism is acknowledged by the editor in his preface—that the essays are very Western-oriented. There is remarkably little on Soviet and Chinese views on the issues, or for that matter, British and French views. Henry Rowen's discussion of the evolution of strategic nuclear doctrine provides a critical, clear and informed description of the shifts and turns in American plans, but little on the academic debate that accompanied this or the parallel movement in Soviet doctrine. The title is somewhat misleading in that the book is less an analysis of the concepts, (deterrence, escalation, etc.) that have dominated strategic thinking over the past few decades but more an examination of the impact of military force, particularly nuclear weapons, on international affairs.

The question posed by Laurence Martin in his introductory essay, on the role of military force, is taken up by other contributors and they tend to support his main conclusion that military force remains a fundamental instrument of policy, but that it is evolving in the way it functions. 'There is a shift toward the threat rather than the deed, the shadow rather than the substance.' The age is one of 'inhibited, latent, indirect force' in which the premium is on a wide range of options tuned to an increasingly complex political role: 'Timeliness and controllability have become cardinal virtues.'

However, Coral Bell in her essay reminds us of the vital importance of skilful diplomacy, given the constraints on the active and direct use of military power, in both preventing crises from getting out of hand and securing political advantages. Robert Osgood concludes his reassessment of limited war (he wrote the standard book on the subject in the 1950s), by noting that 'although the strategy of flexible and controlled response has never been more widely accepted, its utility as an instrument of policy where the prospect of local wars is greatest has never been more in question since it became an integral part of American strategic thought.' With some prescience he warns of the danger of a recurrence of 'the historic pattern of an unanticipated threat, met by a belated, improvised, overwrought and inappropriate American reaction'.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s. By Roger Speed. *Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press. 1979. 174 pp. Pb.*

THIS is a good book about the technicalities of the United States strategic armoury, and the comparable Soviet equipment; and a totally inadequate book about the political relationships which the possession of such armouries embodies. Dr Speed's principal concern is about the survivability of the various elements in the United States inventory, and he sets out the technical parameters of his case with great lucidity and skill. He identifies a range of corrective measures: and says virtually nothing about their costs, either in physical or political terms. And his conception of the complicated relationships which have grown up between the United States and its European allies is both simplistic and ethnocentric to an extent that is not only pre-Kissinger, but very nearly pre-Vandenberg.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

Uncertain Detênte. Edited by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau. *Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff for the John F. Kennedy Institute, Center for International Studies, Tilburg, NL. 1979. 310 pp. Fl. 95.00 $47.50.*

Superpowers and International Conflict. By Carsten Holbraad. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 178 pp. £12·00.*

WHATEVER detente is, and clearly it can mean many things to different people,

measuring its intensity and its impact is a steady source of employment for commentators and scholars. Alting von Geusau's book brings together writers from East, West and non-aligned Europe, as well as from the United States, to comment on a major product and manifestation of dentente—the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki. First comes an introductory section on the nature of detente. This includes a provocative, rather hawkish piece by William Griffith which makes excessive use of the ill-defined term 'destabilising'. The main body of the book is then devoted to three sections which deal with the contents of the three 'baskets' of the Final Act.

Of these the section on economic co-operation is by far the thinnest, perhaps because, as the editor admits, the Final Act has not affected economic matters to any extent. It comprises a summary by John Pinder of the manoeuverings of Comecon and the EEC regarding recognition and an analysis of the benefits of East-West ties by J. Bognar. The latter is optimistic about the growth of trade and he writes in splendid East European style; innumerable sentences are prefixed with assertions such as 'It is common knowledge that . . .'. At other times he offers conclusions only with the greatest reluctance, as when he summarises East-West co-operation to date, 'one might well say that what has happened so far in this field is far from insignificant' (p. 182).

On military matters there is a lot of detail on Mutual and Balanced Forces Reductions from Teunissen, a strong appeal for nuclear disarmament in Europe from Dobrosielski, and a discussion by Acimovic of the agreements at Helsinki on the notification of manoeuvres and the exchange of observers. He comments briefly on the satisfactory implementation of the commitments and makes some modest suggestions for further measures to build confidence. Otto Czempiel offers the somewhat simplistic thesis that American policy will be determined by the outcome of a struggle between the commercial-liberal sector in the United States, which favours detente, and the military-conservative sector which by and large doesn't.

The humanitarian 'basket three' essays bring together accusations that the Soviet Union's human-rights policy has not eased to any significant degree and a defence of the Eastern bloc position by Sheidina, who says that cultural exchange is highly desirable, ideological competition inevitable, and psychological warfare ('to make slanderous allegations, to incite sabotage or to spread rumours about aimed at sowing confusion and discord in a society') improper. While readers may not be clear on the meaning of these distinctions or convinced of Soviet reasonableness, the protestations of the Western authors in the book in favour of 'freedom' must also be taken with a grain of scepticism. None of the writers note that, for many years the United States would not grant entry visas to foreign communists or ex-communists.

With a few exceptions, the essays in this book, although they differ considerably in approach and do not fit comfortably together, are the product of thought and have something to say. Perhaps most disturbing is that the essays were originally conference papers and there is no sign in the book of dialogue between the authors or even between conference participants as a whole. All the contributors appear as talking at, rather than with, each other. Holbraad's book is initially concerned with super-power co-operation in crises and then with the likely operation of a triangular system in which China has the role of super-power. The crises section of the book contains the odd observation of note regarding such matters as the restraint of allies by super-powers but the great bulk of it is devoted to providing summaries of already much-recorded events in selected crises and stressing the fairly obvious consideration that super-power co-operation was then very limited. Had that been otherwise, surely a 'crisis' would not have arisen?

This leads to what is perhaps the most central fault of the work—that it contains almost no reference to methodology, and the author leaves himself wide open to the

charge that he picked his 'crises' to fit his arguments. Clearly, consideration of the Congo crisis or of the Cyprus troubles—when the super-powers were able to agree, if only temporarily, on the establishment of UN forces—would have complicated his arguments.

The book is heavily traditionalist in approach, military strength being seen as the only thing that really matters in international politics. This reviewer found the discussion of the operation of future international systems fairly unenlightening and sometimes irritating (e.g. 'Japan has the handicap of diplomatic inexperience' (p. 135)). However, the author is on safe ground in believing that future patterns of international politics will be complex and that almost anything might happen.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TREVOR TAYLOR

Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma. By Earnest W. Lefever. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1979. (Distrib. in Europe by Blackwell, Oxford.) 154 pp. £8·50. Pb: £3·25.*

IF the main fear of authors of policy relevant books is that current events will render their work obsolete, it appears that Earnest Lefever's worst fears have come true. His study, which is concerned with the short- and long-term policy repercussions, especially for the United States, of selected states' search for nuclear weapons (p. ix) has not stood up well to the test of history since its completion in March 1978. (Lefever chose not to make changes as late as January 1979, p. x.) The author suggests that the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been largely a stabilising factor in the international system and is unlikely to upset super-power strategic stability in the future (pp. 120, 136). In order to study future problems in other respects, Lefever presents a series of case studies 'in the light of US interest in regional and strategic stability' (p. 23). He concludes that states seek nuclear weapons primarily because they are insecure and that an increase in American security commitments will be more effective than the other policy options of obtaining an international agreement or restricting technical data and raw materials, in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons (p. 122).

Of the five case studies in the text, at least four are already in large measure obsolete. The India-Pakistan case minimises Rawalpindi's drive to acquire nuclear weapons, and appears outdated in the light of the much publicised recent Pakistani efforts. The chapter on Iran is much more clearly irrelevant. Considering the rejection by Khomeini's Iran of Western approaches to the international system, there is need for a reappraisal of the position of nuclear weapons in the hands of 'crazy states'. The views expressed by Ali Mazrui, in the BBC's 1979 Reith lectures, on Idi Amin and nuclear weapons and the hypothetical effects of such a combination on the developed world raises a similar question which is far more relevant to the Iranian case than the consideration of the Shah's nuclear development programme which Lefever presents. The case study of Israel and Egypt is also outdated as the author's concentration on the adversary relations now seems far less relevant. Surely a policy relevant book would now have to consider the possibilities of joint nuclear ventures, perhaps in Sinai, but Lefever has concentrated on the pre-1977 hostility. The case study of Taiwan and American security guarantees in the great power calculus suffers equally as events have overtaken the analysis.

The more interesting chapters (seven and eight) deal with American policy options regarding these areas, however this section appears to owe little to the preceeding case studies. What is more, the notion that security guarantees will help prevent nuclear proliferation now seems even more irrelevant, especially in the cases of Pakistan, Iran, and Taiwan. In sum, the author has paid heavily for attempting such an

overwhelmingly policy relevant study, and the publishers have also paid for their slowness in producing the book. One supposes that a text placed in a hard cover binding should remain relevant for more than a few months, and one cannot help but feel that Lefever and Brookings would have both been better served by a less permanent format. We then would have expected less, and been able to praise more.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth GERALD SEGAL

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Communist Reformation, Nationalism, Internationalism and Change in the World Communist Movement. Edited by G. R. Urban. *London: Temple Smith. 1979. 335 pp. £9·50.*

THIS highly interesting collection of dialogues edited by George Urban follows the format used by the editor successfully in his previous books on *Eurocommunism* and *Detente*. The book uses the 1968 Prague Spring as a starting-point, but really no more than a starting-point, for a wide-ranging discussion of the political systems within the Soviet bloc. The feature which sets this book apart from other edited volumes is Urban's ability to structure the discussions and draw out the contributors on points they might not otherwise have covered.

In the interview with Eduard Goldstücker, the reader is left with a very strong sense that the prestige and identity of the intellectual in Czechoslovakia, about which Goldstücker talks, has had an abiding influence upon the formation of his own attitude, and it is this attitude which appears to minimise the otherwise imbreachable gap between the phases in Goldstücker's own career—first as a Stalinist, then as a victim of Stalinism, then as a reform Communist. It is perhaps the strength of Goldstücker's identity as an intellectual which makes it difficult for the reader to fully comprehend the repeated statements that the desire to believe in communism, particularly during the 1930s, forced him mentally to suppress and reject the revelations about the great purges in the Soviet Union.

This view of the ability of ideology to induce so many intelligent Communists during the Stalinist period, and even after, was shared by both Antonin Liehm and Zdenek Mlynár. Both men who, of course, rose to the highest positions of leadership in Czechoslovakia in 1968, agreed that despite the claim of Marxism-Leninism to provide a scientific world outlook, nevertheless, adherence to it even by intellectuals was a matter of faith first and foremost in which the 'discrepancy between Utopian commitment and the crimes committed in the name of Utopia' was minimised.

At the centre of Urban's dialogue with Ota Sik is the question of whether the adherence to Marxist ideology was instrumental in developing a greater insight into deeper ethical and moral issues. For Sik, clearly this had been the impulse for becoming a Communist, but as with the other disillusioned Prague reformers, adherence to an ideology had in the end proved to be a restraint upon higher intellectual pursuits.

A further, somewhat more specific, theme explored in the book, is the historical experiences which should have conditioned the Dubcek leadership's response to the 1968 crisis. Hugh Seton-Watson, in a wide-ranging discussion on the fate of multinational empires, makes the interesting point that 'when nations rise against the world's one remaining colonialism, the Soviet empire, they revert back to a nineteenth-century type of liberal nationalism with a Garibaldian flavour. This was true of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968—both were conscious imitations of 1848' (p. 303). Yet Liehm makes a parallel point (p. 80) that the

Czechoslovak reformers did not apparently draw historical parallels of their situations, and indeed they did not even consider the lessons of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, much less the 1848 experience.

Seton-Watson's view of the inherently more aggressive nature of the Soviet empire and the culturally backward nature of its people is a view not surprisingly shared by the Czechoslovak contributors and by Manuel Azcarate. The only dissenting voices are raised by Jacob Beam, who agrees that there are defects in the Soviet system but who puts great emphasis on Soviet fears of German expansionism as a motivating force of Soviet foreign policy. Vladimir Maximov, in an extremely interesting discussion, rejects the idea that Russians are submissive by nature, that they are doomed to being ruled by a despotic leadership.

Finally, the book also provides many insights into aspects of the Prague Spring not previously discussed. In particular the contributions by Eugene Rostow, Claiborne Pell, and Jacob Beam reveal a picture of Western prevarication and American preoccupation with the 1968 Presidential elections. In studying the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, one always has in mind the question, how could it have happened? After reading the book, with its picture of deep-felt cultural antagonisms between the Russians and the Czechs, the failure to appreciate the *realpolitik* of Czechoslovakia's strategic importance for the Soviet Union, and the perennial distractions provided by the American electoral process, one is perhaps left asking, how could it have been avoided?

University of Southampton KAREN DAWISHA

Control of Terrorism: International Documents. Edited by Yonah Alexander *et al.* *New York: Crane Russak. 1979. 216 pp. £17·50.*

Terrorism, Threat, Reality, Response. By Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent. *Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1979. 450 pp.*

THE stated purpose of *Control of Terrorism* is given as 'to provide, for the student as well as for the specialist, a single source, in compact form, of the texts of terrorism and terrorist acts' (p. xii) yet the volume actually contains, without commentary or analysis, the texts of some selected international and regional treaties and resolutions against terrorism. Part I contains the texts of five pre-Second World War treaties; five of the more recent multilateral treaties; and three draft treaties of which only the Draft Convention Against the Taking of Hostages was eventually adopted by the General Assembly (on December 17, 1979) though in considerably amended form. The dates of submission of two of the draft treaties are listed incorrectly: the United States Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism was submitted to the 6th (Legal) Committee at its 1310th meeting on September 25, 1972 and not to the General Assembly on September 26, 1972; and the West German Draft Convention Against the Taking of Hostages was submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages at its 3rd meeting on August 3, 1977 and not to the United Nations on July 22, 1977. Part II contains the texts of eight General Assembly and four Security Council resolutions which were adopted against aerial hijacking, international terrorism, the taking of hostages, and against Israel's violations of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Part III contains the texts of ten International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) resolutions and Part IV contains the Declaration of the Bonn economic summit of July 17, 1978.

The editors concede the texts chosen were selected (p. xiii) and merely a sampling (p. xiv) but do not set forth their criteria for this. Assuming a minimum intention to only reproduce documents of a specifically 'anti-terrorist nature, selection is

inconsistent and curious omissions occur, such as: General Assembly resolutions 2625 (XXV) and 2734 (XXV) by which no State may organise, assist, foment, finance, incite, tolerate or participate in terrorist acts in another state, and General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) by which any state sending armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries to carry out acts of armed force against another state commits an act of aggression; and the joint proposal by the United Kingdom, France and Switzerland to the ICAO Assembly meeting in Rome in September, 1973 for the drafting of an additional convention on sanctions. Nor are the dates of entry into force of each convention provided for countries other than the United States. Had these been appended as well, the book could have become a valuable reference work.

Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response consists of a lengthy set piece by the two authors, who have considerable experience in national security and domestic crisis management in the United States Federal Government, as well as eight articles by various other specialists. There are sections of the volume which are very good and original contributions to what is alternately termed anti-terrorism (p. xiv) or counter-terrorism (p. 75) but, on the whole, it contains numerous factual errors and internal contradictions, frequent value judgments and inadvertent illustrations of how perceptions can be selected to reinforce an observer's value system and a general inconsistency in terminology, quality of scholarship and terms of reference.

The predominate assumption seems to be that every terrorist, by definition (and there is never an attempt to differentiate between various types of terrorist groups), seeks to engage in mass destruction; Miller and Russell, in their article, present a hierarchy of operational sophistication with this as the pinnacle of competence, and Kupperman and Trent, in their set piece, explain in great detail the effects these weapons would have (pp. 56–74) and countermeasures needed to prevent their acquisition by terrorists (pp. 83–105).

Kupperman and Trent also state 'Terrorist violence is by its nature random' (p. 14), yet later point out 'Generally, terrorists are highly selective in choosing their targets' (p. 44). The article by Smith fails to be convincing and, with its references to 'cold war' (p. 204) and 'direct attack by a strong foreign power' (p. 205), is oddly included. Parts of the article by Kupperman, Wilcox and Smith are reprinted verbatim, but without acknowledgement, in the first section; half of the first paragraph on page 228 is used as part of the first paragraph on page 135 and the first paragraph on page 229 is also used as the second paragraph on page 135. Bennett and Saaty's article employs a case study of the siege of the Munich Olympics in 1972 which is more often than not incorrect in both minor and major details, and their conclusions predictably suffer. In sharp contrast are the superb contributions by Waterman and Jenkins who suggest and analyse the possible use of rule-based computer programs as an aid to crisis decision-makers during a terrorist incident: Alexander, who explores how the media contribute to ensuring the relevance of the adage 'terrorism is theatre'; and Silverstein, who examines the usually forgotten role of medical rescue and medical care in counterterrorism. The final article by Bolz also employs an account of the siege of the Munich Olympics but with contradictory details to those provided by Bennett and Saaty.

In light of the above, the principle usefulness of this book is in providing an insight into the state of contemporary knowledge and understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism in the United States and, as such, gives new meaning to an earlier conclusion by Kupperman and Trent: 'we are poorly prepared to deal with nationally disruptive acts of terrorism' (p. 177).

University of London CLIVE C. ASTON

Leadership. By James MacGregor. *New York, London: Harper and Row. 1979. 530 pp. £6·95.*

THIS is an exceptionally rich and comprehensive survey of politics within states, extensive both in its historical and in its geographical scope: although most of Professor Burns's heroes of leadership are recent, especially the United States Presidents about whom he has been authoritatively writing, his record goes right back to Moses; most detailed examples are from major Western and communist states, but the developing countries are always discussed as a broad additional group. The author uses his theory of leadership to integrate the findings of a number of approaches to politics. He uses the term 'leadership' in a precisely defined and somewhat idiosyncratic form: it does not for him denote a mere power relationship and it is sharply distinguished from mere manipulation. Professor Burns seeks a definition of 'leadership' within the mainstream of democratic theory. For him it

> is the reciprocal process of mobilizing, by persons with certain motives and values, various economic, political, and other resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order to realize goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers (p. 425).

Dynamic reciprocity between the leaders and the followers is thus central. Moreover, the nature of the goals is crucial and hence the latter provide the base for a classification of leadership into the *transactional* type—when the two sides realise related but separate objectives; and the *transforming* type—when the leadership plays a teaching role in shaping, altering and elevating the motives, goals and values of the followers. Consequently the psychological make-up of individual leaders combine with the moral principles they pursue. This results in an analysis which successfully avoids the drawbacks of others which concentrate upon only one of these factors at the cost of being deficient on the rest.

The book starts with the exposition of the definition of 'leadership' and of its moral contents. In the second part Professor Burns analyses the origins of leadership, outlining the psychological and social histories of a number of outstanding leaders about whom he provides concise but admirably telling vignettes: Moses, the Maid of Orleans, Luther, Freud, Wilson, Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt, Gandhi, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Hitler. Using some Freudian insights, particularly as developed by Erikson, as well as the approaches of Maslow, Laswell and Kohlberg, the author traces the likely effects of personal and social events upon the psychology of these leaders.

In the subsequent two parts Professor Burns analyses the record of transforming and of transactional leaderships, using the histories of the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China as the main source of his examples. The presentation of the generally widely known events is not only authoritative but also refreshing and the examples chosen aptly illustrate the line of argument. The author sweeps convincingly through the universe of the well-established states but the extension of his argument to new, developing states is by no means fully documented. In the concluding part Professor Burns discusses the theory and practice of leadership and convincingly concludes that the ultimate test lies in the intended social change.

The comprehensive analysis is full of telling historical examples which admirably illustrate the individual points although, at the same time, they contribute to what may be regarded as excessive length and may, in fact, obstruct a fuller synthesis. An important limitation of the analysis, common to many treatments of comparative politics, is the total exclusion of international relations: politics is assumed to take place wholly within individual states. Therefore, the author cannot deal with two central contemporary issues confronting the national leaders. First, they are unable to cope with many vital needs of their followers because these needs cannot be met within

the confines of national boundaries but require broader, global, or wider regional solutions: this applies to many aspects of defence, of economics, of ecology, etc. Second, the process of interaction between the leaders and their followers does not take place in the relative isolation of domestic politics; national boundaries are frequently penetrated by subversion and other states become involved in the domestic processes, occasionally to the point of military intervention. Another limitation is found in the absence of any theory of changes in leadership—for example, on the lines of Pareto's 'circulation of the elites'. In conjunction with the last point, one would look for some assessment not only of the main modalities of change—some modern variant of the Chinese theory of the loss of the 'mandate from heaven', for instance—but also of the degree to which the process is autonomous or reflects changes in and inputs from the international environment, whether indirectly, through the diffusion of ideas, or directly, through subversion and intervention.

University of Southampton JOSEPH FRANKEL

Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations. By Joan M. Nelson. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1979. 463 pp. £17·20. Pb: £4·40.*

THE list of recent publications providing extensive and comparative surveys of the position of the Third World poor in relation to the process of urbanisation, is already so long that it is increasingly difficult for further surveys to contribute much that is either new or unique. This book, ten years in the writing as the author tells us, attempts to do so by focusing on one particular aspect of the urban poor, their political role. The intention is to provide a global, comparative review of the political implications of rapid urban growth in developing countries, specifically in terms of the political participation of the urban poor.

The book falls into two distinct parts. The first comprises three extensive positioning chapters which review a number of aspects of urbanisation considered relevant for understanding the urban poor. These include a detailed evaluation of the 'dual urban economy model'; the formal-informal concept; substantial empirical data on rural-urban migration; and a discussion of various theories of migrants in cities, including the so-called theories of 'the disruptive migrant' and the 'radical marginal'. Essentially this is an historical documentation of dominant theories in vogue in the 1960s and early 1970s which appears somewhat out of date by the time of publication. This is not helped by the ambiguous position taken by the author who at times lacks conceptual clarity—writing, for instance, 'there is surely *some* validity to the dualist model's explanation of the urban economy, the distribution of earnings and therefore the locus of urban poverty' (p. 33). The fact that two lengthy chapters on migration reaches the conclusion that it is not helpful to separate migrants and urban born in terms of political behaviour, confirms the impression that an overlong book such as this could have stood equally well without the first part.

The second part, which is the core of the book, is concerned with the identification of patterns of participation and channels of access to governmental authority widely used by low-income 'urbanites' to protect or advance their interests as urban poor. Comparative research at the global level is intended to 'identify the key variables and recurring patterns in a search not for uniformity but for ordered variation' (p. 6). Four different patterns of participation are identified—vertically mobilised participation, ethnic associations, special-interest groups, and participation generated by working-class oriented political parties. Each pattern is meticulously examined with a wealth of empirical examples, and in each case the implications spelt out in terms of benefits to,

and political education of, the poor themselves, and in terms of its impact on the broader political system.

While an interesting global distinction is made between the important role of ethnic associations in Africa and Asia, as against the predominance of neighbourhood special interest groups in Latin America, the author, nevertheless, would have benefitted from restricting her survey area to Latin America. For the empirical examples from Africa and Asia are at best no more than 'apt illustration', while it is in the detailed comparative analysis of Latin American shantytown organisations in such countries as Chile, Venezuela and Peru (where the author also draws on her own research) that the book is at its most interesting. For students in this area the bibliography is extensive and impressive though its utility is limited by the omission of works in Spanish, Portuguese, etc.

While comparisons at the global level certainly indicate general categories and trends in the nature of political participation of the Third World urban poor, these are only of broad and generalised significance, and there is a limitation to the extent to which differences are understood. For it is not only the conditions under which different types of political participation emerge, which need to be explained, but also their interaction, and relationship with the wider political and economic structure within which they are positioned. Only then can the processes under which shifts and changes in political participation occur, in response to wider changes in the macro structure, be identified. In this sense it is the very breadth of the book which is responsible for its limitations.

University College, London CAROLINE O. N. MOSER

Plutonium, Power, and Politics: International Arrangements for the Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel. By Gene I. Rochlin. *Berkeley: University of California Press. 1979. 397 pp. £13·75.*

DR ROCHLIN'S subtitle does him less than justice. This dense but absorbing volume is about much more than the disposition of spent reactor fuel. Indeed, it is at least four books in one. There is an expert account of the nuclear fuel cycle and the techniques used to exploit nuclear energy: terse, lucid, dispassionate. There is another book, equally succinct, about the development of concern with nuclear weapons proliferation and of strategies for addressing that problem. A third, as the subtitle suggests, then deals with particular problems at the 'back end' of the fuel cycle: the vexed issues of reprocessing and nuclear waste, and the probability of managing them through new forms of international institution. And, intertwined with all of these, there is a fourth book for the political scientist, relating questions about international nuclear politics to wider propositions about issue linkage in policy formulation and bargaining, and about the construction, maintenance and modulation of international 'regimes'. All the books are worth reading. To have them in a single volume is an unusual bargain.

That said, Dr Rochlin pays a price for his liberality. Especially when so many studies of nuclear power policy fail to recognise, let alone harmonise, those necessarily connected themes, his ambition to orchestrate technology, economics and politics is wholly admirable. Perhaps inevitably, however, the sureness of his touch varies. He is at his best when dealing with the technology of the nuclear fuel cycle: of reactors, enrichment, reprocessing, and waste management. His discussion of uranium resources, production, and trade is slight by comparison, and sometimes insecure. While he acknowledges the salience of economic considerations, there is also a lack of substance in his treatment of them, added to which some of his *obiter dicta*—such as that autarky represents a 'non-economic' objective (p. 104)—seem odd. As to political

science, he owes an obvious debt to Ernst Haas and his associates, whose work on regime construction and change he echoes rather than extends. At the same time, his application of that work to the particular case of nuclear energy—the contention, for example, that international nuclear relations constitute a case of Haas's 'turbulent field', or the characterisation of bargaining in that context as a case of 'fragmented issue linkage'—is often both perceptive and more widely illuminating.

The volume's central purpose is 'to explore a variety of possible international arrangements for the regulation, management, or control of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle' (p. 2). That is itself a major theme, and Dr Rochlin lays a useful theoretical foundation for examining it. He stops short, however, of raising some of the more difficult questions of political practice. There is almost nothing, for instance, about how international or multinational fuel cycle institutions might operate or take decisions as commercial and industrial entities. More surprisingly, he acknowledges that such institutions are bound to be heterogeneous, but fails to discuss the arguably concomitant need for common norms or standards. And above all, by asserting that these institutions are to take as their touchstone the 'collective good' of non-proliferation, without parallel concern for economic benefits, he begs the question of how governments less preoccupied with that former goal might be moved to participate. Any expedition into this largely uncharted territory is to be welcomed, but Dr Rochlin leaves much for subsequent explorers to survey.

In assuming that additional international institutionalisation is both demanded and justified by the risk of proliferation alone, Dr Rochlin writes, as he admits, from an American perspective. That also shows elsewhere. He accepts uncritically, for example, the criteria advanced by Rathjens and Carnesale in 1977 for judging any new approach to proliferation, despite the fact that many outside the United States would regard them as at least debatable. Those who wrote or have read the Brandt Commission report might also feel that Dr Rochlin's discussion of a choice between 'power-oriented' and 'equity-oriented' policies for managing the proliferation problem countenance the former to an extent with which few in other countries would be likely to sympathise. Yet this is a book which contains much wisdom: in its warning, for example, against over-extending the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or in its criticism of the failure of so many institutional proposals in this field to respect socio-political reality. Unfortunately, the thesis in this form may be too wide-ranging, and its presentation too complex, for Dr Rochlin's own realism to reach and influence the policy-makers who could most benefit from it. He has, however, made an unusual and courageous effort to build a framework within which the technology and international politics of nuclear energy can be brought together. If his example is imitated, as it should be, the burgeoning debate about nuclear power and proliferation may yet become both informed and productive.

IAN SMART

International Oil Policy. By Arnold E. Safer. *Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough, Hants.) 163 pp. £9·50.*

Facing the International Energy Problem, 1980–2000. By Amos A. Jordan, Hayden Bryan and Michael Moodie. *New York: Praeger for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 123 pp. £12·00.*

Fuels for the Future: A Survey of World Energy Alternatives. By B. A. Rahmer. *London: Petroleum Economist. 1980. 65 pp. Pb: £12·50.*

STUDIES of international energy affairs generally face two major problems: they tend to be overtaken by events before they reach the public and they often include the briefest discussion of the geopolitical consequences of world resource distribution before

lapsing into the more familiar territory of domestic energy problems. The work of the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the private vision of Dr Arnold Safer fall into both these snares—the first of which is partly forgivable, the second less so.

Arnold Safer's book contains a set of policy propositions for the next United States administration to follow in order to secure America's foreign oil requirements at the lowest possible price. The author's obvious familiarity with the American domestic economic and energy scene is reflected in his suggestions for oil import quotas, foreign tax credits, and an oil futures market. These are particularly interesting for the European reader who needs to be steered through the regulatory procedures which are at the interface of American government/company relations and which greatly complicate, what seem to the outsider to be, fairly straightforward policy measures. There, unfortunately, the value of the work ends, for Dr Safer inhabits a world where oil is not scarce and where consuming countries have the power to influence production decisions of OPEC countries by virtue of the latter's need for revenue. Although one can excuse the projection of a 1980 oil price of $14 per barrel (Table 4.1 p. 48), nobody with a grasp of the subject could surely believe that, 'if there is subversion of the existing Saudi regime, or if Iran is subject to continued internal disruptions, or if Iraq attacks Kuwait, none of these events will have much to do with whether oil prices are $10, $15, or $20 per barrel' (p. 114). The reason for such a statement is that Dr Safer is an economist who believes that economic, and specifically market, forces are the only important determinants of oil prices and the conduct of international oil policy. There is no room here for other international actors; the Western allies of the United States are accorded short shrift (there is no mention of the International Energy Agency), and the less-developed countries (LDCs) just one page. OPEC countries are treated as enemies which have been allowed, by the weakness of the West, to create the world's energy supply and price problems, but which can somehow be faced down by taking tough economic and political measures. This kind of commentary may have been understandable (but not defensible) in 1973; seven years later it is inexcusable and dangerous nonsense. It is depressing that a Presidential aspirant has seen fit to endorse the book by contributing a foreword.

A refreshing change, therefore, to read Congressman Al Ullman, in the introduction to the CSIS volume, state that, 'In the last five years, no one has really provided the simple answers about energy—because there are none. That much Congress has learned.' The collection of papers which form the proceedings of the Fourth Quadrangular Conference held at CSIS in May 1978, is somewhat ambitiously titled for it contains rather general statements about the international energy problems of the next twenty years. Nevertheless, an impressive collection of experts were gathered around the table for sessions on: international oil and nuclear problems, the energy future, energy economics, alternative forms of energy, and the United States domestic coal situation. The volume also includes a useful paper by Sevino Carlson on the prospects for Mexican oil. The most interesting discussion, however, concerns the security dimensions of the energy problem and it is here that the critical questions are raised: the strategic consequences of Western energy dependence; the credibility of Western energy institutions, particularly the IEA; the future role of the Soviet Union in international energy trade; military protection of Persian Gulf oilfields by the United States. These are some of the real issues in the geopolitics of energy relations which have become more complicated and more immediate since these discussions were held. Little headway has been made in finding answers to them.

B. A. Rahmer does not set out to address these problems; rather, as the subtitle of his commendably brief, clear and elegant presentation suggests, he is concerned with the essential details of each of the known fuels and fuel technologies. The author is particularly strong on alternative sources of energy and the reasons why solar,

biomass, wind, wave and geothermal power—important as they are—can in no way provide us with even the medium-term solution to fossil fuel dependence. Although one may not share his innate distrust of the Soviet Union, or his view that, 'The nuclear option . . . has obtained more than its due share of attention and . . . , it deserves to play a far less prominent part in the future' (p. 64), this is an excellent introduction to a most difficult and poorly understood subject. Sadly, the rather high price of the publication may preclude its use as an educational text, a purpose for which it is admirably suited.

JONATHAN P. STERN

Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. By Milton and Rose Friedman. *London: Secker and Warburg. 1980. 338 pp. £7·95. Pb: £4·95.*

BY the simplicity and repetition of his message over the last three decades, Milton Friedman has moved from a position of an unorthodox crank to a most potent influence on many politicians. Britain has become the first major laboratory for his ideas and so it is necessary to understand the reasons for his appeal. The seductive element in his message is his ability to convey the illusion as does much soft pornography that life is free of complications and that one's wildest dreams are attainable by the use of a simple formula. In this case, the formula is *freedom of choice*. You, the consumer, are free to choose what you wish; not only goods in the supermarkets, but education, health, employment and even political arrangements. Only they—the bureaucrats—won't let you.

The message when first conveyed in *Capitalism and Freedom*, also written with Rose Friedman in the 1950s, failed to appeal to many. But slow growth, inflation and the many smaller complaints about the quality of life in advanced countries have now given the authors a larger audience in print—as on the television screen. Two themes which have concerned Milton Friedman over his career appear intertwined here. The first is the superiority of the Market as a way of arranging *all* aspects of social and economic life in contrast to the prevailing fashion for public provision of many goods and public regulation of economic life. The second theme is the pervasive effects of mismanagement of money supply in forms of inflation, unemployment, booms and slumps. The two themes are interconnected since governments misuse their monopoly of money creating power through deficit financing which arises from their inefficient provision of a growing number of economic services best left to private enterprise. After a general chapter on the market as a beneficent, efficient arrangement, follow chapters on the virtues of Free Trade, monetary causes of the Great Depression, the Welfare State, the dangers of a drive for equality, the iniquities of public education, the undesirability of consumerism, the evils of closed shop and the monetarist cure for inflation. The book concludes with a political programme.

The two chapters on monetary economics are the best in the book for here concrete evidence is advanced and hypotheses put forward which can be and have been tested. While these propositions remain controversial this is what Milton Friedman is best known for and respected. The rest is a mixture of argument and assertion by selective evidence. There is a persistent tendency to present as incontrovertible scientific truths statements which are the authors' political beliefs. Authority of economic theory is constantly claimed for these statements, when most economists while agreeing on the pedagogic value of such theory would be loath to advance it as a blueprint for social engineering.

For the authors, all public activity in the economic sphere is inefficient, inspired perhaps by noble motives but sustained by narrow and sectional interests. They accept

the most naîve version of American history as a march, hand in hand, of capitalism and freedom where all social problems could have been solved solely by the working of competition without any need for legislation. No virtue in state action and no evil greater than inflation is the simple message even when inflation may have financed, as it did, the American Revolution. Had they the choice, the authors would perhaps have preferred sound finance and George III.

London School of Economics MEGHNAD DESAI

Legal and Institutional Aspects of the International Monetary System: Selected Essays. By Joseph Gold. Edited by Jane B. Evensen and Jai Kuen Oh. *Washington: IMF. 1979. 633 pp. $17.50.*

International Payments with Special Regard to Monetary Systems. By Iván Meznerics. *Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff; Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. 1979. 269 pp. Fl. 49.50. $24.75.*

Getting From Here to There: A Policy for the Post-Keynesian Age. By W. W. Rostow. *London: Macmillan, 1979. (First publ. New York, 1978.) 271 pp. £7·95.*

NON-LAWYERS should not jump to the conclusion that because these collected essays by Joseph Gold are written by the General Counsel to the International Monetary Fund—and do, indeed, take a rather narrowly legal and professional view of what matters in the international monetary system—that there is nothing here for them. On the contrary, here is a rich resource of usable material for scholars with many different interests. Those interested in the functioning of international organisations will be fascinated to learn, for instance, how when LDC countries began to pack meetings of the Committee of Twenty with the 'associates' of their elected representatives, the monetary powers in the Fund smartly moved the discussion outside to a small group that actually became known, solemnly, as 'The Dinner'. Those interested in bargaining theory can find an extensive exposition of the use of 'Stressperanto' (tr. 'international bureaucratic gobbledygook, often obfuscating meaning but equalizing the dissatisfaction of opposed parties and thus relieving—like aspirin—the stress of conflict'. Maybe recent years will be come to be known as the Stressperanto Seventies?)

There is discussion of the use of sanctions in international relations—important for an organisation deprived by the openhandedness of banks of its financial leverage over all but the poorest and most desperate. And there is much more of general interest regarding North-South relations and all the old, old problems of law and international society. How, in so fast-changing, volatile and unpredictable a world economy can an institution like the Fund continue to exercise authority and maintain, let alone extend, the reach of international law?

That is the central concern of the book. Joe Gold has worked for the IMF for half a lifetime, since 1946, and his commitment to its prestige and purpose is as unqualified as his pen has been prolific. What the present collection of fourteen essays does is to offer an interpretation of how the Fund as an institution and its Articles of Agreement as a legal document have been adapted to the unruly, not to say anarchic and chaotic conditions of monetary relations in the 1970s. Though the matter is sometimes technical, the interpretation—bearing witness to long practice in explaining the nuances of legal drafting to politicians and their financial officials—is always lucid. It is even illuminated with an unexpected kind of judicial style, with sage quotes from Ezra Pound, Samuel Beckett, Henry Miller, and Francis Bacon.

Exploitable, therefore, even readable once you settle in to it—but is it convincing? Gold's fundamental belief, as I understand it, is that though change is an intrinsic characteristic of the international monetary system, it is important to the preservation

of order and confidence that it should be continuously translated into legal formulae and verbalised in a written code of conduct.

He sometimes comes close to admitting that there is an element of *trompe l'oeil* in this sort of constitution-mongering. Whatever happens, he seems to say, the important thing is to pretend that rules still exist (even when they allow us all to behave as we will) and that regimes are 'reformed', not just abandoned as unworkable because no longer suiting the interests of the powerful. Now up to a point perhaps one can agree that monetary security is different from military security. With the latter it may be fatal to security to pretend that rules and agreements govern action if that leads you to ignore or neglect the balance of power. But with monetary security, the precariousness of the whole edifice does perhaps demand the willing suspension of disbelief, as at the theatre, so that habits of conformity and consultation are not wantonly broken when times change. Yet there are two rather basic weaknesses in the argument. One is that if the *trompe l'oeil* is to work, authority must anticipate change—not tag so far behind it (as the Committee of Twenty did) that the law becomes visibly an ass. The point is aptly made in a remark of Giscard d'Estaing's, reported by James Reston and quoted by Gold, to the effect that we 'are not living in a world of constitutions now but in a world of events . . . so that what will matter is what happens not what is written' (p. 8).

The second weakness in the argument is the assumption that because Third-World voices are so small and weak in the Fund (even after the redistribution of quotas and weighted votes) the Fund does not need their willing support if it is to maintain authority. Constitutions of any kind must be backed by a mix of coercive power and willing consent. The Fund has clearly suffered a loss of the former and therefore needs far more of the latter than Mr Gold—for all his parade of Fund concern for LDC interests—is ready to admit. International monetary collaboration—as another distinguished Frenchman, Mr Schweitzer, is quoted as saying—must be 'based on a Fund that is demonstrably advantageous to its members and which therefore continues to enjoy their confidence and support' (p. 9).

The book appends a useful reprint of the original text of Article IV on par values side by side with the revised version under the Second Amendment. The index is good but the bibliography disappointing. It is mildly pathetic (and perhaps indicative of the cloistered calm of H Street) that Gold cites twenty-three references to his own work, two to Ed Bernstein's and none to Robert Triffin's. Characteristically, the price is right: as usual, the Fund—that great believer in the market system—subsidises its own.

Professor Meznerics is a respected Hungarian economist and an active participant in the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The concern of his book is with the legal and customary regime governing the use of various means of payment in transnational transactions and especially in those between centrally planned and market or mixed economies. Paradoxically, his concerns come much closer to those of the real world financial operators in Wall Street or Lombard Street than do those of many Western monetary economists, including Mr Gold. What bothers him is the widening gap between financial practice and financial law, between the proliferating use of all sorts of sophisticated computer-based systems of settling debts (e.g. SWIFT and ADP) and the lagging agreement or co-ordination of state laws and administrative processes. And once more paradoxically, he rates the contribution of the International Chamber of Commerce to the solution of these problems rather higher than that of the intergovernmental and bureaucratic UNCITRAL. Customary law developed through the uniform rules drawn up by the ICC and constantly revised, seem more efficacious and practical than UNCITRAL's attempts to get agreement on uniform codified law. There is also an exposition of the methods of financial payment between the socialist countries which would seem

somewhat to overrate the contribution of the transferable rouble and to underrate the contribution of Western credit creation and of Western banks to the expansion of trade with and within the CMEA bloc of countries.

The one thing Professor Rostow does not really manage to tell you in his book is how to get from here to there—'there' being a prosperous and stable world economy in which the industrialised North and the developing South can live with mutual tolerance and harmony—tracing the origins of capitalism and its subsequent evolution. The book looks ahead to the future and argues that while Keynesian economics went far to solving the problems of flagging demand in the 1930s, it offers only an inadequate framework for dealing with the problems of the 1980s and beyond. Rostow is convinced that the key lies in the long cycles of investment and economic expansion observed in the 1920s by the Soviet economist Konratieff. Only action on the problems of supply—especially supply of energy, food, raw materials and environmental protection—will enable the world to overcome the economic stagnation of our times. 'The changes in thought and policy which this book commends are rooted in the empirical perception that the changed patterns of investment which are now required both for full employment and structural balance will not take place without the conscious intervention of public policy' (p. 53). What he proposes involves the resort to prices and incomes policies and far closer involvement of the United States and other governments in planned long-term investment to procure a structural change adequate to the needs of the future. Though the book is primarily addressed to American readers, he does acknowledge that his solutions demand increased international co-operation. Just how much seems to me greatly underestimated. For closer state participation in investment would involve even greater demand by the American Treasury on international capital markets and thus the probability of still more taxation (through inflation) without representation for the rest of us. But apart from some airy references to the OECD and the United Nations resolutions on the desirability of a brave new world we are never told at all precisely how this higher level of economic co-operation is to be achieved. This economist's *tour d'horizon* of the state of the system is concise and comprehensive but at the end we are not much wiser than we were before.

London School of Economics SUSAN STRANGE

Technology and International Relations. By John V. Granger. *San Francisco, Calif: Freeman. 1979. 202 pp. £9·50. Pb: £3·80.*

Mobilizing Technology for World Development. By Jairam Ramesh and Charles Weiss. *New York: Praeger for the International Institute for Environment and Development and the Overseas Development Council. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 234 pp. £14·50.*

THESE two books both address a subject of enormous contemporary importance, but unfortunately neither of them does much to increase our understanding of it. Both of them represent the optimist school of thought in relation to technology, and are essentially liberal in their economic and political perspective. Neither pretends to offer either deep research or new analysis, and in different ways, this makes both of them less interesting and less useful than they otherwise might have been.

The Granger volume appears to have been designed for use as a textbook. It takes a 'primer' type of approach, which makes it clearly organised and easy to read, and it tries to say something about all aspects of its subject rather than concentrating on particular problems. There are chapters on the nature of technology; on policy sectors and processes relevant to technology; on technology in relation to economic activity, national security and development; on national and international institutions

concerned with technology; and on energy and resource problems. Nearly all of these are written from a rather narrow, American-centered perspective which not only belies the title, but also limits the utility of much that is said. This weakness is compounded by the liberal-technocratic perspective of the author, which leads him to make a descriptive rather than a critical survey of his subject. For both these reasons, the book's utility as an introductory text is limited.

A more serious flaw, however, is the superficiality of coverage necessitated by the book's broad scope. The author appears to be writing to an audience that knows little about *either* technology *or* international relations, and it is not obvious to me that such an audience exists. A much greater need could have been met by a book that introduced technology to those already familiar with international relations, or perhaps one that introduced international relations to those familiar with technology. As it is, anybody moderately familiar with either will find his strong area greatly oversimplified and his weak area insufficiently explored. Although the chapters on Development and National Security are quite good, in general the author fails to explore the social dynamics of technology sufficiently. The issue of technology is left too entangled with other issues and problems for its unique character to emerge clearly from these pages. In the end, the reader is left with little systematic insight into the significance of technology as a factor in international relations, beyond that which comes from the separate study of problems such as resources, development, national security, trade, and international co-operation.

Mobilising Technology for World Development is quite different in intent. Whereas Granger was seeking to inform, Ramesh and Weiss are bent on persuading. The book is the collected papers from the Jamaica Symposium on 'Mobilising Technology for World Development' organised by the IIED and held in January 1979. The Symposium was aimed at finding common ground between the interests of North and South that are normally viewed in an excessively polarised perspective. To a considerable extent it did find such ground, and this is interestingly presented in the report of the Symposium. The view is taken that the existing system is not working particularly well for either side, and that although genuine differences exist, there are many areas where interests overlap and where agreement on joint action might be mutually beneficial. The main burden of the book is a plea for action to be concentrated in these areas.

The problem with the book, as with many collections of conference papers, is that it is neither coherent enough nor deeply enough researched to move much beyond the hortatory level. The bulk of the text consists of eighteen short chapters which cover a wide range of issues and cases. Chapters One to Three constitute a fairly good, brief survey of the standard problems at the heart of development studies. Chapters Four to Seven raise some of the issues surrounding the role of multinational companies, but do not amount to a coherent treatment of the subject. The remaining eleven chapters are mostly short case studies looking at particular technology developments in South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, and Malaysia, and at particular problems arising in the areas of mineral resources, food, energy, microbiology, and environmental management. These chapters are not academic studies in the normal sense of that usage, but briefing reports, often given by practioners involved in the activity reported. They make few arguments and present little systematic evidence, and consequently little can be learned from them. They make entertaining, if rather repetitive, reading, but do not in total lead the reader anywhere. There is a collective impression of political naïvety, as if the mere act of pointing out the inadequacies of the existing system, and presenting the loose outline of a more sensible arrangement, will in itself prove sufficient to stimulate the transition from the one to the other. Too much emphasis is placed on the easy task of suggesting *what* should be done, and far too little effort is devoted to cracking the much harder nut of *how* suggested policies might be implemented.

One has, I think, to question the wisdom of publishing more-or-less raw conference proceedings in this way, especially in the guise of a high-priced, specialist monograph. Good conferences do not necessarily make good books. Conference-goers will mostly confirm the experience that the most valuable part of a conference is usually the discussion amongst the participants and not the papers presented. In this case, there seems little to be gained from all these short chapters. A more interesting approach would have been to use the report of the Symposium as a starting-point for a more systematic and deeper piece of research by a smaller group of authors.

University of Warwick BARRY BUZAN

Jews and the Left. By Arthur Liebman. *New York: Wiley. 1979. 676 pp. £11·00.*

THIS book examines the rise and fall of American Jewry's love-affair with the Left. It traces the roots of this liaison in the original confrontation of Russian Jewry with capitalism which, according to Liebman, transformed the mass of Russian Jewry into proletarians, or threatened to do so. These people, when they emigrated to America, as they increasingly did from the 1880s onwards, brought their socialism with them. Probably a quarter of the book deals with this Russian background. There is some degree of simplification here in that Liebman probably does less than justice to the various Zionist allegiances of Russian Jewry and presents Zionism purely in its role as opposition to the Marxist Bund. The pattern of left-wing Jewish political activity in Tsarist Russia, as shown for example in Brym's *The Jewish Intelligentsia and Russian Marxism* (Macmillan, 1978) is more complicated than Liebman allows. Moreover, to speak of capitalism in Russia begs a lot of questions. Not only is it barely meaningful to put Russian and American capitalism within the same framework but there is a tendency in this early part of the book to overlook the role of popular antisemitism as a factor in the deterioration of the Jews' economic position. This one-sided quasi-identification of capitalism as *the* major factor determining the fate of the Jews in both Russia and America leads Liebman into an interesting contradiction. The 'theoretical overview' declares (p. 32): 'the Jewish confrontation with American capitalism and American society was not as harsh as it had been in Russia, but I contend that the forms and pattern of this confrontation in the New World were not all that dissimilar from those of the Old.' The 'summary and conclusion' speaks a different language (p. 591): 'American capitalists were not as efficient, thorough and mean in their dealings with Jews as were their counterparts in Eastern Europe. Here, capitalism left more doors and mobility routes open than in Russia . . . Quickly after their arrival, many Jews did experience an income, occupational and geographical mobility at a level and at a pace unheard of in Russia.' The author at least has learned something from his book. The theoretical confusion is further compounded in the few pages that Liebman devotes to the Anglo-Jewish immigrants from Russia. Whereas in America or Russia, the leftward propulsion is applied by capitalism, in England the capitalist factor is so weak that it can apparently be neutralised, in part at least, by, of all things, religion and the English rabbinate (p. 161): 'Jewish radicals in England were not able to attain as strong and as enduring a leadership over their East European immigrant co-religionists as did their counterparts in America. One of the reasons for this centered on the rabbinate.'

For all that, this book is extremely valuable as a broad yet succinct account of the socio-economic conditions propelling the Jews of the Pale of Settlement leftwards and westwards. The full value emerges when Liebman confronts the American situation. Here Liebman shows that the Yiddish-leftist culture of the Pale flourished in New York and other major cities as never before—through trade unions, workers' clubs, political parties, the press, *landsmannschaften*, etc. The major theme from then on—

and it is indeed richly documented—is the gradual dissolution of the leftward association in the face of Jewish embourgeoisement, the Nazi murders, in Europe and the pull of Zionism and Israel. Undeterred however, by the evidence of specific Jewish concerns, Liebman anticipates a revival of Jewish interest in socialism based on 'the ongoing deterioration of the economic and political position of the American Jewish community in the context of a society rent by ethnic and class divisions' (p. 611). Maybe yes, maybe no. But it would be unfortunate if the theoretical confusion and the prophetic mantle were to conceal Liebman's searching analysis of what has at least been a significant aspect of the Jewish experience in America.

University of Warwick LIONEL KOCHAN

Aspects of Development and Underdevelopment. By Joan Robinson. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979. 146 pp. £7·95. Pb: £2·50.*

Theories of Underdevelopment. By Ian Roxborough. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 175 pp. £10·00. Pb: £3·95.*

Two Essays on Underdevelopment (From Modernisation to Underdevelopment; Colonial Economies in Africa). By A. G. Hopkins. *Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes. Internationales. 1979. 65 pp. (International Studies on Contemporary Africa Series, No. I.) Pb.*

EACH of these three studies is concerned to a greater or lesser degree with theoretical aspects of the study of the Third World. All three are critical of the lines of enquiry so far pursued and attempt to clear up misleading conceptions relating to the development process. Dr Roxborough points out that social science showed little interest in Third World societies until after the Second World War, and that sociologists then followed economists in believing that development would follow the same lines as in West European nations in moving from the traditional to the modern stage. The best known example of this, W. W. Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth: A non-Communist Manifesto* (1960) saw the transition taking place in five stages, modelled on the British industrial revolution. The need to stimulate the appearance of an entrepreneurial elite had appeared as 'the lesson to be learnt from Western experience and to be mechanically applied to the rest of the world so that they can repeat the transition' (p. 16). The emphasis on capital accumulation has not been confined to sociologists as Joan Robinson makes clear in her book in the chapter on 'Surplus and Accumulation' (pp. 18–40). Dr Hopkins covers some of the same ground in the first of his essays, 'From Modernisation to Underdevelopment', and deplores the weakness of modernisation theory 'its scientific pretensions, its conceptional vagueness, and its adoption of impressive pseudo-technical jargon to disguise weaknesses which would be laid bare were simpler language to be used' (p. 13).

In *Aspects of Development and Underdevelopment* Joan Robinson makes a cogent attack on complacency in mainstream economic teaching especially as applied to the Third World. The main part of the book contains a critical analysis of the Classical and Marxian theories of accumulation, distribution and trade. This is illustrated by examples, taken from the recent past, of the inadequacies of theoretical analysis when applied to the Third World. The final chapter, 'What Now'? puts forward a number of conclusions. The first necessity for Third-World development is 'to increase production of basic foodstuffs' (p. 132). But however the organisational problems of agricultural production are solved the problem of relations between agriculture and the rest of the economy remains. This involves deciding how the agricultural surplus will contribute to the general overhead of the economy; determining the terms of trade between the farming sector and the rest; and dividing the produce of agriculture

between exports and home consumption. In the attack on mass poverty the Third-World countries are urged to define the living standards they can afford, concentrate expenditure on public services, and eliminate imports of Western style luxury goods. This means sheltering behind a 'poverty curtain' and making use 'of their own potential productive resources to meet their own basic needs' (p. 142).

Dr Roxborough draws mainly on Latin American experience in his exposition of contending development theories. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) proposed policies for industrialisation by import substitution, based on protection for domestic industries, manipulation of exchange rates and measures to broaden the internal market. This strategy meant 'an alliance of nearly all social classes against the landed oligarchy' (p. 30), an analysis similar to that advanced by the communists. Dr Roxborough argues that 'two sets of contradictions and two sets of struggles' (p. 159) are involved. These are the struggle against dependency and for liberation from dependence, and the class struggle. In Cuba after the revolution foreign trade was reorientated, and state intervention used to implement policies of economic growth and social justice. In other countries, notably Bolivia and Brazil, dependence on international trade has continued. For Chile, Brazil and Argentina, the author concludes that the choice is between 'socialism or barbarism' (p. 162). The smaller more backward states are faced with 'a more complex array of choices' (p. 162).

The first of Dr Hopkins two essays, 'From Modernisation to Under-development', traces Western thinking on development problems in the past twenty-five years and decides that 'the fact that diagnoses of under-development are dominated by Western intellectual traditions should make us "proffer advice with caution" ' (p. 40). In the second essay, 'Colonial Economies in Africa", which surveys the nature of the European colonial presence in colonial Africa, Dr Hopkins underlines the gaps in information and the reasons for them—that trade figures, for example, relate almost exclusively to the overseas sector. He describes the distinctive features of colonies of settlement and those where expatriate enterprise was restricted to commerce and trade. He neither condemns nor approves the presence of the colonial powers in Africa, and ends his interesting survey with the modest declaration that 'one of the main dangers of scholarly surveys is that they are liable to confuse what is known with knowledge. What is unknown is easily bypassed, without comment, despite its potential significance' (p. 65).

RICHARD BAILEY

World Population and Development: Challenges and Prospects. Edited by Philip M. Hauser. *New York: Syracuse University Press for the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). 1979. 683 pp. Pb: $9.95.*

THE relationships between population and development are not only a matter of great significance to mankind; they are also of considerable contentiousness among politicians, economists, sociologists, demographers and many others. Yet curiously the topic has not been the sole subject of many major texts, despite the innumerable books devoted to either population or development as separate issues. Nevertheless, it has become of great concern to national governments and to international agencies, among which UNFPA is now the most important though it was established as recently as 1969. Indeed, this volume is intended to celebrate the end of the first decade of UNFPA's activities—to take stock of them and to improve their impact. Accordingly, the Director, Rafael Salas, 'invited a number of prominent scholars to review the status of the population and development problems with which the Fund is concerned'. Their seventeen chapters are arranged and organised by a very experienced editor, Philip Hauser, who has edited and co-edited a number of highly

significant books in the fields of population and urbanisation. In range and importance this volume deserves to stand comparison with a previous survey edited by Hauser and O. D. Duncan, *The Study of Population: An Inventory and Appraisal* (Chicago, 1959), and it has the advantage over most comparable volumes in having a low published price, through sponsorship by UNFPA.

It is an up-to-date overall survey of most general aspects of population and development, each chapter reviewing the current problems, positions and literature in the context of a world comprising 'haves' and 'have-nots'. The questions and challenges are large. Chapters tackle different themes: theories of fertility decline; an evolutionary perspective of population; resource consequences of population and economic growth; food and world population; interrelations between health, population and nutrition; reproduction and fertility regulation; demography and development in the 1980s; the Japanese experience; population quality; its relationship with education; population redistribution; the role of women; human rights aspects of population programmes; guidance for population policies and programmes and development policies; management of national population programmes; and organisational issues in international population assistance. Inevitably the chapters vary in freshness; some themes have a rather jaded look, while others have only recently appeared on the scene. The reviewer found most interesting the chapters on demography and development in the 1980s, the quality of population and education (but why so little on population education?), the role of women and the human rights aspects. But there is something here for all serious students of population and development.

On the other hand, the volume is surprising in some ways. One is that the authorship of a book sponsored by UNFPA should be so preponderantly American, with little more than a token representation from LDCs, one Finn, and one Briton—Mark Blaug—on education. France, one of the world's leading countries in population studies, does not even appear in the index, and major donors to UNFPA like the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Canada are scarcely mentioned. One consequence is that references to francophone territories in Africa, for example, are few. The whole approach is distinctly American, and one wonders how this will influence its acceptability.

Another surprise is how the macro-orientation, the aggregate overview, is sustained for so long. The book is almost supranational; only in a few chapters, like those on population redistribution and on population quality and education, are countries and projects mentioned frequently. In some ways it looks as if it was written primarily for the officials of UNFPA themselves, but it will serve as a most valuable 'state-of-the-art' for all serious students of the problems of population and development.

University of Durham JOHN I. CLARKE

LAW

Cases and Materials on International Law. 2nd edn. By D, J. Harris. *London: Sweet and Maxwell. 1979. 829 pp. £17·00. Pb: £13·50.*

DR HARRIS, a Senior Lecturer in the University of Nottingham, wrote the first edition of this work in 1973 and has updated this new edition to June, 1978. Many and important developments in international law have taken place in the five years between these two editions. He has encountered and, in large part, mastered the serious difficulties that confront all writers in this huge field of law: new developments in the subject tending to distort and devalue much of their work almost as soon as it is written. This is particularly true of 'cases and materials' books such as the one under

review. Dr Haris has, nevertheless, contrived to minimise the impact of 'the march of international events' upon the relevance, accuracy, and balance of the 'materials' which he has chosen to include in this edition.

In choosing his rubrics Dr Harris has been orthodox. This gives his work an added value because thereby he makes it complementary to the leading monographs on the subject. Accordingly, his arrangement takes the following pattern: The Sources of International Law; International Law and Municipal Law; Personality; Territory; State Jurisdiction; The Law of the Sea; State Responsibility; Human Rights; The Law of Treaties; The Use of Force by States; Arbitration and Judicial Settlement of Disputes. The materials he selects reflect the main sources of international law: namely, judicial decisions, treaties, the writings of jurists and General Assembly resolutions. He also includes a miscellany of documentary materials necessary to describe international events pertinent to the legal materials. Throughout the book he is scrupulous in maintaining a balance between the views he cites. That in itself is no easy task and he has done it with skill and detachment. He has made it his task to 'expose' and not to 'plead' a particular position. In order to stimulate and hold the interest of the reader he inserts, normally at the end of his materials on any particular topic, his own 'Notes' which formulate specific legal questions directed to the uncertainties implicit in those materials. He does not attempt to answer his own questions. These are so framed that the reader finds himself compelled, at natural break points, to measure and test his understanding of what he has read.

The three subjects which receive more extended treatment than the others are: (i) Treaties (74 pages); (ii) Human Rights (76 pages); and (iii) The Law of the Sea (80 pages). These allocations are probably an accurate estimate of their importance in contemporary International Law. Dr Harris's extended treatment of Human Rights is justified, not least by the contributions his own writings have made to this fast-growing subject. Under this topic he has included the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremburg (pp. 575-81). This judgment embraced crimes against peace, war crimes in the sense of violations of the law of war, and crimes against humanity. The first two categories of international criminality might fall more properly under 'The Use of Force by States' (pp. 662-89), whilst crimes against humanity may properly be seen as an early appearance of Human Rights before the Charter of the United Nations. He displays a certain hesitancy in his treatment of 'reprisals' (pp. 10-11, and 667-70). The materials he cites do not bring out as clearly as they might the distinction between belligerent and pacific reprisals, and that between reprisals in *jus ad bellum* and in *jus in bello*. Recent developments limiting the lawful resort to reprisals in the law of armed conflict (*jus in bello*), to be found in Protocol 1 additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, are not mentioned. This instrument was signed in December, 1977. It is more than likely that Dr Harris decided to exclude the law of armed conflict, and probably for good reasons. However, it may perhaps be pointed out that the General Assembly has consistently treated the important new developments in the law of armed conflict under the title of 'Human Rights in Armed Conflict'.

Without doubt this collection of 'materials' will be an invaluable and a necessary part of the working 'literature' of the student of international law. Dr Harris's selection is good and the arrangement is both coherent and convincing. It combines an up-to-date exposé of 'cases and materials' with a high degree of detachment which is refreshing and scholarly. It is with confidence that this book can be recommended to teachers, practitioners and students and to all who wish to gain an accurate and informed conspectus of international law as it stands at the present time.

G. I. A. D. DRAPER

International Law in Historical Perspective. Vol. IX, Part IX-A: The Laws of War. By J. H. W. Verzijl. *Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff. 1978. 547 pp. (Institute for International Law University of Utrecht, Series A, Modern International Law No. 13.) Fl. 140.00 $64.00.*

THIS formidable work forms part of Professor Verzijl's great legal marathon which he introduced to the world of scholarship in 1968. He has found that the unwieldy size of his volume VIII (Inter-State Disputes and Their Settlement) has compelled him to depart from his original design. He has decided to split up his original Part IX, as he had planned it, and to spread the content of that Part over three volumes: namely, IX, X and XI. The volume under review, includes Part IX-A of his original plan and deals with the laws of war; volume X, will contain Part IX-B, as originally planned, and will treat of the law of neutrality; and volume XI will embrace the content of the original Part IX-C—dealing with maritime prize law. The reason for this change of editorial planning is readily understandable. The sheer bulk of the source material on the laws of war, neutrality, and maritime prize which lies athwart the other two subjects—rendered it impracticable to be included in one volume.

The history of the subject of itself presents major difficulties for the writer whose aim is scholarly comprehensiveness. At one time the law of war formed the greater part of the content of 'the law of nations'. It claimed a paramountcy in size and importance that can be detected in the title of Grotius's great classic *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* of 1624-25. In the enormous expansion of the law of peace in the twentieth century it is all too easy to overlook the considerable terrain of the law of war. Recent developments in the making of new law governing armed conflicts have done nothing to reduce this terrain. Professor Verzilj's work does much to remedy any such oversight. The sheer magnitude of the source material which he has managed to include within the space of 547 pages is remarkable, and even then he has been compelled to make massive rejections.

The arrangement of this volume consists of eight chapters, with a short excursus on 'Civil War' (pp. 485-516), a somewhat dated title. The Chapter titles are: General Subjects; The Opening of Hostilities; Land Warfare; Naval Warfare; Warfare in or from other Areas; Humanitarian Laws of War; Novel Weapons, Partly of Mass Destruction; The Trial of War Criminals; The Termination of Hostilities. The third chapter, on Land Warfare, contains an extensive Annex devoted to the case law of enemy occupation of which nearly a hundred pages deal with the case law of enemy occupation during the Second World War (pp. 197-289). The case law he cites is but a fragment of the case law on that topic which the serious student of the law of war must absorb to become at home in it. This is not surprising if one recalls that the German occupation regime extended from the French shores of the Atlantic to regions of the Northern Caucasus, almost to the edge of the Grozny oilfield. The result, after 1945, was a crop of municipal court decisions in the countries that had been subjected to that regime—not least in the Netherlands.

Professor Verzijl's experience of the law and practice of war criminality at the end of the Second World War has given him a singular vantage point from which to assess the impact of the many decisions in this area of the law of war which deals with its own enforcement by the penal process against the individual. Chapter VIII, 'The Trial of War Criminals', can be recommended as particularly rewarding reading for the student of international penal law.

This book cannot be described as easy reading for the initiate in this difficult subject of the law of war. For the advanced student and for the practitioner, seeking a reliable compilation of source material on most aspects of the law of war, it will be invaluable. On occasions the arrangement is hard to follow. In his endeavour to place so much material in one volume, there has at times been an intensity of condensation which

tends to distort or to leave much that needs further explanation. Such is the price of the method he has adopted.

One senses that he is not entirely at home in his assessment of the achievements, and failures, of the Diplomatic Conference held at Geneva from 1974–77 which established the texts of the two Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, now referred to, compendiously, as 'The Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts'. It would not be sound to envisage the four years of the Conference 'as four years of struggle' (Foreword, p. v). It is true that the sharp cleavage in 1974, the first session, over the inclusion or rejection of 'wars of national liberation' within the ambit of Protocol 1 as international armed conflict, nigh on wrecked that session. By way of contrast the following three sessions, 1975–77, were comparatively calm and much sober law-making was achieved. There was a silent consensus in these three latter sessions to avoid the topic which had almost wrecked the first one. Also, the subject of the law of the use of nuclear weaponry was not mentioned. Had that not been the case, it is open to argument whether the Conference would have proceeded to a positive conclusion. Perhaps Professor Verzilj has not made an adequate assessment of the effects of these two new instruments of law upon the existing law. In that he shared a failing with the participants at the Conference. A full legal analysis and exposition of that impact yet awaits the attention of scholars.

All in all, this is a remarkable work, worth the hard reading demanded. It is a substantial and unique contribution to a subject which this generation will neglect at its peril. It will form part of the scholarly heritage of our age and has enriched the literature of 'the law of nations'.

University of Sussex G. I. A. D. DRAPER

HISTORY

Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement. By Ann Mosely Lesch. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1979. 257 pp. £10·50.*

IN the early days of the Mandate Zionist propagandists contended that their movement posed no threat to the Palestinian inhabitants of Eretz Israel. On the contrary, these would benefit largely from the influx of Jewish skills and capital. For their part the British maintained that their National Home policy would not mean the subordination of Arabs to Jews. Both communities would share equally in the benefits of British rule, which, Winston Churchill prophesied in 1921, would last for several generations. In Europe, if not in America, colonialism was then accepted as part of the natural order, so few questions were raised about the effects of the National Home on the rights of the native inhabitants. The protests and arguments of the natives themselves went unheeded unless they were accompanied by violence. Then, its authors were condemned as savages. So, when one generation proved long enough to bring British rule to an end, to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, and to drive three-quarters-of-a-million Palestinians into destitute exile, the ruling reaction in the Western world was to blame the Palestinians as the authors of their own misfortunes: a barbarous and backward people, led at first by quarrelsome and self-seeking landlords, and later by gangsters whose aims were wholly destructive—a people unworthy of nationhood. It has taken another generation for this false stereotype to crumble at the edges, and this book is another contribution to history's task of destroying the false images built on worn-out propaganda.

Ann Lesch has provided a concise and dispassionate account of the Palestinian national movement's fruitless attempts to persuade the British to abandon or modify

the National Home policy. Part I describes the political and socio-economic conditions prevailing in Palestine in the twilight of the Ottoman Empire, and the changes brought about by Zionist immigration and British rule. Part II traces the fortunes of the national movement through the 1920s and 1930s, when younger activists drawn from a wider social background began to challenge the leadership of the landed notability. Part III describes the varied methods used by the movement—appeals to Arab and Muslim solidarity; diplomacy at the League of Nations and in London; negotiations for a legislative council; and finally the political use of violence.

She points out the immense difficulties under which the movement laboured. The disposal of Palestine had been agreed in principle between the British government and the Zionist Organisation in 1917. The Balfour Declaration had been signed before the British armies reached Jerusalem. No one had consulted the Palestinians. In 1920, when the civil government was set up, the authorities refused to recognise their representatives unless they recognised the policy:

> Arab politicians faced an impossible dilemma: if they gained British recognition by supporting the Mandate, they would lose their popular backing and their status as leaders of the Arab community (p. 81).

The author has to conclude that it was impossible for the movement to achieve its goals in the interwar years because:

> the balance of force between the indigenous movement and the settlers, the strategic requirements of the ruling power, and the international attitude to colonialism . . . coalesced to the detriment of the Arab community in Palestine (p. 232).

J. C. B. RICHMOND

The Royal Navy and the Siege of Bilbao. By James Cable. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979. 219 pp. £7·95.*

WHEN France proposed the adoption of 'Non-Intervention' in the terrible Spanish civil war in August 1936 it was quickly adopted by the other powers because it expressed the desire and feelings of most of their people; but it soon proved to be what Sir James Cable finally describes as 'an internationally unattainable objective' (p. 173). However, by the end of 1937 the Royal Navy, which had come to be regarded as 'the honest broker of human lives and liberty' (p. 38), had carried 17,000 Spaniards to safety in its warships.

In March 1937 the Nationalists, having suffered a check before Madrid, switched their main effort to the destruction of the independent Basque Republic in the north, and the situation at once became far more tricky because Franco gave warning of his intention to interfere with British merchant ships trying to enter the great port of Bilbao. Confrontations were now inevitable.

Though the blockade of Bilbao was at first, and quite reasonably, reported by the British senior officer as 'effective'—and so legal—the hollowness of what that brilliant, if prejudiced, *Times* reporter G, L. Steer called 'the fake blockade' was soon exposed, and on April 23 (St George's Day) three British merchant ships got into the port—thanks to the presence of the famous but ill-fated battle cruiser *Hood.* Sir James gives warm praise to 'the courage, coolness, foresight and tact' of Admiral Blake on that occasion, and of other naval officers before and after him (p. 186); but the incident showed only too clearly that from the British point of view non-intervention was 'the merest hypocrisy'—because Britain was bound to help one side or the other.

If the sailors on the spot invariably acted with judicious firmness the Admiralty, and

especially the First Lord, Sir Samuel Hoare, come in for some sharp criticism—notably over the description of the *Espana* (of 1912 vintage) as 'a new battleship' in order to boost the Nationalists' naval strength on paper. On April 26 the bombing of Guernica, so brilliantly reported by Steer, shocked the civilised world, and Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, promised in consequence that the United Kingdom would give protection to refugee ships sailing to Britain or France. The pledge was fully carried out, and among others 4,000 children were brought to England—with results which Sir James finds far from fully satisfying.

Bilbao fell on June 19 and Sir James gives a perceptive, sensitive account of the harrowing events which followed. By the end of the campaign 100,000 refugees had escaped to France, the great majority of them under Royal Navy protection; and such was the prestige of the service that even Stalin asked in August whether it could protect a refugee ship sailing from Gijon. If it was a poor rehearsal for war, and delayed the rearmament programme—to the anxiety of Admiral Chatfield the First Sea Lord—the navy's morale certainly did not suffer by these taxing operations.

Sir James's chief heroes are perhaps Ralph Stevenson, the British consul at Bilbao, and his ever-faithful Spanish assistant Ojanguren. If one could have done with less of Sir James's personal grudge about the Foreign Office's treatment of consular officers as unfit to conduct diplomacy (pp. 81–82 and 202–203)—and he sometimes gets naval arcana wrong, for example, the Home Fleet was not 'stationed at Portsmouth' in the 1930s (p. 20)—everyone who has worked in the Admiralty's records will applaud his castigation of that department's treatment of its records with 'a wanton hand' whereby much invaluable historical material is lost for ever.

Churchill College, Cambridge STEPHEN ROSKILL

German Rearmament and the West, 1932–1933. By Edward W. Bennett. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1979. 569 pp. £22·00.*

DR BENNETT, who has already written a study of Germany and the diplomacy of the Financial Crisis of 1931 now moves forward with a comprehensive and stimulating analysis of the period just before and just after Hitler came to power. It is an ambitious book because it seeks simultaneously to uncover the pattern of German rearmament and to examine the reactions to it in Britain, France and the United States. To this end, a wide range of published and unpublished sources have been carefully used. The general thesis is controversial but it is convincingly argued. Historians have long debated whether Hitler's accession represented a radical break with Germany's past. Dr Bennett does not consider all the aspects of this problem but his careful analysis of the political implications of the *Reichswehr* plans—his starting-point—suggests that, in the military sphere at least, there is greater overlap and continuity than has sometimes been allowed. He argues that previous writers have been misled by the fact that the number of men serving in the army proper did not, in 1932, exceed the treaty limits. The 100,000-man army constituted only the core of the force that German planners intended to put into the field in case of war. There were, in addition, secret stocks of arms, a secret *Landesschutz*, secret ties with the *Wehrverbände* and a framework for a *Crenzschutz*. There were also plans for the peacetime training of reserves within the army. Totalitarian control of the whole society was not far away. The task before the German planners was not impossible 'but it would lead to a kind of regime that neither Scharnhorst nor Roon had ever dreamed of' (p. 77). The author then considers the perceptions and preoccupations of Britain, France and the United States. He recognises, in the case of Britain, that 'it was always easy to find reasons, even good reasons, for standing aside' and the broad problem was one of the willingness to face a 'hard, unpleasant reality' (p. 130). Further chapters consider

developments inside Germany and the reactions of the powers. Although the discussion is detailed, the propositions are advanced clearly. A good balance is held between careful factual analysis, for example in the scrutiny of Brüning's *Memoirs*, and the more general considerations surrounding disarmament. Bennett concludes by suggesting that the only element of truth in the general contemporary belief that the Germans wanted the disarmament of others for the sake of their own security was that most ordinary Germans did not want another war. However, the German elite did not accept defeat. German military leaders, especially, sought to restore the nation's military strength as a means of revising the peace settlement. German generals sought to retain the capacity for large-scale mobilisation and to take advantage of each successive removal of control to this end. They hoped likewise to take advantage of the Disarmament Conference. Most importantly, the *Reichswehr* needed to train new reserves, while concealing such preparations from other governments. On military grounds, army spokesmen intervened in the German political structure and so undermined constitutional government that they made it impossible to govern the country against Nazi opposition. The military leaders did not want Hitler to have exclusive power, but they underestimated their man. For the first ten months of Hitler's rule, in any case, military policy followed the course already charted under Schleicher. Dr Bennett concludes that 'more than anything else' it was British and American indifference to, or even revulsion from, the balance of power that permitted German rearmament. In 1932 and 1933 the British and the Americans should have done better with the intelligence which was at their disposal. They failed to understand German culture, social structure and history. Although such criticisms are rather general, they do not alter the fact that the author has made a thoughtful contribution to a topic of lasting importance.

University of Glasgow KEITH ROBBINS

Exploding Star: A Young Austrian Against Hitler. By Fritz Molden. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1978. 280 pp. £8·50.*
Mellom Frontene. By Arvid Brodersen. *Oslo: Cappelens Forlag. 1979. 187 pp.*

HERE are two memoirs, by protagonists of distinction in their own countries (and further afield), that differ in kind but both contain material of interest to the historian of war-time occupation and resistance.

Fritz Molden, son of a former editor of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* and of the writer Paula Preradovic (the English title refers to one of her poems), now heads the publishing house of his name; and with his brother Otto is also active in the Oesterreichisches College which runs the annual European Forum at Alpbach. His book essentially covers the period from 1934 (Dolfuss's murder) to Austria's liberation in 1945, during which he operated in various countries, finally as an agent of Allen Dulles and the OSS. It sheds light on a number of matters still not too-well documented (in English anyhow), for example, as regards the two bodies '05' and POEN: respectively the military and the political arms of the official Austrian resistance organisation, that engaged Allied attention in the closing stages of the war. The author's graphic narrative indicates that the information he passed, and the contacts he maintained, at no small personal risk, were of undoubted value, even if the prime aim of all this activity—to enable a resistance authority to take over in Vienna—was frustrated by the fact that the Red Army got there first, and the Renner government established under its auspices owed little to the resistance movement as such. (The Tyrolean resistance, led by Karl Gruber who was duly to become Foreign Minister and to whom Molden acted for a time as assistant, did however assume control in Innsbruck shortly before the arrival of American forces.)

In fact, of course, political and geographical circumstances were to militate against any major resistance effort in Austria, what with the country being an integral part of the Reich since 1938 and its manhood automatically conscripted into the German armed forces—to say nothing of the high incidence of Nazism there—although if the mooted last stand in an Alpine 'redoubt' had materialised, an underground movement could have proved a more significant factor.

From this point of view Norway presents quite another picture. Arvid Brodersen, an academic well-known also in Germany and America, was a leading member of the Home Front, where he acted as contact-man with the German resistance, primarily through Theodor Steltzer, a major in the Wehrmacht stationed at Oslo, who was in close and regular touch with Haushofer, Goerdeler, von Moltke, Bonnhoefer and others in Germany itself (and who was happily to escape the fate of most of his colleagues, through the intervention of Himmler's masseur Felix Kersten). While the section of the book (pp. 77–100) dealing specifically with this group is likely to be of main interest to a foreign reader, and does add a distinctive dimension to the whole of that story, Professor Brodersen tends naturally enough to concentrate on the local objectives of the exercise, such as the rescue of Norwegian prisoners, and the possible 'freezing' of surrendered German occupation forces, or their internment in Sweden (much of the action takes place in Stockholm). If some of these projects were likewise to be by-passed in the event, it is worth having it all on record. Indeed, Professor Brodersen's short and self-effacing (though apparently, in Norway, controversial) account could merit an English edition of the work, perhaps somewhat amplified or otherwise recast—and with an index.

MICHAEL F. CULLIS

The Chindit War: The Campaign in Burma 1944. By Shelford Bidwell. *London, Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton. 1979. 304 pp. £6·95.*

TWO illusions influenced the events of the Second World War in South-east Asia. Roosevelt believed that if sufficient help could be sent by land to Chiang Kai Shek he would drive out the Japanese and make China a second United States: liberal, progressive, and democratic. Churchill thought that after the war the British Empire would go on as before. In 1943, the two illusions converged on Burma and appeared to suggest a community of purpose. But to recover Burma and establish a land route to China involved pouring an immense volume of stores that were in short supply into the Indian sub-continent, which was physically, economically and politically unfit to be used as a base. India said it would take a year to prepare the offensive and was charged with a lack of aggressive spirit, though in the event its analysis proved right. It was during this interlude—so damaging to public morale and made more abrasive by the fact that neither British nor Americans believed in the illusion of the other—that Orde Wingate appeared to Churchill, the Americans and himself to have been sent from heaven.

He had been used by Wavell in Abyssinia as a guerrilla leader behind the enemy lines and his first mission into Burma in 1943 was purely as a guerrilla. He had seven columns at a strength of about 400 men each and their mission was to cut communications, destroy stores, and to show that the British could fight in the jungle. He was successful in all these aims and it would be hard to overestimate the value of the irruption for the morale of the armed forces and of British-American relations. But by 1944 he had the ear of Churchill, always sympathetic to the 'way round' in war, and of the American Chiefs of Staff who saw in him an Englishman who wanted to fight *now*. He had by this time built up a doctrine, almost a religion, called LRP or Long Range Penetration, which pictured forces, much larger than guerrilla bands,

flown in behind the enemy lines and supplied by air, who would establish fortresses which would attract disproportionately larger bodies of the enemy. By methods that were often unscrupulous, Wingate succeeded in obtaining for his LRP operations over 12,000 picked troops and an immense air effort. In view of the high wastage from disease and exhaustion as compared with enemy action, it can be argued that smaller forces with purely guerrilla aims would have achieved almost as much while the resources saved could have been employed more usefully in Slim's great battle of Kohima-Imphal.

Brigadier Bidwell has written a lively and colourful account of these controversial operations. He is strong on personalities and shrewd, sometimes indeed scathing, though fair, in his criticism of commanders. The general reader needs a good memory to pick his way through the movements of columns referred to sometimes by numbers, sometimes by commanders and sometimes by code-names, but a picture does emerge of what it was like to be pushed to such limits of courage and physical endurance of thirst, hunger and disease. He is brilliant on 'Vinegar Joe' Stilwell, 'his capricious favouritism, his aversion from any clear-cut line of responsibility, his dislike of paper-work or precision of any kind, his secretiveness' (p. 91), not to mention his hates, particularly of his superior Chiang Kai Shek and his allies, 'the limeys'. 'It is unnatural to hate so much' (p. 253) writes Brigadier Bidwell. And he is equally good on Wingate and his alternation between the 'guerrilla' and the 'fortress' concepts.

This will be an invaluable book for any one who wants to study the campaign. Even those who think Wingate ought to have been restricted to a purely guerrilla role will recognise his powers of leadership and the heroism he inspired. Survivors must feel as though they had been the first up Everest or fetched a penguin's egg from the South Pole in the Antarctic winter.

PHILIP MASON

WESTERN EUROPE

A Continent Astray: Europe, 1970-1978. By Walter Laqueur. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1979. 293 pp. £7·50.*

DISTANCE in this case has evidently not lent enchantment (Walter Laqueur writes from Washington D.C.); but it has afforded a valuable perspective. Stresses and strains within West European societies may be disregarded by most of their citizens without apparent peril, but seen from across the Atlantic they can readily be viewed as portents of decline, even of impending disaster. To the author, Europe of the 1970s presents a melancholic picture of fragmentation, internal squabbles, and aimlessness (p. 6). The European Community economies may have survived the economic turbulence of the 1970s relatively successfully, but the possibilities of *sauve-qui-peut* panic under pressure remains, and the English 'disease' not only seems endemic in that country but likely to prove infectious. It was in the political realm that the main weaknesses lay; and the basic problem was not the intractability of the issues but the absence of the qualities needed to confront them. 'There was no strong leadership: European governments were headed more often than not by mediocrities, pragmatic politicians lacking strong character, firm beliefs, and on the whole, superior intellect' (p. 57). Shades of Willy Brandt, Helmutt Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing!

The analysis of Eurocommunism, Eurosocialism, and Euronationalism are, as one would expect of the author, highly informed and searching. That on detente in Europe usefully exposes the often very differing interpretations of Western and Soviet leaders, some of the former looking initially to 'generations of peace', the latter stressing the

continuance of the political and ideological struggle and of economic competition between the two systems. The chapter on Finlandisation well illustrates the tight parameters within which Finnish politics have to be conducted, but in implying that 'this kind of relationship might spread to other parts of the globe' (p. 238) the author underplays the rather special geographical, strategic, and economic circumstances making for Finland's dependence on Soviet wishes. The cure for these ills is apparently European unity (p. 178). Yet do not the ills themselves reflect both the jealous clinging to sovereignty and the lack of capacity for government which make such unity so elusive?

Despite these quibbles this is an important book which deserves to be widely read. It is exceptionally well written, informed, lucid and cogent. Even if one does not share his pervading gloom, there is much to be learnt from the supporting argument.

G. L. GOODWIN

Europe Without Defence? 48 Hours That Could Change the Face of the World. By Robert Close. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon. 1979. 278 pp. $19.50.*

THIS book brought General Close some notoriety. When a General, enjoying the vantage point of Nato's Defence College at Rome, demonstrates how the Russians could reach the Channel in forty-eight hours from a standing-start attack, then people take notice. Yet, as so often with this sort of scenario-mongering, the argument is based far more on the exercise of political, rather than military, judgments. General Close's case depends on assumptions concerning the Soviet Union's motives and assessments of risk as much as knowledge of the quantity, quality, disposition, and mobility of its armed forces. Even assertions on the efficiency with which these forces can be used depend on views on such matters as the relationship between Soviet troops and those of other Warsaw Pact countries. Then we must assume that a major operation such as the one Close envisages, even involving extensive fifth column activities, can be set in motion smoothly and in complete secrecy.

Close's political judgments tend to be simple and sweeping. Surprisingly his military judgments are similar. There is little of the flavour of real military operations, although much of the flavour of the briefing of modern Nato planners whose work largely consists of informed speculation rather (fortunately) than concrete experience of major battles using the equipment available to modern armies.

A more cautious and less assertive presentation would have been more convincing, though it would have gained less publicity. In the earlier chapters on the development of Nato doctrine, the failure of the European Defence Community, and the defence policies of the individual European powers, Close has brought together some interesting facts and figures, and his basic argument—that the Europeans ought to do more for their own defence—is quite compelling. The problems of the book lie in the tendency to understand the political sphere in traditional military terms (with a combination of enemy propaganda and the illusions of detente undermining national will and so on), and in the overstatement of the committed advocate.

Chatham House LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance. By A. W. DePorte. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1979. 256 pp.*

Europe Since World War II: The Big Change. Rev. edn. By Norman Luxenburg. *Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press. 1979.* (First publ. 1973.) *London, Amsterdam: Feffer and Simons. 1979. 330 pp. $12.95.*

IN such a sad world it is cheering to read a book that is hopeful. A. W. DePorte, who is a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the United States Department of State, though writing here in a strictly private capacity, takes issue with the popular view that after 1945 the Powers failed miserably to co-operate in putting Europe together again and produced instead a bitterly divided continent, poised always on the brink of war, and tells us that, quite to the contrary, a 'system' has somehow grown up in Europe which assures national independence, and which is more stable and looks more permanent than any international arrangements we have seen since 1914. True, the East European states are 'severely circumscribed', as the author puts it, but their independence always was a fortuitous affair, certain to crumble as soon as Germany and Russia recovered from their defeats in 1918. True, Germany remains divided, the Wall is still there, but no-one can be sure how a united Germany would behave, least of all perhaps the Germans themselves. In politics, we cannot hope for the most desirable outcome; the least undesirable among a host of undesirables is the best we can get. 'The European system', DePorte maintains, 'came to be what it is because, to paraphrase Thiers, it divided least those with power to affect it.'

DePorte begins this thoughtful analysis of the European state system in the twentieth century with the fundamental point that, once Germany was united under Prussia in 1871, and once its industrial growth overshadowed its rivals, its superb central position in Europe and its human and natural resources ensured that it could not be contained by European forces alone. This *was* achieved in 1918, but only for a short period, and only with American assistance. Then the Allied coalition broke up and the European imbalance was resumed. The United States and Russia were indispensable to the overthrow of Germany in 1945, but, when this was done, both found that neither could unite Germany on its own terms and had to be content to hold as much as it had. On that footing, the Nato and Warsaw pacts grew up, incorporating the two Germanies and providing a system of deterrence which has for all practical purposes ruled out total war of the kind witnessed in 1914 and 1939. The morality and effectiveness of the two pacts have been endlessly debated, and so, in the West, has the genuineness of the American commitment to West European defence and the advisability of West European countries making the best terms they can with the Soviet bloc. But, in the end, everyone knows that a major attack on Western Europe *would* unleash the whirlwind; everyone knows that Russia accepts the status quo as safer than any conceivable alternative, and the same goes for all other participants in the system. DePorte considers 'challenges' to the system, as he calls them, which ran the risk of destabilising it—super-power crises like Cuba, Berlin, Angola; the phenomenon of Gaullism; economic tensions between America and the EEC—and concludes that most of them have now either faded from sight, or have positively strengthened the central system.

Of course, the fact is that Europe is no longer central in world politics and DePorte treats it as though it were. There is nothing about China in this book, nothing about the Third World or the growing North-South debate. The book is essentially about Yalta and Potsdam and what came of it all in the end. It is true that the non-European sectors of the world political scene may not affect DePorte's thesis about the stability of the European system since 1955 (when Federal Germany joined Nato and the Warsaw Pact was formed) which we take for granted, but they were assuredly vital

factors in creating it. Just as, in the nineteenth century, the cohesion of Europe rested to an important extent on common European interests *against* the rest of the world, so, since 1955, European politicians, whatever their ideologies, have accepted the status quo partly because of uncertainty where they stand in the world outside. Perhaps that goes for the super-powers, too.

There is another relevant theme suggested by Norman Luxenburg, Professor of Russian at Iowa University in a history of Europe since 1945 which he first published in 1973, and that is European affluence since the mid-1950s: the avalanche of TV sets, fridges, cars, packaged holidays and the rest. 'Though people could speak of the decline of France, of Germany, and of Great Britain, the fact still remained that the generation of West Europeans coming to maturity in 1970 had greater material, educational, health, cultural and travel opportunities than any other generation of their predecessors' (p. 194). *Sic opulentia vincit omnia.* DePorte does not mention this as a factor making the political status quo acceptable, and Professor Luxenburg does not develop the theme either. But there is nothing like a good job and a growing bank account, especially when there are millions in the world without either, to make one wonder what all those battles long ago were all about.

London School of Economics F. S. NORTHEDGE

Eurocommunism and Detente. Edited by Rudolf L. Tökés. *Oxford: Martin Robinson for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1979. 578 pp. £18·50.*

Eurocommunism and Foreign Policy. By Carole Webb. *London. Policy Studies Institute. 1979. 81 pp. Pb: £2·95.*

THE Council on Foreign Relations book on Eurocommunism is a major work which brings together a number of scholars whose knowledge of their individual subject is evidently profound. For this reason Rudolf Tökés's book—despite its price—is a work which few of those interested in contemporary Western communism will be able to do without.

After the introduction there are three parts to this book. The first part deals with the Italian, French, Spanish, and Portuguese parties and includes a contribution by Pierre Hassner on postwar Western Europe. Part II is concerned with the diplomatic aspects of Eurocommunism with chapters by Robert Legvold, W. E. Griffith and R. L. Tökés, and Part III is a sort of conclusion in which John L. Campbell discusses policy questions for the West—there is also a comprehensive index.

Pierre Hassner's chapter provides a sceptical though shrewd overview of West European communism in which he is careful not to be overly optimistic and in which he is careful to emphasise the Leninist heritage of 'Eurocommunism', i.e. the possibility (not more) of what he calls 'left-wing fascism'. He deals with the postwar settlement and with the increasing living standards in Europe which have contributed to the changing climate and hence to the evolution of Eurocommunism, but his caustic analysis of the current crisis and its effects is at variance with some of the substantive conclusions of later contributors.

The chapters by Norman Kogan, Ronald S. Tiersky, and Mujal-León (on Italy, France, Spain and Portugal respectively) are excellent. Discussion of the different national communist parties emphasises the diversity of the phenomenon of Eurocommunism to the point where its very existence is highly unlikely. All the chapters deal with the ideology, history, leadership, strategy, and so on of the various parties and, although they could have been more comparative in structure, the main gap is in an appreciation of one defining characteristic of communism—namely, party organisation where research is not deep enough. However the Spanish, French, and Italian chapters will no doubt be standard references for many years to come.

These chapters are followed by chapters on Moscow's view; on inter-party and international dimensions; and on the impact on detente. Part II demonstrates how difficult it is to deal with a rapidly changing political scene, and the developments in Russia seem to have changed the context of much discussion about Helsinki and 'basket three'. Nevertheless, these chapters are full and considered discussions of contemporary inter-communist diplomacy, which are important contributions.

John Campbell's final chapter (Part III) flirts with the idea of change in East Europe as an indirect result of Eurocommunism but warns of deterioration within Nato if 'vigilance' is dropped. It is however, a very solid, balance and coolly persuasive chapter. This book will overshadow other works on West European Communism for some time to come both in quality of writing and research, and in accessibility.

Carole Webb's small book, *Eurocommunism and Foreign Policy*, deals with European, Atlantic, and Soviet relations as they are affected by contemporary communism, but in this PSI study the European concentration is uppermost. There is an introduction and a conclusion but the four main sections deal with 'foreign policies and Eurocommunism'; the strategies in national context; Euro-American relations; wider international politics and the communists' view of the EEC. Since foreign policy is a vital but neglected aspect of Western Communism, and one where it can have an immediate impact even out of government, this study, which is well-written, solid, and reliable, is a welcome addition to the literature.

University of Leeds DAVID S. BELL

British Foreign Policy and the Atlantic Area: The Techniques of Accommodation. By Arthur Cyr. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 166 pp. £10·00.*

DR CYR'S book is a brief survey of aspects of British foreign policy since 1945, dealing successively with the British role in world affairs; the making of foreign policy; strategic issues; policy towards Western Europe; and relations with the United States. It is avowedly aimed at a student audience, and this appears to mean that the author aimed low. The treatment of each subject is rapid and superficial; and the sections which deal with historical background before 1945 are tenuous and sometimes misleading. The book relies heavily on a few secondary sources—for example, F. S. Northedge's *British Foreign Policy* (for which the 1962 edition is cited, rather than the more recent revised edition), or Richard Rosecrance's *Defense of the Realm*.

The main emphasis of the book's argument lies in its favourable judgment on the handling of British foreign policy. Dr Cyr repeatedly asserts that the British way is to avoid clear-cut decisions or leaps of faith, and instead to go for compromise, continuity and an amiable blurring of the issues—muddling through, in fact, though this is not a phrase for political scientists. On the whole, he finds this habit commendable, and thinks that it has helped us to survive a drastic decline in power and prestige without serious conflict abroad or disruption at home. A British reader may find this, coming as it does from an American writer, of some comfort in a bleak world; but it is hard to think that he will find anything new in the information which is used to support this optimistic thesis.

University of Liverpool P. M. H. BELL

The Reluctant Party: Labour and the EEC 1961-1975. By Lynton J. Robins. *Ormskirk: Hesketh. 1979. 155 pp. Pb: £5·95.*

THE party in the title is the Labour Party and the reluctance is the long history of Labour's refusal to accept the EEC. This book is an account of Labour and the EEC

from 1961 to 1975, it deals with the issues, the personalities, rivalries, and political battles which so envenomed the European issue inside the Labour Party during those years.

In the short introduction there is an attempt to give an outline of the problem, and questions are raised such as: how are decisions made in the Labour Party? What was the nature of the inner-party battle? and what is Labour foreign policy? They are answered implicitly in the course of the following seven chapters which deal with the matter historically although concentrating on the twin themes of the Left-Right battle; and attempts at party management by the Labour leadership—which was Harold Wilson's main response to the Party's internal squabbles.

Chapter One deals with the 'Macmillan Initiative' to start negotiations with the Community and the effect this had on Labour Party politics, particularly in giving the Left a mobilising issue which appealed to a wide audience. In Chapter Two the indecision over the Market is explained and the decision by Labour to oppose entry is discussed. Robins deals here with the famous Gaitskell speech at the Labour Conference in 1962 when he came down heavily on the anti-Market side but the chapter concludes that Party unity was uppermost in the leader's mind—the need for unity subsequently explains much of the tacking by the leadership on this issue.

After Labour's electoral victory in 1964 the Party, at first, continued to ignore the EEC but then began to see virtues in Market membership. Chapter Three takes the beginning of this U-turn as its theme, and Chapter Four deals with Labour's application for membership along with Wilson's conversion to 'Europeanism', the Wilson-Brown tour of the six capitals, and the considerable opposition in the Party. It is argued that Wilson used the Market issue, unlike Gaitskell, to appease the Party's Right.

Chapter Five narrates the history of the EEC issue from 1970–72 when Labour stepped back, once again, into doubt; then Chapter Six deals with the activity in the Party during this period. Chapter Seven brings the story through the end of the Heath government to the 1975 referendum. As Lynton Robins states the EEC has still not been fully accepted as legitimate by the Party and anti-Market feeling is likely to flood out at any time.

This is an excellent and balanced book, it is well written in a relaxed and frequently humorous way. However sometimes the author assumes a background which is not necessarily always obvious. Thus the introduction uses a good deal of foreign policy analysis and the 'revisionists' (is this a useful term) pop in from nowhere to take up a prominent role. Nevertheless almost all left-wing parties in Western Europe have had their troubles with the EEC issue (even the SPD).

University of Leeds DAVID S. BELL

Contemporary France: Politics and Society Since 1945. By D. L. Hanley, A. P. Kerr and N. H. Waites. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1979. 325 pp. £8·50 Pb: £3·95.*

DESIGNED primarily as a textbook for French studies (language and . . .) rather than students of politics as such, the authors hope it will also interest the latter 'perhaps by dint of its rather different approach'. In layout not so different: chapters on the French experience since 1944; socio-economic structures and political culture; governmental system; parties and pressure groups—followed by foreign policy and educational system. Nevertheless, the 'politics and society approach' does quite often give a rounder background than books in the 'government and politics tradition'. This seems to be written by and for people interested in France-the-country rather than France-an-illustration-for-comparative-politics: the student should pick up some of the

background information that the politically informed resident acquires naturally over time.

The authors 'express opinions throughout the book' but deliberately do not sum up chapters, which thus tend to come to rather unsatisfactory ends. Inevitably, too, their coverage is sometimes patchy. Modern historians in the Department of French Studies at Reading, they seem happier discussing the theory of class than economic theory. The reasons for France's industrial dynamism are dealt with in a paragraph that merely lists a variety of possible explanations (planning, climate of opinion, new men in management, role of the state)—not enough there 'to encourage discussion among readers who can formulate judgements of their own'.

Enough to indicate areas of discussion, however, particularly in the first chapter, if the reader compares for himself the French experience since 1944 with the British. The postwar years saw a transformation of the economy which started France on the path to becoming a major second-rank power while the causes of Britain's later decline were reinforced during the same period: the new managerialism in civil service and industry on the one hand; the cult of the amateur in Whitehall and of the gentleman in the boardroom on the other. The Fourth Republic failed less from constitutional weakness than from the weakness of its political class and its failure to bring party politics closer to the public. Nevertheless, when the crisis came—the possibility of civil war on the Algerian issue—France found in General de Gaulle a man without ready-made solutions who appealed to all sides through force of personality, defused the situation with great political skill and saved democracy.

It is instructive, too, to understand the policy of economic growth adopted by de Gaulle's Republic: industrial expansion through direct state intervention and incentives to private investment. Of course, Gaullism could not last, nor would it have been desirable. The issue between Gaullists and Giscardian conservatives about the role of the state remains and the tradition of technocratic expansionism is still strong. While our own Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, pins her hopes on the potential entrepreneurship of others, a faith based on no evidence whatsoever, and preaches non-intervention in crippling industrial disputes, an ideology that allows the coward's way out through abdication of responsibility, France (to use the authors' phrase with regard to the early years of Pompidou's presidency) showed 'heroic state leadership to the private sector'. Our Prime Minister is fond of pointing to the non-socialist states of Western Europe as evidence for the creation of wealth. Perhaps she should read about the French experience. And if the Barre government is economically more like her own in its shopkeeper economics, she might reflect that President Giscard continues to provide some 'heroic leadership' in pursuit of the 'advanced liberal society' in the social sphere. What does our government offer in comparison?

University of Liverpool F. F. RIDLEY

The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism. By David D. Roberts. *Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press; Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1979. 410 pp. £16·00.*

THE study of ideas has never played a major part in the analysis of the wave of right-wing authoritarianism which swept through Europe in the interwar years. Contemporary ideologues of the Fascist and Nazi movements are generally dismissed as second-rate and incoherent freelance intellectuals whose grasp of the disparate ideas they were assembling failed to match their ambition to find a satisfactory role for themselves and their class in a world that was passing them by. As the author of this book observes, in the study of fascism it is 'tough-minded' to concentrate on class conflict and socio-economic structure, and 'soft-minded' to take fascist ideas too seriously.

David Roberts provides us with an interesting and very successful antidote to t conventional wisdom. His focus is the syndicalist wing of fascism, which in the sp of less than twenty years migrated across the political spectrum from the Socia Party, through revolutionary direct action, to Mussolini's Fascist movement, there become the main proponent of the 'Leftist' and corporatist, as opposed to the pur nationalist/conservative brand of fascism. He traces the development of syndica ideas from the tensions which emerged in the revolutionary doctrine of the first deca of the century, through increasing pessimism over the role of the working-class, to t emergence of a brand of syndicalist nationalism, and to the important reworking of t syndicalist programme between 1917 and 1921. The main element of this latter sta was the subordination to a secondary role of the traditional objective of a socia *economic* transformation, and the elevation to the centre of syndicalist doctrine of t concept of cultural and psycho-political change *independent* of changes in prope relations. It was this transformation, Roberts argues, which gave fascism its appeal the disparate groups who were searching for a new post-liberal political order in t aftermath of the First World War. However contradictory, and however ill-conceiv the ideas of the Panunzios, of the Olivettis—and even of the Rossonis—constitute genuine search for a new and more comprehensive solution to the problems of Itali and indeed European, society than traditional liberalism or traditional Marxism co offer; despite their eventual fate in the reality of the Fascist regime, they cannot dismissed as just a superficial gloss on an ill-concealed reaction. The thesis is not, course, an entirely new one, nor is it susceptible to definitive verification. But in sensitivity to the dilemmas of the protagonists, and in its perceptive understanding the peculiarities of Italian society and political culture, David Roberts's book provi an interesting reworking of an issue in which the conventional wisdom has for too lo remained unquestioned. Altogether a weighty and welcome addition to c understanding of Italian fascism, though at £16·00 one which will appear on f private bookshelves.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne DAVID HINE

Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics. By Michael Attalides. *Edinburgh: Press. 1979. 226 pp. £9·95.*

THE main thesis of this book—propounded with considerable subtlety on the basis what is necessarily incomplete and uneven documentation—is that the coup whi briefly overthrew Archbishop Makarios and resulted in the de facto partitioning Cyprus six years ago, though planned and executed by the remnant of the milita regime in Athens, took place with the foreknowledge and encouragement of the Sta Department and with some CIA participation. This conviction, which in cruder for is certainly held by many Greek-Cypriots, has of course appeared in print before nc At crucial points Dr Attalides draws heavily on an article by Laurence Stern tl appeared in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1975), and later that year Christopher Hitche described 'How Cyprus was betrayed' in the New Statesman, setting out the ma lines of the argument Dr Attalides advances here and naming some of the same nam Since then further suggestive details have been unearthed or leaked. But the scope this book is rather broader than that, since to argue his case the author has to disc the different aspirations which influenced the Cypriot communities at various tin after the British occupation, and to relate these to developments in the island and (t lesser extent) to politics in the two 'parent' countries. This is done briefly and clear though the schematised 'ideal-types' of nationalism chosen to help make thir intelligible seem over-elaborate and not very illuminating.

While seeing his country as, primarily, the victim of 'imperial' policies,

Attalides maintains an equable tone, for the most part. He is understandably sharp about Britain's handling of the majority demand for self-determination during the postwar decade; few, probably, would now question that London gave every encouragement to Ankara in the early 1950s. However, he does not seek to gloss over the imprudence of pan-Hellenic nationalism in the Republic after independence, nor the excesses committed by the temporarily stronger party during 1964-67.

He admits that at many points his reconstruction of State Department attitudes and actions must remain hypothetical for the time being—and in places alternative explanations are considered. But, as he sees it, American apprehensions were 'initially triggered-off' by Makarios's refusal to seek a Nato-sponsored solution to the island's communal troubles; and by Turkey 'reopening the Eastern Question' (a not especially apt description of Turkish moves to improve relations with the Soviet Union in the early stages of detente, which he dates from the test-ban treaty of 1963). The ominous demonstration, during the October 1973 Middle Eastern War, that in another such conflict American supply-lines to Israel might be very hard to keep open unless Cyprus were available as an 'unsinkable aircraft-carrier', together with the diminution of British strength in its sovereign bases on the island, supplied further motivation. There are difficulties, not always adequately considered by Dr Attalides, such as the dramatically sudden disappearance of the Greek regime just at what would seem to have been its moment of greatest usefulness; and, more generally, the fact, which he emphasises at the end of the book, that actual results have turned out to the detriment of American (and Nato) interests in entirely foreseeable ways—of which Congressional reactions and the deep offence given thereby to Turkey are only one. Can the State Department Machiavellis have been quite so ignorant and short-sighted as is suggested? And were they really so paranoiac about the implications of Makarios' adopting a neutralist stance? Whatever the answers, this well-written and well-produced book repays careful reading.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Political Culture and Soviet Politics. By Stephen White. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 234 pp. £10·00. Pb: £4·95.*

THIS is a book which will be of considerable value and use to the student of Soviet society and communist politics. White treats political culture in a wide sense as 'The attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located' (p. 1). He is not only concerned with the narrower definition which sees political culture as a political psychology—essentially of sets of individual orientations to politics—but also as a political 'way of life' (p. 164). This definition leads to the inclusion of very many aspects of social life in the book. Not only do we have an account and analysis of Soviet studies of various types of participation in, and exposure to, political activity but also included are the results of numerous studies of Soviet emigrés. White does a useful job in bringing together these disparate sources and he shows how participation varies by social class, age, sex, and nationality. Though some of these data are repetitive and inconclusive, it must be emphasised that White should not be made responsible for the absence of reliable data and he always qualifies his conclusions in the light of methodological inadequacies.

One of the major themes in the book is the continuity between the political way of life under the Tsarist autocracy, and the modern Soviet state. White's historical chapters are very good and he succeeds in pointing to the oppressive and non-participatory nature of the traditional political culture in tsarist Russia and its

implications for Soviet socialist construction. I am less sure, however, whether the author deals very satisfactorily with the impact of Soviet values. While it is true that there has been 'no wholesale conversion to the principles of Marxism-Leninism' and that many 'sub-cultural' differences still persist, this rather plays down the changes in ideological orientations which have occurred. Again, it would have been pertinent in many places to have brought out a comparative element showing similarities with Western societies. In the discussion of political education there is a tendency to take ideal standards as the unit of comparison whereas, of course, the typical mass orientation to politics, even in liberal-democratic societies, is relatively passive and apolitical.

Despite these caveats, this is a scholarly and well-researched book which makes good use of both Western and Soviet source material. While other writers have referred to political culture, this book can justly claim to be the first full-length study of the political culture approach to Soviet politics.

Cambridge University DAVID LANE

Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union: Poverty, Living Standards, and Inequality. By Alastair McAuley. *Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press; Hemel Hempstead: Allen and Unwin. 1979. 389 pp. £15·00.*

THE Soviet Union has been in existence for over sixty years; for more than three decades no hostile army has invaded its territory; and for some time it has officially been labelled a developed socialist society. Undoubtedly, this calls for a reappraisal of its established institutions, professed ideology, the regime's domestic and foreign behaviour, and the lot of the population.

Alastair McAuley's book can be regarded as a timely contribution to such a reappraisal. It deals with recent changes in the standard of living of the Soviet people and in economic inequality, as well as with the instruments used by the Soviet government to influence the level of economic welfare and the distribution of incomes namely, its control over wages and salaries, social consumption expenditures, and direct taxation.

From the detailed analysis presented, two main conclusions follow. Since the death of Stalin, the Soviet standard of living has increased substantially. Nevertheless, in 1974 it was still modest, both by international and domestic standards—and if the Soviet poverty line is set at a per capita money income of 50 roubles a month, even in 1967-68 there existed widespread rural and urban poverty. Secondly, although between 1960 and 1974 differentiation in the standard of living was reduced somewhat, considerable inequality remains, whether between the social classes identified in Soviet social theory, or between the various nationalities that make up the country, or among Soviet households.

Thus, Soviet society appears to be neither too affluent nor too egalitarian. Regrettably, the author does not attempt any systematic cross-national comparison. On the other hand, he emphasises the question of social stratification. He wants the book to influence the discussion of stratification under state socialism and, indirectly, the study of inequality in other industrial societies, and expects the material contained in it to modify dominant Western views of stratification in Eastern Europe, or at least in the Soviet Union.

Undoubtedly, sociologists also will find useful data and ideas in the book. Of course, social stratification has not only an economic dimension (examined by McAuley), and those of power and prestige (mentioned by him), but that of education as well. Moreover, an inquiry into a system of stratification should take into consideration the role of sex and the position of retirees.

Some other points deserve attention. For instance, the author omits the impact of the illegal and semi-legal 'second economy' on the standard of living and economic inequality. He gives the impression (see pp. 55, 85 and 219) that he assumes a rather extensive part-time employment. And he appears (see pp. 233–35) to disregard the fact that within the Soviet context the allocation of human resources (male and female alike) is a result of both differential rewards and socialisation in the school, protective labour legislation, admissions policies to education beyond the compulsory level, etc.

At the same time, the book touches upon a number of 'perennial', albeit still intriguing questions. One of them is that of popular satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the existing standard of living and economic inequality—which is of potential political significance. Over the years, the population has become accustomed to job security, steadily rising earnings, relative price stability, social insurance benefits, and free and subsidised services. How would it respond, if the regime could not guarantee these values any more: i.e., if the standard of living began to stagnate or decline? Otherwise expressed, what is the extent of the Soviet population's 'zone of indifference'?

St Antony's College, Oxford J. L. PORKET

Soviet Strategic Initiatives: Challenge and Response. By C. G. Jacobsen. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 168 pp. £13·00.*

THIS is a confused, but at times thought-provoking monograph on an issue that surely requires a more comprehensive and sophisticated approach. Jacobsen states that his objective is 'to document and chart trends of import for the future, trends of theory, procurement and inclination . . . (and) construct a more realistic spectrum of likely Soviet objectives and capabilities . . .' (p. xiv). These 'modest' objectives are of course not met in 140 pages, but what emerges from this idiosyncratic effort, if the reader is willing to persevere, is the occasional interesting insight.

The author adopts a broadly middle position in viewing the Soviet Union as assertive, yet cautious (p. 135). He is most interested in the Soviet ability to engage in 'distant intervention' which he sees as the most important new aspect in Soviet strategy and the one 'establishing and cementing the USSR as a truly global superpower' (p. 9). Various chapters deal with the subject, but chapter eight on Angola and Somalia is clearly the most successful. Jacobsen's view that Soviet strategy is not a 'new colonialism' illustrates the judicious analysis.

However, the rest, and by far the vast majority of the book, is undeveloped and largely incoherent. The author sets himself far too much to accomplish; engages in detailed discussions of obscure aspects; produces long quotations; and obviously cannot find the wood for the trees. The subtleties of strategic arguments are omitted and yet an intricate analysis of the Canadian and Norwegian strategic positions is included. The 'possible ferro-manganese nodule presence' in the Arctic is of course discussed in detail (p. 89). Jacobsen includes extensive sections on Soviet policy along its 'flanks' but offers no compelling argument for why we should regard the vastly different areas in the same fashion or see an overarching pattern to their significance. Although the subjects may well be interesting and important in their own right, the disunity that results from lumping them all together is a serious problem. The incoherence of the text is also enhanced by two appendices, one on party-army relations and one on the Sino-Vietnamese war, both of which are unrelated to major trends of analysis in the main body. Furthermore, there are numerous typographical errors and scattered remarks of a highly controversial nature which are left unsubstantiated. In general then, a distinctly flawed effort.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth GERALD SEGAL

Soviet Naval Diplomacy. Edited by Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon Press for the Center for Naval Analysis, University of Rochester, 1979. 409 pp. £12·50. Pb: £5·00.*

THIS long, and readable, book traces the emergence of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of diplomacy in Third-World areas. The detailed analysis is constructed against the hypothesis that this mission for the Soviet Navy developed as an important factor in the post-Stalin shift of political strategy whereby 'peaceful coexistence' has been transformed from a periodic tactic into an integral element of long-term policy. It is well balanced between general exposition and detailed analysis, and contains an enormous amount of material covering the period of the mid-1950s to 1976. It ends with two most interesting chapters, in which James McConnell discusses a 'rules of the game' theory on the practice of super-power naval diplomacy, and then he and his fellow editor discuss the origins, methods and utility of Soviet naval diplomacy, pointing up some lessons for the United States in particular and, by analogy, for the West in general: 'The risks are undeniably higher, but the situation under the rules of the game is still relatively ordered and calculable. The rules do not enforce themselves; but if the United States remains willing to make the effort—to keep up its capabilities, its commitment to the status quo, and its resolve to demonstrate that commitment—then tolerable order can be maintained on the periphery in spite of a politically active Soviet presence (pp. 311–12).

I found the analysis carefully and clearly set out, and generally persuasive; McConnell in particular has a way of presenting his material that is attractively relaxed, even though the argument is precise. But I was left wondering how the rules of the game get changed, as naval capabilities alter and as case-law on specific incidents provides the temptation to make glosses, and to refine our categories of intent and acceptable response. We *deduce* that there is a game: but what happens when the steeplechase suddenly turns into a pentathlon? I think that McConnell and Dismukes could, fairly, retort that that will require another book; the question is beyond their limited purpose. But I hope they are working on it; and if it is as well prepared as this one, it will also be worth reading carefully and thoroughly.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt. By Karen Dawisha. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 271 pp. £12·00.*

THIS is a clinical study of unfolding Soviet policies on Egypt from the first arms transfer deal in 1955 to President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. Focusing on the Soviet Union, the author seeks to penetrate the thick crust of secrecy that conceals the identity of the policy-makers, their motives and goals, and their modes of reaching decisions. A great deal must therefore be left to speculation: whether the decisions are taken in the organs of the CPSU or of the state, whether the decisions are individual or collegial, whether there is a standard or variable practice. The author is cautious in interpreting the available evidence. Nevertheless, she puts to effective use the progressively imaginative studies by non-Soviet scholars on the Soviet foreign-policy style. She also benefited from research residence in Moscow, which enabled her to interview informed associates of the Soviet think-tanks concerned, officials of the Foreign Ministry, and attachés of the British, American, and several Arab embassies. She reinforces the testimony from time to time with available published reports of Egyptian participants, particularly those by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, then editor and publisher of *al-Ahram*—who doubled as a principal confidant of President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and as such took occasional part in the Kremlin negotiations.

The book is divided into two parts. The first consists of a chronological outline of Soviet-Egyptian relations in the period under review. The second and longer section examines the capabilities and constraints (military, demographic, economic, and ideological as well as external); the Soviet Union's political structure and its competing elites and interest groups in the policy-making process; the political, strategic, and economic aims of its Egyptian policies; and the instruments used in the pursuit of these goals (diplomacy, aid and trade, arms transfers and military roles and bases, propaganda, cultural export, and clandestine activities). In a word, the author charts the rise and fall of Soviet fortunes in Egypt and plausibly concludes that these fortunes might once again be reversed.

The major defect of the book is its structure. The selective chronology of Soviet-Egyptian relations, which takes up one-quarter of the work, is largely wasted. It tells the initiated very little that they do not already know and the uninitiated too little to be convincing. The space might have been put to greater effect by using the data as further evidence in the analysis of the shaping of Soviet foreign policy on Egypt. Moreover, the value of the study would have been enhanced, had the author kept constantly in mind the regional and international restraints on Soviet action. Israel and the Arab states appear only intermittently and dimly in the assessment as do also the United States and its major European allies, particularly Britain and France.

Still, on balance, we are deeply indebted to the author for enlarging our fund of knowledge about a significant postwar phenomenon: the development of the Soviet Union into an influential power in Middle East affairs.

Columbia University J. C. HUREWITZ

The Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union. By Thomas E. Sawyer. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press; Folkestone: Dawson. 1979. 353 pp. £12·00.*

THIS is a useful rather than an enlightening book. It is useful in the sense that it provides in summary form a vast amount of documented information concerning Soviet Jewry—principally over the last few years but against the background of events since the Revolution of 1917. Thus the book begins with an account of Marxist teaching on the Jewish question—not only that of Marx himself but also the later versions of Lenin and Stalin. Then follow chapters devoted to the demography, and to legal and ethnic status of Soviet Jewry. The book is rounded off with a study of Soviet policies, official and unofficial, aimed at the Jews as a distinct national group, and with a study of the Jewish emigration issue.

The discussion of these themes is deepened in most cases by a short consideration of the respective policies undertaken by the tsarist regime. This enables perhaps the most important and overriding theme to emerge with great clarity; and that is the ambivalence of governmental treatment of the Jewish minority. In tsarist days it was expressed in the urge to assimilate the Jews, but at the same time making them subject to discriminatory legislation—for example, to various forms of discriminatory taxation and, above all, to enforced residence in the Pale of Settlement. Today a similar ambivalence persists. Thus the regime still denies the status of nationhood to the Jews and argues that the only genuine solution to the 'problem' posed by the Jews lies in total assimiltion, and that attempts to preserve or revive Jewish nationalism are not only retrogressive but also contradict the basic teachings of Marx and Lenin.

But on the other hand, it is Soviet practice to treat the Jews as a separate 'nationality' which is often equal in status with that of officially recognised nationalities. Hence the obligatory use of the term *Yevrei* (Jewish) in the internal passport of a child born of two Jewish parents; or the official existence of a Jewish Autonomous Region. In a recent publication concerning the nations of European

Russia, the Jews are even listed as one of the 'basic nations' with a national language (Yiddish) and a national region (Biro-Bidzhan).

In short, the Jews are kept alive although they are also required to assimilate. What threatens to exacerbate an already unhappy ambivalence and dichotomy is the awakening of a Russian xenophobia, fostered by the number of Jews in the dissident movement, the numbers of Jews wishing to emigrate, and the foreign-political need to curry favour with Moslem powers—to say nothing of the pressure exerted by the large Moslem minority in the Soviet Union itself. There is every reason to echo Sawyer's judgment: 'that the Soviet-Jewish experience constitutes a human tragedy of considerable magnitude'. If the book has a weakness, it lies in the fact that Sawyer hardly ventures at all to analyse why the Soviet regime should in fact have created 'a Jewish problem' of its own volition.

University of Warwick LIONEL KOCHAN

The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania. By Stanley V. Vardys. *New York: Columbia University Press for the East European Quarterly, Boulder. 1978. 336 pp. $22.50.*

THIS is the first book-length 'in-depth' study of the relation between the Catholic Church and nationality in Soviet Lithuania. It focuses on the Lithuanian dissent movement which, in recent years, has expressed and further merged the concerns of religion and nationality. The scholarship of the work is greatly enhanced by the author's utilisation of a wide range of sources, drawing on pre-Soviet and Soviet publications, Lithuanian *samizdat* and emigré literature, Vatican archives, and the work of Western scholars. The result is a very comprehensive and reasonably balanced coverage of the problem.

The book starts with a number of historical chapters giving detailed accounts of the evolving relationship between the Catholic Church and Lithuanian nationality. The author draws attention to the fact—easily forgotten in the face of the strength of the present-day national-religious movement—that, unlike in neighbouring Poland, the development of a clear Lithuanian national identity and its connection with the Catholic Church are a very recent phenomenon. An independent native Lithuanian Catholic Church came into existence only in 1926. Two further chapters on Soviet law and the Constitution, as well as on the organisation and implementation of atheist propaganda, provide the political and ideological context in which state-Church relations have to be seen.

The next five chapters describe at some length the religious and national dissent movement—the content of its *samizdat* publications, its major goals, the extent of its public support, its collaboration with the Russian dissent movement and, lastly, the reactions to it by the Soviet government. Here it is very revealingly shown that, despite prolonged and intense efforts by the Soviet government to uncover and destroy the Lithuanian dissent movement, it has had little success. This imperviousness to the efforts of Soviet security forces is in stark contrast to developments in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) where the strength of the Russian dissent movement has been gravely undermined.

The two closing chapters are the most interesting ones. One examines to what extent the militantly atheist state has been able to weaken the strength of the institutional church, looking at such indicators as the number of working churches, priests, and practising believers and comparing them with the relevant pre-Soviet figures. Vardys concludes that, although the state has been able to undermine the strength of the Church in many ways, the latter is still strong by any comparison, except with its own past. He does, however, detect a battle weariness among members

of the hierarchy and among priests and expresses some anxiety about the Church's future.

The concluding chapter attempts to predict the consequences of the various possible future relationships between the Church and the Soviet state. Vardys points out that this relationship is problematic and potentially dangerous not only for the Church but equally for the Soviet state. He sees the Soviet government locked into a vicious circle: further suppression of the Church intensifies nationalism, whereas an easing of nationality policy would raise demands for greater republican autonomy which would be incompatible with general Soviet nationality policy. But the Catholic Church is also in a vulnerable position. According to Vardys, it fears more than anything a destruction from within by Soviet-sponsored infiltrators. Such infiltration would be much easier if the Lithuanian Catholic Church were to be 'denationalised' and instead be subordinated to an all-Union Soviet Catholic hierarchy. The existence of negotiations between the Soviet government and the Vatican hold the possibility of such a creation and thus threaten to sever the mutually enhancing ties between the Catholic Church and Lithuanian nationalism.

Despite its considerable merit, the book will probably appeal only to a specialist readership, interested either in Lithuanian affairs or in the religion and/or nationality question in Soviet society. The absence of any theoretical social science perspective, and the extremely detailed descriptive accounts, limit its appeal to a wider readership within the social sciences or Soviet studies.

University of Aston in Birmingham CHRISTEL LANE

Communism in Eastern Europe. Edited by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy. *Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press. 1979. 338 pp. $17.50 Pb: $7.95.*

THIS book is designed as a general textbook for junior and graduate students, in the field of East European affairs. It is organised mainly in 'country' chapters, each of which considers briefly the political evolution in the country concerned since 1945, and primarily the events of the 1970s, with some projection of the trends of that decade into the next. Within this framework there is some discussion, country by country, of the intensity and effectiveness of political opposition to the communist regimes. Outside the framework of 'country' studies, there is an introductory chapter giving a general but not entirely undifferentiated picture of the part played by Eastern Europe in world affairs, particularly in providing military, economic and academic assistance to countries of the Third World, and in 'strengthening the Soviet Union's credentials as an ideological and revolutionary power'. There are also general chapters at the end on the economies of Eastern Europe, their achievements, problems and prospects; on the interaction of Eastern European Communist Parties with their 'Eurocommunist' colleagues in Western Europe; and on the continuing tension between nationalist tendencies towards independence and Soviet attempts at integrating Eastern European countries into the Soviet political and economic system.

Of the general chapters, that on the current problems of the national economics of Eastern Europe is terse, lucid and compelling. It is likely to be valid for some time to come and should be extremely valuable for political students of all ages (perhaps specialist students of economics might find it too elementary, but the exposition is admirable).

So far as the 'country chapters' are concerned, they conform generally to the broad pattern laid down in the introduction and should be useful for the non-specialist student of politics and international affairs. The disadvantage in most cases is a certain uniformity, noticeable to anyone who reads the book continuously. There are two less

'conformist' authors. Andrzej Korbonski (on Poland) brandishes a formidable critical apparatus at the reader, and then dispels any fears aroused with an excellent and reasonably chronological treatment of his subject or subjects. Robin Alison Remington has in Yugoslavia a subject peculiarly resistant to any schematic treatment. The reviewer can sympathise with his difficulties, but the student reader is likely to emerge puzzled and often misled by the author's highly condensed if sometimes brilliant schemata—for instance he seems to confuse too often decentralisation (of a 'command economy', to local centres), Republican autonomy (in the economic and political spheres), and self-management by individual enterprises.

By and large this collection of essays fulfils its stated purpose, and will meet usefully (though inevitably for a few years only) a genuine student need.

Corpus Christi College, Cambridge DUNCAN WILSON

The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power. By George Konrád and Ivan Szelényi. Trans by Andrew Arato and Richard E. Allen. *Brighton: Harvester Press. 1979. 252 pp. £7·50.*

INTELLECTUALS in Eastern Europe catch Western eyes most frequently as courageous, isolated dissidents. They also engage the attention of political and social scientists as a class in their own right. This work attempts a sociological analysis but is itself by two dissidents. Writing in Hungary in 1973–74 they were constantly harrassed by the police and both suffered imprisonment. Offered the choice between recantation and emigration George Konrád, the prominent novelist, stayed in Hungary; Ivan Szelényi emigrated. Their joint work has now received an adequate English translation.

The authors aimed to distill the findings of the empirical sociological research which they conducted in Hungary after 1965. But they approach their task from a theoretical rather than a scientific angle, describing their book as 'an Eastern European *samizdat*' (p. xiii). This is in some ways a misleading characterisation: *samizdat* precision, objectivity and bald, telegraphic style are all conspicuously absent; unsupported generalisation, a pan-historical perspective, a fondness for allusion and stylistic diffuseness recall more readily nineteenth-century historiosophy and social thought.

Konrád and Szelényi are almost reluctant Marxists: 'we used the tools of Marxism . . . not because our academic establishment expected it of us, but . . . because in the course of our work we came to discover the explosive critical potential of Marxist theory' (p. xvi). They seek to update and extend the ideas of Trotsky and Djilas on the Soviet class system, contending that 'the dictatorship of the proletariat is a myth, an ideology which legitimizes the power of an oppressive new social force' (p. xiii); that 'if there is a new dominant class in Eastern Europe it has been composed, since the sixties at least, of the intelligentsia as a whole rather than just the bureaucracy narrowly defined' (pp. xiv-xv); and that 'the differences between intellectuals and bureaucrats are gradually disappearing' (p. xiv). In separate sections they attempt to define intellectual status, knowledge and activity; to evaluate the applicability of Marxist and Weberian notions of class; to assess the role of the intelligentsia in different economic structures (using Marxist categories though not Marxist terms); to chronicle the changing fortunes of the intellectual class in the history of Eastern Europe in particular; and to determine the present-day structure and dynamics of the intellectual class, especially *vis-à-vis* the ruling elite on the one hand, and the rising technocracy on the other. The final chapters look forward to a time when dissident intellectuals (the 'marginal intelligentsia') will 'take up their position between the technocracy and the working class, becoming the organic intelligentsia of both, so that the one and the

other can derive their own ideologies from the immanent critical activity of that intelligentsia' (p. 252).

As an extended profession of faith this work is much more likely to appeal to those in search of refinements of 'new class' or New Left theory. Since no attempt is made to integrate empirical findings with *a priori* theorising, academic political and social scientists are unlikely to find it wholly satisfactory, as the authors themselves admit.

University of Hull M. C. CHAPMAN

Handbook of the Economy of the German Democratic Republic. Edited by Reinhard Pohl. *Farnborough: Saxon House. 1979. (First publ. Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch for the German Institute of Economic Research, 1977.) 366 pp. £15·00.*

THE German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in West Berlin has undertaken to produce the *Handbuch DDR-Wirtschaft*—from time to time in order to make its extensive research on the GDR economy available to a wider public. With the welcome appearance of this English translation of the 1977 *Handbuch* an even larger readership is assured. The title is deceptively neutral: the comprehensive factual account of the structure and development of the economy is supplemented by the authors' views on the workings of the institutions they discuss, and the book is none the worse for that. The sub-title of the 1972 edition, 'A Stock-taking', conveyed slightly better the scope of the work.

The first chapter describes the GDR's progress from war-torn occupied zone to industrial power and the envy of the other small Soviet bloc countries. There follows a comprehensive survey of the economic institutions of the GDR, documenting their development from the start of central planning, through the reforms to the current arrangements in all their hierarchical complexity. Clear diagrams show the stages of plan formation, financing, and execution. In the chapter on national accounts, the differences in accounting concepts between centrally planned and market economies are briefly explained, while the problems inherent in the evaluation of economic progress on the basis of dubious output statistics are clearly and concisely treated. Here and elsewhere, the authors distinguish carefully between allocative (static) efficiency and technical (dynamic) efficiency. The former is still sadly lacking, but it is primarily the latter which affects economic growth, and that is very much in evidence in the GDR.

Sectors of the economy (industry, construction, agriculture) are described in detail, as are the state budget and personal distribution of income, again with frequent recourse to helpful diagrams. Separate chapters cover foreign economic relations and the place of the GDR in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). Throughout these sections there is an understandable, but for non-German readers unhelpful, preoccupation with intra-German comparisons, to the exclusion of all other contrasts. The foreign-trade section belies an earlier reference to the GDR's economic isolation. Clearly, what matters is that in the country's early days, foreign trade was largely a balancing item, a regrettable necessity which did not justify great attention to competitiveness in world markets. Now the export sector is large, trade is recognised to be an important factor in economic growth and products are designed and manufactured with foreign markets in mind.

The last quarter of the book is a statistical appendix, drawing on official sources of both the Federal and the Democratic Republic, and including many of the DIW's own indispensable calculations. Unlike the original, the Handbook contains no bibliography. The book is further marred by careless proof-reading, but these cavils notwithstanding, the *Handbook* can be thoroughly recommended for the student of

the GDR economy and of centrally planned economies in general. Its scope, and the authority which the DIW commands, should ensure that it becomes a standard work of reference.

London School of Economics J. T. EVERSLEY

MIDDLE EAST

Arab Industrialisation and Economic Integration. Edited by Roberto Aliboni. *London: Croom Helm. 1979. 196 pp. £9·95.*

THE book consists of three independently written articles, The first one on 'Industrialisation in Arab Countries: Patterns, Options and Strategies' by Professor Zvi Hershlag takes up nearly half the volume, yet reads as though the core of its analysis was somehow omitted. The writer appears to be most at home when he discusses the Arab economies simply as a group of less-developed countries. One learns little about the problems of industry or industrialisation in the Arab world. Whatever positive economics one comes across seems either too trivial or too little supported by evidence or analysis:

> Arab industrial strategy aims not just at an accidental and marginal growth but at a structural change, which would shift the main contribution to the national product and balance of payments from low-level, primary to high-level secondary sectors' (p. 64).

This is just one example. One wades through cursory commentaries, lists, platitudes written in difficult syntax to be confronted with a conclusion sounding like a void pontification:

> There is growing awareness and declared strategies pronounce in favour of consumer goods, agro-industry and processing domestic raw materials, in response to a critical reassessment and an appreciation of the requirements of factor endowments, comparative advantage and competitiveness, as well as of socio-economic pressures (p. 63).

The impression cannot be helped that the writer is pronouncing on a subject of which he has little first-hand experience.

Nor is he more illuminating on the question of Arab economic co-operation and integration, which is described rather more objectively and lucidly in the second article by Professor Samir Makdisi. Here there does not seem to be any justification, however, for the writer's conclusion that: 'economic co-operation among Arab or other countries is less likely to lead to substantial benefits for the co-operating countries, the less it takes the form of close economic integration which implies, among other things, some degree of policy co-ordination' (p. 129). If anything, economic co-operation among the Arab countries produced tangible benefits when it was limited and circumstantial whilst agreements about all-embracing integration were hardly ever implemented.

In the third article Professor Abdelwahab Bouhdiba comes closest to the declared dedication of the book to the problems of the Mediterranean where he describes the emigration of Arab workers from North Africa to Europe. The analysis of the migrations ends in a number of pleas and exhortations: 'The Mediterranean unites us'; the host European countries 'must attempt to integrate their foreign (Arab) labour force rather than trying to assimilate it'; to recognise the basic complementarity between the Arab world and Europe we need to 'rid ourselves of outdated ideas, of artificial drives for power'; and a plea for so-called triangular co-

operation quoting the example of projects in television and telecommunications between Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and France.

Perhaps the most dissatisfying feature of the three parts of the book is the absence of analysis of the relevant politics; hence the artificiality of discussing such political economy problems in a political vacuum.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London A. K. SELBY

Radical Dissent in Contemporary Israeli Politics: Cracks in the Wall. By David J. Schnall. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 229 pp. £15·00.*

WHILE Israeli politics have usually been fiery and volatile and Israel's political culture has always been marked by intense partisanship, reflecting the multiplicity of views which various sections of the population hold on socio-economic, religious and foreign policy questions, the emergence of radical and militant ideologial dissent on a significant scale is essentially a phenomenon of the last decade. During the 1970s, and especially since 1973, salient forms of protest have surfaced which are radical in the sense that they make demands for change of a fundamental nature, outside as well as through the normal parliamentary channels.

The ideologies of seven such dissenting groups, representing a fair cross-section of those who have lived on the fringe of Israeli politics, form the substance of the study under review. For the purpose of analysis, three conceptual categories are employed. Each ideology is first discussed in terms of its 'world view', then in terms of its set of 'values and goals' and, finally, in terms of the 'strategies for social change' by which these goals are to be realised. The study opens with two introductory chapters: in the first, Zionism, the central ideology of Israeli politics, is discussed while in the second, the major social and political institutions of the Israeli state are presented. Both chapters are brief and elementary, containing no new material or insight, but they help to set the stage for the analysis of the protest movements and their ideological positions.

The author distinguishes two major sources of radicalism in Israeli politics. The first is left-wing political ideology whose anti-Zionism is largely based on a Marxist-socialist perspective. Certainly this typifies the thought of *Rakah* (the New Communist List), *Matzpen* (the Israeli Socialist Organisation), *Moked* (the Focus) and, to a lesser extent, of Uri Avnery, the political maverick who set up a party in the early 1960s bearing the name of his sensationalist anti-establishment weekly—*Haolam Hazeh*. Although these groups vary considerably in the strength of their rejection of classic Zionism, in their commitment to the Israeli state, and in the extremism they advocate, it is noteworthy that the first three owe their beginnings to *Maki*, the original Israel Communist Party.

The second major source of protest is rooted in religious and ethnic identification. In the case of Natore Karta, a strong sense of Jewish tradition and custom coupled with an apocalyptic religious vision, has led the movement to adopt a fiercely anti-Zionist stand. The opposite has been the result for Gush Emunim (the Bloc of the Faithful), though the source of its right-wing Zionist pioneering spirit and fanatical commitment to Jewish settlement on all parts of the biblical homeland is the same body of Jewish tradition. The major instance of purely ethnic political dissent, the Black Panthers, is presented, no doubt correctly, as springing from a sense of deprivation on the part of the underprivileged Orientals rather than from a cogent political philosophy.

David Schnall concludes his study with a compact chapter devoted to a comparative analysis of the seven protest movements which make up the body of the book and a

final chapter entitled '1977: The Year of the Earthquake'. Since most of the research and writing was done prior to the May 1977 elections, there was obviously a strong case for bringing the account up to date by examining the activities of the seven groups in 1977 and attempting an assessment of ideological dissent as reflected in the elections. But the chapter on 'the Earthquake' is bland and superficial, rarely rising above the level of sophistication of the *Jerusalem Post*—which was evidently used as the principal source of information. This is a great pity because the treatment of the radical movements up to 1977 is systematic, cogent and makes a valuable addition to the literature on Israeli politics. But the one persistent weakness of the book lies in the failure to relate effectively the developments on the fringe to developments at the heart of the Israeli political system—and particularly to the decline in the ability of the ruling parties to manage the country's internal and external problems which has become so conspicuous since the October War.

University of Reading AVI SHLAIM

Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval: An Interpretive Essay. By Sepehr Zabih. *San Francisco: Alchemy Books. 1979. 104 pp.*

SEPEHR ZABIH has a sound record as a commentator on Iranian political affairs and his essay on the Iranian revolution must be taken seriously. The present volume brings together a series of reviews of the Iranian political system as it existed under the Shah. It examines the nature of political participation in the political process, the political and religious role of the bazaar, and the political involvement of the major Shi'i clergy in so far as they contributed to the overthrow of the Shah. Very little of the material presented here is new though the evidence is handled intelligently and coherently to demonstrate the growth of political apathy and the conversion of this into active political dissent in the period from 1977. Unlike other recent publications on the matter, Zabih offers a convincing if brief explanation of why the revolution gathered way and overwhelmed the establishment. If he tends to emphasise the purely Iranian input to the revolution and ignores almost totally the problems arising from the ineptness of the United States in its handling of the Iranian situation, except Carter's declaration on human rights, he does a major service in correcting those deep and mainly Iranian beliefs that the revolution could only have been manipulated by the great powers.

In the second half of the volume Zabih traces the major events of the revolution and provides a useful chronology of the phases of challenge to the Shah's regime. The book ends with an assorted mixture of conclusions and postscripts which scarcely does justice to the central essay and would have been better omitted. Other vehicles exist for carrying immediate news of the progress of the revolution while the volatility of the political fabric in Iran would appear to make instant judgments on the current situation rather insecure.

The main argument presented by Zabih, that the mobilisation of the country—beginning with the intellectuals and the middle class and later spreading to the peasantry and the urban masses—was achieved through a set of sentiments and institutions peculiarly Iranian, has much to recommend it. The only weakness in the elaboration of the theme is on the economic side. A measure of confusion exists in this area. Zabih would like to reject the notion that economic forces were the main motivation behind the clamour for change. Yet he demonstrates clearly himself that the effects of the Shah's anti-profiteering campaign on the bazaar was a principal grudge of the bazaari group. Little mention is made of the importance of the strikes, especially in the oil industry. No specific recognition is given to the fact that the armed forces only lost their battle on the streets after they had found themselves unable to

drive workers back to their duties. It is also unfortunate that proper analysis is not given to the convention wisdom surrounding economic events. Zabih appears to accept that over-rapid economic growth and modernisation brought failure and makes no attempt to examine the more interesting contention, which fits far better with his political analysis, that only when growth dropped did political reactions begin. Doubtless Spehr Zabih will have more to say on the matter of the revolution when he will have more time for further and wider examination of events during the period after 1973 and add to the present volume's sensible, perceptive but incomplete analysis.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London KEITH MCLACHLAN

The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy. By James H. Noyes. *Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press. 1979. 144 pp. pb: $6.95.*

JAMES NOYES'S careful study of the issue of security in the Gulf was written before the fall of the Shah. He has thus not been able to take account of, or describe, the dilemmas facing the United States and other Western powers since the Shah's fall. Nevertheless, the book does help towards an understanding of the development of United States policy towards the Gulf.

The study begins with a historical perspective. Noyes maintains that, long before Europe first established a presence in the Gulf region, stability was already of crucial importance to the prosperity of the region. Prosperity depended upon the Gulf's role in international trade, and this in turn required security of the trade routes. Europe's entry into the region from the sixteenth century disrupted the trading system and thus undercut the source of prosperity.

The framework for contemporary concern over Gulf security was set by the emergence of the Gulf as a major oil producing area, and by the decision of the British government in January 1968 to withdraw from its protectorate obligations. The latter decision raised fears that the historical enmities among the states, the spread of radical nationalism and the manoeuvring of the Soviet Union would combine to undermine Western interests in the area. Yet the dire predictions were not fulfilled. Local rivalries and conflicts have been defused if not solved, radical nationalism has been contained, and Iran, Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the smaller Gulf states have steadily strengthened their defence capabilities—within a Western-oriented framework. Noyes provides valuable detail on these developments.

The most fundamental element in the United States policy towards the Gulf has, Noyes maintains, remained consistent for more than two decades. He quotes Eisenhower as saying in 1957 that, 'should a crisis arise threatening to cut the Western world off from Mid-East oil, we would have to use force'. The linking of the West's military security with continued access to Gulf oil has been strengthened both by the increased dependence of the United States on Gulf oil and by the likelihood that the Soviet Union's depletion of its own oil reserves will require it to enter the market for Gulf oil during the 1980s.

In attempting to create a suitable framework for maintaining security in the Gulf, the United States government was faced in the early 1960s with two alternatives. Either it could establish a direct military presence in the region, or it could involve itself closely in strengthening the defence capabilities of Saudi Arabia and Iran—such that they, with United States help and supervision, could play a major role in maintaining security. The final and most weighty chapter in Noyes's book provides a detailed justification for the adoption by the United States government of the latter option.

The author's precisely argued viewpoint raises two queries in this reader's mind. One is whether recent events in Iran have in any way tempered Noyes's enthusiasm

for the twin-pillar policy. The other is whether policies which envisage the use of force as the West's ultimate prerogative can really appeal to Gulf state populations in the long term. Noyes does not examine one option for Gulf security which is currently being canvassed within the Gulf itself: that the Gulf states should be left wholly responsible for the security of the area, which they would maintain through co-operative defence forces whose equipment would be dependent upon no single source.

University of Exeter TIM NIBLOCK

Democracy and Development in Turkey. By C. H. Dodd. *Beverley, N. Humberside: Eothen Press for the University of Hull. 1979. 231 pp. Bb: £4·95.*

THIS is an exceptionally useful study of the political system in Turkey and its origins both in Ottoman and even pre-Ottoman, history and in the revolutionary changes introduced by Atatürk. Professor Dodd traces the evolution of the various components of the system in more recent ties and asks the important question whether liberal democracy of the kind enshrined in Turkey's 1961 Constitution can solve the problems of rapid development of which Turkey is so desperately in need. He comes up with, on the whole, an optimistic answer, based partly on the deep attachment of most Turks to the interplay of political parties—which have to some extent inherited the loyalties of clans and family groups and local communities; partly, and more paradoxically in experience outside Turkey, on the fact that the armed forces see themselves as guardians of the system and did not relish the period in 1960-61 when they temporarily overthrew it and governed directly without political intermediaries.

The main threats to democracy in Turkey are three: the appalling state of the economy, the continuing violence and the extremist politics with which it is associated, and the possibility of a wave of Islamic primitivism *à la* Khomeini. This book is based on lectures given to university students of politics, and is clearly not intended to be an economic treatise. Nevertheless, for the general reader a fuller treatment of Turkey's economic problems together with some of the basic statistics would give a clearer picture of what any Turkish government is up against, and what strains the conventional IMF-type solution will impose on social and political coherence.

The other two threats, violence (known in Turkey as anarchy) and Islam, are dealt with more satisfactorily. The students are over-politicised; they suffer from the usual excess of expectation over reality, particularly in a time of rapid expansion of university education; a growing number tend to despair of the capacity of the existing system to improve their lot or that of Turkish society. Marxism has taken a strong hold, and is countered, in a way sadly reminiscent of the 1930s in Western Europe, by the 'grey wolves' of the rightist National Action Party. One aspect to which Professor Dodd does not pay sufficient attention in this context is the extraordinary weakness of the police. This was clearly demonstrated in the early phases of the 1960 revolution when police failure to keep order in the streets of Ankara and Istanbul led almost directly to military intervention, and seems hardly any better now when extremist student gangs of both Right and Left have arsenals of weapons and most of the country has had to be put under martial law. The army is better equipped to keep order, but in the long run may be expected to do so only by its own rather ruthless methods and on its own political terms, which recently involved a praiseworthy attempt to cajole the two main political parties to work together.

There is a useful account of the philosophy of the National Action Party of Colonel Alpaslan Türkes of which otherwise little is known outside Turkey. This has a strong corporatist flavour, advocating an assembly composed of representatives of six vertical groupings of workers, peasants, artisans, officials, employers and the professions, with

a management role for a 'nationalist educated elite'. Although the party speaks of respect for individual rights it must be doubted whether such a system could be imposed without the coercion of an expanded militia of 'grey wolves', whose present function is mainly confined to murdering their rivals of the left.

Professor Dodd deals briefly but convincingly with the rise of Islam as a potential factor in Turkish politics. Even in later Ottoman times Islamic influence in the Turkish political system was declining. Atatürk completed the separation of Church and state. The Sunni sect to which most Turks belong does not have the messianic tradition of the Shia. An avowedly Islamic political party has lost ground in recent years and will probably lose more as a result of events in Iran. On the other hand Islamic ideas are percolating more gradually into the other political parties. It remains to be seen exactly how a balance will be struck between a somewhat revitalised Islam and the still powerful Atatürkist tradition.

BERNARD BURROWS

AFRICA

The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis. By Ali A. Mazrui. *London, Nairobi: Heinemann Educational. 1980. 142 pp. Pb: £2·95.*

OVER the past dozen years Ali Mazrui has been letting off a series of exploding rockets: lively, stimulating, brief pieces to make people re-evaluate their views of contemporary Africa. Up they go, and one is dazzled and excited. But when the sky darkens again, and the stick falls, one cannot help wishing, as one waits for the next burst of bright stars, that he would take a rest from pyrotechnics. Could he not close his ears to the publishers and lecture promoters who demand his services, and devote himself to the quieter task of developing some of his more sensible ideas into a reflective, serious work, where his wisdom and experience could be displayed in less transient form?

Meanwhile we have the whoosh and burst of the 1979 Reith Lectures. In them he looks, as usual, at the African political scene. His insights are embodied in a series of paradoxes, contrasting the apparent advantages Africa possesses—size, strategic position, and rich natural resources—with the disadvantaged realities of poverty, technological weakness, and economic and cultural dependence. Throughout runs a quest for countervailing power to use against the domineering selfishness and rapacity of the West—or, more properly, North. OPEC provides an obvious model. So, in the cultural field, does the Unification Church of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon. The ascendancy and rigid discipline which the Korean Moon exerts over his disciples in America are presented as a late twentieth-century equivalent of the harsh methods used by equally alien Christian missionaries in early twentieth-century Africa. And Mazrui's recipe for saving the world from the global genocide of nuclear war is proliferation of nuclear weapons: 'Only when unstable Third World Rulers acquire these dangerous toys will the superpowers be converted to total denuclearization'.

Out of his clustered arguments brilliant little throwaway rocket-stars keep exploding. On a possible Afrikaner exodus from South Africa—'I cannot imagine the western world shutting its doors against whites on the run from blacks'. Or 'the moral duty of every family in the northern hemisphere is not to leave its children materially even better off than they have been, but to plan for a slight impoverishment of the next generation.' Those who missed the lectures on radio and enjoy Mazrui's writings will feel rewarded as they read rapidly through the book (for, like any firework display, it is soon over). Those who heard and enjoyed them will be pleased to have a permanent reminder in print. Those who think fireworks are frivolous, and life serious, had better stay away from the show.

University of Edinburgh CHRISTOPHER FYFE

Aid in Africa. By Guy Arnold. *London: Kogan Page; New York: Nichols. 1979. 240 pp. Pb: £5·95.*

A diatribe is no substitute for analysis. Unfortunately this is true however much one may be in sympathy with the position taken by the perpetrator. Guy Arnold's book *Aid in Africa* begins as a diatribe of the least helpful form. The position which he takes is that 'aid' or 'Official Development Assistance' are misnomers for the use of funds by 'donors' to further their own political and economic interests. Receipt of these funds damages rather than improves the development prospects of the recipient. In his Introduction these points are asserted time and again, interspersed with statistics and quotes about the aid relationship. Any coherent argument to support these assertions is, however, conspicuous only by its absence.

For the most part the book continues as it begins. It is divided into a review of the aid programmes of the main bilateral donors, followed by a discussion of multilateral aid; the final section of the book reviews the aid receipts of ten African countries. Russia, China and Cuba are among the bilateral donors discussed, and here some interesting material is presented. Unfortunately, however, in these chapters as in most of the book, statistical sources are not cited. Any reader who might wish to use these chapters as a starting-point for further study of the Chinese or Cuban aid relationship with Africa is provided with no references at all. A short bibliography at the end of each chapter would have been helpful. Finally, the studies of recipient countries at the end of the book are equally disappointing. These provide little more than statistics on amounts of aid received for different purposes from different sources, with figures presented in various currencies and without conversion rates for the recipients' currencies. In most of these chapters there is no attempt to analyse the impact of aid flows. Despite the importance of the existence of negative impact to the author's whole theme, other studies of aid impact are also ignored. Nevertheless, the book ends with the bleak conclusion that:

> those who continue to depend on the major aid donors for economic succour (let alone real progress) have only one future before them, and that is to be drawn further into the economic toils of the existing system. In the end, the only way they will break free is by violent revolution. And that fails more often than it succeeds (p. 222).

If Mr Arnold had argued these points this might have been a useful study. As it is, he has both failed to do so and has ignored the on-going debate concerning the prospects both for capitalist development and for the transition to socialism in Africa and other parts of the underdeveloped world. Of the writers on these issues Rodney is quoted once, Claude Ake several times and all others are passed by.

University of Sussex DIANA HUNT

The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa: Essays in Contemporary History. By John D. Hargreaves. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 141 pp. £10·00.*

Main Currents of West African History 1940-1978. By Frederick Pedler. *London: Macmillan. 1979. £12·00. Pb: £4·95.*

IT is perhaps appropriate that the most successful student of partition should now turn his attention to the process of decolonisation. John Hargreaves's interesting- and horribly expensive- collection of essays is one of the first works to have taken advantage of the thirty-year rule at the Public Record Office and it is good to see citation of such sources reaching as far back as 1950. It is also good to note that such material does not fundamentally disrupt a picture that has emerged from scholars who

have until recently been 'flying blind'. In Hargreaves's account the importance of the Depression and the Second World War, in forcing Britain to reappraise the future of its colonies, emerges clearly. This led to a commitment to disengagement in territories designated 'viable' which went far beyond the largely philosophical attachment to such principles. Hargreaves takes us through the pressures which led to the new reasoning, both international and domestic, and goes on to place nationalist movements within this more general context. Some readers might find his approach to *soi disants* liberation struggles in West Africa less than romantic; but the context of colonial powers minded to gradual withdrawal is precisely that in which nationalist parties worked. As Kojo Botsio was reported to say at a Convention People's Party Central Committee meeting in 1950 there was little point in marshalling all efforts to shove open a door that was being slowly opened from the other side.

The sections on British policy are, then, very much in tune with an emerging orthodoxy laid down by scholars like Michael Lee, David Goldsworthy, and Gary Wasserman. Those on French proclivities in the same period are necessarily more tentative; French scholars have not pursued this period with zeal—indeed much of the secondary literature has been written by English speakers—not least because of the more restricted access to official sources in Paris. Hargreaves's own early experience of colonial Sierra Leone, and his major contribution to the study of that country's history, account for a very welcome emphasis on the recent history of a colonial and independent state which has always been something of a Cinderella, in terms of scholarship, to its ugly sisters, Ghana and Nigeria. Hargreaves's personality is also very much to the fore in the last thirty-three pages when in discussing the development of tertiary education in British West Africa and the development of scholarly enquiry into the African past, both deep and recent, he very honestly assesses his own role in a story that has not been universally felicitous. As in any collection of essays some make more comfortable bed-fellows than others: interesting as John Hargreaves's reflections are in this last section of the book they do not fit quite so happily with earlier sections—which have an unusual coherence for such a collection.

There are problems with the analysis to be sure. It is, for example, very much part of the overall context that the 1940s saw active decolonisation in British Asian possessions. Although Malcolm Macdonald's personality haunts this period, events in South-east Asia—which were not only very much orchestrated by him but also produced both Arden-Clarke and Twining—are largely ignored. The precise nature of amplified American anti-colonialism after 1944 (based upon economic and strategic imperatives), the influence of which, particularly after the fall of the Labour government in 1951, has great explanatory force—is similarly skirted by Hargreaves. Moreover, the restriction of the debate to West Africa excludes not only Asia and the West Indies (where, for example, many key approaches to organised labour in the colonies emerged) but also the relationship between West and East African initiatives and that relationship is a two way dialectic. It is too early to assess the role of Britain's decision to apply for EEC membership, and the huge shifts in policy and politics implied in the radical reshaping of the timetable for East African independence. But the evolution of Conservative thinking, City opinion, and Commonwealth ideas also had importance for West Africa. John Hargreaves raises many other issues which excite debate, and there can only be gratitude for the elegant, charming fashion in which this most humane and intelligent historian introduces that debate.

Sir Fred Pedler's very personal account of thirty-eight years of West African history in which he served both as a centrally placed, senior civil servant and then as a top executive with is the United Africa Company is energetically but deftly penned. It is not merely for the author's gusto but also for his praiseworthy attempt to get an English reading public acquainted with places like Togo, Dahomey, and Guiné-Bissau

that it deserves attention. Being personal, and almost aggressively unacademic (no footnotes *might* explain why we have 300 pages of Sir Fred for £12·00 and 141 of John Hargreaves for £10·00—from the same publisher, but only might!) it is frequently a contentious book and none the worse for that. It is a matter of great regret that more people who have influenced African affairs significantly in the last thirty years have been so shy of the typewriter.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London RICHARD RATHBONE

The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa. By John S. Saul. *London: Heinemann. 1979. 454 pp. Pb: £3·95.*

THIS most valuable collection brings together fifteen pieces written between 1972 and 1979, all—except one on The Dialectic of Class and Tribe, previously published—linked by short introductions to the various parts. They are written by an activist Marxist scholar with a long and deep personal involvement in the area. They are perhaps not for the beginner in the area, for they assume knowledge of the recent history of Eastern Africa and form part of the continuing debate among radical scholars—African and other, of whom Saul has been one of the most stimulating—on the problems and possibilities of socialist transformation in the states of the area; the debate in turn being linked to the work of Poulantzas and others on the state and social classes.

The essays are predominantly concerned with Tanzania, yesterday's socialist hope; and Mozambique, today's. But the volume also contains a number of more general thematic essays in which Uganda, Angola, Kenya, and Zimbabwe are discussed. The focus is on the historical legacy of dependency and its associated international and internal supportive structures and how they can be transformed. Postulated, implicitly or explicitly, is the notion that only two outcomes are possible—neocolonial or socialist. But, as is so often the case, neither is very clearly defined, and the number and variety of political and economic systems now given either label are becoming bewilderingly large. One is left here with the impression that a neocolonial outcome is avoidable, anywhere, given the right political leadership—but is it? Dependent states clearly have any number of internal arrangements and policies, but for Saul, it appears, socialism and dependence are mutually exclusive—the dependent socialist state does not exist, but this seems more the result of the way the terms are used than a matter of logical impossibility.

The only previously unpublished paper, on Class and Tribe, represents a most interesting attempt to begin to grapple with a problem Marxists prefer to avoid (he makes no reference to the provocative work of Wallerstein). But one gets the impression that he too would rather have avoided it, as it gets only scant treatment in the country studies—apart from Uganda—and is treated largely as a result of outside manipulation in the case of Angola, whereas the countries he deals with offer interesting, but here unexplored, contrasts in the saliency of the ethnic factor. But the paper does throw up some ideas which can form a starting-point for further debate. All in all, a most stimulating collection.

University of Birmingham A. M. BERRETT

The Liberal Dilemma in South Africa. Edited by Pierre L. van den Berghe. *London: Croom Helm. 1979. 164 pp. £8·50.*

PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE, who has done so much for South African scholarship, has thoughtfully collected a series of papers in honour of Leo Kuper, a distinguished South

African sociologist who emigrated to California in the early 1960s. Leo Kuper deserves to be honoured, as someone who has contributed to the understanding and furtherance of liberal values as as he saw them, and who has been widely liked and respected by those who have known him.

There are two main themes in the book: the place of the intellectual, and the role of liberalism in South Africa. Neither theme is satisfactorily explored in the generally very short essays and not a great deal which is new or stimulating emerges. Heribert Adam explores the six options he considers to have been open to liberals in South Africa: privatism, exile, liberal retreat, the militant-radical stance, change through association, and reformism. Hilda Kuper (the only contributor to make a serious attempt at defining liberalism) defends both the Liberal Party and liberal scholarship from some of the shabbier attacks of the ideological Left. Pierre van den Berghe argues for the impossibility of a liberal solution in that 'rotten, oppressive society' (p. 63). He suggests that although the Liberal Party came in time to differ very little from the African National Congress in its policy, it failed to attract either Whites or Blacks in sufficient numbers to be meaningful. But its failure was a 'glorious' failure. Hamish Dickie-Clark criticises the limited and inadequate 'liberal definition of the situation' in South Africa and especially its concern with freedom rather than equality. Fatima Meer takes a pretty wide swipe at sociology in general and South African sociology in particular as being the left-hand of capitalism, and argues for a more normative commitment amongst sociologists, while seeking still a science of society. Science in defence of values? Why not? Adam Kuper compares African and European perceptions of Christianity and religion, while Hilstan Watts reports on the attitudes and role of African doctors as an 'educated elite', finding them keeping a low profile politically. Edna Bonacich smartens up an old theme by referring to a 'split labour market analysis' to describe the complex triangular relationships between White labour, Black labour, and Capital in South Africa, which she sees as the co-ordinates of conflict there. Margo Russell and Kogila A. Moodley each look at different aspects of university apartheid. The former carefully analyses the various reactions of South African academics during the period (1950-65) when the 'Open Universities' were under attack, while the latter shows how politicised the separate ethnic colleges have become—contrary to government hopes—and how Black student unity has prospered despite the separate colleges.

Despite some interesting points, the overall effect is a bit flat. The title may be a little misleading. Few of the 'big' issues in the liberal dilemma (of the kind which Socrates, Locke, Mill, and Arendt would confront) are explored: what is the proper relationship between the individual (academic or not) and the State? where does or should the liberal stand in relation to legality in a totalitarian society? are violence and liberalism incompatible and, if so, why? was South African liberalism the political expression of capitalist interests or was it a kind of local Fabianism with even less contact with a Labour body? And would it not have been a good idea for someone to review and assess Leo Kuper's work, for many of these were problems with which he was concerned? They might have provided a more stimulating framework of issues for the essays to wrestle with in honouring such a fine man.

University of York ADRIAN LEFTWICH

Year of Fire, Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a Revolution? By Baruch Hirson. *London: Zed Press. 1979. 348 pp. (Africa Series No. 3) £12·95. Pb: £3·95.*

One Azania, One Nation: The National Question in South Africa. By No Sizwe. *London: Zed. 1979. 215 pp. £8·50. Pb: £2·95.*

BARUCH HIRSON was a political prisoner in South Africa for most of a decade as a

result of his opposition to apartheid. His commitment to a real understanding of 'the latest in a long history of school boycotts and strikes' (p. 286) means he gives a highly critical analysis of the role of African groups and organisations in the Soweto Revolt of 1976.

In the Introduction, Mr Hirson refers to the interconnection between the violent confrontation over the government requirement that Afrikaans should be the medium of instruction for half of all subjects above the elementary school level, and both long-term grievances and more immediate domestic and external developments. His account of the uprising attributes particular significance to the latter developments.

The timing and character of the Soweto Revolt are explained in part by the changes in attitude and expectation of young Africans deriving primarily from the wave of strikes between 1973 and 1976 and also from the influence of the Black Consciousness Movement and events in Mozambique and Angola. Thus when on top of 'the chaotic conditions following the quadrupling of numbers allowed to enter the secondary schools' (p. 286). Afrikaans, a language in which many African teachers were not trained, which lacked the vocational utility of English and which had negative associations with state oppression, was imposed without consultation and against the vehement opposition of pupils, teachers and parents, the revolt erupted.

In this study, the author illuminates some key problems within, between and surrounding African movements and organisations resisting apartheid. He discusses the ideological, organisational and tactical weaknesses of the most structured of the three main groups concerned with the uprising (the others being the school students whose organisation experienced frequent changes of leadership and police harassment and African workers who had little formal organisation), the Black Consciousness Movement and associated bodies like the Black Peoples' Convention. Mr Hirson is sharply critical of the Movement's stress upon individual rather than group identity, its rejection of a class analysis, and of the Black Peoples' Convention lack of radicalism and inadequate definition of objectives and means for their attainment. He also censures the Black Consciousness organisations for their failure to establish effective ties with African workers and pupils and the latter for their similar shortcomings in relation to the workers. These failures are persuasively argued to have decisively weakened the impact of specific actions during the Revolt, so that although the struggles overlapped in time, they were often 'light years apart in orientation' (p. 157).

Mr Hirson's study, while reflecting constraints in access to participants in, and records of the events of 1976, and being too demanding in its assessment of Black Consciousness organisations, provides a very competent and thoughtful account of the Soweto Revolt.

No Sizwe, the author's pseudonym, was according to the publisher's biographical note a political prisoner on Robben Island for many years. The central argument of *One Azania, One Nation* is that agreement by opponents of apartheid, at the strategic and tactical levels, about who constitutes the South African nation is a necessary condition for effective resistance to that system. This book has the very ambitious objective of furnishing elements of the answer to the question of national unity.

Following a critical survey of the National Party's evolving theory of nationality and its Bantustan strategy, Sizwe elucidates conceptual and strategic weaknesses in the approach of those seeking to end apartheid. He cogently argues that any ideology, which views the people of South Africa as being composed of a number of nations and races, even one which unambiguously rejects notions of conflict between those nations or domination by any one of them, has serious difficulty in countering the divisive theories and strategies of the Nationalists.

Consistent with his Marxist analysis, the author observes that racial prejudice can be described and explained 'without once having to concede the existence of a quasi-

reality called race' (p. 136). He notes that in the 1950s and 1960s the group most conscious of the theoretical need to form a non-racial organisation, namely the Non-European Movement, had little weight in the liberation movement (p. 115).

Sizwe makes a number of assertions and judgments which are not especially convincing. He suggests at one point that the revolutionary struggle led by the working class will secure the support of 'large numbers of white workers, especially Afrikaans-speaking workers, (p. 157) and elsewhere indicates the overthrow of apartheid 'means nothing else than the abolition of capitalism itself' (p. 178). Overall the author is much more successful in illustrating the weaknesses at the theoretical level of the liberation movement(s) than in showing why his prescription for fundamental change in South Africa should be considered more feasible than others.

University of Keele DAN KEOHANE

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence. Edited by Lawrence Ward Beer. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1979. 210 pp. £11·25.*

THE Committee on Asian Law of the Association for Asian Studies held a bicentennial programme in the spring of 1976 on 'Asian perspectives on the American constitutional influence in Asia'. Here eight Asian experts explain their respective territories' indebtedness to the United States Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Amendments of 1791, and judicial developments thereafter. It is an impressive story. The United States Constitution has had an impact, deep-seated and profound, on the fundamental laws of practically all the Asiatic countries that have recently attained their statehood, as well as of Japan (p. 177). No doubt Bangladesh (A. S. Chowdhury), Indonesia (O. S. Adji), Malaysia (Tun M. Suffian bin Hasim), and Singapore (S. Jayakumar) reveal little direct dependence on American inspiration, in contrast to Korea and the Philippines (the latter exhaustively treated by E. M. Fernando). But the common-law tradition, derived via the Inns of Court, directly from the spirit of Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights, finds continual expression under often adverse conditions, for where poverty is the general enemy not only American, but also English and Commonwealth precedents, can be less than compelling (p. 178). The editor rightly sets out one object of the enquiry, how far American influence has turned out to be relevant, and by what instrumentalities it is effective.

The studies are varied in style and weight. The most elegant is that by Fernando, centred on the Philippines, a little-known field, where admiration for the judges (as in Pakistan) will be inspired in every reader. The most intriguing is that by the universally acknowledged expert on India, P. K. Tripathi. In a small space the troubles of the Supreme Court in its long conflict with the legislature (whom Tripathi favours) are summarised with finely selected documentation; even the traumatic 'Emergency' is handled tactfully. Economic necessity is forcing constitution-makers and amenders to acknowledge a judicial expertise which is in large part derived from the Anglo-American law-world; and even in those territories which favour presidential rule there are large areas where those techniques flourish.

As usual, the extraordinary nature of Japan's experience (N. Ukai) claims bewildering attention: a special eclecticism enables authoritarian ideas to survive, enveloped in a sincere and widespread desire to educate the nation in respect for fundamental rights. Attention is given to the question how far, 'state action' apart,

citizens can be forced to apply *between themselves* standards binding on the state under the written constitution.

The volume is beautifully produced, with an excellent bibliography.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London J. DUNCAN M. DERRETT

Modern Sri Lanka: A Society in Transition. Edited by Tissa Fernando and Robert* N. Kearney. *Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 1979. 297 pp. (Foreign and Comparative Studies/South Asian Series, No. 4.) Pb.*

THIS intriguing volume on the society, culture, and institutions of Sri Lanka will appeal to anyone with an interest in the non-Western world. It is the work of seven Sri Lankan and four American scholars. The thirteen essays, most of which are short but substantive, are intended to introduce important topics to the general reader and to convey some sense of the problems being tackled in research. Both novices and specialists will find that most contributions succeed admirably.

It opens with a cogent introduction to the island's geography, society, history, and culture by the editors. Tissa Fernando then offers an essay on social stratification which is valuable despite its failure to integrate the crucial recent research of Patrick Peebles. C. H. S. Jayewardene follows with a useful chapter on demographic trends. Robert Kearney takes up this and other themes in a characteristically solid piece on politics and modernisation. This is nicely complemented by a chapter of admirable clarity on the difficult topic of religion, politics, and the Sinhalese national myth by Donald E. Smith. The division of labour between Kearney and Smith apparently prevented the latter from setting down his ideas on the secularisation of the island's politics by the 1970s. This is a pity for, although this reviewer rejects Smith's views, they make stimulating readings.

N. Balakrishnan has written a survey of the economy over three decades which is good value, despite the fact that his notion of its dualistic structure at independence has been overtaken by the recent findings of Eric Meyer. This is followed by a helpful chapter on education by Swarna Jayaweera and a clear, elegant essay on kinship and rites of passage by Geraldine Gamburd. She takes us inside a family ritual and vididly brings home to Western readers the cultural gap that separates them from Sri Lankan society—which may seem in some ways rather Westernised. Swarna Jayaweera then presents a second study, as sound as the first, this time on the role of women.

The volume is completed by four chapters on cultural topics. The first is a dreadfully over-written attempt by John Ross Carter to take us inside the Buddhist tradition. It is a well-intentioned piece, but badly needs severe editing. In radical contrast is a study of popular religions by Gananath Obeyesekere who seldom writes anything but *tours de force*. Readers will find that he expects a lot of them, but if they stay the course, they will come across insights of real depth. Siri Gunasinghe then offers a lively, lucid chapter on art and architecture. This is followed by an ambitious, impressive survey of the Sinhala literary tradition from ancient times to the present by Ranjini Obeyesekere. This has important implications for the study of Sri Lanka's history and politics, enriching our understanding of some of the themes raised by Smith.

University of Leicester JAMES MANOR

Mass Movement in a Chinese Village: Ten Mile Inn. *by Isabel and David Crook. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1979. 291 pp. £6·95.*

The People's Republic of China After Thirty Years: An Overview. Edited by Joyce K. Kallgren. *Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California. 1979. 122 pp. (China Research Monograph, No. 15.) Pb: $5.00.*

THESE two works differ in almost every respect. The first is the third volume of a trilogy whose authors are delightfully described as the 'Crooks of Pekin' in an extract from the review of the second volume on the dust cover. They are not to be confused with the criminal Gang of Four. The volumes cover the events in the Chinese countryside in which is located the village of Ten Mile Inn, liberated in the early 1940s, and which underwent a seven-week campaign of land reform in 1948. The events of this campaign, in which the authors participated, are described vividly in this volume. The use of direct speech, graphic description of the settings and participants with over fifty snap-shot photographs bring these events to life. There is no explanation of the way in which the mass of detail was recorded or how far the details have been imaginatively reconstructed after such a long passage of time. What emerges clearly from the account is the poverty-line existence of the villagers; the cultural backwardness inherited by them from feudal ages; the almost complete lack of political experience and of effective political institutions at the local level. The army plays a shadowy role in these pages although other evidence suggests that it served for most of this time (and long afterwards) as the main social and political structure in which this and similar villages existed.

The second work is a symposium of five essays summarising key national policies and experiences of the thirty years since 1949. Two cover the development of political institutions, the party, ideology, leadership and politics mainly at the national level; one deals with the economy and the available statistical evidence about its performance during the thirty years; the final two essays cover domestic and foreign policy matters. The first essay provides a general picture of the changes that have occurred in the formal structure of the political institutions and sets the tone for the remaining essays. The theme is that, in spite of many difficulties, the positive results of the three decades can be seen in the maintenance of a high degree of unity in such an enormous society and in the resilience it has shown in rapid recovery from what must have appeared at the time as crippling disasters. The title describes the work as an 'overview' and the use of various models in the essays tends to give a picture of life in China remote from the close-up view of it in Ten Mile Inn. Nevertheless, the essays have direct topicality and reach into the prospects for the 1980s, in which the strains on party, government and economic institutions may be much more severe than those they have so far survived. The main danger is seen to be in the drive to achieve the targets of the four modernisations which may run ahead so fast as to lead to major imbalances in the economy from which it has suffered so much in these thirty years. A minor imbalance may mean intolerable suffering for ten or more million people in such an enormous society.

But the reader is warned not to be misled by the recurrent, exaggerated critical reports such, for example, as have been directed at the Gang of Four, which are designed to serve the interests of particular factions in internal political conflicts and are seldom true assessments of recent past events. How then should we assess the past and the even more confusing present of China? Reading the account of events in Ten Mile Inn one is left with the impression that socialist virtue was bound to prevail over evil in spite of the daunting obstacles it faced. The authors of the five essays accept that the main line of development in China during the thirty years has been towards the establishment of a socialist order against all the pressures of nationalism and tradition. The major purpose of the First Five Year Plan was the establishment of the economic

foundations for a socialist political order, and the Great Leap Forward was an attempt to accelerate the pace of advance which failed. The harmful economic effects of the Cultural Revolution are brushed aside as having been 'frequently exaggerated'. We are left then in some doubt about what would amount to a satisfactory basis for a socialist political order in China. But the authors have brought together in this monograph a valuable summary of existing studies of China since 1949 and suggested some ways in which we may be able soon to formulate our own answers to this basic question. For that one must be grateful.

University of Leicester M. HOOKHAM

Value Changes in Chinese Society. Edited by Richard W. Wilson, Amy Auerbacher and Sydney L. Greenblatt. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 309 pp. £14·00.*

The China Difference. Edited by Ross Terrill. *Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside; New York, London: Harper and Row. 1979. 335 pp. £5·95.*

BOTH these books are collections of articles concerning values and value change in contemporary Chinese society. However, that common focus is really the end of their similarity, and the publication of one by no means hinders the production of the other. For a start, the volume edited by Wilson, Wilson and Greenblatt does not confine itself to a consideration of the People's Republic of China, but also examines values and value change in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Chinese culture more generally. On the other hand, *The China Difference* assesses the People's Republic not only in the context of China's own past, but also by reference to Western, or rather American, society.

The underlying contrast between these two books is provided by the question which, to a large extent lies at the heart of both: namely 'where is the real China to be found?' Fortunately, neither provides an answer for there clearly is no single China in any but the simplest of political senses. It is the variety and range of Chinese society and culture which impresses, not its uniformity, and neither book attempts to impose a single vision of China as a framework for its contributions. The result, each in its own way, is a rich and lively debate about the nature of contemporary China. Nevertheless, the search for 'the real China' remains an underlying theme in both collections and leaves the reader with at least two important untreated problems.

Value Change in Chinese Society is the product of the second inter-disciplinary social science conference on China organised, more or less on a freelance basis, by Richard Wilson, Sydney Greenblatt, and Amy Auerbacher Wilson. For their initiative and hard work alone they are to be congratulated. The academic community in general, and sinologists in particular, owe all three a debt which especially in an era of economic recession should be acknowledged.

This particular collection contains sections on Chinese value orientations seen through Confucianism, language, socialisation and the use of models for emulation (an interesting chapter but far too short); the change of values in agriculture and industry, in architecture, and towards the family and sex; and finally the change and conflict of values in the People's Republic of China for the newly emergent social groupings, within the Mass Organisations, and within the health-care system. By and large it is the chapters on the People's Republic which are of greatest interest and hence most convincing—if, for reasons of size alone, other Chinese settings are somewhat marginal. Taiwan and Hong Kong have undoubtedly been more accessible for the social scientist in the past. However, the extent to which Chinese culture in general can be assessed by investigations of relatively small and isolated communities must remain an open question. If, as stated in the preface, this volume is to contribute to our

understanding of the modern Chinese, then this problem must at least be addressed and not just simply ignored.

Where *Value Change in Chinese Society* is clearly directed at the academic market, *The China Difference* is just as clearly aimed at a more popular one. Fortunately for the reader, it does not, as its cover proclaims present 'A portrait of life today inside the country of one billion'. On the contrary, its authors are well aware of the problems of talking about 'China', and provide instead different portraits of different lives and different views of China. Thus, there is, for example, an excellent and stimulating section on questions of human rights and law by Professors Klein, Li, and Cohen. Apart from anything else their three chapters highlight the question of whether values are universal, country-specific, or whether China alone is a special case—as is sometimes argued.

Asked to write a contribution, fifteen of the United State's most prominent sinologists have produced an admirably readable introduction to China. Some have dwelt on the continuities or otherwise with China's past, some on the similarities or differences when China is compared to the West. What emerges strongly is fifteen different views of China, but this is the book's strength. There is, however, little consideration of the differences *within* China, but this perhaps is another book. In addition to the section already mentioned there are those on the Mind of China, Tradition and Change, Daily Life, and Culture. Ross Terrill is to be congratulated for editing this collection, which should be of great use to the undergraduate as well as the general reader.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne DAVID S. G. GOODMAN

The Chinese Military System: An Organisational Study of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. By Harvey W. Nelsen. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press; London: Thornton Cox. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Seeley, Service, London.) 266 pp. $18.00. £11·00.*

WESTERN analyses of Chinese military politics have progressed considerably from the early post-1949 hypotheses which posited a complete identity of interests between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Developments subsequent to the Korean War and the Peng Dehuai Affair of 1959, for example, generated fresh hypotheses to the effect that the PLA had 'professional' or 'expert' organisational interests divergent from those—'political' or 'red'—of the CCP. Later, the revelations of the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Biao Affair Demonstrated that the PLA was no organisational monolith and that it too had been subject to the horizontal, regional and generational cleavages which had developed in Chinese society and politics since 1949.

Dr Nelsen's contribution is an attempt to describe the PLA's internal organisation and to analyse the extent to which the operational efficiency of its organisational structure has been effected by the tortuous path of Chinese politics from 1966 to 1976. After an introductory overview of the Chinese military system, separate chapters examine provincial and regional military administration, the central High Command, the PLA's main forces, 'Military Life' the Air and Naval forces, the paramilitary Militia and Production-Construction Corps and the relationship between national security and foreign policy. The concluding chapter briefly examines the PLA's fulfillment of its political, socio-economic and national security functions. Useful appendices contain charts of infantry unit organisation.

The main virtues of the book lie in two areas. First, Dr Nelsen has brought together in coherent form an abundance of material which has hitherto been available only in scattered periodical literature or in reports and papers by the US Departments of

Defence and State with whom he worked in the 1960s. As a standard work of reference, Dr Nelsen's book will fulfill a valuable role for some time to come, particularly given the current emphasis on defence modernisation in the PRC.

Secondly, the author has amplified, extended and brought up to date his earlier original work on intra-PLA cleavages and organisational divisions. The significance of organisational bases of conflict within the PLA and between the PLA and other actors in China's polity cannot be underrated and his book will provide a student new to the topic with a very useful introduction.

Does the book succeed in fulfilling its stated objectives? The answer is affirmative. Dr Nelsen intended to produce a study of the military system which would follow logically from earlier introductory studies, for example, Gitting's path breaking *The Role of the Chinese Army* (RIAA, 1967). This he has done admirably. Unlike some writers who portray armies as the dullest of political organisms, he writes with a refreshing style which will encourage undergraduates and the like to persevere with the subject. As to his particular conclusions, they are well argued and mostly consistent with the available evidence which suggests that military organisation was a major casualty of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), and that the 'Civic Action' roles of the PLA have been greatly overemphasised in past studies. Specialists however, may find his critique of Whitson's theories to be under-developed and worthy of a little further refinement. However, this is a mere quibble about an otherwise excellent book.

University of Bristol DAVID CHAMBERS

Trading with China: A Practical Guide. Edited by Colina MacDougall. *New York, London: McGraw-Hill. 1980. 278 pp. £12·00.*

THE publication of a guide through the maze which China still is has been long overdue. During the two decades when the great gardener Mao watched with growing concern the country's weed patches of its 'hundred flowers', their blossoms grew pale and their fruits full of poison. It required a change of management before a new burst of blooms became possible and the spring fairs at Guanzhou ceased to be mere shows of artificial flower arrangements.

In the last few seasons the Chinese and their Western partners have become buyers and sellers of increasing quantities and varieties of goods and services. This has brought a rapidly growing number of Western traders and technicians as well as brokers and bankers to China and it has taken Chinese missions to Japan, Western Europe and America. In the course of these exchanges it soon emerged that the ignorance of each others' abilities and expectations was staggering. Vacillations between euphoria and despondency became a common feature on both sides of the newly discovered frontier. In China, this goes by the name of the 'four modernisations', embracing agriculture, still the country's 'foundation'; industry, now, as before, its 'chief sector' and its main customer for scarce capital resources; defense against enemies real and imagined; and science and technology, the handmaiden of each one of them. This is where guidance across the frontier becomes a *sine qua non*.

In the long years during which China-watchers and tourists alike could get no nearer the mainland than the fence erected in the village of Sha Tau Kok or the Crown Colony's watch tower at the Shum Chun river, Colina MacDougall, the editor of *Trading with China*, was one of those trying to winnow fact from fiction when the daily bag of news from China arrived at her desk at the Far Eastern Economic Review. At times she got things wrong—all of us did—but she has learned a great deal since those early days. Her 'practical guide' contains mainly the nuts and bolts of the

business with China. General assessments and reassessments are less in demand these days. Thus the contributors to the guide are chiefly practical people concerned with commerce, banking, shipping, exhibitions, translation services as well as legal and tax affairs. Among the authors, Christopher Howe of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London is the only academic. His introduction is followed by Nicolas Ludlow's useful list of sources of reference. Among those he lists, erroneously as it turned out, the second (statistical) volume of the report of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress is still not available. Other essential references, including names and addresses of Chinese trading organisations supplement an altogether useful collection of essential data. In his forecasts, Nicolas Wolfers tends to err a little on the side of optimism, but on the whole the volume is realistic in its assessment. The chapter on the legal aspects of joint ventures has been overtaken by events, though. This incident points to the need for revisions, preferably presented from time to time in a pocket paperback edition, which might even allow for updating in the form of exchangeable pages on the Keesing model.

St Antony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977. By Yitzhak Shichor. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Centre for International Studies, LSE. 1979. 268 pp. £12·00.*

IN the more than thirty years of Western analysis of Chinese Communist foreign policy there has developed an increasingly significant gap in the literature: the study of Peking's attitude towards the Middle East. Perhaps because of the difficulty in mastering not only Chinese sources, but also Arabic and Western (including Israeli) the subject has previously been treated in little more than a passing fashion. This gap in the analysis of China has now been more than adequately filled by an impressively comprehensive study by an Israeli scholar. Dr Shichor has brought together a vast array of Chinese, Arab and Western material and produced a balanced and thoughtful examination of the subject.

The author's analysis assumes an historical format, tracing Chinese policy towards the Middle East from before the Communists assumption of power. The perspective is sympathetic to Peking's perceptions, noting the Chinese term of 'West Asia' for the area we call the Middle East. Dr Shichor argues that even though China has been unable or unwilling to increase its presence in the area, it has consistently seen 'West Asia' as important. Several aspects of this excellent book stand out as especially notable.

The section on the Chinese Communists' attitude before 1949 and the contacts with Israel in the early 1950s provides fascinating detail on a much ignored aspect of the subject. However, Shichor is at his strongest when suggesting key concepts in China's approach to the Middle East. For example, he sees an important key to understanding Peking's policy in an appreciation of what is perceived as the 'main contradiction'; that between the local states and imperialism (both the United States and Russia). This has led China to minimise the importance of the political nature of local states while stressing the specific stance they assume against the United States and Soviet Union. Thus China's policy in the Middle East can be understood as a reaction to global events rather than to local conflicts. For example, the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute was seen as more important than the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and China's interest in the area increased in the early 1970s as a result of the perception of growing Soviet expansionism in the area, rather than any alteration in the local balance of power.

Another crucial concept emphasised by Shichor is that the Middle East was more

important to China than China was to the Middle East. This did not result in Peking sending large scale aid to the area as the Chinese did not perceive their interests as being best served by such a policy. Shichor stresses that concentration on aid figures and traditional super-power measures of influence are not particularly relevant to understanding China's role in the Middle East. However, the Arab states' desire for concrete aid programmes in the Western mould continues to be a major reason for their minimising ties to Peking. Therefore, despite recent talk of increased Chinese involvement, especially with Egypt, Dr Shichor argues that China's profile in the area will remain low. It is precisely in this appreciation of Chinese and Arab perceptions that this book excels, and should earn the author a wide audience.

University of Wales, Aberystwyth GERALD SEGAL

Japan, Korea, and China: American Perceptions and Policies. By William Watt *et al. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough, Hants.) 154 pp. £10·50.*

EVEN under the best of circumstances, a policy-relevant analysis of American perceptions and policies towards Japan, Korea and China is a mammoth task; let alone in 154 pages. In this case the authors attempt to study (1) the nature of American ties with Japan, Korea, and China; (2) the climate of opinion within the United States towards these countries; and (3) suggest new policy directions (p. viii). The book is divided into a section on each of the three states, and the opinion-poll data for the sections dealing with American opinions was obtained in April 1977 and April 1978. Thus, if we accept the inherent limitations in attempting such a large task in such a short space, we can be more sympathetic to the result.

The section on Japan provides a moderate, conventional review of current relations between the United States and Japan. Based on poll data, it suggests that the American public shows a 'level of realism, sophistication, and pragmatic good sense' on foreign policy issues towards Japan (p. 38). The data also indicates that the American public wants Washington to come to the defense of Japan and not Korea or Taiwan (pp. 38-40); wants American troops to stay in Japan (p. 42); and generally views Japan favourably (pp. 46-47). In a phrase typical of the middle ground assumed throughout this book, the authors suggest that the outlook for Japanese-American relations is 'reassuring yet cautionary' (pp. 54-55).

The smaller sections on Korea and China also adopt the cautious approach to policy suggestions. Furthermore both sections suffer significantly from the passage of time. The Korean case, and especially its polling data, is distorted by the 'Koreagate' scandal and the question of American troop withdrawals from South Korea. Both issues, and hence the discussion in the text, are far less relevant today. In the China section the detailed analysis of whether to normalise relations with Peking is even more dated as is the poll data on the issue. Such problems of anachronistic discussions are rather significant in a policy-relevant text. The authors state that previous studies of American perceptions of China suffered from the same problem: for example, the analyses before 1971 on the issue of whether China should be seated in the United Nations (p. 125). The state of the art is apparently not much improved.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth GERALD SEGAL

Japan and the United States: Challenges and Opportunities. Edited by Williams J. Barnds. *London: Macmillan for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1980. 286 pp. £12·00.*

THIS book is a collection of six papers presented at a series of Council of Foreign

Relations discussion meetings in 1977-78, on the subject of strains on the United States-Japanese relationship caused by the erosion of American economic competitiveness and military supremacy in the Pacific. The Council meetings were a response to growing concern over whether and how well the relationship could bear the pressure of constant trade conflicts and military insecurity, and the six specialists called on to present papers reflect that American anxiety. There is an underlying aim—to educate and explain the domestic political and economic forces shaping Japanese foreign policy, and an underlying purpose—to warn America of the consequences of letting Japan down, either by going back on the economic principles taught to Japan, or on the military security promised to her.

Two chapters deal specifically with the alliance, one gives a general summary of the challenges ahead, particularly the shared task of managing the international economic system, the other, by I. M. Destler, deals with a specific issue—the trade crisis of 1977. Destler questions whether American pressure on Japan then was really necessary and warns against the tendency to follow the 'black ship' or high pressure scenario in trade negotiations. Such tactics mean short-term success at the price of more hysteria and suspicion. Japan, too, in response to foreign pressure has to 'create a framework for deciding when and where to make adjustments', according to W. Rapp and R. Feldman in the chapter on 'Japan's Economic Strategy and Prospects'. Japan's dilemma is to decide whether to frustrate its own efficient and logical economic development because of poor competitive responses from the United States and the EEC. The authors are fairly optimistic about Japan's capacity to overcome the future constraints on growth—the aging of the population and energy supplies—which are so widely feared now in Japan.

Gerald L. Curtis is more pessimistic in his analysis of trends in Japanese domestic politics. He envisages the diversification of political power, following the loss by the Liberal-Domocrats of their political monopoly leading to an ever more protracted decision-making process, and the 'domestication' of foreign policy issues. While Japanese foreign policy will remain essentially reactive, it will become increasingly difficult for any Japanese government 'to mobilize broad support for any departure in policy characterized as a defensive response to a threatening and hostile situation'.

Two final chapters deal with defence and security issues in the Far East, prompted by concern for changing military balances in the region. According to Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's confidence in the American security guarantee, and perceptions of the strategic environment in the area are in the process of change. He offers four scenarios, ranging from 'successful detente' to 'radical deterioration', of how Japan's defence policy might develop, and concludes that Japan is looking neither for an opportunity to rearm nor to move away from its alliance with the United States, but that American policy is pushing Japan into a vulnerable position. His warning is that, 'if American policy becomes a bluff, so does Japan's. And Japan stands to lose much more heavily . . . if that bluff is called.' In the final chapter, William J. Barnds, emphasises the shared responsibility of the two countries for stability in the Far East. He runs through the main issues—from relations with ASEAN, to Vietnam, to China, pointing out where the United States-Japanese interests lie in each case and when they differ, and argues that the difficult problems for the relationship could arise if either country ignores the needs of the other in dealing with the key issues in Asia.

In the authors' efforts to make Americans see the Japanese side, they often bend over backwards to avoid apportioning blame to Japan, and place a very heavy burden of responsibility on the United States for keeping the alliance intact. The essays are clear and well-written summaries of the issues troubling the relationship, and the speculation on future courses and policy recommendations contribute to our knowledge of what should be done, even if not exactly how to do it. The book would be useful to students of international relations and enlightening to those concerned with

the European-Japanese conflict, because it puts Japan's policy toward the EEC in the broader context.

Chatham House MAUREEN WHITE

The Japanese Challenge: The Success and Failure of Economic Success. By Herman Kahn and Thomas Pepper. *New York: Crowell; London: Harper and Row. 1979.*

THE slowdown in economic growth which has occurred in all the advanced capitalist countries has brought special problems for Japan. Starting from a higher growth rate of about 10 per cent, the slowdown still means growth at 5-6 per cent per annum, much in excess of American or British experience. Herman Kahn believes in economic growth as being good, and tends to discredit antigrowth sentiments. The question he addresses in this book concerns Japan's ability to recover from the current state of low growth, its lack of firm commitment to future growth, and the rising tide of environmentalist antigrowth sentiment.

As is now the house-style at Hudson Institute, various scenarios are presented as likely outcomes: a reversion to an austere lifestyle; a welfare-leisure orientation; or a business-as-usual Japan. These three outcomes are likely to lead to low or moderate growth and leave the overhang of excess capacity which exists today untouched. The authors prefer what they label Yonzensō Japan: a bold plan to increase the growth rate by supplying social infrastructure—houses, roads, hospitals—with which Japan is underprovided. They feel that unless such bold commitment is made in the form of a Fourth National Plan superceding the current Third Plan, Japan is likely to recede into a xenophobic-nationalist Japan or an antigrowth Japan.

The various scenarios are dealt with in more or less detail. After noting the collapse of growth and the rise of antigrowth sentiments as reported in opinion surveys, structural problems of Japan are outlined. A major problem is the confidence that continued growth at previous high rates is possible. But the pursuit of gross national product (GNP) has left many gaps in housing, in social infrastructure-activities which yield low growth per unit of capital invested or which carry low weight in terms of a market-price biased measure such as GNP. Also the Japanese have been averse to taking growth for granted and consumption has lagged behind increases in income. The collapse of growth has reinforced this risk-averse attitude, and hence continued growth requires rising exports since the domestic market is limited.

The discussion of alternatives is in rather broad terms, and relies much on compound interest-rate projections than detailed analysis. Only the chapter on Business-as-usual Japan is substantial enough to be of any value. Here the authors argue that given the investment trends of the past twenty-five years, a continuation of current policies will lead to growth only at about 6 per cent, per annum. and this will leave a lot of excess capacity. This will in turn affect business confidence adversely.

The authors' favourite Yonzensō Programme solution is outlined very sketchily. The notion is that Japan can catch up with other advanced capitalist countries in facilities like housing, etc. While it is true that these goods absorb a lot of investment, it is not at all clear that the growth rate is raised sufficiently by the kind of sums proposed. What is also not clear is that the current excess capacity is in industries which will be major input suppliers in these activities. Much more detailed demonstration is required before the authors' argument can convince. What they offer is the faith that a commitment to growth is necessary to get growth, but not much more.

London School of Economics Meghnad DESAI

ASEAN Economies in Perspective: A Comparative Study of Indonesia, Malaysia the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. By John Wong. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 217 pp. £8·95. Pb: £3·95.*

THE Association of South East Asian Nations, formed in 1967 after the end of 'confrontation' between Malaysia and Indonesia, has been seen increasingly as a potential political and economic force since the end of the Vietnam war. John Wong's book is an attempt to view the ASEAN economies as an integral whole for the benefit of a wide, non-specialist readership. In this, it succeeds admirably.

Wong's rationale for treating the five ASEAN economies as an entity is that they are all still heavily dependent on external trade yet trying to diversify away from primary commodity exports. The book does not subscribe to the view that such exports have been a force for 'underdevelopment'. Nevertheless, they have created a lopsided production structure, vulnerable to world price fluctuations and to declining terms of trade in relation to manufactures. Considerable moves have been made in the ASEAN countries towards diversification of the range of commodity exports themselves, which is often useful in reducing vulnerability to price fluctuations. Though much trade is still in 'colonial' products, markets are not predominantly found in the former colonial powers—Japan and the United States being more important customers.

After establishing the role of foreign trade, Wong moves to industrialisation. There the attempt at an overview is supplemented by short country studies of policy towards industry and foreign investment. Rural development is considered in a separate chapter, which stresses the dangers of squeezing the subsistance sector.

Wong's book would be very useful for undergraduates as an example of liberal development economies in action, particularly his tracing of the difficult process of moving from import-substituting industrialisation towards export manufacturing. Thus the Philippines has had a legacy of industrial inefficiency since the 1950s. Malaysia retains pockets of highly inappropriate activity such as its motor-vehicle assembly industry with a multiplicity of makes and models for a small domestic market. Singapore has achieved industrial export expansion to the virtual exclusion of wholly local firms. Businessmen and economists will appreciate the addition of nearly seventy pages of statistical appendices, from sources often otherwise inaccessible.

Underneath the author's (almost excessively) moderate approach to policy-making some hints of criticism and pessimism about ASEAN's development performance can be detected. The situation regarding poverty and maldistribution of income, and the closely associated need for employment creation, is showing little improvement. A partial exception is Malaysia, but there it is connected with 'restructuring' in favour of ethnic Malays, a policy which is now incurring the cost of a shortfall in private local and foreign investment. Ambiguous policies towards foreign investment in Thailand and Indonesia have reduced their capital inflows, and many businessmen may agree with Wong that simplified administrative procedures are the best investment incentive of all. There has been a limited growth of trade within ASEAN, but much of it is still between Malaysia and Singapore. Ironically, intra-ASEAN industrial exports often face higher effective rates of tariff protection than those imposed by Western countries, and genuine industrial co-operation is still in its infancy.

University of East Anglia, Norwich JOHN THOBURN

Politics and Government in Malaysia. By R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy. *Singapore: Federal Publications for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 1978. 406 pp.*

Malaysia and Singapore: the Building of New States. By Stanley S. Bedlington. *Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1979. 285 pp.*

A NEW generation of textbooks on the Malaysian political system was probably due, but not necessarily overdue, after the collapse of the original inter-racial bargain in 1969 and the elaboration in the early seventies of a more pro-Malay, more comprehensive and coercive 'consensus'. Any doubts about the need for up-to-date analysis in this form might relate to the fact that the National Front—the enlarged governing coalition which superseded the old Alliance formally during the election year of 1974—had only contested that one election by the time the two volumes under review were being rounded off for publication at the end of 1976. It is the nature of any up-to-date book to become quickly outdated, yet Professor Milne and Dr Mauzy have exposed themselves to criticism more than sympathy on that score by giving such climactic emphasis to the year 1976 as almost to imply that by that date Malaysian politics had found its definitive mould. Since then Parti Islam, the corner-stone of Tun Razak's politico-economic strategy, has been expelled from the National Front and the Front has won a new election without it (1978). So much for the perils of communalist 'out-bidding' of government programmes from outside the consensus!

In truth, *Politics and Government in Malaysia* is a work of no small value particularly for political science students specialising on Malaysia at undergraduate or graduate level. At first sight the judicious Professor from the University of British Columbia has simply mobilised one of his doctoral students to help him update *Government and Politics in Malaysia* (Houghton Mifflin, 1967), but there is more to it than that. The revised edition is longer by some 150 pages, with a greater amount of detail and documentation generally (though the earlier years are beginning to retreat into the background shadows) and an extraordinary wealth of new information about party organisation.

We may have the authors' partnership to thank for the fact that the power of the Rulers to veto changes in Malay Special Rights since 1957 is stated unambiguously (p. 98; cf. the partial and misleading reference in Milne 1967, p. 146), or that we get at least a passing reference to the fact that there were State Assembly elections before 1955 (p. 142; cf. the error in the old edition, p. 95). There are only minor inaccuracies. Under the 1948 citizenship rules not only foreign-born Chinese *but also first-generation locally born* had to apply for citizenship (*pace* Milne and Mauzy, p. 30). However, *ius sanguinis* was extended to the children of citizens in 1948 (see Federation of Malaya Agreement, 124 (i) (f)) and some non-Malay children gained the benefit of it, at least temporarily, whereas the authors say (p. 38) that *ius sanguinis* was first conceded in 1957. Some figures for opposition candidacies in the 1969 and 1974 elections appear also to be in error.

At a more general level one will welcome, *inter multa alia*, the observations on the decline of 'psychological feudalism' (i.e. rank-and-file deference) in the United Malays National Organisation, and the importance of its conflict with the People's Action Party of Singapore (PAP) in launching the factional dissidence which has been with UMNO ever since. The violence of 13 May 1969 is described with a delicacy verging on distortion, but the point may be well taken that the riots were less important in themselves than the interpretation which the government placed upon them subsequently. However, the Constitutional changes of 1971, the national ideology, the National Consultative Committee, the National Front and the whole 'more realistic' approach to race relations may be less the *means* whereby Malay advantage is maximised than, rather, legitimating devices for an exercise of uncompromising

political will backed by implicit physical force; less still are they just a set of measures to 'reduce conflict in the system'. The Malay violence of 1969 should not be played down, for the memory of it defines the terms of every debate in Malaysia today and conditions the style of Malay protagonists even in international academic forums. Are political scientists becoming squeamish about their own subject matter? Perhaps not; but to treat ABIM (the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia) as a socialist phenomenon and ignore the Islamisation of Malay girl students' dress may suggest an element of selective vision.

Dr Bedlington's study is conceived with a rather less specialist audience in mind: let us say, undergraduates studying a number of political systems on a course about developing countries, and journalists, businessmen or aid officials posted to South-east Asia for the first time (the new Cornell series in which the book appears supersedes Professor Kahin's omnibus work, *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia*, last issued in 1964). British readers may regret that Stanley Bedlington, a former British Police officer in Malaya and Sabah but now with the American State Department, has adopted some American mannerisms in the course of his naturalisation (why call a group of PAP Assemblymen 'Assemblypersons', rather than 'MPs' if perchance they were not all men; and what are we to learn from references to the 'sequestering' of funds and property in various contexts?). Furthermore the author appears uncertain in his historical pages whether to blame the British or the Malays' more distant historical environment for their backwardness. But these are minor quibbles. The author strikes an essentially modest balance between personal recollection as a former official and a wide-ranging, objective survey of the politics of not only Malaysia but also Singapore and (briefly) Brunei. To have said, in a relatively short space, practically everything that is germane about the political development of these countries and to have said it in an eminently readable style, without squeamishness—yet without beating an ideological drum as some writers on Singapore, particularly, are prone to do—is an admirable, indeed enviable, feat. It evinces above all a background of sound scholarship and a precise feel for the organisation of *power* in the modern Asian polity.

University of Kent ROGER KERSHAW

Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines. Edited by David A. Rosenberg. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1979. 315 pp. £12·25.*

OBSERVERS of Philippine politics will have been interested to note recently that, in the opinion of President Marcos, a return to democracy in that country apparently depends upon the price of oil and the situation in Kampuchea. They will also have noted, wryly, that for the last two-and-a-half years he has been suggesting a move towards the end of martial law but, the outcome of this year's exercise in limited democracy notwithstanding, it is difficult to see an end to this highly personalised form of emergency rule.

Although hardly the first to discover the principle of the 'Everlasting Crisis', President Marcos has certainly been one of its more successful exponents in Asia. But, in spite of some impressive reforms and developments which are acknowledged, the authors of these essays take a uniformly critical—if not understandably jaundiced—view of the 'New Society'.

A useful synoptic introduction by the editor, David Rosenberg, is followed by a long, substantial and at times brilliant analysis by Jose Veloso Abueva—'Ideology and Practice in the "New Society".' Reminding us how, before Marcos in effect took power in September 1972, the tide had been running against the presidential and in favour of the parliamentary system, Professor Abueva has some honest difficulty not only in understanding how and why the Philippines has abandoned the democratic

form but in giving a name to the phenomenon which has succeeded it. And not only the name, perhaps, but the historical analogies as well. Whether one accepts 'constitutional authoritarianism', 'benevolent centralism' or some other description of President Marcos's regime, it remains remarkably difficult to get the man himself into focus. The emphasis on discipline, noted by Abueva, suggests Franco; the enabling legislation reminds one, unfairly, of Hitler; but, in the concentration of political power and the frequent and sudden excursions into plebiscitary democracy the inescapable comparison must be with Louis Napoleon.

For the most part though, and particularly in the essay by Robert Stauffer on 'The Political Economy of Refeudalization' the authors are more concerned with 'conceptualizing the factors . . . which facilitate the creation of an authoritarian regime' (p. 24); in Stauffer's case this leads to an attempt at developing a rather arid concept first propounded by Galtung and the proposition, or description, of 'dependent authoritarianism'. The three other essays are on 'Constitutionality and Judicial Politics' by Rolando V. del Carmen—in which the new constitution is seen as unconstitutional and the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to avoid conflict; 'The Transformation of Philippine News Media Under Martial Law' by David Rosenberg—in which continuing control of the Philippine press to save it from subversion is seen, at best, as unjustified; and Land Reform by Benedict Kerkvliet, which is seen as camouflage, a function of counter-insurgency rather than emancipation. All in all, then, a study not so much of Hamlet as of princely rule in Denmark. Hardly the worse for that although it does deliberately exclude the factor of insurrection, both as a continuing problem and as a cause or justification for martial law in the first place. And if it is still important to get the image of Marcos and his ambitious lady right, then it seems to be somewhere between that of President Peron and Governor Wallace.

University of Aberdeen ANTHONY SHORT

Illusions of Power: The Fate of a Reform Government. By Michael Sexton. *Sydney, London: Allen and Unwin. 1979. 305 pp. £12·95. Pb: £5·95.*

AMONG the many authors who have taken advantage of evidence available on the workings of Australian government under Gough Whitlam's premiership, Michael Sexton has the rare gift of being able to combine both a stylish presentation and an interesting analysis. He gives a detailed account of the characters involved in the 1972-75 administration—with almost the verve of Theodore White, John Gunther or Anthony Sampson—and a specific thesis that Whitlam made too many concessions to interest groups and that his government failed to hold together sufficiently well in order to impose its priorities in the bureaucracy. Although the evidence he uses comes largely from revelations made by the characters themselves, he also has the advantage of first-hand experience, as private secretary to the Attorney General in 1975.

He adopts the dramatic device of comparing the scene on December 13, 1974 when the Executive Council authorised the Minister for Minerals and Energy to borrow $4,000 million on behalf of the Commonwealth with the scene exactly a year later when Gough Whitlam conceded defeat in the General Election. His next five chapters sketch the lives of the principal actors in the first meeting: Gough Whitlam himself, Jim Cairns, Lionel Murphy, Rex Connor, and the Governor General, Sir John Kerr. In these sketches he describes all the tensions of the Labor Party as a reform organisation. He then follows with an account of the Senate campaign against Whitlam, the damage done by the loans affair, and dismissal of the government by the Governor General.

An important element in the analysis of Whitlam's failure is the author's insistence that the Labor Party is inadequately equipped to identify and tackle the private sources of power in Australian society, particularly the media and the large corporations. Mr

Sexton is convinced that Labor should build up a much more coherent programme of reform. A crucial step in his argument is that Whitlam (pp. 186-87) prevented any systematic approach to policy questions by abandoning regular meetings of standing committees of Cabinet and by relying on innumerable *ad hoc* arrangements. Whitlam's appointment of John Menadue in November 1974 to be secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet led to the creation of a potentially more powerful system of co-ordination, but this organisation became primarily occupied with day-to-day political protection' (p. 183). One of the strengths of the book is its account of the influence exercised by the permanent heads of federal departments, particularly Sir Lenox Hewitt and Sir Frederick Wheeler. All Labour's efforts to recruit alternative sources of advice outside the bureaucracy had little lasting effect.

The author toys with the idea (p. 253) of what might have happened if Gough Whitlam had refused to accept the Governor General's letter of dismissal. It is certainly ironic that Malcolm Fraser, on succeeding him as Prime Minister was also able to benefit from the improvements already begun in Cabinet administration. Mr Sexton is right to argue that Labor should continue to pay attention to the machinery of government and indeed to the Constitution itself.

Birkbeck College, London J. M. LEE

The New Zealand Political System: Politics in a Small Society. By Stephen Levine. *Sydney, London: Allen and Unwin. 1979. 207 pp. £11·95. Pb: £5·50.*

THIS book is written with a lucid narrative style and in a language and form which can interest both general readers and also meet the needs of political studies students. It is set against the background of contemporary problems. Despite years of advance warning New Zealand's general failure to diversify its economy has produced what the author describes as a 'permanent economic crisis': an economy characterised by high rates of inflation and low productivity; a declining British market for her traditional primary products; repeated balance of payments deficits; and chronic deficits in internal government accounts. Indeed in many ways New Zealand has achieved the ultimate form of a comparatively affluent but no growth economy with zero population growth. For many New Zealanders these conditions appear to have been a stimulus to external migration, whereas in the early 1970s new arrivals were generally matched by departures, by 1978 permanent and long-term arrivals of 36,972 were matched by departures of 63,680.

In the light of these pressing economic and social problems the author discusses in considerable detail the rightful role of politics in such a society. He suggests that the political choices open to citizens are as follows: Exist, that is withdrawal from community affairs; Voice, partisan involvement to secure political change; Loyalty, support for the status quo; and Silence, a passive orientation towards politics. Historically, New Zealanders have opted for Loyalty or Silence, today an increasing number of people are choosing Exist as the only viable option for themselves and their families. He concludes that to create a comfortable life for its people, in a placid social setting, whilst seeming an uninspiring goal to some may well be one 'peculiarly appropriate to New Zealand in scale and tone'. More importantly, it may also be within reach of creative politics, whose realisation in so small a society may be 'an example to larger more generously endowed nations'. However, to fulfil the New Zealand promise will clearly require compassion, understanding and sustained effort.

The author also clearly feels that many present policies are mistaken. He points to the temptation, not confined to the Antipodes, to condemn the unfamiliar, or to revile those in need of support. He suggests that this will need to be resisted for this kind of judgmental approach to social problems and individual needs is one 'fundamentally

incompatible with a commitment to democratic values'. Current problems will naturally mean that for politicians, voters, and political commentators alike, there is a need for a fresh approach to politics involving a real willingness to admit the possibilities of error, and the recognition of the potential virtues in the criticism of an adversary!

From a distance of some 12,000 miles it is fascinating to see how a small country, based strongly on British derived traditions, has evolved its own institutions and responses to the many strains of the contemporary world. The present-day world of low growth is likely to prove particularly difficult for a country of New Zealand's size—with its uniquely isolated but historically dependent and relatively affluent urbanised society based on the success of the agriculturally based export economy.

For Mr Levine there is a great urgency surrounding all this; for while the 'democratic experiment in New Zealand has shed some of its tranquility to arrive at its present crisis point, controlled political change needs to be preceded by contemplation and understanding'. Yet as the author emphasises, political affairs necessarily involve all citizens and can only be affected in the long run by thoughtful and energetic participation. As such the book includes discussion of the November 1978 election and a closer look at the way the Prime Minister of the Muldoon style reflected on the New Zealand approach to political leadership. Again the need for a Bill of Rights and a written constitution for New Zealand is considered, and various suggestions for a major overhaul of the Parliamentary system put forward. Moreover, the reform of Parliament, alternatives to the electoral system, and the use of the referendum for assessing public feeling towards urgent issues are of widespread concern and are amongst the many topics discussed in detail. Many of these issues are of application and concern to our own islands, and the book can, therefore, be read with interest and profit by British readers as well.

JOHN HUTTON

NORTH AMERICA

Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence. By R. Douglas Arnold. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1979. 235 pp. £11·00.*

THIS is a welcome and timely addition to the growing number of studies of the complex relationships that now exist in the United States between members of Congress and those who administer the laws. Professor Arnold concentrates in particular on an analysis of the extent to which Congressmen can influence bureaucratic decisions about the geographic allocation of federal expenditures. This is done in three stages. First, he critically assesses existing theories regarding decisions concerning the geographic allocation of such benefits, and specific approaches used by others to measure Congressional influence over allocational decisions. Secondly, he develops an alternative theory to explain the relationship between Congressional influence and bureaucratic decisions over expenditure allocations. Finally, he applies this theory with respect to three policy areas—military employment, water and sewer grants, and model-cities grants. The result is a thoughtful and novel attempt to link political analysis with policy analysis.

With respect to military employment, Arnold attempts to determine if certain Representatives have a disproportionate influence over decisions about the geographic allocation of such employment. He shows that members of the committees concerned with military matters may have more influence in keeping, rather than getting, military installations—especially those on the relevant Appropriations sub-committee. Though the analysis lacks the added dimension of interview evidence with

Representatives, it suggests that bureaucrats do allocate benefits in terms of an assessment of the capacity of individual Congressmen to influence the future of their programmes. Hence Congressmen with military installations in their districts will seek places on the House Armed Services committee, and will stay on the committee to protect their acquisitions.

This picture of a mutually advantageous reinforcing pattern of behaviour in which Representatives support bureaucrats, who in turn reward such support, is not new, but Arnold does a careful job of showing that most actual allocational decisions are made 'according to a mix of objective and political criteria, though the precise mix varies from program to program' (p. 209). As is unerringly demonstrated in the valuable study of the model cities programme, one consequence of this is that policies intended to provide a concentration of resources in specific problems areas can end up being spread thinly and often uselessly in order to obtain a sufficiently large coalition of political support. The bureaucrat, in order to obtain a programme and the necessary funding, may thus bargain away the real value of a programme before it is even implemented. Such behaviour is partly the result of the declining influence of party and party leaders on individual Representatives, but it has serious implications for policy outputs. What is required is a more careful assessment of the politics of enactment and implementation as new programmes are devised, especially if a more optimal use and distribution of government resources is to be achieved and the hard economic and social problems identified and tackled.

As Arnold concedes, a more detailed knowledge of the interests and policy preferences of all Representatives is required before the theory developed here could be extended to include a wider range of bureaucratic decisions. Nevertheless, he has made an important contribution in a crucial area of political investigation.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

Challenges to America: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s. Edited by Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Patrick J. McGowan. *Beverley Hill, Calif., London: Sage. 1979. 312 pp. (Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. 4.) £15·60*

The Process of Priority Formulation: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. By Dan Haendel. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1978. (Distrib. by E. Benn, London.) 428 pp. £16·95.*

IF one were to try to explain the main international stories in the last few months as reported, let us say, in the *New York Times*, would Kegley and McGowan's *Challenges to America: US Foreign Policy in the 1980's* prove to be of any assistance in one's efforts? For a variety of reasons, 'academic texts' are rarely judged this way. But to the credit of the editors of this fourth volume of the Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, they have collected eleven contributions which for the most part bridge the gulf between the 'academic' and the 'real' world, and meet the intended objective: 'to identify some of the most significant trends in the contemporary world system which pose challenges to the United States, and to assess and prescribe what the American foreign policy response to these trends will and should be like as we move into the next decade' (p. 14).

In other words, the intention is primarily to speculate; no, even more hazardous than that—to prognosticate. Prognostication, as the editors readily accept, is always fraught with difficulties; to offer prescription with prognoses is to increase the risk by geometric proportions. Yet Kegley and McGowan have at least made their forecasting efforts plausible by selecting contributions which as a whole offer two important features. The first is that each contribution consistently weaves the past and present

into the future. In other words, the points of departure into the future of conflict (Small and Singer), of resource politics (Doran), of the US, Japanese and EC 'trilateral' (Feld), to name just three, appear 'realistic' because they emerge from a world which the contributors have made, through sound analyses of the past, recognisable.

Secondly, the book has a basic general coherence in two senses: the contributions here are logical in their order, and seem to share the same general 'weltanschauung'. The former lends the impression that the book's destination has been clearly considered and charted; the latter lends plausibility because the vision of the future seems so much more credible if the speculators are generally agreed on what some of the main strands of that future might be.

Two further general commendations are worth mentioning. Kegley and McGowan have chosen pieces which, *in toto*, run a wide range of methodological approaches. Various contributors have made efforts to explain their methodologies in laymen's language, and have not assumed that the intelligent reader, concerned about American foreign policy, will also necessarily understand the intricacies of 'factor analysis'. In this regard, the technical appendix by Abolfathi, Hayes and Hayes (pp. 83-85) deserves particular notice. Secondly, the bibliography of comparative foreign policy studies by De Lancey and Johnson (pp. 293-306), like its predecessors in the Sage series of international yearbooks, provides a useful up-date for specialists in foreign policy analysis.

While so much of this work is good, it is by no means free from weaknesses. Perhaps it would be too trivial to criticise such things as Professor Feld's contention in his article on American policy toward an ascendant European Community and Japan that *all* EC members are in Eurogroup (p. 175), or to mention that this very expensive book does not have an index. It is perhaps less trivial to suggest that despite Professor Klingberg's very interesting analysis of cyclical trends in American foreign policy moods (pp. 37-55), he does not tell us how public attitudes were measured in either the 'introvert' or 'extrovert' phases of the late eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. His explanation in footnote 2 (p. 51) is insufficient to enlighten us on a matter that seems an important part of his case, namely, how he derived the patterns or cycles of public attitudes.

Kegley and McGowan's volume represents a brave and sound effort that should prove of value for both academics and non-academics interested in the art of speculating about American foreign policy.

For those academics and non-academics, armed with prognoses and prescriptions such as those of Kegley and McGowan, there is still the key question of the responsive capability of the US foreign policy machine to the changes and continua of what is called the foreign policy environment. How sensitive to the 'external environment' will those decision-makers be? Will their effective responses be mired down in the Webberian nightmare of standard operating procedures? Will their sensitivities founder on the rocks of cognitive distortion, group-think syndromes and inter-departmental rivalries? All these questions sound extremely familiar and equally as unresolved, but decision-making analysts still press on undeterred.

An interesting addition to the increasingly voluminous works on foreign policy decision-making is Dan Haendel's *The Process of Priority Formulation: US Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971*. Despite its dissertation-like style and substance Haendel does two things which are worth noting and which make the book worth reading by foreign policy specialists. In the first place, he focuses upon a case study which he calls a 'middle level' crisis for the United States government: viz. the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. It is not the potential global catastrophe of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, nor is it the relatively 'out-of-the-blue' crisis of the 1973 October war; nor is it the greatly massaged ABM, TFX, or MLF non-crisis-type situations. A 'middle level crisis' is a crisis in which at least one element of a conventional crisis is

missing, i.e. 'high threat to high values', 'occurs as a surprise', or 'must be resolved in a short period of time'. By adding this type of crisis to analysts' repertoires and by showing how the situation evolves out of the periphery of departments to the executive centre of action, i.e. the White House, Haendel has made an interesting contribution. His point about priority formulation is also interesting. He uses major Washington foreign policy figures' belief systems in 1971 to chart the way that decision-makers determine what should be 'of priority' in their decisions. His suggestion that policy 'preference ranking' is intricately tied to a decision-maker's cognition, belief-set and values is not of course new, but what is 'new' is to see the way the author directly relates policy priorities to personal beliefs and values. Given this particular emphasis, however, it is perplexing that no reference throughout the entire work was made to Robert Axelrod's concept of cognitive mapping.

Haendel's work, on the whole, is worthwhile. Had he spent more time on de-doctoralising it and on checking the spelling it would have been a better book. Nevertheless, the interesting theme which he presents would probably have remained the same.

University of Southern California RANDOLPH C. KENT

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964. By Phyllis R. Parker. *Austin, Texas, London: University of Texas Press. 1979. 147 pp. £7·00.*

THIS book is an assessment of American relations with the government of President Joao Goulart (1961–64) and in particular of Washington's role in the coup which led to his overthrow in March 1964; it draws extensively on documents in the Johnson and Kennedy Presidential Libraries. It is more of a straight record of events than a scholarly treatise and it is written impartially and in a succinct and lucid style.

It is made clear that the worsening of relations between the United States and Brazil in the early 1960s began with the lukewarm support given by the Goulart administration to the Alliance for Progress and its failure to fulfil the terms of the Bell-Dantas agreement on the linkage of American financial support for the Three-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1963–65) (pp. 35–44). The American administration gradually became disenchanted with the style of rule provided by Goulart and fears grew that he intended to set up a populist dictatorship along the lines of those of Vargas and Perón; there was also concern over the growing extent of communist influences in all branches of his government. Goulart emerges as a pusillaminous leader and he is considered to be the weakest of the Brazilian Presidents during the last period of civilian rule (1945–64). The book dwells heavily on the personal relationships between the principals of the events of 1961–64 and it is particularly interesting to note that a strong bond of friendship existed between Goulart and President Kennedy (pp. 51–52). Another very useful feature of the study is a discussion of the political and economic perspectives of American aid to Brazil during the 1961–64 period and a full statistical breakdown is given of this (pp. 87–100).

Phyllis Parker concludes 'that there is no evidence that the USA planned, directed or participated in the execution of the 1964 coup' (pp. 102–103). However, she states that Washington approved and backed the coup almost from its inception and drew up contingency plans to assist it if necessary. These measures included the delivery of oil and oil products, arms and ammunition, and the positioning of a naval task force in Brazilian waters (pp. 72–87). In conclusion, the book may be seen as among the most easily digestible and arguably the most perceptive yet to appear in English on United

States–Brazilian ties during the Goulart period, and it will serve as a very valuable reference source.

ROBIN CHAPMAN

Brazil as a Model for Developing Countries. By Joseph Eduardo Villegas. *New York: Vantage Press. 1979. 77 pp. $5·95.*

THE declared aim of this book is to demonstrate that the Brazilian model of economic development cannot serve as a model for other developing countries. Its concluding sentence states that 'Taken as a whole, however, the cost is simply too high' (p. 69). While this may or may not be an acceptable assessment of the transferability of the Brazilian model, it is an apposite comment on the book itself.

The stated hypothesis is that despite Brazil's considerable economic progress, the same path cannot be followed by other Third World countries. However, the basic nature of the 'Brazilian model' in terms of its form and achievements in promoting economic growth are scarcely discussed here. Instead, the model merely provides an excuse to attack what might be seen as the undesirable facets of Brazilian developmentalism, and the book therefore consists of familiar diatribes against military regimes, ethnicide, Brazilian imperialism, the United States, and multinational corporations. Discussion of United States policy and the influence of multinationals in Latin America takes up almost one fifth of this slim volume, though little attempt is made to relate this discussion to Brazil.

It is claimed that this is a 'thoroughly researched and documented account' which 'should prove invaluable to the researcher' and to 'the reader interested in relatively virgin territory' (front cover). There might possibly be some substance to the latter claim; the first two are highly questionable. Charity might suggest that the text has suffered in translation or proof-reading, but one's faith in thorough research is shaken as early as page 2 where Brazil's area appears as fifteen times greater than that of the earth's surface and its extent as greater than the circumference of the equator. Elsewhere it is implied that slavery persisted in Brazil until 1930, and it is unclear whether the current (1979) President is Geisel or Figueiredo. More generally the book is geographically inaccurate, historically over-compressed, and socially over-simplified. The prose is often florid and occasionally crude. Platitudes are sometimes presented as profundities, while provocative issues such as Brazil's nuclear energy programme, or recognition of the MPLA in Angola are dismissed in single sentences.

Snr. Villegas's basic argument, that Brazil's economic progress has been bought at a heavy social and political price, may not be in dispute. However, whatever the vices and virtues of the Brazilian model, they have been frequently described elsewhere, and with greater accuracy and elegance.

University of Liverpool JOHN P. DICKENSON

Contemporary International Relations of the Caribbean. Edited by Basil A. Ince. *St Augustine, Trinidad/Tobago: Institute of International Relations, UWI: 1979. 367 pp. Pb.*

The Restless Caribbean: Changing Patterns of International Relations. Edited by Richard Millett and W. Marvin Will. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 295 pp. £13·25.*

THAT there exists a dearth of analytic work on the external relationships of the politically and ideologically pluralistic Caribbean states cannot be doubted. As William Demas notes in his excellent introduction to the Millett-Will book, they exhibit rapidly

evolving patterns 'resulting primarily from the changing nature of the political and economic linkages of Caribbean counties and territories both within the Caribbean region and between the Caribbean and the metropoles or dominant powers' (p. vii). He should have stressed that these linkages arise far more from the region's historical heritage as the most colonial of colonial societies and possibly the most asymmetrically interdependent of Third-World regions than from any external stimuli.

Neither book adequately fills the identifiable gap. But such is the socio-political complexity of the Caribbean and the rapidity of events that any attempt at conceptual analysis of the region as a whole would be very difficult. The latter hazard is particularly pertinent: major events do not respect publisher's deadlines. The Grenada revolution of March 1979, an event of considerable significance, goes unrecorded.

Of the two, that edited by Basil Ince is the better not so much because it is written entirely by indigenous scholars but as it is better structured and academically more vigorous. Major issues are identified: economic dependency and multinational company activities; the political problems of regional economic integration; non-alignment and Third-World linkages; the reconfirmation of the region's strategic and now energy importance to the United States, resulting in a widespread renaissance in interest by Washington; the resurgence of Cuba; and the developmental problems inherent in smallness. It is divided into four parts: Caribbean and Third World; Metropolitan Ties and Influence; Political Processes and Foreign Policy; and Economic Development and Interaction.

The contributions vary both in quality and approach. Of particular interest are those on racial interactions between the Commonwealth Caribbean and Africa (Locksley Edmondson and Peter Phillips) and the political evolution and political processes of Trinidad-and-Tobago, and the Bahamas (Carl Parris and Ramesh Ramsaran respectively). Some are almost entirely pieces of socialist advocacy such as Maurice Odle's analysis of 'The Dynamics of Nationalization' and Clive Thomas's 'Neo-Colonialism and Caribbean Integration'. To the latter, the dream of a united Caribbean nation was unfulfilled because 'the incipient growth of national capitalist interest was in conflict with the direct colonial subjugation of local capital' (p. 285); only if workers and farmers seize state power 'can the principles of socialist integration operate' (p. 297). With only slightly less insight Ince attempts to discern a domestic racial variable in Guyanese foreign policy, a notably unproductive exercise. Some relief is, however, afforded by George Reid's summary analysis of the effect of diminutive size on foreign policy formation and execution. Selectivity of concerns are stressed as being necessary to maximise effect but when he briefly turns to his case study of Barbados he finds that this is not done; no attempt at explanation is offered. Elsewhere, Angel Calderon-Cruz advocates a greater international role for Puerto Rico but barely acknowledges that the status question is not only the crucial variable but that its settlement is the necessary prequisite. Omission is similarly a feature of Anthony Bryan's essay on patterns of co-operation and conflict between the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America in that no reference is made to the regional and hemispheric implications of the Belize dispute. He does, however, try to redress this in his contribution to the Millett-Will volume.

These two American authors have also divided the topic into four: The Context of Caribbean International Relations; Current Issues; National Policies; and Caribbean Nations and International Organizations. As contributors range over both continental (littoral) and insular territories, Demas's definition of the area in culture terms is essential. But space is wasted later by, for instance, Bryan repeating the exercise, something, like numerous misspellings (e.g. Carribean, ECC, Strategis) the editors should have picked up. Some contributors have very little to say about the region as such while others are almost journalistic in tone and seemingly avoid any attempt at critical analysis. There are also errors of fact: for instance, the Declaration of Guyana

(December 1974) should read 'Guayana', and the Commonwealth Secretariat in London does not administer the (non-existent) sterling tie. Interesting themes are not explored such as the dysfunctional consequences of the growing Commonwealth Caribbean bloc within the OAS and the ambiguity of American policy on the Belize issue. On the other hand some essays are useful for the serious student of the region's affairs such as those by Raymond Duncan on Cuban and Soviet policy ('North America lies in Cuba's front yard' (p. 142) is one of more memorable observations); Roberta Johnson on the Puerto Rican status question; Dawn Marshall on migration; John Plank on the United States and Cuba; Basil Ince's comparative study of Trinidadian and Guyanese foreign policies and that part of Albert Gastmann's essay dealing with the French Antilles. But, even taking these into account, the structure and editorial direction of the volume does not adequately explore its subtitle. And that is surely what it's all about.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TONY THORNDIKE

Cuba in the World. Edited by Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago. *Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1979. 343 pp. $21.95. Pb: $5.95.*

THE Cuban Revolution has come of age. It celebrated its twenty-first birthday at the beginning of this year. Thankfully scholarship on Cuba is also growing up. The early responses from the academic community to the Revolution were far too strident. Its supporters enthused in the face of failures and mistakes and its opponents developed myopia in the face of its obvious successes. Its foreign policy was caricatured as that of a pristine liberator or of a Soviet puppet. These days such excesses appear in print less frequently. The Revolution still challenges its observers into taking sides but they do so armed with more hard information and less prejudice than before.

In large part this improvement is the inevitable result of the passage of time. Tempers have cooled and the Revolution's legitimacy is no longer seriously questioned. But some of the credit must also be given to the work of the Centre for Latin American Studies of the University of Pittsburgh. It has acted as a clearing house for research on the Cuban Revolution in the United States and its library, its sponsorship of conferences and its publications have made an invaluable contribution to our understanding of post-revolutionary Cuba.

The latest book to emerge from the Centre, *Cuba in the World*, joins an already distinguished list of credits. It is based on papers delivered at a conference held in Pittsburgh in November 1976. The fifteen essays are organised into two sections—'Cuba's political role in world affairs' and 'Cuba's economic role in world affairs'. Fortunately most of the contributors ignore this rather arbitrary distinction and the quality of most of the essays is very high. On the whole the tone of the book is sympathetic to the revolutionary government's foreign-policy record and most of the authors conclude that Castro has been remarkably independent of his powerful Soviet *patrón*. The pick of the essays are those by Valdes on Cuba in Angola, by Mesa-Lago on the island's delicate international linkages, by Dominguez on the role of the armed forces, by Perez-Lopez on the importance of sugar, and by Gonzalez on the institutionalisation of the decision-making process.

As is often the case with conference-based collections, however, the book has its weak points and omissions. It is particularly sad, for example, to find that Cuba's relations with the Non-Aligned Movement—a major element of Castro's foreign-policy agenda—receives such cursory treatment. Three-and-a-half pages of exeedingly 'non-aligned' commentary draped around one-and-a-half pages of quotations from Castro, Dorticos, and the Belgrade and Cairo declarations hardly do the subject justice.

The book would also have benefitted from an essay or two on the problem of a small

country with limited resources pursuing a truly 'international' rather than 'regional' foreign policy. One imagines that such a 'spread' of concern and involvement, whilst confirming the revolutionary reputation of the regime, can also stretch scarce resources and seriously affect domestic policies.

Almost as frustrating is the lack of any systematic treatment of the 'political' connections between Cuba and the United States. Mesa-Lago's thoughtful essay on the economics of the Cuban-United States *rapprochement* deserves a parallel essay on the tangled web of diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic dealings between the two countries and their various proxies. The short piece by Linsley on the role of Puerto Rico in US-Cuban relations falls well short of the mark.

Another omission concerns events in the period between the original conference and the publication of the book. In October, 1978 Castro initiated a 'dialogue' with the Cuban exile community in the United States and since then a steady and growing stream of largely exile tourists have visited the island. Of this traffic and its implications for both countries there is no mention. Since many of the contributors to this book have taken advantage of this new atmosphere and have visited the object of their academic concern, one looks forward to their future publications. A closer, personal contact with the Revolution they have been studying through its printed words can only be welcomed.

University of Glasgow DAVID E. STANSFIELD

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

The International Who's Who 1979-80. *London: Europa. 1979. 1384 pp. £28·00.*

OVER four hundred new biographies have been added to the latest edition of this invaluable reference work, many existing entries have been revised and expanded. An obituary list of persons whose deaths have been noted since the preparation of the previous edition appears at the front of the book.

The format is new and slightly larger than the previous editions.

Chatham House Library N.G.

The Book of World Rankings. By George Thomas Kurian. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 430 pp. £15·00.*

THIS is the first edition of this reference work which covers 325 subjects from politics and defence to consumption, from education and the media to culture and sports. The aim is to display in rank order, within each category, figures relating to various countries in order to show strengths and weaknesses. Each section is preceded by an introduction which purports to explain the emerging pattern.

While in some areas of statistical comparison geographical and climatic or economic, a not unexpected pattern can recognisably emerge, it is difficult to see the value of listing the size of the Cabinet in 151 countries. It is downright suspect to try and establish marriage-rates listings, without taking into account religious practices leading to polygamy or polyandry. It is quite unnecessary to produce inconclusive or obvious data relating to mortality rates, especially where the numbers of reporting countries is too limited to be of value.

The country summaries reflect this general inconclusiveness.

Chatham House Library N.G.

World Armies. By John Keegan. *London: Macmillan, 1979. 843 pp. £22·50.*

THE first edition of this new 843 pages reference work portrays the armies of over 140 countries listed alphabetically. Each signed main entry is arranged in standard form, containing nine headings: History and Introduction; Strength and Budget; Command and Constitutional Status; Role Commitment, Deployment and Recent Operations; Organisation; Recruitment, Training and Reserves; Equipment and Arms Industry; Rank, Dress and Distributions; and Current developments.

This treatment aims at building up a picture of each army's military capability as well as its relationship to the government and administration of the state to which it belongs. Editorial emphasis bears on the domestic rather than the international status of each army, thus leading to some entries seeming disproportionately lengthy in comparison with the international involvement of the army under consideration.

This is a valuable work which brings together information about both the older and larger countries and the armies of newer and smaller countries, the latter previously poorly documented.

Chatham House Library N.G.

Annuaire Europeen Vol. XXV. 1977. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1979. *Fl. 190.00.*

THE entry of Spain into Europe; the Labour market-place in Europe; the European Youth Centre and the European Youth Foundation; specialist training for architectural conservation—are all topics treated in the Articles section of the latest edition of this yearbook. The Documentary section deals with the membership and activities of twenty-six European organisations. In the Bibliographical section a selective bibliography of periodical and pamphlet material published in 1977 is preceeded by a small number of signed reviews of books on the subject of European co-operation. There is a list of names, and an alphabetical index.

Chatham House Library N.G.

European Communities Yearbook. Bruxelles: Editions Delta. 1979.

THIS French/English 3rd edition of the European Communities Yearbook has been updated to May 1, 1979. In addition to practical information about the European Communities official publications, as well as daily and periodical press publications, there is a list of European institutes and foundations, and of European schools, universities and institutes.

The institutions of the Community are described, their functions enumerated and their officials listed. A special section is devoted to the first European elections.

In addition to a listing of professional and trade non-governmental associations set up at Community level, there is a directory of the Diplomatic missions accredited to the European Communities.

A brief analytical index is supplemented by an index of names, an index of publications, and a much needed index of initials and abbreviations.

Chatham House Library N.G.

The British Year Book of International Law 1978. *Oxford: Clarendon. 1979. 454 pp. £30·00.*

THIS is the 49th volume of this annual which has been published annually since 1921, with a break in publication, caused by the last war, between 1939 and 1944.

The contents include a variety of essays on topical aspects of international law, followed by a section of signed reviews of books. The third section is devoted to decisions of British Courts during 1978 involving questions of Public and Private International Law, Decisions on the European Convention on Human Rights during 1978, and Decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Communities during 1977.

The final section, a new contribution to the year book, entitled 'United Kingdom Materials on International Law', contains materials which evidence the practice of the United Kingdom in international law matters.

Chatham House Library N.G.

The Middle East and North Africa 1979–1980. London: Europa 1979. £22·00.

THE 26th edition of this reference book maintains the breadth of coverage and the accuracy of previous volumes. The General survey of political and economic topics includes text of such documents as the text of the March 26, 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and the section on regional organisations is followed by a survey section where the geography, history, economy, constitutional and governmental aspects of twenty-one countries are reviewed.

Part Four includes a ninety-pages 'Who's who in the Middle East and North Africa', Muslim, Iranian and Hebrew calendars, as well as a select bibliography of books on the Middle East.

Chatham House Library N.G.

The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey. 5th edn. Edited by Peter Mansfield. *Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. 579 pp. £10·50.*

THIS is a new and thoroughly revised version of a book whose earlier editions proved to be important analytical studies of, and excellent sources of information on, a politically turbulent, yet economically crucial region.

As the last edition appeared in 1973, this present volume, in effect, analyses the political and economic development of the Middle Eastern countries in the 1970s, taking in such important events as the 1973 October War; the rise of OPEC in the world economy; the civil war in Lebanon; Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in late 1977; the Camp David agreement of November 1978; and the revolution in Iran—a list of developments that more than justifies the appearance of this new edition.

The book contains extremely well-written and informative chapters on the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and the Sudan. However, there are still no essays on Algeria, Libya, Tunisia or Morocco.

Chatham House A.D.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY

*Evan Luard**

THERE has probably never been a time when there was so much concern about human rights questions as there is today. Because the world is so much smaller, we are all now more conscious of the human rights violations that occur in other parts of the world and more determined to do something about them. There is a widespread sentiment that this concern should not simply be voiced by ordinary citizens, or by non-governmental organisations such as the United Nations Association (UNA) and Amnesty International, but should be expressed in the foreign policy of governments. Foreign policies, in other words, should not just be concerned with the promotion of narrow, national self-interest but with remedying the injustices suffered by many in other countries living under tyrannical and inhumane governments. If government policies reflect the deep concern of their citizens on this issue, the means available to governments, and to governments alone, can be brought into play and so help influence the policies being pursued by other states towards their own populations, and to end, or at least reduce, the grievous violations of rights which many continue to suffer.

During the last two or three years there have been more active efforts by governments in a number of Western countries to implement such policies. The Carter administration in the United States and the former Labour Government in Britain each sought to pursue active policies in this field. Some smaller countries, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, have made similar attempts. The policies of these governments were designed not only to make general statements about the importance of respect for human rights, but to take actions related to individual countries to induce them to change their policies. Where these have failed, adjustments have been made—withdrawal of ambassadors, or the cutting off of aid—as an indication of the importance attached to these matters.

Both the Carter administration and the former British Labour Government have been criticised for their efforts in this field. These criticisms have been made mainly on two diametrically opposed grounds. They were attacked by some for failing to pursue the policies with sufficient vigour and outspokenness, especially where to do so would threaten other foreign policy

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aims (for example, so it was said, in the cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia or even in those of South Africa and the Soviet Union). By others they were criticised for injecting into inter-state relations highly controversial issues relating to the internal affairs of other states, which, therefore, aroused the maximum resentment and hostility among such states, without succeeding in influencing the situations in those countries significantly: this, it was said, prejudiced the attainment of other objectives in the foreign policy field which might have been achieved and which were more vital to the interests of the Western countries concerned.

This is thus a good moment to look again at these difficult questions and to consider how much weight should be attached to these criticisms and what lessons, if any, may be learnt about what governments can achieve by their efforts in this area.

There is nothing new in concern among governments about human rights matters. Questions concerning freedom, the right to a fair trial, the rule of law, freedom from torture or arbitrary imprisonment, the right of assembly, freedom of speech and so on, all these have been the stuff of politics within states almost since states began. Even concern about the enjoyment of such rights in *other* states goes back two centuries at least, to the beginning of the agitation over slavery and the slave trade in the late 18th century. The question of the role of human rights issues in foreign policy has been discussed for well over a century (for example, in the controversy over Gladstone's famous Midlothian campaign, when he challenged the response of the Disraeli Government to Turkish atrocities in Bosnia and Bulgaria).

Yet it is undoubtedly the case that over recent years the enjoyment of human rights elsewhere has been a more significant preoccupation of governments, or at least of some governments, in the prosecution of their foreign policy than in any earlier times. The main reason for this is undoubtedly that we know more about what happens in neighbouring countries and we care more in consequence. Populations are more concerned over such questions and influence governments to be so too. At the same time there exist now for the first time institutions—such as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the European Commission and Court of European Rights—that are directly concerned with such matters; these provide the opportunity at least to discuss such questions, and governments must formulate their policies towards such discussions. For these reasons human rights policy has become a more central feature of foreign policy than at any earlier time. Governments need to establish the principles that should guide their conduct.

The desire of a government to play an active role in this field, however, encounters immediate difficulties. Its concern to make an issue of human rights violations in some other country may conflict with other important foreign policy aims. Thus President Carter, for example, has been rightly concerned with the pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union; and he has found

that the attainment of that objective has sometimes compelled him to be more restrained about the treatment of dissidents in the Soviet Union than he showed himself in his first years of office. The Labour Government found that Britain's close economic involvement with South Africa sometimes constrained it to be cautious towards proposals for international action against that country which might involve economic sanctions. Both the United States and Britain, for all their genuine concern about the human rights policies of the Shah of Iran, felt compelled by economic and strategic interests to speak out on his behalf even in his dying days of power. While he was still Foreign Secretary David Owen accepted that, because of foreign policy considerations of this kind, there could not be complete consistency in the policies adopted: political factors also sometimes play a part. On these grounds both governments were, partly for political reasons, considerably more severe with Chile than with Argentina, even though the situation in the latter country has in the past two or three years certainly been far worse.

These are typical of the conflicts of interest that are always likely to be encountered (and to be seized on by critics) when such policies are pursued—even when governments are genuinely and sincerely committed to seeking improvements in the human rights situation all over the world (and few serious observers would doubt that President Carter and the last Labour administration were serious in their attempts in that direction). Any government that seeks to commit itself to such a policy is bound to find itself faced by difficult choices and to encounter serious constraints which appear to limit its freedom of action. An important purpose of this article must be to examine how serious these constraints really are.

Foreign policy constraints on human rights policy

What then is the nature of these constraints?

In the first place, every government needs to have dealings with most other governments of the world, whether it approves of them or not, on many diverse questions. It must deal with them over the welfare of its own nationals, resident or trading abroad; over commercial and other matters between states—or over any other practical problems which may arise; over aid programmes it may be implementing; and over many wider issues affecting the international community as a whole. It will deal with them both bilaterally, and in the United Nations and other international organisations. Such dealings are designed (as Winston Churchill said about the act of recognition) 'not to confer a compliment but to secure a convenience'. An active campaign designed to denounce the domestic policies of such a government in relation to its own population will inevitably arouse deep resentment in any such government and will complicate dealings on any practical matter between two states. It may endanger commercial or other prospects and the securing of government contracts. It will certainly damage political goodwill (about which our embassies abroad are often mainly concerned). And since it will not necessarily

bring any improvement in the human rights situation in the country concerned in any case, it is understandable that many governments are reluctant to stick their necks out on such issues (and are nearly always advised by their representatives on the spot not to do so).

In some cases there may be more special reasons why it is believed inadvisable to antagonise the other government concerned. That state may be considered important for strategic reasons; it may even be an ally, so that to engage in criticisms which might endanger the government's position may be held to be highly undesirable on defence grounds: it was these considerations which are believed by many to have muted criticisms among other Nato governments of the Salazar regime in Portugal and that of the colonels in Greece in former days, as well as of some other governments in other parts of the world. Or the state concerned may be an important commercial partner: that is the consideration which is sometimes said to have damped down British criticisms of Iran, Argentina and other states in recent years. It may be an important supplier of raw materials, as South Africa is to all Western countries: It may be a financially powerful state which could make its displeasure felt in the foreign exchange markets; a consideration which some believe will have virtually silenced criticism of Saudi Arabia and other oil producing states in recent years. Finally, it may be a great power with which negotiations on many delicate subjects including vital strategic issues, are being undertaken: thus for example the conclusion of a Salt agreement with the Soviet Union has been regarded as so important as to deter too outspoken criticisms of its human rights policies by the United States over the past year or so.

A third kind of argument that can be used against attempts to undertake an active human rights policy is that it is contrary to the rules of diplomatic intercourse. The tradition that each state exercises full sovereignty within its own territory and that other states therefore should not interfere in such matters is firmly established and is said to reduce the danger of conflict among states through mutual interference. This rule, it is sometimes held, precludes any criticism of the actions of other governments within their own countries. International bodies, such critics claim, are equally debarred from interfering in such matters: Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter states that nothing in the Charter 'shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'. These rules, even if they are not always accepted by those nations which wish to make the criticisms, will certainly be insisted on by those that are under criticism (as, for example, British governments of all political persuasions have consistently rejected the right of outside governments or organisations, and even of outside commentators, to make judgments on British policy in Northern Ireland). How much more, it is argued, will authoritarian governments—often guilty of gross brutality towards their own subjects—reject any attempt by outsiders to influence their conduct? If every government began criticising and

commenting on all actions of every other government in every part of the world even undertaken within their own territories—offering perhaps conflicting advice—the conduct of international affairs would, under this view, become impossible. Is it not far wiser, it is asked, to maintain the traditional rules on this question and so reduce the possible areas of conflict?

Finally, the fourth type of argument often used against governments taking too active a role on these matters is that such efforts are in any case ineffectual: they will have no influence. They are thus a waste of energy, resources, and political capital. The type of government that engages in this oppression of basic human freedoms, it is said, is often already intensely insecure in its internal position and is unlikely to be deterred from its policies by outside criticism. Indeed for such a government it may be a point of honour to ignore all criticisms, to demonstrate its own independence and its unwillingness to be deterred: so, some hold, the Western campaigns on behalf of dissidents in the Soviet Union do not in fact alter Soviet policy on that question and only make it more difficult for the Soviet Government to make the concessions which it might otherwise be willing to grant—and so intensify the possibility that harsh penalties may be imposed as a demonstration that that government cannot be deflected from its chosen course by outside criticism. Outside condemnation might, by attracting publicity to the affair, even cause a government to behave more toughly than would otherwise be the case, to show that it cannot be intimidated. Finally, it is argued that overt criticisms on such questions, by alienating the government concerned, may in fact serve to *reduce* the influence of the outside governments which advance them, and make it less likely that they can have any useful impact in similar situations in the future.

The force and influence of all these different arguments should not be underestimated by those who are concerned about human rights questions. All of them may be challenged: and we will look at the weaknesses of some of them. But they are none of them altogether irrational. And the important point is that, whether or not they are true, they are *believed* to be so by many governments and so deter attempts to pursue an active policy in this field at least by governments (none of the arguments of course apply to activity by unofficial organisations). The objections are ones that therefore have to be considered carefully.

Before going on to consider what governments can and should do, we need to look at each of the main objections in a little more detail and consider the amount of weight that needs to be attached to them.

How important are these constraints?

The first of the arguments described suggested that, because governments have to deal with each other all the time on a wide variety of issues, they cannot risk exacerbating their relations by injecting controversial issues of human rights policy which will inevitably cause grave offence and may even

fatally damage relations in every field, so endangering other important ends or policy.

It is, of course, the case that any one government is at all times obliged to deal on a day-to-day basis with many other governments, whether or not it approves of them, on a large number of different and mainly uncontroversial issues. Most of these relations will continue whatever posture that government may adopt on human rights issues. The argument we described has force only if it is assumed that expressions of concern by one government on human rights questions will totally prejudice the conduct of normal business with the government that is criticised. But there is little evidence for this assumption. It is unreasonable to expect that relations will be totally unaffected: but the *degree* to which relations are damaged will depend partly on other factors governing the relationship between the two states, and it will depend even more on the manner in which the issue is raised. If the complaints made are aired in a polemical and highly political style, or are pursued obsessively and to the exclusion of all other questions, the relationship may indeed be seriously damaged. If, on the other hand the complaint made is raised in the proper forum, in reasonable terms, and is consistent with the policy pursued on similar matters towards other states, this need not be the case. If the issue has been raised first on a confidential basis, and without publicity, the government concerned will be given notice in advance that the matter is one which genuinely arouses strong feelings and will be less surprised if it is subsequently raised in a public forum. Similarly if the charges made are specific, factual and backed by firm evidence, rather than vague and generalised, it will have less justification for any belief or accusation that they are inspired by malice or political prejudice. Perhaps the most important condition is that of consistency. If Western governments (as in the early cold war years) denounce only human rights violations in Eastern Europe, but ignore those of their allies in the West; if communist states denounce the situation in Chile or Northern Ireland, but say nothing of that in Cuba or Ethiopia, they cannot expect to be treated as unbiased in such campaigns.

The fact that human rights issues have already in the last few years become so much the normal stuff of international politics, has reduced the danger that any expression of concern on such matters can be used by other governments as a justification for breaking off or damaging relations. Not only Western countries but many developing states as well have become increasingly concerned in such issues and play a growing role in the international bodies responsible. The development of new institutions with responsibility in this area, both at the world level (the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and its sub-Commissions) and at the regional level (the European and Inter-American Commissions), and the increasingly active role these bodies play, has accentuated this trend. No individual government can any longer insulate itself altogether from this change in the international climate. Even the Soviet Union today submits to questioning on its domestic policies in the

Human Rights Committee (which supervises the implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). It and nearly all other states gladly participate elsewhere in the discussion of the human rights policies of South African, Chilean and Israeli Governments, and rightly reject any attempt by the governments of those countries to claim immunity on the grounds of domestic sovereignty. It is now almost universally recognised that serious violations of human rights are a matter of concern to the international community as a whole, and while the states accused will doubtless continue to protest when other governments criticise their record in this field, it is less and less likely that interstate relations will be fatally damaged because one state dares to criticise the performance of another in this field—so long as it does so in the appropriate manner.

All the evidence of recent years confirms this fact. Even the governments that are most fiercely criticised do not in practice fatally disrupt relationships in retaliation. Even at the time when American criticism of Soviet human rights policies were at their height, the Soviet Union continued to discuss Salt and many other matters as before. Similarly, criticisms of South Africa's policies of apartheid or Israel's policies in the occupied territories has not prevented the governments which have made them from maintaining relatively normal relations with those governments on other questions. There is, in other words, a considerable willingness to divorce disagreements on such matters from the conduct of affairs in other areas. It cannot, of course, be said that no price will be paid for being outspoken: this is the price of having a human rights policy. But it is not usually an unduly heavy one. And in general, therefore, the first of the four objections which we listed against an active human rights policy is not one that can be considered to have overwhelming weight.

The second objection to an active policy on human rights concerns the special difficulty which arises when human rights violations occur in states which have a particular importance, whether diplomatic, strategic or commercial. Thus it is argued that, even if Western governments can afford to be outspoken in condemning a remote and insignificant state in Africa or Asia whose goodwill is unimportant, they should be less uninhibited in their public criticism of states which are their close allies, or which have the power of life or death for their economies, or even those with which they are negotiating over important strategic questions.

The first thing to be said about this is that if this is the objection to an active human rights policy, such a policy can still be pursued towards the great majority of states, which do not fall into any of these categories. But even in the other cases, the argument is open to challenge. It is, for example, often the case that where there is a special relationship with a particular country of this kind, it is a reciprocal one; the government being criticised may attach quite as much importance to that relationship as the one that is doing the criticising. In these circumstances even though the former may be resentful of criticism it will have in practice no alternative but to accept it and will be most unlikely to

take actions that are seriously damaging to its partners. This is why the suggestions made at the time that Western states could not afford to be too rude to the former regimes of Salazar in Portugal or the colonels in Greece, or the Shah of Iran, were so specious and short-sighted. For those governments were in fact far more dependent on the good-will of the West than the West was on them. Thus the blood-curdling stories sometimes employed in such situations—that if we antagonise such governments they may suddenly abandon us and go over to the 'enemy'—lack all credibility. The fact is that such regimes usually (as in all these cases) have nowhere to go. They are tied firmly into their existing alliances, both by strong ideological conviction and by prudent self-interest (it is more a matter for question how far the West can really gain, even in purely strategic terms, from allies whose policies are so questionable and who are therefore so vulnerable to political overthrow). It might rather be argued that the fact that such countries are allies gives Western states both a greater right and a greater incentive in seeking to bring about the changes in such regimes which alone can make them acceptable and durable partners.

Still less is it true that Western governments cannot afford to offend powerful adversaries such as the Soviet Union. The Salt negotiations may not have been helped by President Carter's public comments on the Soviet Government's treatment of dissidents, but they were certainly not stopped. It was always unlikely that they would have been, since detente and Salt ratification is at least as much in the interests of the Soviet Union as of the West. Nor are important oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia, likely suddenly to halt their oil supplies, or double the price, because they are angered by criticisms of their domestic policies. For their policies too are determined ultimately by their own conception of their economic self-interest; and it is improbable that their calculations in this respect would be significantly altered by comments from Western states concerning their domestic policies.

It is thus far less the case than is often suggested that governments must constantly maintain a prudent silence about the policies of other states which are important to them. Provided, once more, criticisms are raised in a reasonable and unpolemical manner, reactions are unlikely to be so drastic as is occasionally suggested. Again the evidence of the past supports this. Although the Shah of Iran was frequently strongly criticised in Western countries, and occasionally even by Western governments, he was not in any way deterred from his pro-Western allegiance, nor at any time considered cutting off oil or raising its price on such grounds. While the Arab oil producing countries cut off oil to two states for a time in 1973, this was because of those states' alleged sympathy with Israel, not because of offence at Western comments on their own affairs. Nigeria nationalised British oil in that country in 1979; but this was said to be a reaction to Britain's policies concerning Rhodesia, not to comments on the human rights situation in Nigeria. The fact is that governments today have come to expect comment on human rights affairs by

other states; and there is no evidence that they will wantonly sacrifice the relations that are most important to them by over-reacting to expressions of concern which, however unwelcome to them, can never be a fatal threat to their vital interests.

The reason that governments generally refrain from speaking out on such questions is because it is inconvenient to do so, not because it is fatally damaging. It is not believed to be worthwhile to create difficulties in relations with important states for ends that are regarded, by most officials and by many ministers, as only marginal in importance. How far a government will in practice go in criticising a friendly or politically important state about its human rights policies usually depends on the degree to which public opinion at home demands it, rather than on the absolute scale of its atrocities. British governments have not hesitated to express their condemnation of policies of, for example, the Soviet Union, Uganda, Chile and South Africa, because public opinion at home demanded it. They have spoken out less strongly about the policies of Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, Uraguay, Cuba and Ethiopia, because British public opinion and even British human rights organisations, have not expressed themselves as strongly on that subject, not because it is thought important not to prejudice relations with those states.

The third difficulty we noted against making human rights considerations a prominent element in foreign policy was that the pursuit of human rights aims by governments (as against unofficial organisations) is contrary to the traditional rules of diplomatic intercourse forbidding interference in internal affairs. Here the simple answer is that the rules of diplomatic intercourse change all the time, and have changed quite dramatically in the last thirty or forty years. Such a change was already manifested in the United Nations Charter, in which provision was explicitly made for the discussion of human rights matters in the organisation, and in its 'Commission on Human Rights' in particular. This has been reinforced by the subsequent establishment of regional organisations devoted to the same subject, such as the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and subsequently in such documents as the Helsinki Final Act—which has clear references to human rights issues. And it is shown above all in the current practice of states many of which (not all developed countries) continually make clear the importance they attach to the conduct of other governments in this respect.

Nor are these arguments overcome by referring to traditional conceptions of 'sovereignty' or to Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter already quoted. For definitions of the sovereign rights of states, or of what is 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' of a state, as the Charter puts it, are continually evolving. So is the definition of 'intervene' in that context. Today there are few states that consider it inadmissible for another government to express concern about human rights issues in general; while many accept that this carries with it the implication that governments must sometimes express concern about the

human rights situation in particular states. International law has never been a static and inflexible body of rules. And it is perhaps in this particular area that it has evolved most rapidly in recent years.

The final argument we noted against a government playing too active a role in this field was that such policies are anyway ineffective. Few governments are influenced by public expressions of concern on such matters, it is said, and may only be incited to worse excesses. But this argument is contrary to the facts. There are a considerable number of cases where international pressures, including public expressions of concern by other governments, have led to considerable improvements in the human rights policies of particular states. In recent years this has occurred, for example, in Chile, Indonesia, Iran, Brazil, and probably in Argentina. Even in the Soviet Union there is evidence that on some matters—for example the emigration of Jewish people—policy has been significantly altered because of hostile comment from elsewhere.

But this criticism anyway misconceives the effect that is ultimately to be expected from the actions of government in this field. For few realistic observers expect that, because one or two governments begin to state their concern about the human rights situation in a particular state (say Uganda or Equatorial Guinea), the government of that country is suddenly going to reverse all its policies and become all at once a model of virtue. In the short term, little may happen. But there may be a number of indirect effects. First the government under attack, whether or not it undergoes a change of heart, may be gradually brought to realise that there are significant external costs to the type of policy it is pursuing. At least its foreign office, which is usually most aware of foreign criticisms, may become an influence within the government machine for a reform of policy. Secondly, human rights campaigners within the country concerned may be given new hope and encouragement, and redouble their own efforts to secure reforms. Changes may be induced within the government itself, with those favouring a more liberal policy (partly because of its foreign policy effects) prevailing over those furthering repressive policies (as has recently occurred in South Africa). But above all, it is the international climate as a whole which will be altered by expressions of concern on such matters. The expectations that are placed on all members of the international community are slowly changed. New norms of the behaviour to be expected from civilised governments are established. Regional organisations that may previously have been ineffective in this field may become more active. It is this wider effect, the slowest and most indirect of all, which may nonetheless ultimately be the most important in reducing the scale of human rights violations, for ultimately it will affect the expectations and attitudes of all: even those of future governments which might otherwise be tempted towards tyrannical policies.

Thus none of the arguments that have been put forward against an active human rights policy are convincing. This does not mean that the arguments should be discounted altogether. It must be accepted that there are real

difficulties for any government in carrying out a firm and consistent human rights policy. It will on occasion appear to conflict with other foreign policy aims, whether accommodation with a super-power, or the cultivation of relations with an influential Third-World country, or even the maximising of exports. What is suggested here is not that such choices never have to be made. It is that the conflict is not as acute as is often made out. Relative frankness on human rights issues is normally compatible with the achievement of other foreign policy goals. Equally important, where a direct choice has to be made, the human rights objective—in a narrowing world where concern over such issues is increasing among the general public even while serious human rights violations still occur—ought in many cases to prevail (put differently, there are costs in not responding to human rights' violations). Such a policy must be consistent. If, where such a choice is necessary, governments continually take the easy way out—convince themselves that here is a special case, that relations with such and such an important country cannot be put at risk—the entire policy begins to be valueless: it ceases to be an attempt to act in accordance with certain moral principles and becomes a policy of expediency, to be applied only where it conforms with other foreign policy objectives.

To make such a policy successful, therefore, requires courage. No foreign policy objective can be achieved without a price. The saving of lives elsewhere, the prevention of torture and other violations of essential liberties, may be a goal for which it is worth paying such a price.

The ends of human rights policy

If it is accepted that the concern that is now widely felt over human rights should be reflected in foreign policy, what are the precise objectives such a policy should try to achieve, and how should it set about achieving them.

The first distinction to be made is between the general and the particular. Policy will be concerned in part to secure *general* recognition of the importance of human rights all over the world and to define precisely what are the rights that all governments should protect. And in part policy will be concerned with preventing or deterring particular violations of rights in individual countries in all parts of the world. Both of these have their part to play and neither can be ignored. Unless general principles are clearly laid down and widely publicised, governments cannot even know what is expected of them, nor is there a standard by which to judge their policies. Conversely, there is no value in establishing general principles in abstract form, unless a real attempt is also made to ensure that they are observed in practice. Until recently most of the energies of the international community were devoted to the former task. And it could be said that there now exists a fairly broad set of general statements of principle, setting out the main rights which the international community demands should be protected. The task of ensuring that these principles are observed is by far the more difficult—partly for the reasons already mentioned. But before considering the problem of implementation more fully it would be

helpful to remind ourselves of the main objectives to be pursued by governments in this field.

The first aim of any government that is deeply concerned about the human rights issue, is to ensure that it remains at the top, or near the top, of the international agenda. The easiest policy to pursue in this field is to remain silent. Because the whole question is so controversial governments are inevitably tempted to conclude that discretion is the better part of valour and simply keep quiet on the subject. Because governments deal with other governments, the temptation is not to offend them too much, whatever the shortcomings in their conduct. But if the question is as important as many people believe, and if governments can have an influence that other groups cannot, then it is essential that governments, as well as unofficial organisations, continue to make human rights an important international issue and ensure that they are kept at the forefront of international attention.

A second important aim of human rights policy must be to ensure that the minimum standards of human rights which civilised states expect to see observed are satisfactorily defined. Here a considerable amount of progress has already been made by the international bodies responsible over the last thirty or forty years. The essential standards by which governments must be judged were first laid down, in somewhat general terms, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, formulated more than thirty years ago and endorsed by almost the entire international community. Since then these have been amplified in more detailed and specific instruments, mainly formulated in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The most important of these are perhaps, respectively, the two Covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights—the former of which has now come into effect. There are also more specialised instruments covering particular fields, such as the Convention on all forms of racial discrimination, and that still being discussed on religious tolerance. There are also special regional codes such as those established in the European Convention and applied by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, and that operated by the inter-American Commission on Human Rights. One of the continuing aims of governments working in this field is to clarify and amplify this code, particularly by extending it in certain specialised areas.

A third aim of policy must be to try to ensure that better machinery exists to try to see the new codes are complied with. There is no value in laying down general principles if these principles continue to be flouted by large numbers of governments, including many that have in theory subscribed to these documents. It is generally accepted that the United Nations bodies responsible should now move on from legislation to the process often described as 'implementation': ensuring that governments adequately conform with the good intentions which they have professed. Improvement of the machinery to achieve this is by no means easy because of the resistance of many members to granting the United Nations effective powers in this field. This results partly

from a general sensitivity about sovereignty—a reluctance to see any interference by international bodies in domestic matters—and partly from the fact that many governments have skeletons in their own cupboard and recognise that if more effective machinery were created it could well be applied against themselves.

The fourth and most important aim of human rights policy must be to bring direct influence to bear on governments all over the world so that the grave violation of human rights, which today are unhappily still only too common, become less likely to occur. As we have seen, this is both the most important and the most difficult task. Governments are often as indifferent to the representations of other governments as to the recommendations of international bodies. Often they may believe that their own survival depends on the continuation of policies of repression: that they face a 'security' problem which requires that 'subversive' forces should be suppressed. In these circumstances, even if they recognise that serious violations of human rights are occurring, they may feel that these are the inevitable cost of maintaining power, or bringing a disturbed situation under control (this has for instance been the main justification used for human rights violations in Argentina, Uruguay and some other Latin American countries in recent times). Or, even worse, they may, like an Amin or a Pol Pot, care absolutely nothing for the opinions of other countries, any more than they do for that of their own people, and thus appear almost totally impervious to any representations or appeals that other states may make. But whatever the motives or attitudes of such governments, it is an essential aim of human rights policy to bring effective influence to bear to secure a reversal of policy.

This is not an exclusive list of the human rights aims which a Western government concerned with such matters will wish to pursue. But it probably includes the main objectives that governments will have in mind. The more difficult question, however, of the *means* by which such objectives can best be achieved—must now be considered.

The means of human rights policy

Keeping human rights to the fore

Ensuring that human rights remains near the top of the international agenda, is perhaps the easiest to achieve by any government that is so minded. No government has any reason to feel inhibited from declaring in general terms its concern on this question. The supreme achievement of President Carter in this field has not been the changes he has brought about in individual countries (which must surely be less than he had hoped): it is that he has publicly demonstrated the importance that he and his government attach to the question of human rights, and has made it part of the normal subject-matter of relations between states. It will be a tragedy if any failings in the particular application of this policy—and, as we have noted, there have been successes as well as failures—should cause any move to back-track on that general aim. It is

thus essential that the present British and other Western governments should continue to show their support for that general objective; and should continue to make clear the importance they too attach to performance in this field. Only if other governments in all parts of the world are clearly aware that they are being judged, by their friends as well as by their opponents, partly on the basis of their performance in this respect, is their behaviour likely to be influenced. Only if the importance which civilised states attach to the preservation of elementary human rights, even in poor states, is continually reaffirmed, will the necessary international climate be established and the attitude of governments and populations alike be gradually transformed.

It is sometimes suggested that Western countries, in the insistent emphasis they place on human rights matters are, at least in their dealings with Third World states, seeking to impose on countries of totally different cultures and conditions attitudes and standards developed in the West for Western societies which are in no way appropriate for universal application. It is held that there are no absolute standards in this field, and that it is only comparatively recently that Western countries themselves have begun to conform with the principles which they now preach so ardently. They thus have no right to seek to apply them to others of widely differing backgrounds. For poor countries, it is said, human rights begin with breakfast. What matters to them is that people should have enough to eat and to house and clothe their families. The civil and political liberties to which Western countries attach such importance, therefore, are an irrelevance which have little meaning for such countries.

The argument is a gross and unwarranted insult to the poor countries that it purports to defend. When we speak of human rights we are speaking of the elementary right of people not to be killed, not to be tortured, not to be arbitrarily imprisoned, not to be raped or assaulted. Those rights are not a recent discovery but have been recognised the world over almost from the beginning of time. The belief in such rights is not the invention of the Western world but is cherished equally in the Third World. There are a considerable number of poor countries (particularly in the Pacific, in the Caribbean and parts of Africa and Asia) which have consistently maintained the very highest standards of human rights despite a very low standard of living (just as there have been some wealthy countries that have nonetheless extremely poor records in this respect). But if it is an insult to the governments and people of those countries which have good records to suggest that human rights standards should not be applied to poor countries, it is even more of an insult to the hundreds of thousands, and possibly millions, who have suffered violations of their rights, who have lost their lives in Cambodia and Uganda, or been tortured in Latin America, to imply, however indirectly, that the governments of such countries cannot be expected to refrain from killing or torturing them because of the low standard of living there. Arguments on these lines indeed—apart from being factually false—could be used to provide a heaven-sent justification to tyrants and petty officials or military officers in poor

countries who wish to find excuses for their repressive policies. It is not the case—and fortunately is not accepted as the case in most developing countries—that poverty excuses or condones barbarous conduct by governments there.

Nor is there, as such arguments imply, in some way a choice to be made between economic rights and civil rights. Both sets of rights are of the highest importance. But they are in no way in conflict with each other. Development is not impeded in a society which respects human rights—indeed the evidence would seem to prove the contrary. In general the developing countries which have shown the highest respect for human rights have the best record of economic growth. And conversely it is in states where human rights have been most widely and systematically abused—in such countries as Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua and Paraguay, for example—that economic growth has been slowest, if it has not indeed been backward.

The two types of rights, therefore, far from being in conflict are complementary. It is the governments that are genuinely concerned about the economic standard of living of their people that usually have most concern about their rights in other fields as well; while conversely it is those that are least concerned about their civil rights that will neglect their economic rights likewise. It is a legitimate argument for Third World countries to use against the West, that, if they are concerned about human rights at all, they should be concerned about economic rights as well (and therefore be willing to provide more aid and better access to their markets). It is not a legitimate argument that, because economic rights are important, civil rights can be ignored.

Fortunately this is a truth generally recognised by most Third World countries. Nothing has been more heartening during recent years than to note the importance attached to this subject by many Third World states—as evidenced, for example, in the leading role played by a number of them (including Senegal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, and India) in the Human Rights Commission. Indeed there is a case for saying that Western countries should, so far as possible, leave the task of highlighting the violations that occur in parts of the Third World to other developing countries—thereby avoiding the charge of neo-colonial imperialism. The standards they apply, however, will be those that are generally applied to the international community as a whole. It is not by chance that the most important international instrument in this field is entitled the *Universal* Declaration of Human Rights, and was adopted without a single dissentient vote. The assertion was that the standards laid down could and should be attained in any country. It was never accepted that any state is too small, too remote or too poor to be expected to attain them.

Definition of responsibilities

The second general aim we mentioned was to carry forward the process of defining and elaborating the responsibilities of states in assuring the protection

of human rights. Here the means required to achieve this are well established and no revolutionary changes are needed. Since any convention or other instrument in this field must, if it is to have any influence, reflect the views of the international community generally, it can only emerge from a process of international negotiation as at present. There may be room for improving the procedures used for this purpose. At present the work is done sometimes by working groups of the Commission on Human Rights or (as in the case of the Covenants) by the Commission itself, followed by detailed examination in the Third Committee of the General Assembly. It cannot really be said that such bodies, with fairly low level representatives often with little or no legal background, are well equipped for this difficult but very important task. It really requires a forum that is legal rather than political in its approach. There is a case for asking the International Law Commission (which is anyway less directly representative of governments) to be more closely involved in the process in the future. Though it has undertaken the drafting of a number of extremely important conventions, the Commission—composed of distinguished international lawyers from a balanced group of countries—has not taken any part in drafting conventions in the field of human rights. Since it is balanced by nationality, like all United Nations bodies, it would reflect as well as they do the varying national approaches to such questions. But it will not be so influenced by narrowly political factors as purely inter-governmental bodies sometimes are.

In the immediate future the most important need is the drafting of a satisfactory convention on the subject of torture, on which discussion is now taking place. There are also important debates concerning new rules governing the rights of mental patients (it is well known that it is a common practice in certain countries to incarcerate troublesome dissidents by declaring them mentally disordered); as well as rules governing the treatment of all those under detention. All of these are vitally important questions—central issues for the protection of human rights—and it is vital that satisfactory texts should be achieved which can significantly influence the behaviour of governments in these areas. It is particularly important that there should be a satisfactory international convention covering torture, one of the most hideous yet most widely used violations of human rights in recent years, and that such a convention is widely ratified. But efforts to improve penal practice generally are also required. Although, for example, imprisonment without trial is often regarded as one of the most serious violations of human rights that can occur it is widespread; and there are many countries all over the world, including some with otherwise good human rights record (such as India and Italy), where people, subsequently found to be perfectly innocent, may languish in jail for many years before being brought to trial at all.

Appropriate and effective machinery

The third objective suggested for a constructive human rights policy is the

improvement of the international machinery which at present exists for promoting and protecting such rights. Foreign policy concerning human rights must be partly a policy for improving this machinery. However committed its government and however active in this field, Britain can do little, acting bilaterally, to secure more effective protection of rights elsewhere. One of our aims, if we are concerned to make progress in this field, must, therefore, be to secure better *international* action to bring this about.

At present the main body concerned is the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Though it has been criticised with some reason in the past, there has been a significant improvement in the operation of this body in recent years. It has come to be widely recognised within the Commission that what really counts is deeds and not words, and that therefore what is now required is better machinery to ensure that governments abide by their undertakings. This has been shown in two ways. When new instruments have been negotiated it has been laid down from the start in one or two cases that there should be some machinery for supervising implementation. This was true of the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1965); and, more importantly, for the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which came into effect in 1976. In both cases inter-governmental committees have been set up which cross-examine representatives of each government on their performance in putting the instrument into effect, and subsequently issues a report. The necessity to justify themselves before these committees, and the danger of being exposed when it has been shown they are flagrantly failing to live up to their obligations, probably represent some influence on governments (as do the similar procedures employed by the ILO over many years for covenants concerning labour standards). Minorities within the state concerned are also able to quote the terms of the undertaking which their government has made. And the procedures serve to establish more unmistakeably than written documents alone the standards of national conduct which are expected by the international community.

The other, and perhaps more important, development is the use of the so-called 1503 procedure (named after the United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution which first established it). This is a procedure under which the human rights situation in particular countries may be examined by the Commission. The procedure is long and cumbrous, beginning in a Working Group of the Sub-Commission (which meets in August/September); goes from them to the sub-Commission, which may and often does recommend action by the Commission; It then goes to another Working Group of the Commission itself; which finally makes a further recommendation to the Commission. The number of hurdles to be crossed has meant that very few issues have got all the way through to substantive discussion and decision by the Commission. Moreover all the discussion is, at least in theory, confidential: though in practice there are often judicious leaks at least about which countries have been discussed (so that the procedure may begin to have an effect even if it never

reaches its final conclusion). However, public discussion is also possible by other procedures. The situation in Chile, South Africa and the territories occupied by Israel have all been discussed in this way. The former Labour government in Britain raised the situations in Uganda and Cambodia in public debate in the Commission; and in both cases eventually some form of international action ensued, though it is symptomatic of the very slow-moving machinery that in each case the offending government was overthrown before any substantive action was taken (in the case of Uganda negotiations were proceeding about the despatch of a fact-finding commission, and in that of Cambodia a report was being made on the situation by the chairman of the sub-Commission when the government was overthrown).

Thus the procedure is still inadequate, but it is a beginning and it represents a significant advance on the situation ten years ago when United Nations bodies discussed human rights only in abstract terms and never concerned themselves with the situations that actually existed in particular countries. At that time communications and petitions were all pigeonholed and never discussed: now the many communications received are examined to see if they give evidence of a 'systematic pattern of gross violations of human rights'. The task now is to build on what has been developed. It is necessary, for example, to try to speed up the whole procedure so that it can reach final conclusions much earlier: otherwise, as in the case of Uganda, Equatorial Guinea and others, discussion will proceed interminably while thousands of lives are being lost, so that nothing is actually done until the regime has finally fallen. There is also a case for allowing public *reports* to be made by the Sub-Commission, and perhaps by its Working Group, even if the debates remain confidential. It would be valuable to call more senior representatives of governments to appear at the Commission more often. Above all it is necessary to establish better fact-finding machinery so that reports concerning the position on the spot may be made by impartial observers (like the studies made by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). Sub-Commissions could perhaps be appointed to look at individual situations; and there could be a role for regional field officers.

There should also be more frequent meetings of the Commission (at least twice a year) so that urgent questions could more easily be raised; or at least the establishment of a small sub-commission that could meet at more frequent intervals and in emergencies. Above all there should be much more publicity for the Commission's activities so that the healthy fear that governments are already beginning to have of its reports, manifested in the intensive lobbying they undertake to prevent adverse reports (as by the Argentine government in recent years) is intensified. This is a matter primarily for the media, but the United Nations itself can do something through its Office of Public Information; and non-governmental organisations such as the United Nations Association (UNA) can also play a vitally important part in focusing more attention on the Commission's work.

There is another development of the existing machinery which could be of value. There is no doubt that governments are sometimes more influenced by the judgments of bodies which represent governments in their own immediate neighbourhood, of similar political and cultural background. Already in Latin America the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights probably plays a more effective part in judging and deterring human rights violations than any United Nations body. Similarly, the European Commission and Court have been entrusted with much greater power by its member governments than has the United Nations Commission because they trust its judgment. The steps that would perhaps do more than anything else to improve the protection of human rights in the world today would thus be the creation of regional bodies to perform the same role in Africa and Asia. It would be something if existing organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were to take more interest in human rights questions. While this is not a matter on which outside governments can do very much, it could be encouraged by United Nations bodies (as it was in a recent General Assembly resolution); and again unofficial organisations such as UNA, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other such groups have a role to play, through their contacts with sister bodies in those continents, in promoting this development.

There has been a great deal of discussion in the United Nations over many years about the establishment of a High Commissioner for Human Rights. The establishment of an authoritative figure, who could, whenever he received strong prima facie evidence of violations of human rights, ask to examine the situation on the spot and subsequently report, would clearly be a valuable innovation. The difficulty is that, in this form at least, the proposal has become something of a political football. It has been supported mainly by Western countries and is seen by some developing countries and even more by the communist states, as evidence of a desire by the West to interfere in their internal affairs. Many countries do not welcome the prospect of a close examination of their arrangements by such a figure. Any proposal that is to have a chance of success must take account of these apprehensions. Though it would be possible for those governments willing to accept the proposal to go ahead by themselves, and hope to draw in others as the system developed, this could probably not be done under the auspices of the United Nations and there is some danger in creating a divided system. For the moment it might be better to settle for a figure with more modest powers, such as the 'Co-ordinator of Human Rights Affairs' that has been suggested by Nigeria. Even an upgrading of the post of Head of the Human Rights Division in Geneva to enable him to use his authority more assertively from time to time would do something. But it would help even more if the Secretary-General would lend his own considerable authority to seeking solutions of particularly glaring human rights violations on occasions. Kurt Waldheim did this usefully in negotiating with

Amin for the despatch of a mission to examine the human rights situation in Uganda. Such initiatives could with advantage be repeated.

Action by individual governments

What are the means available to individual governments in pursuing the advancement of human rights elsewhere? The following are the main types of action which a government can take to influence other states on such matters, in ascending order of urgency:

confidential representations to the government concerned;
joint representations made with other governments;
public statements of concern in parliament or elsewhere;
support for calls in such bodies as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights for investigation of the situation;
direct initiation of such action in international bodies;
cancellation or postponement of ministerial visits;
restraints on cultural and sporting contracts;
embargoes on arms sales;
reduction in aid programmes;
withdrawal of an ambassador;
a cessation of all aid;
the breaking of diplomatic relations;
trading sanctions.

This list is not necessarily exhaustive. There are additional gradations that could be introduced at different levels. But it probably includes the main type of response open to governments in dealing with such questions.

There are many states which rarely if ever undertake any of these steps. Even Western governments which claim to be concerned about human rights questions do not often proceed beyond the first two or three steps (though the previous Labour Government in Britain proceeded to the last but one in relation to Uganda and the last but three in relation to Chile).

If action on these lines by outside states is to be effective, there are a number of conditions that need to be fulfilled. First, the policy must be pursued consistently, regardless of political prejudice or diplomatic convenience. This will sometimes involve difficult and unwelcome choices, both for governments and even more for diplomats. At present our diplomats abroad, perhaps because they are dealing on a day-to-day basis with a particular set of rulers, tend to become gradually committed to the existing regime and acquire a marked reluctance to take any steps which may be unwelcome to them. Equally, they are most unwilling to have contacts with groups or organisations that are regarded by those authorities as 'subversive' (a former ambassador in Iran informed me personally that he regarded it as totally impossible for him to be known to have frequented any forces in Iran known to be hostile to the Shah—during the Shah's day). But the effect of this policy is questionable even

so far as British material interests are concerned; for it means that when a government is overthrown—a not uncommon occurrence in recent times—we are known as the friend of the displaced and discredited regime and are distrusted by the incoming government with which we will in addition have had no previous contacts. But such a policy is even more damaging to our aims in the field of human rights, because it prevents our diplomats from having any contacts with those forces that may be doing most to promote respect for human rights, contacts which may be of great importance to their morale. Britain may thus become closely identified with a government that is engaged in seriously oppressing its own people.

So an important condition of an effective human rights policy directed towards any particular country (and also perhaps a condition of effective diplomacy) is the establishment of contacts with as broad a section of the population as possible, including political opponents of the government. But there is a corollary to this need for contacts—and one that may be more welcome to foreign office establishments. This is that, even where the human rights record of a government is appalling, there is every disadvantage in a total severing of relations. This in practice provides the worst of all worlds. Not only is all hope of influencing the regime in question lost: an isolated regime often becomes still more brutal than before. Equally serious, all opportunity for showing moral support for opposition groups or influencing the situation in any other way, is also abandoned. By washing our hands of the situation we may feel we are keeping our souls pure. But in practice we condemn the population under pressure to isolation, and ourselves to impotence. We salve our own consciences but abdicate responsibility.

This is illustrated by a number of cases of recent years. Perhaps the most disturbing is the case of Cambodia, where between 1975 and 1978 the most bestial violations of human rights of any in recent years took place, including, it is now believed, two or three million deaths, largely by deliberate killing. Because no Western country had any links with that country during that time, there was not even the smallest possibility of influencing the situation, nor any reason for the Cambodian Government to heed the occasional condemnation of its policies that were made in the West from time to time, of which it may well have remained totally ignorant. Indeed the boycotting of the country led to widespread ignorance in the West of what was happening there; so that there was for example no upsurge of world indignation until after the regime had already been overthrown and more knowledge of its misdeeds became available. Human rights violations almost as abominable took place over a number of years in Equatorial Guinea under the Nguema regime, which was equally isolated and equally ignored by Western governments. There is a double disadvantage in such situations. On the one hand there is little external influence on the government concerned. On the other the oppressed population feels deserted and without recourse. Potential centres of resistance lose hope. Churches and religious groups, without support from elsewhere,

lose influence. A policy of isolating a country where such events are taking place is thus the opposite of what in fact is required.

The case for maintaining contacts, however oppressive the government, and however alienated its population, has always been accepted in relation to such countries as South Africa and the Soviet Union, both serious human rights offenders. It has been generally agreed in those cases that the promotion of contacts provides at least a chance to influence the climate of opinion within those countries, and give support to those forces that are working for change. The same considerations apply equally elsewhere. There is a strong case for deliberately fostering contacts with countries where human rights are being seriously violated. Certain kinds of contact are of particular value in this type of situation. It is, for example, especially important to maintain links with professional, academic and religious groups which are often doing something to keep the spirit of freedom alive. These should be deliberately fostered. It would thus be of great value if the British Government were to promote contact between, say, British lawyers and Chilean lawyers; between British scientists and Soviet scientists; between British writers and South African writers; between British trade unionists and Vietnamese or Cuban trade unionists; between church groups in Britain and church groups in Latin America (where the church has often been the main focus for resistance to oppressive regimes). If the existing extensive sponsored visits programme were deliberately used in appropriate cases to foster contact of this kind—inviting key figures such as politicians, bishops, journalists and others who are fighting lonely battles of resistance to oppressive regimes—we would perhaps do more of practical value to influence the situations in those countries than by any other possible means. Our information effort may also have a role to play, in disseminating the ideas concerning civil and political freedoms which are cherished in our society but knowledge of which is often suppressed in such countries. Non-governmental organisations also have a part to play here; groups such as UNA can play an important part in maintaining links with such groups in other lands. The United Nations Association in Spain was a principal focus of resistance to fascist ideas when Franco was still in power: there is no reason why UNAs should not perform similar roles elsewhere.

Aid programmes too can sometimes be used far more constructively than by simply cutting them off in mid-stream when human rights violations occur. In general, aid should not be provided to governments in the form of large prestige products, but direct to the people. Small-scale assistance can be given, independently of the regime in power, to church groups and others running projects in the field to help those most in need (as the Labour Government did to church groups in Chile). It should go primarily to educational and agricultural projects, or small scale co-operatives, that will make the biggest contribution in creating employment and meeting basic needs, rather than in large scale dams, roads, steel mills. Where aid is given in this way, and is providing direct benefit to the people, it should not be cut off because of human

rights violations, except possibly in the most exceptional circumstances. It is wrong and illogical that the people of a country, already suffering under an oppressive regime, should be penalised further to punish the sins of their rulers. Moreover aid programmes may provide a means, however marginal, of influencing the situation through the many direct contacts which result: once it is cut off all chances of influence is lost and the direct contacts with the population are destroyed.

On the other hand, the halting of arms supplies and other kinds of military assistance should be one of the first steps taken once it is established that serious human rights violations are occurring. Such assistance is often directly used, or may be so used, by the government in its oppression of its population. It can also reasonably be claimed by the recipient government as a mark of friendship and approval. There is thus a need for the regular reappraisal of all such programmes to ensure that the human rights policy of recipient states is satisfactory. Such a policy needs, moreover, to be fully co-ordinated among different organs of the government so that the defence sales section of the Ministry of Defence is not busily peddling arms to a government that may be regarded with disapproval by political departments (so we may hope to avoid the situation reached in 1977 when a proposed arms sale to El Salvador had been almost completed before it was cut off).

The breaking-off of trade relations is the most serious step of all that can be taken (it has virtually never been done by a British Government for such reasons). It will therefore only be considered in the most extreme cases—it is arguable that Uganda should have been such a case. On the other hand investment in a country with a bad record could be prevented or at least discouraged at a much earlier stage. Many believe that this should already have occurred in the case of British investment in South Africa. The breaking-off of diplomatic relations should be at least equally rare. If, as has been argued, there is always some value in maintaining contacts, it is nearly always best to retain diplomatic representation in some form (especially since once broken, diplomatic relations cannot be restored without appearing to grant a mark of approval). If a gesture is required, the withdrawal of an ambassador, while retaining the rest of the staff, has the necessary symbolic effect without destroying communications altogether.

It is in any case wrong to believe that the most drastic step is always the most influential. Sometimes the most effective weapon is direct representation to the government concerned. Visiting ministers, even if they have arrived for some other purpose—to negotiate a trade agreement or discuss civil aviation affairs—can take the opportunity to make clear the concern caused in their own country by reports of serious human rights violations, and the obstacle these place in the way of continued co-operation. The Minister approached may then use his own influence within the government machine to bring about changes in politics. Visiting foreign ministers should be particularly ready to take up such questions; and even when at home they can express their

concern, either about a particular incident or a general situation, to the ambassador of the state in question. At present, because the basic philosophy of foreign offices is always business as usual, such representations are relatively rare. This allows the erring government to feel there are few serious political costs to their misdemeanours. But direct representations of this sort can be of special influence. Many governments may be prepared to ride out a critical report or two by Amnesty International. But if made to feel that the whole texture of their international relationship may be affected, they may be more willing to consider seriously radical changes in policy.

Representations on such matters (which will normally be unpublicised, though the wisdom of letting it be known that such a question has been broached can be considered in particular cases) of course carry far greater weight if they come from several governments together rather than from one. This also reduces the political costs of taking action and lessens the problem of 'locus standi', that is, the right of governments to intervene in matters in which their own nationals are not directly concerned (though since Britain and France already in 1863 took joint action in sending notes protesting against Russia's treatment of its Polish subjects, there is perhaps no good reason for states to be over-concerned about this question today). In serious cases, therefore, there are good grounds for joining with other like-minded governments in voicing concern and expressing the hope that the situation will shortly be improved. There is certainly a case for far more frequent joint initiatives of this sort than has occurred in the past (they are at present very rare indeed), for they are perhaps more likely to give a government serious reason to re-think its policies than any representations made on a unilateral basis. The EEC has at least once taken such a step (in relation to a Latin American country) but could with advantage do so more often.

A final way in which governments can influence such questions, at least indirectly, is by giving assistance to the many unofficial organisations that are active in this field. These non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are indeed in some ways more effective in this area than governments. They are able to speak, and certainly to publish, their concern more freely than governments usually do. They are less likely to be accused of political bias, or a desire to score points off a political opponent. And they are more likely to be accepted as reflecting and representing the opinions of ordinary people everywhere. For this reason one of the most useful things that governments can do is to provide assistance for such groups. Financial assistance would not usually be welcomed by them, since they would feel that their independence could be prejudiced, or at least that this might be believed. But there can be regular exchanges of information and ideas, a pooling of knowledge about the situation in particular states; joint seminars or other activities to educate the public; and co-operation in international human rights bodies (the last Labour Government deliberately cultivated close contacts of this sort with the human rights 'network' of organisations active in this field, while equally important, good contacts existed

between Amnesty and similar groups and FCO officials at desk level). It is very much to be hoped that close liaison on these lines will continue. For example, human rights organisations will no doubt wish to establish regular contacts with the newly created parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, to ensure that its members, in considering policy towards particular countries and areas, are at all times very conscious of the human rights consideration involved. Parliamentarians, and indeed governments, are usually concerned to reflect the views of influential and active groups within the nation; and the more frequent and regular their contacts with human rights bodies, the more such concerns are likely to be reflected in policy.

1979 should have been seen by human rights campaigners as a red-letter year. For it has seen the fall of eight governments that were among the worst of all violators of human rights in recent years; these were (in approximate order of brutality) those of Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda, Central African Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Iran and South Korea. There have been some improvement in one or two others (Paraguay, Cuba and perhaps in Argentina). And there was a splendid example in Bolivia of how the resolution and combined action of many brave people, including President, parliamentarians, unions, students and the general public, could without arms, defeat an apparently successful military coup. But these welcome improvements must also give pause to all those who are concerned about human rights matters. For it has brought home that in many of these places brutal violations of human rights, including the indiscriminate slaughter of innocent people, could occur over years without any effective action by the international community—indeed to some extent almost unregarded by the outside world. After the defeat of Nazi Germany and the revelation of the unspeakable crimes committed there, many people said that never again would the world sit idly by while millions of innocent people were brutally slaughtered by an insane government. Yet in Cambodia this is precisely what occurred again between 1975 and the end of 1978; while the rest of the world did precisely nothing and few governments uttered a single word or protest. If equally monstrous happenings were to begin elsewhere next year, would the world again stand by, equally dumb and equally helplessly?

One thing that is certainly necessary if outside governments and human rights organisations are to be more successful in the future is that a greater degree of information should be made available to the public about the situation that exists in different countries all over the world. At present, though most educated people have a vague idea of what is happening in individual countries, impressions are generally very unclear, based on stray newspaper reports rather than reliable and systematically compiled evidence. In practice the degree of concern that is felt about each situation depends almost entirely on how far it happens to have been high-lighted by the press and television. Because there was widespread reporting in Britain about the situation in Uganda between 1975 and 1979, there was general concern in Britain about

that country; because there was none about Equatorial Guinea, there was little concern, and almost no knowledge, about the situation in that country, though the situation measured in the number of totally innocent people slaughtered was probably even worse. Similarly, because there were only a few and scattered reports about the situation in Cambodia, there was only a slight and sporadic public concern about it at the time when large scale killings were taking place; and opinion became generally aroused only when the government responsible had already fallen and television programmes began showing the starvation of the population left behind. Even the best known human rights organisations in this country during this time devoted far more of their resources (at least so it seems in retrospect) to publicising the situation in Chile and Argentina and the Soviet Union; situations which, bad though they were, cannot be compared with the situation of prolonged and systematic slaughter that was occurring in Cambodia and Equatorial Guinea.

If outside opinion, including outside governments, are to be able to play a more effective role in preventing such outrages occurring again, it is essential that they should be equipped with more objective information about the situation that exists all over the world, and the relative scale of the violations that are occurring. As we have seen, governments usually only take action when their own public opinion is aroused; and a better informed public opinion would do much to stimulate more effective action by governments. The most useful action that could be taken by human rights organisations—perhaps Amnesty or the so-called human rights network working together—would be the publication of an annual survey of the human rights situation in every country in the world (or at the very least all those where human rights are being seriously violated), with some indication of the gravity of the situation in each place. This would not necessarily involve a system of marking (as did the system undertaken for internal purposes by the Labour government until 1979), though it would require fairly bold judgments about the scale of the threats to human life and liberty that were occurring in each state. The task would involve a systematic collation of press reports, and of first-hand accounts from those on the spot in each country. It would need to be done on a systematic and highly objective basis—but it should not be beyond the capability or resources of the organisations working in this field. It would magnify many times the value of the periodic reports at present issued about individual countries, because it would present a comprehensive picture of the world situation so far as human rights violations are concerned; it would give people an idea of the relative seriousness of the problems in different countries of the world; and it would serve to remind people of the continuing problems existing in countries that had not perhaps been reported on individually for some years. It would not only be of assistance to all unofficial organisations and individual workers in this field. It would assist governments—and not only in this country—in showing them where they should best direct their own efforts without being accused of political partiality.

Conclusions

We have now examined the problems that occur for governments in seeking to express in their policies the concern that is felt among their populations about human rights violations elsewhere. When all that is involved is the passage of resolutions and the drafting of conventions, these problems are not great. There may be differences of view between governments about the type of machinery to be established, and the standards to be laid down; but these are not acute political issues and receive little publicity. The real difficulties occur when it is necessary to move on from that process to seeking to influence the conduct of governments in relation to their own populations in their own territories. It is at this stage that many governments feel constrained to pull their punches: because of the danger, in their own eyes, of prejudicing their relations with the governments in question or damaging particular national interests. The natural instinct of nearly all governments, and even more of diplomats, is to maintain smooth working relations with whatever authorities they have to deal, and to avoid injecting into these delicate political issues such as human rights problems. These attitudes derive partly from the narrow way in which national interests are conceived by many. The wider and more long-term national interests—of bringing about a world in which fewer people are killed, tortured or imprisoned without reason and more enjoy basic freedoms, including freedom to have a say in the way they are governed; even the less noble one of securing the gratitude of future governments once the oppressive regime has been overthrown, while winning world respect for the demonstration of concern on these questions—these count for little against the immediate aim of not offending existing governments. Perhaps a little human rights training for diplomats, or at least intensive briefing on the question before each foreign posting, would be a help; there is little in the current training of diplomats to lead them to take much interest in this subject). Only if these wider aims come to play a much larger role than they have in the past would governments begin to become more active in the protection of human rights elsewhere.

One of the major tasks for organisations such as UNA is to ensure that these wider considerations play the role that they should in government thinking. It is important that such organisations should maintain and deepen their links with governments, so that the latter can be made fully aware of the importance that the public, outside official circles, attach to these wider issues. They should seek to foster contacts with officials as well as with ministers (since the former are at least as important in formulating policy); and should insist that they see sometimes the most senior officials (such as the Permanent Under-Secretary and Deputy Under-Secretaries in the Foreign Office), rather than the comparatively junior bureaucrats with whom they often have to be content to deal at present. They should continue to maintain close links with MPs and seek to mobilise these as an effective pressure on governments: parliamentary opinion in Britain, for instance, has so far been a much more

muted force in such matters than the human rights lobby in the United States Congress.

Finally, the NGOs have a vital role to play in educating opinion at large; including opinion in other countries, and especially in the Third World where there is a less strong tradition of interest in such matters. The organisation of conferences, seminars and other activities, the publication of suitable literature and the maintenance of links with corresponding organisations in other countries all have a role to play here. In the final resort better respect for human rights everywhere can only be brought about through changing the attitudes of world public opinion, and so changing the climate of expectations which ultimately influence governments.

The willingness of Western governments to play an active role in influencing the human rights situation in other countries too will ultimately depend on their beliefs about the demands placed upon them by their own public opinion. The extent to which, therefore, human rights considerations play a significant part in the foreign policy of our own government will depend crucially on the success of UNA and other NGOs in building up a constituency within public opinion, at home and abroad, that recognises and insists on the importance of these issues; which accepts that, in today's narrow world, the right of all peoples to live free of oppression, of arbitrary arrest and of torture and sudden death is the concern of all of us, and of all governments, in whatever territory of the world they may happen to dwell.

THE SECURITY DEBATE IN JAPAN

*Wolf Mendl**

FOR Japan the 1970s was a decade of 'shocks' and has raised doubts about its basic postwar policy of economic growth and passive diplomacy under the protection of American military power. The shocks were the result of fundamental changes in the international environment. The first change appeared in the economic sphere, where acute friction with the other industrialised economies began to surface at the end of the 1960s. This was followed in 1973 by the first of the so-called 'oil shocks', signalling a shift in the balance of economic power towards the resource-rich countries. In recent years a further set of issues in the economic field has arisen because of the challenge from the newly industrialised countries in Japan's established markets.

The second major change was political in character associated with the apparent decline of American power in Asia—one of the direct consequences of which has been the Western *rapprochement* with China and the emerging Sino-American *entente*. Corresponding to these developments has been the greatly increased visibility of Soviet policies and military power in Asia.

Yet, after a decade of buffetings from outside and of political uncertainty within, Japan is entering the new decade as it entered the previous one: with the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) once again in firm control of the Diet[1] and with a prime minister known for his skills as a behind-the-scenes party manager but not for any pronounced views on policy. The apparently inevitable decline of the faction-and-scandal-ridden LDP forecast in recent years has simply not happened. This is further proof, if proof is needed, of Japan's basic social and political stability. If, as may well be, the 'shocks' of the 1970s are going to be followed by the 'decisions' of the 1980s, those decisions will be made in response to the world outside and not as a result of pressures for change from within. It is external events that are forcing the Japanese to re-examine the foundations of their diplomatic and security policies.

The security debate

The focus of the security debate in Japan has shifted noticeably in the past

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1. In the June 1980 election, the LDP won the highest number of seats in the Lower House (284) since 1969, when it gained 288. Its share of the popular vote was also the highest since then and almost identical.

few years. Up to the 1970s the issue of national security centred on the question whether military policies were violating the constitution. It was complicated because the constitution did not specifically deny the right of self-defence, although in Article IX it renounced 'war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes' and the possession of 'Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential'.[2] Thus the debate hinged on the question of where self-defence ends and where the capacity to wage war begins.

The issue was never resolved clearly or satisfactorily and what happened in practice was a steady expansion of the boundaries of 'self-defence' in so far as 'permissible' weapons and the range of operations were concerned.

At independence in 1952 the government took the position that military resistance against aggression was not 'war' because armed action in self-defence is not a means of settling international disputes. A major shift came four years later when the Hatoyama government declared that it was within the realm of self-defence to attack an enemy's bases if, for instance, there was no alternative means of defence against a missile attack. Ever since then the debate has raged around the definition of defensive weapons and postures. There were many who argued that the constitution forbade any form of armed forces, but their influence has only sufficed to delay or moderate the steady growth of Japan's military capabilities.

When the F-4EJ (Phantom) aircraft was introduced, its in-flight refuelling equipment was converted to a ground refuelling system, and its bombing capability was removed. Although this was justified on purely technical grounds, there is no doubt that the action was taken as a result of pressures from the opposition in the Diet and to reassure public opinion. The F-4EJ is now being replaced by the F-15 and the government has decided to retain its in-flight refuelling capability and its bombing system, in spite of opposition pressures. The authorities again justify their decision on technical grounds and have enunciated the principle that although 'war potential' refers to a capacity *exceeding* the minimum necessary for self-defence, the defensive capability must be related to advances in military technology and to the international military environment.[3]

This theory of military relativity brings Japan's armed forces nearer to the grey zone where defensive and offensive capabilities overlap and where other countries have to accept the government's declared defensive intentions on trust—a commodity in short supply in the world.

A further example of the trend away from using the constitution as a yardstick for deciding whether weapons are legitimate or not is provided by the official position over 'defensive' nuclear weapons. Since the late 1950s there have been periodic statements that such weapons are in theory permissible

2. For a study of the origins of the 'no war' clause in the Japanese Constitution, see Theodore McNelly, 'The Origin and Meaning of the Disarmament Clause of the Japanese Constitution' (*Report of the 4th Kyushu International Cultural Conference 1977*, Fukuoka Unesco Association, 1978), pp. 187–202).

3. *Defense of Japan 1978* (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1978), pp. 123–133.

under the constitution. After the predictable uproar, they were always followed by assurances that Japan will not possess them, either because it is the government's declared policy or because of the terms of the Basic Atomic Energy Law and, after 1976, Japan's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The significance of the shift from constitutional prohibitions to other legal constraints is that whereas it might not be too difficult to amend the Basic Atomic Energy Law or to withdraw from the NPT, it is generally believed that amendments of the constitution would be politically impossible.

The expansion of military capabilities has gone hand in hand with the expansion of the 'permissible' range of military activities. We have already noted that an attack on enemy bases outside Japanese territory would under certain circumstances be considered an act of legitimate self-defence. At one time the capacity for maritime defence was strictly confined to coastal defence and the protection of shipping by the convoy system. Today, the official strategy envisages the patrolling of 'safety navigation routes' extending south-eastwards to the Marianas and south-westwards to the northern reaches of the Philippines.[4] A further step was taken this year when Japanese naval units joined in multinational naval exercises (RIMPAC) for the first time. The decision is justified on the grounds that the 'training' of the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF)—which is constitutionally allowed, as distinct from 'manoeuvres', which are not—is taking place in a multilateral context instead of the usual bilateral context with the United States.[5]

The steady conversion of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) into normal armed forces, though subject to important limitations of their armament and functions, has not taken place by stealth but against a background of growing and by now overwhelming public acceptance of the SDF. Public discussion of defence and security was taboo during the first two decades after the war. Any move by the government to increase Japan's defence capability was fiercely attacked by its political opponents in the Diet and met with strong resistance from the press and among the general public. All this began to change rapidly in the mid-1970s. It is now respectable to discuss such matters and the past year has seen a flood of articles on the subject in the press and serious magazines. Decisions over the acquisition of the F-15 and participation in RIMPAC would have caused a political storm ten years ago; today they arouse a certain amount of opposition in the Diet but otherwise leave the public mood unruffled.

A further indication of the change in the domestic climate is provided by the stance of the centrist opposition parties. Kōmeitō, which not long ago opposed the existence of the SDF, formed an electoral alliance with the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) last year, making concessions by agreeing to support the maintenance of the SDF and to retain the Mutual Security Treaty with the

4. Tomohisa Sakanaka and others, 'JSDF—As We See It', No 13. A series of twenty six articles written for *Asahi Shimbun*, reproduced in *Asahi Evening News* in the winter and spring of 1979.

5. *The Japan Times*, Nov. 29 and Dec. 12 1979.

United States 'for the time being'. Even the leadership of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), most committed of all parties to a strict application of Article IX, is apparently moving towards acceptance of the SDF and is displaying a readiness to discuss security and defence policies on their own merits.

It would, however, be a mistake to conclude, as some observers do, that discussions about the constitutional and legal inhibitions have become no more than 'nit-picking' irrelevancies. The constitution may have receded into the background but it is by no means dead. Opinion polls reveal that it, and Article IX in particular, still enjoy widespread popular support. The SDF may be accepted and the Mutual Security Treaty approved as necessary in a turbulent world; but any change of the present situation in favour of substantially increased armament has the support of only a small minority. It is true that the size of the minority has increased steadily over the years, but the authorities feel constrained to stress continually that every step taken to improve the capabilities of the SDF is not a violation of the fundamentally defensive orientation of Japan's security policy. On the face of it there is nothing extraordinary in this, as all governments say the same thing, more or less, about their defence policies—but given the general acceptance of the spirit of the constitution (and, after all, Japan has prospered under it as never before in its history) there is little incentive for the government to lurch suddenly from a course which has served Japan so well for more than thirty years.

The argument has, therefore, moved decisively from the issue of whether it is *permissible* to have any form of military organisation and equipment to the question of what military capabilities are *desirable*, given the constitutional and legal constraints and Japan's deliberately pacific foreign policy.

What is desirable?

Any theoretical discussion of national security has to take into account perceptions of value (what is to be protected?); perceptions of what threatens these values (not only a matter of *who* the aggressor might be but *what form* the threat might take); and calculations of means and their cost (what is the best method to defend values and is it the most economical?). Generally speaking, perceptions of value and threat dictate the choice of means and cost; but the concept of security is usually regarded as a value itself, thereby helping to confuse the debate over means.[6]

There is an additional complication which undermines such neat academic formulations. In most societies powerful interest groups will have different perceptions of value and threat, and different preferences for means and cost. When Japan embarked on its postwar independence, the issue of national security was almost exclusively the concern of the Prime Minister's office and the Foreign Ministry, which had the responsibility for the day-to-day management of relations with the United States under the Mutual Security

6. Karl Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 169-170.

Treaty. Postwar constitutional and legal dispositions ensured that the emerging defence establishment was kept in strict subordination to the civil power. The civilian bureaucrats of the Defence Agency had a very lowly position in the hierarchy of bureaucracies. The leading officials were recruited from other ministries and especially from the ranks of former police officers, partly because the SDF had their origin in the National Police Reserve authorised by MacArthur in 1950 and partly, no doubt, because it was assumed that policemen would be best able to keep the military in order.[7]

Things are different now and it is possible to identify a 'defence lobby' composed of a variety of interest groups, each seeking to influence policy in one direction or another. A generational change has brought young and able graduates straight from Japan's top universities into the Defence Agency, which commands their first loyalty. They are no longer content to play second fiddle to their colleagues in other ministries when it comes to the formulation of security policy. The uniformed officers, too, are gaining in confidence and demanding a greater voice in matters of defence. Some businessmen have also entered the debate and one has been so bold as to raise the issue of conscription.[8]

The defence establishment has been riven by the same kind of in-fighting that one finds in military bureaucracies everywhere. The younger civilian officials criticise their superiors for their lack of commitment and drive; the men in uniform resent their exclusion from the highest levels of policy-making; the various arms compete for attention and resources. The Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF) stresses the Russian threat to Hokkaido to emphasise its own importance; the MSDF warns about the potential threat to sea communications—Japan's jugular vein. The industrialists are worried about unit costs and production runs.

It would be highly misleading, on the basis of these developments to conclude that Japan is about to revert to the militarism of the past. The traumatic experience of the war and its aftermath, and the unparalleled prosperity since then, have created a thoroughly civilian society. Above all, the completely changed international environment makes any thought of a return to the past an absurdity. Those whose primary business is defence, whether as administrators, military personnel, or suppliers of matériel, have acquired an important—but not a dominant voice—in the debate over national policy. They will be heard but they will not be the decisive influence as the Japanese try to come to terms with the changing world around them.

Japan's values

Very simply put, the Japanese are most concerned to safeguard their independence and prosperity. They have benefited greatly from the existence of the particular world order which has prevailed since 1945. It has ensured both

7. Sakanaka and others, 'JSDF—As We See It', No. 5.
8. *The Japan Times Weekly*, March 8, 1980.

objectives, but so far at least the Japanese have not felt a great sense of responsibility for maintaining that system, let alone defending it. The international environment has seemed to be something existing independently of Japan. Like an ocean surrounding an island, it might be calm or stormy but there was nothing one could do to influence it. All that could be done was to exploit it to one's advantage while seeking to limit the damage from storms. For the past three decades it has been sufficient from Japan's point of view to develop a local defence capability and to rely on the United States to keep the peace in the region, while avoiding any close involvement in American activities elsewhere—apart from allowing the Americans to use their Japanese bases.

For many years now, the United States has urged Japan to take a less parochial view and to support the 'West' as a whole in maintaining a balance of power designed to prevent the further expansion of Communist or, more precisely since the 1970s, Soviet power. Japan has nominally accepted the challenge to play a more active part in world affairs and has paid lip-service to the need to take initiatives towards this end. It is an important member of the club of leading industrial states; it belongs to the OECD; it represents one side of the unofficial but influential Trilateral Commission; and so on.

In practice, however, Japan has taken little initiative except when under direct pressure. Normalisation of relations with China only came after the United States had shown the way and threatened to steal a march in this field. The yen was revalued under the impact of a 'shock' administered by the Americans. Trade liberalisation got under way to head off a damaging trade war with the United States and Western Europe. The oil 'shock' of 1973 produced a shift in Japanese Middle East policy against American wishes. Even the recent action over international refugee problems in south-east Asia was a reaction to world-wide criticism of Japan's previous inactivity.

Such a passive pattern of behaviour may be variously ascribed to the postwar structure of Japanese politics, the national psychology, the traumatic experience of the past, the special relationship with the United States that emerged from the Occupation period (1945-52), and the benefits gained from a passive diplomatic posture. No doubt all have played their part, but it seems that Japan may have to rethink its international position, not because of any major changes in the domestic scene, nor because the United States says so, but because Japan can no longer rely on the international system to operate as it has done over the past thirty years. This is not to say that Japan's basic values have changed or that the preservation of a particular international system has been added as an additional value to be secured. Rather, the need to think again is a question of how Japan can *adjust* to change with the least possible dislocation of its fundamental interests.

Perceptions of threats

Since the mid-1970s, the Japanese have become more acutely aware of the

potential threat from the Soviet Union. The threat is essentially military in character because naval and air power could give the Russians the means with which to dominate the seas around Japan, exposing it to pressures and blackmail. This heightened awareness of the Soviet threat owes as much to the withdrawal symptoms displayed by the United States since 1975 as to anything the Russians have done. While few believe that Japan is likely to face a direct Soviet attack within the foreseeable future, many are fearful that the continued strengthening of Soviet military, naval, and air capabilities in North-east Asia, combined with a Soviet penetration of South-east Asia through influence over the states of Indochina, might lead first to the enforced isolation and neutralisation of Japan, and eventually to it being sucked into the Soviet orbit.

The situation in Korea poses another kind of threat and possibly the most immediate of all. But because of the involvement of three other major powers in the peninsula Japan's margin of manoeuvre is limited to trying to stabilise the situation through quiet diplomacy; and Japan would be most unwilling to take on the role of sole protector of the South. Indeed, one has the impression that what worries the Japanese most is the prospect, in the event of war or revolution, that hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of Korean refugees might try to make their way across the straits separating the peninsula from Japan.

There is a third sense of threat which preoccupies the Japanese considerably more than the particular challenge from the Soviet Union or the changes of the situation in Korea and which—as a consequence of the two oil 'shocks' of 1973 and 1979—is becoming a national obsession. This, of course, refers to anxieties about Japan's ability to sustain its economic prosperity—which is so dependent on external factors. Access to essential sources of energy and raw materials and to the markets for Japanese exports requires safe passage over the oceans and good relations with the countries concerned. The security of Japanese overseas investments will be a matter of increasing importance during the next decade. The whole edifice of overseas economic interests was built in an era when the United States was undeniably the world's dominant economic and military power and when oil and other raw materials were relatively cheap. The effect of America's apparent economic vulnerability and of global shifts in economic power has created new and perplexing problems of security.

This economic threat is much more diffuse than the one posed by the Soviet Union. It is not unrelated to the Soviet threat because of the advantages the Russians might gain from the growing disorders of the Third World, especially in the Middle East—disorders which the United States no longer seems capable of preventing or controlling. American impotence in turn poses a new threat, most vividly demonstrated in Iran where the hostage crisis caused an agonising conflict of interests for Japan: should it join the United States in concerted action which could bring about a direct threat to its oil supplies and leave Japan dependent on the good-will of the largely American-dominated international oil companies? Or should Japan refuse to co-operate with the

United States, thereby benefiting from Iranian goodwill but perhaps further weakening the international system from which Japan has benefited so much? The decline of American power, therefore, creates problems for Japan not necessarily because it means a corresponding increase of Soviet power—it is not proved that a Western discomfiture produces an automatic Soviet gain—but because a weakened United States will exact a greater price from its friends in return for its support. A weaker and frustrated United States may also be a more unpredictable power. Japan must balance the requirements of meeting a potential Soviet threat, which is primarily military and regional, with the requirements of meeting a potential threat to its prosperity, which is economic and global. And there may no longer be a simple solution ready to hand in keeping close to the United States.

Means and their cost

If one considers the military threat alone, cost should in theory be no problem. Japan could spend 2 or 3 per cent of its gross national product on military procurements without seriously undermining the economy. If the Federal Republic of Germany can do it, why not Japan? Indeed, some industrialists are urging the government to increase defence expenditure, thereby helping to take up some of the slack caused by the current recession and—if the ban on the sale of weapons abroad were to be relaxed—opening the way for a promising line in exports.

But the cost in political terms is quite another matter. This is not only a question of the right distribution of national resources—how much for social welfare? how much for the private consumer? how much for the development of alternative sources of energy? It touches on the equally important consideration of what might be the best means with which to ensure the requirements of military security.

It is by no means self-evident that greatly increased rearmament would be the best solution. The government stresses the importance of qualitative improvements and it is obvious that much could be done to modernise naval and air-defence capabilities and some of the equipment of the GSDF. But it is not clear at what point a military build-up might begin to undermine the very security it is designed to safeguard—by creating capabilities which would destroy the image of an inoffensive state that Japan has been trying to project. Thus the definition of missions is far more important than some formula which seeks to define abstractly the amount of the national product to be devoted to defence.

If, for example, Japan were to develop armed forces which could easily be used beyond the territorial confines of the islands and the seas immediately surrounding them, that might lead to several undesirable consequences. It could frighten Japan's neighbours, especially the smaller countries of South-east Asia—who might see it as an indication that Japan was trying to back up its considerable economic influence with military power, leading to political

domination. It might intensify pressures from friendly countries and from certain quarters inside Japan to join a collective security system, bringing with it the risk of being drawn into other countries' quarrels. A policy which assumed the burden of collective security might also threaten an economic prosperity based on a world-wide network of interests not obviously tied to a particular power bloc. Finally, a crash programme of rearmament might revive bitter divisions at home and threaten the country's basic political stability.

The intention of the present government is to keep Japan's military policy subordinate to other means for ensuring national security, in spite of strong pressures from the United States and China, and growing pressures from within. Japan's main instrument in the pursuit of security is the so-called 'economic diplomacy', whose function is to combine the protection of the nation's economic prosperity with the exercise of influence abroad, and to satisfy the need to be seen as a 'major power' without provoking potential enemies.

Japan as a great power

The application of 'economic diplomacy' means using Japanese capital and technology to further Japan's economic and political interests—especially in the resource-rich developing countries. It means acting as a discreet go-between where possible (between the United States and ASEAN, between ASEAN and Vietnam, between China and South Korea) while observing the rule of 'criticising privately but keeping quiet publicly'. It means making substantial contributions to international agencies—Japan provides the third largest contribution to the United Nations budget. And it means using funds to promote interest in, and friendship for, Japan.

Is it then only a matter of time before Japan moves from this position towards a more traditional power orientation? The question raises a number of problems which need closer examination in the light of Japan's peculiar position in the world today. Behind it lies the belief that the separation of economics from politics, which Japan apparently pursued so profitably in the post-war era, can no longer be sustained. This is arguable. For instance, the Japanese Government's decision to allow trade with China in the 1950s and 1960s and trade with North Vietnam during the Vietnam war had a political significance. The claim that economic activities can be pursued in isolation from politics is merely a convenient and very useful fiction. This is all the more true of Japan where there exists such an intricate relationship between business, bureaucracy and politicians.

The concept of Japan as a 'great power' also begs the question of what constitutes a great power today. In classic definitions of the term, military power was an indispensable attribute of any state which claimed such a status. This is the one attribute, however, that Japan professes not to want. Being a great power has also usually meant having a concept of the international system or of what it ought to be. Indeed, it is the major powers that are seen as

having the responsibility for shaping and managing it. There is little evidence that the present Japanese leadership has any idea of wanting to manage the system, let alone of shaping it. This has its reasons not only in the contemporary political culture of Japan but also in history.

To take the initiative in world affairs, the Japanese leadership must first acquire a clearer conception of the most favourable environment for Japan's interests and then develop policies designed to promote it. Judging from past performance, the nature of Japan's decision-making process, and the present condition of the Japanese body politic, the development of a radically more active posture would seem likely to be a slow process—which might not be completed during the coming decade. The actual development of Japanese policy will, therefore, be largely dependent on the impact of the outside world. Looked at from this perspective, it is possible to postulate several changes in the emphasis, if not the direction of current Japanese security policy.

Policy options

Japan is on the threshold of a great debate over its national security and external relations. The issue of defence, for instance, played a prominent part in the recent general election, although there is no evidence that it greatly influenced the voters' decisions.[9] The debate is essentially between those who think that Japan should be a fully participating member of the Western group of states under American leadership and those who believe that Japan should pursue a more independent and nationally assertive policy.

This is, of course, an over-simplification. The pro-Western camp includes some who put all the emphasis on the bilateral relationship with the United States and others who want Japan to break out of the mould of bilateralism and develop a multilateral concept of the Western 'Alliance'. The exponents of greater independence and national self-assertion vary from advocates of a looser and more discriminating association with the other Western powers to those who prefer a neutralist or non-aligned position.

The division between these two schools of thought also cuts across the boundaries of the established political parties and interest groups. Adherents of both are to be found in all institutions. It is however fair to say that the majority of the officials in the Foreign Ministry and among the political and industrial leaders of the country belong to the first school. The Self-Defence forces are divided: the MSDF leans towards close collaboration with the United States and the other services tend to argue for a more independent defence capability because of doubts about American reliability in an emergency. Some industrialists, too, favour more independent policies towards the Third World or the Soviet Union. Acceptance by the opposition parties, except for the

9. An interesting example of the state of public opinion during the election was the defeat of ex-general Hiroomi Kurisu, former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, in the Tokyo constituency of the House of Councillors. His main platform was the need for a stronger SDF to counter the Soviet threat. On the other hand, Tokura Utsunomiya, who strongly opposed rearmament and warned against the revival of militarism, was successful.

Communists and some elements in the JSP, of the need for the Mutual Security Treaty, has tempered the attempt to play on nationalist feelings by calls for a more independent position. The ever closer relationship between China and the United States has dampened the enthusiasm for links with China as an 'Asian' alternative to the pro-Western orientation of Japan.

There are thus not only considerable differences within each camp, but the positions of the two camps overlap at the edges. It is when one considers the various alternatives that the divergences in thought and inclination become clearer. There is no lack of policy options, though some are obviously more credible than others.

Under the Ohira government the most favoured 'alternative' seemed to be the formation of a wider Pacific community of industrialised states, which might eventually develop structural links, primarily in the economic sphere—though possibly including an element of collective security, as foreshadowed by the RIMPAC exercise. It may be that Japan would prefer such a grouping to be similar to the EEC and not include the United States. This would give it the kind of independence that the Europeans enjoy, enabling them to deal with the Americans more as equals—something which they cannot do within Nato. However, it is difficult to envisage a Pacific grouping without the most important Pacific power, just as it is difficult to think of a North Atlantic grouping without the United States.

A Pacific community might include the island states of ASEAN. However, a different line of approach would be to make ASEAN the main focus of Japanese policy, reviving and bringing up to date the concept of a co-prosperity sphere. The economic relations between Japan and the members of ASEAN make such an arrangement entirely conceivable; and, again, there have been intimations, especially under Mr. Fukuda's premiership, which have pointed in this direction. There are, however, a number of considerations which make it very unlikely that Japan would move far along this road. There is the danger of arousing strong anti-Japanese reactions within the region; and Japan's interests may not be served best by the creation of a special economic zone through which it might be dragged into the politics of the volatile South-east Asian region, bringing it into conflict with Vietnam and, what would be worse, with the Soviet Union or even China.

A closer association with China, much favoured by some circles in Japan, has its temptations. The Chinese, however, appear to be more interested in a United States-Japan-China axis to bar the way of Soviet expansion. The Japanese, in spite of sentiment and dreams about the vast potential of an eventual East Asian economic bloc, will approach their relations with China with the utmost caution. They have good reason to. Uncertainty about the course of events in China and about its foreign policy will persist for some time to come—at least until the middle years of this decade, when it should become clearer what the prospects of success for the modernisation programme might be and how stable the present leadership is. Japan would also want to steer

clear of any political entanglements on the Asian mainland which could bring it into direct conflict with the Soviet Union.

A gradual drifting into the Soviet orbit is another alternative which is sometimes mentioned. It is difficult to see any reason why this prospect should be taken seriously. It is true that the Soviet Union, and more particularly Siberia, offers considerable attraction for Japan; but the experience of the past twenty-five years of negotiations over economic co-operation, the generally unfriendly feeling among the Japanese public towards the Soviet Union, exacerbated by the territorial issue and the problem of fishing rights, combine to make this a most improbable scenario. On the other hand, Japan would be reluctant to abandon its present economic collaboration with Russia, however meagre the prospects might be, if only to make sure that the West Germans, or even the Americans, do not eventually monopolise foreign assistance in developing Siberia's riches.

Finally, there is always the possibility of cutting loose from all entanglements and pursuing an independent course. This would not be a new departure for Japan. Self-imposed isolation is a part of its historical tradition. Even today it has an appeal to nationalist sentiment on both the Left and the Right of the political spectrum. The major difficulty with such a policy is that to be successful it requires less dependence on the outside world. Surrounded by powerful and quarrelsome neighbours, an isolated Japan would feel insecure and vulnerable. A balance among these neighbours might provide some sort of guarantee of Japan's inviolability; but balances are not immutable and—whether it likes it or not—Japan has become part of the balancing system.

The degree of Japan's involvement with the world is such that instead of seeking security in isolation, Japan might be more tempted to find it by joining the whole world, becoming an active member of the international community of states and taking a non-aligned position, perhaps following the Swedish example. It is interesting that from time to time, when dealing with major international issues, Japanese spokesmen refer to the need to defer a decision until the general will of a particular group of nations or of a majority of members of the United Nations becomes clear. This could be a transfer to the international arena of characteristics of the policy formulation process in Japan. But as the United Nations, at best, can still only exercise a kind of restraining and moral influence on the problems of international security, Japan must continue to try to find security in an association which provides it with some protection against military pressure or attack but does not entangle it in the quarrels of others. Its geographical situation may not, after all, make non-alignment seem a desirable course of policy, however, attractive it might be in other respects.

Events in the Middle East and South-west Asia have brought to light an interesting new development since the beginning of the year. Over Iran Japan has behaved as if it were a tenth member of the EEC. It is the first time that

consultations between the European Community and Japan have transcended bilateral or trilateral economic problems and have involved a search for a common policy in a complex international crisis. This novel development has several aspects. First, Japan, true to style, waited to see what the members of the Community were going to do before making its own decisions. Secondly, the Europeans and Japanese have come together as friends of the United States but acutely aware that their material interests may be threatened by American actions. Thirdly, they have agreed that, from their point of view, to attempt a military solution to the crisis would probably be disastrous.

It is tempting to see in this a convergence of interests between Western Europe and Japan and to speculate whether it might not create the basis for yet another option for Japan: the development of a partnership with the West European states, and more particularly with the Federal Republic of Germany, for the joint managing of the non-American component of the Western Alliance. Germans and Japanese have much in common: both were late-comers among the Great Powers of the nineteenth century; both have broken with their militarist past; both are the most important friends of the United States; and both depend on the United States for protection but want to retain a freedom of manoeuvre within their regions, particularly in relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Federal Republic has the added attraction for the status-conscious Japanese of being the most important and economically successful member of the European branch of the alliance.

A Japanese-German/European association could have the dual advantage of reinforcing the American resistance to Soviet expansion while at the same time more effectively influencing and moderating American policy. Japan's integration into a global alliance is often taken for granted in the foreign press these days and the impression was strengthened by its association with the declaration on Afghanistan issued by the Venice Summit. There are, however, several reasons why this may not turn out to be an effective choice for Japan, quite apart from the problems of geography. The Japanese, for historical reasons and out of self-interest, do not share the concept of 'alliance' that the Europeans have when dealing with the United States. They would want to avoid the kind of commitment to mutual assistance explicit in the North Atlantic Treaty. There are parts of the world—south-east Asia, the Middle East, and Africa—where Japanese interests might be served best in not being identified with those of the West. Above all, Japan would want to avoid appearing as an American/West European outpost in east Asia. Conversely, the Americans and Europeans have not always made the Japanese feel that they are fully accepted members of the 'club'—as witness their exclusion from the Guadeloupe meeting in January 1979 and the way oil import quotas were worked out behind their backs during the Tokyo Summit.

Into the 1980s

Because the prospects of alternative arrangements are either nebulous or

hazardous, Japan will try for as long as possible to preserve the old bilateral relationship with the United States. In spite of growing doubts about America's power and will to protect its friends against the Soviet Union, the United States provides the only credible counter-force to Russia's expanding military might. In spite of a divergence or conflict of interests in the Third World and in bilateral economic relations, the American economy—both in terms of its domestic market and the importance of American influence throughout the world—will continue to be the largest single factor in Japan's external economic relations. Governments will continue to stress that relations with the United States are the 'cornerstone' of their external policy, while supporting the United States diplomatically, soothing the irritations caused by economic friction, and increasing military expenditure.

At the same time, Japan will cautiously become more visible in international politics, whether as a spokesman on behalf of ASEAN in the councils of the industrialised states, or as a proponent of trans-Pacific relations, or as a collaborator with the West European states, It may move in several directions simultaneously as it tries to find its place in a rapidly changing world.

In the long term, the outcome of the debate between the protagonists of the strongly pro-Western and the more independent tendencies in Japan's foreign policy will depend on whether the Europeans and Americans are able to contain the protectionist pressures in their economies and whether Japan can avoid provoking them. But it will also depend on whether the Western powers can make the Japanese feel that they are fully accepted into the 'club'. Failure to do either will undoubtedly strengthen all those in Japan who are looking for alternatives to the Western connection.

In the short term the military component of Japan's security policy will remain subordinate to its economic, diplomatic and cultural components.[10] To change this order of priorities would be to counter the drift of the whole postwar period and it would be easier to continue in this now established direction than to reverse it. Important interests in Japan do favour a greatly increased military build-up. Their arguments and the anxieties caused by a deteriorating international climate are conditioning public opinion sufficiently to make possible a very rapid swing of the national mood in favour of speedy and substantial rearmament. Further 'shocks', such as the outbreak of a major conflict in South-east Asia or the threat of more American withdrawals from the region, may bring this about.

By the mid-1980s, when the present plans to modernise the SDF should be completed, the military establishment will have acquired greater weight in the

10. The first few weeks of the Suzuki government have produced evidence of an increased emphasis on defence. The decision to allow a rise in defence expenditure in Fiscal 1981 above the rate of increase for the rest of the budget, the likely establishment of a National Security Council, and the more explicit tone of the Defence White Paper for 1980, all point in this direction. The Cabinet also includes a number of ministers known to favour rearmament. Three of them were once associated with a very right wing group, now moribund, within the LDP.

political system so that the question of Japan's military policy, including perhaps the issue of a 'defensive' nuclear armament, will be posed more acutely. It is likely to bring into still sharper relief the inherent contradictions between Japan's global and regional interests. As a global economic 'power', Japan may find the military instrument of marginal significance and possibly even counter-productive in the defence of its interests. But within the North-east Asian region, Japan may feel the need for greater military security while finding itself hemmed in by militarily stronger powers whose strength it might be futile or dangerous to emulate.

A PROSPECT OF SAUDI ARABIA

*T. R. McHale**

UNTIL the 1970s Saudi Arabia was rarely mentioned in the world press, it attracted scant scholarly attention, and it was largely ignored by international businessmen other than oilmen. To those few who knew anything of the country, the Kingdom was a barren, sparsely populated desert country, most immediately identified with the holy Muslim cities of Mecca and Medina, the exploits of 'Lawrence of Arabia', the forbidding sands of the Rub al Khali, and the philioprogenative King Abdul Aziz bin Saud, the eponymous founder of the country. In the late 1960s oil people knew Saudi Arabia as oil-rich—but in the context of a world surplus of oil production and declining real prices for oil in world markets.

Riyadh, the capital city of Saudi Arabia, was frequently missing from or misplaced on maps of the Middle East; and the rare foreigners who had visited or lived in the city were usually intrepid travellers seeking the more remote cities of the world, or the occasional technical specialist serving the Royal household or a government ministry.[1] Even the diplomatic community was denied permission to reside in Riyadh—it remained residentially restricted to Jeddah, a thousand kilometres away. Indeed, prior to the arrival of American oilmen in the Al Hasa region in the mid-1930s non-Muslim residents were restricted to Jeddah and were forbidden to travel to other parts of the Kingdom without Royal approval. As a result, the foreign non-Muslim community was understandably small. In the 1930s the number was usually less than a hundred, and most were staff from the legations and consulates serving their country's Haj pilgrims.

Saudi Arabia enters the modern world

Saudi Arabia's isolation from the rest of the world was largely self-willed and reflected a conscious policy on the part of the Government. The ruling Royal Family of Saudi Arabia had willingly assumed the obligation to protect and promote the Haj—the religious visitation to Mecca required of all Muslims during their lifetime. But secular 'tourism' was made next to impossible, non-Muslim foreigners were prohibited from establishing businesses, and the number of visitors other than Muslim pilgrims was limited to those acceptable to King Abdul Aziz. Even with the development of the oil industry, entry into

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1. As late as the 1950s, foreign visitors permitted in the capital city of Riyadh were required to change into Arabic dress before entering the walled city.

the Kingdom was strictly controlled and the 'Western' Aramco oil community lived an isolated life in their own 'camp' community in Dhahran. During his half century in power, Abdul Aziz never travelled out of the Arabian peninsula except for a brief visit to Iraq in 1916, a meeting with President Roosevelt on the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal in 1945, and a subsequent brief visit to Egypt to meet King Farouk. Abdul Aziz believed that isolation served the Kingdom's best interests, and tried to minimise the country's involvement in international affairs even in the Arabic world. He refused to have his country join the League of Nations, but eventually gave in to the pleading of the Americans and British, and the realities of world politics in 1945, to join the United Nations; in the same year Saudi Arabia became a founding-member of the Arab League.

When Abdul Aziz died in 1953, he was succeeded by his eldest son, Saud. By necessity rather than desire, Saudi Arabia was forced into a more active international role as its economy became more and more dependent on the sale of its internationally traded oil, as the appeal of Pan-Arab Nasserism began to grow within Saudi Arabia, and as specific issues or conflicts—including Palestine, Yemen and a boundary dispute over the Buraimi Oasis with Britain—involved international rather than domestic appeals.

With the forced abdication of King Saud and his replacement by Faisal in 1964, the most widely travelled and internationally experienced member of the Royal Family was in power. As his father's de facto Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Faisal had visited Europe on several occasions and had visited Russia in 1933; in 1945 he was present at the initial meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco as representative of Saudi Arabia, one of the founding-members of the organisation. Despite his long and relatively wide background in international affairs, King Faisal chose to follow a narrow and largely regional focus in his foreign relations. He avoided military alliances or bloc commitments and sought to keep the Kingdom free from entanglements within the Arab world that might promote serious internal dissent.

Paralleling Saudi Arabia's relative isolation from the world outside was the isolation of communities internal to the Kingdom. A single track railway had been built between Dammam and Riyadh for King Abdul Aziz by Aramco in 1951, but it was well into the 1960s before a road system connecting major population centres was begun; and it was not until 1967 that a paved road connected the capital city of Riyadh with the main port of entry, Jeddah. Without roads, the few travellers relied on camel or car tracks and a limited air transportation system—which, until 1963, was operated by the Ministry of Defence. Even after Saudi Arabian Airlines became an independent commercial operation no international flights were permitted into the capital city of Riyadh until the 1970s. The telephone and the telegraph had been introduced into Saudi Arabia under Abdul Aziz in the 1920s despite the opposition of the conservative Wahhabi religious leaders who considered them instruments of the devil; but the systems were never developed to serve the

larger community, and it was not until the late 1970s that reliable inter-city telephone calls were possible, and the public had access to telex facilities.

The first radio station was established in Saudi Arabia in the 1920s, but religious objections limited its use almost exclusively to readings from the Koran until the 1960s when the Government undertook a Kingdom-wide construction programme which reached all parts of the country. Television was introduced into the Kingdom by Aramco for its employees in 1957. While radio was grudgingly accepted after many years, television was bitterly fought by the more conservative members of the community. In 1965, when the Government established its own station, strong elements in the Royal Family as well as in religious groups bitterly opposed the move. Prince Khalid bin Musaid, a nephew of King Faisal and one of the leaders of the anti-television forces, was killed in a fight with the police after he led a group which pulled down a television tower. And it was Prince Khalid bin Musaid's brother, Prince Faisal bin Musaid, who later assassinated King Faisal in 1975.

The emergence of Saudi Arabia in history

Much that happens in contemporary Saudi Arabia, and many of the emerging patterns of its political and social development, can be understood only through reference to the historic past of the area and its people.

For well over a millennium after the founding and spread of Islam in Arabia, 'government' remained a highly localised function of individual leadership qualities and constantly changing tribal or settlement alliances. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, a revivalist Islamic teacher, Mohammed bin Abd al Wahhab, appeared on the scene with a vision of a polity based exclusively on the Koran.

Distressed by the deterioration of religious practices and the growth of superstition and icon worship in Arabia, Mohammed bin Abd al Wahhab began to preach the need to return to the basic teachings of the Koran. His own family as well as several communities in which he preached, rejected him for his narrow and uncompromising views, but he eventually managed to ally himself with Mohammed bin Saud, one of several petty rulers in the Nejd or Central Plateau area of Arabia. Mohammed bin Saud, based in the settlement of Deriya near present-day Riyadh, was an able and ambitious desert warrior. Within the Saud-Wahhab alliance, a working relationship was established in which Mohammed bin Saud committed himself to a *Jihad*, or holy war, on behalf of the Wahhabi revivalist objectives; in return Mohammed Saud was recognised as imam of the true faith and secular leader of the movement. The Saud and Wahhabi alliance formed in the eighteenth century has undergone many vicissitudes but it remains the basis of the dynasty that rules Saudi Arabia today.

The combination of religious zealotry and able military and political leadership provided by the Saud and Wahhab families led to a rapid expansion of the movement which believers refer to as the *Muwahhidun* and most

outsiders call Wahhabism.[2] By 1811, the *Muwahhidun* had established their dominance in all of the Nejd and Al Hasa and had gained control of Mecca, Medina and Jeddah in the West; their armies were also operating as far north as Aleppo in Syria and as far east as Iraq. The Ottoman Government, alarmed at the growth of the movement, sent an Egyptian army to re-establish Ottoman control over the areas that had fallen. In 1817, the Egyptian army captured the key *Muwahhidun* settlements and destroyed the Saud family base in Deriya; but within two decades the Saud family, exploiting the failure of the Ottomans to garrison the area, had re-established a base in Riyadh close to the destroyed settlements of Deriya, and had regained effective control over the Central Nejd area.

From the 1830s to the end of the century, feuds and intrigues within the Saud family permitted the Rashid family from Hail to gain control over much of the Central and Eastern areas of Arabia. In 1890, the Rashids captured Riyadh and the defeated Saud family went into voluntary exile, first in Bahrain, thence to Qatar and finally to Kuwait.[3] In 1902, however, the Saud family re-established their base in Central Arabia as a result of a daring raid on Riyadh led by twenty-two-year-old Abdul Aziz bin Saud which resulted in Riyadh's recapture. It was from this event that the modern history of Saudi Arabia emerged.

In the subsequent half century, Abdul Aziz subdued his northern adversaries, the Rashids, forced the Turkish garrisons out of Al Hasa, and in the mid-1920s, captured the holy cities of Mecca and Medina as well as the key port of Jeddah in the Hejaz. With the collapse of the British-supported Hashemite government in the Hejaz, Abdul Aziz had attained his major territorial objective. He then sought to consolidate his position by eliminating the major abuses in the administration of the Haj that had grown to intolerable levels under the Hashamites[4]. He also sought to avoid actions that would serve as an excuse for the British or other powers to challenge his authority within his newly won territory. In this he was successful, and in negotiations with the British he gained de facto recognition of his conquests. In 1932, the three principal areas of Al Hasa, the Nejd and the Hejaz were combined to form the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Abdul Aziz was declared king.

The consolidation of Abdul Aziz's authority in the central province of the

2. The best study of the early history of the movement can be found in the widely used but still unpublished PhD thesis of George Rentz. *Muhammad ibn 'Abd al' Wahhab (1703-1792) and the beginning of Unitarian Empire in Arabia.* University of California, 1948.

3. See R. Rayly Winder, *Saudi Arabia in the 19th Century* (New York: St. Martin's, 1965) for the most comprehensive treatment of this period: and also the summary treatment by H. St. John Philby in *Saudi Arabia* (New york: Praeger, 1955).

4. Improvements were not difficult to make if we can believe the 1923 observations of the American Counsel in Aden that (King Husain) 'feels himself to be so sure of his position, so far removed from the consequences of public opinion that no excesses are too great for him to consider, provided they are money getters. He lives to rob and the organisation of the Hejaz Kingdom today is a gigantic scheme for the wholesale fleecing of pilgrims'. Quoted in Peter and Marion Sluglett's *The Precarious Monarchy: Britain, Ibn Sa'ud and the Establishment of Hajaz, Nejd and its Dependencies.* Paper presented at the Exeter University Symposium on State, Economy and Power in Saudi Arabia, July 1980, p. 10.

Nejd, the expulsion of the Turks from Al Hasa and the conquest of the Hejaz, including the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, were accomplished with the support and assistance of the *Ikhwan*—a force which combined military functions with Wahhabi religious fanaticism. Building on the Saud family political power and the basic fundamentalist religious doctrines of Abdul Wahhab, Abdul Aziz began the organisation of the *Ikhwan* movement shortly after he had captured Riyadh.[5] Within a dozen years *Ikhwan* settlements could be found throughout the Nejd.

The *Ikhwan*, following the Wahhabi creed, were committed to a strict interpretation of the Koran, a rejection of all innovations (defined as anything not mentioned in the Koran), and the elimination of the cult of saints and other 'intermediaries' which it claimed were corrupting Islam. Its recruits were largely desert tribesmen who were induced perhaps as much by the material rewards of money, arms, land and booty as by the spiritual appeal of being fighters in a holy war against all who did not follow the strict tenets of Wahhabi Islam. Significantly, the early *Ikhwan* settlements were supra-tribal and represented from this point of view a major step up from the exclusiveness of the sense of tribal identity in the past.

The military success of the *Ikhwans*, however, brought a new set of problems for Abdul Aziz. Committed to the constant spread of the Wahhabi brand of Islam by fire and the sword, the *Ikhwan* leadership in the field became restless when administration and diplomacy were given equal weight with battles, and when practical accommodations were made with 'infidels' (especially the British). They also objected to Abdul Aziz's use of modern conveniences such as automobiles and the telegraph—innovations anathema to fundamental Wahhabis. A further point of contention was Abdul Aziz's 'toleration' of the 'apostate' Shia population.

In 1928, after successive military successes in Mecca, Medina, Jeddah and Taif, the *Ikhwan* were anxious to move into Southern Iraq to attack their Hashemite enemies and to 'purify' the holy Shia city of Kabala. Abdul Aziz had no intention of taking on the British, who had firmly established themselves in Iraq, and he specifically forbade Faisal Dawish and other *Ikhwan* 'hawks' from raiding settlements in Iraq. When raids continued after his warning, he summoned the *Ikhwan* leadership to Riyadh but many *Ikhwan* leaders refused to answer his call. In 1929, with the loyal forces he had in his command, he confronted the major dissident *Ikhwan* forces under Faisal al Dawish in a battle near Sibillah and defeated them. The *Ikhwan* rebels regrouped and continued the challenge until they were decisively routed near the Kuwait border by an army loyal to Abdul Aziz[6]. This marked the end of the movement, as Abdul Aziz, recognising the dangers inherent in trying to

5. The most thorough study of the Ikhwan is John Habib's *Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: the Ikhwan of Nejd and their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom* Brill: Leiden, 1978.

6. A fascinating first hand account of these events seen through the eyes of one of Abdul Aziz's interpreters is contained in Muhammad al Mana's, *Arabia Unified; A Portrait of Ibn Saud*, London: Hutchinson, 1980.

control armed fanatics, destroyed most of the *Ikhwan* settlements and transferred the remnant *Ikhwan* members to his regular army or pensioned them off. The *Ikhwan* have never since been permitted to re-emerge as an independent force in Saudi Arabia, although their legacy was clearly present in the exhortations of the forces that took over the Mecca Mosque in 1979.

In addition to military conquests and diplomacy, Abdul Aziz used the marital bed to expand and unify his Kingdom. By his own count he had married '135 virgins and about a hundred others' during his life; but in conformity to the precept of Islam, Abdul Aziz never had more than four wives at one time. Abdul Aziz's marriages were essentially political acts designed to establish blood ties and secure tribal support throughout the land. By the end of his life, most major tribes and many sub-tribal clans were related by blood to the House of Saud. Thirty-two sons alive today provide the basis of the Saud family leadership and control of the country.

The discovery of oil and the great transformation

Abdul Aziz's early military and political successes were not matched by comparable economic rewards, and lack of money was a recurring problem. The general poverty of Arabia at the time provided few and limited sources of income. The traditional spoils of victory helped, but they had to be supplemented in a variety of other ways. One source was a subvention from the British. In 1915, Abdul Aziz had requested, and received, a subsidy of £5,000 a month, together with four machine guns and three thousand rifles, in exchange for a promise to maintain a force continuously in the field against the Ottoman-supporting forces of the house of Rashid. This subsidy was continued until 1924 despite many vicissitudes and the erosion of its original purpose. From a financial point of view, Abdul Aziz's conquest of the Hejaz in 1925 was of major significance. The Hejaz was far more developed than the Nejd or Al Hasa and it provided him with the two largest sources of income in the expanding area under his control: the customs collections at the port city of Jeddah and the various taxes which could be levied on the Haj pilgrims.[7] Pilgrim taxation was by far the most important potential source of state income; and soon after he had gained control of the Hejaz, Abdul Aziz made certain that there were significant improvements in the security of the pilgrimage as well as better transportation and living facilities for the pilgrims. As the improvements became known in the years immediately following his conquest of the Hejaz, the number of pilgrims—and the size of his income—increased dramatically.

But this substantial improvement in Abdul Aziz's finances was short-lived. In the early 1930s, as the great depression spread world-wide, the number of pilgrims fell to less than a third of the number making the Haj in the latter 1920s. As a result, Abdul Aziz was faced once again with a critical and growing shortage of funds—exacerbated by the extravagance of the rapidly

7. A discussion of Abdul Aziz's finances during this period can be found in Sluglett, *op. cit.*

growing Royal Family as much as by the drastically reduced income from a decreasing number of Haj pilgrims. The financial crisis faced by Abdul Aziz in 1931-32 was far more serious than others he had faced. Official salaries could not be paid; the domestic commercial debts of the Royal Family and the Government were increasing rapidly; and loans secured from the Government of India and the Jeddah merchant families could not be repaid. As the King and the Kingdom was pushed further and further into economic despair, a drastic new approach to the Kingdom's financial problems was clearly necessary.

Abdul Aziz had always been reluctant to permit foreigners—particularly Western non-Muslims—into his Kingdom, but a growing realisation of his financial predicament finallly led him to tap one of the few possible 'new' sources of funds: an oil concession.[8] In 1932, he made it known to close advisers that he would be willing to entertain offers from Western interests seeking oil exploration rights in Saudi Arabia. Oil had been discovered in nearby Bahrain a year before, but the world was in the midst of one of its periodic oil gluts and few companies were willing to compete for the Saudi Arabian concession. In 1933, Standard Oil of California (Socal), the only company willing to make a large signature payment, signed an agreement with Abdul Aziz which granted them a concession to explore all of Saudi Arabia. The agreement called for a signature payment of $250,000 and promises of royalty payments on any oil found and produced of four gold shilling per ton.[9]

In 1938, Socal exploration teams made a major oil discovery in Dammam in the Al Hasa region. Other discoveries soon followed and it rapidly became evident that Saudi Arabia was going to be a major oil producer. King Abdul Aziz, still short of funds, was delighted; and he encouraged California Arabian Standard Oil Company, a new firm organised by Socal jointly with Texaco immediately after the discovery, to begin production as soon as possible; this they did by initiating crude shipments to their refinery in Bahrain in the very year of the Dammam discovery. Coincidently, plans for further exploration and the expansion of production facilities were announced as additional discoveries were made north of Dammam and in Abqaiq.

The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 dealt a serious blow to development plans for the Saudi oil industry. Shortages of personnel and materials, particularly of steel, forced California Arabian Standard Oil Company to hold development in abeyance. In 1942, the combination of a severe drought, the cessation of oil field developments and the drastic decrease in Saudi Arabia's income from the Haj pilgrims, brought about still another severe financial problem for Abdul Aziz's government. Conscious of Saudi Arabia's potentially strategic position astride the sea passage to India and the

8. An earlier concession agreement for the al Hasa region had actually been signed in 1923 by Major Frank Holmes representing a British group calling itself the Eastern and General Syndicate. The agreement called for payments of £2,000 in gold a year but payments were stopped after the second year and little or no exploration was actually undertaken. See al Mana, *op. cit.* p. 217. A more detailed historical account, including the involved oil company politics, is in the *Aramco Handbook* rev. edn. (Aramco: Dhahran, 1960), pp. 107 108.

9. *Ibid.* pp. 109-119 gives the historical details of the negotations.

Far East, the British agreed to provide generous financial assistance in 1941. In 1943, after Britain had already lent Saudi Arabia over 50 million dollars, the Americans took over responsibility for aid by making Saudi Arabia eligible for Lend-Lease assistance. American lend-lease assistance continued through to 1945, and undoubtedly contributed to Saudi Arabia's declaration of war on the side of the Allies early in 1945 after a historic meeting between King Abdul Aziz and President Roosevelt on an American cruiser in the Great Bitter Lake in February 1945.

As the Second World War came to an end in Europe, the postponed development programmes were restarted by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, renamed in 1944 more appropriately as the Arabian American Oil Company, or ARAMCO. In 1946, the realisation that the large and increasing magnitudes of the Saudi Arabian oil deposits would require capital investments for surface facilities and market outlets led ARAMCO to invite Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) and Standard Vacuum Oil (now Mobil) to share development costs and become part owners. By 1949, ARAMCO crude oil production had reached a half a million barrels a day. By 1955, production was near a million barrels a day and Saudi Arabia had emerged as one of the major world exporters of oil. By 1960, Saudi oil production exceeded 3½ million barrels a day and, encouraged by the Saudi Government, the expansion of production facilities was planned on a long-term continuous basis. During this period, Saudi oil reserves, which had been rapidly expanding as exploration successes multiplied, were recognised as the world's largest.[10]

In terms of national income and Government finances, oil company payments based on increased oil production completely transformed the Saudi cash economy. Income from the Haj pilgrims (both taxes and service fees) and the commercial sales and exports of dates, camels and sheep, which had been the main source of the country's cash flow before the Second World War, became less and less important as a source of income.

Only two years after the War's end, oil income exceeded all other sources of Government revenue and national income, and by 1955, the oil sector provided almost all of the Government's foreign exchange earnings, over three-fourths of the Government revenue, and two-thirds of the gross national product (GNP). Despite continuing plans and projects aimed at 'diversification' beginning in the 1960s, Saudi Arabian finances have remained overwhelmingly dependent upon an oil economy that is narrowly based in terms of geography, labour and technology.

Although the rapid growth of a foreign-owned oil industry in a geographically localised area provided the basis for the development of a classical type of economic dualism in Saudi Arabia, the political organisation of the Kingdom ensured that this did not happen. Oil income received by the

10. *Ibid.* pp. 113-35 reviews both the organisational history of Aramco and the growth of its reserves and the production facilities.

King was widely distributed throughout the Kingdom. By the late 1960s almost two-thirds of Saudi families were recipients of some cash income from Royal Government funds through Government contracts, membership in the Army or National Guard, direct tribal grants, individual grants for education or payments for religious duties.

Contemporary Saudi Arabia can only be understood in oil terms. As the Kingdom enters the 1980s, oil has actually increased in economic importance and now accounts for 98 per cent of all the Kingdom's export earnings and 90 per cent of the total Government revenue. Despite massive investments in non-oil sectors of the economy, the oil industry still accounts for over 65 per cent of the Kingdom's GNP.[11] And the oil is a long term resource: even if no additional discoveries were to be made, production at current rates could continue for over fifty years.

Oil reserves are measured in a variety of ways but it is universally assumed that more than a quarter of the known reserves of oil in the world today are in Saudi Arabia. Complementing the fact of the huge oil reserves available in Saudi Arabia are technical factors involving field size, well-production rates, and reservoir pressure which make the extraction of oil less costly in Saudi Arabia than in almost any other place in the world. In 1980, Saudi Arabia has been producing oil at the rate of 9·5 million barrels a day. With existing surface facilities this output level could be increased by a quarter at a negligible marginal cost. Furthermore, with the available technical and financial resources, surface facilities could be expanded to produce 15 million barrels a day within the 1980s without a major strain on the industry or the known fields.

It is this oil wealth that gives Saudi Arabia leverage in international affairs, and it is oil as a political weapon that has been of most concern to the outside world. The oil wealth that has made it possible for Saudi Arabia to build up one of the most dramatic real income redistribution programmes the world has ever seen in terms of health-care, education and general welfare. And it is the oil industry that provides the potential for a major industrial development programme in Saudi Arabia based on the use of hydrocarbons and petrochemicals and in low-cost energy intensive industries.

High prices for oil and high productivity from the Saudi Arabian fields has resulted in a massive transfer of international financial wealth to Saudi Arabia—a transfer that is unprecedented in world history. In 1980, largely on the basis of oil income but supplemented by investment income from oil revenues that have been invested in the past, foreign exchange income will exceed $100,000 million. Comparatively, the foreign exchange earnings of Saudi Arabia now exceed the total foreign exchange earnings of all of Africa, or

11. Oil production and oil export values are closely monitored and the figures available date from the first beginnings of the industry to the present period. The non-oil components of national income are estimates of varying degrees of accuracy. Data used in this paper are from the *Annual Reports* of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and unpublished Central Department of Statistics estimates.

all of South America. They are greater than the export earnings of any country in the world with the exception of the three most important industrial countries—Japan, the United States and West Germany. On a GNP *per capita* basis, Saudis now have double the income of Americans and almost five times the income of the average Briton. In historic terms, the *per capita* GNP of Saudi Arabia today is 30 times what it was in 1970.

This massive and unprecedented transfer of wealth to Saudi Arabia has not been evenly redistributed. Nevertheless, redistribution has been widespread within the Saudi community and almost all Saudis today participate to a greater or lesser degree in the flow of wealth. Much of the redistribution has been directed through increased salaries for working in the Government either as a public servant or a member of one of the armed forces. Much has been redistributed through the favoured position of Saudis in terms of participation in large projects as agents or as organisers of business entities serving the rapidly expanding economy. But much of the redistribution has also been accomplished indirectly through the provision of universal free education for everyone at all levels; in the provision of comprehensive health care, perhaps the most expensive health system in the world today; through heavy subsidies on basic commodities which permit water and electricity to be provided to just about everyone at relatively low rates; in the provision of interest free loans of a large magnitude for housing and for building commercial properties; by highly subsidising the credit for Saudi agricultural and industrial endeavours; and by the dramatic increases in pensions and other social payments being made to those too old or too sick or infirm to participate in everyday life.

Contemporary Saudi society, economy and polity

Thus Saudi Arabia has figuratively exploded onto the world stage in less than a decade. Since so much of its contemporary role stems from exogenous developments in the world energy balance and particularly in the oil sector, the present and future appear to have only tenuous historic ties to Saudi Arabia's past. But this is clearly not the case, as Saudi Arabia's values, institutions and individual leaders are the critical vectors of the changes that are taking place. They are as important in Saudi Arabia's future as its resource base.

Saudi Arabia lends itself to descriptive extremes. A large area almost half again larger than the nine EEC countries together, its native-born Saudis number perhaps half the population of London. Saudi Arabia has more than a quarter of the world's known oil reserves, but hardly any fresh water resources: with scant rainfall, it has no rivers or lakes, and severely limited usable ground water. The Rub al Khali, occupying a third of the Kingdom, is the largest sand desert in the world and goes years without more than traces of rain: it cannot support habitation even by nomads. The acute shortage of water has forced Saudi Arabia into the largest desalination programme in world history; and recent modern 'development' has made it increasingly dependent on a costly desalination technology developed in other parts of the world.

Outside of oil and associated gas, Saudi Arabia's resource base is limited. Agricultural land makes up less than one per cent of the total Kingdom's area and the severe shortage of water limits this area's usefulness. The mountainous areas of Asir do get more rainfall than other parts of the Kingdom, but there are no commercial forests in the Kingdom. Both the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf have fishing and shrimp grounds that, in previous decades, supported a modest fishing industry. But there is little or no room for the expansion of these industries at the present, and the Arabian Gulf shrimp grounds have been depleted in recent years.

Saudi Arabia does possess some ferrous and non-ferrous mineral deposits. Commercial mining of gold has been carried out in the past and plans are under way to restart sometime in the future. A number of small but high-grade deposits of copper and other non-ferrous minerals have been discovered. Low grade deposits of both iron-ore and phosphate rock have also been identified, as have a number of areas where limestone and a variety of ornamental stones can be commercially extracted. Unfortunately, all the metallic mineral resources require large amounts of scarce water to process. And by comparison with the oil resources, all these non-oil resources pale into insignificance.

Demographically, there is little published information on Saudi Arabia and the limited available data is sketchy and often subject to question. The results of a census taken in 1974 remain unpublished, and the Government has been silent on its plans for the next scheduled census in 1984. Current population estimates range as low as 3½ million and as high as 8½ million people in Saudi Arabia. On the basis of sample surveys and educated guesses, it is most likely that the current resident population of Saudi Arabia is somewhere around 6 million. Of this total, probably 2 million are non-Saudis.

A great majority of the non-Saudis are 'transient labourers' who came to work on the multitudinous public and private development projects in the period after 1974 when restrictions on the use of foreign labour were relaxed. The distribution of the new foreigners is uneven. In both Jeddah and Dammam, Saudis appear to have become a minority in their own land. The capital city of Riyadh is also losing its historic Nejd purity as foreigners become an increasingly significant percentage of the population.

The social and political implications of a large non-Saudi population have not been lost on Saudi officials. They have established policies that have prevented any one group from gaining a strong position in Saudi Arabia. These policies include a conscious diversification of the labour force and restrictions that make it highly unlikely that the great majority of workers will remain in Saudi Arabia over any extensive period of time. It is particularly significant that the Saudis have placed increasing reliance on Korians, Filipinos and Thais in recent years and have decreased their relative dependency on Yemeni, Palestinian, Syrian and Egyptian labour. Saudi Government officials believe that by employing people who are culturally apart from the Saudis in language, religion and general culture, they will have less of a problem in ensuring that

their stays are temporary. Diversification of the labour force also applies to Aramco[12] which is the largest employer in Saudi Arabia. In 1979, it had employees on the payroll from 45 different countries.

Until the 1970s, the limited demographic information available suggests that cultural and health factors kept the natural growth rate of the Saudi population relatively low. Natural growth has clearly increased dramatically in recent years as a result of better nutrition and vastly improved health and medical facilities. The most significant improvement has occurred in the dramatic lowering of infant mortality, which has led to a rapid decrease in the average age of the population. It is ironic—and politically significant— that the increasing oil-based affluence of Saudi Arabia has required the labour of a relatively small number of Saudi Arabian—or other— workers, and that the production is concentrated in al Hasa which is geographically distanced from the commercial centre of Jeddah, the religious centres of Mecca and Medina, and the political capital of Riyadh. The minimal labour requirements of the Saudi oil industry stem from a variety of technical and locational factors including (1) the giant size of the Saudi oil fields (the Ghawar field alone has more oil than all the known United States reserves in the hundreds of producing fields); (2) the high productivity of individual Saudi wells (the average in Saudi Arabia is over 10,000 barrels a day compared to a world average of less than 100 barrels a day); (3) high reservoir pressure which makes it unnecessary to pump the oil, and; (4) the close proximity of the production areas to tidewater transportation facilities.

The number of workers needed to produce oil at the current level of production and to maintain the surface facilities for this production level is under ten thousand. This size of work force could continue to produce at current levels indefinitely. We thus have a literal inversion of the Kingdom's economic structure. In the pre-oil days, the Kingdom's income was heavily dependent on a poor but widely diversified number of productive enterprises and individuals. The most important sources of income were the Haj taxes and the sale of services to the Hajis, which in turn was heavily dependent on the numbers of pilgrims. As oil production and prices have increased, more and more people have become financially dependent on relatively fewer and fewer people in the oil industry. In this newly inverted economic pyramid the relatively small number of Saudis and foreigners in the al Hasa region who discover, produce, and export oil are the fulcrum point on which rests the welfare and prosperity of contemporary Saudi Arabia and its internal political leverage. In rough percentile terms today over 90 per cent of the government's revenue and the Kingdom's export earnings, and over two-thirds of the Kingdom's GNP are generated by less than one per cent of the labour force.

With the huge amounts of money now available, the 'demonstration effect'

12. Aramco has increased its work force to 35,000 at present, but two thirds of the work force are working on new projects not directly related to crude oil production including the massive new gas collection and treatment system and the electrification of the Eastern Province.

of two million foreigners, and the frenetic travel of the newly affluent Saudis themselves, have come the 'geegaws' of more material cultures—as well as a rash of new political, intellectual and cultural ideas and influences. Many of the new ideas are seductive; and not a few are fundamentally in conflict with the existing order, which has reflected a working balance of interests among the Royal Family, the religious leadership, the urban business men, the symbolically important non-sedentary Bedouin and the newly emerging bureaucrats. The prevailing order has never been rigid, but it has been slow to change; and gaining a perspective on the process of change and the areas of major stress requires an understanding of the basic fabric of Saudi society and culture.

The concept and practices of a modern nation state are relatively new to Saudi Arabia; but the Islamic religion, the Arabic language and the long history of the Saud family leadership of the country provide the current basis for national unity and identity. Unlike Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Yemen with their historically important pre-Islamic civilisations, Saudi Arabia's contemporary ideology and rhetoric is based on a near total Islamic cultural heritage and historical experience. Islam permeates all aspects of Saudi life, not as a state religion but as the very basis of the state. The Koran is more than a holy book of Islamic religion; it is an all-encompassing social, political and economic code by which all 'good' Saudi Arabians live. By definition, a non-Muslim cannot be a Saudi citizen, and the idea of religious pluralism in the Kingdom has neither meaning nor support in any segment of the population.[13] The Islamic nature of Saudi Arabia is further enhanced by the fact that it is the land of the prophet; the Kingdom and its leaders have a deep sense of responsibility for protecting the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and all who make the Haj pilgrimage.

All Saudi Arabians speak Arabic as their native tongue. Minor dialect differences exist between the sedentary city dwellers and the bedouin community, and regionally between the Nejd and the Hejaz. Nevertheless, Arabic is the universally used language of Saudi Arabia, the only official language of the country, and the language in which all legal or governmental documents and communications must be written. Most importantly, Arabic is the language of the Koran.

The role of the Saud family and its central role in Saudi Arabian political history has already been outlined. Since the reunification of the Kingdom under Abdul Aziz in the early part of this century, the Saud dynasty has forged among its subjects a sense of national identity that is perhaps as strong as that of any other state in the Arabic world. The growth in size of the Royal Saud family is also important. With over two thousand princes that have blood ties with all the major tribal groups, the extended Royal Family can be found

13. An excellent discussion of this point can be found in Peter Iseman's article 'The Arabian Ethos' *Harpers*, Feb. 1978.

everywhere in the Kingdom; and in terms of functional roles, the Royal Family participate in all aspects of Saudi life, from the Government and the military to business and educational. Intermarriage and continuing close relations with the Wahhab family has also ensured that the Saud family is closely associated throughout the Kingdom with the religious leadership.

The religious, social and political forces of national unity in Saudi Arabia are not without centrifugal counterforces, with all the internal stresses and contradictions which are inevitable in any nation undergoing rapid development; and the pace of Saudi development is unprecedented in world history. Global political developments are bound to play a role in Saudi Arabia's future, but it is largely the way that the country accommodates or resolves its internal stresses and contradictions which will give shape and direction to that future. A brief review of the most apparent—but not necessarily the most real—areas of stress provides a useful base from which to speculate on what lies ahead.

Sunni/Shia Relationships

Because the religious commitment to the Islamic faith is so strong in Saudi Arabia, the division between the majority Sunni community and the minority Shia community is of particular significance. The Shias represent only 10 per cent of the total population, but they are geographically concentrated in the Al Hasa area of oil production, and they probably make up almost a third of the total labour force in the oil industry. They are even more heavily represented in the critical oil export ports of Ras Tanura and Juaymah.

The early origins of the Shia community of Saudi Arabia are uncertain, but they date back to the earliest centuries of Islam. The Shia community, like those in most other parts of the Arabic world, is non-tribal in organisation and sedentary. Shias also tend to be found at the lowest end of the economic scale, holding the poorer paid jobs. Until Aramco established their oil operations in the Al Hasa and hired large numbers of Shias, the disparity of income and influence between Shias and Sunnis was immense. Employment with Aramco and recent public sector commitments to Shia settlements in the Al Hasa have served to increase the level of Shia prosperity, but the relative disparities continue.

The Sunni majority, particularly from the Nejd heartland of the *Mahhundun*, have had little tolerance for Shias as a group, and particularly object to specific Shia rituals which they consider anathema. Periodic conflicts have developed between Sunni policemen or National Guard soldiers and Shias, including serious outbreaks in 1979 and 1980. Confessional divisions are accentuated by the virtual exclusion of Shias from responsible positions in the government. Shias are not recruited as members of the Saudi National Guard or police, they hold only one senior position in the national government and few positions even of lesser import. Even in the local Shia communities, all important government posts are filled by Sunnis.

Tribal divisions and Royal distractions

Tribal identity and class loyalty remain a most important but frequently overlooked aspect of contemporary Saudi society. Although less than a half million Saudis still pursue a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence (whether as pastoralists or seasonal taxi drivers), and urbanisation and its associated social changes have been massive in recent years, the traditional sentiments and loyalties of Saudis retain their wonted importance and power, even in the office towers of ultra-modern Riyadh. Political power, business prowess and social influence are derived from traditional family patterns and political alliances which date back generations and even centuries. Today, this fact is particularly important in marriage arrangements, political appointments and general access to the inner power elite. In the world of Saudi business, most of the prominent merchants of the Hejaz are of foreign origins (*i.e.* Ottoman, Persian or Hadramaut); as a result, they must work with more indigenous intermediaries to reach the circle of influence where decisions are ultimately made.

The most notable instance of tribal identity and clan loyalty is, of course, the House of Saudi—whose domain has been referred to by the Arabic scholar, Peter Iseman, 'as the only family-owned business recognised by the United Nations'.[14]

King Abdul Aziz can be considered the father of his country in many ways. As his descendants and collateral kinsmen have matured, married their cousins and multiplied, the number of adult able-bodied princes in the House of Saud has grown to perhaps 3,000. The rules of marriage in the House of Saud have retained their traditional endogenous preferences, with the only non-tribal exception being the time-honored clans of the Alash Sheik, the Thuniaiyans, the Saudairis and the Jiluwis.

With the passage of time the restrictive endogeny of the House of Saud after the death of Abdul Aziz will sharpen the distinctions between Royal and non-Royal. This in turn will tend to make the House of Saud, with its royal income and privileges, a class apart as well as a clan apart.

The divide between the literate and the non-literate

In the recent past, the division between literate and non-literate was an important line of demarcation within Saudi society. Functional literacy in Arabic or any other language was severely limited, and largely confined to the Royal Family, the religious leaders and a few merchants, together representing the core of the power elite. Moreover, until recently, for example, the Saudi Royal Family have ruled with a leadership group whose single language competency was Arabic. The next generation, however, is largely bilingual and tends to feel as much at home in English as it does in Arabic. Furthermore, the range of materials its members read is vastly expanded by the literature of other languages. More importantly, the increasing numbers of the Western educated tend to be carriers of a commitment to modernity, with an awareness

14. *Ibid.*

of the material aspects of modern life as well as of the wide range of ideas and criticisms that can be found in the Western press and Western scholarship.

Until the 1950s the only organised education available was at the village or neighbourhood level where the local imam or religious leader was the teacher. These village schools focused exclusively on the memorisation of the Koran; and few of the boys who did go to school spent more than four or five years at such schools. Only a very small number of Saudis ever went beyond this level until recent decades when a combination of government policy and Aramco influence led to a public school programme that underwent significant expansion at both secondary and college levels in the 1970s. At the same time the first beginnings were made in educating girls. The number of students, however, remained a relatively small percentage of the total population until recent years and this was reflected in the continuously low relative rate of literacy up to the 1970s.

Beginning in the 1970s, the emphasis on education for both boys and girls and the financial commitments to educational institutions have resulted in a dramatic upsurge in the level of literacy in the younger generation. At the present time, for example, it is both possible and likely that Saudi boys and girls will continue their formal education over as long a period of time as the average youth in the West. Furthermore, through the provision of extensive educational facilities and subsidies the Government has made the circumstances such that almost the entire younger population now approaching school age will be literate. As a result, Saudi Arabia now has an older generation that is largely illiterate which contrasts sharply with a growing younger generation nearing full literacy.

The lack of census data on educational levels and on age-specific literacy makes it impossible to quantify the past or present situation with confidence. However, evidence from several limited sample surveys suggests that the indigenous Saudi population is rapidly becoming younger as infant mortality decreases dramatically. It is probable that the median age of Saudis is now around sixteen years of age and three-fourths of the population is thirty or younger. While literacy in the younger age segments is growing rapidly, power and social leadership in the foreseeable future will remain where it has been traditionally—in an older generation that has a surprisingly small literate minority.

Urban/rural conflicts

Conflict between the urban communities and the rural or nomadic pastoralists is one in which time is on the side of the urban dwellers. The number of Saudis who graze camels, goats and sheep has been in rapid decline for years, as have the sedentary 'farmers'—despite heavy Government subsidies. The economics of pastoral agriculture are so negative that without such government subsidies few if any people would remain in the traditional occupation of the Saudis. Even here one sees dramatic changes as roads replace

tracks, and as the Mercedes Benz truck becomes ubiquitous in areas formerly only populated by camels. Power, money, water and health services are all city attractions that are hard to find elsewhere, and the 'rural', 'pastoral' Bedouin has a decreasing role to play in the Saudi Arabia of the future.

Divisions between men and women

Women in Saudi Arabia have been described as a 'depressed majority'. Until a decade ago Saudi women were largely illiterate with almost no access to schooling. The few women who managed to get an education were not permitted to hold Government positions, nor were they allowed to work in private industry where possible contact with men might occur. Educational opportunities are now opening up for women—but they are still not permitted to drive automobiles, travel alone on domestic or international airlines, or attend classes with men.

Only recently have Saudi women begun to look outside the harem—yet change is slow. Saudi women still remain fully veiled in public, and tradition still dictates that marriage arrangements are the responsibility of the parents and that a wife never sees her husband before marriage. Some women have developed significant indirect influence through their husbands or their wealth, but this is limited.

The role of Saudi women is now a subject of increasing concern in Saudi Arabia. The fact that women are now being educated and will have rates of literacy approaching those of Saudi men is particularly significant. Equally important is the growing exposure of Saudi women to the active social and political roles of women in other cultures, an exposure widened by increasing international travel, access to video tapes and by the examples supplied by the growing number of foreign women resident in Saudi Arabia. The traditionalists would like to maintain the restricted role of women—but a few long range planners see a Hobson's choice of bringing women into the labour market rapidly and in massive numbers or increasing the already worrisome number of foreign workers and Saudi dependence on them.

Saudi women themselves have never supported aggressive feminism; nor have they directly challenged the existing order—as has happened in other Arab countries. Nevertheless increasing conflicts over the role of women can be expected as economic development accelerates in the Kingdom.

Institutions: non-formal/formal

Saudi Arabia today is a non-constitutional Kingship, with a King who exercises all executive and legislative functions—subject only to the precepts of the Koran as interpreted by the King and his close advisors. The range of policy initiatives of the King is also limited by the real need to maintain a working consensus in the Royal Family.

Iseman has described the Saudi Kingship as an amalgam of Sheikh, Imam and Malik. A Sheikh, the King is the tribal leader; as Imam he is commander

of the Islamic faithful; and as Malik, he is head of the secular state.[15] Because the Saudi Arabian kingship lacks any defined constraints other than the vague prescriptions laid down by Sharia law, the power exercised by the King is largely a function of the kingly personality and ability and the circumstances of the time. Abdul Aziz was an absolute ruler during much of his reign; he kept his hands on all the levers of Government power and income, and was intimately involved in all decisions relating to the Kingdom. His son and successor, King Saud, delegated authority (or abdicated it) widely and his reign was characterised by mindless inefficiency and waste. More significantly, King Saud dissipated his power and influence and power devolved haphazardly into the hands of his retainers and advisors. In due course his command of Kingdom affairs weakened and the country was threatened by threats from abroad and bankruptcy from within.

Faisal ruled with a strong hand—but built up a functioning administrative group which not only included other members of the Royal Family but an increasing number of non-royals with Western educational backgrounds. King Khalid has continued the policies of Faisal, and has actually expanded the role of the non-Royals in the formal agencies of the Government, without decreasing the power and influence of the Royal Family.

Although the ultimate power has remained in the King's hands, functional administrative responsibility for finances, the oil industry, education and other sectors has been increasingly delegated to ministers, some of them non-Royal. Shortly before Abdul Aziz's death in 1953, a Council of Ministers was established. The Council has grown in size and perhaps importance since that time, and it now operates as an organised body with regular scheduled weekly meetings at which the King may or may not be in attendance. Although highly visible, the Council is without any effective power. Many Royal decrees are issued by the King on the basis of Council recommendations, but most significant policy decisions are still made 'within the family' and are often not even discussed within the Council.

The King has, in theory, never shared his absolute power with an elective group representing the people, yet the actual relationship between ruler and the ruled has been characterised by a surprisingly high level of egalitarianism. As King Abdul Aziz used to remark 'we have many democratic traditions in Arabia, and one of them is that the ruling family should rule. The remark is droll, but at its core lies the reality of the Arab tradition of the *majlis*, which allows frequent and extensive contacts between the ruler and the ruled and facilitates communication on a wide range of subjects. The *majlis* provides any Saudi—or non-Saudi, for that matter—an opportunity directly to petition the King at a sitting usually held weekly. Other members of the Royal Family—Including many junior Princes—operate less regularised *majlis* which keep lines of communication open to the Royal Family at many levels. From

15. 'Saudi Arabia and the House of Saud', address at the Rockefeller University, Sept. 9, 1980.

time to time, proposals have been made to establish a consultative assembly (*Majlis ad Shura*) to advise the Royal Family in its ruling functions. Such an assembly is always discussed in terms of appointive rather than elective membership, but never envisages any legislative role. To date the concept remains on the drawing-board for future consideration.

The improvement in communications, the increasing economic integration of the Kingdom, and the massive wealth that accrues to the Central Government in Riyadh has increased the central government's importance. This contrasts with the earlier years under Abdul Aziz when the local Emirs administered their Districts as semi-autonomous fiefdoms within the shared poverty of the Kingdom—but always in the King's name and within the established policies. Since all key Emirs were influential members of the Royal Saud family, the pattern did not represent local autonomy. Today, the most powerful and ambitious members of the Royal Family seek posts in the Central Government where money and power are more highly concentrated; and the power and influence of the Emirs appears to be on the decline.

Questions for the future

In substance the entire oil industry in Saudi Arabia, including Aramco, has been completely owned by the Saudi Government since 1976[16]; and it is in the Royal Family leadership of the Government and not in the major oil companies that the final decisions on production levels, prices and income are made.

With its existing financial resources, its projected income flows and its known physical reserves of oil, Saudi Arabia has an economic power base unique in world history. One of the world's smaller states, by its possession of a large portion of the oil in an increasingly energy-short world, Saudi Arabia can literally buy practically any future that is commercially 'buyable'. But what can money buy for Saudi Arabia, and what future does it seek?

In its recent five year plans and in public statements by leading members of the Royal Family, Saudi Arabia has outlined future national goals, including a more diversified product base for its economy, a rapid increase in the participation of Saudis in the work force, a healthy, well educated and socially satisfied population, a continuing commitment to Islamic religious values and a secure place in a somewhat less than secure world. Clearly, many of these objectives require money to be achieved; but the financial costs are frequently less important than social, cultural or psychological costs that are difficult to quantify. Furthermore, some of the goals are likely to be incompatible with others.

Saudi Arabia has the current financial means to establish a diverse range of factories for the production of practically anything: computers, shoes, aeroplanes, petrochemicals, fur coats, battleships, pianos, sun-lamps.

16. 'Participation', the euphemism used for nationalisation of Aramco, took place in stages, and was not completed until mid-1980. Aramco still operates pretty much as it used to on a day-to-day basis, but its former owners have no control over production policy and no equity involvement.

Necessary management and workers for such factories could be induced come to Saudi Arabia for financial considerations if local skills or willingne were lacking. Obviously, many of the diversification options that have be mentioned are outlandish and neither serve a felt need of the Saudi populati nor reflect cost competitiveness in the world market. Yet all diversificati options differ only in degree when judged in strictly economic terms—as it abundantly clear that both the absolute and the comparative econom advantages of oil production and processing are so great that alternative non- investments, even in the long run, are unwarranted.

For varying reasons, almost all countries establish or maintain particul industries through direct or indirect economic subsidies; and Saudi Arabia c better afford to do so than others since its range of options has no financi limit. But the heavy non-financial costs that are the inevitable factor in ar development equation cannot be ignored. Historically, rapid development h always been at the expense of traditional cultural values; and almost b definition, modern development has increased secularisation, promot individualism, and depreciated the value of the family and traditional religio commitments. Rapid development can also be expected to lead to increasi psychological problems for individuals and increasing social dislocation traditionally ascribed status relationships erode and new material-achieveme status relationships emerge.

Saudi Arabia's current development planning aims at diversification in petrochemical and energy-intensive projects based on Saudi gas resources. C a 'stand alone' basis these projects do not appear to be economically viable, ar the Saudi government has offered substantial subsidies to its joint partners the form of concessionary financing, low feed stock prices, and crude c entitlements. Given the government's desire to diversify, and tl diversification options available, such an approach is eminently defensible c grounds of logic and economics since use can be made of Saudi gas resource and the projects are highly capital-intensive in a domestic labour-sho economy. But a look at the social and cultural implications reveals the hea non-economic costs that are likely to be involved. Recent studies of Jubail ar Yanbu, the industrial cities under construction to house the workforce ar provide the sites for the proposed projects, suggest that foreigners will make u a majority of the resident population and workforce for almost two decade even on the basis of optimistic assumptions.[17] This will mean the Saudis in tl two cities spearheading the nation's diversification programme will have to li and work as a minority in a largely alien environment; they will be competi with foreigners on a technical and management level that has been alien Saudi Arabia in the past; and they will be expected to respond to a pattern incentives and rewards based on types of achievement that have no correlati in traditional Saudi culture.

17. See Michael R. Anderson-Nicholls, 'The Socio-Political Implications of Jubail and Yanbu'. Pap delivered before symposium on State, Economy and Power in Saudi Arabia, University of Exeter, July 1980.

The specific examples of Jubail and Yanbu can be viewed against the wider background of world history—in which no nation has ever faced a challenge of moving so rapidly from poverty to supra-affluence. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the Kingdom has remained so isolated until recently from the modern mainstream of social, political and scientific thinking. It is only within the last quarter of a century that the state income has been segregated from that of the Saud family, that the rudiments of a central administration have been established, and that a national currency has been widely accepted. Saudi Arabia's future development cannot build on any great industrial or agricultural tradition; the country has no evolved jurisprudence for the regulation of commercial and industrial conflicts (and for much of its law it continues to rely on a Sharia religious code which dates back over a millennium). Public schooling for women is only a decade old and public education for men dates back less than a generation. All of these factors contribute to a striking discontinuity between the past and future, with the received cultural perspective of the most recent generations in sharp contrast to older generations. Meanwhile the reverse side of the coin should also be noted: Saudi Arabia's development faces few of the organisational and institutional impediments to rapid change found in most other developing areas of the world; and the country's leadership has managed, to date, to exercise a high degree of control over both the development process and the direction of social accommodation.

Saudi Arabia's increasingly important role as a world financial power as well as the most important supplier of oil to the Western industrial world raises the important question of the Kingdom's political future. The direction of future political developments will be influenced to a large degree by two basic facts which call for opposite policy directions. The first is the critically important role played by Saudi oil production in the economies of the West and Japan with whom Saudi Arabia has integrated itself at many levels. The second is the limited absorbtive capacity of the domestic Saudi economy and the inevitable need to invest surplus funds externally. A drastic cut in Saudi oil production would conceivably throw the Western economies into a serious depression. On the other hand, a continuation of high levels of oil production generates funds that must be spent or invested at magnitudes that are difficult to handle and which are undesired by most Saudis.

For all the stresses and contradictions within Saudi society, it is noteworthy that so far the Royal Family has been largely successful in its responses and adaptations to rapidly changing political circumstances. But it is now certain that in the years ahead a number of more fundamental stresses are likely to emerge as 'development' accelerates and exacerbates both domestic and international political forces, many of which the Royal Family never considered or had occasion to imagine in the past. Some of the more significant areas which warrant the attention of 'Saudi watchers' are described below.

The changing nature of the Saudi kingship and the problem of managing the Royal succession

Few Saudis harbour anti-Royalist feeling; and the extensive size of the Royal Family and their long historic role in the Kingdom suggest a continuation of Royal Government into the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the Saudi kingship is likely to undergo changes in its function and influence, and the person who occupies the kingship is also bound to change from time to time. Although the power of the Saudi King is unlikely to be constrained by a formal constitution, it is likely that the Royal Family will seek to have the King share both power and responsibility more and more as the complexity of government in Saudi Arabia grows and as domestic and international pressures mount. In the absence of constitutional rights and limits such changes in the kingship will be made de facto and not de jure, and they can be achieved without public discussion. More difficult will be identifying those with whom the king should share his decision-making responsibilities, and the formal or informal roles these associates should assume.

The traditional *majlis*—up to the present—has provided the basic means of communication between the rulers and the ruled. With the growth in the size of the population, the quantum jump in the number of educated and literate men and women, and the expanding abilities, aspirations and horizons of the Saudi population, a consultative assembly or *majlis al shura* would appear to provide an appropriate new vehicle for closing a growing communication gap. Significantly, the concept has not generated wide interest or support in the Saudi community, and the perceived recent failures of such assemblies in neighbouring Bahrain and Kuwait is still fresh in mind. Furthermore, it is certain that the Royal Family would move slowly and with extreme caution in establishing such an assembly, as it is clear that any non-Royal representative body—even with limited consultative functions—poses a potentially dangerous challenge to the existing Royal system of authority and decision-making power.

Prior to 1953, King Abdul Aziz established a pattern of horizontal succession to the Kingship, whereby his thirty-two sons would succeed him on the basis of age seniority and suitability for public office. Prince Fahd, usually associated with a progressive and pro-Western policy line, as well as a strong advocate of current high levels of oil production is expected to succeed King Khalid. Fahd should be followed by his half brother, Abdullah, who is considered conservative, close to the tribal segments of Saudi society and less than enthusiastic about current high rates of oil production and the pace of development. After Abdullah, the next in line is another of Prince Fahd's full brothers, Sultan, whose views mirror those of the Crown Prince.

In all dynastic systems, questions of policy continuity are always concomitant to any change of ruler. Traditionally, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the only prerequisite for naming a new King is a concensus within the elder circle of the Royal Family, and confirmation by the religious *Ukima*.

Nevertheless the collegial nature of Royal Family decision-making suggests that any critical policy differences will be resolved informally during discussions relating to the succession.

The growth of the power and influence of the expanding bureaucracy

The number of bureaucrats and their influence has expanded tremendously over the past decade. This growth reflects an increasingly complex administrative structure that requires special skills and knowledge, and operates with massive budgets, expenditure audits, licences, numerous new agencies and functionally specialised funds, and the widespread use of computers. Until now, the bureaucracy has not developed a sense of independent power—but it has become more and more the interface between the Royal Family and the individual Saudi; at the same time it has become involved in significant administrative decision making. The future growth of the bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia appears inevitable, but its relationship to the Royal family which it has served is likely to change as it develops its own lines of communication and support.

The changing domestic role of the military

The Royal Family have always been aware of the need to control the military establishment. This they have accomplished by placing Royal Family members in all services at all levels, as well as having senior family members in direct charge. Equally important is the division of the army into two widely separate 'establishments' under different leadership and with different locations. Despite such moves, the increasing firepower and mobility available to even small segments of any armed service with modern weapons and technology is always an ever-present fact that cannot be ignored. By proposing universal military training for all males, the Saudi Government is seeking to establish a stronger national identity in the newer generations, as well as increasing its military strength. But can this be done successfully when manpower is already in short supply and interest in military service low? And what will be the reaction if and when any military action is required of an army which has not been effectively tested in battle for almost half a century?

The changing international political perspective

Saudi Arabia's role on the centre-stage of international relations is both new and highly vulnerable to forces over which it exercises little control. In less than a decade, Saudi Arabia has become a major world financial power. It has become the world's largest source of oil exports to the industrial nations of the West and Japan. It has become a highly visible, critically important Arab and Muslim state that cannot be ignored and in turn cannot itself ignore what is happening in the Arab and Muslim world. Saudi Arabia cannot opt out of its central role, yet its options are circumscribed by a number of political, military and economic facts or circumstances.

The country's international relations have become global and important only in the last decade. Prior to 1973, Saudi Arabia's foreign policy objectives were simple: maintaining a strong 'special' relationship with the United States which promised super-Power protection, and opposing by all practical means the spread of radical and communist influences in the region. Saudi Arabia's attitude toward the Palestinian question was thus somewhat ambivalent: while opposed in principle to Israeli control over an Arab population and places holy to Islam, it avoided any direct confrontation on the issue, and it was one of the first Arab states to offer recognition of Israel's 1967 boundaries if Israel would negotiate within UN Resolution 242 Saudi Arabia's emergence as one of the world's wealthiest nations, combined with British military withdrawal from the Gulf and the more recent collapse of Iranian pretensions as the 'policeman' of the Gulf, has required the country to expand its international role to cope with problems others took care of in the past. But the 'special relationship' with the United States remains a key element in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy despite the conscious attempts to play down the extent of the relationship.

Saudi Arabia's relationships with the major Middle Eastern Arab states remains correct rather than close; it continues to provide financial subventions to both Jordan and Syria as 'confrontation' states, but it has terminated the heavy support it provided to Egypt before the signing of the Camp David accord. It has also used its financial power to strengthen its ties to nearby African states and to assist them in resisting communist or radical pressures. In its relationships with contiguous states, Saudi Arabia has managed to resolve almost all border disputes, including the vexing one with Abu Dhabi over the Buraimi oasis. It has also provided generous financial assistance to all its neighbours, with the tacit understanding that its leadership in the area be recognised. Only the Yemens remain a problem. North Yemen, a persistently unstable 'client' state of Saudi Arabia, is now negotiating a political union with the Marxist government of South Yemen. Saudi policy toward this move is ambivalent; it cannot be opposed too openly without attracting the opposition of other Arab States. Yet at the same time, the Saudis fear the radical influence which South Yemen would be bound to bring into any 'shared power' formula for a combined Yemen.

The constant and the variables in Saudi Arabia's military equation

Despite immense expenditures on weaponry, training and support facilities, and the probable establishment of compulsory military service for all Saudi young males, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to develop into a strong military power, even in regional terms, relative to the scale of the interests it has to protect. It has developed a small arms industry which it would like to expand—but the country is, and will continue to be, overwhelmingly dependent on foreign (Western) military equipment and technology. It is also likely to continue to be heavily reliant on foreign military training programmes and missions. The

United States mission has been in the country continuously for thirty-six years and the British for over a decade.

Since the Second World War, Saudi Arabia has maintained a close military as well as political relationship with the United States, reflecting the 'special' political ties between the two countries. The military relationship is not spelled out in any defence agreement but it is widely understood on both sides that the United States will provide assistance against any aggression from the outside, and will provide support to the Royal Family internally as long as they maintain wide domestic approval. Since the United States also maintains a similar 'special' relationship with Israel, one can only speculate about the results of a direct Saudi-Israeli conflict. Despite the long-standing friendship and close military ties, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will offer the United States military bases; indeed it will undoubtedly continue to take the position before the world that it is against foreign military bases or forces on Arab soil anywhere.

With the collapse of Iran's policing role in the Arabian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has been anxious to develop a joint security force of some form with the littoral states of the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has always preferred financial subventions to direct involvement—and this pattern of support is likely to continue at an expanding level in the Gulf. Subventions are also likely to be used for security objectives in the Horn of Africa as well as in the wider arena of Arab politics.

Until recently, Saudi Arabia had assumed that any serious military threat from outside would come from the major regional powers of Iraq or possibly from Iran. Iraq and Saudi Arabia, for different reasons, are now collaborating with each other; and Iran's preoccupation with its internal problems has lessened its capacity for military adventurism. But Saudi Arabia does have an increasing military concern over its Yemen border, particularly if the unification of the two Yemens might bring a committed Marxist regime into a shared government on its most vulnerable border.

On the basis of recent statements by the Israelis, Saudi Arabia also has a growing concern with Israel's potential use of airpower against its oil installations. It knows that such a move by Israel would be certain to hurt the United States and its Western allies, and would take place only as a last resort. Yet it refuses to rule out the possibility.

Saudi Arabia's limited economic policy options within the accepted world order

Since the end of the Second World War, Saudi Arabia has integrated its economy almost completely with the economies of the Western, non-communist group of nations including Japan. Large and continuing income flows from oil are based on sales in these markets, and imports of food, machinery, consumer goods and technology are counterpart purchases. Any dramatic shift in Saudi Arabia's pattern of oil production and sales would have

serious consequences for the Western European and Japanese economies as well as for the United States.

Historically, oil sales as well as investments from earnings have been denominated largely in dollars; it is likely that this pattern will continue since the dollar is the only reserve currency with the capacity to absorb the large and growing amounts of funds at the disposal of the Saudis. A corollary of this pattern is that the Saudis, whether they like it or not, are essentially tied to a dollar economy. Any sudden attempt to switch the currency of payment or significantly to change the pattern of dollar money market placements would seriously disrupt the Western international monetary order based on the dollar as a reserve currency. The increasing magnitude of Saudi foreign asset holdings also raise another issue: will the potential financial power of Saudi Arabia be used politically to a degree found unacceptable by the world financial community, or important segments of it? If attempted, could Saudi 'dollar diplomacy' succeed if Saudi Arabia and the United States were in strong disagreement on the Saudi objectives of that diplomacy?

Perhaps the most widely recognised new international 'economic' role of Saudi Arabia is as the leading member of OPEC. Saudi Arabia has been a consistent—but mostly unsuccessful—advocate of price moderation in OPEC. It has also sought to establish a working dialogue between OPEC and the Third World to blunt criticisms of the OPEC oil producers. Since Saudi Arabia's oil exports and production capacity are by far the largest of any member of OPEC it assumed at the beginning that it could provide direction for the organisation—but it has not been able to do so. Frustrated by its failure to have an influence on the organisation commensurate with its role as a producer, it has recently acted independently on pricing, resisting efforts to keep prices higher by proration. Saudi Arabia's future role in OPEC is increasingly uncertain.

In place of a conclusion

In the past, Arabian society and the particular political culture of Saudi Arabia, have shown considerable resiliance and strength in meeting stresses on its institutions and challenges to traditional values. Yet Saudi Arabia is now confronted with forces of change that are of extraordinary magnitude and without precedent in world history. Domestic politics in Saudi Arabia are no longer the concern of Sauds alone. When we now ask 'Whither Saudi Arabia?', the entire world has a strong vested interest in the answer.

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE SUPER-POWERS

Adrian Guelke *

THE crises over Iran and Afghanistan and their impact on relations between the super-powers have inevitably shifted the focus of world attention away from events in Africa, with the single important exception of Zimbabwe's independence. Against this background the birth of Zimbabwe has provided the world with a rare moment of celebration in which all states apart from South Africa could join. The American journalist, Anthony Lewis, summed up the spirit of the occasion 'a world with little enough good news can be happy with Zimbabwe'.[1] The gulf between South Africa and the rest of the world has never seemed wider. Yet if the whole world has had cause to celebrate the Zimbabwean miracle, the grounds for celebration have been as varied as they have been numerous. In Britain the emphasis has been on the success of British diplomacy, the resolution of the conflict thanks to a smooth transition, and the success of constitutionalism and of Western political forms over revolution.[2] In Africa the stress has fallen on the legitimisation of armed struggle and on the forging of new frontiers of freedom through the victory of African nationalism. In the United States the outcome has been seen as a belated vindication of the African policy of the Carter administration and as a setback for the Soviet Union. Thus the United States Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Richard M. Moose, described the circumstances of Zimbabwe's independence as 'the greatest reverse the Russians have suffered in Africa in years'.[3] Yet while the Soviet Union has reason to regret its cultivation of Mr Nkomo's ZAPU at the expense of Mr Mugabe's ZANU it can derive satisfaction from the fact that a strategy of backing national liberation movements has borne fruit in the electoral triumph of the guerrilla leaders and the complete eclipse of Bishop Muzorewa.

These differing grounds for celebration underline both the variety of expectations flowing from the settlement of the Rhodesian issue and the difficulty of assessing the strategic implications of Mr Mugabe's triumph. It is worth recalling that in May 1979, less than a year before Zimbabwe's independence, such an outcome seemed most improbable. The United States

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1. *New York Times*, April 17, 1980.

2. See, for example, Robert Jackson, 'Zimbabwe: a triumph and an opportunity' in *Daily Telegraph*, March 14, 1980.

3. Quoted in *Christian Science Monitor*, (weekly edition), April 28, 1980.

Senate had voted in favour of the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia in response to the internally supervised elections, and in Britain a Conservative government had been elected on a manifesto that was widely interpreted as implying that it would recognise the Muzorewa government if it judged the internal elections of April 1979 to be a fair test of opinion.[4] In the event, the Conservative government treated the constitution rather than the elections themselves as an obstacle to recognition. What has not changed is that southern Africa remains an important area of super-power competition and rivalry, despite its being in most respects peripheral to their vital strategic interests. To explain why this is so, the present situation needs to be put in historical perspective.

The 1960s: South Africa weathers the storm

Africa last stood close to the centre of world politics during the process of decolonisation in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. 1960 itself was dubbed the year of Africa, as in that year fifteen African states celebrated their independence. In the climate of those times few would have predicted that it would be another twenty years before Zimbabwe gained hers. Yet in retrospect, the three years, 1960, 1961, and 1962 stand out as the high points of African influence on world affairs. This was before the independence of some significant African states—notably Kenya and Zambia—and before the formation of the Organization of African Unity (the OAU). At the same time, they were years of considerable tension between East and West, partly exacerbated by the competition for influence among the new states of Africa. President Kennedy, in particular, set great store by America's relations with Africa. Opposition to the repression of Blacks both at home and abroad became a theme of his administration. This was a policy of obvious ideological utility in the context of rivalry with the Soviet Union, but it also seemed a practical policy in the light of events of that period. The Sharpeville massacre in March 1960 had highlighted internal opposition to apartheid and undermined the confidence of foreign investors in South Africa's political stability; while in the same year Harold Macmillan's 'wind of change' speech, and the referral of the South West Africa case to the International Court of Justice, had underscored South Africa's international isolation.

In these circumstances, it seemed to many, even in South Africa, that the days of White supremacy were numbered. Yet within a remarkably short period of time expectations of radical change in Southern Africa had evaporated. By the time of Richard Nixon's election as President of the United States in November 1968, South Africa's position seemed invulnerable. Indeed, the South African government was no longer on the defensive. In a remarkable book published in 1968, the then influential Afrikaner nationalist, Eschel Rhoodie, argued that the Republic dominated Central and Southern

4. See *Conservative Manifesto 1979* (London: Conservative Central Office, 1979), p. 31

Africa 'to the same, if not to a greater extent than the United States enjoys pre-eminence in the Americas'.[5] He put the case for a more aggressive effort by South Africa to fill the vacuum in Africa created by the departure of the colonial Powers. Rhoodie took his argument to its logical conclusion by suggesting that Black majority rule in Rhodesia and Mozambique might even be in South Africa's best long-term interests.[6]

Confidence that White South Africa could surmount the challenge of African nationalism in part reflected a radical transformation in the Republic's economic position since the early 1960s. The foundation of this transformation was domestic tranquillity. By 1964 the South African government had successfully crushed all internal resistance to its rule. This led to a restoration of confidence among foreign investors and a large inflow of new investment into South Africa, fuelling an economic boom. Far from appearing politically unstable, South Africa now appeared to be a haven of stability in an otherwise turbulent continent. Events elsewhere in Africa cruelly exposed the weakness and apparent unreliability of African nationalism. Of these the most important were the continuing instability in the Congo—which was not ended by the Tshombe government's use of White mercenaries—mutinies in East Africa in 1964, a series of military coups in West Africa in 1966, including two in Nigeria that were a prelude to civil war, and Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence on November 11, 1965. All these events except perhaps the last, which Pretoria opposed, strengthened South Africa's position. Other developments, such as the decline in the prestige and influence of the United Nations following the Congo operation, the 1966 decision of the International Court of Justice against Ethiopia and Liberia in the South West Africa case, the closure of the Suez canal after the Middle East war of June 1967, race riots in the United States, and the reaction against coloured immigration in Britain, also worked in South Africa's favour. In addition, by the late 1960s the interest of the world's major powers in Africa was at a low ebb.

American disillusionment with African affairs had already been apparent by the mid-1960s.[7] The same was true of Moscow. There was thus a coincidence between the decline in super-power rivalry and interest in Africa and an improvement in South Africa's position. It put the South African government's efforts to sell itself as a bastion of the West against communism in a somewhat ironic light. It also raises a question. Was there in fact any interplay between African affairs and relations between the super Powers? In a book published in 1971 on Africa's role in world politics, James Mayall suggested that there was. The main theme of this book is a paradox, which he states as follows:

5. Eschel Rhoodie, *The Third Africa* (Cape Town: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1968), p. 3.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

7. See, for example, A. Rivkin, 'Lost goals in Africa', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 1, October 1965, pp. 112–13.

> So long as the greater part of Africa remained under colonial rule, and the principle and timing of decolonization stood as one to the central issues in world politics, the few independent African states and nationalists in the colonial territories were able, acting together, to exercise pressure in the international arena, and to achieve results, which were clearly out of proportion to the actual power at their disposal; by contrast, in the period since 1960, when the African states have indeed occupied a larger number of seats than any other group at the United Nations, their influence on world politics, either singly or collectively, has progressively diminished.[8]

Thus ironically, the completion of the process of decolonisation in Britain's remaining dependencies—with the important exception of Southern Rhodesia—coincided with a recession in the cause of African liberation in Southern Africa.

Mayall argued that the African revolution has already lost momentum by the time of the formation of the OAU in May 1963. A turning point was the Security Council debate on South Africa in 1963, when the African states failed to secure the active support of the Western powers that they needed it they were to pose a serious challenge to White rule in Southern Africa. Why the OAU did not get Western support for sanctions against South Africa was explicable in terms of Western economic and strategic interests. The more interesting question is why the OAU had been hopeful of getting Western support. The short answer is that such a hope was encouraged by President Kennedy's rhetoric—rhetoric based in part on the fear that the Soviet Union would gain influence among the new states if the United States appeared indifferent to their aspirations. It can be argued that the African states mistook the rhetoric for policy; alternatively, that they calculated that the intensification of the cold war at an ideological level which seemed to be happening at the time would increase their leverage on the West over Southern Africa. But by the time of the formation of the OAU this was already an unrealistic hope in the light of the improvement in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union that followed the Cuban missile crisis. With the thaw in relations between the super-powers, South Africa's position grew more secure.

Further, the improvement in South Africa's position itself became a factor in American foreign policy towards Africa. Shortly after taking office, President Nixon ordered a review of American policy towards Southern Africa. To this end, the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa was asked to produce an assessment of the area's future prospects and to suggest 'the full range of basic strategies and policy options open to the United States'.[9] The study was completed in August 1969 and subsequently

8. James Mayall, *Africa: The Cold War and After* (London: Elek, 1971), p. 9.

9. Henry A. Kissinger, *National Security Study Memorandum 39*, quoted in B. Cohen and M. A. El-Khawas, eds., *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), p. 37. This reprints the NSC study in full.

'leaked'. The Group put forward five policy options. The most important were option two: 'broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to encourage improved relations among states in area', and option three; 'limited association with the white states and closer association with the blacks in an effort to retain some economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states while maintaining a posture on the racial issue which the blacks will accept, though opposing violent solutions to the problems of the region'.[10] The report described option three as 'a codification and extension of present policy'[11], while option two was the policy option actually adopted by the Nixon administration.[12]

This represented a considerable gain for South Africa and in particular was a striking vindication of South Africa's efforts to establish friendly relations with other African states. The willingness of states such as Ivory Coast, Gabon, and—at the time—the Malagasy Republic to enter into a dialogue with South Africa was an important factor in the Group's assessment of the reaction in Black Africa to a closer association between the United States and the White regimes of southern Africa envisaged under option two. It bore out the South African foreign minister's contention that 'as the West becomes aware of our fruitful cooperation with other African states, their attitude towards us improves'.[13] Dr Hilgard Muller went on to argue that 'our relations with the rest of the world is largely determined by our relations with the African states'.[14]

A somewhat similar point was made by the Commandant-General of the South African Defence Force, General Hiemstra, in July 1969.

> If only they [some NATO members] would realize that there is more goodwill in Africa towards white South Africa than is superficially visible, they would not continue to foul their own nests by encouraging terrorists and hatemongers in their evil, and in so doing play right into the hands of their enemies.[15]

What General Hiemstra apparently had in mind was Dutch and Scandinavian support for the liberation movements in the Portuguese territories. It was perhaps significant that he should have been so concerned. By contrast, the American National Security Council study was distinctly sanguine about the stability of the White regimes in Southern Africa. Indeed, the assumption that

10. *Ibid*., p. 63.
11. *Ibid*., p. 70.
12. See, for example, Ken Owen, 'Why Nixon took option 2', *The Star* (Johannesburg), February 13, 1971.
13. Quoted in Colin Legum and John Drysdale, eds., *Africa Contemporary Record, 1968-9* (London: Africa Research Limited, 1969), p. 317
14. *Ibid*
15. R. C. Hiemstra, 'The Strategic Significance of South Africa' in *South Africa in the World* (Cape Town and Johannesburg: Suid Afrikaanse Akadamie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 1970), p. 83.

the White redoubt would remain intact underpinned the whole report. Thus, it stated:

> There is no likelihood in the foreseeable future that liberation movements could overthrow or seriously threaten the existing white governments. Rebel activity may expand and contract from time to time, but there will be no definite victory or defeat resulting from the guerrilla activities. In Angola and Mozambique, where insurgency is most active, the rebels cannot win militarily—but neither can the Portuguese. In the longer run the most likely prospect is a continuation of present trends—a rise in activity and the number of incidents, but no conclusive results.[16]

On Rhodesia the study concluded that 'despite the effects of sanctions, the white regime can hold out indefinitely with South African help. The internal security system can meet foreseeable threats'.[17] On the disputed territory of South West Africa:

> South Africa will continue to occupy and administer the territory while the African and Asian nations press for stronger measures to force South Africa out. The South African police and military forces will be able to successfully counter any insurgent or dissident activity for the foreseeable future.[18]

It was less complacent about stability in Black-ruled states—'Zambia shows latent instability for tribal reasons, and may face internal crises'.[19] The other important conclusion of the study was that 'the Soviets appear to afford Africa a low priority at present and can be expected to limit the extent of their commitment and involvement'.[20]

With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to criticise the NSC study, but even considering the period when it was written it seems incomplete and inadequate. For example, in assessing possible African reaction to American policy, there was no mention of the giant of the continent, Nigeria. Consequently, there was no consideration of Nigeria's potential importance as a major oil exporter (although it is true that oil was not then a major issue in world politics); nor was there any attempt to assess the significance, or consequences of Soviet support for the Federal side in the Nigerian civil war. While Chinese aid to Tanzania and Zambia was mentioned, there was no analysis of possible Soviet responses in the light of the growing Sino-Soviet rivalry. Finally, there was no attempt to assess the cost to Portugal of continuing stalemate in its African wars.

However, even taking these factors into account, there were good reasons for supposing that the super-powers would be reluctant to become directly involved in African conflicts. The fact that the OAU was opposed to external intervention in African conflicts, and was supported by a large majority of

16. NSC study quoted in Cohen and El-Khawas, eds., *op. cit.*, p. 94.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

African states in this interpretation of the meaning of non-alignment, was a powerful disincentive to overt and direct interference. The impact that intervention might have on their mutual relations elsewhere was also a deterrent. Moreover, 'the very incoherence of African state structures and the volatility of African politics were likely to undermine any sustained attempt at political influence'.[21]

The 1970s: African upsurge

What upset these calculations was an upsurge of radical African nationalism throughout Southern Africa in the early 1970s. It took different forms in different countries. In the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique there was a widening and intensification of guerrilla warfare. In South West Africa the main challenge to White rule was a strike by thousands of Ovambo workers against the contract labour system in December 1971. It was followed by disturbances in Ovamboland on South West Africa's northern border. In these circumstances, the ruling by the International Court of Justice in an advisory opinion that South Africa's presence in the territory was illegal took on new significance.

By contrast, the end of African quiescence in Rhodesia occurred when the Smith regime had apparently achieved complete victory. The British Conservative government elected in June 1970 was committed to one last attempt to reach a negotiated settlement with Rhodesia, but not to the indefinite maintenance of sanctions. It was a weak bargaining position which was further weakened during 1971 by a vote of the United States Senate to allow the importation of chrome in violation of United Nations mandatory sanctions. Nonetheless, in November 1971 proposals for a settlement were agreed between the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and Ian Smith. They involved very substantial concessions to the Rhodesian regime and offered no prospect of majority rule in this century. However, the proposals were subject to the condition that a commission appointed by the British government should find the terms of the settlement 'acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole'. Essentially, this was a face-saving formula designed to show that the proposals were in accord with the principles for a Rhodesian settlement Sir Alec Douglas-Home had laid down as British Prime Minister in 1964. In the event, when the commissioners under Lord Pearce arrived in Rhodesia in January 1972 to test opinion they were greeted with a chorus of 'noes'. The consequences for the White regime were more serious than simply the loss of the settlement. It now became more difficult for the British government to lift sanctions; and, more importantly, the 'no' campaign encouraged more violent defiance of White rule within Rhodesia and led to a rapid escalation in guerrilla warfare.[22]

21. Mayall, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
22. See A. R. Wilkinson, 'From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe' in B. Davidson, J. Slovo, and A. R. Wilkinson, *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976).

In South Africa itself, the challenge to White authority was as unexpected. It came in the form of strikes. In the first three months of 1973 there were 160 strikes involving over 61,000 Black workers.[23] They were followed by a revival in the fortunes of African trade unions. The general upsurge in African militancy had little immediate impact on the foreign policy objectives of the major Western powers. The United States, Britain and France continued to support South Africa's diplomatic overtures to Black Africa and there was actually increased American and British backing for Portugal.[24] But the signs of active internal opposition to the White regimes made a much greater impact on the African states. In particular, the OAU's liberation strategy of armed struggle gained new credibility, while the position of the minority of African states who argued for an accommodation with South Africa was critically undermined since their case had rested on the futility and cost of continued confrontation in the light of the absence of any serious internal challenge to White rule. The new circumstances, even if they did not end all contacts between South Africa and other African states, ruled out the possibility of a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough by the Republic. This reduced hopes in the West that its interests on both sides of the southern African divide could be put on a more secure footing through an accommodation between South Africa and the rest of Africa.

The most far-reaching and dramatic consequence of the African nationalist resurgence was the Portuguese revolution of April 1974, in which the strain of the African wars played a major part. This ensured that the transition to majority rule in the Portuguese territories would be a revolutionary rather than an evolutionary character. Above all, it reinforced the trends towards radicalism in the other countries in Southern Africa. Whereas the sources of the radicalism of the early 1970s had been principally internal in each case, with comparatively little interplay among the different African nationalist movements, since 1974 the interaction between events in the different countries has become marked. In particular, there was a widening and intensification of the guerrilla war in Rhodesia as a result of Frelimo's coming to power in Mozambique, while the Soweto uprising in South Africa in June 1976 was in part a reaction to South Africa's apparent defeat by the Angolan MPLA and its Cuban backers earlier that year.

The South African government made a carefully calculated response to the Portuguese revolution. It took into account its experience of relations with neighbouring Black-ruled states and was influenced by the argument of Rhoodie and others that the economic dependence of Rhodesia and Mozambique on South Africa would help to ensure that the Republic was able to maintain good relations with those states after the transition to majority rule. Further, the government realised there was little it could do to prevent the transition to majority rule in Mozambique and that that in itself would

23. *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg), April 27, 1973.
24. See W. Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp. 151-60.

increase the cost of South Africa's continuing to sustain the existing structure of White power in Rhodesia. It also recognised that the survival of the favourable American policy towards South Africa depended on positive action that showed that the Republic was able to manage change in the region. Indeed, if South Africa itself could make a major contribution to restoring stability, it might encourage the United States to rely more fully on South Africa as a bulwark of Western strategic interests in the region.

The South African government therefore immediately recognised the new Portuguese government. In fact, South Africa was the first country to do so. It gave its tacit approval to Portugal's decision to hand over Mozambique to Frelimo. The government hoped that by assisting Frelimo's take-over it could pave the way for business-like if not friendly relations with the new state and blunt the revolutionary appeal of Frelimo within South Africa. The South African press played its part by hailing the former 'terrorists' as 'pragmatists'. At the same time, manifestations of support for Frelimo among South African Blacks were met with an iron fist. South Africa also enlisted the aid of the Zambian and British governments to bring about a negotiated transition to majority rule in Rhodesia; and it decided that the structure of White supremacy in South West Africa would at least have to be modified, given the territory's long frontier with Angola and Zambia and its position under international law. What this amounted to was an ambitious programme to dampen down African militancy by assisting the peaceful dismantling of structures that entrenched White supremacy in countries where the long term viability of White rule was anyway in doubt. The hope was that economic factors would enable South Africa to dominate a constellation of neighbouring Black-ruled states that would consequently pose no threat to White supremacy in South Africa. Ideally, the unstable White buffer would be replaced by a more stable Black buffer. In addition, South Africa hoped to establish its value to the West in the region and to be given a place in American global strategy in accordance with the Nixon doctrine.

South Africa's strategy ran into difficulties for three main reasons. In the first place, the Smith regime was unwilling to commit suicide. The South African government was able to force Smith to negotiate, but he proved adept at frustrating agreement. An early casualty of White Rhodesia's intransigence was detente between Zambia and South Africa, which was based on Zambia's and South Africa's common interest in a peaceful transfer of power in Rhodesia. While the Zambian and South African governments worked in unison to bring Rhodesia's warring African nationalist factions together so as to lay the basis of a negotiated settlement, the Smith regime directed its efforts at keeping the African nationalist movement divided. (During 1976 the aid of the United States in the person of its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was enlisted to persuade Smith to settle. Like so many previous negotiations with Smith they were initially successful but ultimately failed.) The main obstacle was that White Rhodesia's interest was not in political stability as such, but a

position from which it could exploit African nationalist divisions to increase its own leverage to defend White privileges. The widening guerrilla war actually enhanced the regime's bargaining position because of the pressure it put on those African nationalist factions without significant guerrilla support to reach an accommodation with the Whites. Eventually, Smith's strategy came to fruition with the internal settlement of March 1978. While this meant that the Whites had to accept a diluted form of majority rule, it lent credibility to Rhodesia's efforts to portray the guerrilla war not as a White-Black conflict but as a battlefield between East and West and it made it easier for Rhodesia to enlist support in Britain and the United States.[25]

The second reason South Africa's strategy ran into difficulties was the Republic's disastrous intervention in Angola in late 1975 and early 1976. Angola posed a special problem for South Africa because it was not economically dependent on the Republic, yet occupied a strategically important position on the boarder with South West Africa. Obviously, a friendly government in Angola would greatly ease the problems of transition in South West Africa. The divisions within the Angolan nationalist movement provided the opportunity for South African assistance to that end. Further, the Republic hoped through its intervention to cement an alliance with Zaire. But perhaps the most important factor of all was that South Africa had American support for its action; a claim the South African government has been able to substantiate.[26] The Ford administration's own efforts to support two of the factions (FNLA and UNITA) were hampered by Congressional opposition. South Africa calculated that its intervention would lead to the swift defeat of the MPLA, and that the OAU would be faced with a *fait accompli* that radically altered the balance of power on the continent in South Africa's favour. The Republic clearly did not anticipate the increase in the scale of Cuban and Soviet support for the MPLA. It is not difficult to speculate why. In the first place, the South African government probably reasoned that the policy of the OAU would inhibit a large scale Soviet and Cuban commitment to the conflict, given the general OAU injunction against super-power intervention. In addition, the OAU's position on Angola was that a government of National Unity composed of all three liberation movements should be established. In supporting the MPLA government from the outset the Soviet Union laid itself open to the accusation of not abiding by specific OAU policy on Angola.[27] Further, its intervention represented a radical departure from the cautious policy it had pursued in Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Nonetheless, in retrospect, it is not difficult to explain the scale of Soviet and Cuban involvement, since the situation in Angola during 1975 presented the two communist powers with an unparalleled set of opportunities. They were able to defend their action on the impeccable Pan-African ground that it

25. See B. Rogers, 'Rhodesia's American lobby', *New Statesman*, May 25, 1979.
26. See, for example, *The Star Weekly* (Johannesburg), April 22, 1978.
27. See Colin Legum, 'The role of the Big Powers' in C. Legum and T. Hodges, *After Angola: The War over Southern Africa* (London: Rex Collins, 1976), p. 17.

furthered the liberation of Southern Africa. Moreover, of the three African nationalist factions in Angola, the MPLA enjoyed by far the greatest support among African states. The crisis in Angola also provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to counter the growth of China's influence in Africa. During the early 1970s China had forged strong links with a number of African states through its aid programme and its support for liberation movements in Southern Africa. Indeed, it can be argued that the displacement of China as the principal supporter of armed struggle against White rule was the most important motivation of Soviet involvement in Angola.[28] At the same time, the disarray in American foreign policy following Vietnam and Watergate considerably reduced the risks of a forceful American response. Finally, Soviet intervention was explicable as an element in the Soviet quest to achieve the status of a global power with a stake in the settlement of all major international conflicts, including the racial confrontation in Southern Africa.[29]

In the event, the effect of South African intervention was to legitimise Soviet and Cuban actions. It not only failed to achieve the objective of installing a friendly government in Luanda but positively encouraged defiance of White authority within South Africa itself, raising a question mark over the Republic's own stability. For the United States government, the outcome was hardly less disastrous. Its African policy which had been based, in Legum's words, 'on a momentously wrong judgment that armed struggle by Africans could not succeed anywhere in southern Africa'[30] was further discredited. Angola was also a major setback for China: during 1977 the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation with Frelimo, Peking's erstwhile ally, now installed in power in Mozambique.

The election of Jimmy Carter as President of the United States in November 1976 was the third reason why South Africa's strategy ran into difficulties. The new President adopted a much more hostile policy towards South Africa, as the administration forged a new African strategy to fit in with the overall emphasis on human rights in its foreign policy. Its key feature was American support for the OAU and its commitment to non-alignment and the liberation of the White South. It involved giving priority to America's relations with countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia in the mainstream of African opinion, rather than to relations with anti-communist states indifferent to Pan-African aspirations. The fundamental objective of the policy was, in President Carter's words 'to held Africans create a strong prosperous Africa at peace with itself and with the world, not to gain some advantage over the Soviets or Cubans or any other power'.[31] The American administration hoped that the strengthening of the non-aligned bloc within Africa would contribute to a

28. See, for example, David E. Albright, ed., *Africa and International Communism* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

29. See Anatoly Gromyko, *'Conflict Strategy' and International Situation* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1979), p. 5.

30. Legum and Hodges, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

31. Quoted in *Africa* (London), No. 76, December 1977, p. 16.

reduction of foreign military intervention in the affairs of the continent. This was a logical strategy, since America could not expect to compete in the military field in view of the opposition of public opinion to American involvement in conflicts without any direct bearing on America's own defence. By contrast, the United States was well equipped to compete economically in Africa and it was argued would gain rather than lose from the continent's deeper political non-alignment.

For the South African government, the strategy represented a nightmare—since a necessary part of the policy was the eventual liquidation of White supremacy in South Africa itself. Henceforth securing a reversal of Carter's African policy became the overriding priority of South African foreign policy. In particular, the South African government no longer had an interest in working with the United States to bring about a negotiated transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, since it could no longer rely on American assistance to ensure that its interests were not damaged in the process. Much the same argument applied to South West Africa. Whether in consequence internal settlements evolved as a conscious policy to frustrate American policy seems somewhat doubtful—they were a product of a variety of pressures and were not simply South Africa's creation. The Republic probably viewed them initially as *ad hoc* solutions in the absence of any safer alternative. By the middle of 1979 they represented much more than this. Despite enshrining White privileges they had achieved a measure of legitimacy, at least in the eyes of conservatives in the West. What is more, they seemed proof that radical African nationalism as represented by the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia was less than an overwhelming force in the region. If the settlements were fragile, it could nevertheless be plausibly argued that they would offer a prospect of a measure of stability if only they were positively supported by Western governments. In so far as the fragility of the settlements was seen as presenting an opportunity for the expansion of Soviet influence, it was not difficult to put the onus for creating this opportunity on American policy-makers. Thus it was possible to argue that continuing American hostility towards South Africa involved an unnecessary sacrifice of Western interests on *both* sides of the Southern African divide. At the same time, the Botha government's commitment to domestic reform was beginning to make a favourable impact on Western opinion.

In the circumstances, it was not surprising that support in Washington for the Carter administration's African policy was soon at a very low ebb. In the South African press there was a revival of speculation that the Republic's regional role as a bulwark of stability and of Western economic interests would gain recognition, and that South Africa would acquire the position of a 'deputy peace-keeper' for the United States.[32] Speeches by government ministers

32. R. Milne, 'US draws on South Africa for stability', *The Star Weekly* (Johannesburg), May 26, 1979.

reflected South Africa's growing confidence. What had been desperate responses to international pressures were now interpreted as grand strategy, most notably in the development of the helpfully vague concept of a constellation of states.[33] American strategy rested on the assumption that in the long term the force of African nationalism would ensure that no advantage would accrue to any foreign power meddling militarily in the continent's affairs. Unfortunately for American policy-makers it was inevitable that their strategy would be judged by what happened in the short term. Such evidence was obviously more likely to impress American opinion if it involved the United States's principal rival, the Soviet Union. The strategic gains made by the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa were peripheral to Southern Africa. Nonetheless, the apparent success of Ethiopia in overcoming Somali nationalism with Soviet assistance obviously did nothing to enhance the credibility of the 'force of nationalism', argument and consequently widened divisions within the Carter administration over its larger African policy.

The continuing presence of Cuban troops in Angola also provided ammunition for the critics of American policy. It buttressed the case for an informal alliance with South Africa, as well as underlining the failure of American hostility towards South Africa to bring the United States strategic dividends on the Black side of the Southern African divide. What critics ignored was the role of South Africa in sustaining the Cuban presence through its support for the resort to guerrilla warfare by UNITA, one of the nationalist factions defeated in the Angolan civil war. The aim was to use UNITA to restrict SWAPO's infiltration into Namibia through Angola. In carrying out this policy, South Africa went to great pains to obstruct any improvement in relations between Zaire and Angola. Indeed, the South African press was remarkably forthcoming about the success of South African efforts to undermine detente between Zaire and Angola early in 1978 and in explaining why it was 'in South Africa's interest to prevent a rapprochement that gave the Marxists in Angola more room for manoeuvre'.[34]

In fact, the country that lost most from the continuation of the conflict in the area was not Angola but Zaire. Rebels based on a nucleus of Katangese gendarmes invaded Zaire's Shaba province in May 1978, bringing copper production to a halt after a massacre of European mining technicians and their families in the town of Kolwezi. The self-evident inability of the Zaire army to restore order provided the pretext for French intervention to re-establish the authority of the Mobutu government in the province and, along with Belgian troops, to protect the remaining Europeans. South Africa could hardly have hoped for a clearer demonstration of the inadequacy of Carter's African policy. The South African-supported news magazine *To the Point* headlined its reporting of events with 'massacres shake US Africa policy' and 'rumble of

33. See Wolfgang H. Thomas, 'A Southern African "Constellation of States": Challenge or Myth?' in *South Africa International*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Jan. 1980, pp. 113-28. Thomas suggests six different meanings of the term.

34. *The Star Weekly* (Johannesburg), March 18, 1978.

cold war drums'.[35] Perhaps inevitably, what happened in Shaba was seen in East-West terms and led to a sharp deterioration in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, at least at a rhetorical level. This was to South Africa's advantage in that the more Africa was drawn into a struggle between East and West the less tenable the President's policy of backing the non-aligned bloc within Africa appeared. This was clearly understood by advocates of the African strategy within the Carter administration. Andrew Young, the American ambassador to the United Nations, in particular made a point of playing down Soviet involvement in Africa. The success of French intervention in Shaba strengthened the position of those within the administration like Dr Brzezinski who advocated a more forceful response to what they saw as a Soviet challenge to Western interests in Africa. Further, the French action exposed a weakness in the assumptions underlying Young's position. This was that the American public's unwillingness to countenance military intervention in Africa negated the effectiveness of force as a means by which Soviet influence could be combatted. The intervention in Shaba showed that force could be an effective instrument of Western policy, if America enlisted the aid of third parties or supported their efforts.

Prospects for the 1980s

However, it would be wrong to conclude from South Africa's role in exacerbating East-West tensions through helping to foment conflict in central Africa that the general deterioration in relations between the super-powers since Afghanistan is necessarily in South Africa's best interest. The picture is more complex than South Africa's attachment to anti-communist rhetoric might suggest. Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that in the early 1970s detente exercised a benign influence on South Africa's position in so far as it dampened down ideological conflict between the super-powers of a kind that would have made South Africa an embarrassing partner for the West. Further, in the light of the ideological onslaught on the Soviet Union by the Carter administration over the question of human rights, a case could be made for the view that Soviet actions in Africa represented a calculated response to this pressure.[36] But this view certainly exaggerates the extent to which one super-power can manipulate its commitments in the Third World in the interests of its primary relationship with the other. In particular, no super-power can do much to determine the timing of opportunities for the extension of its influence. Nonetheless, there may be a more indirect link between the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and Soviet intervention in the Third World. In so far as the process of detente involves recognition of Soviet claims as a global Power, the Soviet incentive to pursue these claims through military intervention outside the Soviet sphere of influence is reduced. By the

35. *To the Point* (Antwerp), June 9, 1978.
36. See, for example, Coral Bell, 'Virtue unrewarded: Carter's foreign policy at mid-term' in *International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3, October 1978, pp. 562–67.

same token, a policy of containment and/or attacks on the legitimacy of the Soviet system provide an obvious incentive to the Soviet Union to demonstrate its power to challenge Western interests and hence to force the West to adopt a more accommodating policy. However, this does not mean that the Soviet Union will turn down opportunities to extend its influence in periods of detente. In relation to Southern Africa, the Soviet Union may calculate that political influence in the region so enhances its appeal to the Third World that it would be unwilling to forgo opportunities to extend its influence in the area, even in the context of global detente.

Nonetheless, a period of deteriorating relations between East and West would be likely to intensify competition for influence in the Third World and raise the costs to the West of its association with apartheid. This is the essence of the argument by John Rolt (military correspondent of *The Star*) that the Afghan crisis could affect South Africa adversely, notwithstanding the impact of the crisis on the gold price.[37] On the other hand, the damage to the Soviet Union's reputation in the Third World as a result of Afghanistan, and Soviet preoccupation with the instability on its southern borders, may in the short term reduce the prospects for further Soviet involvement in Africa. Nonetheless, one might speculate that South Africa would fare best in a situation in which an American policy of detente was coupled with vigorous regional policies to eliminate Soviet influence through the support of explicitly anti-communist governments and movements—what might fairly be called the Kissinger mix. In Southern Africa such a policy would involve, for example, increasing support for UNITA and reviving the FNLA rather than relying on Angola's reduced dependence on Cuban military help to bring about a lessening of Soviet influence: and the reception that UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, received on his recent trips to Western capitals suggests considerable political support for this option in the West.[38] However, for this strategy to be attractive it would have to hold out the prospect of stabilising the region in the medium term. It would also imply an informal alliance with South Africa.

How has Mugabe's victory affected the prospects of such a strategy being adopted? On the face of it, the results of the Rhodesian elections represent a vindication of the policy espoused by Andrew Young, through their demonstration of the potency of radical African nationalism. At the same time, the eclipse of the supporters of the internal settlement has undermined the credibility of Namibia's internal settlement. Further, by raising expectations of change in South Africa, they have made it more difficult for the Botha government to eradicate unrest within the Republic. All these factors reduce the attractiveness to the West of any sort of alliance with South Africa. However, if South Africa can ride out the present storm, a rather different picture may emerge. Zimbabwe poses no direct threat to South Africa, and as

37. *The Star Weekly* (Johannesburg), March 1, 1980.

38. See, for example, Lord Chalfont, 'The bush fighter who deserves our support', *The Times*, July 7, 1980.

the constraints on its ability to align itself with Pan-Africanism become apparent the strengths rather than the weaknesses of South Africa's position may be recognised. It is also possible that American policy elsewhere in Africa—notably support for Morocco in the Western Sahara and plans to develop military facilities in Kenya and Somalia—will so sour relations with the non-aligned states in Africa that the argument that American hostility towards South Africa pays dividends in the rest of Africa will again lose much of its force. In these circumstances, Western urgency to find a solution to the problem of apartheid or even to bring about an international settlement in Namibia—provided that South Africa can contain the guerrilla war there—might evaporate. It might then be possible to argue that the birth of Zimbabwe had lessened rather than heightened the West's dilemma over Southern Africa. But such a scenario presupposes a return to African quiescence, which on present evidence seems improbable.

To make any guesses about the future, many other imponderables need to be taken into account. An obvious one is the outcome of the American Presidential election in November 1980. A Reagan administration might be expected to be less hostile towards South Africa, though it will have to take into account constraining factors, such as America's substantial imports of Nigerian oil. In this context, the policies of the major Western European Powers are worth considering in view of their economic interests in both black Africa and South Africa. France, alone of the European Powers in recent times, has made use of military intervention to protect its interests in Africa, though this has been confined to francophone Africa and is therefore somewhat peripheral to Southern Africa. Further, France now appears to be having second thoughts about the value of military intervention as an instrument of policy after its failure in Chad.[39] In general, the European powers have supported American policy in Southern Africa, though with a greater emphasis on defusing the crisis through encouraging reform in South Africa. The British government has expressed the hope that there will be 'progress towards ending the isolation of South Africa in world affairs'.[40] The policies of the African states in the region are another important variable. To a considerable degree, Soviet influence will depend on their perception of its utility, notwithstanding any attachment they might have to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Economic factors are not a constraint, in view of the absence of any deep-rooted economic ties between the region and the Soviet Union.

To try to predict the course of super-power involvement in Southern Africa would therefore be foolish. As long as White supremacy remains entrenched in one form or another, competition between the super-powers in the region seems certain. Soviet interest in the region is unlikely to diminish, and the elimination of its influence also seems improbable—not least because of its

39. David White, ' "Africa's gendarme" hopes aid can replace intervention', *Financial Times*, June 13, 1980.

40. Mrs Thatcher, quoted in *The Times*, December 19, 1979.

links with SWAPO and the African National Congress of South Africa. At the same time, while South Africa may be a pariah of international society, it is still able to exercise considerable influence on world politics. The influence South Africa is able to exercise among the elites of Western society was perhaps the most striking aspect of the Muldergate revelations. The other side of the coin is the extent of Western interests in South Africa, particularly in minerals. Indeed, it is the contradiction between Western economic domination of the continent and Africa's political non-alignment, placing it outside any recognised sphere of influence, that perhaps best explains why the African continent—although peripheral to the super-powers' vital strategic interests—may nevertheless cause conflict between them. In Southern Africa the ideological ramifications of the stance of the super-powers on the issue of racialism adds to the stakes.

HISTORICAL NOTE

THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE 'PROPOSED INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1919'

*M. L. Dockrill**

THE establishment of an Institute of International Affairs was initiated by members of the British and American delegations at the Paris Peace Conference in May 1919. It received the blessings of senior members of both delegations, Lord Robert Cecil[1] and the Americans, Colonel Edward House,[2] Henry White[3] and General Tasker H. Bliss.[4] Lionel Curtis,[5] who was to become a leading enthusiast for the scheme, noted that although it was 'unofficial', the institute was intended to be 'strictly of the nature of public service connected with [the] objects of the present Peace Conference'.[6]

A meeting to discuss the foundation of such an institute was convened at the Hotel Majestic, the residence of the British delegation, on the evening of May 30, 1919. It was attended by over thirty members of both delegations. The British side consisted of about twenty-eight representatives, many of whom later became well known in the worlds of scholarship and of public affairs. The bulk were from the Foreign Office, although the War Office, the Colonial Office and other departments were also represented. Amongst their number were Cecil, Lord Eustace Percy,[7] Major Harold Temperley,[8] James Headlam-Morley,[9] Philip Baker,[10] Harold Nicolson,[11] Philip

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1. Minister of Blockade, 1916-18; Head of Foreign Office League of Nations section, 1918-19 and Leader of the British delegation on the League of Nations Commission, Paris, 1919; Lord Privy Seal, 1923-24; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (with special responsibility for League of Nations affairs), 1924-27; League of Nations enthusiast and President of the League of Nations Union, 1923-45.

2. Special Adviser to President Woodrow Wilson at Paris.

3. American diplomat and American plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference, 1918-19.

4. Former US Army Chief of Staff and US plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

5. Secretary to Lord Milner in South Africa in 1900; Co founder of *The Round Table* and editor, 1909; Colonial Office member of British League of Nations section in Paris, 1919; Colonial Office official, 1920-24; Author of a number of books on Imperial and Commonwealth affairs; later Fellow of All Souls.

6. Minute by Curtis, June 21, 1919. FO 608/152. The correspondence on this subject is filed under 'Peace Congress, Political, General' No. 502/4/1 in the Foreign Office papers on the Paris Peace Conference at the Public Record Office, Kew.

7. British representative (Foreign Office) on the League of Nations Commission, 1919; Conservative MP, 1921-37; Minister of Health, 1923-24; President of the Board of Education, 1924-29; Minister without Portfolio, 1935-36; author.

8. Member of British Military Section, Paris, 1919; A leading diplomatic historian; Editor of *A History of the Paris Peace Conference*, 6 vols (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1920-24).

9. Foreign Office adviser (Political Section) at Paris, 1919; diplomatic historian.

10. Noel-Baker. Foreign Office adviser and Head (under Cecil) of the League of Nations Section, Paris, 1919; Labour MP, 1929-31 and 1936-70; British delegate to League Assembly, 1929-31; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1947; fervent supporter of the League of Nations; Professor of International Relations, University of London, 1924 29; prolific writer of substantive books on international law and disarmament questions.

11. Foreign Office adviser (Political Section), Paris, 1919; National Labour MP, 1935-45; biographer and historian.

Kerr,[12] Curtis, Major C. K. Webster,[13] Captain Clement Jones,[14] Captain Frank P. Walters,[15] Cecil Hurst,[16] Captain J. R. M. Butler,[17] Colonel Frederick Kisch,[18] E. F. Wise,[19] Alexander W. A. Leeper,[20] Captain Edgar Abraham,[21] Charles Strachey,[22] Sir Robert Garran,[23] F. B. Bourdillon[24] and H. J. Paton.[25]

The American delegation fielded nine members, including George L. Beer,[26] Bliss, Professors James T. Shotwell[27] and Archibald Cary Coolidge,[28] Captain Stanley K. Hornbeck,[29] and Ray Stannard Baker.[30] Many of the Americans were also prominent in scholarly and official circles. General Bliss agreed to chair the meeting. Curtis moved

(1) That a Committee of three American and three British members be appointed to prepare a scheme for the creation of an institute of international affairs.
(2) That the scheme when drafted be submitted to a meeting of those present at this gathering together with any others whom the Committee may see fit to add to their numbers.

He then embarked on an hour long peroration, justifying the proposal on the grounds that

> the settlements being made in Paris were mainly the resultant of the public opinions of various countries concerned, which public opinions were often in conflict. The future moulding of those settlements would depend upon how far public opinion in these countries would be right or wrong. Right public opinion was mainly produced by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved.
>
> In Paris, a number of men, partly permanent officials and partly specialists attached to the delegations had been brought into close contact with facts. They had also for some months past been brought into close contact with each other. When the Conference closed they would constitute the most valuable factor in the production of sound public opinion. But

12. Editor of *The Round Table*, 1910-16; Lloyd George's private secretary, 1916-21; British ambassador to Washington, 1939-40 (as Lord Lothian).

13. Secretary of Military Section, Paris, 1919. He became a distinguished diplomatic historian.

14. Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, 1916-20; secretary of the British Empire delegation, Paris, 1919.

15. Private Secretary to Lord Robert Cecil, 1919. Afterwards served on the League of Nations secretariat and wrote *A History of the League of Nations* (London, 1952).

16. Foreign Office Legal Adviser, 1916-29; Secretary of Legal Section at Paris, 1919; judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 1929-46.

17. Member of Military Section, Paris, 1919. A distinguished historian and writer; Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Regius Professor of Modern History, University of Cambridge, 1947-54; chief historian for Official Military Histories, 1939-45.

18. Member of Military Section, Paris, 1919. An Army engineer who served with great distinction in North Africa until killed in action in 1943.

19. Ministry of Food adviser at Paris, 1919.

20. Special Adviser, Foreign Office (Political Section), Paris, 1919; Head of League of Nations and Western Department, 1933-35.

21. Indian Civil Servant; a British Secretary to the Council of Ten at Paris, 1919

22. Colonial Office representative at Paris, 1919.

23. Solicitor General of Australia and member of the British delegation at Paris, 1919.

24. Admiralty Intelligence Department, 1916-19; Political Section advisory attachment, Paris, 1919; secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1926-29.

25. Admiralty Intelligence Department, 1918-19; attached to Political Section as adviser on Polish affairs, Paris, 1919; Philosopher and classicist; Professor of Logic at Glasgow and of Moral Philosophy, Oxford.

26. Businessman and historian of the British colonial system in the 17th and 18th centuries; member of Woodrow Wilson's Inquiry into American Peace Aims, 1917-19; member of American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Paris, 1919.

27. Historian of Columbia University; member of the Inquiry and of the Commission.

28. Professor of Eastern European History at Harvard University; member of the Inquiry and of the Commission.

29. Professor of Political Science at Wisconsin University (Chinese Department); member of US Tariff Commission, 1917-18; member of the Inquiry and of the Commission; later became head of the State Department's Far Eastern Division.

30. Director of President Wilson's Press Bureau at Paris, 1919; edited Woodrow Wilson's private papers.

> their value would deteriorate unless steps were taken to keep them abreast of the facts and to enable them to think out the issues by discussion with each other. It was recognized by all thoughtful men that in future the policy of each state ought not to be guided merely by a calculation of its own individual interest. National policy ought to be shaped by a conception of the interests of society at large; for it was in the advancement of that universal interest that the particular interest of the several nations would alone be found. It was all-important, therefore, to cultivate a public opinion in the various countries of the world which kept the general interest in view. For this purpose, the various bodies of experts in the different countries should try to remain in touch with each other. A beginning might be made if an institute of international affairs were created by the two great commonwealths which had the advantage of a common tongue. He therefore advocated the creation of such an institute by the experts attached to the British and American Delegations, with one branch in England and another in America at the outset. The aim should be to create institutes like the Royal Geographical Society, with libraries where the members would study international affairs. The results of their studies could be put in the form of papers for discussion by the members. This would keep officials and publicists in touch with each other. *Officials might often have to abstain from discussion of the papers, but there was no reason why they could not listen to them.* More important still, the institutes would form centres where they would converse on these subjects.

He further suggested that the institute produce a year-book or 'Register' of international affairs under joint Anglo-American editorship.[31]

Most of those who spoke in the ensuing discussion were in favour of the institute. The sole exception was Eyre Crowe, who voiced an apprehension which was shortly to complicate relations between the Foreign Office staff and the proposed institute. Curtis noted later that 'Crowe . . . made the most interesting speech of the evening, if only because it was the only one in which any doubts were expressed on the merits of the proposal as a whole'. The Assistant Under Secretary feared that in any association between the Foreign Office and outside opinion the official view of foreign policy would come to dominate that of the 'publicists' and, through them, that of public opinion as a whole. As a result free and independent thought in society would atrophy.[32] According to Headlam-Morley 'the difficulty of the co-operation of officials was raised and the question of official secrets'.[33] Neither problem was considered by the meeting to be insoluble. That risks were involved was admitted, but none of the non-official experts at Paris felt that they had been compromised by their experiences at Paris and Curtis believed that 'the danger of not providing for such intercourse [was] even greater'.[34] Headlam-Morley insisted that Government officials had a 'sense of responsibility' in their handling of official secrets.[35]

A provisional committee was then set up to formulate a scheme to establish the institute. This was composed of three British representatives, Headlam-Morley, Percy and Lieutenant-Commander J. G. Latham,[36] and three Americans, Dr James Brown Scott,[37] and Professors Coolidge and Shotwell. Curtis and W. H. Shepardson of the American deligation agreed to act as joint secretaries. The committee drew up a series of reports and resolutions which were considered by the others at full meetings on June 9 and 17, 1919.

The committee resolved that 'the Institute of International Affairs founded at the Conference of Paris 1919' should consist of two branches, one in Britain and the other

31. Minutes of meeting at Hotel Majestic May 30, 1919, FO 608/152. Author's italics.

32. Curtis to R. H. Campbell, Foreign Office, August 20, 1919, FO 608/152.

33. Sir James Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, edited by Agnes Headlam-Morley (London, 1972). Diary entry May 31, 1919, p. 132.

34. Minute of Meeting relative to proposed Institute, May 30, 1919, FO 608/152.

35. Headlam-Morley, p. 132.

36. Australian lawyer and politician; member of the British Empire Secretariat, Paris, 1919; Attorney General, 1925–29; Deputy Prime Minister, 1932–34; Chief Justice of Australia, 1935–52.

37. International lawyer; member of the Inquiry and of the Commission.

in the United States.[38] Members were to be recruited from the British and American delegations at Paris and also from British and American citizens who had been engaged in responsible work connected with foreign affairs during and after the war. Thus the membership was to be strictly limited to those qualified to make original contributions either to knowledge or thought about foreign affairs. The subscription was to be fixed at a level 'not likely to exclude anyone otherwise qualified for membership'. Each branch was to issue 'monographs on special subjects'. The constitution was to be settled by the membership of each branch.[39]

The question of the proposed membership was considered to be of the utmost importance. Headlam-Morley and Curtis believed that 'if the thing is to be effective, admission must be difficult so as to avoid a great mass of incompetent members who are admitted to many other learned societies in order to get funds'.[40] The Joint Committee recognised the virtues of personal selection. 'Its [the Institute's] future will mainly depend upon the success or failure with which this selection is made.' To carry out this task a special committee of selection was set up consisting of Cecil (the convener), Hurst, Sir Valentine Chirol,[41] the Master of Balliol, Clement Jones, Geoffrey Dawson,[42] Philip Baker and Dr G. W. Prothero.[43] After the members had been selected, the provisional committee would summon a meeting in London to submit the proposed constitution for approval 'and [then] ask for the appointment of a permanent governing body to take their place'.[44] It was recognised that little more could be accomplished on this subject in Paris. In London the two committees—of selection and of establishment—were amalgamated, with Sir John Tilley,[45] Temperley and Percy replacing Chirol and Hurst, who were in Egypt.[46]

The future of the Institute could be left in abeyance until after the Conference but that of the 'Register of International Affairs' could not—the work had to be planned and apportioned amongst the intending writers before they left Paris. Percy and Beer, the joint editors, drew up an outline of subjects to be dealt with in the book, and the format they suggested was by and large adopted by the contributors.[47] Curtis felt that while governments had always been prepared to publish official histories of wars, they had never published accounts of peace conferences. This the institute intended to put right, at least as far as the Paris Conference was concerned. A meeting of members of both delegations was again held at the Majestic on the evening of June 25. Curtis invited about twenty members of the British delegation, many of whom had attended the inaugural meeting of the institute.[48] Temperley agreed to edit the history, and contributors were to include Colonel J. M. H. Cornwall,[49] Edwyn Bevan,[50] Ray

38. The United States branch evolved into the Council of Foreign Relations.

39. 'Report of the British members of the Joint Committee appointed May 30, FO 608/152 'Report of the Committee Appointed by an informal meeting of persons attached to the British and American peace delegations at the Hotel Majestic, on May 30, 1919', *ibid.*

40. Headlam Morley, p. 133.

41. Former Foreign Office official; Foreign Editor of *The Times*, 1896 1912.

42. Private Secretary to Lord Milner, South Africa, 1901-1910; Editor of *The Times*, 1912-19 and again 1923-41. (Changed his name from Robinson in 1917.)

43. Foreign Office adviser (Political Section) 1919; Foreign Office Librarian and editor of the Foreign Office *Peace Handbooks* for members of the British delegation, 1918.

44. 'Report of the British members of the Joint Committee appointed May 30', FO 608/152.

45. Chief Clerk Foreign Office, 1913 18; Joint editor of *The Foreign Office* (London 1933).

46. H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London: Institute of International Affairs, 1920), Vol. I, p. viii.

47. Curtis to Major Webster and 19 others, with plan of book, undated but registered at the Foreign Office, Paris on June 20, 1919, FO 608/152.

48. Robert Vansittart, Adviser to the Political Section at Paris; Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1930-38, and Chief Diplomatic Adviser, 1938-41, was also invited, FO 608/152.

49. Member of the Directorate of Military Intelligence, War Office, Paris, 1919.

50. Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, 1918-21; Lecturer in Hellenistic History and Literature at King's College, London, 1922-33.

Stannard Baker, Headlam-Morley, Kerr, Kisch, Wise, Hornbeck, Dudley Ward,[51] Shotwell, A. E. Zimmern[52] and Scott. Thus the history, which was to consist of four volumes,[53] was to be written largely by the participants at the conference, and was to include detailed maps and the texts of all the treaties signed at Paris. Webster was to approach the French Secretary General of the Conference 'to secure the correctness of any references to the French attitude in the history'.[54]

It was soon clear that the higher echelons of the Foreign Office were not in favour of any active participation by their officials in the venture. The collaboration of civil servants with journalists and others in what might turn out to be a public forum of debate was viewed with the greatest suspicion by old-guard Foreign Office officials and diplomats. At the inaugural meeting Crowe had already voiced his fears about the scheme. He had long been unhappy about what he described as the unwarranted interference in foreign affairs by journalists and other 'busy-bodies'. He 'disliked and distrusted outsiders (even those from other government departments) and considered them intruders in a highly skilled craft'.[55] On June 26 he penned a long minute setting out his opposition to Foreign Office participation in the venture.

> My reason for this is that the scheme raises a very important question of public policy, which ought, I think, to be referred to the Secretary of State.
>
> It has been assumed, as part of the scheme, that members of our diplomatic service and of the diplomatic establishment of the Foreign Office, shall become, or be encouraged to become, members of the proposed 'Institute of International Affairs', and take part, more or less systematically, in discussions of foreign policy which, although considered confidential, will necessarily become known to a wide non-official audience.
>
> The avowed object is to establish direct contact between our officials and people whose aim is to influence public opinion.
>
> It will be obvious that the same machinery will lend itself, in the very measure in which it is successful, also to the inverse process. Outside opinion will seek opportunities, and may find them, to influence the judgment and attitude of our officials.
>
> Both processes may be healthy and may remain harmless. There is however, to my mind, a distinct danger that the reverse may happen. There is the danger that the machinery may be so used as to degenerate into a kind of press bureau on the model of that set up in the German Foreign Office. There is the other danger that private interests may use the machinery to direct the policy of the Foreign Office into channels specially fertilizing those interests.
>
> In both cases the danger is the more serious because the officials are likely to be chiefly recruited from among the junior and more inexperienced and more irresponsible of the members of the service. No service is without its faddists. A large field will be opened to their activities.
>
> I may exaggerate these dangers. But I feel bound to call attention to two facts which cannot be overlooked: (1) The manner in which the foreign policy of the government should be presented to the country, and public opinion educated truly to appreciate it, is so important a factor in the conduct of foreign affairs, that only the Secretary of State himself—or some one specifically authorized and instructed by him to this effect, is really able to discharge this difficult duty without risk of embarrassment to the government. Discussions of foreign affairs require to be approached with every kind of special precaution. It may be desirable in regard to some particular matter, to take the public into the fullest confidence. At other moments such a course might be highly dangerous and even lead to

51. Treasury Officer; member of the Financial Section of the British delegation at Paris, 1919.

52. Classical Scholar; member of Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, 1918-19; scholar and specialist in international relations.

53. Finally six volumes.

54. Michael Palairet, Paris, to Campbell, Foreign Office, Aug. 16, 1919, FO 608/152. See also Wilfred Knapp, 'Fifty Years of Chatham House Books', *International Affairs* (50th anniversary number), Nov. 1970, pp. 139-140.

55. Zara S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1891-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 139-140.

war. Junior officials not always fully informed, and without responsibility, are not the most suitable exponents of grave matters of foreign policy to the outside world.

(2) Apart from the peculiar difficulties attaching to the discussions of foreign affairs particularly, there is the general question of authorizing the permanent civil service to break one of the fundamental rules of its constitution by ventilating not only official information, but their own private opinions on the affairs which they are called upon to conduct in accordance with their official instructions. It is an innovation of a rather serious kind, and I feel that before the matter goes further, it ought to be referred to the Secretary of State for his views and decision, and that pending such decision, we officials should not be asked to engage ourselves in any way.

I do not wish to appear determined to oppose the scheme, which is favoured among others, by Lord R. Cecil. My desire is that the matter should be carefully weighed on its merits by the responsible authorities and ultimately by Lord Curzon and Mr. Balfour themselves. No doubt they will wish to hear Lord Robert Cecil's views first.

The Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, and Superintending Ambassador at the Peace Conference, Lord Hardinge, shared Crowe's distrust and added his own assessment.

I may be old-fashioned but the scheme does not please me. I have been brought up in a school where it was considered irregular to discuss or criticise, outside the walls of the F.O., the policy of the Govt in foreign affairs for which the S. of State is solely responsible to the Govt. I still hold these views which seem to me to be incompatible with membership of the members of the F.O. & Diplc Service in the proposed institute.[56]

Curtis did his best to rescue the proposed institute before it was sabotaged by the heads of the Foreign Office. He wrote to Crowe on the 26th:

I entirely agree with you that a ruling should be obtained as soon as possible on the position of Officials with regard to the scheme. As you are aware Lord Robert [Cecil], when at the Foreign Office, formed views on this subject & I take it that before any decision is made some opportunity will be given him of recording his opinions. I hazard a guess that it will be found that existing regulations scarcely cover the case which is to some extent a new one & that the whole matter will have to be thought out afresh. I understand for instance that officials are members of the Royal Geographic Society, where frontiers are freely discussed, & a ruling which would involve their retirement from existing societies would naturally be considered with great care.[57]

Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, felt that the papers should be sent to Lord Curzon, the Lord President of the Council in London, for a decision.[58] It had already been decided that Curzon would take over as Foreign Secretary when Balfour had finished his work on the Paris treaties. It was soon evident that Curzon shared the doubts of Crowe and Hardinge about Foreign Office participation in the Institute. He informed Balfour on July 28:

I have studied this very difficult question on which it is your wish that I should give a decision.

Without risking to disparage an enterprise which is clearly inspired by the most excellent motives, I cannot help feeling serious doubts as to the wisdom of going the full length contemplated by its promoters.

To allow individual members of the Foreign Office to join a Society, whose main object is the free interchange and propagation of opinions upon matters connected with the business of the Department, would seem to me to be subversive of discipline and derogatory to the authority of the Secretary of State.

I cannot subscribe to the view that the Secretary of State and his staff are separate entities. Surely the latter are the servants of the former, and whatever views they may express within

56. Minutes by Crowe, June 26, 1919, and Hardinge (undated), FO 608/152.

57. Curtis to Crowe, June 26, 1919, FO 608/152.

58. Sir George Clerk, Paris, to Sir Ronald Graham, London, Aug. 1, 1919, FO 608/152. Curzon was Acting Foreign Secretary in London while Balfour was in Paris.

the four walls of this building (where little if any restriction is placed upon their liberty of thought or expression) I do not consider that they are at liberty without the express authority of the Secretary of State, to ventilate them outside. He ought in my judgement to be (with the exception of the Prime Minister) the sole mouthpiece of the Government in matters of foreign policy, except in so far as he may choose, in particular cases, to delegate this function to others.

The attitude of the Foreign Office towards the 'Institute of International Affairs' should be one of helpful sympathy. We should be ready to receive and consider any information they may offer, or views they may propound, and we should supply them, whenever we properly can, with anything they may desire from us. But to allow individual members of the staff to assume the obligations—however slender—entailed by membership of the Union would, in my opinion, be contrary to the best traditions of the Service, and, in the long run, prejudicial to the public interest. For these reasons I should feel very reluctant to give it my sanction.[59]

Balfour was less certain than Curzon about the demerits of the scheme. He minuted that:

I am (with some doubts) inclined to agree with L[ord] C[urzon]. At any rate *in existing circs* I do not think it would be right for an outgoing S. of S. to override, in such a matter, the opinion of a man who is doing his work.[60]

Hardinge harboured no such hesitations: 'I am very pleased with the decision taken', he minuted. Copies of Curzon's minute were sent to Cecil and Curtis.[61] Cecil's reply was brief—and cold: 'I am afraid I must express profound disagreement with this minute', he replied. 'I am sure that the conception of the Foreign Office, that it is the private property of the Secretary of State, is incompatible with any real confidence in it by the public'.[62] Curtis wrote a more elaborate and tactful rebuttal. He pointed out that no scheme or constitution for the organisation of the Institute had yet been drawn up and he was sorry that Curzon had passed judgment on the Institute beforehand. 'We still presume that there would be no desire on the part of the S. of S. to record a decision as to the position of officials until he had a scheme before him.' Curtis outlined once again the purposes of the Institute and insisted that the founders were in agreement that it must be precluded 'from forming, recording or propounding any view on international affairs'. Indeed no member would be allowed to write to the press on Institute notepaper, or use its address. It would be a place for study, research and exchange of information. He compared it with the Royal Colonial Society, where Colonial Office officials followed the proceedings without ventilating their Department's views. However he was pleased that Curzon was willing to extend helpful sympathy to the Institute. 'I can assure you that this will not be accepted in a Pickwickian sense.' The organisation would be developed only on lines helpful to the Foreign Office and free from any embarrassing features. The founders hoped to learn unofficially from the Foreign Office the lines upon which the Institute, in the Foreign Office's view, could do useful work.[63]

Later Curtis re-emphasised the degree of Anglo-American support the proposed Institute had mustered at Paris. He added that, while Hardinge had not been invited to the first meeting, on the grounds that this might embarrass him, Cecil had asked Crowe to attend so that Hardinge could be kept fully informed. Although Crowe was too overworked to attend future meetings, his criticism on May 30 did make all those present aware of the need for a constitution which would confine the Institute within strict boundaries so that officials could attend its meetings. He hoped that Sir William

59. Curzon to Balfour, July 28, 1919, FO 608/162.
60. *Ibid.* Minute by Balfour (undated).
61. Minute by Hardinge on Campbell to Hardinge, Aug. 2, 1919, FO 608/152.
62. Cecil to Campbell, Aug. 7, 1919, FO 608/152.
63. Curtis to Campbell, Aug. 2, 1919, FO 608/152.

Tyrell[64] would attend the autumn meeting of the Institute committee which was to draft a constitution, in order to point out possible pitfalls, and that the Institute would then be acceptable to the Secretary of State. He also promised that a copy of the history of the Paris Peace Conference would be sent to the Foreign Office before publication in order to ensure that all material not in the public interest was erased. Tyrrell had already been sent a copy of the plan of the book and Temperley would keep in close consultation with Percy and Beer throughout. For his part Curtis insisted 'I have nothing to do with the account of the making of Peace . . .'[65]

The Institute was established in July 1920 and developed along the lines outlined by Curtis. It received its Royal Charter in 1926. Since the publication of *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* it has produced a large number of scholarly monographs on international affairs which have been of a high standard. Its annual *Survey of International Affairs* (now discontinued) had a wide appeal. Its quarterly journal, *International Affairs*, circulates extensively. It became, and still is, a useful forum for the discussion of a wide range of world affairs by academics, journalists, representatives of business and commerce, politicians—British and foreign. Ministers and officials, both from the Foreign Office and other departments, participate in Chatham House meetings and ministers occasionally introduce discussions. The Royal Institute of International Affairs has amply fulfilled the hopes of its founders.[66]

64. British representative on the Polish Commission at Paris 1919; Assistant Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, and Permanent Under Secretary 1925–28.

65. Curtis to Campbell, Aug. 20, 1919, FO 608/152.

66. See also Kenneth Younger, 'The Study and Understanding of International Affairs', *International Affairs* (50th anniversary edition) Nov. 1970, pp. 150–164.

BOOKS

THE ORIGINS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

*Roger Homan**

BY any standards, the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy and the forms of power which have replaced it are remarkable phenomena that deserve close attention and analysis. Shah Mohammed Reza had aimed to legitimise his power in a programme of modernisation expressed in a rhetoric of benevolence and patriotism[1] and had established it with the development of a well-equipped security force and the support of strategic allies in the Western world. His successors were, by contrast, unequipped in modern terms: their folk heroes had been exiled or executed; their communications were primitive; their legitimising ideologies in many ways disparate and in some cases ancient; their technology anachronistic. Whether perceived in Marxist terms as a revolution or in Islamic terms as a revival, the recent history of Iran is deserving of a larger and more serious analytical literature than the one or two books and few articles that have so far appeared. The Western news media have offered a daily commentary upon executions and disturbances, glimpsed the gauntlets thrown down in Paris by Khomeini, the waning loyalty to the Shah of his former allies, and his flight into insecure exile and death. That the complexities of social and political change underlying those appearances have been so little observed in the West is a consequence first of information control within Iran and subsequently of the virtual cessation of scholarly traffic.

The principal accounts of the demise of the Pahlavi regime were each written before the event of the Shah's removal from Iran in January 1979. Robert Graham's *Iran: The Illusion of Power*[2] attributes the problems of Mohammed Reza's last years to his basic inefficiency in state management, whereas Fred Halliday in *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*[3] accommodates his data within the iron laws of a plainly materialist perspective.

Halliday's work is thoroughly researched and his book closely documents the social, economic, political and strategic dimensions of the Shah's development programme: no other volume provides recent data on Iran in such range and extent. Nevertheless, the observable realities of the situation as it has unfolded do not support Halliday's interpretation as nicely as the evidence he adduces. His intellectual perspective disposes him to investigate and document the atrocities of SAVAK, the nature of relations with the United States, the arms economy and the growth and organisation of what he refers to as the Iranian working class. He undervalues the benevolent intentions of the Shah's 'White revolution'—a programme of national development inaugurated in January 1963 that included plans to abolish the landlord-serf relationship, nationalise forests, reform the electoral system and enfranchise

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1. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country* (London: Hutchinson, 1961).
2. (London: Croom Helm, 1978).
3. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979).

women, promote the sharing by workers of company profits and establish a literacy corps to enable compulsory education. Halliday dismisses the White revolution as a pretence by the Shah to pre-empt another Cuba. The frustration of the Shah's plan, however, was not secured by a working class striving for real revolution against the sham of reformism so much as by religious fundamentalists who perceived in Westernising tendencies a severe threat to traditional values in general and to the economic security of the Islamic intelligentsia, the *ulema*, in particular. In attempts to overcome and placate the faction that raised religious objections as well to certain kinds of sanitation as the ownership of land by peasants, the Shah blew alternately hot and cold—first accelerating SAVAK activities and then announcing the liberation of political prisoners. While Robert Graham sees in the Shah's management of affairs the full paradox of coercive democratisation—the difficulties of modernising the polity along with the economy—Halliday does not even credit the Shah with inconsistency.

The least plausible of Halliday's interpretations, however, is his denial of religion as a significant factor in the social changes that led to the Shah's fall from power. The folk heroes and leadership of the Islamic resistance are defined by Halliday in secular terms: Ayatollah Khomeini is presented as a leader in the bazaar, and the *ulema* as a faction of the intelligentsia. Again, Halliday regards the assaults upon banks and finance houses as the revolt of the urban poor against the rich—overlooking the fact that cinemas were also subject to attacks: the targets of violation and arson in late 1978 had in common a symbolism of Western civilisation, and the resistance to Westernising tendencies was legitimised in Islamic fundamentalism. In subsequent events, the centrality of the mosque, the mullahs and the ayatollahs, and the prominence of Islam in the naming of the revolutionary government and its institutions have rather given the lie to Halliday's thesis. While Fred Halliday was right in foretelling the fall of the Pahlavi regime (and Penguin have made a selling-point of the prophetic element in his book), the political regime he anticipated is not at all that which has been emerging.

Robert Graham, on the other hand, assesses the Iranian monarchy on its own terms—and finds it wanting. Graham's evaluations are concerned with the efficiency of Pahlavi government: he takes Pahlavi ideology as read and then asks what Mohammed Reza could have done to survive. The paradox of coercive liberalism is a persistent theme in Graham's account and he well elucidates the tensions that prevailed. He identifies in Shi'ite principles the source of resistance to some of the proposals of the White revolution, such as land reform and the enfranchisement of women, and he adopts the standard view that Shi'ism validates a form of nationalism antipathetic to the relationships with the West fostered and practised by the incumbent political elites.[4] He documents, too, the metropolitan-rural tension, showing the concentration of wealth, power and privilege in Tehran; and he gives an historical account of Mohammed Reza's political insecurity and the persistence of the outlawed Tudeh party. In this context, Graham argues, patience was the most necessary of virtues and the Shah's mistake was that he attempted to modernise too fast. After an economic boom in 1974 and the Shah's extravagant celebrations at Persepolis of 2,500 years of Persian monarchy, he accelerated his spending programme; the effect, says Graham, 'was like changing from first to fourth gear: comfort and control were sacrificed to speed'.[5] By mid-1976 expenditure overtook revenue and bottlenecks hampered the pace of development.

The economic and social inequities that bred rising political unrest in the late 1970s were observable in extreme in the half-hour bus ride from suburban Tajrish to downtown Tehran: the dynamic of the revolution existed in the complex opposition of

4. Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite in Iran* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971).
5. See Graham, *op cit.*, p. 19.

the communities settled round either terminus. In the south of the city aged and bent men struggled to their dying days as bazaar porters and the mullahs were thick on the ground. On the cooler mountain slopes to the north of the city there was no observable religious presence and the shops sold German foods and French cosmetics. In the bazaar the aspiration to dignity was realised in religious hope whereas towards Tajrish comfort was a material rather than spiritual consolation. The contradictions were simultaneously of religious and secular, of traditional and modern, of Eastern and Western, of proletarian and bourgeois, of the wealthy elites and the unpossessing. Halliday's approach is too exclusive an attempt to identify the dominant factors in this complex opposition.

In many ways the most cogent and comprehensive analysis and certainly the most concise and coherent is that in the tradition of mass society theory developed by Majid Tehranian[6]; this interpretation merits wider attention than it has hitherto received, being arguably the least palpably eclectic in the evidence adduced. Tehranian recognises the inevitable alienation from cultural roots engendered by the Western complexion of Pahlavi modernisation, and the generation in this process of a political and cultural elite with a secular historical consciousness[7] and a commitment to the systematic overhaul of the social and political structure. Tehranian elucidates three sociological consequences of modernisation in Iran: the atomisation of society; the bureaucratisation and centralisation of authority, and the homogenisation of culture. He documents an obsessive 'cult of the State as the embodiment of all that is true, good and beautiful'[8]: evidently 'Hamlet' and 'Macbeth' were banned because they showed the killing of a king. Intermediate social groupings such as the village community, the guilds and the tribes, the *khanegah* and *zurkhaneh*, the voluntary associations, were systematically destroyed without being replaced by modern institutions of participation. Tehranian concludes his estrangement thesis:

> In spite of its different ideological manifestations, the basic phenomenon is no different with Stalin or Attaturk or the Shah. If the tragic case of Iran teaches us one lesson, it is that the traditions of civility are inextricably tied to a country's myths, legends, archetypical heroes, religious beliefs and, yes, superstitions. To debunk them altogether in the process of modernization is to reject the possibility of all communication, and all civility.[9]

It is true that in Russia, Turkey and Iran tradition stood to be obliterated by the imposition from above of a modernity discretely perceived; modernisation was not envisaged as an evolutionary process but as the wholesale replacement of one set of conditions by another. But that is scarcely why the Shah failed. There is no iron law in political sociology prohibiting revolutionary change in the cultural dimension and the merit of Robert Graham's contribution is that it shows how nearly the Shah saw modernisation through. To varying degrees, the loyalties of an urban proletariat and peasantry are up for grabs; if these groups enjoy in sufficient measure the material benefits of modernisation, their allegiances to traditional ideology and institutions will weaken. Such at least is the lesson of Eastern Europe, in which the peasantry has been largely co-operative with political change—when treated well—if it has been intransigent when abused. The missing concept in Professor Tehranian's conclusion, then, is that of legitimacy.

The religious factor in the Iranian opposition remains a subject for discussion and its importance a matter for debate. Graham treats of it appreciatively: but while in

6. Majid Tehranian, 'Iran: Communication, Alienation, Revolution', *Intermedia* (March 1979), pp. 6–12.
7. See Zonis *op. cit.*
8. Tehranian, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

REVIEWS

CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967: Documents and Commentary. Vol. 3: Africa. By Rosalyn Higgins. *Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1980. 472 pp. £30·00.*

THE literature relating to United Nations peacekeeping is now quite considerable, comprising numerous studies of particular United Nations operations as well as studies of a more general nature. Useful as such secondary sources may be, the particular value of a comprehensive work setting forth the actual documentation is apparent. Rosalyn Higgins, has therefore offered a singularly important contribution with this series of volumes by providing an accessible and comprehensive collection of United Nations documents in connection with each of the Organisation's peacekeeping operations up to 1967. The documents are interlocked by lucid editorial commentary which serves to clarify particular points raised by the documents.

The first two volumes of the series (published in 1969 and 1970) addressed United Nations operations in the Middle East and in Asia respectively. The wide acclaim which is accorded to both volumes was reflected in their being awarded the Certificate of Merit of the American Society of International Law. This third volume concerns Africa and is devoted to the United Nations operation in the Congo from 1960 to 1964. Without question, the same standard of excellence is maintained.

Like its predecessors, the volume on Africa has been written primarily as a reference work, and this places particular importance on the organisation of the material. The format is identical to that of the first two volumes, with documents and commentary being divided into twelve analytical categories: introduction; enabling resolutions and voting; functions and mandate; constitutional basis; political control; administrative and military control; composition and size; relations with contributing states; relations with the host state; relations with other states involved; finance; and implementation. This structure facilitates easy reference to the materials included in the volume under review; it also encourages comparative analysis with the same facets of the different United Nations operations documented in the several volumes—which Professor Higgins believes may be the key to a real understanding of United Nations peacekeeping. Volume III also retains the very useful practice of briefly summarising the major events which fall within each of the analytical categories, thereby further facilitating reference to the sections which follow.

The focus here, as before, is on official United Nations documents and records. Professor Higgins recognises that certain problems are posed by limiting source materials in this way, but reasonably attributes the selection of materials to limitations of space. In view of the vast amount of United Nations material which exists, the selection and editing of such documents alone are considerable achievements. In addition, government statements issued at the United Nations as well as references to important national documents and other materials are also included.

Throughout the series, more obscure United Nations operations are not neglected in favour of those which are well known. This comprehensive approach is quite admirable, and to the scholar and practitioner, very useful indeed.

Volume III will, in any case, be of particular interest because of the significant place which the United Nations operation in the Congo has come to have in relation to peacekeeping. In experiencing all of the major problems inherent in peacekeeping, ONUC thereby highlighted the limitations with which peacekeeping in general must contend. By accurately unfolding the very complicated history of ONUC, this documentary account would be a valuable contribution even if it were not an integral part of a highly respected larger work.

The exposition of the United Nations operation in the Congo begins with an introduction which briefly describes the deterioration of internal stability, tribal violence, Congolese independence, mutiny in the army, foreign intervention, and the government request for United Nations assistance. The documents and commentary which follow thereafter record in some detail the involvement of the United Nations in the Congo, from the Security Council resolution of July 14, 1960, authorising the Secretary-General to provide the government of the Republic of the Congo with military assistance, through the extraordinary complexity of succeeding events, to the withdrawal of ONUC in 1964 and the repercussions with respect to financing peacekeeping which continued to linger thereafter. The successive analyses of different aspects of the United Nations operation leaves one with a closer understanding not only of ONUC, but of the strengths and limitations of peacekeeping in general.

The fourth and final volume of the series, concerning United Nations operations in the Balkans and Cyprus, is forthcoming. On the basis of the first three volumes provided by Professor Higgins, it is awaited with great interest.

London School of Economics, and Coudert Brothers RICHARD KENNEDY GUELFF

Trade Problems Between Japan and Western Europe. By Masamichi Hanabusa. *Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1979. 125 pp. £8·50.*

WHAT has morality to do with international trade? Moral qualities seem to feature prominently in the arguments between Japan and the West which have dragged on for the last few years. We accuse the Japanese of cheating; they accuse us of laziness. One wonders too what link there is between the often obscurely technical arguments (about, for example, the measurement of invisible exports) and the real world. Could either side prove its case? Would it make any difference if they did?

Mr Hanabusa very nearly succeeds in proving his case—which is that the problems are not Japan's fault—but not quite. His book is nevertheless a concise and fair presentation of that case and a valuable quarry of facts and figures. It is particularly illuminating reading for hardened exponents of the European view.

Sometimes Mr Hanabusa's figures speak louder than his words: for instance he slips occasionally into the Japanese myth that ' Japan's heavy dependence on imported raw materials makes it impossible to expand imports of manufactured goods ' (p. 81). But elsewhere (see Table 2.4) he shows that Japan's dependence on imported raw materials (given by the ratio of SITC 0-4 to GDP) is little different from that of most West European countries (Japan's ratio in 1977 was 6·6 per cent; that of West Germany 5·1; the United Kingdom 6·1; Italy 9·0 per cent).

If Mr Hanabusa fails to convince entirely it is not so much because of rare (though revealing) slips such as that above but rather because the most important questions lie outside the scope of his book. His target is to persuade Europeans of the foolishness of protectionism; but to do this he will need to propose a solution to the worrying problem of why the world monetary system fails to bring about smooth adjustments to payment imbalances (Japan's imbalances are currently adjusted jerkily courtesy of OPEC) and how to solve the problems of declining industries. Instead Mr Hanabusa

exhorts us all to try harder. This is not a promising approach. If moral appeals are necessary to make an economic system work it is a sign that it has already failed. (The Japanese system is perhaps an exception.)

Strangely Mr Hanabusa does not use the one moral argument against protection that does have force in the West: that is that trade is in itself a worthwhile activity; one which is ' good ' since it raises welfare levels (enabling us to drive Japanese cars while they drink our whisky). But that is a rather un-Japanese thought: it certainly appears from Mr Hanabusa's book that, in his mind at least, ' trade ' is linked inexorably with ' problems ', a necessary evil to be kept to the minimum necessary to pay for one's raw materials. Perhaps this is the thought that lies behind Japanese resistance to foreign manufactured goods.

ROBERT COOPER

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The Study and Teaching of International Relations. Edited by R. C. Kent and G. P. Nielsson. *London: Frances Pinter. 1980. 358 pp. £15·00. (First publ. New York: Nichols, 1979.)*

THIS book has grown out of the University of Southern California's (USC) United Kingdom Graduate Programme, which runs Masters courses for a range of military, diplomatic and business personnel. It attempts to relate the substance of this particular international relations programme to the approach used to teach it to such students. The substance covers seven areas of international relations from methodology, through international organisation and foreign policy analysis to regional studies. In Section I each contributor has offered a view of the intellectual development and current methodological state of their respective area, and then written a piece for Section II about the problems of teaching it to mid-career students. There are other contributions also, which describe the USC Programme's curriculum and student reactions to it.

This is both an ambitious and a rather limited book. Its aim, in integrating approaches to the study, with approaches to the teaching, of international relations is commendably ambitious. The taboo in the discipline on discussing the problems of teaching, as opposed to the problems of intellectualising, is still powerful and some of the confessions in Section II may well encourage the rest of us. One is less sympathetic to the editors' excitement that both they and their mid-career students are constituents of those very transnational forces that their programme is analysing: foreign diplomats, officers, etc., being given perspectives on world society by an alternating group of academics. No book requires this all-done-by-mirrors trick to justify itself.

The genuine limitation of the enterprise, however, is that it is linked so specifically to this one programme. Far too many pages are taken up with material and reminiscences that can only be of interest to those who have participated in the programme. Even in the more general sections we are belaboured chapter by chapter with the special needs of mid-career students, their ' real-world ' background and—in a number of places—the somewhat alarming notion that they are being ' retooled ' for a change of career development. The analyses of teaching problems in Section II, in fact, generally fall short of expectations. With all the modest disclaimers the contributors write into their introductory paragraphs, it is still disappointing to see discussion slide back and forth between evaluative impressions of the *students*, of the

substance and of the actual *teaching techniques* involved. Like the rest of us, all of the contributors have got something to say about the students, but not all have something to say about the presentation of their material.

The real value of this book, therefore, is tied up in the first section where the contributors have written competent reviews of aspects of the discipline. There are other works that do this, however, and the ground will be familiar to most teachers of international relations. But whether borrowed or not, there are some interesting organisational schemes which try to make sense of the multiple paradigms which now characterise the discipline. It is a pity that this coherence is not sustained in relation to the book's more ambitious designs.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne MICHAEL CLARKE

Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans. Edited by Elmer Plischke. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute. 1979. 456 pp. (AEI Studies 247.) Pb.*
Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy. Edited by Paul Gordon Lauren. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1980. 286 pp. £16·25.*

THE dispatches of Andrew D. White from Berlin in the 1890s were models of penetrating reporting; those of Thomas F. Bayard in London . . . consisted largely of pasted-up clippings from British journals. The foreign service has no place for the lazy man or the windy man ' (Plischke, p. 213). Nor, it might be observed, has the profession of scholarship in international relations. Of these two books Plischke is the Bayard, Lauren (in parts, though not consistently) the White.

Plischke's collection, consisting of papers most of which have been previously published, is arranged in seven sections: nature and development of diplomacy; changing diplomatic practice; democratic and open diplomacy; some dimensions of diplomacy; envoys ordinary and extraordinary; professionals and amateurs; functions of diplomats. Evidently the dividing lines between the sections are blurred, and the reader, particularly in the first half of the book, is constantly irritated by restatement of the same points by different authors in different extracts. Frequently one finds a reference in one paper to another authority, and then one arrives at a paper by that authority which contains both the reference and the context from which it is taken. Stock quotations keep on reappearing: the old one from Henry Wotton about a diplomat being sent abroad to lie for his country pops up in three different places. The book includes a few attractive anecdotal pieces by former practitioners. It also contains some information not readily available elsewhere, such as, for instance, that since 1940 one of every two United States chiefs of mission have come from California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania or the District of Columbia. But although it is called ' Modern Diplomacy ' it has a strangely old-fashioned air: of the forty papers twenty-six date from before 1970 and fifteen from before 1960. They are almost entirely descriptive and informatory with very little analytical comment; and one feels that if a book had been written about diplomacy instead of a collection made of things other people have written or said about diplomacy, everything that is printed here could have been included in half the number of pages.

Lauren's volume is also a collection of essays. In his case, however, all the essays have been specially written for the collection. The book may not have quite as much freshness as that fact might suggest, since many of the papers represent distillations of what their authors have written at greater length elsewhere. They are diverse in style, in method, and in quality, but they have a unity in diversity in that they have all been written in relation to a single theme.

The theme is that in the study of international affairs historians and political

scientists go their own separate ways to their mutual disadvantage and to the impoverishment of scholarship. In that flat form the case is perhaps overstated; and it is probably more true in the United States than in the United Kingdom where the study of international relations is still heavily influenced by history (and by philosophy) and where ' scientific ' approaches have made less headway. But even if in the context of international scholarship Lauren somewhat overstates the antipathy between historians and political scientists, it is regrettably true that they do not universally regard each other with mutual esteem. Several of the papers in this volume show how each can derive advantage from the work of the other. The use of historical data by political scientists Holsti and Small has already been referred to: the potential of political science for historians is illustrated in an admirable way by Samuel R. Williamson Jr who applies the organisational process model in his study of the Hapsburgs in 1914 and arrives at a set of most suggestive observations. The purpose of the historian remains different: he wishes to gain as clear an understanding as he may of how and why over time a succession of events occurred, but Williamson shows how he can enrich his understanding by the use of a political scientist's model, just as Small shows how the historian's work can lay the basis for the creation of generalisable data that can be used for the testing of hypotheses about the causes of war.

The book thus addresses itself to an important purpose. Significant contributions, in addition to those mentioned, are made by Alexander George and Richard Smoke among the political scientists and by Gordon Craig among the historians. Unfortunately the standard is not uniformly maintained. Roger V. Dingman appears to be hardly aware of any books written outside the United States (and Japan), and his study of one clause in the United States-Japanese treaty of 1951 reveals little understanding of any of the ' theories ' of alliance politics that he discusses. Samuel F. Wells Jr states that 'history and political science were a single field of study not much more than a generation ago ' (p. 269; *pace* Bentham, Hobbes or *The Federalist*), and in discussing history and policy he reveals little sensitivity to the dangers of historical comparisons or of the epistemological problems that lie at the root both of such comparisons and of the historian's art. But it is a rare collection indeed that maintains a consistently high standard, and there is enough here almost to justify its price. What is not acceptable at that price is a standard of proof-reading that lets through an error on every second or third page.

University of Lancaster P. A. REYNOLDS

Diplomatic Handbook. 3rd edn. By R. G. Feltham. *London, New York: Longman. 1980. 140 pp. Pb: £3·95. (First publ. 1970.)*

THIS is an exceptionally handy little book for all those concerned with the details of the practice of diplomacy; it is no coincidence that the author is the Director of the Oxford University Foreign Service Programme for trainee diplomats. In the first six chapters the author deals with the nature of diplomatic relations, the organisation and functions of ministries of foreign affairs, the role of the diplomatic mission, diplomatic procedure and protocol, diplomatic privileges and immunities, and the role of consular officers. In the remaining four chapters he offers useful, if sketchy, outlines of the United Nations, international organisations outside the United Nations, international law, and the nature of international conferences. Finally, there is a set of appendices which deals with a wide range of subjects, from the organisation of the Foreign Office to a guide on entertaining. This latter appendix reminds one of how formal diplomacy remains in its socialising role. Obviously, as in any such short handbook, there is the problem of dealing with complex subjects in a very summary fashion and thereby over-simplifying: however, this is to a large extent avoided in this book. Whilst it reflects a

view of diplomacy which many would see as outmoded, it must be evaluated as a handbook for practicioners and students interested in understanding the details of diplomatic procedure; as such it is a very useful and well-written guide.

University of East Anglia STEVE SMITH

Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of Credentials. By P. J. Boyce. *Queensland: University of Queensland for the Australian Institute of International Affairs. 1977. 289 pp. £12·95.*

IN some respects an overlooked aspect of international relations is the implication of the continued entry into the international community of new states—particularly those which fall into the micro-category which now constitute some 35 per cent of sovereign states, depending on the population criterion adopted. In this study Professor Boyce has made an excellent contribution to an aspect of this question in analysing the problems of weak political and administrative structures found in some, but by no means all, new states. His book falls perhaps within the boundary area between public administration and international relations, with chapters exploring issues such as disputed sovereignty; the problems of establishing and operating foreign ministeries; external representation; and the extent to which micro-states can meet international obligations. A useful ' scoreboard ' of new states is, incidentally, contained in an appendix.

Whilst there is much to the central theme concerning the constraints stemming from limited foreign policy machinery and representation, the relationship between perceived foreign policy tasks and organisational performance needs to be explored more fully. For example, a new state might find its representation interests in part adequately satisfied by having an embassy in a key capital largely staffed with naval attachés, whilst its external policy will invariably engage not only the foreign ministry but perhaps mean a dominant role for the commerce ministry, as well as involving banking and tourist organisations—often crucial in the small or new state organisational profile. Moreover, the decision-makers of new states are frequently selective in the extent to which they consider it necessary to attend or actively participate in international conferences. In short, organisational structures have to be considered not only against the domestic setting but the state's evolving external orientation and foreign policy requirements.

Nevertheless, this is a valuable book which draws upon a wealth of illustration. It is perhaps appropriate to remind ourselves of A. D. McIntosh's comment, cited in the closing section of Professor Boyce's book:

> In the field of external relations, no concessions are made because a particular country may be small or poor or lacking in experience in the conduct of its own affairs. In all international negotiations it is assumed that those participating are in every way equipped to present their country's position and to defend its interests. It's just too bad if they can't.

University of Lancaster R. P. BARSTON

International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-77: The United Nations, Organization of American States, Organization of African Unity, and Arab League. By Mark W. Zacher. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 397 pp. £13·50.*

COLLECTIVE security tends to be discussed in terms of its implications, its advisability, and the deduced prerequisites for its success. Mark Zacher, to his credit, has done

something rather different. He has made a thoroughgoing attempt to articulate a theory which would predict and, up to a point, explain when international organisations and their members are likely to exert effective pressure to stop one state attacking, or threatening to attack, another and to test that theory against the experience—since 1945—of the United Nations, the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Arab League.

His main thesis is that:

> the likelihood of organizational intervention and success in conflicts is significantly determined by the nature of the coalition configuration prevailing in the system in which a given conflict occurs, and by the affiliations of conflicting parties with the groupings that constitute this configuration (p. 206).

Success can be expected in two categories of cases. One is where members of an organisation share a consensus against aggression, or military interference in each other's affairs as, he would argue, is the case with the OAS (except where the victim is a regime thought to be Communist). The second is more complicated. In the absence of such a consensus, Zacher argues, members divide into a few (normally two) competing coalitions while still leaving some states unaligned, and success is likely only in cases where an unaligned member is attacked by an aligned member, since the latter's allies will press it to desist so as not to alienate the victim and other non-aligned states. This works well for the United Nations, so long as the aggressor is a former colonial power—as with Suez (1956), the Congo (1960), Cyprus (1963-64), and the second stage of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war—but not notably so in other cases. Zacher further hypothesises that organisations will intervene, unsuccessfully, in three other categories of cases: where a member of a coalition commanding a voting majority is attacked by a member of a rival coalition, or where a member of an outvoteable minority coalition is forcibly prevented from defecting, either (a) to the majority coalition, or (b) to a non-aligned position. Hungary (1956) is the only example he finds of a conflict falling into either of the latter categories. The other hypotheses are broadly confirmed after an examination of 116 conflicts since 1945, which necessitates determining, throughout that period, the major coalitions in the United Nations, the Arab League and, since 1963, the OAU—a mammoth task. Success rates for all four bodies—in terms of the proportion of conflicts among their members in which they successfully intervene—are low, ranging from 37 per cent for the OAS to 9 per cent for the United Nations.

Much of course, as Zacher himself concedes, depends on definitions—of ' aggressor ', ' coalition ', ' intervention ', and ' success '. It is unfortunate, then, that having defined ' intervention ' as requiring the passage of a resolution, he explicitly modifies this definition when considering the OAS, thus invalidating comparisons. Moreover, in consequence of this definition, one of the United Nations' outstanding successes, the Middle East crisis of 1958, is not counted as such because it was over before the General Assembly's Emergency Special Session adopted its unanimous resolution. It is odd, too—in view of its importance, and the claims that have been made for it—to find the Korean War relegated to one short paragraph, though I would agree with Zacher in not regarding it as a success for collective security.

In spite of these, and other, flaws (such as making China the original aggressor against India in 1962, and describing Lumumba as *President* of the Congo in 1960) combined with an unexciting and often far from lucid style, this is essentially a stimulating book. It is fruitful to conceive of collective security, not as an absolute commitment of states to enforce ' peace ' where necessary, but as a tendency (varying in strength) for those uninvolved in a conflict to bring pressure to bear to prevent breaches of a widely acknowledged norm; and it is worth showing, as Zacher does, that

in Africa, Latin America, and to a lesser extent among the Arab states, there is a fairly strong consensus against territorial annexation or secession (though Eritrea may prove an exception to the latter); but it is certainly not the last word on the subject.

University of Sussex RODERICK C. OGLEY

The United Nations and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States: Interpretations and Applications of the Non-Intervention Principle. By Goronwy J. Jones. *Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 1979. 275 pp. £12·95.*

ONE of the more important problems faced by the United Nations has been to judge the most appropriate manner to handle a variety of internal issues—political, military, economic and social—which have caused different degrees of international concern yet whichmember states claimed have been within their domestic jurisdiction and thus not open to international intervention.

Mr Jones's book is based upon a thesis he wrote for a higher degree of the Open University. The research is rather uneven: in some chapters he has used primary sources and in others he has relied largely upon secondary work. The main part of the book is concerned with the discussion of the domestic jurisdiction clause at the San Francisco Conference where the Charter of the United Nations was debated and approved, and then the subsequent practice of United Nations organs in the areas of human rights and colonial questions; peacekeeping operations; the regulation and reduction of national armaments; and economic and social questions.

Previous writers on Article 2 (7) have fallen broadly into two schools (with, of course, important shades of difference within them). Those who have argued that the United Nations should have favoured a static approach—that is that any action by the United Nations (except for enforcement activity by the Security Council under parts of Chapter 7) which exceeded discussion amounted to intervention in matters which were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. And those who favoured a more dynamic approach—that is that the United Nations could take any action in the domestic jurisdiction field which did not involve threats or compulsion if a state ignored a United Nations resolution addressed to it.

Mr Jones, however, believes that a third approach is more useful. He argues that the discussions at San Francisco ' reflect(ed) the desire of the majority of powers to make the domestic jurisdiction reservation subject to the interpretations of the sovereign state ' (p. 31) and that non-intervention meant no interference in any form. Therefore, he considers that the United Nations could take action in the domestic realm only if a state gave permission, or if a state ratified a new treaty which allowed some degree of international action, or if a resolution was of a general nature addressed to all member states and was within the purposes of the Charter, or if the International Court of Justice provided an advisory opinion in controversial cases, or if the Security Council took enforcement measures. Action in other circumstances involving claims of domestic jurisdiction was likely to lead to the embarrassment of states, the possible withdrawal of co-operation and the weakening of the United Nations.

One can argue that there are a number of important weaknesses in this view. First, as Mr Jones points out, the domestic jurisdiction clause was not free from ambiguity, and at the San Francisco Conference not every state was satisfied with Article 2(7). Secondly, each organ of the United Nations interprets its own powers and competence by majority vote and does not allow a member state to judge its own case. Thirdly, domestic jurisdiction as interpreted at the United Nations is a relative concept, the content of which is likely to vary over time depending upon the state of international relations; the size, political composition and mood of the particular organ at the time; the political popularity of the plaintiff, defender and issue at stake; and the awareness of

the precedents that might be established. And fourthly, as Mr Jones sadly comments, legal considerations seldom carry as much weight as political factors when states calculate their attitudes towards issues debated at the United Nations. Thus the discussion of domestic jurisdiction was always likely to be controversial and the United Nations consideration inconsistent.

Yet this is not to argue that the domestic jurisdiction clause has not offered a degree of protection against international intervention. One can conclude from Mr Jones's case studies that the availability of Article 2(7) has been a factor which has helped persuade a United Nations organ not to debate an internal issue which has become of international interest; on other occasions debate has occurred but no resolution adopted, and, on yet other occasions, resolutions have been adopted or delegated actions undertaken by the Secretariat that have taken account of domestic jurisdiction.

University of Lancaster DAVID TRAVERS

Regionalism and the United Nations. Edited by Berhanykun Andemicael. *Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana; Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff. 1979. 603 pp. $45.00.*

DURING the 1970s the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (Unitar) published a series of monographs on relations between regional intergovernmental organisations and the United Nations. Substantial extracts from some of them, usually in an updated form, have now been brought between a single set of covers together with a number of other relevant studies, most of the latter having been specially written for this publication. The resulting volume cannot be said to be more than the sum of its parts. But undoubtedly all its parts are very useful, based as they are on careful and detailed research, and some are valuable on account of their individual quality or the absence of comparable studies. Thus this book is of considerable worth.

Unitar's Executive Director, Davidson Nicol, contributes a chapter on the role of the Commonwealth within the United Nations. It is a straightforward and largely uncritical account which makes it all the more surprising that, almost in passing, he suggests that any state which shares Commonwealth ideals should be able to apply for full or associate membership. Then there are three chapters on the United Nations and political regionalism in developing areas. Aida Luisa Levin writes thoroughly on the Organisation of American States (OAS), albeit primarily in a legal vein. Relations between the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations are surveyed by the Editor in a worthwhile if cautious way. One of his points is that the OAU is most anxious not to offend its members, and that this limits its usefulness as a mechanism for conflict resolution. A similar observation is made by Hussein A. Hassouna in his useful discussion of the Arab League and the United Nations. He also has some particularly interesting material on the role of the Secretary-General of the League.

The next part of the book deals with the United Nations and economic regionalism in developing areas. Parley W. Newman, Jr has a very good chapter on its regional economic commissions and their relations with regional organisations. He says some very perceptive things about intra and inter-organisational problems, especially the latter. The Economic Commission for Latin America, for example, has been so successful in using the OAS for its own purposes that one government ' presumably that of the United States ' (p. 373) complained. Michael Haas, by contrast, while providing plenty of clear and useful information about three Asian organisations, is less interesting.

The book concludes with three chapters on the United Nations and European regionalism. Dr L. I. Lukin, of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, examines

its relations with the United Nations. His account is helpful as far as it goes but, being wholly uncritical, does not go far. De A. H. Robertson surveys the Council of Europe and the United Nations, and does so in a thorough, down-to-earth, but rather unexciting way. And John de Gara deals with the European Community and the United Nations. He offers some interesting figures and conclusions. At the 32nd (1977) session of the United Nations General Assembly, for example, the Nine held no less than 242 meetings. But, in the words of someone whom he quotes, their spirit of co-operation ' often seems greater in New York than in Europe ' (p. 575).

The most lively chapter in the book, however, is the first, where Sir Peter Smithers, a former Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, takes a synoptic look at international organisations dealing with economic and social matters. He argues that the present system is very disorderly, and that as a single world-system is developing it must be dealt with as a whole. He therefore calls for the radical reform of the United Nations but insists that, like other international organisations, it must remain under the control of its member state. However, for this to happen states themselves must reorganise their decision-making processes in regard to international issues. His writing is spirited and iconoclastic, and he makes some particularly telling comments on a variety of questions. For example, he says that the ' present lack of control over secretariats competing with one another is responsible for a considerable part of the confusion and uncontrolled growth of inter-governmental organizations ' (p. 49). To identify the problem is not to provide the remedy, but Sir Peter's remarks deserve close attention.

University of Keele ALAN JAMES

Beyond the North-South Stalemate. By Roger D. Hansen. *New York, London: McGraw-Hill for the 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations. 1979. 328 pp. $12.95.*

Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order. By Robert L. Rothstein. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1979. 286 pp. £11·60. Pb: £3·10.*

ROGER HANSEN'S book, *Beyond the North-South Stalemate*, contains a broad survey of the present state of what is now termed the North-South dialogue, together with a carefully argued set of proposals for improving the relations between the two groups of countries involved. The author believes that the chronic stalemate can and should be brought to an end. In order to achieve this, a new approach is needed on both sides, but particularly from the rich industrial countries: ' Chronologically, psychologically, diplomatically, it is time for a Northern response . . .' (p. 8). The main single reason why a major change in attitudes is needed is said to be that ' rules that have governed the behaviour of states in the international milieu for centuries are no longer congruent enough with the global system and the needs of Northern and Southern states to be followed except at very high cost to both parties ' (p. 286). The evidence for this rather dramatic view of the world is set out, to my mind sketchily and unconvincingly, in Chapter 2 of the study. This is followed by two lengthy chapters on the prospects for the North and the South in the next ten years, while the rest of the book is concerned with the various ' strategies ' which the author perceives as being open to the two sets of countries, concluding that a blend of the ' global reform ' and ' basic needs ' strategies could form the basis of a new and fruitful relationship.

This broadly familiar argument is set out clearly and deliberately, in an unvaryingly calm and fair-minded manner. Yet the study is marred by four defects, which in increasing order of seriousness are as follows. First, it makes rather tedious reading, since it is a good deal longer than it need have been and is written in depressingly ponderous academic prose. Secondly, a surprisingly naïve conception of economic

analysis and relationships is revealed at a number of points—most notably, perhaps, in the references (pp. 175–76 and 204) to an imaginary body of doctrine labelled ' neo-classical ', in which among other things distributional questions are ignored. Thirdly, a touching faith is implicitly shown that recent work on the problems of the developing countries and the international system has now made it possible for the first time to specify a workable set of internal and external policies, including ' refocusing development strategies ' (p. 55). Fourthly, a similar confidence is apparent in the potential capacity of the governments of North and South, once they decide to act in concert, to achieve ' the novel objective of managing global agenda problems ' (p. 312).

One of the many good points which Professor Hansen makes is that ' There is much room for improvement in procedures ' in North-South discussions (p. 14). The actual conduct of negotiations between these two groups of countries forms the main subject-matter of Robert L. Rothstein's informative and readable study. It reviews for the years 1974–77 the course of the negotiations held under the auspices of UNCTAD on commodity problems, centring on the UNCTAD-sponsored ' Integrated Programme '; it considers the reasons why so little was achieved in these negotiations; and it draws some possible lessons from this experience for the future conduct of North-South relations.

Global Bargaining thus has both a negative and a positive side, and as is usually the case the former is both more interesting and more convincing. Rothstein gives a perceptive account of what happened, together with a convincing diagnosis of the reasons for failure. Three factors in particular are mentioned. First is the neglect of uncertainty, the tendency to maintain the fiction that the problems are well understood and that only one view of them is possible. A second factor was the lack of concern with implementation—the attempt to restrict the debate to issues of principle, without much regard to whether the parties were agreed on the likely actual consequences of a given course of action. A third theme is the way in which the attitudes of the two sides, together with the group system of negotiation which has become established in UNCTAD, affected the agenda of the discussions in ways which reduced the likelihood of agreement. There is a good analysis—highly critical but not unsympathetic—of the role and performance of the UNCTAD secretariat and of its Secretary-General in particular. Throughout the book a lot of emphasis is rightly given to the fact that widely different perceptions of the issues and problems are held with deep conviction.

Given the defects of the present attitudes and procedures, and given also—an assumption which Rothstein shares with Hansen—that it would clearly be in the interests of both parties if the negotiations between North and South were more fruitful, what changes might improve the prospects for success? Rothstein's suggestions fall under two headings, institutional reform and ' the quest for rules '. Some good points and interesting proposals are made under both, though the analysis is to my mind somewhat weakened by the questionable notions that the rich countries are very largely concerned with efficiency and that the poorest countries would not benefit from freer trade. Here and at some other points the underlying economic assumptions strike me as rather shaky. However, I believe that the author's generally sombre conclusions are fully justified. In any case this is an original, stimulating and useful book.

University College, London P. D. HENDERSON

Political Leadership in NATO: A Study of Multinational Diplomacy. By Robert S. Jordan. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1979. 316 pp. $20.00.*

IN the Introduction to this book its author takes pains to state what the book is *not*. ' It

is not a book on NATO, nor is it a book on international organisation. It is not a history of European politics nor an analysis of East-West relations. It is not a study of nuclear politics . . .' (p. 1) and so on. He is right. It is none of these (though all these themes appear in the book).

Professor Jordan also states what he thinks the book *is*: ' a study in diplomacy ' and in particular ' of individuals and the impact of their personalities and vision on international events ' (p. 1); a work going ' beyond an analysis of NATO as a political system, or as a military coalition, in order to portray the secretaries-general as individuals within that system ' (p. 18). The trouble with the work is that it isn't any of these things either. It consists of four separate essays on the first four holders of the office of Secretary-General of Nato. These tell us who the individuals were, where they came from, what qualities they brought to their work in Paris and Brussels, what transpired during their tenure and what part they played in those events. To be sure, this material is preceded by the Introduction and followed by a short concluding chapter entitled ' Can the Office transcend the Organization?'; but by no stretch of the imagination do these amount to more than prologue and epilogue. In fact the author's claims should really be stood on their heads. Essentially the book portrays the secretaries-general as individuals within the system *without* going beyond this to a more searching analysis of Nato as a political system or as a military coalition, and *without* attempting *wider* reflection on the role of personality in Alliance politics. Accordingly it is best judged as a set of essays in biography rather than on any other terms.

Considered in this light, the book is excellent value. Each of the personal portraits is sensitively and sympathetically drawn. New information and new insights are proffered concerning numerous episodes in the Alliance's evolution. The different ways in which Ismay, Spaak, Strikker and Brosio contributed to the shaping of developments in Nato, and were in turn influenced by the experience, are carefully delineated and judiciously assessed. In short, any student of Nato can turn to these pages confident that he will emerge with a richer understanding of the first twenty-odd years of the organisation's history.

Particularly rewarding are the reminders in these pieces that most of the issues which have exercised the minds of Nato policy-makers and planners in recent years have clear antecedents in the Alliance politics of the past. In 1951-52 Lord Ismay was telling the North Atlantic Council that ' we cannot do our business except on a *global* basis ' and his final months in office saw him seeking to develop non-military consultation and co-operation along the lines recommended by the ' Three Wise Men ' (Pearson, Lange, Martino). In the later 1950s and early 1960s Paul-Henri Spaak was worrying about a growing tendency for important business affecting security to be handled by ' summitry '; and also trying to stop worrying and learn to live with French idiosyncrasy. In 1963-64 relations between Greece and Turkey—over Cyprus and other matters—were among Dirk Stikker's principal preoccupations, overshadowed only by the debate on the composition and control of the Alliance's theatre nuclear forces. In the later 1960s one of the things at which Manlio Brosio had to work hardest was the orchestration of consultation between the United States and the European allies on the conduct of strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Perhaps this is the greatest merit of Professor Jordan's undertaking. Through his skilfully composed biographical sketches he succeeds in showing that in Atlantic security affairs the more things have changed the more they have stayed the same.

University of Aberdeen DAVID GREENWOOD

Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses. By Dennis H. Wrong. *Oxford: Blackwell. 1979. 326 pp. £12·00. Pb: £4·95.*

Power, Capabilities, Interdependence: Problems in the Study of International Influence. Edited by K. Goldmann and G. Sjostedt. *London, Beverly Hills: Sage for the Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). 1980. 300 pp. (Sage Modern Politics Series Vol. 3.) £11·25. Pb: £5·50.*

POWER remains a central concern of political scientists, students of international relations, sociologists and the more realistic of economists. Both of the books reviewed here offer much on the subject, treat it as a ' dispositional ' concept and draw basically upon Bertrand Russell's definition—' Power is the production of intended effects '. Apart from such similarities of basic view, the two volumes are markedly dissimilar and are likely to appeal to quite different readerships.

The earlier chapters of Dennis Wrong's *Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses* provide a wide-ranging review of competing views of power and an interesting discussion of its various forms. Wrong's own argument is in favour of the use of the term ' power ' as a generic concept covering a variety of relationships and situations in which it is possible to discern ' the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others ' (p. 2). Such ' power ' should, moreover, be viewed as a ' dispositional ' phenomenon—emphasising capacity—rather than as an ' episodic ' phenomenon tied to specific behavioural events or outcomes. Such a dispositional view is, it is argued, essential if ' power ' based upon the ' anticipation of reactions ' by the subordinate(s) is to be accomodated.

In application, any form of power will, according to Wrong, be defined by its extensivity—how many subjects are affected; its comprehensiveness—how many areas of activity are covered; and its intensity—how strong is the effect on the subject(s). Power may also assume diverse forms—force, manipulation, persuastion and authority—both coercive and legitimate. In empirical situations various forms of power may be associated or fluctuate—particularly in the case of coercive and legitimate authority.

The latter chapters of *Power* constitute an excursion into the sociology of political groups, democratic politics and the psychology of power acquisition. These have only a loose connection with the conceptual discussions in the earlier part of the volume and this, combined with the book's undue length and idiosyncratic coverage, will diminish its usefulness for students of international relations.

Goldman and Sjostedt's *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence* is an edited volume of papers addressed directly to international relations. Power is the focus of the first half of the book. Here, a number of good points are made, if in a rather laboured and repetitive manner. Of considerable value is the emphasis placed upon the complexity of power relations in the contemporary international system and the doubt cast upon the validity of attempts to construct a model of the overall power structure.

The second part focuses upon the now fashionable notion of ' interdependence '. Here the reader will find sound, if fairly conventional, discussions in which Reynolds and McKinley highlight the serious imprecision and diversity of contemporary usages of the term, and Klaus Knorr casts timely doubts upon the more exaggerated recent statements about the profound effects of growing international interdependence. Subsequent papers offer interesting, if again rather laboured, discussions of the notion of a state's ' autonomy ', the relationships between multinational corporations and smaller industrialised nations, and the effects of relatively low power resources upon the foreign policies of smaller states. In his concluding remarks, Gunnar Sjostedt also proposes the use of ' manipulative theories of bargaining ' (as developed by Schelling), rather than more formal, orthodox theories of bargaining, for the study of international

negotiation: a study which would emphasise the role of processes involved in the structuring of negotiations as well as bargaining within structured negotiations.

Overall, while not constituting a text book, *Power, Capabilities, Interdependence* should offer the general student of international relations much of value on ' power ' and ' interdependence ', if not deterred by the laboured style of some of the papers.

University of Reading R. J. BARRY JONES

Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Application. By Oran R. Young. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1980. 172 pp. £7·25.*

THIS is an extremely interesting and stimulating book; in the long run it may turn out to be a very important work. In it, Young sets out to analyse compliance, focusing specifically on international relations. The reasons for undertaking such a study are spelt out in the Preface where Young states that the origins of the study lie in doubts he has about certain widely shared beliefs concerning international relations. He has not felt comfortable with the argument that the fundamental problems of the international system are due to the absence of centralised institutions. Nor does he totally accept the view that international law, because of the absence of enforcement mechanisms, is not really law. These doubts have led him to the topic of this book: why do individual actors comply with or violate the rules of international society?

The starting-point for Young's study is the assumption that international society is not unique but is a member of the set of highly decentralised social systems and therefore shares certain common problems with regard to the phenomenon of compliance. Thus, the book consists of three parts: the first is concerned with outlining a special theory of compliance; the second applies this to international politics; the third is concerned with more general statements about compliance. In a preliminary chapter Young introduces the problem of compliance; in any social system actors have the choice of whether or not to comply with behavioural prescriptions (rules, laws, moral standards and social norms). For Young there are two interesting issues raised by this problem: what are the factors that govern whether actors abide by behavioural prescriptions? How do public authorities approach the problem and how do they elicit compliant behaviour from groups of subjects? On the one hand then, Young is concerned with the issue of compliance in general—that is not specifically in the political realm. On the other, he is, given his doubts about common assumptions regarding international relations, most interested in the problem of compliance in highly decentralised social systems.

In the first section, Young outlines a ' special ' theory of compliance, in which he examines the ways in which actors assess the reasons for and against complying with a behavioural prescription, and the problem of compliance in the international system. With regard to the calculus of the individual actor regarding compliance, he notes that the main reasons for compliance are self-interest, inducement, enforcement, social pressure, obligations, and habit. When applied to international society he notes that compliance is normally seen as being difficult to achieve, yet he sees no *a priori* reason to expect this; although there are reasons why compliance might be more difficult to achieve—the ambiguous nature of the rules in international society and the characteristics of the actors—he points out that the level of compliance is not strikingly low. In the second part of the book he examines two case studies drawn from international society—the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention. He argues that these two case studies show that high levels of compliance can be achieved in international society despite the absence of centralised institutions. In the final part of the book he returns to the general

problem of compliance and centres his discussion on the ways in which public authorities deal with the problem of compliance; the chapter that concentrates on this issue is an excellent discussion of the ways governments trade-off the costs of achieving compliance against the social costs caused by non-compliance.

In summary this review cannot hope to do justice either to the range or to the subtleties of the arguments contained in this book. It is a most stimulating discussion of one of the major problems of international society. Although the book tends to lack direction towards the end—a concluding or summarising section would have been most useful—it is concerned with what has been, and remains, the central structural paradox of international society: in an anarchical society why do actors comply with ambiguous behavioural prescriptions? This book goes a long way towards answering this question; it deserves to be very widely and closely read.

University of East Anglia STEVE SMITH

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation. *London: Taylor and Francis; New York: Crane, Russak for SIPRI. 1979. 462 pp. £14·00.*

International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional Aspects. By Ashok Kapur. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 387 pp.*

THESE two volumes are, coincidentally, complementary to each other, one being concerned almost exclusively with political aspects of proliferation and the other almost exclusively with technical considerations. Both volumes appear to have been inspired by the 1980 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, though to what audience they are addressed remains obscure in both cases.

Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation is the compendium of papers given at a multinational SIPRI symposium in Autumn 1978, and suffers from all the strengths and weaknesses of such compendia. There are twenty-one papers reproduced, spread across twelve chapters. The volume begins by examining fuel cycles, continues with reactor design and control mechanisms, takes in the Carter Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (complete with sixteen appendices to ch. 14 summarising the provisions of the Act), and concludes with an examination of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives (PUNE) and reactors in satellites. Many of the papers are, inevitably, highly technical. Although the authors of these papers attempt, usually with a high degree of success, to make their papers intelligible to the layman, they are clearly directed to different audiences than the less technical papers. Many of the papers appear to have ' political ' overtones. Even to the layman, unable to make technological judgments, some of the technological claims appear to have a greater basis in nationalism than in nuclear physics. As one author succinctly notes, ' each participant in the technical discussion tends to start from a predetermined viewpoint . . . This can hardly be considered a free and objective technical discussion ' (p. 262).

The object of the technical papers is to indicate means whereby nuclear energy can be allowed to develop without furthering the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To this end several aspects of ' proliferation proof technology ' are examined. In several areas—for example, fuel cycles and reprocessing—it appears that weapon proliferation, even if it cannot be prevented, can be made appreciably more difficult by the adoption of one technological ' route ' to nuclear energy rather than another. However, having pointed out technological ' solutions ' the symposium failed to address itself to the

rather critical areas of political will, compensation for thwarted economic aims etc. Thus, all the fond hopes for technology control, no matter how fervently expressed, contribute very little to the overall debate. Although the volume neatly and conveniently gathers together some technical arguments and information, it does not face the altogether different, and questionably more difficult, political problems.

The editors of the volume appear to have interpreted their remit very lightly. No attempt appears to have been made to eliminate repetition, thus one loses count of the number of times that the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) safeguards or the INFCE is described. Perhaps the strangest editorial decision is in the location of the final chapter—one of two chapters written expressly for the volume. Having struggled through 373 pages of the finer points of reactor design, fuel cycles, etc., the final chapter sets out the basic notions of nuclear energy production and the alternatives available. At that position in the book the chapter serves no useful purpose whatsoever, but as an *introductory* chapter, establishing the parameters of the discussion, it could make the early technical chapters more meaningful and easier to assimilate. The volume, as one has come to expect from SIPRI, is extremely well documented and contains a glossary (at the front) and lists of abbreviations, acronyms, units and conversions (at the back!).

International Nuclear Proliferation has the advantage of being penned by a single hand. It is refreshing to find a treatise on proliferation written from an unashamedly Third-World viewpoint. The penalty is that it appears to be oversensitive to, and overconcerned with, issues of discrimination—to the point of seeing the American position as bordering on racism.

Professor Kapur addresses himself to three central issues—the nature of the proliferation process, the future of the NPT regime, and the future of proliferation as seen by the potential proliferators. It is the national perspective that Dr Kapur sees as being critical to the proliferation issue, as it is the specific concerns of the state that will determine whether proliferation occurs or not, rather than the more ambiguous ideals concerning the security of the international system as a whole. Essentially the book is, as its author claims, ' about perceptions and misperceptions ' (p. 25). Throughout, the author is at pains to emphasise the complexity of the issue—that proliferation does not take place as a consequence of a single, simple decision, but as a result of a complex inter-action amongst decision-makers, competing both amongst themselves and in the international political arena. The volume divides into two sections. The first part is concerned with proliferation as a phenomenon. The first four chapters establish the nature of the diplomacy of proliferation and non-proliferation and indicate the difficulties involved in the process. Chapter 5 examines the political and technical problems of nuclear safeguards.

By contrast with the sophistication of analysis established in the first five chapters, the case studies of the second part of the volume are, in the main, disappointing. They fail to make systematic reference to the conceptual studies of the first part and they tend to be heavily historical and discursive. This is especially true of Chapter 8 on south Asia which discusses only India and Pakistan. (Pakistan appears to be Professor Kapur's Achilles Heel—he tends to be unduly dismissive and condescending.) The chapter on South African nuclear diplomacy stresses the diplomatic value of acquiring the nuclear option, and suggests that the acquisition of a weapons capability might either erode or destroy the diplomatic leverage to be gained from being a near-nuclear state. This chapter is, perhaps, one of the best in the book, examining and exhibiting the subtlety of arguments used by the Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWSs). Chapter 10, on north-east Asia, whilst discussing Japanese security perceptions at length, only marginally links these perceptions to Japan as a potential proliferator.

The book is anti-American in tone, and tends to use India as the yardstick by which

potential proliferators are to be judged—for example, Chapter 11 on Latin America. Somewhat surprisingly there is no examination of the Middle East in the case studies. Israel is mentioned *vis-à-vis* South Africa and India, but one would have thought that if Brazil and Argentina merited specific examination then Israel might have warranted similar treatment.

Of the two volumes Professor Kapur's is the more subtle and tendentious and for the student of international relations it is the more valuable. Anyone reading both of these volumes will emerge well informed on both political and technical aspects of proliferation. However, it might be more economic of time and energy to derive the same material from the more concise sources available in the literature.

Glasgow College of Technology ROGER CAREY

Conflict and Intervention in the Third World. Edited by Mohammed Ayoob. *London: Croom Helm. 1980. 261 pp. £12·50.*

THE question is whether the great proliferation of sovereign states in the world since 1945 has made dangerous conflict easier or more difficult to control. It has certainly made the concept of intervention less useful. As T. B. Millar writes at the beginning of the first chapter of this book ' All conflict between states is intervention . . . When we speak of intervening in a conflict we are speaking of intervening in an existing intervention.'

The last thirty years has seen the virtual disappearance of the recognised imperial overlord, one of whose functions and self-appointed duties was to deal with tribal conflicts. Today the major powers have, however, assumed a similar role: they intervene in or seize the opportunities offered by the continuance or renewal of those conflicts, which, because the actors have now become separate states, have been elevated to the status of wars at the international level. The difference and perhaps the advantage, from the point of view of long-term regional stability, may lie in the fact that the great powers seem to be finding it increasingly difficult to control of effectively manage over a long period particular Third-World countries.

The seven case studies in this book scarcely needed selection. Indo-China, the Middle East, Cyprus, the Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa—embracing separately Rhodesia and South Africa—picked themselves. The emphasis is generally on the local quality of such conflicts and their persistence. The main argument between the contributors is whether local circumstances or deliberate external influences are the predominant factors in stimulating violence.

Intervention by the super-powers emerges, as much less consistent—more intermittent—than is commonly supposed. It is not clear, however, in spite of J. D. Millar's assertion in his Foreword (p. x), whether it is truly selective, in the sense of choosing particular targets, or simply opportunist within the framework of a set of general priorities. What does emerge, as he says, is the shrinking significannce of Britain in this respect as a former imperial power. Unfortunately the case of France is not really tested and might well turn out differently in parts of Africa.

The case of South Africa, as analysed by D. T. Goldsworthy, stands out partly because there is not yet a war there in the ordinary sense, but it is a situation with global ramifications because racial, ideological, and economic roots of conflict coincide. The apocalyptic character of some of the scenarios described might, with greater prescience about Rhodesian developments and the emergence of Zimbabwe, have been modified, as might references to attempts to install in power ' safe ' African leaderships.

Whatever the defects of the case studies, however, and some of them are not only better but more original than others, there is at least a serious attempt, both directly by

T. B. Millar and obliquely by most of the rest of the contributors, to tackle the question of legitimate intervention by democracies. Its Earlier publication might even have helped to sharpen and make more realistic the debates on Iran and Afghanistan.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

Problems of Contemporary Militarism. By Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee. *London: Croom Helm. 1980. 414 pp. £14·95.*

HALFWAY through this collection of essays presented under the aegis of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, we hear the crack of Michael Howard's whip: ' militarism has become a term of . . . general illiterate abuse ' (p. 181). At the beginning it might have checked the wordy proselytism of one of the editors, Marek Thee, who manages to tell us that ' under the term militarism, I subsume such symptoms as a rush to armaments, the growing role of the military . . . in national and international affairs, the use of force as an instrument of supremacy and military power and the increasing influence of the military in civilian affairs ' (p. 15). Militarisation he defines more simply as ' an extension of military influence to civilian spheres, including economic and socio-political life '. The ritual incantation of the military-industrial complex being made, after a sticky opening the essays come to life, though the delicately nurtured reader is advised to ignore a new rude word—' armamentism '—and the assertion that the term ' military ' derives from the Latin *milit*, a soldier, these in an excellent attempt at conceptual clarification by another IPRI scholar, Kjell Skjelsbaek. Amongst some lucid studies of Marxist and non-Marxist approaches to militarism, the concluding essay by Julian Lider sets Michael Howard against an unnamed Soviet analyst: ' [by militarism] we mean simply an acceptance of the values of the military subculture as the dominant values of society ': ' the militarised-state apparatus is the weapon of the whole monopoly bourgeoise ' (p. 173). The resultant exposition is both elegant and informative.

There are some surprises; Ernie Regehr draws attention to the conclusion of Stephen Ambrose (of *Rise to Globalism* notoriety) that the military itself is not a convincing scapegoat for the rise of militarism in North America. Further on, we read of the downward trend in the frequency of war over the years 1966–76; Istvan Kende who demonstrates this and other truths in his study of local war since 1945 is not, however, one lightly to jump to conclusions: ' the phase of regression of wars . . . coincides more or less with general acceptance of the principles of peaceful co-existence and the realisation of certain elements of detente . . . without wishing to demonstrate a casual (*sic*) relationship between detente and the threat of war, I believe, nevertheless, that there is a certain relationship between the two phenomena ' (p. 269).

There is a fair amount of mutual back-slapping by the various writers and one of them in a list of forty-four recommended further readings mentions himself thirty times. But Richard Falk lets his well-conceived maps tell their own grim story in his contribution on militarism and human rights, and at the very end of the book Melton Leitenbeg gives us a tantalising introductory note on threats of the use of nuclear weapons which whets the appetite for the larger study he promises us.

This collection of essays, then, is very much a Scandinavian open sandwich; some parts are tasty, a few dull, but the whole better than the parts.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

A New International Commodity Regime. Edited by Geoffrey Goodwin and James Mayall. *London: Croom Helm. 1979. 237 pp. £11·50.*

THE adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the twin Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, in May 1974, ushered in not only a continuous process of international negotiations but also a wide-ranging debate on the economic and political problems involved in a radical restructuring of the international economic system. In this debate the question of the reform of the existing commodity arrangements has occupied the central place. *A New International Commodity Regime* is a contribution to this debate. It is divided into two parts: Part 1 examines the current state of commodity markets and looks at the pressures for change; Part 2 concentrates on various responses to these pressures and possible solutions to the question of security of supply.

James Mayall in ' The Pressures for a New International Commodity Regime ' traces the genesis of the present debate and analyses the Group of 77's bargaining postures and strengths in what he sees as an attempt at a constitutional reform of the institutional order. He concludes rather soberly, but correctly, that the Integrated Programme of Commodities negotiations will not lead to any dramatic restructuring of North-South relations. Stuart Harris in his contribution attempts to bring some clarity to what he considers a confused discussion. He highlights the tentative nature of much of our knowledge on the behaviour of commodity markets and the imprecision of currently available analytical tools. In attempting to construct a reasoned case for a new international commodity regime he argues that equity, as well as efficiency, must be a primary objective. The other papers in this section concentrate on international commodity negotiations. Alister McIntyre, the Director of UNCTAD's Commodities Division provides a summary of the current state of commodity negotiation (of course somewhat dated). This is followed by four appendices. The first reproduces the agreement reached in March 1979 on the ' Fundamental Elements of the Common Fund '; the remaining three discuss respectively the stabilisation of wheat and coarse grains, tin and copper.

Part 2 begins with a paper by Geoffrey Goodwin on the response of the industrialised countries to the Group of 77's demands. Goodwin's analysis shows the evolution of thinking within this Group and the manner in which a graduated response to the 77 has developed. The major division between exponents of laissez-faire and those favouring a dirigiste approach although still relevant is less important than previously. The remaining papers in this section—by Fry on the scope for co-operation between existing market institutions and international commodity agreements, Hindley on Third-World policy towards the mining industry, and Shelp on private sector investment and political risk—are concerned specifically, albeit in different ways, with the relationship between private-sector activities and any future international commodity regime.

This is a useful book which should be of interest to all those interested in the NIEO. It is particularly welcome in that the contributors show an awareness of both the economic and political aspects of the debate. Although mainly reflecting Western concerns it is an informative and interesting contribution to this subject.

University of Sussex MARC WILLIAMS

The International Economy and the National Interest. By Irvin Millman Grossack. *Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press. 1980. 253 pp. £10·50.*

IN common with many works on this subject, the author's starting-point is the inability of the economic theory current in orthodox, especially Anglo-Saxon, circles to make sense of international economic relations. Nevertheless the canons of academic good form are duly observed in the first few chapters. The offer curve approach, Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo make their dignified ceremonial appearances as the author establishes quite clearly that he deals primarily with economic analysis. There is in this book no similar exposition of the essentially political concept that constitutes the second part of its title. The author leaves the term ' national interest ' undiscussed save to say that ' This assessment emphasizes the economic welfare of the individual nation ', adding that, ' Furthermore, as an economist, I feel constrained to remain in my area of competency ' (p. 6).

The value of this book for its readers will therefore lie in its attempt to illuminate the relationship between international trade and investment. The accounting approach employed, notably in Chapter 6, does help one to visualise and expose for analysis the complex web of transnational transactions that constitutes the core of international corporate business activity. As the author states:

> My objective in this chapter is to develop an accounting approach that can consider trade and factor movements together. This will be done by redefining ' international transaction '. As now used, this term refers to transactions between individuals or organisations located in different nations. We argue that a more relevant definition is that an international transaction is any transaction between individuals or organizations of different nationality, regardless of their location (p. 71).

This is an interesting idea. The problem is, of course, that while location is an unambiguous geographical concept and, as long as states command a reasonable degree of territorial integrity, a clear juridical category—the concept of nationality is protean. One obvious difficulty concerns the loyalty, motivation and behaviour of economic actors in international affairs. Corporations, ideological organisations and even families may be directed from one central decision-taking location yet employ various nationalities of convenience by which to pass assets and liabilities,. claims and obligation back and forth from one nationality to another. It is for this reason that some discussion of national, sub-naional, sectional, class interests, and all the other collective and public goods ideas that economists have recently begun to explore, would have been much to the point in this book.

On the credit side, however, the exposition of firm ' A 's activities in country ' B ' is clear and concise. Moreover, when the writer turns to contemporary and historical commentary he is able to make some telling points. For example:

> It is widely thought that England, when in 1846 it eliminated its tariffs on food imports, thereby sacrificed its agriculture on behalf of its manufacturing sector. When it started to make massive loans abroad, specifically to countries and sectors that were competitive with its own manufacturing industries, it may have sacrificed its manufacturing sector on behalf of its money-owning classes and financial institutions (p. 173).

Bristol Polytechnic FRANK GARDNER

A Multinational Look at the Transnational Corporations. (An international collection of academic and corporate views on the future of transnational enterprise.) Edited by Michael T. Skully. *Sydney: Dryden Press. 1978. (Distrib. by Australiana Publications, Caterham, Surrey). 278 pp.*

MICHAEL SKULLY is rightly concerned about cultural domination of the literature on multinationals by the United States and has collected together papers, many of them previously unpublished, by authors from a wide range of backgrounds—including American, European, Japanese and Australian businessmen. This variety of contributors must have made the task of the editor a difficult one. There was never a chance that all the contributors were going to produce neatly argued papers meeting Western academic criteria. Some of the papers are, indeed, quite lamentable if viewed as contributions to the secondary literature, but may be of use in class discussions as primary documents written at the high point of international concern about multinationals between 1974 and 1977. This said, the editor is much to blame for directing all but a valiant minority of dissident authors to speculate about the future rather than comment on the recent past, and for allowing a sloppy text to reach the press. The book is a rich quarry for misprints; Warren J. Keegan, for example, appears to have been attending a phenomenal synposium in the Breton woods (*sic.*) (pp. 24, 31n, 26) when the other kids were learning to spell. We are referred to the *World Journal of Trade Law* (*sic.*)—no date, no volume—for the previous publication of a useful piece on the Middle East by Lawrence Franko, and so it goes on.

But for three of the twenty-seven papers the book would be of negligible academic value. Robyn Lim, of the University of New South Wales, offers an account of the activities of multinationals in the Philippines since the imposition of martial law in September 1972. The message is the familiar cry of the dependency school: there has been growth without development, and such growth cannot be long sustained. However, the case is well put, with an avoidance of stock arguments and references which is rare in what has become a somewhat incestuous zone of the literature. It also provides useful information on a country which, to this reviewer, appears under-represented in other publications on multinationals in the Third World.

Also useful are papers by W. D. Breit on Australian-based multinationals (reprinted from the *Journal of World Trade Law*, no date) which offers a persuasive analysis of the effects on capital movements of the economic policies of the Whitlam government, and by J. Wilczynski of the University of New South Wales (from *Acta Oeconomica*, 15, 3-4). The latter is a well-informed piece detailing areas in which Russian and Czechoslovakia have established a technological lead, noting current licencing arrangements for the production of ' Comecon designed ' products in the West, and speculating about the possibility of overseas production by Comecon enterprises in future.

Three out of twenty-seven is not a high score. As Mr Skully observes, ' the book will undoubtedly find its own level ' (p. ii).

University of Warwick CHARLES JONES

Tourism: Passport to Development? Edited by Emanuel de Kadt. *Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank and UNESCO. 1980. 360 pp. £5·95. Pb: £2·50.*

OVER the last fifteen years, tourism in Third-World countries has experienced considerable growth and has become a service industry of some significance in many small developing countries. Nevertheless the literature on this topic has been sparse and not easily accessible. Yet ' tourism ' as a topic is of interest, not only because of its practical importance but also analytically—if only because it is an ideal subject for an

interdisciplinary approach. The costs and benefits of tourism are not merely economic: the impact of a tourist industry on a country has obvious cultural, sociological and political dimensions as well.

This book is based on a World Bank/UNESCO Seminar held in December 1976: its practical orientation can be inferred from its sponsorship; nevertheless it is a well-balanced collection of essays of a theoretical nature and empirical case studies: all focusing on appropriate policies by Third-World governments towards the encouragement of tourism in their countries. The introductory chapters are written by Professor de Kadt who reviews the main arguments in the book as well as drawing on other literature on the subject. There follow a number of papers on ' Planning and Political Economy ' and ' Tourists, Hosts and Culture '. The case studies deal with a wide range of countries embracing different levels of development, cultures and political systems. Many of the contributors emphasise that not only the value of tourism but the type of tourism to be offered must depend on the political objectives of the state and that many of the alleged disadvantages of tourism—for example, its distributive effects, the extent of foreign control—are equally, attributes of other industries. The multinational corporation, however, has particular functions in tourism not only as the supplier of knowledge and managerial skills but also because of the need for a world-wide marketing service. Perhaps the most distinctive attribute of tourism as a service industry is its impact on international relations at the most micro level: that of the individual. It is not just that the nature of the industry as a purveyor of luxury goods for foreigners to enjoy within the producing economy is an encouragement to the hostility of the low-income local residents: also the indifference shown by visitors to the local culture—which is to some extent encouraged by the tour operators—leads to misunderstandings and further hostility. The chapter on ' Tourism for Discovery ' describes an interesting experiment in Senegal to overcome these failings and which also ensures that some of the benefits of tourism do fall on the rural poor.

All in all, this is an interesting and useful book: if some of the theoretical chapters seem to be stating little more than common sense, it is common sense not easily thought of and apparently often, learned the hard way.

University of Bath E. HORESH

Quest for Survival and Growth: A Comparative Study of American, European, and Japanese Multinationals. By Anat R. Negandhi and B. Rajaram Baliga. *New York: Praeger; Konigstein: Athenäum Verlag for the International Institute of Management. 1979. 163 pp. £15·75.*

BETWEEN 1974 and 1976 senior executives of subsidiaries of 124 multinational corporations operating in six Third-World countries were interviewed at length. The emphasis was on the character and causation of conflicts in relations between companies and governments, and to fill out and balance the corporate view, fifty senior officials from host governments and chambers of commerce were also interviewed.

The details of method and analysis, including the interview guide and full results of statistical operations carried out on the data, are collected at the end of the book leaving a brief text of some hundred pages in which the authors report the results of their investigation and set ment in the context of the secondary literature.

The equation of conflict with discrete incidents or crises (called, somewhat mysteriously MNC—environmental-unit conflicts ' for the sake of brevity ') leads to relative neglect of the longer-term structural problems created by multinationals for the Third World through, for example, their influence on patterns of demand for branded consumer goods and their use of capital-intensive processes, even though

these may lie at the back of surface conflicts. We find that conflicts centre most commonly on the level of equity participation. Beyond that, Latin Americans are concerned about manipulation of transfer prices and Asians about indigenisation. The most crisis-prone firm turns out to be the 100 per cent owned subsidiary of a United States parent engaged in extractive operations. This is not a great surprise.

Perhaps the most interesting facet of the study is the explanation it provides for the disproportionately high propensity of United States firms to foul up their relations with hosts. In Malaysia, the Americans blustered against indigenisation laws while the uropeans made a show of compliance. The Americans got their knuckles rapped, even though they employed *more* Bhumiputras than the European colleagues. Elsewhere, American firms tried to stir up public debate on the justice and wisdom of government policy and exhibited in public a romantic but unrealistic desire for consistency in government policy. In short, the Americans appear to wear their hearts upon their sleeves, and it is this, and not distrust or fear of their mighty parent-state, that seems to land them in trouble.

The study is weakest when it attempts to relate the data collected in the debates current in the secondary literature. Here the authors have not allowed themselves sufficient space for adequate discussion.

University of Warwick CHARLES JONES

The Sociology and Politics of Development: A Theoretical Study. By Baidya Nath Varma. *London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1980. 219 pp. £9·50.*

PROFESSOR VARMA begins his book with a general chapter on the scope of modernisation and the criteria for evaluating the modernisation process. This is followed by the general paradigm of modernisation and a description of the author's own model for it. The problematics arising from various models are then examined with a discussion of ideological, social science and activistic theories, and a brief analysis of the actual responses to them of developing countries. The ingredients of activistic theories of modernisation, which are the focus of the book, are dealt with in a separate chapter. The main features of modernisation theory are summarised in terms of the guidance they provide to decision-makers on the economy, the political machine, education and the bureaucracy. The concluding chapter ' Modernisation for What?' sets out the author's personal views in what he calls a ' humanistic manifesto for modernisation '.

A summary of the organisation of the material cannot do justice to the breadth of Professor Varma's scholarship and the skill with which he has illustrated his subject. In spite of the wide range of the ground covered he carries the reader along with him, helped by the conclusions at the end of each chapter and the comprehensive summary in the Epilogue (pp. 139–74). His case is that the developing countries can reach modernisation through capitalism or socialism, both with the objective of advanced industrialisation. The capitalist model, is described by Max Weber as ' the creation of goal-seeking men, who produce a growth product, called " society ", through rule-guided behaviour ' (p. 142). In this framework the market is the model for currency circulation as well as the creation of wealth, status and power. The Marxist model is based on the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, dictatorship of the proletariat, reorganisation of labour for higher social production, planning and social pride. Professor Varma discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the two models in terms of the modernisation achieved in the United States, Soviet Union, China, Japan, and India. The results shown in the table summarising their performance (p. 173), are somewhat surprising. China and Japan lead in annual

growth of gross national product per head; in food production per head all five are doing well with the United States just ahead of the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union, China and India lead in energy production. As comparisons take no account of imports, figures for energy consumption per head would give a very different picture from those for energy production. For Professor Varma the important point is that for the first time the developing countries can choose their path to modernisation. The choice depends on whether they place a higher value on the greater equity, justice and freedom of capitalism, or on the more rapid improvement of the conditions of the poor in a socialist regime, where however, ' freedoms take longer to achieve ' (p. 174).

RICHARD BAILEY

The New Political Economy of Development: Integrated Theory and Asian Experience. By Kurt Dopfer. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 342 pp. £20·00.*

THE author is a practitioner of economic futurology at the Swiss National Science Foundation, Berne. His argument is that the study of development needs a particular style of argumentation. The style would be ' holistic ', a word much in current fashion. I think it means non-specialised. So there are two problems at once. What is development? Dopfer seems to mean any improvement which any organisation (or in his language ' system ') might want. Secondly, does he encounter the actual problems of getting away from monistic thinking, that is, the use of rules and models? In fact Dopfer is very dependent on his models: population, socio-economic, political and ecological, which he takes to establish a system with causal relations such that prediction then becomes possible.

Dopfer sees that politics is about the confining of action by sets of rules and that it must have some relationship with his other systems, demographic, ecological and so on. The relationships he is interested in have to be ' causal '. But he excludes political factors when he gets round to discussions of the other systems, like population or income differentials (*e.g.*, p. 159). He seems to know that the non-market allocation of welfare is important and that these things have something to do with politics. Unfortunately he assumes them away. Surely this is verbalisation not an explanation of relations let along an actual demonstration of causalities. He might say that his figure 16.1 about social welfare in multi-systems context—with policy linkages—does all that. Is it not in fact simply a graphic development of his own definitions? His discussion is, to use another of his favourite words, ' revealed ', in statements of this sort (p. 193) ' that welfare will be impaired by (1) an inadequate level of actually attained welfare '. Why does he bother to tell us that he is not going to attempt ' an excursus into the history of doctrines or the psychogenetic aspects of scientific discovery ' (p. 20)? It seems odd to conduct argument by giving impressive short titles to subjects you are not going to deal with. It is pleasant to be reminded of the political tag, I think, from Oxenstjierna, ' *Nescis, mi fili, quantilla ratione mundus regatur* ' (p. 271). One accepts his gloss ' However, not all accidents are equally accidental '. But to say that an ' exogenous variable set is, at least in part, quasi deterministic and, thus, the variables are quasi-exogenous ' (p. 271) is a pretty complete get-out. If we knew what the elements were and that they could be usefully measured we could no doubt actually be told the weight of the quasi, the determinations and the exogenes. We might at least be given some cases and told some stories. We are not. As for ' the Asian experience '; we are told that social mobility, education and information matter for ' Asian society '. I suppose most of us knew that already.

Institute of Development Studies, Sussex B. B. SCHAFFER

Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence. Edited by Jose J. Villamil. *Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press for the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex. 1979. 325 pp. (Harvester Studies in Development, No. 2.) £14·95.*

Transnationalism in World Politics and Business. Edited by Forest L. Grieves. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon. 1979. 217 pp. $17.50.*

THESE collections of readings present a most interesting contrast. Despite the similarity of subject-matter, for both cover the impact of transnational corporations (TNC's) on the world economy, the role of the World Bank, problems of development and its meaning, each embodies the thinking of a distinct ' school of thought '. The Villamil volume is representative of recent work done by the ' Dependence Cluster ' at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, and is entirely in the tradition of the ' Dependencia ' school. The volume edited by Grieves consists of ten papers, plus an introduction by the editor, all by political scientists working in universities in the United States. It is noteworthy that the Grieves volume begins with a paper by J. Martin Rochester entitled ' The Paradigm Debate in International Relations: Data in Search of a Theory ', because the two volumes illustrate competing paradigms. Both are self-referencing and concerned with internal debate rather than with external challenge and comparison. Further, both tilt at straw-men: in the Grieves volume the ' traditionalists ', who focus on the nation-state as the only important actor in international relations theory; and the ' Modernisation perspective ' (the view that less-developed countries can blindly follow the example of the industrialised West) in the Villamil collection.

The volume edited by Grieves attempts to view international relations from a transnational perspective based on the suggestion that new actors have emerged in modern world politics and are dominating the international economic system. The section ' Transnational Ties ' concerns the TNC and includes a pessimistic view of the possibility of the control of TNC's by codes of conduct (P. G. Bock) as well as an unusual analysis of the transnationalisation of domestic policy, using social security policy as a case study (Richard L. Siegel). Section III examines OPEC and the impact of the oil embargo on the Netherlands, whilst Section IV contains four papers on development, imperialism and penetration, concerning the policies of the World Bank; imperialism as a transnational system of privilege; ' Hostage Capitalism in the People's Republic of China 1949–57 '; and an analysis of East German penetration of Africa. The subject-matter consequently is varied and interesting.

The subtitle of the Villamil volume, ' New Perspectives on Dependence ' is apt. Deriving from the works of Sunkel (whose paper ' The Development of Development Thinking ' sets the tone for the volume), Cardoso and dos Santos, dependency theory is seen as a conceptual framework rather than a precisely articulated model. Dependency theory suggests that integration into the world capitalist economy has disintigrative effects on the peripheral countries in social, economic and cultural terms, for whilst an elite adopt the consumption patterns and life-style of the advanced countries, an increasing proportion of the indigenous population becomes marginal. The theory emphasises the structural relations between the ' centre ' and the periphery of the world economy, stressing the historical context of the transmitted pressures. There is a suggestion that the language barrier has played a role in distorting the true message of dependency theory (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, p. 33) and this volume is welcome because some of the key works have yet to become available in English. It contains fourteen papers plus an editorial introduction.

In view of the criticism that the Western model of development cannot be transplanted to the less-developed countries, it is interesting to note that three papers attempt to transplant the dependency model from Latin America to Africa. Langdon's

'Multinational Corporations and the State in Africa' finds that the Sunkel framework must be focused more explicitly on the role of the state if it is to be applicable to Black Africa as exemplified by Kenya. Whilst in 'Partners in Underdevelopment? The Transnationalisation Thesis in a Kenyan Context' Godfrey and Langdon provide strong evidence that the model needs substantial modification to accommodate the legacies of imperialism and the particular class structures of Kenya—but then conclude that 'it does seem to offer sufficient insight . . . to be worth carrying into further investigation' (p. 284). Other papers in the volume concern problems of technological innovation (Fuenzalida), mass communication (Rita Cruise O'Brien), militarism (Luckham), the state and multinationals (Fortin) and a case study of Puerto Rico (Villamil). Theoretical perspectives are given in papers by Sunkel, Valenzuela and Valenzuela, Sunkel with Fuenzalida, and Seers. The policy prescriptions are derived in papers by Oteiza and the editor. Oteiza analyses proposals for 'delinking' from the world economy and 'relinking' with it on more favourable terms. However, he recognises that autarky may not be feasible for smaller less-developed countries. The difficulty arises with the achievement of the internal adjustments which are required before successful relinking and despite the emphasis on 'collective self reliance', this remains nebulous. Villamil in the final paper (Planning for Self Reliant Growth) takes this a little further with a discussion of 'mobilisation planning'. The alternative strategy may be in the process of planning but does not yet seem to be fully formulated.

In summary, both collections are rewarding in the narrow sense of giving insights into different paradigms. Perhaps both would have been improved by a note of 'outside' criticism and questioning.

University of Bradford PETER J. BUCKLEY

To Feed This World: The Challenge and the Strategy. Edited by Sterling Wortman and Ralph W. Cummings, Jr. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1978. 400 pp. £17·50. Pb: £4·79.*

Food and Population: Priorities in Decision Making. (Report of a meeting of the International Conference of Agricultural Economists, Nairobi, August, 1979.) Edited by T. Dams and K. E. Hunt. *Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House. 1979. 192 pp. £8·50.*

THE first of these books is a cry of hope from two distinguished American agricultural scientists closely associated with the International Agricultural Development Service. They 'believe that new world capabilities offer a firm basis for hope that world hunger and the associated poverty can be alleviated' (p. xii). In fifteen chapters covering 431 pages they succeed in their stated intention of occupying the middle ground between academic specialists and the general reader. There must be some doubts, however, on the size of this middle ground. The authors would like their work to be read by decision-makers in the developing world, but few will have time to plough through this extensive, somewhat repetitious tome. If they did do so, the result could be some angry mutterings in the corridors of Third World agricultural ministries. For while the book addresses itself to administrators, it does not adequately address itself to the art of administration. The authors' sophistication in matters of agricultural technology stands in unhappy contrast with a naïveté on political and administrative matters. For example, the section on implementing the authors' prescribed 'Basic Strategy' avers that, 'Candidates to direct commodity programs should be well grounded in the technology required to raise productivity, should have the proven ability to lead, and should be dedicated to making the commodity system work to the advantage of producers and the nation' (p. 246). As if agricultural administrators were deliberately

selecting the incompetent and inept to direct their programmes. The agricultural service of developing countries often does not attract bright candidates with initiative and flexibility. But this is not due to an oversight.

This is more than a quibble since technically acceptable strategies that remain unimplemented are of limited value. The authors recognise this, and even argue boldly that ' External agencies should help those governments [and, by implication, only those governments] which have the will to help themselves ' (p. 410). But ' lack of political will ' is the perennial refuge of strategists who have failed to take account of realities outside their specialism.

This caveat aside, *To Feed This World* can be recommended thoroughly as a handbook on the technical possibilities for agricultural development. The first half reviews emerging trends on world food output, population growth, physical constraints on growth, and aid to agriculture, and concludes with position sketches of specific crops—rice, wheat, barley, maize, sorghum, millet, legumes, roots and tubers, etc—and of past development projects. Part 2 outlines a strategy for future development, learning from the technical (although not, as noted above, the managerial) mistakes of the past. The essence of the strategy is that if sufficient resources are brought to bear on the agricultural sector of developing countries, food production can be increased greatly and rapidly. The strategy is directed primarily to Third-World governments who are rightly seen as having the main responsibility for achieving this metamorphosis. There are chapters on land tenure, agricultural research, the provision of inputs, finance, marketing and adequate prices, and training. The final chapter deals with the responsibilities of the developed world to provide assistance in specific areas. Its call for increased aid to agriculture has since been reiterated by the Brandt Commission which argued for $8 billion of extra assistance to be provided *annually* to 1990 for agricultural development as part of a programme to eliminate world hunger. An argument that the British government, not least, has responded to by a heavy cut in the aid programme.

Food and Population is a much shorter (and more expensive) book. It reprints the papers, together with a record of the discussion they provoked, at a group of meetings on population and food which formed part of the 26th International Conference of Agricultural Economists held in Nairobi in August 1976. Editors always have difficulty ensuring that the papers they bring together between two covers add up to a coherent whole. This problem is especially marked in the case of collections of conference papers. *Food and Population* is no exception. While some of the seventeen substantial contributions are interesting and valuable, the book as a whole fails to convey any of the intellectual excitement of the Conference, or a sense of its purpose.

Overseas Development Institute, London
Institute of Development Studies, Sussex CHRISTOPHER STEVENS

World Change and World Security. Edited by Norman C. Dahl and Jerome B. Wiesner. *Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1979. 174 pp. £10·50.*

THIS fifth collection in the MIT Bicentennial Studies (the overall objective of which was to ' inquire how human beings might deal more intelligently ' with ' social and intellectual—mostly developments in science and technology—aspects of the world we inhabit ') is, properly, a distinguished contribution. The lectures, which form the content of the volume, were organised by an eminent academic panel and delivered by internationally famous and influential politicians, statesmen and diplomats. In this sense alone, the volume could hardly fail to interest, for it is as important to know who is saying things as it is to know what they said.

Each contributor—and collectively they represented a broad sweep by continent, occupation, discipline, and political persuasion in the Western world—addressed himself to the problems of change and security in today's world. The editors provide excellent prefaces to the lectures, identifying linking themes, compatibilities and contrasts. It was concluded that for the most part they were in accord mainly about the impact of science and technology but also about the need to find new ways of dealing with the world's problems outside the terms of the East-West ideological debate, and the present world structure. If any prescription emerged it was that boundaries and barriers should break down—for without it the potential for misunderstanding, aggression and hostility, as manifest in many areas of the world today, would increase.

The volume, for all the authors compatibilities, is a fascinating amalgam of mature analysis, prescription, and cautious—if not always convincing—optimism. From Robert MacNamara's somewhat Malthusian discussion of the world's population and the need for remedial action and David Hamburg's consideration of the potential to mitigate aggression (through, of all things, the use of television), to discussions by Roy Jenkins, Willy Brandt and George Bundy respectively of Europe, the Helsinki Accord, mutual and balanced force reductions and the cold war, and Georgi Arbator's and Frank Church's examinations of military aspects of United States-Soviet Union rivalry, the content is comprehensive indeed. If any one contribution from so many disparate contributions might be identified as beginning to get to the nub of the world's problems, it must be Roberto Campos's discussion of the new international economic order seen in contradistinction with political ideological confrontations.

By way of criticism of the volume as a whole, there was possibly too much emphasis on Western preoccupations, Western perspectives and major power ideological concerns for it to appeal to the student of world affairs—despite the background brief of the MIT planners. But the justification of any celebratory volume lies in the content, and as with so many studies which look at the present and into the future, the events of the past three years have largely overtaken predictions. How many of the contributors, one wonders, would welcome the chance of a rewrite in the light of recent events?

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure. By David K. Whynes. *London: Macmillan. 1979. £10·00.*

DAVID WHYNES has produced a provocative book. Its purpose is to suggest that the burden of defence expenditure is excessive for Third World countries, even though it is recognised that certain positive benefits accrue from a military establishment. The author concludes that ' civic action ' and ' social integration ' might make the burdens both more acceptable and more functional for the society concerned. The tenor of the volume may be discerned from the final paragraph, in which it is pointed out that in 1972 11,000 Egyptians died in war, when defence expenditure was 20 per cent of Egyptian gross national product, and yet, ' nearly 250,000 died from diseases of the respiratory and digestive systems. The moral is clear—guns kill in more ways than one ' (p. 152). The volume has many such observations, which are not, of themselves, incorrect, yet which fail to advance our understanding.

The volume is divided into an Introduction and a Conclusion, plus five substantive chapters dealing with The Growth of Military Expenditure; Defence and the Economy; Military Trade and Aid; Military Regimes, and Military Policy for Development. It is in the Introduction that the major weakness of the volume is revealed—the inadequacy of the definition of the Third World attempted on pages 4–5.

Here, every state outside the Northern Hemisphere, Oceania and Japan is deemed to be in the Third World, or—in the jargon of the economist author—an LDC. Thus Mr Whynes's arguments, observations, models and prescriptions have to be equally applicable to states as diverse as India, Argentina, and Upper Volta. Little wonder that we are frequently informed that the examples quoted are either not typical or not generally applicable. Whilst it may be possible for an economist to view Third-World states as a series of cloned units, to the student of international relations such diversity cannot be accommodated under a single heading—especially in regard to perceptions of national security.

Oversimplification bedevils the whole volume—for example, the view of arms races (p. 119); the two line explanation of the American military aid programme of the 1950s and 1960s (p. 86); the presentation of tables of statistics drawn from IISS and SIPRI sources with no comment as to the diverse assumptions upon which they were originally constructed. It may be that in attempting to put so much into so short a volume Mr Whynes has done himself a disservice. In attempting to cover such a vast area—academically and geographically—he has fallen prey to oversimplification and generalisation to such a degree as to detract from the validity of the study. A more selective approach might have avoided many of the pitfalls and produced a more effective book. However, this is an area where the literature is scarce and if, in attempting this brief overview, Mr Whynes stimulates more and deeper research, his volume will have made a valuable contribution.

Glasgow College of Technology ROGER CAREY

World Labour Rights and Their Protection. By James Avery Joyce. *London: Croom Helm. 1980. 190 pp. £10·95.*

THIS is a short (and expensive) survey of the international machinery for the protection of individual labour rights. The actual text is about 120 pages and, since it deals with the procedures under the United Nations Covenants and the European Convention as well as those of the International Labour Organisation, it is necessarily pitched at a simple level. Also, little is said about the rights themselves, other than to catalogue the formal provisions of certain international agreements.

Dr Joyce sees clearly that the full realisation of the objectives of human rights agreements requires a fundamental change from the present inter-state structure of international society. He is perhaps too optimistic that the achievements for the better protection of labour rights have done much to bring such change about. He regards human rights as a seamless web but he understates the inter-reaction of the various mechanisms of protection, for instance, the use of the ILO Conventions and practice in the interpretation of the European Convention and Social Charter. He has a tendency to run together the ideas of human rights and law. It is not the case, for instance, that the continuation of the Israeli presence in the occupied territories is itself a breach of human rights standards, or even unlawful, as distinct from the manner in which the occupation is conducted.

Although Dr Joyce writes well and with passion, it is not likely that this book will be the successor to the well-established books on international labour law. The most useful contribution is a series of case studies of nine countries where serious issues of denial of labour rights have arisen. However, they all are too general and insufficiently documented to be of much use to serious students of these matters.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

Less Than Slaves: Jewish Forced Labour and the Quest for Compensation. By Benjamin B. Ferencz. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1979. 249 pp. £9·00. $15.00.*

THE story of Benjamin Ferencz himself is remarkable enough. A law student in New York, a soldier in Overlord, he was transmuted into a war crimes investigator, an habitué of the concentration camps and ultimately assistant at Nuremberg to the deputy United States prosecutor, Telford Taylor (who contributes a trenchant introduction to his book). A specialist in tracking the SS *Einsatzgruppen*, Ferencz subsequently directed the Jewish Restitution Successor Organisation (JRSO), and finally the United Restitution Organisation (URO), ' the biggest legal aid society in the world '.

But the story he unfolds is not only remarkable, it is revolting. There is a loophole in the *Wiedergutmachung* or reparations programme enacted in 1956 by the Federal Republic to indemnify Nazi victims, both Jews and others, even after its 1967 amendment. Work performed by prisoners for private companies, or injury and suffering sustained thereby, were rejected as grounds for indemnification. Ferencz has led the fight against the great giants of German industry who, by pleading the legality of their wartime *corvée* or alleging ignorance of its implications, have successfully resisted any form of restitution in a sequence of actions before complaisant courts or by calculated inertia.

The case history of Friedrich Flick, who when he died was known as the richest man in Germany, may serve as a grotesque paradigm. Before 1939 he was close to, and a financial supporter of, Himmler and the SS. At Nuremberg he and his associates were indicted on the charge that the companies they controlled (including, ironically DAG or *Dynamit Nobel Aktiengesellschaft*, sired by the founder of the Nobel Peace Prize) had knowingly employed slave labour supplied (on payment) from concentration camps. Flick got seven years but served less. By 1963 *Dynamit Nobel* was again in full production of munitions for various countries, with Flick in the chair as an 80 per cent shareholder. When he died in 1972, his funeral attended by the *prominente*, Flick ' had paid the Jewish concentration camp inmates not one single cent '—and that in spite of years of negotiation involving such notables as the German-American-Jewish banker Eric Warburg and Fabian von Schlabrendorff, better known as one of Hitler's would-be assassins.

In a table printed as an appendix Ferencz demonstrates that the total sum paid to 15,000 odd claimants from forty-two different countries amounts to some 52,000,000 Deutschemarks, a trivial figure by comparison with the irrefutable evidence adduced by his and other organisations and the quantum of human degradation which it represents. At the head of the columns stand famous names, Krupp, I. G. Farben, Siemens. It is a pity that another table has not been printed to stigmatise the firms which, by collusion and sleight-of-law, have evaded even that mite of conscience-money. But their record is not available in this grisly but unforgettable chronicle.

RONALD LEWIN

LAW

International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht. Vol. 4: The Law of Peace, Parts VII and VIII. Edited by E. Lauterpacht. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1978. 571 pp. £35·00.*

THIS, the fourth of the volumes of the collected papers of the late Sir Hersch

Lauterpacht, edited by his son, Mr E. Lauterpacht, is the last of the volumes devoted to the Law of Peace. It consists of Part VII (pp. 5-92), dealing with state responsibility, and Part VIII (pp. 95-563) dealing with the law of treaties. The editor tells us, in his general preface (p xi); ' There remains for publication in the next volume only his significant contribution to the law governing disputes, including the jurisdiction of the International Court, and the law of war and neutrality.' The superb scholarship which has been displayed in the four volumes published to date is likely to evoke a high degree of anticipation of the fifth.

Chapter 1 of Part VII (state responsibility) contains a hitherto unpublished opinion which Lauterpacht gave for the *Nottebohm* case, *Leichtenstein* v. *Guatemala*, ([1955] ICJR. 4). In that case the court, not without some criticism, used the concept of ' genuine connection ' as a factor determining the obligation of one state to recognise the validity of a naturalisation by another. This concept has now found legal acceptance, at least in theory, in Article 5 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958 which provides that: ' There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship [*i.e.*, between the state and the ship to which it has granted its nationality and flag] in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control . . . over ships flying its flag.' The large scale use of ' flags of convenience ' by certain maritime states—for example, in the shipment of oil—does not, however, suggest that the ' genuine link ' principle has yet found universal acceptance.

Chapter 2 of Part VII contains another previously unpublished paper of Lauterpacht namely, the amended draft of the legal submissions he prepared for the United Kingdom in the *Anglo-Iranian Oil* case, Preliminary Objections ([1952] ICJR. 93)—which it appears he completed in about ten days. It is an impressive piece of legal argumentation and likely to be of considerable value to the student of that part of international law which deals with the treatment of alien property. Lauterpacht's draft is in some ways unique as being a full exposition of his views of the traditional law on that subject as it stood before the era of challenge to the sanctity of foreign property which has unfolded since 1945. In that unfolding, it may be ventured that the *Anglo-Iranian Oil* case can now be seen as an important landmark.

The greater part of the volume under review is taken up by Part VIII, devoted to the Law of Treaties. The editor sets out, in his preface to this Part (pp. 95-96), the background to the reports (as they appear in Chapters 1 to 18) prepared by Lauterpacht, in 1953 and 1954, when a member of the International Law Commission.

The law of treaties had been one of the topics which the Commission chose as ready for codification, at an early stage in its work, and when Lauterpacht succeeded Professor Brierly as special rapporteur in 1952, he prepared two fresh Reports which were published in the Commission Yearbooks for 1953 and 1954 respectively. Lauterpacht's successors, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Sir Humphrey Waldock, continued and completed this series of reports providing the basis for the draft articles on the law of treaties which eventually became the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. Four outstanding British jurists had, therefore, contributed to that outcome.

In the chapters which comprise the various portions of Lauterpacht's reports to the Commission of 1953 and 1954, the editor first sets out the relevant articles as they now stand in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 and then the draft articles as prepared in Lauterpacht's reports, together with his original commentary and notes. The reader thereby gains a clear view of the development of Lauterpacht's thinking about the law of treaties and is able to appreciate more fully his contribution to the modern law of treaties. Indeed Lauterpacht's formidable and elegant erudition in the law of treaties is apparent throughout Part VIII of this volume.

This volume provides a fascinating and impressive vista of the scheme of

Lauterpacht's thinking about the law of treaties. Through it he emerges, it may be ventured, as one of the great jurists of our time. For this exposition of his thinking, lucidly and coherently set out by the skill and fidelity of the editor, we stand under considerable obligation, to both father and son.

G. I. A. D. DRAPER

The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict. Edited by Antonio Cassese. *Naples: Editoriale Scientifica. 1979. (Distrib. by Oceana, New York.) 501 pp. (Studies in International Law, I.) $40.00.*

THE 1949 Geneva Conventions on the laws of warfare have become so widely accepted, their contents so familiar, that there is a strong temptation to take them for granted, to assume that they have always had full legal effect and to imagine that their provisions are regularly applied in international conflicts. To do so would be to underestimate the rather desultory way that the Conventions came into force and the somewhat piecemeal record of their application. We must, therefore, not be too quick to imagine that the present climate of official indifference to the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions necessarily means that they will be consigned to juristic and military oblivion.

As the essays in this most interesting and well-produced book show, there were substantial, if not always consistent, divisions among the states which participated in the Conference on Humanitarian Law at which the Protocols were elaborated. Even when great compromises were made, most of them at the expense of humanitarian objectives, the final texts are not entirely to the satisfaction of the states involved. Most of the contributors to the book are, however, reconciled to what relatively little was achieved and are hopeful that wide acceptance and sympathetic interpretation will squeeze the maximum of protection out of the treaties. The most interesting aspect of the book as a whole is the insight that it gives into the negotiating processes at Geneva. The constant conflict between the demands of military necessity or, more exactly it seems, of military options, and the humanitarian aim of mitigating the excesses of war is made quite clear. So is the dominating role of the great powers, invariably on the side of the military option. The relevance of Mr Eide's early essay on the influence of what he calls ' the Global Military Structure ' becomes apparent as the chapters unfold. Among these is a somewhat polemical account of the status of wars of national liberation by Professor Salmon, in which he pours justifiable scorn on those legal troglodytes from Western states who persist in denying the legal status of the principle of self-determination. This is one of the three essays written in French out of a total of seventeen. There is a chapter by Professor Cassese, of great learning but rather sad in tone, about the limited success of the Conference in moving towards the control of the means of warfare. In the end, this is the nub of the failure. The compromises on wars of national liberation, on the status of guerrillas, on the measures of implementation and so on may, as all the writers earnestly hope, eventually provide for the better protection of individuals in time of war. There remains a gap which no degree of ratification of the Protocols, which no imaginative interpretation of their provisions, can close. It is that the governments of the world have retained to themselves an effectively unlimited right to choose the weapons with which they will fight: whether by sophisticated chemical de-afforestation or by crude starvation, they have kept an unregulated option to cause great suffering.

It is not the fault of the authors of these excellent essays that the position is not otherwise. Almost all of them were involved in the Geneva Conference and the evidence is that they laboured mightily for other outcomes. To the extent that a wider dissemination of what they did achieve can contribute to ensuring that it has a real

effect on the way that wars are fought, this distinguished collection does all that can be done.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the Law of the Sea. By Ross D. Eckert. *Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press. 1979. 390 pp. $16.95.*

LIKE some ageing diva promising that each performance will positively be her last, so the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been convened year after year, not so much a programme, more a way of life. A final session is scheduled for 1980 to decide the remaining contentious points and thoughts are now directed to the regimes that may result from the success or failure of the conference.

Professor Eckert writes as an economist, concerned with the maximisation of revenues from ocean resources both now and in the long term and from such a vantage-point he favours the claims of the coastal states. He argues that UNCLOS sessions have precipitated maritime claims, each nation claiming its enclosures before international law halts them, and has anointed rather than reversed such claims. Tracing the origin of such claims to such economic factors as population pressures, he draws a parallel with enclosures of land and urges that the property arrangements associated with enclosures by the coastal states would reduce the likelihood of wasteful exploitation. He therefore prefers such national enclosures to the pre-existing regimes based entirely on high seas freedoms or the international controls that may emerge from a successful UNCLOS. Furthermore, if enclosure increases the total size of the economic cake, and if this is distributed among enough nations by the operation of market factors, it may be less distabilising than some international regime. In other words, coastal enclosures are not a zero-sum game.

The collision of property rights is seen as pertaining not only to nations but also to uses of the sea, and the cost of certain traditional uses such as freedom of navigation (with consequent pollution) has not been quantified. Ironically, the collection of scientific data on which meaningful economic forecasting must be based may itself be in difficulty as coastal states have not been friendly towards scientific investigations. Pessimistically he opines that when the consent of many countries is required to re-arrange long-standing patterns of ocean use, the resulting increase in efficiency often amounts to less than the transaction costs of achieving it.

This comment informs his account of UNCLOS as a whole. It has been a political rather than an economic process and nobody comes out well. The response of the United States was often inept and contradictory, particularly over high sea freedoms. The true signals of the market-place were often ignored in favour of voting and coalitions formations, the developing countries using their tight majority control of the agenda to gain their own way.

Since nations were aware that UNCLOS was supposed to be of a one-off conference they were chary of granting concessions here that might not be offset in terms of other permanent forums such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In fact, Professor Eckert might have noted that UNCTAD had tried to take under its wing land-locked nations and those that have land-based mines, so whatever the results of UNCLOS some of the issues will certainly be debated elsewhere. Also, his theme that communal rights are inefficient could well have been illustrated by a reference to the difficulties encountered in the North Sea fisheries regime.

Professor Eckert has a bold and not entirely popular theme and in this well-written, well-researched book he has presented it forcefully.

AUDREY PARRY

Pollution, Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea. By R. Michael M'Gonigle and Mark W. Zacher. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1980. 394 pp. £9·50.*

IN 1973 a United States National Academy of Sciences report concluded that in one year more than 6,700,000 tons of oil had escaped into the world's oceans. In a detailed and well-researched account of the ecological problems of oil pollution and the political and legal difficulties of dealing with it the authors of this recent book emphasise the dramatic social and economic consequences and, above all, the environmental problems which are occasioned by oil pollution.

Environmentally the problem of oil pollution from ships at sea cannot be separated from the problems of spillage from land or sea drillings, nor from other pollutants. In the Mediterranean, for example, oil spillage is merely a part of a much wider problem, whereas in the Persian Gulf it is the major and indeed almost the only serious pollutant, although not all of it is directly from ships. However, the legal, political and commercial issues involved in oil pollution from tankers at sea can be specifically identified and this is what the authors set out to do.

Attempts to legislate for the problem go back to the 1920s and 1930s, although the first international agreement of significance was the 1954 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. This Convention and the subsequent Amendments of 1962, 1969 and 1971 are discussed at length, although the authors concentrate more on the politics and diplomacy behind the Convention than on its legal technicalities. The same is true of their discussion of the 1973 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and, understandably, of their discussion of the 1978 Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention Conference. The authors offer more analysis of the voluntary schemes adopted by the multinational oil companies—the Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement on Liability for Oil Pollution and the supplementary Contract Regarding an Interim Settlement on Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution—but the whole emphasis of the book is descriptive of the problems of oil pollution in the context of commercial interests, environmental danger and shifting political position. Given the difficulty of getting agreement on meaningful conventions and of translating them into law, this emphasis is understandable. It enables the authors to identify conflicting interests and motives and review them in their historical, political and commercial context whilst eliminating more technical documentation from the text.

The book is very readable. Its authors adopt an essentially functional approach, although they are not out of sympathy with the need to see international problems in the context of the broad movement toward a world order. Their work is socially orientated and is more concerned with policy than technical matters and their analysis. It will primarily interest students of international affairs and officials in government and industry concerned with the oil pollution problem. It is not a technical reference book for a lawyer which may account for its refreshingly reasonable price.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth J. A. ANDREWS

SECOND WORLD WAR

The War That Hitler Won: The Most Infamous Propaganda Campaign in History. By Robert E. Herzstein. *London: Hamish Hamilton. 1979. 491 pp. £8·50.*

Propaganda in War 1939–1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany. By Michael Balfour. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1979. 520 pp. £15·00.*

Selling the War: Art and Propaganda in World War II. By Zybnek Zeman. *London: Orbis. 1978. 120 pp. £6·95.*

IT is very difficult to imagine that there is any important aspect of the organisation, content and influence of civilian Nazi propaganda, that is examined in neither of the excellent studies by Professors Herzstein and Balfour. With contrasting perspectives, both authors admirably synthesise their extensive researches upon this vast subject into incisive and readable volumes. The only complaint, that a reader less familiar with the material might legitimately make, is that neither writer provides an ' easy-reference ' diagram of the overall structure and relationship of state and party organisations in the propaganda apparatus.

Professor Herzstein addresses himself in great detail to an analysis of how and why, right to the bitter end, the Germans never turned against the propaganda but rather away from it, as they slowly came to mistrust it. In so doing he traces the organisation and effectiveness of propaganda right down to what one might call the ' local government ' level. While such important minutiae sometimes make for less than compelling reading, Herzstein compensates with fascinating sections upon Nazi newsreels and feature films. He also endeavours to take his reader deep into the mind and personality of Goebbels. Not all of the arguments which Herzstein presents here convince totally. However, the discussion of Goebbels's literary self-portrait, his novel ' *Michael* ', and the description of the influence of Gustave le Bon's *The Crowd* upon Goebbels, certainly offer some interesting revelations.

Professor Balfour also provides a pen-picture of Goebbels and a lucid description of the propaganda machinery of the Third Reich. In this, he clearly demonstrates—as does Herzstein—the limitations which other organisations and personalities placed upon the propaganda minister's freedom of action. Such limitations are again exposed in Balfour's very interesting study of the British Ministry of Information. Indeed, it is this comparative nature of his study which makes Balfour's work so outstanding. Having set his organisational scene, he then treats his reader to a superb dissection of the major events and features of the Second World War, as they were seen, utilised and responded to, by the propagandists and, with differing levels of compliance, the peoples of both states.

Professor Zeman illustrates certain facets of the other two works with a selection of the posters and leaflets which were produced by all the major belligerents. Many are familiar, but the presentation is original. Zeman compares them thematically, not nationally, grouping them in such sections as: Appeals to Patriotism; Security Instructions and Exhortations; The War Effort; Images of Allies and Foes. The text and commentary are helpful, although Pope Gregory XV founded the *Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* in 1622 not 1662.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

The Crucible of War: Western Desert 1941. By Barrie Pitt. *London: Cape. 1980. 506 pp. £8·95.*

THIS is the first volume of a trilogy dedicated to the grand project of a history of the war in Africa from the first clash with the Italians in 1940 to the collapse of the Axis forces in Tunisia. It is based, the publishers assure us, on ' material recently released by the relaxation of the fifty-year rule '. On the dust-jacket Mr John Keegan is quoted as saying that it will ' undoubtedly become the standard work on the subject ', Field-

Marshal Lord Carver, no less, speaks of its ' meticulous historical accuracy ', and Lord Chalfont of ' a remarkable piece of military history '.

There is no room to differ. Barrie Pitt has certainly written a popular, readable account of these campaigns, including those in Ethiopia and East Africa in the south, and the air attack on Taranto and the war in Syria in the north, with many exciting accounts of minor actions, but after such a puff the reader will expect something more than a ripping yarn.

The important questions that should occupy the attention of a serious military historian must surely include the vexed subject of control of the air forces, and how it was resolved—for the war in the air and on the ground was one. The information provided by radio interception and decryption merits discussion. There is no proper analysis of the quality of the weapons available to both sides. Above all there is the striking contrast between the German adherence to the orthodox principles of intimate co-operation between arms and concentration, and the Eighth Army's peculiar habit of fighting in widely separated groups, the armour often acting alone, which led to its regular and disastrous defeat in detail. Why, and by whose influence this policy was adopted is a subject of the first importance. The basic information is available in the contemporary operational reports emanating from the Middle East and both arms and tactics have been professionally analysed elsewhere by Lord Carver and others.

We cannot, however, tell what sources the author has consulted, because his only detailed acknowledgment is of quotations made verbatim. Every historian is naturally and inevitably indebted to previous workers in his field and, judging from the text, Mr Pitt is no exception. He does not, however, provide a bibliography or references. There is no mention of the new material mentioned in the blurb or, for that matter, evidence of its use. This is slovenly and surprising to find in a work from so highly respected a publisher.

This is a disappointing book, and we can only hope that these faults will be remedied in the next two volumes.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Band 2: Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent. By Klaus A. Maier *et al. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1979. 439 pp.*

THIS is the second volume of the war history of the Research Institute for Military History, which may be said to have semi-official status. The introduction states that ' it is addressed not so much to the professional historian as to a wider circle of readers interested in contemporary history ' (p. 10). But for this hope to be realised it would have been necessary to reduce the amount of detail and also examine leading personalities in greater depth. What most general readers will miss is the broad sweep of narrative, which Hitler's *annus mirabilis* merits. This is precluded by the decision to entrust the various aspects of the war effort to four different experts and to slice the subject-matter into relatively short segments. Other problems follow: for example, there are areas of overlap and the section on Hitler's ' New Order ' in Europe precedes that containing his admission that Churchill intended to continue the fight. One cannot escape the conclusion that more editorial control would have been advisable.

Tribute must be paid to the mastery of detail and to the generally objective and comprehensive character of this volume. But against this background certain defects stand out all the more. One misses a clear statement that Hitler was fighting two quite different wars: one in the West for rational political objectives and fought more or less in accordance with the rules of war; the other a war of ruthless extermination against

the Slavs. The latter, it is true, reached its nadir in the Russian war, which lies outside the scope of this volume; but Hitler's ideological aberrations had already sufficiently revealed themselves in the Polish war. Horst Rohde misses the point when he ascribes the greater control exercised by the *Wehrmacht* over the occupation of France to lessons learned in the occupation of Poland; the disparity was implicit in Hitler's war aims.

The introduction states that this volume, apart from taking the war at sea up to the spring of 1941, ends in the late autumn of 1940 with the decision to invade Russia. There is, however, no section devoted to this crucial decision and one must hope it will be treated more fully in a later volume. This one contains only two references to it; both are controversial; neither enters into the subject in depth. Bernd Stegemann, in his opening sketch of the whole period covered, maintains, without developing his argument, that Hitler's decision was not ideologically motivated, but was based on a rational appraisal of the conflicting strategic objectives of the two dictators. Hans Umbreit, without any close analysis of Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940, holds that Hitler gave serious backing—at least for a time—to Ribbentrop's projected 'continental coalition', which would have lined up the Soviet Union against Britain.

This volume, which includes excellent maps and sketch plans, will prove of considerable value to historians; but it also has certain deficiencies—especially for the general reader who is not already familiar with the period.

R. CECIL

Britain and European Resistance, 1940–1945: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive, with Documents. By David Stafford. *London: Macmillan for St Antony's College, Oxford. 1980. 295 pp. £15·00.*

GOETHE was certainly right to observe that 'the most important things are not always found in the files', but Professor Stafford's study is an eminent demonstration of how the Argus-eyed researcher can sometimes discover there matters of importance which might otherwise have been overlooked. The documentation of Special Operations Executive (SOE) has always been troublesome. In his preface to the Official History of SOE in France Professor Foot noted that he had been virtually debarred from the Paris archives, that SOE's files for North Africa had been destroyed and that in any case good agents kept few papers. Professor Stafford points to the lack of consistency in the documents now available in the Public Record and to the fact that the weeder's hand has stripped much that should be relevant from the records of the Chiefs of Staff, the Foreign Office, and the Office of the Prime Minister. Nevertheless, whilst 'the secrecy surrounding SOE must long since have lost any "rational" justification' (p. xiii), by careful cross-reference and astute deduction he has identified much of value which, embedded in other files, has dodged the denying hand.

This is particularly important for the main thrust of his study. The flood of books about the personalities, the derring-do, the high drama of resistance—much of it highly coloured—has gushed for years. A cool and relatively unemotional examination of the guiding policies which directed British participation in the European movements is therefore most welcome: but without at least the quantum of documentary evidence which Professor Stafford has been able to adduce such a study would be necessarily emasculated, since it is in the files, above all, that the internecine warfare of government departments and the growth or adjustment of policy can best be evaluated. We well knew that the instrument of war, named SOE, itself constituted a battlefield over which the rivalries of ministers, the predilections of men in high places and the military necessity led to many a skirmish: Professor Stafford has exposed, perhaps as never before, the stern realities.

Robbed of control over SOE as it bent over its cradle, the Foreign Office continued to cast its shadow, like some malignant fairy, until on June 30, 1946—by a decision of the Defence Committee—SOE was merged with SIS (the Secret Service) and the Foreign Office achieved in peace that overlordship which had been withheld in war. Yet though direct control by the Foreign Office was refused and SOE operated under the Chiefs of Staff, perhaps the most striking feature of this book is the light it throws on an area of high policy where much, in the past, has been obscure.

The extent to which Eden and his advisers in the Office, jealously guarding the prerogatives of the Secret Service, were in a position to exercise pre-emptive control or, as it were, issue travel warrants for the activities of SOE in the various countries it penetrated has never been so starkly disclosed or so tellingly documented. Allied to this, as Professor Stafford indicates, was the way that SOE agents working dangerously in the field could return to find themselves suspect and even blackguarded because of a switch of high policy. The fortunes of men like Brigadier Myers in Greece do not make comfortable reading.

Since British policy has always been at its most ruthlessly pragmatic in war, it is perhaps not surprising to discover in Professor Stafford's analysis the clearest possible evidence that, in its relations both with the agents of SOE and the resistance movements with whom they worked, Churchill's administration was entirely concerned with what was reckoned to be ' the national interest ': or that, in consequence, guerrillas were fostered with aid, or left high and dry, according to the strategic needs of the conflict with Germany rather than out of direct concern for the resistants involved, whether militant or underground—a chop-and-change of attitude which harshly affected many of SOE's men and women whom parachute or submarine placed by their side. The conventional briefing of the secret agent in the romances of John Buchan and his kind may now be seen to be not too far from the truth: ' we shall, of course, disown you if necessary '.

RONALD LEWIN

' London-Regjeringa ': Norge i Krigsalliansen 1940–1945. Vol. II: 1942–1945: Vegen Heim. By Olav Riste. *Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget. 1979. 466 pp.*

DR RISTE'S second volume on the Norwegian government's wartime exile in London completes the story from 1942 until liberation in May 1945. Using official Norwegian and British archieves as well as the papers of many of the politicians, civil servants and military personnel involved, the author produces a fascinating analysis of the dilemmas facing the exiled Norwegian government as the war drew to its close. What form was the liberation of Norway to take and what action was to be taken against the enemy in Germany before liberation? How would plans for the military liberation of Norway affect the Norwegian authorities' take-over of power after occupation? What problems did the government-in-exile have with the home resistance and how are they resolved? How did Norwegian aims fit into the wider scheme of the Allies?

The first part of this volume concentrates on the efforts made to ease tension between the London government-in-exile and the home front in Norway, 1942–44. The second part is mainly concerned with the need during the 1943–45 period to prepare plans for the liberation of Norway that would fulfil overall Allied requirements; would satisfy the individual concern of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in particular; and would still allow the sovereign Norwegian government to take over its liberated territory without a costly hiatus. Dr Riste is particularly interesting on the plans for the liberation of Finnmark and the attempts to involve Sweden in the final stages of liberation. The third part of the book covers 1942–45 from a security-political perspective and gives valuable insights into the

development of the Atlantic-orientated element in Norwegian policy, the attempts to lay the foundations of postwar bridge-building between East and West as well as Norway's contribution to the reconstruction of the European—and world—peace in 1945.

Dr Riste's valuable book is not only of interest to those studying Norwegian political history but to anyone concerned with alliance politics, bargaining techniques and small state problems. For this reason, one can only look forward to an English translation that will make this excellent scholarly work available to a wider audience.

University of Aberdeen CLIVE ARCHER

WESTERN EUROPE

The European Defence Community: A History. By Edward Fursdon. *London: Macmillan. 1980. 360 pp. £15·00.*

THE author is currently Director of Military Assistance at the Ministry of Defence, but it is in an unofficial capacity, and using only published sources, that he has produced this account of one of the most traumatic international issues of the early 1950s. His account is the more welcome for being the first comprehensive work on the subject—for, with one partial exception, there is nothing in French (as might have been expected), possibly because—to quote an unattributable source of General Fursdon's—' no-one wants in public to remember, still less to write about, a failure that had already succeeded in splitting the nation into two . . . it is still too near us, still too emotional a matter for Frenchmen '.

This book in fact covers the ground very adequately, taking us through the various stages of the drama from beginning to end: the impact of the Korean war; the original French (Pleven) plan; the ' Spofford compromise '; the Petersberg conference; the revival of the European Army idea; the shock of the British government's announcement of non-participation, followed however by its guarantee of military assistance (and a later more substantial commitment); the Treaty's signature in May 1952; the long-drawn-out struggle over ratification, with its domestic antagonisms, and Soviet wrecking tactics; the Indo-Chinese debacle; the arrival of Mendès-France; the deadlock in Nato over his attempted amendments to the Treaty; his meeting with Churchill; and the vote in the *Assemblée Nationale*—on a procedural motion—that led to the abandonment of the whole project.

The last section of the book deals with the aftermath of the breakdown, culminating in the use of the Brussels Treaty as an expedient for bringing Germany into Nato, and the British offer to station permanent forces there. While listing a number of people who have claimed a part in this, the author accords the essential credit to Eden, whose performance on that occasion, as also to some extent over the parallel settlement in Indo-China, testified to a diplomatic skill that was perhaps at its best in solving the problems of other countries, rather than his own. All of which the author recounts with due thoroughness—even if the writing is somewhat loose at times—and it it of undoubted value to have the story thus on record. It remains perhaps to ask what is its bearing on Europe's present concerns.

While there are, of course, important lessons to be learnt from it, one may venture a doubt whether in the case of the European Defence Community (EDC) these are likely to prove of great practical relevance if and when European integration ever reaches a stage where the question of some system of *communautaire* defence again becomes actual. For the immediate imperative that gave rise to the EDC project—how, in the aftermath of war, to accommodate a German military contribution to the nascent

Alliance—was in the event settled decisively by a solution which the very failure of the EDC made inevitable: namely, the inclusion of the Federal Republic as a sovereign member of Nato. Nor can the coincidence that the EDC concept had its origins in the same year as the Schuman Plan, as well as in the same fertile mind of Jean Monnet, and that it embodied the same inspiration (Franco-German reconciliation on a ' safe ' basis) and the same principle of supra-nationality, alter the fact that the one was to succeed and develop, the other to fail and be superseded by a lastingly satisfactory alternative.

General Fursdon however is evidently not of this opinion. On the contrary, the conclusion of his final chapter is that ' what has been without doubt the most striking aspect of the research undertaken for this book has been the relevance of so many of the EDC's facets, even after 25 years, to contemporary Europe . . . and not just (their) academic historical interest.' Indeed, he promises a further volume, to be devoted to this theme: an interesting prospect, especially if it is as well researched and thought-out as the present work—besides having (may one hope) an index worthier of the text itself.

MICHAEL CULLIS

European Security: Prospects for the 1980s. Edited by Derek Leebaert. *Teakfield, Farnborough: Lexington Books. 1979. 322 pp. £11·50.*

AS befits a symposium produced under the aegis of Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs, this is a book of generally impressive competence and occasionally penetrating insight; and, among the collection of works which have appeared taking stock of Nato at the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and assessing the European security outlook for the next decade, it is the one which probably represents the best value for money.

The most pleasing feature of the work is its thoughtful composition, beginning with the editor's own essay on the present condition of the Atlantic Alliance, concluding with Jane Sharp's answer to the question ' Is Europen Security negotiable?' and covering a lot of important ground in between. Had events in the second half of 1979 been foreseen—turbulence in Iran culminating in the hostages crisis, the Afghanistan affair and the Alliance debate over theatre nuclear forces modernisation—the content, balance, and tone of some of the contributions might have been different, of course. On the other hand, it is a measure of the book's worth that very little has happened in recent months to invalidate what *is* said.

Not that there are no questionable assertions between these covers. For example, Derek Leebaert is surely barking up the wrong tree when he argues that ' the European Community has the potential to serve as a prime instrument for several pressing alliance purposes ' (p. 19); and he is certainly premature to claim that ' the myth of Finlandization has generally been dispelled ' (p. 24) within Western Europe. False notes like these are few and far between, however. What stick in the mind, rather, are those that are sweetly struck: like Leebaert's own observations, first, that Nato ' has been sustained for thirty years by the Europeans' assumption that the United States knows what it is doing and by their resignation to the corollary that if the United States does not know what it is doing it will do so anyway '; and, secondly, that many present-day troubles exist because ' Washington has little idea where it is going ' and ' its decision-making processes are so diffuse that it could not pursue a specific policy even if it were a misguided one ' (p. 5).

In four contributions to the work there are hardly any false notes at all. Starting from dissatisfaction with the way in which ' the numbers game has had a mesmeric effect on the military and the media so that capabilities have often been reduced to an

arithmetical statement ' (p. 48), Henry Stanhope, himself a media man, has written an excellent assessment of the military balance in Europe. In a fuller version of an essay which has already appeared in *Survival*, Robert Dean brings welcome realism to the whole subject of prospects for collaborative weapons acquisition. Looking at Eastern Europe, Edwina Moreton offers a carefully-documented reminder that most of the assumptions we make about ' the Soviet bloc ' collapse under expert scrutiny. And the last essay in the book, on the lessons to be drawn from experience in various negotiating fora (and particularly the MBFR talks), is one in which Jane Sharp has packed more wisdom into thirty-five pages than most defence commentators manage to get into an entire volume.

To single out these four pieces is perhaps unfair to the other contributors (Barret on European-American relations, Linda Miller on energy-security dilemmas, Blacker on Soviet perceptions of European Security, Devlin on Eurocommunism). But in symposia as elsewhere it is usually the case that some *are* more equal than otners.

University of Aberdeen DAVID GREENWOOD

Europe and the Middle East. By Albert Hourani. *London: Macmillan. 1980. 226 pp. £15·00.*

MR HOURANI has written nothing that is not distinguished by meticulous scholarship, constant awareness of the wider issues in which his immediate subjects are involved, and elegance of thought and language. This collection of essays, reflecting some of his most compelling preoccupations over two decades, offers an unusually intimate display of his gifts.

The essays, in his own words, ' all spring, in one way or another, from a concern with the attitudes of Western thinkers and scholars towards Islam and those who call themselves Muslims, and more generally with the relations of Christians with those who profess other faiths ' (p. xi). They have a perhaps unforeseen topicality at a time when politico-religious forces in a number of Middle Eastern countries have focused attention on what is currently defined as an Islamic revival. It must be said also that they bring together unexpected bedfellows in Volney, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and H. A. R. Gibb.

Two of the longer essays reflect the author's experience (which I shared to my lasting benefit) of working under Arnold Toynbee and Hamilton Gibb in the wartime organisation of Chatham House. These two remarkable men could hardly have been more different—Toynbee so fluent, overflowing with facts, analogies and hypotheses, which he nevertheless presented with a disarming diffidence; and Gibb so careful, seemingly engaged in a constantly self-critical effort to find the language which exactly fitted his profound and complex thought, expressed in the end however with impressive confidence. Mr Hourani speaks of Toynbee's vision of history as ' the product of a strange, haunted and powerful imagination ' (p. 142); and of Gibb, who was also drawn towards bold historical concepts, as fearing that ' imagination and the speculative mind might outrun the need to be loyal to the facts ' (p. 111).

The last essay in the volume, on the present state of Islamic and Middle Eastern historiography, discusses *inter alia* the consequences of the preponderant part played by Orientalists, with their distinct scholarly tradition, as opposed to historians applying the concepts and methods of Western historical enquiry, in the interpretation of Islamic history to the West. Thus, he suggests, ' the structure of ideas around which historical writing on Islamic history has been built is inadequate, in the sense that it does not enable the historians to explain many of the features of Islamic history, or to answer the questions or satisfy the demands of historians working in other fields ' (p. 180). He concludes by drawing attention to the penetration into Islamic historical

tudies of the concept of social history, and by proposing ways in which the study of slamic society and its development can, without losing sight of its specific identity, be ıore fully incorporated into the general historical culture.

HAROLD BEELEY

'he Changing Face of Western Communism. Edited by David Childs. *London: Croom Helm. 1980. pp. 286. £12·50.*

'HE concept of ' Eurocommunism ' has invited a good deal of controversy and has ecome something of an academic Aunt Sally. This new venture on the theme has the dvantage of avoiding ideological embroilment, since it concentrates largely on the ituation of individual Communist parties and relates them to their national contexts. fter a short historical introduction by David Childs, there is a careful examination of he genesis and differing perspectives of the ' Eurocommunist ' label by Elliott and chlesinger. The rest of the book is then devoted to the various countries, with a atural concentration on France, Italy and Spain. All the parties are sensibly related by he contributors to the problems they encounter within the domestic arena and in heir relationships with other parties. It will be apparent that if there is any common rend taken by the Communist parties of Western Europe, it results from the xigencies of national politics, not as part of a conscious strategy nor through onsummate duplicity.

Not unexpectedly the coverage is incomplete. The Nordic states are all represented, ut some eight countries (listed in an appendix on Communist electoral strength) eceive at best only passing mention. What should the criterion of selection be: the im-ortance of the country, the size of the party—or possibly its ideological ontribution? For some reason in his historical overview, Childs gives prominence to he puny British Communist Party, and the book ends, somewhat abruptly, with the orry plight of the Austrian KPÖ—surely both of interest only to the connoisseur of ismal failure. The Portuguese party is excluded (it has not undergone the necessary ace-lift), but the ommission of Western Germany—a diminutive party but an nportant state—does raise the problem of precisely what we *should* be examining in Vest European communism.

A misleading picture of Communist strength emerges if we concentrate on the najor cases. For Western Europe as a whole, Communist support is below 10 per cent f the vote and approaches a ' critical mass ' in only three or four countries, and those rimarily in Southern Europe. West European Communism is a particular henomenon, not one of advanced industrial society, and has to be explained on that asis. There is no European ' face ', or if there is, the flesh is absent.

What is missing in the book is an attempt to draw the threads together. If we are isposed to look to the future, then rather than take the fashionable example of Italy, it nay be more rewarding to study the case of Finland, expertly analysed by Seija and)erek Spring. There we can see how an alliance strategy has worked out: Communist articipation in government, but also the tensions and factionalism within the party, nce it has become ensnared by democratic responsibility.

ondon School of Economics GORDON SMITH

Trade Unions and Politics in Western Europe. Edited by Jack Hayward. *London: Cass. 1980. 138 pp. £12·50.*

The State in Western Europe. Edited by Richard Scase. *London: Croom Helm. 1980. £12·95. Pb: £6·50.*

N his brief introduction the editor of *Trade Unions and Politics in Western Europe*

sets the scene by distinguishing ' between types of trade union movements according to their relationships with their political-economic environments '. In a longer essay ' conceptions of class inequality ' are examined by reference to a comparative study of workers in the oil-refining industry in France and Britain in 1971-72. Duncan Gallie concludes that British workers ' were fully aware of the existence of inequality ', but ' were less likely than the French to believe that these inequalities made a great deal of difference to the quality of life ' (p. 13). In his contribution on international trade union co-operation Emil Kirchner finds evidence of increasing co-operation and trans-national collective bargaining. Examining the role of West German trade unions from a left-wing standpoint Andrei Markovits and Christopher Allen find the DGB fighting defensive battles over jobs without having developed any broader strategy to deal with the current crisis. Three other contributions look at union problems mainly in Britain, France, Italy and Sweden. Though useful, this volume by British and American academics ignores a number of interesting questions—what is the degree of actual rank-and-file participation in European trade unions? How are the unions dealing with the problems associated with migrant workers? What do case studies reveal about the actual experience of *Mitbestimmung* in Germany? What has been the experience of trade unions in Austria where they appear to have authority guaranteed by the constitution?

One of the most interesting developments in Western Europe in the last decade has been the virtually bloodless transformations of the political superstructures in Spain, Portugal and Greece. How did this happen? Will the attempts to introduce ' bourgeois democracy ' succeed? Contributors to Richard Scase's volume give certain tentative answers. In one of the most interesting chapters Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla are cautiously optimistic about Spain. They conclude:

> the process towards the full consolidation of a Western-type pluralist, industrialised and welfare-state ' corporate society ' though well under way, will not be easily completed. The chances of this happening, however, are fairly high. Spanish economic and political integration into Europe (first through the EEC . . .) will only signal the culmination of the country's path towards that kind of society (p. 226).

In an interesting chapter on ' Swedish Welfare Capitalism ' Casten von Otter produces evidence that the replacement of the Social Democrats in government has not led to any dramatic shift in public spending policies. Apparently public opinion polls indicate that the majority of Swedes favour ' further expenditure and production in the public sector . . . Overall there was a definite preference for *more* rather than less government ' (pp. 161-62). Von Otter seems to imply that developments in Sweden have gone too far for any reversal. Interestingly, he concludes, ' it seems evident that the sheer size of the public sector and the disparity between political democracy and a free market economy, in themselves, bear the seeds of a post-capitalist social order, albeit not necessarily *socialist* in character ' (p. 162). Less interesting, is the contribution by Joachim Hirsch on West Germany. Though a useful corrective to the optimistic ' liberal ' interpretations of developments in the Federal Republic, this Marxist analysis is too simplistic. He appears to see everything happening according to how ' West German capital ' interpretes its chances ' on the world market '. Thus capital favours the maintenance of the present democratic facade because open repression, ' would threaten internal socio-economic structural transformation and hence, the position of West German capital on the world market. It is probably this risk that still causes relevant sections of the bourgeoisie to favour the existing mode of mass integration ' (p. 138). The *Ostpolitik*, according to this account, was based ' upon considerations of foreign trade and strategies of investment ' (p. 129).

Other chapters of this book deal with Britain, Italy, France, and Greece. It will be useful to students of the politics of Western Europe containing, as it does, much useful material on the politics and economies of the countries concerned, but it fails, in what is its main (though unwritten) aim, to contribute to a new, more sophisticated, Marxist analysis of the state in Western Europe.

University of Nottingham DAVID CHILDS

Welfare and Efficiency: Their Interactions in Western Europe and Implications for International Economic Relations. By Theodore Geiger. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 149 pp. £12·00. Pb: £4·95.*

THE unprecedented growth of international trade in the postwar world made possible two other features of modern Western economies: high national growth rates and rapid expansion of welfare services which came to form part of a general and steady improvement in living standards. The argument of this book is that there are now signs that this trend is in danger of killing the goose that has laid such golden eggs—for there comes a point at which 'too much' welfare adversely effects economic efficiency and this in turn affects a state's international trading position. To counteract this effect governments are resorting to devices, such as exchange-rate manipulation or subsidies to exporting industries which themselves help to destroy the international system which is a necessary precondition for welfare. Of course, in recent years the international economy has experienced other hard knocks. But of all the factors impeding a reconstruction of the international economy Professor Geiger considers welfare to be the biggest villain.

Welfare, in its broad sense demands growth in government expenditure and in a bureaucracy to administer it. Whether we are considering transfer payments, services-in-kind, industrial subsidy or forms of public ownership the effect is the same: namely, the growth of a non-market sector which can now account for half of gross national product. This sector requires money which can only come from business activity and from individuals but this necessity brings about a new set of problems. The removal of profits and business incentive means less investment and lack of innovation; high individual taxation brings loss of the work ethic. More lame ducks and more unemployment result which require more subsidies, benefits and retraining and thus more taxation which brings . . .

The balmy days of the 1960s encouraged the growth of distributional socialism. This brought the argument for the natural right to a civilised existence irrespective of an individual's contribution to production and pushed new ideas about industrial democracy. In its most radical form of worker control this would transform the nature of the Western economy by breaking any remaining link with profitability but its rigidities would require considerable protection against the rigours of international competition. Such trends are discernible in all six of the countries studied (Sweden, UK, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway) although with individual variations and from the mid-1970s all have been making attempts to bring the non-market sector under some sort of control. However, the three beneficiaries of the North Sea are finding it the most difficult to pull in the reins.

Professor Geiger has to determine when the interaction between welfare and efficiency is positive and when negative. He believes that much welfare has the former effect but that at some point it becomes counter-productive and to determine when this stage has been reached he has in mind the use of criteria such as tax rates, productivity growth, subsidies, rate of investment in the market sector and level of unemployment.

Unfortunately it is not self-evident that we all agree on what constitutes a positive

or negative welfare/efficiency relationship, upon the right balance to aim for or the methods to achieve it. His point that we are only beginning to think about welfare in this way and lack basic information to develop the concept of the interaction is well-founded. In the absence of such knowledge, of hard definitions of ' welfare ', ' efficiency ', the ' international economy ', the ' liberal idea ' and so on many of his points can be no more than interesting speculation.

University of Leeds DOREEN COLLINS

The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy. By Philip G. Cerny. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1980. 319 pp. £12·50.*

GAULLIST foreign policy became in the author's words (p. 274) ' part of the national myth '. This book aims to show how it achieved that status—in other words, the author is mainly concerned with the domestic ramifications of foreign policy. He adopts a two-part framework: the first consisting of an analysis of Gaullist ideology with special reference to its nationalist components, and the second of a detailed case study of the Atlantic question, 1958–69. The first part thus embodies a lengthy discussion of the overarching (to use a favourite word of the author's) patterns of French political culture and the ways in which an ' independent ' foreign policy might articulate with them. In general, the author wishes to show the limits of such policy, which is seen above all as ' symbolic ' and aimed at building an ideological consensus inside France so as to consolidate the new Fifth Republic regime.

Clearly such an overall view has much to recommend it, representing as it does an attempt to fit the study of international relations into a clear political context. One wonders, however, just how well the thesis is demonstrated here. It was a deliberate choice to privilege the French/United States relationship, that *locus classicus* of Gaullian ' independence ', so as better to demonstrate the limits of such independence. But might not the limits have emerged better if this relationship had been treated more compactly (quite feasible, given the way in which this book was written) and juxtaposed with an analysis of French relations with another key area, say Western Europe or the former French colonies? Had such themes been treated, it might also have been possible to fill what seems another noticeable gap, *viz*, the scant discussion of the economic foundations of Gaullism. Work has been done to suggest that even under early Gaullism, the French economy became more and more integrated into the capitalist world-economy in a way that did more than anything else to undermine claims to independence. Yet this dimension, surely essential to any assessment of the limits to independence, receives but slight treatment.

On the relationship to Nato, it might have been made clearer just what was the French military commitment to this organisation before the 1066 withdrawal, so as better to assess what, if anything, changed. On another level, there is a tendency to take Gaullist ideology (which is thoroughly and clearly set out) far too much at face value, nowhere more than in the numerous references to the state as impartial pursuer of the ' general interest '.

The book is written in a vocabulary which owes much to systems-theory and social psychology. M. Edelman and J. Rosenau would seem to have been particularly influential. At times it is a little repetitious, and not always exempt from jargon, for example, ' a spill-over of affect from the salient and charismatic Gaullist pursuit of *grandeur* ' (p. 245). But it is on the whole an earnest and conscientious work. In trying to show the domestic spin-off of Gaullist foreign policy, the author has set himself an extremely hard task; for in order to measure this at all well we would need much wider and more empirical evidence than currently seems to be available. Hence

the recourse to theory in order to carry out the task. As to how well the author has succeeded, readers will doubtless judge for themselves.

University of Reading DAVID HANLEY

A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918–1926, with a survey of the foundation of British rule. By G. S. Geoghallides. *Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre. 1979. 471 pp. (Texts and Studies of the History of Cyprus, VI).* £10·00.

THE title of this book, taken in association with its dimensions, will probably seem daunting to the layman, and perhaps recall that epigram of the 1890s (in one of 'Saki's' stories) about the island of Crete always having produced more history than could be consumed locally. But although it would be fanciful to suggest that all parts of Dr Georghallides's admirably researched and excellently written study will be of equal interest to non-specialists, the reviewer must emphasise that there is much in it deserving the attention of a wider readership. Those concerned with British Near Eastern policy in the hectic period between Turkey's defeat and the Treaty of Lausanne, or with Greece's Anatolian misadventure in 1919–22, or—most notably—with what Robinson Gallagher and Denny called 'The official mind of Imperialism' can all find in it a good deal of new information that will interest them, apart from the author's meticulous close-range treatment of more narrowly insular matters.

The book is in two parts, of which the first, 'The Foundations of British Rule' is a preliminary survey. The unusual constitutional situation of Cyprus, before it was formally annexed in 1914, and the practical consequences of this are examined fully; the author shows how continuing Ottoman sovereignty made possible a kind of highly versatile double-think about what Britain could or should be doing with this recent imperial acquisition, so very different in most respects from almost all the others. The arguments used to justify the occupation in 1878 lost much of their cogency when Egypt came under British control four years later. There could be no question, after the Bulgarian massacres, of any British government's restoring a predominantly Christian population to Turkish rule, and neither in those early days nor at any subsequent stage of the British involvement with Cyprus was there any active sympathy, in official circles, with the pan-hellenic aspiration for *Enosis* or incorporation into the Greek state. Britain's offer of Cyprus to Greece in October 1915, on condition of that country's immediate entry into the war, which is fully elucidated and discussed in Chapter 4, was an emergency tactic that in British eyes did not constitute a precedent, though it was frequently to be cited as one by Greek Cypriot politicians during the subsequent four decades of British rule.

The first two chapters in Part Two give a detailed and admirably clear account of the attempts made by the Greek-Cypriot political leadership to get their nationalist claims attended to by the peacemakers at Paris, and how any slight hopes of success were dashed by Venizelos's understandable refusal to risk alienating the Lloyd George government at a time when British support for his Anatolian ambitions was so crucial. Disappointed in their hopes of Greek sponsorship, the Enosists tried hard to get a hearing from British policy-makers—from the Prime Minister downwards. The arguments against Britain's relinquishing Cyprus that were publicly rehearsed, and the inter-departmental confabulations that underlay them, are set out and criticised at length; they ranged from strategic considerations (sometimes very fanciful, or even mutually contradictory) to the familiar dismissal of local politicians as unrepresentative agitators, irresponsible visionaries or corrupt moneylenders. There is an air of hasty and aggrieved improvisation about a lot of this; the official mind, one feels, had still not really considered what the value of Cyprus, if any, to the British Empire was. From the

records it would seem that H. A. L. Fisher, President of the Board of Education, was the only figure of any prominence to suggest that the principle of self-determination might be applied without damaging British interests; his eloquent and persuasive Cabinet memorandum of September 1919 is quoted in full (p. 133).

With the Turkish triumph in 1922 it clearly became less likely than ever that the British government would make any significant changes in the status of Cyprus, and in the last three chapters of the book the *Enosis* debate returns to a more exclusively Cypriot forum. The essentially static nature of the British administration, as well as the evident shortcomings of many of the administrators, come in for much justified criticism; but it is hard not to feel that the scale of the narrative in this part of the book (and especially the exhaustive treatment of the ' Turkish Tribute ' question) puts a heavy burden on the reader. The concluding pages set the scene for the governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs (1926-32); it will be interesting to see how that unorthodox and flamboyant figure fares at the hands of this somewhat mordant but scrupulously fair historian of British colonial rule.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform. By Ronald J. Hill. *Oxford: Martin Robertson; New York: Sharpe. 1980. 221 pp. £12·00.*

WHEN Khrushchev put an end to Stalin's postwar policy of isolationism, he launched the Soviet Union into an era of economic and political competition with the West which entailed, in part, an emulation of Western techniques and technology. One of the by-products of this relatively open attitude to the West was the gradual growth of the social sciences in the Soviet Union. Of all the social sciences, political science is the most sensitive. It is not surprising, therefore, that its exponents have had a difficult task in making their field academically respectable, independent of Soviet ideology and the value-set predetermined by the Communist Party. Soviet political science often functions as a legitimising device for politicians. The extent to which it can be critical of Soviet political reality is circumscribed. It is politically engaged, serving the normative function of identifying political problems and suggesting solutions which might lead to a more efficient society, and it cannot stray far from Marxist-Leninist principles. This little resembles Western ideals of objective, value-free social science. Nonetheless, there has been progress in Soviet political science, both methodologically, and in the kinds of things investigated. Dr Hill argues convincingly that it has a literature worthy of Western attention: Soviet scholars have access to material unavailable to their Western counterparts; they investigate problems which can enhance our understanding of the Soviet system; and their work gives us some insight into Soviet political culture.

Dr Hill charts the progress achieved so far by the Soviet political scientists, and examines their impact on political change and decision-making in the Soviet Union. In the first part of his book he concentrates on Soviet research into the electoral system, the role and efficiency of local Soviet deputies, and the work of local government. He goes on to show that the concept of interests has gained acceptance in the Soviet Union, and that increasing attention is paid to public opinion. The problem of party-state relations is almost as old as the Soviet state. Dr Hill looks at recent research on the functional divisions, and on the composition and the role of the Communist Party.

The impact of political science research is seen to be twofold: it has caused a new conceptualisation of political processes, and this in turn leads to the posing of new

questions and less complacency about the system. At a local level political scientists have fuelled experimental institutional changes and 'by this means, slowly and incrementally, reformist change takes place' (p. 165). Since the 1977 constitution introduced so few real changes, it is difficult to agree with Dr Hill's implication that it provides evidence of political reform, inspired either by academics or by politicians. On the question of the role of political scientists in decision-making, the author finds evidence that they are rarely involved directly in policy decisions. But they play an active role in drafting legislation, and they have sufficient contact with politicians for some influence to be assumed.

The infrequency with which official Soviet reformist writings are treated as more than 'an elaborate hoax perpetrated on an innocent Soviet people' (p. 168) explains the slightly apologetic tone Dr Hill sometimes adopts. He needs no apologies—his book is well-written and informative. It fulfils a valuable function, bringing Soviet political science literature to the attention of non-readers of Russian, and selecting the more interesting studies for those who do read the language.

University of Surrey MARGOT LIGHT

Money, Banking and Credit in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. By Adam Zwass. Trans. by Michel C. Vale. *New York: Sharpe; London: Macmillan. (Published simultaneously as Vol. XVII, No. 1-2,* Eastern European Economics.*) 1980. 233 pp. £12·00.*

THERE is, at the moment, no shortage of literature in English on money and banking in Soviet-type economies. One might thus have high expectations from a contribution from someone who, before his present residence in the West, had considerable experience of socialist banking and has already written extensively on the subject. Unfortunately the book only partly fulfils those high expectations.

The first three chapters deal with money, the price system and inflation. Here, no substantial addition to knowledge results. His treatment often lacks clear theoretical bases and occasionally is marred by assertions not supported by convincing analysis. One is surprised not to find references to Western debates, especially on inflation and savings in Soviet-type economies, which attempt a more rigorous and balanced approach.

The banking system and credit policies are covered in the next two chapters. Though the author claims to stress the evolution of Soviet-type banking and credit principles, this aspect, in fact, is rather weak in terms of explanation and periodisation. Readers wishing to understand the evolution, as well as readers interested in comparisons with Western monetary characteristics which are neglected in the book, may well be better served by other relevant works in English. However, the comparative study of credit policies in Eastern European economies is useful, interesting and not to be found in other English texts.

The last section of the book discusses monetary aspects of foreign trade. It brings together information on both financial arrangements of Comecon and East-West finance. It is a pity that this useful contribution is not supported by a more balanced and realistic discussion of issues in international finance.

The book's unusual terminology and jargon may be attributable to lapses in translation. Some frequently used concepts (like 'control' and 'steering' instruments or 'equilibrium') are not well defined and there are mis-spellings. These, however, are only minor irritants. As the text develops, the predominance of criticism over scholarly evaluation intensifies and, at times, assumes almost missionary fervour.

It seems that until the market is allowed to shape them, monetary relationships in socialist economies can make no effective contribution to national economic

management: ' authentic monetary categories can come only from an authentic market '. Even inflation in market economies is clearly preferable to that in socialist economies.

The ultimate goal of the author's market mission is revealed in the final sections on international finance. There he has a vision of ' planned economies, with full-blooded monetary systems ' being incorporated into the world market. The book ends with the following prospects:

> Orientation toward an integrated world market would demand a proper contribution from both world systems: from the West, the gradual elimination of crisis phenomena in the world monetary system so that it can function on a world-wide basis, and, until such time as that can be achieved, a co-ordination of foreign trade and credit policy toward the East in order to put an end to unfair competition; and from the East, the adaptation of steering mechanisms to the needs of an effective international division of labour (p. 231).

Doubtless the author's sentiments are sincere and noble, but his work is likely to be appreciated more by readers sharing his faith than by those seeking explanations through a more systematic use of theory and rigorous analysis.

Portsmouth Polytechnic T. M. PODOLSKI

Industrial Labour in the USSR. Edited by Arcadius Kahan. And Blair A. Ruble. *New York: Pergamon. 1979. 417 pp.*

SINCE the publication of E. C. Brown's classic, *Soviet Trade Unions and Labour Relations*, in 1966 there has been something of a dearth of general works on the Soviet labour scene. The present work is very much a collection of essays, and we may continue to feel the lack of an up-to-date integrated text. In terms of breadth and depth of coverage, however, there can be no doubt that *Industrial Labour in the USSR* is a most important and timely addition to the literature.

The early chapters of the book are on the whole fairly dry compendia of statistics and facts—though absolutely invaluable for the specialist. Janet Chapman's account of trends of the wage structure, for example, is full of fascinating things, particularly on piece-work and bonus arrangements. But the general reader may well wish, at least initially, to skip through to some of the more colourful later chapters. Outstanding, perhaps, is Alex Pravda's chapter on spontaneous workers' activities. Covering the whole gamut of options open to the Soviet worker—from getting drunk up to, if he dares, striking and rioting—Pravda presents a particularly sharp evocation of working-class life in the Soviet Union. The discussion of *tekuchest'*—excessive job-changing—is illuminating, and a telling contrast is drawn between the young worker, who tends to drift, and the older workers, particularly in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories, who may combine long service with a strong tendency to absenteeism and other forms of indiscipline. In conditions of prevalent labour shortage, and with the traditional emphasis on job security, management often winks at diverse forms of ' infringement of good order '. Strikes are another matter, and Pravda cites interesting details on recent trends in the manifestation and repression of this kind of spontaneous activity. There is, I felt, some tendency to oversimplify the relationship between ' economic reform ' and workers' attitudes and behaviour, but this is an excellent chapter.

Jerry Hough's chapter on policy-making and the worker is a vivid attempt to fill the one big gap that exists in our knowledge of Soviet labour affairs. As the other contributors show, painstaking research into literature, the local press, the statistical yearbooks, etc., can ultimately provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the life of the Soviet worker. The higher level of decision-taking remains essentially a mystery, but

Hough manages, for example, to provide a convincing, if not ' proven ', version of the relationships between Central Committee, State Committee for Labour and Social Questions, and the Trade Union Central Council. His evocation of the kind of quasi-pluralism that exists in the contemporary Soviet Union (pp. 386-87) is surely on the mark, helping to explain the essential nature of the ambivalence of organisations like the trade unions.

This book will certainly find its way onto many university reading lists. Its general readability will hopefully not be seriously affected by the inordinate number of editorial/printing errors it contains. When Walter Connors, in his stimulating piece on politics and class consciousness, is made to say that ' Andrei Amalrik may well have been correct in citing the pains of importance [impotence] for those elements of the professional strata which have a stake in change ' (p. 321 he inadvertently sums up the paradox of the worker in the Soviet Union.

University of Sussex D. A. DYKER

Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Teilung: Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1979. By Renata Fritsch-Bournazel. *Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher. 1979. 167 pp. DM 24·80.*

BEFORE the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the most recent misgivings in Western Europe over relations with the United States, doubts had been expressed about the future of political detente in Europe. It is a reflection of the still unresolved German problem that speculation about the future role of the two German states thus becomes inevitable. In particular, however, the long term objectives of the Soviet Union must again come under scrutiny. This slim volume, by a French political scientist, is the first for some time to re-examine the course of the Soviet Union's German policy.

Given the space available and the time-span covered (the entire postwar period) the discussion is inevitably curtailed. The descriptive, historical approach adopted results in a summary of major events but adds no new ginsights. References to sources in German and Russian are extensively documented. However, most of these have already been covered in existing secondary sources. Reliance on such sources is suggested by the noticeably superficial attention paid to East Germany, where secondary literature is much thinner on the ground.

A number of relevant themes are restated: Stalin's consistent wartime distinction between the German people and the ' Hitler clique '; the ambiguities written into Allied agreements; the strikingly different conceptions of such formulations as ' peaceful ' and ' democratic ', etc. There is value, too, in being reminded that between 1945 and 1949 the many disagreements were not exclusively between East and West. The ambiguities and inconsistencies in the policies of all the major powers would seem to be no less irreconcilable from a vantage point three decades on.

Yet whatever the diplomatic intricacies of the process of division, the author quite rightly points out that the real complexities of the postwar German problem emerged only after 1949. However, again the painstaking progress through the 1950s and 1960s concentrates on re-enactment of familiar events rather than attempting a reconstruction of the underlying policy framework. With the advantage of hindsight some analysis concerning the place of Germany, East and West, in the Soviet Union's global strategy might be hazarded. In the absence of such a framework, the fundamental significance of 1969 and the impact of the radical change, inaugurated by Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, on Soviet strategy in Europe is misfiled under such headings as trade and technology transfer. Another opportunity to focus on long-term Soviet policy objectives, consistencies and inconsistencies is thereby lost.

Moving on into the post-*Ostpolitik* era, the concluding chapters suffer from the

analytical deficiencies of the preceding survey. There is little basis, except in the inquiring mind of the reader, for speculation as to the possible impact of change in international politics on the policies either of the Soviet Union or the two German states.

Since there is no questioning of traditional arguments in the literature, the reader is left with an orderly but familiar and somewhat superficial review of events. It would seem a pity that a book dealing with Soviet policy towards Germany, appearing almost a decade after the major agreements marking a political caesura in East–West relations, should make no attempt to identify long-term patterns. Perhaps fittingly for the exercise, the conclusion is simply a far shorter re-run of the summary already presented in the main text.

The Economist EDWINA MORETON

Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968. By Jiri Valenta. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1979. 208 pp. £7·75.*

JIRI VALENTA wrote his book on Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He argues that in August 1968 many observers were needlessly surprised by Moscow's extreme action; they would have been better prepared if they had been aware of the decision-making process in Soviet foreign policy. No doubt someone will say the same about the incursion into Afghanistan.

Valenta's analysis of the 1968 decision is remarkably good. There are still great gaps in the information available, but he has combed a wide range of sources that includes the recollections of some of the participants as well as an impressive run of newspapers and periodicals. And he has carefully arranged the collected pieces onto a bureaucratic-politics model of the decision-making process.

What emerges is a situation in Czechoslovakia that had deteriorated by early in July to the point where all the Soviet decision-making groups were forced to consider intervention a serious possibility. Opposing positions had already been taken up in the uncertain months before. Roughly speaking, the advocates of intervention were the Central Committee figures responsible for ideological matters, Party bureaucrats in the more vulnerable non-Russian republics, sections of the Red Army command, and the KGB. Those inclined to less violent means of persuading the Czechoslovak reformers to back-pedal were the Party and government figures, including Kosygin, involved in dealing with foreign parties and governments, and the command of the Soviet rocket forces. Exerting pressure from the fringes were the Polish and East German interventionists and the Rumanian anti-interventionists. Brezhnev sat in the middle.

The apparent strengthening of extreme reform forces in Czechoslovakia precipitated a full and fierce debate over the proper response, first at the Warsaw Pact meeting on July 14–15 and then at the Soviet Central Committee meeting four days later. The pro-intervention forces brought in all possible allies. But Kosygin in particular was concerned about relations with the United States, and Brezhnev remained ambivalent. At the turn of July and August the entire Soviet Politburo faced its Czechoslovak opposite number at Cierná-nad-Tisou, partly to apply pressure and search out divisions among the Czechoslovak leaders, but also to try to resolve its own differences in debate. The outcome then, and at a meeting with Warsaw Pact leaders at Bratislava, was a compromise which left the issue unresolved and thereby intensified the pressure to resolve it.

The Red Army was particularly keen either to invade at once or to stand down. Apparent American indifference, the biased information coming from the anti-reformers inside Czechoslovakia, and the likelihood of their being swept away in

September were arguments that the interventionists were able to use to effect. They finally won their majority and Czechoslovakia was invaded.

Valenta himself readily admits that much of his information is conjectural and that some of his conclusions are speculative. Yet, even allowing for that, his case is not wholly convincing. The decision in favour of intervention stemmed as much from limits that seemed about to be crossed as from the pressures of interest groups. Moscow, however defined, could not allow the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia to lose its monopoly of power or to become a federation of Czech and Slovak parties. Valenta has concentrated too much on the bureaucratic model of decision-making. At the same time, he has made a most important contribution to understanding Soviet foreign policy—past, present and future.

University of Glasgow WILLIAM V. WALLACE

Flashpoint Poland. By George Blazynski. *New York, London: Pergamon. 1980. 416 pp. (Pergamon Policy Studies—52.) $27.50.*

GEORGE BLAZYNSKI provides an eminently readable and informative account of Poland in the 1970s: Mr Gierek's new broom and team, his economic miracle financed by Western credits, the disillusionment of 1976 when rising expectations could no longer be met, his subsequent appeals to patience and patriotism, and the question mark of the future.

Mr Blazynski—Anglo Pole, diplomat, broadcaster, writer, and traveller—is admirably qualified. He feels in his bones the dilemma of Poland, ravaged for centuries by Germans and Russians and saddled by Stalin with an alien regime. He has talked to hundreds of key people all over Poland and authoritatively analyses what they have said. The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74 could perhaps have received more prominence as a major factor underlying his correct assertion that recovery in the capitalist West is of major importance for communist Poland. Poland's and Britain's economic problems have much in common.

Gierek stands out throughout the 1970s as the one indispensable leader of Poland, trusted by most Poles and statesmen of East and West. He overcame the strikes and distrust of 1970-71, abandoned austerity, brought a glimpse of the longed for house and car-owning democracy, stuck by and large to his habit of keeping in touch with the people and now, as a Polish patriot squeezed between Stalinists and liberals, suffers from a chronic lack of room to manoeuvre. Geo-politically anchored in the Soviet bloc, and ideologically in favour of solidarity with it, he nevertheless feels that his policy of developing all kinds of links with Western countries is correct and helps with the all-important task of preserving the Polishness of Poland.

Accommodation with the Church is logical if, although professing atheism, you are a leader who heeds the sentiments of most patriotic Poles. In 1977, well before the Polish Pope was elected, Gierek travelled to Rome to demonstrate, as did the Emperor at Canossa nine hundred years ago, that a ruler respects the reverence for Rome of a Catholic population; and Protestant Head of State Jablonski welcomed the Pope in Krakow, where hundreds of thousands of Poles, despite communist indoctrination for thirty-five years, chanted ' We want God!'

Blazynski differs from the British government in his assessment of the importance of Poland. At the outset he says ' Poland is the key country in the Soviet Bloc . . .'. The theme recurs: ' But Poland . . . as the biggest and least conformist country in the Bloc, is for the Russians the key to stabilization of their East European Empire ' (p. 374). If Blazynski is right about the key position of Poland, and its ' flashpoint ' potential, then the attention paid to it by Britain indeed seems meagre.

He speaks wistfully of Poland looking West for help and sympathy, and of the skill

with which the French have developed special ties at the top. He alludes to the benefit of Anglo-Polish exchanges culminating in the Polish Prime Minister's visit to Britain in December 1976. The implication is that we in Britain underrate Poland and are doing too little to keep our friendship in repair. He has a point.

He thinks that human rights, religion and ' pluralism ' will combine to make Poland an increasingly awkward member of Moscow's empire and increasingly worthy of Western attention. He foresees a period of restrained confrontation rather than a sudden explosion; his long-term hope for Poland is that the Soviet empire will ' some day go the way of all others ' (p. 375).

NORMAN REDDAWAY

Non-Alignment: The Conscience and Future of Mankind. By Josip Broz Tito. *Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1979. 170 pp.*

PRESIDENT TITO left to his compatriots four major recommendations: first, to be faithful to the federal system (formulated by him as early as in November 1942) as the only form of government capable of maintaining the political independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia; secondly, to practice fairly the self-management regulations in the field of industrial relations enacted in June 1950—regulations limiting the rights of factory managers and giving greater powers to works councils elected by the workers; thirdly, to follow the succession procedure submitted by Tito and unanimously adopted in October 1970 by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; fourthly, never to deviate from the non-alignment precepts proclaimed by Tito at Belgrade on September 1, 1961.

While the first three directives relate to home affairs, the fourth is a command concerning the foreign policy. This book, published in English, contains thirteen of Tito's addresses and statements concerning the six Conferences of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held respectively at Belgrade (1961), Cairo (1964), Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973), Colombo (1976) and Havana (1979).

Tito, the *spiritus movens* of the movement, remained faithful to his 1961 definitions that the non-aligned countries (twenty-five in number) were against the division of the world into two main power blocs and had no intention of creating a third. At Lusaka he admitted that, encountering strong trends towards alignment with military political groupings, ' it was not an easy matter to stand firm on the positions of non-alignment '; but he added: ' We have remained staunch as it is our conviction that this is the most constructive way we can contribute to the peace and progress of mankind '. Returning from Zambia he said at Belgrade that the non-aligned countries, ' regardless of potential, represent the conscience of mankind and the moral political force in the world '.

Addressing the conference of non-aligned foreign ministers at Belgrade in July 1978 Tito reiterated that their grouping was directed ' against power politics, political and economic hegemony, and every kind of external interference '. The non-aligned movement, he proudly claimed, ' is an independent, united and autonomous factor in world politics, and such it must remain '. In defence of these principles, Tito flew to Havana in 1979 to fight for the integrity of non-alignment against attempts by Fidel Castro to ' reorient ' the character of the movement. On his return to Belgrade Tito stated diplomatically on September 10, 1979 that the movement remains ' an independent, non-bloc and worldwide factor, despite attempts to present it in a different light '. This was more wishful thinking than a statement of fact. As long as the world is, more or less, at peace the movement of non alignment will survive. In the case of a serious international crisis, however, each non-aligned country would be compelled to chose who is its real friend.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

Tito's Yugoslavia. By Duncan Wilson. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1980. 269 pp. £12·00.*

THIS book appeared at about the time when Tito was stricken with his long, final illness. It provides a useful background to enable the reader to assess the probable course of events following Tito's death.

The book is aimed at the intelligent, non-expert reader who wishes to understand the Yugoslavia which Tito created, and which he led for over thirty-five years. On the whole it achieves this aim, although there are passages, particularly those dealing with the complexities of self-management and the organisation of the economy, where the 'non-expert' may need to consult other authorities. Unfortunately, Sir Duncan's footnotes do not give this kind of reference, although there is a short 'Note on Sources' at the end.

A brief chapter on the prewar Kingdom of Yugoslavia gives a succinct account of the main developments between the wars. The rest of the book is devoted to a study of the collapse of old Yugoslavia, and of the emergence from its ruins of a new Yugoslavia led by Tito and his Communist followers.

Sir Duncan's service as a diplomat during the 1950s and 1960s took him to Peking as Chargé d'Affaires, and to Belgrade and Moscow between 1964 and 1971. This experience places him in a strong position to assess the significance of Yugoslavia's role in world affairs, especially in its relations with the Soviet Union, and its influence in the non-aligned movement, of which Tito was a founding father.

The author believes that an implicit bargain existed between Tito and Brezhnev under which the Soviet leaders were prepared to tolerate Yugoslavia's pursuit of its own 'way to socialism', including its non-aligned policy, provided that 'the Yugoslavs will not propagate the doctrine of national interest too actively among the member countries; that their concepts of non alignment should not work against Soviet interests; . . . and that on some important issues . . . the Yugoslav Government should back the Soviet line' (p. 257).

If such a gentleman's agreement existed, it clearly did not inhibit Tito during his last year of life from strenuously opposing Soviet influence in the non-aligned movement, nor from roundly denouncing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The questions which now arise following Tito's death concern the ability of the collective leadership which has now taken over to walk the non-aligned tightrope as successfully as he did, and also to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia in the face of internal and external pressures. Sir Duncan is optimistic on this score, although he sees the possibility of an increasingly 'firm hand' being necessary to maintain internal order I support his general conclusion that 'the present internal system rests on a fairly solid and adaptable basis of institution and habit' (p. 259), and that it will survive Tito's death. I believe also that an acceptance of Yugoslavia's non-aligned position by the major powers is a paramount necessity in the preservation of world power.

University of Bradford F. B. SINGLETON

The Struggle and Development of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia Between the Two Wars. 2nd edn. By Josip Broz Tito. *Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice. 1980. 122 pp.*

THIS collection of speeches by the late President Tito includes four which were delivered in 1977 to the League of Communists Political School in Tito's birthplace, Kumrovec, and one which was given in 1976 at the Belgrade Staff College. They give Tito's personal account of his role in the underground Yugoslav Communist Party

(CPY) between the wars, and his view of the wartime struggle in which resistance to the invaders was combuned with a revolutionary struggle to establish who would rule Yugoslavia after the war. Although there are no startling revelations or new interpretations, and although most of the material has already appeared in English, it is nevertheless fascinating to read Tito's own account of the dramatic events in which he played so vital a role.

During the first two decades of its existence the CPY was notorious in Comintern circles for its factionalism—two Yugoslavs, three factions—but the young Tito showed considerable political acumen in steering a careful course through the stormy waters of Comintern intrigue, to emerge in 1937 as the Secretary General of the CPY. The leadership of the CPY suffered appalling damage at the hands of both Stalin and the royalist regime at home. Tito himself endured five years in a royalist jail (1929–34), and was accused of Trotskyism in 1938 whilst on one of his frequent visits to Moscow (p. 55). There are some hints as to his success in escaping Stalin's clutches. He kept a low profile. When an NKVD man suggested that he should write to Stalin, complaining about the Soviet refusal to allow him to return home from Moscow in 1939, he replied, ' Oh, no . . . it is better that he should not know about me '. He also had a protector in Dimitrov.

When war came to Yugoslavia in 1941 the CPY was in a better condition after four years of Tito's leadership than it had ever been since it was forced underground in 1920. Its membership was only 12,000 (p. 65—although on p. 68 he says 8,000, of whom 3,000 were in prison), but they were well organised, and represented all national groups and social classes.

Because of Tito's longevity and survival power, most of the names of his comrades who are mentioned in the book either died before him—like Kidrič and Kardelj; were disgraced—like Ranković and Djilas; or suffered both fates—like Hebrang and Žujović.

There is much still to be written about the Yugoslav Party's relations with the Comintern, but if this book is not the last word, it does tell us much about this remarkable man's ability to alter the course of Yugoslavia's history. His pragmatism, and his common sense help to explain his ability to survive.

University of Bradford F. B. SINGLETON

The Soviet Road to Olympus. By N. Norman Shneidman. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1979. 180 pp. £6·95. Pb: £3·50.*

THIS book presents a review of the theory and practice of sport in the Soviet Union and is an excellent text for this purpose. The early chapters give an overview of how Soviet sport fits in with the general educational philosophy, and in particular with its overt ideological functions. One section deals specifically with the practical application of Soviet sport ethics, and this represents an advance over a parallel text *Soviet Sport* by James Riordan—which is excellent in its description but not so penetrating in its analysis.

Shneidman continues with a historical analysis of Soviet physical culture, making the important point of its link with military considerations as well as its ability to provide a central unifying force in Soviet society. This leads into a very detailed analysis of contemporary organised physical culture including its relation to the major institutions of the Soviet Union, the educational system, the trade union movement, and the way sport articulates with the mass media, and how it is funded. Perhaps at this stage of his analysis Shneidman might have been more critical of the overtly elitist elements in Soviet sport.

There follow four chapters dealing with aspects of Soviet physical culture and

education, the last one of which is particularly appropriate to the build-up for the Olympic Games. Unfortunately details are not offered which might allow the reader to judge whether, in any meaningful way, Soviet athletes are amateur or professional, though there would seem to be some indication that Soviet athletes are in the category of ' State Professionals '.

Some of the most interesting detail is provided in a very lengthy series of Appendices, though much of the material is dated. However a detailed section on Soviet periodical publications in physical culture and sport, including those in English, is given.

The final verdict on the book is that it represents a much more analytic view of Soviet sport than other comparable publications, and that its appearance in the year of the Olympic Games 1980 makes it eminently topical as well as readable.

Dunfermline College of Physical Education J. YATES

On Stalin and Stalinism. By Roy A. Medvedev. Trans. by Ellen de Kadt. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1979. 205 pp. £6·60.*

IF Stalin atomised Soviet society in order to create a new homogeneity, it is perhaps not surprising that non-conformist Soviet commentators on Soviet actuality come across so strongly as individuals. The authentic history of Stalinism, or such part of that history as is generated within the Soviet Union itself, reaches us in the form of personal reflections and records of personal experiences, which together form one jigsaw out of individually jigged pieces. It is perforce a historiography not of schools but of persons, and it is all the more powerful for that, even if idiosyncracy at times outweighs synthesis. Nor is it therefore at all surprising that Roy Medvedev should still be somewhat unique as a historian of the twentieth century, a curious product of the Stalinist phenomenon which he has done so much to help us analyse. ' Somewhat ', because, unlike the fiercely idiosyncratic Solzhenitsyn or Amalrik, he makes what in Soviet circumstances is a herculean attempt to synthesise and to relate what he is saying to what others have said, both inside the Soviet Union and outside it.

There is no doubt whatsoever about this book's value as a contribution to our knowledge of Stalinism. Moreover the translation, by Ellen de Kadt, is really excellent: the English vocabulary is rich, and there are no traces of the familiar problems of translating from the Russian, such as that of word order. The result is a book which is eminently readable by generalist and specialist alike. Still at the general level, it might be held that the anecdotal element is more obtrusive than befits a scholarly historical work. Yet the historian must work with what is available, and who can doubt that there exists, in the Soviet Union, a wealth of anecdotal evidence for events which have been prevented, in one way or another, from finding their way into published records or academic footnotes? What makes Medvedev so valuable as a historian is not only the stories which he records but also the very convincing perspective into which he inserts his anecdotal material. His truth is the truth of coherence. He accepts and rejects on the basis of what makes historical sense, and he applies this razor not only to evidence from within the Soviet Union but also to the conclusions of Western writers. It is in this solitary search for coherence that Medvedev's blend of idiosyncracy and synthesis is so impressive and so compelling. At the same time, it is an approach which can easily be claimed to be vulnerable. Each ' this seems more plausible ' prompts the question ' to whom and why?', and each intolerant ' this is pure invention, of course ' seems to wave aside the problem of verification. On one page Medvedev is saying that ' the absence of source material inevitably leads to inaccuracy and makes it easier to get things wrong ' (p. 86); one page later he is saying: ' this is just one example of how an informed reader can

distinguish genuine memoirs from forgeries with relative ease '. It is in being informed of the context in which the Stalinist drama was played out—that is, by living it—that Medvedev aims to remedy the absence of source material; it is his service to scholarship that he conveys a great deal of that context, and relates it to such hard evidence as we do have in a way which makes very good overall sense.

Turning from the general to the particular, this new book carries on the good work of Medvedev's earlier writing by providing a mass of hitherto unknown details. Particularly valuable is the chapter on ' the twenty-five years without Stalin ', which reminds us that the unravelling of the Stalinist dictatorship was every bit as important, and far more clearly marked as a process, than was its inception. It is remarkable to read, also that Ezhov was a ' quite agreeable ' person who fell totally ' under the almost hypnotic influence of Stalin ' (p. 100). Medvedev's treatment of Trotsky is, on the whole, unfavourable, and at times reaches the point of ungenerosity. Thus the kind words which Trotsky used in his obituary of Krupskaya are put down to Trotsky's own vanity, since to have criticised Lenin's widow would have been to undermine the validity of Krupskaya's support for Trotsky after Lenin's death. It is worth recording also that the origins of socialism in one country are, for Medvedev, to be located in the policies which Lenin recommended under the rubric of the New Economic Policy.

Finally, in the conclusion to the volume, entitled ' Leninism and Stalinism ', Medvedev ranges himself with those who see Lenin and Stalin predominantly as individual actors, as opposed to those who seek to promote the role of the battalions over that of the generals; but he does so within a framework which sees Stalinism as a system. Indeed, he endorses a quotation to the effect that Stalinism was a ' total system of social, political and economic organisation. It is pseudo-socialism '. It is characteristic of the work as a whole that the quotation is attributed not to a published source but to a letter ' which I have received from an old Bolshevik '. If the Stalinist dictatorship had no Nuremburg, it has at least a growing mass of personally recorded experiences; and in Medvedev we have a historian to help us judge them.

University of Manchester MICHAEL WALLER

The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State: A Study of Soviet Managers and Technicians 1928-1935. By Nicholas Lampert. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 191 pp. £12·00.*

THE attempt after the 1917 revolution to create socialism in a backward economy presented the new Soviet leaders with a number of major dilemmas in their relationships with different social strata. How could an independent peasantry be integrated into the fabric of a rapidly industrialising state? What role, if any, had trade unions to play in a state which supposedly embodied the fundamental interests of the industrial working class? What degree of authority and esteem should be allocated to the (ideologically suspect) engineers and managers, who occupied the crucial middle ground between the state and the shop floor? At the end of the 1920s these matters came to a head in a dramatic ' revolution from above ' in which the balance of power was tilted firmly in favour of the state; politics was ' in command '. Dr Lampert's extremely competent and well-written monograph examines one aspect of this process—the changes which occurred from the October revolution to the mid-1930s in the complex triangular relationship between industrial workers, technical specialists and the central political authorities.

The period in question falls into three more or less distinct phases. During the Civil War, early experiments with workers control in industry petered out in an atmosphere which favoured firm discipline and the unfettered power of expertise. Official

indulgence toward technical specialists continued during the New Economic Policy of the 1920s: a blind eye was turned to their social origins and political shortcomings in return for the honest application of technical skills. After March 1928, however, as tension in the countryside mounted and the rate of investment grew the policy of the government changed. ' Bourgeois ' specialists now became scapegoats for industrial failures; even when they could not be accused of ' wrecking ', their scepticism and aloofness were seen as obstacles to economic progress. In this second phase political neutrality was tantamount to treason. But this new toughness on the part of the government obscured the fact that only a question of management style was at stake and not a fundamental reorientation in the relationship between mental and manual labour. Indeed, from June 1931 onwards, when the first main battle with the peasant was over and serious internal dissention within the leadership had become less likely, a new conciliatory policy towards the technical intelligentsia was set in motion. The classic Stalinist pattern began to establish itself: on the one hand, steeper income differentials, material privileges and the official legitimation of technocratic authority; on the other hand, since economic failures could still be interpreted in political terms (some ' wreckers ' still existed!), a strong element of vulnerability and dependence upon the whim of the state remained. Such were the trials and tribulations of the minor service nobility of socialist industrialisation.

The only major shortcoming of the book lies in omission rather than error. The narrative ends at just the time when the relationship between the technical intelligentsia and the Soviet state was about to enter its most critical phase. The reader is therefore left unprepared for the scale and ferocity of Stalin's purges. This omission is regrettable but it is not a fatal weakness since Dr Lampert is concerned primarily with the long-term mechanisms of adjustment between the state and different social strata; the hysteria of the late 1930s is really a special subject in its own right. Seen in this light, Dr Lampert has made an imaginative and intelligent contribution to our understanding of the place of the technical intelligentsia in Soviet society.

University of Birmingham RONALD AMANN

MIDDLE EAST

Great Power Intervention in the Middle East. Edited by Milton Leitenbert and Gabriel Sheffer. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon. 1979. 352 pp. (PPS-27) $18.50.*

THIS is primarily a book for specialists: a collection of essays commissioned for a conference held by the Cornell University Peace Studies Programme in April 1977, and subsequently updated though not to take account of the Iranian revolution or the actual Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The brief which the editors gave to their contributors was to place intervention in the Middle East within the wider framework of great power intervention in less-developed countries since the Second World War. The approach was to be analytical, and empirical rather than speculative. The contributors have complied, and the overall standard of the essays is high.

Where the editors have, however, had problems is in achieving a fully balanced account of their subject. There is perhaps rather too much concentration on the Arab-Israeli conflict and insufficient material on the Gulf, although that was probably the obvious order of priority some three years ago. There also seems to be relatively little about direct military intervention, including super-power naval diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the deployment of Soviet air and missile crews in Egypt between 1970 and 1972. We do however, have a chapter by Yair Evron, which surveys the

subject briefly and concisely, and provides a valuable discussion of the ' rules ' of super-power behaviour in the region.

In contrast, the section on arms transfers appears unduly long, though it should quickly be added that this is probably the best part of the book. Anne Cahn of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, questions the utility of arms transfers as an instrument of American foreign policy. Roger Pajak tells us a great deal about arms sales by Western Europe and the Soviet Union, and includes very useful material on how the various countries go about organising arms sales. Mary Kaldor discusses the economic benefits—or otherwise—from the suppliers' point of view. Those interested in more specifically military matters should read James Foster's article on the implications of the revolution in conventional arms (primarily precision-guided munitions), as it may affect the military balance in less developed regions, notably the Middle East.

What comes off least well is the section on prospects for a political resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The period during which the essays were being written, *i.e.*, from shortly before the 1977 Israeli election which brought Mr Begin's Likud government to power until shortly after the 1978 Camp David agreements, was a particularly difficult time for confident assessment or speculation. All in all then, some very useful material but certainly not a book to be read from cover to cover.

PETER MANGOLD

The Elusive Peace: The Middle East in the Twentieth Century. By William R. Polk. *London: Croom Helm. 1980. 201 pp. £7·95.*

THE more the Middle East becomes an important region in world affairs the more books are written about it. Some have something genuinely new to say but many others are content simply to rearrange well-known material in a slightly different light or justify themselves solely in terms of the importance of the subject itself. W. R. Polk's *The Elusive Peace* falls under all three categories. For the most part it is a brisk, well-written, highly schemetic account of recent Middle Eastern history, paying particular attention to the role of both Arab and Jewish nationalism. Little of it is new, however, and if it has any interest for the specialist it comes in small measure from two other features. The first is the way in which, writing at this present moment in time, Polk chooses to highlight the careers of Menachim Begin and Anwar Sadat, with only passing reference to names which featured so prominantly in earlier books of this kind, such as Golda Meir and David Bengurion. Secondly, Polk has some trenchant things to say about American policy, with which he has had some close connection, and in particular about its failure either to grasp the basic nature of Palestinian grievances or to find a way of bringing a stateless people into the diplomatic negotiating process. In addition he mentions, without giving details, his own role as a private emissary between the Israeli government and President Nasser just after the end of the War of Attrition across the Canal in Autumn 1970.

St Antony's College, Oxford ROGER OWEN

World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. By Robert O. Freedman. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon. 1979. 344 pp. (PPS-31.) $28.50.*

THIS book stems from a conference made possible by a grant from the Zionist Academic Council of the American Zionist Federation, and was held at the Baltimore Hebrew College in March 1978. It adopted a multidimensional approach and aimed to evaluate the interaction between changes in Arab-Israel relations and the super-power

competition for influence in the Middle East. The papers are divided into three groups, dealing respectively with super-power perspectives; regional perspectives; and domestic perspectives. They are introduced by an account of the origin and development of the Palestine problem from the early years of the century until the end of the British Mandate, and followed by an epilogue carrying on the story from the Camp David summit to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. A useful series of appendices gives the texts of the Camp David Accords, the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

The editor's introduction gives the standard Zionist account of the origins and course of the British Mandate, deploring the ' tragedy ' that ' Zionism and Arab Nationalism, instead of cooperating against the colonial control of Britain and France became bitter enemies ' (p. 2). The results were tragic indeed but, since both the strategy and tactics of Zionism combined with the nature of Arab nationalism and of the Arab population of Palestine to preclude any such co-operation, it seems unhistorical to suggest that it could have been otherwise.

Super-power involvement has done so much to define the shape of the conflict in recent years, that it is disappointing that John Campbell and Professor Freedman add so little to our understanding. The former's account of the instant demise of the United States-Soviet Declaration of October 1977 does not mention Moshe Dayan's visit to Washington and the American-Israeli Working Paper, while the latter adduces very little evidence to support his assumption of the insincerity of the Soviet Peace Plan of January 1977. The papers in the other two sections are more enlightening. It is encouraging to find a paper on Palestinian politics alongside those on the politics of Israel, Egypt, and Syria among domestic perspectives, but one cannot help wondering why no consideration was given to Jordanian or Lebanese politics, both surely of very great importance to the evolution of the conflict. The contributors to the section on regional perspectives find it difficult to shed the habit of looking at Middle Eastern politics through American spectacles. But David Albright on the Horn of Africa proves a brilliant exception. He provides a succinct and lucid account of the complex interactions between super-power ambitions, Somali and Eritrean nationalisms, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic ideologies, and the policies of colonial successor states and post-imperial Ethiopia. It explains convincingly why this strategically important area has produced so many paradoxical alliances in recent years, as well as such a heart rending refugee problem. This paper redeems a rather disappointing book and does something to justify its enormous price.

JOHN C. B. RICHMOND

The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. By Bruce R. Kuniholm. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1980. 485 pp. £15·20. Pb: £5·90.*

THIS is one of the first histories of the origins of the cold war. Concentrating on the so called ' Northern Tier ' of Greece, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, Bruce Kuniholm examines the struggle for power between Britain, the United States, and Russia in an area which in the immediate post-1945 era served as the thermometer of the emerging cold war. Kuniholm offers an account of the efforts of Iran, Turkey and Greece to maintain their independence and territorial integrity in the interwar years, and describes how Anglo-Russian rivalry in the region was replaced by the clash between the United States and Russia. In implementing this transition Truman was neither pulling Britain's ' chestnuts out of the fire ' nor impelled by economic motivations, but rather ' responding to his responsibilities for protecting the broad, complex, and inextricably interwoven strategic and security interests of the United States, and to the

State Department's well-founded belief that those interests were best served by maintaining the balance of power along the entire Northern Tier ' (p. 431). 1944, however, appears to have been the key year when Russian pressures in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Iran resulted in both the State Department and the British Foreign Office being willing to settle their differences in the Near East. Kuniholm argues that by this time the essential factor in the policies of both Britain and Russia towards Turkey was the need to secure their interests in the eastern Mediterranean in the postwar world.

The work is based on a careful scrutiny of the available primary sources, particularly for the years after 1945. There is a detailed analysis of how decisions were taken in the United States and an evaluation of the role of various officials. It seems that the tough attitude evidenced towards Russia by Loy W. Henderson was continued when removed from the Russian to the Near-Eastern desk. This was of particular significance because of the ' warm relationship ' which developed between Henderson and Dean Acheson (p. 240). But Kuniholm shows that the State Department was not always in control of policy in the area: Roosevelt distrusted the body as it had trouble in implementing presidential ideals. The role of the ambassadors is also carefully evaluated: as early as 1944 Lincoln MacVeagh, the United States ambassador to the Greek government-in-exile, warned that the British Empire was crumbling in the Balkans and the Near East, and that it was up to the United States to recognise that its own security interests depended on Anglo-American influence along the Northern Tier and in the Balkans (pp. 96-100).

Overall there is a commendable concentration on trying to establish what happened. Kuniholm eschews the temptation to impose artificially concepts of ' economic and political goals, ideologies and self-interest ', and sees such considerations as being of ' little use ' and probably not ' of much ultimate significance ' (p. 428). This important piece of research has been immaculately produced by the publisher: the references appear at the foot of the page; and it is even printed on acid-free paper.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth RITCHIE OVENDALE

Palestinian Society and Politics. By Joel S. Migdal. *Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1980. 290 pp. £12·00. Pb: £4·25.*

IT is not easy to review a volume containing contributions by nine writers. The first is by the author covering about ninety pages and entitled ' Book I '. The other eight articles, nominally edited by the author, constitute Book II. There is no obvious link between the one book and the other, and the editor neglected to write a co-ordinating article. Despite the editor's efforts to obtain contributions from Palestinian and other Arabs, the editor states that none accepted his invitation to participate.

Offered as a ' comparative study ' of the Palestinian Arab society under Ottoman, British, Jordanian and Israeli Governments with a view to understanding the ' historical sociology ' of that society, the book is too diffuse to present a consistent whole. Although ' Palestine ' is taken to refer to the territory that was under British Mandate till 1948, the major concentration is on the West Bank of Jordan after 1967. And although the term ' Palestinian Arabs ' is defined to mean those who inhabited this territory till the end of the British Mandate and also their descendants wherever they happen to be now, the attention is directed—at least in Book I—principally to those who are under Israeli military rule.

Inaccuracies and inexactitudes in Book I are many. Here are examples: The author's map of Mandatory Palestine (p. 18) is truncated on the north by the exclusion of Lake Huleh and the adjacent lands. It is surely a mistake to say that the

British ' secured ' for Kamil al-Husaini the title of ' Grand Mufti ' of Jerusalem (p. 20), for he was Mufti before the British occupation, and the adjective ' grand ' was not officially used by the British in reference to this Mufti or to his successor. Equally mistaken is the assertion (p. 19) that the British ' awarded ' the kingdom of Iraq to Faisal.

Book I abounds in jargon, obscure expressions and muddled constructions. How did the increase of missionaries ' lend security to the country ' (p. 15)? What is meant by the statement that ' Jewish land-buying contributed to land pressure ' (p. 23)? What sense can be extracted from this sentence: ' Without that minimally common language of the rules of the game, politics does not become a coordinated joint venture by those controlling crucial resources ' (p. 33)?

The history in Book I is rather sketchy, derived mostly from secondary works. It is strange that the discussion of the movement of population ignores the two census reports issued by the British authorities in 1922 and 1931, and yet census reports issued by Israel after 1967 are frequently quoted. The sociological research consists of some twenty interviews with individual Arabs in nine villages. The questionnaire is not disclosed, and no particulars are given about any of those interviewed. All interviews were conducted through an interpreter, but the answers were not recorded during the session. The author introduced himself to all those interviewed as an American academic, and concealed the fact that he is a Jew ' affiliated with ' the University of Tel-Aviv (p. 92). He does not give a single full report of any of the interviews. What he gives are mere snippets of recollections written with the help of the interpreter some time after the interviews.

How can such scanty evidence be regarded as a sufficient basis for drawing far-reaching conclusions? There are several such conclusions which may be questioned, but for lack of space here are only two: (1) the claim that the movement of Arab peasants during the mandatory period was from the east to the west. It was in fact the opposite, as a result of the acquisition of land by the Jews in the coastal plane. (2) A hurried journalist might, but an independent academic would not, suggest that the Israeli military administration in the West Bank is simply following precedents set by the Jordanian administration.

A. L. TIBAWI

Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation. By David C. Gordon. *London: Croom Helm; Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution. 1980. 297 pp. £12·95.*

AS someone who knew and was fascinated by Beirut before the civil war, I found this book interesting and enjoyable. For anyone who was captured and entranced by the old Lebanon, it is well worth reading. A very personal account of Lebanese history, the book is written by an American who spent over twenty years living in Beirut, teaching at the American University. His descriptions of university and political life, of intellectual cafe society in places like Faisal's Restaurant, of the quarter of Ayn al-Muraysi where he lived next door to an Italian restaurant and down the street from a mosque and Koranic school—capture familiar images of Beirut as it was.

Any nostalgia one may experience, however, is for a mirage which existed only for a privileged few. Whereas the author moved in the intellectual society of Ras Beirut, anyone who saw the poverty and violence of popular Beirut would have gained some insight into the nature of repression and social control in what was once held forth as an open, democratic and liberal society. Those who really knew the latent tensions of popular Beirut should not be surprised at the viciousness and hatred which became manifest in 1975.

But what of the reader who knows little about life in prewar Lebanon? The book

provides many insights into modern Lebanese history. It is well written, full of revealing anecdotes, and is a lively blend of reminiscences, character sketches and sociological analysis. The analysis is, unfortunately, largely behavioural, much of it cast within the constraints of modernisation theory. As a result, it fails to explain adequately the outbreak and course of the war. The section on the economy, for example, merely skims the surface and does not analyse the class conflict which contributed to the confessional bloodbath which ultimately ensued. Nevertheless, what the book does do is to explain the *milieu* which produced most of the standard works on Lebanon; and because it is written by an intelligent and sensitive observer, it gives the reader a feel for Lebanese political and social culture which is lacking in drier texts on the subject.

University of Sussex MICHAEL JOHNSON

The Fall of the Shah. By Fereydoun Hoveyda. Trans. by Roger Liddell. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1980. 166 pp. £6·95.*

Fall of the Peacock Throne: The Story of Iran. By William H. Forbis. *New York, London: Harper and Row. 1980. 305 pp. £6·95.*

The Rise and Fall of the Shah. By Amin Saikal. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; London: Angus and Robertson. 279 pp. £8·10.*

FEW revolutions are inevitable, fewer still have their course foreordained. Revolutions are therefore difficult to predict but easy to account for after they have occurred. Like the causes of war the reasons adduced are myriad—ranging from broad and longstanding underlying trends and systematic failures, all the way to specific precipitants and even failures in judgment. The Iranian revolution caught most observers unaware yet many commentators today appear to exclude themselves from this category. This is a pity because it leads retrospectively to simplistic analyses, the scoring of political points, and self-justification. The inherent difficulties of identifying trends that make for revolutions are well known; many of these trends persist in some countries (*e.g.*, Italy today) without revolution. In the case of Iran the pessimists (or optimists) had been disproven once before in the early 1960s when learned articles about the ' Coming Crisis in Iran ' had been disproven. Few were prepared to believe them a decade-and-a-half later. Furthermore, scholars of postwar Middle East politics were conditioned to look for indications of military coups rather than popular revolutions.

Whether or not the causes of the Iranian revolution are unique, it is clear that Iran's rapid economic development fuelled by oil revenues has parallels elsewhere in the Third World. Rapid growth generally exacerbates income inequalities. Lopsided growth especially in the development of the economic infrastructure while the political structure stagnates, also generates tensions. This much was well known in the literature of the 1960s on development. Yet the revolution still came as a surprise.

The three books under review have in common the assumption that the Shah's fall was inevitable, yet none show why this was so. In fact one could as easily conclude from much of their work that the regime would persist. All three attempt to explain the revolution as a reaction to the regime's policies—although, the course of the revolution itself was largely fortuitous. The three books are otherwise of uneven quality. The Saikal and Forbis books look like attempts to update and revise a story which was intended for an earlier period. The Hoveyda book is an attempt to explain and justify the author's participation in the Shah's regime as a senior diplomatic official and, as such, he does a creditable job of describing the Shah's regime anecdotally from the standpoint of a skeptical participant within the regime. By no means himself a member of the inner power circle. Hoveyda (the brother of Amir

Abbas Hoveyda, the Prime Minister executed by the revolutionary regime) nonetheless has two problems: to justify his own participation in the regime from which he benefited, while at the same time criticising it (and especially the Shah) for its blindness and ultimate disloyalty toward its loyal supporters. This is not easy to achieve but Hoveyda's attempt illustrates the moral dilemma of many educated people in the Middle East who must choose between serving unattractive regimes or permanent exile. The dilemma if anything is sharpened today.

The Forbis volume is altogether less serious and reads rather like a travel book. Basically favourable to the Imperial regime it is ill-disposed toward its successor. It fails to explain in any systematic way the fall of the peacock throne although the author gives some lively descriptions of the country he visited and the people he met.

Amin Saikal's book is the best single volume on contemporary Iran. It attempts an integrated analysis of the various aspects of the country's economy, political and social structure, foreign and oil policy, etc., to explain present-day Iran—and how it got there. It is, therefore, self-consciously a macro-study; a synthesis of much of the existing specialised work, presented forcefully and readably. The advantages of the approach are at the same time its defects. Its broad range necessitates simplification and the sources quoted are uneven at best. Saikal's emphasis on Iran's foreign and defence policy and its relationship with the United States is, in fact, marginal to the principal issues which animated the revolution. Some of the criticisms of the regime in this field appear simplistic; such as the supposition that Iran's arms purchases posed a threat to its neighbours, particularly in the light of the latter's greater fear of Khomeini who possesses fewer arms. But above all, missing in this competent work is the sense of tragedy. The reader is not enlightened as to the best course to achieve rapid modernisation, or how to avoid ' dependency ', or how to reconcile the conflicting aspirations of the educated classes seeking modern democracy with those of their more traditional brethren longing for an older form of despotism. The reader is sensitised to the manifest errors and failures of the Shah but not to the narrow range of choices which exist in countries such as Iran.

It is still too early to expect books on the Iranian revolution to treat the subject with the detachment and care that it deserves. But until these appear readers should at least be aware of the moré partisan offerings purporting, in simplistic terms, to explain a highly complex and significant event.

International Institute of Strategic Studies SHAHRAM CHUBIN

The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers. By Hanna Batatu. *Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979. 1,283 pp.*

HANNA BATATU must be congratulated for his undoubted scholarship as well as his perseverence in writing this massive volume on the politics of modern Iraq. His book must be regarded as a reference work. It constitutes the most valuable source on the socio-economic politics of the modern state of Iraq ever published. Its 1,300 pages are packed with facts, figures, and analysis on such varied subjects as landlords and peasants, tribal shaykhs and government, radical trends, the origins and history of the Communist and Ba'th Parties, military coups and the officer corps, outlining their role in the politics of Iraq since the establishment of the state to the present.

The author is painstaking in tracing the social background of individual politicians—conservative or radical, nationalist or communist, patriot or secessionist, military or civilian—in order to provide a portrait of Iraq undergoing fundamental changes under the impact of economic and social development which transformed the

political leadership and introduced a new political order. The transformation was made possible by the creation of a new political entity and the subsequent attempt to pacify, integrate and assimilate the diverse communities that made up Iraqi society into a nation-state; a process which Britain ascribed to, mainly to serve her own imperial interests. The author makes no distinction between the initial decision to set up Iraq as a state, which was made to meet a certain set of circumstance on the one hand, and the provisions for political stability in which all governments are interested irrespective of their ideological orientations. Nevertheless, the structural changes which ensued from this process, Batatu argues, were extremely far-reaching.

The main thrust of the author's thesis is that there have been significant changes in the leadership, ideology, and the system of government which have been brought about as a direct result of the socio-economic transformation of Iraqi society since the establishment of the new state in 1921. In numerous tables the names of all those who rose to a position of power are listed showing their social and educational background. The purpose of this tedious exercise is to indicate the variation in the personnel of the ruling groups. However the evidence provided by Professor Batatu also shows how little change has in fact occurred.

It is unfortunate, and the publishers must bear the blame, that Batatu's three excellent but separate studies—namely, of the tribal shaykhs, land ownership and the government; the Communist Party of Iraq; and of the Ba'th Party and military-civil relation in the politics of modern Iraq—should have been lumped together to make up this volume. In his attempt to give these diverse topics thematic uniformity by subjecting them to quasi-Marxist analysis the author succeeded only in reducing the valuable contribution his volume has made. This drawback notwithstanding the book is a welcome addition to the library of Middle Eastern studies. Furthermore Batatu's work on the Iraqi Communist Party will remain unmatched for a long time, since he has been the only scholar to have been allowed an open and free access to the archives of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior on this important subject.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London ABBAS KELIDAR

AFRICA

The Influence of Islam upon Africa. 2nd edn. By J. Spencer Trimingham. *London, New York: Longman; Beirut: Libraire du Liban. 1980. (First publ. 1968.) 182 pp.*

' SECULARIZATION as a process is inevitable here as elsewhere in the modern world '. Thus Professor Trimingham ringingly concluded the first edition of this book: the secular world outlook and underlying material forces are stronger than Islam's capacity to change. The modern school, court, clinic, and the materialist current of opinion are in the process of overwhelming the corpus of Islam. That conclusion apparently still stands, as does the 1968 text: an additional chapter, ' A decade of expanding horizons ', restates the conclusion in updated form. The last ten years apparently demonstrated to the author's satisfaction that ' pan-African but above all *socialist* objectives were stronger forces than Islam '. The Ghana Guinea Mali union, startlingly, is singled out in support of this thesis, as are many equally defunct nationalist political parties.

A newcomer to the field might be tempted to dismiss this book out of hand. But while Trimingham clearly does not read newspapers much, and while he has no detailed understanding of modern political events, he does know a lot about the history of Islam in Africa—enough to write more than eleven books on the subject, books

which remain unsurpassed at their chosen level of generality. So even his political conclusions may be taken with some seriousness.

But what does Trimingham mean in political terms when he talks of this irreversible secularisation? The key to an answer here lies in the subsection entitled ' Conflicts misnamed religions ', where we learn that in Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, ' where any of these conflicts are analysed it is found that they have nothing to do with religion, certainly not in any spiritual sense. Religion is exploited for secular ends ' (p. 133). Quite so, and religion has often been thus ' exploited ' across time and space, with notable effect. The violent ways in which religion moves in the real world are disbarred by the author from the properly religious, a position more soundly based in (oecumenical?) theology than in any study of historical events or observation of recent political conflicts. Monotheistic religion may be at the root of the problem: with the arrival of Islam and Christianity, ' Religion has changed in Africa from being the regulative principle of life to becoming a theology or a law that man could use to forward secular urges '. This statement could evidently be the point of departure of another book, by another author.

Professor Trimingham is unimpressed by the recent record of fundamentalist Islamic reform in Africa. The oil-powered *wahabiyya* is crippled by the inability of its missionaries to speak the relevant African languages, including French and English. And as for the Iranian Islamic Republic, it is ' contrary . . . to the global trend of modern life ', therefore unlikely to survive. His preference is for a reformed Islam, incorporating both Koranic learning and Sufism, appealing to modern ' two-dimensional ' man. He has produced a humane and in its way learned study, as one might expect, but one that is no guide to politics.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London DONAL B. CRUISE O'BRIEN

South Africa's Options: Strategies for Sharing Power. By F. van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh. *Cape Town: David Philip; London: Rex Collings. 1979. 196 pp. Pb.*
Transkei's Half Loaf: Race Separatism in South Africa. By Newell M. Stultz. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1979. 183 pp. £10·00.*

BOTH of these books explore the prospects of South Africa's evolution towards a liberal democratic society, though from different starting-points. The three authors assume with some justification that one man one vote is unlikely to yield such an outcome. However, both books base this conclusion more on the difficulty of operating a system of majority rule in the context of a society deeply divided on racial and ethnic lines than on the certainty of protracted White resistance to one man one vote. It is the authors' perception that liberal values are unlikely to survive the looming confrontation, ostensibly over this issue, between White supremacy and African nationalism that motivates their search for alternatives. In a telling phrase Stultz refers to ' humane alternatives to majority rule ' (p. 4).

Stultz examines the meaning of Transkei's independence in 1976 in the light of schemes for the radical partitioning of South Africa. Such schemes, with the added option of some form of federation, have been put forward by liberals as a possible solution to the conflict, though more commonly a measure of partition has been associated with proposals to buttress rather than eliminate White supremacy. Nonetheless, treating Transkei's independence as a modest step along a long road that may one day lead to an equitable division of South Africa's resources seems, at first sight a viable proposition. That it is not, is suggested by the difficulty Stultz encounters in trying to fit Transkei's experience into this framework. The book is well-written and researched and deals honestly with the authoritarian character of Matanzima's rule, but the author never surmounts the sense of unreality that

pervades his analysis. However, his book does underline that Transkei's independence cannot be ignored in any analysis of the unfolding of the conflict.

F. van Zyl Slabbert is the Leader of the Opposition in South Africa. His co-author, a distinguished liberal academic. In discussing the prospects for a negotiated solution to the conflict in South Africa, they draw on a wide range of academic literature on the resolution of conflict in divided societies, particularly that dealing with the so-called consociational democracies. Much of the analysis is intelligent and nuanced. In developing their thesis that simple majoritarianism would not work in South Africa, they demonstrate their impressive knowledge of comparative politics. Government in Holland, Fiji, Belgium, and Malaysia, to name a few of the examples they choose, is examined. Where they are less successful is in showing the relevance of these cases to the South African situation, at least in the present phase of the conflict.

Once the structure of White supremacy has been dismantled, consociational devices may provide a means of preserving some form of liberal democratic rule that would accord with the authors' hopes for South Africa. In short, there may be a role for consociationalism after the achievement of one man one vote. In arguing for a consociational constitution as an alternative to majority rule, they are putting the cart before the horse. However, this is not to say that power-sharing is irrelevant in the present situation. The South African government has a keen interest in legitimising its rule through forms of power-sharing that are compatible with the maintenance of White supremacy. Whatever other merits it might have, such a government would certainly be authoritarian in character. To an outside observer, it seems most unlikely that White supremacy will disappear without a violent, bitter, and protracted struggle. Both books are concerned to find an alternative to such a struggle. Van Zyl Slabbert and Welsh are persuasive when they suggest that the costs of a violent resolution of the conflict will be very high. Unfortunately, their proposals for averting disaster are less so.

Queen's University of Belfast A. B. GUELKE

The Quail Report: Feb 8 80. (Ciskei Commission). *Pretoria: Conference Associates. 1980. 328 pp. Pb.*

THIS well-researched report was produced by a Commission set up by Chief Sebe of the Ciskei to advise whether his Bantustan should accept 'independence'—as the South African Government is pressing it to do. Its appointment is noteworthy. There was little prior consultation, either with their own 'citizens' or with outside experts when Transkei, Bophutatswana and Venda recently became independent.

The report summarises clearly the well-known economic problems of the Bantustans—their fragmented and undeveloped state, high man-land ratios, and consequent dependence on the 'White' areas for jobs: two-thirds of those classified as Ciskeians live outside their Bantustan; the remaining third rely heavily on remittances from migrants working in South Africa and almost 80 per cent of Ciskeri's budget is financed by Pretoria. The Commission thus has little difficulty in establishing that the costs to Ciskeians of relinquishing their claim to a share in the wealthy, developed 86 per cent of South Africa that comprise the 'White' areas would outweigh the benefits of independence—at least on the basis currently offered by Pretoria. It would be 'imprudent', they warn, to adopt South Africa's suggestion that they *first* take independence and *then* negotiate for the 'as yet ill defined advantages of membership of a hypothetical constellation'. This recommendation was unanimous, even though the Commission included two prominent Afrikaner nationalists (a businessman and an academic). Among its other members were Professors Rotberg and Kilby of the United States and Arthur Snelling, former British ambassador in Pretoria.

The South African government argues that, despite the economic costs, independence would confer political benefits—the preservation of their ' identity ' and control over their density—which it believes is desired by both Black and White ethnic groups. The Commission asked Professor Lawrence Schlemmer to test this. His findings, published in appendices and tabulations to the report. constitute a valuable exploration of attitudes on these key questions.

Schlemmer found that only 37 per cent of Ciskeians favoured independence, ranging from 42 per cent within some areas of Ciskeri to 19 per cent among the more numerous and politically important Xhosa-speakers (the Ciskei/Transkei ethnic group) in the big cities outside. Moreover, those who favoured independence did so because it would enable them to escape from apartheid and discrimination, not because they valued it *per se*. Schlemmer's findings thus provide irrefutable evidence for the widely-held belief that the majority of Blacks reject the official ' separate development ' policy.

The preferred option of 90 per cent of Blacks is a unitary multiracial state with a common franchise for all races. However, the complementary survey of White attitudes shows that they reject this. In the search for second-best solutions, various confederal and ' consociational ' options are explored. The surveys show that 70 per cent of Whites would prefer a confederation to independent Bantustans, which could lead to economic fragmentation; 72 per cent of Blacks would also accept this—although it is not their first choice. The surveys also show that most Blacks favour using the Bantustan institutions to press for more land and other improvements, that Bantustan leaders such as Buthelezi have widespread support, and that 88 per cent of Blacks would not rule out independence on more favourable terms.

The interpretation of findings on these often hypothetical questions is more problemmatical—as Schlemmer implicitly recognises when he argues that, despite his own finding of overwhelming Black support for non-racial policies, this current ' political orthodoxy ' of urban Blacks is largely a reaction against the government's emphasis on ethnicity and that ' ethnic social boundaries are sufficiently crystallised to provide a focus for conflict under adverse circumstances ' which could leave minorities highly vulnerable. The report therefore reflects current thinking among (White) South African reformists in preferring a decentralised system with weighted and entrenched rights for minorities, to the ' Westminster type of majority rule '. The non-racial character of the Commission's own imaginative suggestion of an experimental multiracial condominium is unfortunately marred by the bizarre suggestion that it should be administered by a bicameral legislature consisting of ' one Black and one White house of equal size ', with legislation requiring a two-thirds majority in each house.

Commendably, this official report records complaints of corruption made by witnesses and, in an Appendix, Professor Rotberg objects to Ciskei's ' political intimidation ' of the opposition and its use of the powers of detention without trial lavishly bestowed on it by Pretoria.

MERLE LIPTON

Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966–79. Edited by Oyeleye Oyediran. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 319 pp. £12·00. Pb: £4·95.*

WITH Nigeria's return to civilian rule at the end of 1979 it is appropriate and timely that Dr Oyediran and his collaborators should have given us this interesting and very informative account of the thirteen years of military government. It is in no sense a detailed or comprehensive history of the period but sensibly restricts itself to looking at the effect of military rule on ' certain aspects of government and politics '. In view of

the theme of the book it is perhaps surprising that there is no chapter on the army itself: but then, although the military was predominant throughout the period, a major grievance of the soldiers long before 1975 was the small part they, as individuals, had in shaping and administering the country's policies. Other and perhaps more serious omissions include the trade unions and students, both of which played a prominent part in the opposition which coalesced in the mid-1970s around the issue of civilian rule.

Although the army does not get separate treatment there are two chapters dealing with the crucial (and highly controversial) role of the civil servants, whose influence appeared greater under military rule than under that of the politicians.

On the record of military rule in Nigeria there seems a broad measure of agreement that the country's international standing was considerably enhanced by a more outward-looking and at times even militant foreign policy. On economic policies the record appears to be more equivocal. Dr Iwayemi is critical of the government's ' indigenisation ' policies, prefers to suspend judgment on the operation of the recent Land Use decree, and regrets that ' agriculture has consistently stagnated during the military era ' (p. 56). On civil liberties Lateef Jakande, now governor of Lagos State, is distinctly unfair in concentrating on the notorious ' Amakiri affair ' as in some sense typical of the problems of the press under military rule. Relations between the press and the government were frequently strained, but the Nigerian press was remarkably free in its criticisms of the Gowon administration, and the campaign against ' corruption ' mounted by the country's leading newspapers contributed greatly to Gowon's demise in 1975. The remaining contributions deal largely with military withdrawal and the detailed implementation of the government's very precise timetable for the handover to a civilian administration. The process, which really only began in 1975, was still incomplete when the book went to press. Even at this early stage however, the contributors appear pessimistic—not about military withdrawal, but about the prospects of the successor regime. In his concluding chapter—' Civilian Rule for How Long '—the editor tries to assess the prospects for civilian rule after 1979 by examining the issues that prompted army intervention in the first place to see how far they are still relevant today. While some of the issues have indeed been resolved and the responsibility for government now rests unequivocally with the figure of the president, the book ends on an ominous note: ' It is the unpredictability of the military factor that makes a long civilian rule in Nigeria very doubtful ' (p. 287).

University of Warwick IAN R. CAMPBELL

Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. By Guy Gran. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 331 pp. £14·75.*

' WHEN the observations of facts do not agree with a theory . . . the theory has to be discarded and replaced by another one which promises a better fit.' Thus wrote Gunnar Myrdal nearly a quarter-of-a-century ago, and before Zaire became independent. This symposium considers the economic medicines administered to that country and its predecessor, the Congo, and attempts—both by local and general studies—to describe how the patient has fared under the theories applied to it. The report is a depressing one.

The underlying hypothesis is that neo-classical economic theory has failed utterly to supply the overwhelming majority of people with a minimal standard of existence. This, it is contended, is due to its inability to take into account the nature of the systems through which it has to operate and of the real people which it believes it can benefit. Stafford Beer's contention that systems exist to maintain themselves rather than to do what they are set up to do (p. 1) is central to the book, and the evidence

provided in the text would seem to bear this out entirely. A list of nearly eighty acronyms (pp. xvi–xviii) suggests how even the intended functions of systems important to the country can hide behind superficially meaningless initials. This is a legacy from the Belgians which has been taken up with enthusiasm.

Once having established itself, a major preoccupation of any colonial government is self-maintenance. In the case of the Congo in particular, a cash economy had to be induced in order to meet the costs of an exotic government, and the need to maintain and expand the tax-base continued to shape the development of its colonial economy. How far has this fundamental position changed with independence?

In Zaire today, welfare and development funds flow into the top of the governmental pyramid; for those slightly lower down, wages are small. Even after President Mobutu Sese Seko and his entourage have taken their ' rake-off ', there may be some worthwhile ' percentages ' left. For those at the bottom of the pyramid or heap there are few wages, no ' percentages ', and even those crates which do arrive more often than not have had their contents stolen. Each of the dozen or more individual contributions to the study tells much the same story from as many different situations in various parts of the country and at several levels. It would be invidious to single any one of them out. Yet excellent as this book is as a study in misgovernment and the mismanagement of welfare schemes Guy Gran's final chapter does make some challenging suggestions for a more constructive approach.

In his Introduction, Gran makes the valid claim that this volume can serve as ' A broad and analytical introduction to modern Zaire for the English-speaking audience '. There is nothing nearly so good for this purpose on the market, and there is an excellent Bibliography.

University of Dundee PHILIP WHITAKER

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan. Edited by Onkar Marwah and Johnathan D. Pollack. *Boulder, Col: Westview Press; Folkstone: Dawson. 1980. 180 pp. £9·00.*

OVER the past decade it has become very clear that China, India, and Japan are not only the leading powers of Asia, if we leave out the Soviet Union, but that their influence extends to the world at large. The editors of this volume, however, rightly confine their attention to the place these three states occupy within their regions and offer a useful collection of essays examining their military organisation and potential.

Marwah and Pollack avoid the temptation of trying to put the three case studies into a theoretical straitjacket, although the reader is left rather confused by the claims made for the book in the editors' introduction and Stephen Cohen's first chapter.

We are told that ' This study challenges the belief that the security concerns and strategic objectives of lesser states are dependent on the dominant power alliances and on assessments by major powers of the prospects for peace or war.' Fair enough, if only they had left it at that. But later on there is a hint that the book will make a contribution to a new understanding of international politics whose ' predominant focus ' has been on the European state system. Yet in the end we get a very conventional concept of world politics whose norms are derived from the European state system.

State power is measured in the usual way. The criteria are the military and industrial potential, defence organisation, and the strategic environment. The limitations of this approach become apparent in Stephen Cohen's essay ' Toward a

Great State in Asia?' The picture that seems to emerge from this overview is that of a world where nothing changes except the three powers which are the subject of the book. It leads him into absurdities such as the statement that ' Neither superpower is likely to decline ' (p. 35), followed by a very good discussion of their relative decline.

The basic weakness of the approach is that it overlooks the exceedingly complex relationship between domestic and external policy. Cohen writes: ' Even in Japan, the central leadership must demonstrate continued toughness on territorial questions ', but he does not ask why this should be so or whether governments have not chosen to emphasise such issues for reasons of domestic politics which have very little to do with ' national security '.

The best contribution in the book is by Pollack whose study of China never loses sight of the wider perspective and who is well aware of the many uncertainties of the Chinese situation. He has a particularly interesting and well-informed discussion of China's military organisation and strategies. Onkar Marwah's chapter on India is very informative about the structure of the armed forces, strategy, and the technological and industrial infrastructure. The discussion remains, however, two-dimensional and there is no serious consideration of social and political constraints.

The last essay, by Yasuhisa Nakada, is the most narrowly focused of all. From his account of ' Japan's Security Perceptions and Military Needs ' one has the impression that there is no security debate in Japan at all and that the view of the ' politico-military establishment ' (p. 157), which is neither explained nor defined, is the accepted orthodoxy. As for Japan's threat perceptions, Nakada concentrates his discussion almost exclusively on Korea and to some extent it has been overtaken by events.

The three studies contain some valuable information and the reader would have been helped by an index to make better use of it. As a study of the interaction of military power and national policy, the essays on India and Japan take a curiously uncritical view of the military as a powerful interest group within the state.

King's College, London WOLF MENDL

Food Trends and Prospects in India. By Fred H. Sanderson and Shyamal Roy. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1979. 162 pp. Pb.*

WHETHER by the year 2000 some 1,000 million Indians will have enough to eat or whether they will have to compete for limited world exports with, say, China, Russia or Japan could well become a matter of prime preoccupation to the world's political leaders of the time. Fred Sanderson, formerly a commodity specialist at the State Department, has investigated these questions on behalf of the Brookings Institution, which a year earlier published his assessment of Japan's food prospects. In co-operation with his Indian colleague Shyamal Roy, Fred Sanderson applied the familiar tools of the econometrician to the analysis of India's food supplies and demands during the last twenty-five years and to the projection up to the turn of the century. Of course, similar exercises have been carried out before—for varying spans of time—by national and international agencies, such as the US Department of Agriculture, the International Food Policy Research Institute and the FAO of the United Nations. Thus the authors did not plough an entirely virgin furrow. Set against the conclusions of earlier studies (see Table 9-3, p. 136), the authors display a fair degree of optimism with regard to India's population growth rate, *per capita* income, and demand for foodgrains. Their findings, therefore, call for some scrutiny.

The authors believe that ' India's food policy will continue to operate under the same economic and political constraints as in the past ' (p. 146). This seems questionable; new problems are bound to crop up. It may also be doubted whether

' India can, with a slightly increased effort, produce enough food to satisfy any likely increase in demand ' (p. 137)—particularly since this is thought to entail a wholly improbable daily food intake, by the year 2000, of 3,400 calories. A realistic demand projection of this magnitude would have to allow for the conversion of some 1,000 primary calories into, say, 150 calories in the form of animal produce. This addition to the 350 calories of animal origin anticipated by the authors would probably exceed the limits of the family food budget. Some important aspects of the composition of the diet (proteins, minerals, vitamins) and thus of malnutrition (as against undernourishment) have been badly neglected by the authors. This also applies to the detrimental effects which family ' planning ' during Indira Gandhi's emergency is likely to have on the growth rate of the population in the years to come.

On the supply side of the balance sheet, the authors underestimate the inhibiting effects which the oil price policy of OPEC countries is having on the production and use of fertilisers. They also ignore the need for a shift in the fertiliser ratio from nitrogen to phosphates and potash in line with the diversification of the cropping pattern which they anticipate. As to the future needs of the paddy rice economy, the authors pay scant attention to the interdependence between irrigation and drainage and the conflicting interests of the water managers and the electric-power engineers. On the institutional side, the authors make light of social inequality and political polarisation. Yet, even allowing for faults in the statistical returns, the doubling of the number of tiny farmsteads and their fragmentation within a mere two decades suggest that, outside the Punjab and Haryana, India's countryside is heading towards massive socio-political conflict. The widespread abuse of land reform and the change of tenants into landless seasonal labourers are ominous pointers in this respect.

In their projections the authors actually magnify the potential dangers in years to come by assuming that at the turn of the century more than two-fifths of the population will be town dwellers—against less than 30 per cent estimated by the Indian government (in the report of the National Commission on Agriculture). By implication, the authors transfer more than 100 million under-employed villagers to towns and cities where, as members of a rapidly growing *lumpenproletariat* they are likely to make revolution a near-certainty. In sum, the reader can be expected to conclude that—within the wider socio-political context—India's food and farming will differ substantially by the turn of the century from the somewhat idyllic colour slide projected with the aid of the tele-lenses used by Sanderson and Roy. Any snapshots of India's future require the use of both red and green filters.

W. KLATT

St Antony's College, Oxford

The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy. By Greg O'Leary. *London: Croom Helm. 1980. 302 pp. £12·50.*

THIS is an attempt to analyse from a leftist perspective the changes in Chinese foreign policy during the 1968–73 period. The author's central argument is that these changes, including detente with the United States, did not simply derive from an ' unprincipled ' fear of the Soviet Union but from an internally consistent view of the world that was based on a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of ' developments in international capitalism '. These included an assessment of a ' decline in United States imperialism ' that was contested by some in Peking, including Lin Piao. The best chapter is the third, in which Dr O'Leary scrutinises the emergence of these new perspectives and the domestic Chinese opposition to them. This is ground over which other scholars have gone, but few with quite so much thoroughness. Other chapters consider the background to China's foreign policy and the detailed application of the new policy lines to China's relations with the super-powers, the Third World, Japan,

and Europe. The book is based on substantial research and is thought-provoking and sometimes perceptive. The author has the happy knack of being able to distil the significant essence from lengthy Chinese articles on international affairs.

There are, however, several basic flaws. He seems to accept every Chinese statement at face value, never looking beneath its surface. If the Chinese say that their policy is ideologically sound, then so it is. His tendency in the early part of the book to leap around in time, and throughout it to indulge in constant sermonising digressions on the evils of ' American imperialism '—sometimes makes it hard to follow his arguments or grasp his point. More seriously, some of his chief assertions are untenable. He seems, for example, unaware that a fear of the rise of Soviet power is not only compatible with a perception of declining American power, it is the other side of the same coin. His dismissal (p. 248) of those who discerned North Vietnamese opposition to China's negotiations with Nixon was, clearly, written several years ago and looks ludicrous today. His apparent assumption—evident in his many abusive asides against other authors—that he has been granted some insight into the minds of China's leaders that is denied to lesser mortals is as groundless as it is tiresome. Dr O'Leary was particularly ill-advised to take on more subtle and better informed analysts than himself, such as A. S. Whiting, whose ' absurd ' thesis (p. 130) about Chinese motivations for rapprochement with America looks only too relevant today. Finally, his initial interesting assertion (p. 13) that China's foreign policy is an ' outgrowth ' of the dominant class interests there, promises a sociological analysis of the Chinese ruling elite and the relation of its interests to foreign policy which never materialises.

University of Birmingham J. D. ARMSTRONG

Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms 1950–1965. By Frederick C. Teiwes. *New York: Sharpe; Folkestone, Kent: Dawson. 1979. 729 pp. £15·00.*

THIS book covers a well-worn period of Chinese history, namely the years from liberation to the Cultural Revolution, but what Teiwes offers us is a unique approach to the study of the conflict which erupted during the Cultural Revolution. Previous studies have concentrated on the debates and conflicts which have arisen over social and economic questions. Teiwes, while acknowledging their obvious importance and relationship to his main focus, concentrates on the organisational norms defining acceptable behaviour within the elite and the associated process of rectification. In this fascinating study Teiwes maintains that Chinese politics since 1949 can be seen in terms of the erosion of these organisational principles, which had been developed in Yanan, and which had served the Chinese Communist Party in the immediate post-liberation years.

Principles such as Leninist discipline (' the lower level is subordinate to the higher level '), collective leadership (' the minority is subordinate to the majority ') and minority rights (' if a Party member holds different views . . . he is allowed to reserve his views ') operated during the early 1950s and helped ensure the smooth functioning of the system (except for the hiccup of the purge of Gao Gang and Rao Shu-shi). However, by the late 1950s important differences appeared within the leadership over organisational practices, differences which placed the traditional approach under challenge and in the mid-1960s these norms were totally shattered by the Cultural Revolution.

Gradually over the period of time rectification became increasingly coercive as its more persuasive aspects were disregarded. Teiwes identifies both problems which are inherent in certain salient features of the political system (*e.g.*, phenomena related to

the bureaucracy such as excessive red tape and the pursuit of narrow departmental interests) and problems which arise from the particular policies being pursued. Teiwes highlights a series of variables which shape both the focus and methods of a rectification campaign. First, the nature of administrative arrangements at a given time, especially the degree of centralisation or decentralisation, will have an important bearing on the aims and targets of rectification. Secondly, the short-term phase characterising the political system—namely whether it is one of consolidation or mobilisation —is an important determinant. Thirdly, and most importantly, the degree of unity and consensus within the top leadership of the Party is crucial. As this leadership cohesion broke down from mid-1957 on, the effectiveness of reform efforts decreased and coercive disciplinary methods increased tied to the larger pattern of declining norms. Where fundamental approaches were involved, as was especially the case after the retreat from the Great Leap Forward, the stakes became higher and the survival and fortunes of individual leaders became increasingly tied to the outcome of policy disputes. Finally, overlooking this was Mao who Teiwes sees as being a crucial variable frequently changing his position. He was, Teiwes states, ' the foremost proponent of long-established organisational norms and the political force whose actions cut the ground from beneath those norms '. Mao's concern for maintaining the values of the Chinese revolution is seen as destroying the organisational guidelines which had capably served the revolution.

Although the substance of the book deals with the pre-Cultural Revolution years the conclusion contains an interesting few pages on the period since 1966, which is seen as initially a struggle over competing norms and latterly as the restoration of Party norms. The book represents a unique look at pre-1966 years which is eloquently written and is one of the best works of the last decade representing the progress that has been made in the field of China studies since the 1960s.

University of Newcastle A. J. SAICH

Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-1946. By James Reardon-Anderson. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1980. 216 pp. $18.75.*

THIS is a valuable contribution to the growing literature on relations between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1940s. It sets out to show how Yenan's policies were framed against a background of conflicting pressures and constraints, with three factors of most importance. First, was the changing strategic situation in China which, in general, encouraged the Communists to opt for military rather than political means towards their goals. Secondly, there was the balance of forces within the Party itself, with the army keen to expand and the advocates of conciliation silenced by the recently concluded Rectification Campaign. Finally, the influence of the Soviet Union and the United States was of critical importance until both powers began to reduce their presence in China. The book is clearly and succinctly written and, based on much recently available information, makes a good case for its central theme that CCP policies continually shifted and changed throughout the period in response to different external stimuli.

Three criticisms may be advanced, none of which detracts from the book's considerable merit. First, it is too short. In particular, it would have been interesting to have the author's conclusions on the 1946-49 period. If the CCP was able to manoeuvre so flexibly between the great powers in 1944-46, why was its posture apparently so rigid in the remaining years of the civil war? Secondly, it is somewhat Americo-centric in orientation. For example, the author's opening gambit, that 1944 ' marks the beginning of contemporary Chinese foreign policy ' (p. 1) is only valid if

one accepts that the United States was the only foreign country of any importance to the CCP and that its experiences in more than twenty years before 1944 had no impact whatsoever. Finally, the Introduction and Conclusion are dominated by an unnecessary and less than subtle dismissal of ideology, and even ' ideas ', as factors of any significance in CCP policy-making. Nowhere does the author say what he understands ' ideology ' to mean, although his use of phrases like ' master plan ' and ' vision of world order ' suggests a somewhat simplistic definition of the term. The claim that ' circumstances more than ideas dominated Yenan's behaviour ' (p. 169) is only acceptable if it can be shown that ' circumstances ' could only be perceived in one way and that, having been so perceived, no dispute was possible concerning the correct policy response. The author's refusal to consider the possibility of any ideological predisposition on the part of the CCP to believe the best of the Russians and the worst of the Americans leads him occasionally to needlessly complicated explanations of Yenan's behaviour—after the departure of Stilwell (p. 48) or during the Soviet ' rape of Manchuria ' (p. 139), for instance.

It is, perhaps, only fitting that the current vintage crop of American sinologists should labour to correct the misconceptions of a ' few bad elements ' amongst their predecessors. They need, however, to guard against the danger of replacing one mythology about China with another.

University of Birmingham J. D. ARMSTRONG

Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan: The Postwar Experience of the Republic of China. Edited by Walter Galenson. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1980. 519 pp. £17·75.*

TAIWAN has often been referred to as a model of development when compared with other countries in Asia whose economic record and documentation leave much to be desired. Taiwan, a small island of some 17 million people, has had one of the highest rates of economic growth in modern times, one of the least skewed patterns of wealth and income, and the most comprehensive and consistent account of its performance including the relatively brief setback caused by the Middle East crisis of 1973. Even the Statistical Data Book, a paperback which, in some 190 tables, contains the record of the last quarter of a century, gives more factual information than many a developed country provides.

It might therefore be thought easy to write about Taiwan's economic growth and structural change, but this is not so; hence the devotion of seven highly qualified practitioners of economic development to the analysis of the island's record, which is justly dedicated to the late Ta-chung Liu, the pathfinder for the economists among the China-watchers. In the first chapter, Simon Kuznets of Harvard, one of the best judges of the economics of development, draws attention to certain shortcomings in this otherwise remarkably good source material, as in the case of the all-important size and composition of Taiwan's population. Following Mao's seizure of power on the Chinese Mainland, Taiwan's population suffered some major upsets as a result of the influx of more than a million refugees some of whom married local Taiwanese. Thus the traditional ties of these girls were broken and they attached themselves to the minority of the Kuomintung which took over from the defeated Japanese colonial administrators the role of the island's rulers.

The authors of the book—a truly multinational team of specialists—spread throughout the text well over a hundred tables and graphs, of which unhappily there is no index. Documentation and analysis cover all major sectors of Taiwan's economy, such as industry (Gustav Ranis of Yale); agriculture (Erik Thorbecke of Cornell); finance (Erik Lundberg of Stockholm); foreign trade (Maurice FitzGerald Scott of

Nuffield College, Oxford); as well as labour and living standards (Walter Galenson, the book's editor and for many years the leading spirit of the project on the economy of China, sponsored by the American Social Science Research Council). Last but not least a summary review by Ian Little (Nuffield College, Oxford) provides the reader with a final overall assessment which is enriched as a result of comparisons with Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore—the other success stories of the Far East. Like Professor Kuznets at the start of the book, Ian Little at the end reconnoitres the broad structural aspects of an absorbing subject which deserves the attention of planners and politicians the world over.

In the circumstances, it is a little unfortunate that the book has been written by economists for economists, to the almost certain exclusion of those who are in search of a generally applicable model, if such there is. Readers of this kind will not find it easy to penetrate to the few remarks on the most relevant question why Taiwan succeeded where others failed. Thus, a few of the most important aspects of the Taiwan ' model ' deserve to be singled out. There were not only the lessons of the past, such as the experience gained during Japanese colonial rule, but also the challenge to adapt to new, unexpected situations. In particular, there was the influx of large numbers of KMT civilian administrators and military strategists—none of them having ties or titles to Taiwan's vested interests and thus all of them being able to implement radical reforms which they had failed to enforce back home on the Mainland. Finally, there was the outstandingly large American aid programme which—leaving aside substantial amounts of military hardware—added about one year's gross national product in the most crucial decade of the island's development. Being economists, the authors refrain, perhaps wisely, from considering the political aspects of the Taiwan experiment. Yet, may the reader not be expected to ask whether the harshness of Taiwan's KMT leadership, as displayed recently in the Chungli ' birthday party ' incident (May 1979) and in the ' Formosa sedition ' case (December 1979), will not jeopardise the gains worked for so hard in three decades of economic growth and social change? That question has to await the findings of another team of Taiwan-watchers.

St Antony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

How Mongolia is Really Ruled: A Political History of the Mongolian People's Republic, 1900–1978. By Robert Rupen. *Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1979. 225 pp.*

THE article on the Mongols in that scholarly edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* of 1910–11 concludes ' their name has left its imprint only on the dreary stretch of Chinese-owned country from Manchuria to the Altai Mountains '. This work is one of very few studies that have been made of the international importance of the Mongolian Republic which now occupies the strategically important buffer zone between the Soviet Union and China. It is a volume published in the series entitled *Histories of Ruling Communist Parties* although the subtitle indicates it is a study of the political history of the Republic going back to the days of its ' dreary stretch ' status. The author is an established authority on Mongolia who has travelled over the ground of this study in Soviet Central Asia, Siberia and Mongolia—although the text conveys little of the feeling of first-hand observation. It is a work of reference rather than one of stimulating ideas and the value of much of the detailed information it contains is not always obvious.

Mongolia was long regarded by both China and Russia as lying within their respective spheres of influence. The Mongolian revolution of 1911 coincided with the end of the Manchu dynasty in China and was given international recognition in the Treaty of Kyakhta in 1915 between Russia, Mongolia and China. The boundaries it

established have remained substantially intact to this day. Bourgeois nationalism is held to be the main source of opposition to Chinese penetration of Mongolia which was eliminated by the early 1960s. Russian influence has steadily prevailed and is characterised as ' progressive ' and the quality of the health, education, standard of living and cultural values of the Mongolian people in the Republic are shown to be much better than that in the Chinese province of Inner Mongolia in which the Mongols are a declining ethnic minority.

The Mongols are reported to be

> willing and even eager to follow the Soviet lead for three principal reasons: (1) Russian strategic interests and Mongolian national interests coincide in one important respect—opposition to China; (2) improved health and education assure physical survival and greater career choices for Mongols; and (3) the Russians have paid well for services rendered by Mongols—in extending generous support to a Mongolian elite that does the USSR's bidding and in supplying goods without requiring direct repayment.

Furthermore ' the Soviets are unlikely to move in on, dominate, and assimilate the Mongols as the Chinese have shown through their takeover of Inner Mongolia that they are willing to do ', and it is ' the very impossibility of massive Russian settlement in Mongolia that makes the Mongols prefer the Soviets to the Chinese '. Recent reports of the decision by the Chinese to restore the shrine of Chinggis Khan in Inner Mongolia suggest that China can still wish to woo the Mongols. The author however concludes that the Republic is a stable regime which is a ' dual polity, partly integrated into the USSR and partly independent and organizationally autonomous '.

University of Leicester M. HOOKHAM

NORTH AMERICA

America and the World 1978: *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 57, No. 3. Edited by William P. Bundy. *New York, Oxford: Pergamon. 1979. 277 pp. $15.95. Pb: $5.00.*

Congress and American Foreign Policy. By Godfrey Hodgson. *London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1979. 57 pp. (Chatham House Papers, No. 2.) Pb: £5·00.*

THE *Foreign Affairs* book is a simultaneous and unabridged publication of Volume 57, No. 3 of the journal and retains the original pagination. For many years the Council published an annual survey of world affairs with an accompanying volume of documents. These excellent and invaluable series were supplanted in the early 1970s by a single annual volume on American Foreign Relations, presumably for reasons of cost; it is to be hoped that the present innovation does not previsage the imminent decease of the post-1971 series also. According to an editorial note the aims of *America and the World* are ambitious: ' to catch the most important events of the year 1978 on the fly . . . (and) connect what happened in 1978 to the past and unfolding future '. Elaine P. Adam contributes a chronology of the year.

The thirteen interpretative essays by different writers embrace a variety of approaches and judgments. The first is a view from abroad by Professor Hedley Bull of Oxford that stresses ' Consistency under Pressure ', but the counterpoint piece by Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University develops ' the Perils of Incoherence ', a theme that is common to most of the domestic American contributors. A consensus evaluation seems to emerge in which the Carter administration is accused of lack of clarity of aim, and inadequate co-ordination of method, in the pursuit of ideals that

tend to have merely rhetorical definition. Hoffmann stresses the need for a ' strategic rationale that brings the fragments together ' (p. 489); many of his co-contributors subscribe to this and, in their several criticisms of the administration's inability to command events, imply that such control is in fact possible through better management of policy. This is highly debatable in the post-Vietnam world, for if that war demonstrated anything at all it was surely that the concept of super-power demands re-definition and qualification.

Those essays that focus more exactly on exposition of policy events are generally more satisfying than the more speculative exercises. The sections on East Asia, the Middle East and Africa are models of their kind. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr contributes an elegant essay on ' Human Rights and the American Tradition ', relating Carter's concern to the long-standing American preoccupation with philosophical proclamation, and takes the editorial instruction to relate the events of 1978 to the past very literally indeed. A number of the writers refer to Congress's role in foreign policy, but only incidentally. This is disappointing, particularly in view of the criticisms of the President which have pervaded Congress in recent years. An essay analysing legislative attitudes would have married well with Daniel Yankelovich's concluding chapter: ' Farewell to President Knows Best '. His analysis of increasing public mistrust of presidential leadership, and his concurrent argument that the public *is* able to have informed and coherent views on foreign policy matters, and *can* act responsibly, lead him to the conclusion that ' public involvement is the only real alternative to an imperial presidency ' (p. 693). This again should raise questions about Congress.

Godfrey Hodgson's work paper is a very different exercise, infused with the enthusiasm and vitality of a keen mind unsated by years as a Washington correspondent and writer on the American scene. Congress is his prime concern. After general comment on the system of checks and balances he takes four case studies: the Turkish arms embargo; Rhodesia; the Tokyo Round; and SALT II—stressing the pluralistic nature of Congress in the context of a tilt towards the legislature in the formulation of foreign policy that has, he argues, become institutionalised and ' irreversible ' (p. 52). This judgment is debatable, as are many others in this lively and well-written paper, but their zest makes it an excellent text for student use. Hopefully the sale price will not deny it the circulation that it deserves.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy. By Robert C. Johansen. *Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1980. 517 pp. £19·50. Pb: £4·25.*

THIS book merits intensive study and deliberation beyond the limits imposed by the exigencies of review. Johansen, President of the Institute for World Order in New York, is a leading exponent of global humanism. This seeks to provide an alternative framework for decision making through definition of a value-centred approach. Four problems are expressed as values: ' peace without national military arsenals (V_1), economic well-being for all inhabitants on the earth (V_2), universal human rights and social justice (V_3), and ecological balance (V_4) ' (p. 20). These problems are also goals, and being stated as values suggest a philosophical problem inherent in the transition from empirical assertion to ethical principle. To this extent what seem to be psychological assumptions about the nature of man need perhaps fuller explanation if the exercise is not to be dismissed as visionary.

Johansen certainly appears to hold no immediate expectation that positive policies will result from a reorientation of thinking, and is aware of the danger of cultural

imperialism in the definition of value. He is not a utopian insisting on unilateral great-power adaptation of its thought processes but does believe that somewhere a beginning has to be made to launch ' a humane alternative to the neo-Darwinist trend in the establishment of a concert of great powers or multinational corporate elites '. He remains convinced, however, that ' the most beneficial future world order system will be responsive to populist demands for peace, economic equity, social and political dignity, and ecological balance ' (p. 36). The psychological dimension does raise questions in the light of historical experience, for populism has not invariably been beneficent.

The bulk of the work is devoted to four case studies: strategic arms limitation, American foreign aid to India, the United States and human rights in Chile, and American policy for international control of marine pollution. Each begins with a descriptive policy statement, followed by analysis of the official rationale compared with the values implicit in American policy, and concludes with application of the global humanist approach. What is meant by this can be readily indicated by reference to Chile. Policies would be launched directed to the following goals: termination of all covert intervention; termination of all covert intelligence gathering; extension of aid and credit on the basis of need rather than ideological sympathy; prohibition of clandestine political activities by multinational corporations; education of the American public to accept indigenous and spontaneously generated desires for rapid socio-economic change; use of judicial tribunals and arbitration procedures to resolve questions of compensation arising from the nationalisation of investment, and the use of ' principles of human rights to restrict policy means as well as to guide policy ends ' (p. 275).

Few would debate Johansen's conclusions about the need to change present patterns and move towards greater co-operation if our world is not to destroy itself. Whether it can be done by transnational citizens' groups and non-governmental agencies imposing human values on established institutions must remain conjectural; unless man's innate instincts are as enlightened as he requires them to be.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

Foreign Policy by Congress. By Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1980. 357 pp. £10·50.*

THIS study is an important analysis of the ' revolution ' in the control of American foreign policy which has followed the ending of the Vietnam War. In the view of the authors the present period of Congressional assertiveness may be a permanent rather than a temporary phenomenon, and the case they make is persuasive. The value of the study is that it is one of the few that examines the changes in detail from a legislative perspective, illustrating not only the extent of the new Congressional impact on a wide range of foreign policy issues but also the changes in the balance of influence within Congress which affect the nature of this impact. The authors have combined interview evidence, documentary material, and specific case studies into a highly readable assessment of the virtues, consequences and defects of the new developments.

The result is a realistic and comprehensive appraisal of the capacity of Congress to share the responsibilities of foreign policy. Several traditional arguments made about the demerits of Congressional involvement in decisions on specific foreign policy issues are challenged, while new problems are outlined. For example, the authors show that today Congress has the information capability and the expertise to make independent judgments, and that many recent specific decisions have been at least as responsible as those made by the executive. More decisions have also been made in public. However,

other changes within Congress which have begun to affect members may have ' mixed ' consequences. While Congress can make a major impact through comprehensive scrutiny of specific foreign policy decisions, the increased fragmentation of committee and sub-committee responsibilities and the increased influence of sub-groups and individuals within Congress has produced problems. This is illustrated in a valuable chapter on relations between Congressmen and the foreign relations lobbies, both domestic and foreign in origin, and the increase in such interaction. Hence the paradox that while there is the will and the capacity in Congress to affect foreign policy implementation, this in turn requires a more ' responsible, responsive and respected committee structure ' (p. 225) and greater controls on lobbying by ' single-interest ' groups concerned about specific foreign policy issues.

The case studies reflect accurately the fashioning of a new pattern of relationships characterised by participation, consultation and compromise. There are also costs, as shown by idiosyncratic behaviour by sub-committee chairmen or incomprehensible requirements for reporting to, or consulting with, Congress imposed upon the executive. There is also evidence of Presidents slowly coming to terms with the new political realities.

Professors Franck and Weisband are to be commended for their forthright exposition of the ' revolution ', warts and all. The only deficiency is the absence of a final chapter summarising the pros and cons of the changes, since the full implications of their evidence can often only be inferred, and a good deal of prior knowledge of Congressional behaviour is assumed. Nevertheless the study should be required reading for all those inside and outside the United States who wish to understand the more erratic and less predictable (though more open and legitimate) behaviour which characterises recent efforts to create a new framework for the co-determination of American foreign policy.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

Trade, Taxes, and Transnationals: International Economic Decision Making in Congress. By Kent Higgins Hughes. *New York: Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 255 pp. £13·00.*

THIS study illustrates the domestic political ramifications of the gradual decline of America's pre-eminence in the international economy. It provides information about the response by Congress in the 1970s to the changing demands of economic interest groups and to new economic evidence and issues relating to matters of foreign trade and investment, and explores the manner in which Congress has come to make decisions in the area of international economic policy. The author was directly involved in this process, working in 1972 as a legislative counsel and staff economist for Senator Hartke who played a major role at that time in sponsoring legislation, supported by most labour groups, which was designed to bring the multinational corporations under government control and to establish quotas on virtually all imports which competed with United States domestic production.

In essence the author seeks to assess the behaviour of economic interest groups in the context of economic theory, and the extent to which the explication of economic arguments, as articulated by group representatives and others, actually affects the nature of decision-making by Congress over time. This is a potentially valuable and important empirical undertaking, but the results are disappointing. This is, in part, because the book is essentially a revised doctoral dissertation which has not been revised sufficiently. At times it falls unhappily between attempting to satisfy the professional economist and edifying the student of Congress. The issues discussed are

complex, and the procedures through which Congress deals with foreign economic policy matters more complicated than is suggested. There is a lack of continuity and coherence which at times confuses rather than clarifies the subject-matter for the reader. This is redeemed somewhat by a useful final summary chapter drawing out the lessons and implications of the case study, but the three themes of trade, taxes and transnationals and their inter-relationships are not always clearly developed.

For this reviewer the study was significant in demonstrating that in the 1970s many foreign policy decisions had important domestic implications, and that short-term factors often dominated the attitudes of the major economic interest groups. The attitudes of such groups can also have a significant influence on those members of Congress making initial decisions, and a greater influence apparently than economic theories or even administration pressure. The ongoing nature of such issues means that Congress is likely to continue to consider matters of international economic policy very much in terms of prevailing grass-roots economic concerns. Hence the increase in protectionist sentiment within organised labour may gain more rather than less support in Congress in the future. Finally the study itself shows that, as in politics, style and flair are invaluable assets in making complex, dull but important matters seem more intelligible and significant. In the end the study remains a useful but uninspiring contribution to the understanding of Congressional decision-making on matters which have important foreign policy implications.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

Decent Interval: The American Debacle in Vietnam and the Fall of Saigon. British edn. By Frank Snepp. *Harmondsworth: Penguin; London: Allen Lane. 1980. 496 pp. £8·95. Pb: £4·50.*

THE title is an allusion to the charge that the 1973 Paris Agreement did little more than achieve a breathing-space between the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the climacteric month of April 1975. The author was in Vietnam during this period, and also in 1969–71, as an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, from which he subsequently resigned. He states that he ' ran one of the CIA's most productive informant networks, and became the agency's principal briefer and political-strategic analyst in the Saigon Embassy ' (p. 9). His book is largely based on what the Foreword describes as a ' briefing notebook . . . kept during the last two years of the war, and a personal diary, and on hundreds of interviews with former colleagues '. The only printed sources cited—there is no bibliography—are the 1976 memoirs of General Van Tien Dung, the North Vietnamese commander in the South from December 1974 to the end of hostilities, and the recorded testimony—before several Congressional committees in 1974–76—of the American ambassador to the South Vietnamese Government between 1973 and 1975, Graham Martin.

Snepp's account of the role of the CIA in those years provides some interesting footnotes to our knowledge of the period, besides provoking perennial questions about the use and abuse of Intelligence. Probably even the CIA never mounted such an operation abroad as the Saigon station. Countless South Vietnamese in key positions were on its payroll, while its command of financial and technological resources seemed virtually unlimited. Nevertheless, there were formidable blind-spots in its view of Vietnam: it seems to have missed, or ignored, until the consequences became all too apparent, such crucial factors as President Thieu's concept of ' light at the top, heavy at the bottom '—*i.e.* the decision to concentrate his reserves in the Third Military Region around Saigon, which in March 1975 led to the chaotic withdrawal from the north and centre and to the South's defeat the following month. Hanoi, on the other hand, knew of Thieu's intention not to reinforce the Central Highlands as early as

December 1974, and fashioned its final campaign accordingly. The effect of the Saigon station's deluge of ' appraisals ' on the actual conduct of American policy seems to have been small, its performance illustrating the hoary maxim that any intelligence organisation is only as good as the interpreters and end-users of its product allow it to be.

J. B WRIGHT

Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations. Edited by Richard R. Fagen. *Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 1979. 446 pp. $22.50. Pb: $6.95.*

THE collection of papers here presented by Professor Richard R. Fagen, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, had its origin in a conference on the ' deep sources ' of United States foreign policy planned as early as 1976, with the deliberate intention of influencing United States policy choices towards Latin America and the Caribbean region. The book itself was sponsored by the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies of the Social Science Research Council of the United States and the American Council of Learned Societies. Its critical, even radical appraisals break new ground in involving a modern reconsideration of the nature of the United States polity itself. Thus the chapter by Ira Katznelson and Kenneth Prewitt finds two factors as ' basic to an understanding of the pattern of oscillations in foreign policy within a consistent set of hegemonic goals ', namely ' the " low stateness " of the polity ' and the ' " low classness " of social and political life in the United States '—both factors which have been either misunderstood or misrepresented by many recent European and Latin American critiques of United States foreign policy. The United States lacks the social democratic consensus, these and other contributors conclude; instead, as Alan Wolfe and Jerry Sanders put it, there emerged the ' ideology of Cold War liberalism ', which, in the highly competitive struggle for power and influence which generates United States foreign policy decisions, has since 1947 gained its own degree of hegemony.

Wolfe and Sanders see President Carter's failure to reject ' Cold War liberalism ' after 1976 as being the decisive turning-point for United States foreign policy in the immediate future. It will, instead, continue to be dominated by the global struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, to which Latin America is merely peripheral. That the assumption that in consequence Latin America will be unable to resist the pervasive attentions of United States financial and commercial interests is, however, not wholly borne out by the series of very useful case studies of which the rest of this volume consists. They include studies of which the rest of this volume consists. They include studies of the ' Stabilisation Programs ' of the International Monetary Fund by Roberto Frenkel and Guillermo O'Donnell; Peru and the United States banks by Barbara Stallings; socialism in the English-speaking Caribbean by Anthony P. Maingot; shoe industries in Brazil by Peter Evens; and business interests and Mexican gas in Mexico by Angela M. Delli Sante, and by Richard R. Fagen with Henry M. Nau respectively. The least compelling article is that by Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arnson on ' exporting repression '. Like most of its kind it fails to indicate that Latin Americans used historically to practice repression without the aid of American armaments, and depends on a series of assumptions about the relevance of statistics which look less convincing the more one looks at them. The twenty-two revolvers supplied to Chile between 1973 and 1976 do not seem to indicate a very formidable repressive apparatus.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

The Past and Future of Presidential Debates. By Austin Ranney. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute. 1979. 226 pp. Pb: $5.75.*

IT is interesting that both John Kennedy and Richard Nixon attributed their respective victory and defeat in the 1960 American presidential election to the same event. Both candidates subsequently declared that the four televised debates had materially affected the election result. Kennedy believed that the debates had destroyed the Republican allegations that he was immature and inexperienced, while Nixon could only reflect, somewhat ruefully, on his disastrous appearance during the first debate and on the difference that a good make-up man would have had on the election outcome. Inevitably, given the importance that was and still is placed on the impact of the Kennedy-Nixon debates on the 1960 election, the question of whether the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates should participate in a series of televised debates has arisen in every subsequent election campaign, although for one reason or another no debates were held until 1976. The debates between Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter did not have quite the same dramatic impact on the election campaigns as the Kennedy-Nixon series, and perhaps they are best remembered for President Ford's gaffe about Soviet influence, or the lack of it, on Eastern Europe, and for the breakdown in sound transmission during the first debate, when for twenty minutes both Ford and Carter, in the words of Nelson Polsby, were ' zombie-like . . . as though they had been wrapped in aluminium foil and frozen ' (p. 176).

The Past and Future of Presidential Debates attempts to provide an academic overview on the subject. The book itself emerged from a conference organised by the American Enterprise Institute, and like most books that are the offspring of conferences, it is uneven. Some of the essays such as the one by Nelson Polsby are lively and intelligent. Richard B. Cheney's paper on the Republican perspective of the 1976 debates is both informative and useful, but unfortunately Evron Kirkpatrick's contribution on what can be learnt from the 1960 debates strikes a pedestrian and obvious note. Kirkpatrick, for instance, comments that a candidate, whether he is an incumbent or challenger, will only agree to debate his opponent ' because of his expectation that he would derive political advantage from the decision ' (p. 8). Kirkpatrick's observation, I suspect, will not be greeted, by either politicians or academics, with a great deal of astonishment or surprise. Nevertheless, the book does have merit. It collects a considerable amount of information regarding presidential debates under one set of covers. Nicholas Zapple's essay, for example, on the historical evolution of section 315 of the Communication Act of 1934, which provides equal time for all candidates for public office, while dull to read, is useful and valuable to students of American politics. The paper by Stephan Lesher with Patrick Caddell and Gerald Rafshoon is informative about the Carter campaign in 1976. *The Past and Future of Presidential Debates*, if variable in quality, is nonetheless a useful contribution to the study of the presidential election campaigns.

University of Keele RICHARD MAIDMENT

The Office of Management and Budget and the Presidency, 1921–1979. By Larry Berman. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1979. 180 pp. £9·10.*

IN the institutional jungle of Washington DC, there once flourished, surprisingly, a creature remarkably like HM Treasury. The Bureau of the Budget was created in 1921 (and kept that title for fifty years). At its peak its members justly saw themselves as a civil service elite. They were proud of their devotion to their institution, of their long view of both public and presidential needs, and of their preference for anonymous service rather than the usual frenzied Washington struggle to extend personal, along

with departmental, power. They would carry out the wishes of any President: when Roosevelt died, Senator Truman's activities were promptly analysed so that the office could assimilate his thinking and before the 1960 election the Bureau prepared both a ' Nixonopedia ', later discarded, and a ' Kennedyopedia ' which was carefully studied. They saw themselves as the only people who could take a broad view of government activities, and offer impartial advice comparing the rival projects, always too numerous and too costly, which each self-interested department was single-mindedly pushing. Hostile views of the Bureau would also have been familiar in Whitehall. Sometimes its broad view was a euphemism for petty cheeseparing (a single pencil for each civil servant, replaceable when he handed in the stub); sometimes for constant meddling with the policies elaborated in specified departments better qualified for the task. Both institutions were often criticised for failing to ensure the managerial efficiency of the administrative machine.

Berman's short book describes clearly the sixty-year development of this central yet little-known component of American government; first as a saver of candle-ends; then in its broader role under Roosevelt and Truman; later faithfully cutting budgets for Eisenhower and being overloaded by Johnson, who stole its younger staff to help develop his policies. When his successor took office it had become unpopular in Congress, and could not stave off legislation bringing it under White House control. Nixon, with his unerring reverse-Midas touch, corrupted this essential presidential tool into an instrument of immediate and even sordid political pressures. The distinction between a President's short-term demands and the Presidency's long-term needs was always delicate, and the struggle to preserve it is a main theme of the book. Where Johnson had blurred it for policy-making purposes, Nixon wantonly obliterated it for narrow partisan ends—perhaps the most permanently damaging part of his evil legacy.

Though the author's style is occasionally awkward, the book is well-organised and researched and contains some splendid quotations. It makes a very valuable contribution to the study of American government, and it casts some light on politics too. For one lesson (not drawn) is that at three periods the Bureau's influence was wholly restrictive: in its first decade, in the 1950s, and after 1968. It behaved quite differently in the New and Fair Deals when it was used wisely, and again in the Great Society when it was used too well. The former were the years of Republican presidencies, the latter of Democratic. The parties really do differ, not just in policy or legislation but even in administrative style.

Nuffield College, Oxford P. M. WILLIAMS

The Politics of the US Supreme Court. By Richard Hodder-Williams. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1980. 204 pp. £10·95; Pb: £4·95.*

THIS excellent little book makes a new contribution to a well-worn topic. It has three principal aims. The first is to explain the Court to British students unfamiliar with a political system so constrained by legal processes. The second is to describe both its domestic conflicts and its relationship with the executive and legislature. The third aim is to make the subject less tedious to those without legal training, by writing about cases before the Court in terms of the litigants and their circumstances and not merely of the legal consequences.

All three purposes are admirably fulfilled—especially, perhaps, the second—in six chapters and only 182 pages of text (plus appendices listing all the Justices, past and present, with their ages and length of service). The first and last chapters are quite

brief presentations for British readers, superfluous for Americans; so is the rapid historical summary which opens Chapter 5, preceding accounts of the Court's handling of electoral problems (franchise and re-apportionment) and those of school integration, which are useful without being new. Chapter 2, on the separation of powers, deals mainly with appointments (especially Nixon's), with the threat of Congressional attack, and with the organisation of the United States judiciary to cope with its expanding case-load. Chapter 3, the most original, discusses how the Court decides which cases to hear and which Justices should write the opinion, and how it is influenced by the Justices' clerks, the legal profession, or the pressure groups which increasingly submit their own briefs independent of the parties formally involved. Chapter 4, on enforcement, analyses clearly the factors affecting the likelihood of effective compliance.

Concentrating on the political aspects of the Court, the author naturally tends to a behavioural approach—though avoiding its crude excesses. He discusses shrewdly—without either undue cynicism or undue reverence—how the Court uses protective devices, like the marvellously pliable concept of a political question, to avoid dangerous issues; and also how it chooses to assert its authority when it feels the time and topic are ripe. In stressing the importance of pressure groups in promoting, financing and arguing for the major cases, he roundly asserts ' that litigation before the Court masquerades group political conflict under the guise of a suit between individual adversaries ' (p. 129). Few important matters are overlooked, though he says little about the periods when the Court has abandoned unpopular minorities to a strong tide of majoritarian intolerance; and he does not explain very convincingly the survival of its independent influence despite its apparent vulnerability to legislative pressures. Besides its attackers who condemn, and its defenders who approve, its current course of action, there is usually a crucial group of moderate critics whom he neglects, who subordinate their dislike of its specific decisions to their reluctance to tamper with an institution whose protection they might one day need. A short book cannot do equal justice to every aspect, however, and this is an admirable introduction to the Court: by far the most useful and illuminating single volume for the non-lawyer to read.

Nuffield College, Oxford P. M. WILLIAMS

Rules and Racial Equality. By Edwin Dorn. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1979. 158 pp. (Yale Studies in Political Science, 30.)*

The Nature of American Politics. By H. G. Nicholas. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1980. 134 pp. £4·50. Pb: £1·95.*

ONE of the major changes in the United States in the last twenty-five years has been in the position of Black Americans. From the beginnings of school desegregation, through the abandonment of inhibitions on Black voting, to the development of a Black political presence unknown since Reconstruction, an apparent improvement has occurred which, taken with the absence of overt racial conflict during the last decade, leads many observers to believe that the race issue is a problem of the American past. But to this optimistic view there can be opposed a much more pessimistic alternative. Whatever the gains made, the Black population remains, in terms of political representation, economic opportunity, educational and technical skills and level of employment, underprivileged. Dr Dorn holds this latter view. He is concerned, in *Rules and Racial Equality*, to demonstrate that, whatever change may have occurred in the formal rules governing the relations of Black and White citizens in America, there remains a marked gap in the effective position of the two groups, and that, despite the advances made by some Blacks, substantive inequality between the two racial

categories continues to exist. The right to vote is now guaranteed equally to Blacks and Whites, but is affected by a variety of factors, from the arrangements for holding elections to the underrepresentation of Blacks in office-holding. To take one example: in municipal affairs, the practice of holding elections at-large may make it exceptionally difficult for Blacks to secure election; but even if a system of proportional racial representation is applied, Blacks must necessarily remain a minority, and on issues with a direct racial component must necessarily lose. To take one further example: opportunities for Black businessmen have increased but the majority of Black-owned firms remain small, predominantly engaged in retail sales or personal services, hold a negligible share of the market, and have a high failure rate. Dorn's conclusion is a plausible one: that rules forbidding discrimination against a group will only produce a genuine equality of opportunity if, at the time when the rules are imposed, all groups are in a roughly equal position to take advantage of available benefits. The burden of historical inequality makes that impossible in the present case. The answer is, of course, affirmative action, and the thrust of Dorn's argument is to demonstrate that such positive discrimination is philosophically compatible with the rules of equal opportunity to which Americans are expected to subscribe. Against the background of the *Bakke* case, this is perhaps less of an academic exercise than at first appears. It may be superfluous, in the face of the facts, to construct so elaborately Rawlsian a framework for the presentation of the evidence, and it must be said that some of Dorn's arguments, particularly on the nature of preferential treatment, are more ingenious than convincing, but as a case for programmes of action the book carries conviction. It is, therefore, in terms of what Dorn sets out to do, a minor point of dissent to say that such programmes must operate within a set of social, psychological and cultural complexities which Dorn does not consider relevant to his case.

If Dorn is optimistic about the possible effects of affirmative action, so equally is Professor Nicholas about the capacity of the American political system to solve its difficulties. The *doyen* of English observers of the United States has produced an elegantly written and often incisive study, which students should be encouraged to read. Brief essays deal with federalism, elections, parties and institutions; historical and social explanations are skilfully presented. A gloomy reader might say that it is all a little too cheerful, and that Nicholas's view of the existing distribution of power and of the responsiveness of the system is rather too close to the complacency of the pluralists. But it is the duty of the essayist to provoke disagreement as well as pleasure, and Nicholas contrives to do both.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge GERARD EVANS

In Defence of Canada. Vol. 4: Growing Up Allied. By James Eayrs. *Toronto, London: University of Toronto Press. 1980. 431 pp. $25.00.*

THIS is the fourth volume of James Eayrs' superb study of Canadian defence and foreign policies since 1918. This volume deals almost exclusively with Canada's role in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and in the management and resolution of the major issues which Nato faced in its early years. It is thus about issues and events which were of major international importance and in which the Canadian involvement was often of central significance.

Eayrs does not attempt to analyse the broader issues which faced the Western Alliance at that time. He is rightly content in this volume to tell the story of how Canadian policy-makers identified Canadian defence interests in the world as they found it and how they then pursued these interests.

Growing Up Allied is extraordinarily rich in its details of the policy debates within

the Canadian Government and within Nato which preceded the major decisions of this period. Eayrs deals with the most complex issues with great clarity. His book is beautifully organised and his prose is constantly clear and crisp. The writing of contemporary or near-contemporary history, in his hands, seems effortless. He draws no conclusions in this volume and offers very few generalisations. Indeed he even rations more strictly than in the earlier volumes (and this is a complaint) the ironic and astringent asides that enlivened those volumes. Nevertheless, four themes do seem to emerge.

First, from immediately after the war ended there was within the Canadian Government a deep-rooted conviction—which was as much ideological as it was deduced from Soviet actions—that the Soviet Union was determined on world conquest. Secondly, Canada saw its interests as best served by close North Atlantic co-operation over a wide range of issues. This was in part a judgment on how communism could best be halted, but it also reflected the conviction that within such an alliance Canada could be true to its varied heritage and Canadian autonomy could be protected from an American influence that might otherwise be overwhelming. In the third place, the Canadian Department of External Affairs was anxious that Canada should play a prominant role in international affairs. This desire was at times as important a determinant of policy as any specific Canadian interest in whatever was the particular issue in question. Finally, Pearson and his team enjoyed a very wide latitude in the shaping of Canadian foreign policy. Parliament seems hardly to have had any influence. The Cabinet and the Prime Minister played their role very largely only when another department persisted in challenging a particular initiative or proposal of External Affairs. Public opinion, it is true, is referred to occasionally as a determinant of policy, but almost always as an explanation to an ally of why Canada cannot do what the ally is recommending but which the Canadian Government, for reasons quite independent of public opinion, does not wish to do.

In his preface to *Growing Up Allied* Eayrs refers to a critical comment by a reviewer of Volume III and expresses the hope that this volume meets this criticism. This leads this reviewer to express the hope that Eayrs won't conclude his final volume of *In Defence of Canada* without offering his own assessment of the adequacy of the perception of Canadian national interests and of the understanding of the requirements of international peace which have informed Canadian policy since 1945. No one could identify and analyse the ideology of the Pearsonian establishment better than Eayrs. It would be a further contribution by him, and a very important one, to that informed public discussion of foreign policy issues which is still seriously lacking in Canada.

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CRANFORD PRATT

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

The Structure of Brazilian Development. Edited by Neuma Aguiar. *New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. 1979. 258 pp. £8·75.*

THIS book is a collection of papers by young Brazilian social scientists on various aspects of the country's political and social development. The papers stress the underprivileged role of the peasantry in Brazilian society, and the existence of a tacit understanding between the central government and rural elites which views with favour the conduct of populist politics in urban areas while leaving the rural structure

largely intact. Indeed, the tenor of the book is that the workings of the Brazilian political process have changed very little during the past century.

The most interesting papers are ' Traditional Politics, an Interpretation of Relations Between Centre and Periphery ', by Antônio Otávio Cintra (pp. 127-67), and the ' State and the Frontier ', by Otávio Guilherme Velho (pp. 17-35). The first is an excellent background piece and it dwells heavily on the continuing role of *coronelismo* in the perpetuation of official controls over the rural population, particularly as regards voting patterns in the north and north-east. The second compares the Brazilian and American experiences in the development of outlying regions and concludes that in broad terms they are not compatible, as in Brazil the impetus for this development is mainly provided by the government and large-scale private entrepreneurs.

Papers on ' The Aftermath of Peasant Mobilization; Rural Conflicts in the North-East since 1964 ' (pp. 91-97), and ' Social Marginality or Class Relationships in the City of Sao Paulo ' (pp. 167-202) contain a fascinating wealth of detail from individual case studies, and emphasise the role of the family unit as an economic support factor. The Introduction (pp. 1-16) outlines current trends in social-science research in Brazil, and a particularly useful feature of the book is a selected bibliography of work produced by Brazilians in the field between 1960 and 1977 (pp. 223-47); the statistical tables in some of the papers and the notes and reference sources at the end of all of them are valuable.

The book is the first to be written in English about Brazil by Brazilian social-science specialists, and is thus an important addition to the literature on the country's development problems. The papers by Cintra and Velho are recommended reading for all concerned with Brazilian politics. On the whole, however, the book would mainly seem to be of interest to sociologists and political scientists; it will serve as an indispensable reference source for them and a point of departure for future analysis.

ROBIN CHAPMAN

Caribbean Dependence on the United States Economy. By Ransford W. Palmer. *New York; Praeger. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt Saunders, Eastbourne.) 173 pp. £12·50.*

The Future of the Inter-American System. Edited by Tom J. Farer. *New York: Praeger for the American Society of International Law. 1979. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 290 pp. £13·00.*

IN the twenty years since the Cuban Revolution there have been many claims that the ' Inter-American System ', as a distinct sub-system of the world community, is dead. As the collection of articles presented by Professor Farer indicates, it is on the contrary very much alive. Support for Cuba from the Soviet Union, the involvement of Cuba in Angola and Ethiopia, and its accession to Comecon, all are only tangentially mentioned. What remains is the traditional, but now much more developed structure of inter-American co-operation, in which, paradoxically, Latin America and the United States—united in common hostility to the Cuban ' bridgehead ' in the 1960s—are now, after a period of divergence, once again relatively close together in common recognition that a ' Grand Design ' for the Americas creates more problems than it can solve.

It is, therefore, high time there was a new overview of the system and of its future, and Professor Farer is eminently well-fitted to provide one. Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers University, he writes as Vice-President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Hence he is one who has a special knowledge of what in the late 1970s has proved at one and the same time to be most contentious and to

have provided an area for common concern about basic and fundamental problems of life in the Americas.

He and his contributors cover a wide range of topics in their overview of this day-to-day co-operation that actually exists on a wide range of problems between Latin Americans and their powerful northern neighbour. Alternative views on the value and likely future of the system are first presented by Richard J. Bloomfield and William D. Rogers. Conflict and co-operation in inter-American economic affairs are next discussed by Werner Baer and Donald V. Coes, Stephen H. Rogers and Richard J. Bloomfield—whose account of the dialogue in the working group on transnational enterprises is both relevant and revealing. Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Bryce Wood then focus more closely on the issue of human rights, their relation to economic realities, the problem of capitalist development in the Americas, and the role of the inter-American machinery in promoting a better domestic climate. Similarly the defence aspect is covered by an overview of the inter-American military system by Colonel John Child and a study of the partially successful effort to limit nuclear proliferation in the Americas, written by Jo L. Husbands. Special studies of Brazil and Venezuela as regional powers within the system, by Riordan Roett and Franklin Tugwell respectively, conclude a work which throughout is well built together by the editor's comments and observations. For anyone who wants an up-to-date briefing and informed analysis of current problems there is a great deal here that will be of value.

The economic relationship with the United States, which in Latin America forms only part of a huge complex of problems, is of major importance in the case of the English-speaking territories of the Caribbean, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Barbados. As the author of the second study, Professor Ransford W. Palmer, of Howard University, says himself: ' The short histories of these countries as independent nations provide an ideal example of the shifting, within the international capitalist system, of their economic dependence from one metropolitan center to another.' At the same time their dependence on the strategy which has been termed ' industrialisation by invitation ' has not proved to be a success once the long postwar period of boom came to an abrupt end in the oil crisis of 1973.

Professor Palmer examines in turn the effectiveness of economic nationalism, the imbalance in trade patterns, the critical importance of ' stabilisation programs ' to the continued inflows of foreign capital, the gathering public sector debt, the net inflow of capital from the poor Caribbean to the rich United States, and the effect of migration and making the United States act as the urban centre to the rural Caribbean periphery. He concludes that the United States must plan for a new policy of regional economic development in the Caribbean, and develop agencies to monitor the consequences if these are not to continue to be essentially inimical to the best interests of the host countries concerned.

Significantly what neither of these two works, each of authority in its field, considers at any length, is the inter-relationship between these English-speaking states and their relatively powerful Hispanic neighbours, for it is that there is a community of interest between them that is a fundamental postulate of the call for a New International Economic Order. A new order will undoubtedly emerge: the only question is, in what sense, if any, will it represent an improvement on the traditional one?

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

Urbanization and Urban Growth in the Caribbean: An Essay on Social Change in Dependent Societies. By Malcolm Cross. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979. 174 pp. £10·50. Pb: £3·95.*

THIS volume is the fourth in a series entitled *Urbanization in Developing Countries*

edited by Kenneth Little. The avowed aim of the series is to provide up-to-date studies of social change in developing nations, concentrating on the issues and problems raised by the growth of cities which often provides the most visible form of such social change. However, in most Caribbean territories urbanisation is not the foremost social problem and herein lies a major weakness of this book.

Malcolm Cross bravely attempts to cover the whole of the region defining it largely in terms of the dominance of the plantation economy. Colonialism and plantation dependency are seen as the villains in the present economic order and provide the Caribbean region with a unity of social and economic problems. Despite this apparent similarity, generalisation across the region is difficult. Dr Cross provides some useful statistical tables but these figures are generally drawn from secondary sources and are based on projections from the 1960 census data. Delays in publishing the 1970 census material for many parts of the Caribbean have made it very difficult to recognise the most recent social and economic trends in the region. Case studies of particular Caribbean societies based on the author's own field work would have helped to illuminate the thin scattering of information relating to the last decade. Lack of familiarity with certain parts of the region leads Dr Cross into some careless statements such as ' Antigua, Nevis and St. Kitts, Montserrat and Anguilla . . . are still largely dependent upon sugar ' (p. 33) while in fact only St Kitts still exports sugar. He shows how the percentage of labour in agriculture in Barbados fell from 26 to 17·7 per cent between 1960 and 1972 but then gives 1960 figures for eleven other territories and suggests that it is unlikely that there has been much change in the intervening years.

The Caribbean is still largely rural. By 1970 only the Bahamas, Cuba, the Netherlands Antilles, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States Virgin Islands had more than half their population living in urban areas. The increase in the urban proportion of the population between 1960 and 1970 varied considerably from zero in Belize to 13 per cent in Trinidad and Tobago. The average figure for the region as a whole is given as 4 per cent. which is much less than in many Latin American countries. Some form of spatial and temporal comparison would have provided a clearer picture of the relative importance of urbanisation in the Caribbean today. In his paragraph on the dominance of the primate Caribbean city Dr Cross fails to note that for some territories such as Dominica and St Vincent this dominance is less than it was a century ago. The present rate of urbanisation is less than it was in the immediate post-emancipation period in many territories.

In general, this reviewer was left with the feeling of a title in search of a subject. There is no clear characterisation of the urban migrants although it is briefly mentioned that the majority are women. The push and pull factors involved in urban migration are never very firmly established and there is no mention of intra-regional migration. The social problems of urban marginality and the informal sector are largely ignored. The author provides us with a useful review of the region's population structure and social and economic patterns but no clear picture of the importance of urbanisation.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne JANET D. MOMSEN

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Year Book of World Affairs. 1980. *London: Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs.* 1980. 368 pp. £13·00.

THE thirty-fourth edition of this well-known annual contains, as usual, studies on many aspects of international relations and law. United States policy is especially well

covered, and President Giscard d'Estaing is the subject of a lengthy article. Contributors include Colin Legum, Georg Schwarzenberger, Lord Home, and Lord Zuckerman.

Chatham House DENIS JONES

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1980. *Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press. 1980. 486 pp. $35.00.*

THIS yearbook is now in its fourteenth year. Sections on developments in Eastern Europe and China are included, but the bulk of the work contains fascinating information on non-ruling parties, orthodox or otherwise, giving details of leadership, membership and legal as well as illegal activities. It concludes with a section on international front organisations, a few biographical studies and a bibliography.

Chatham House DENIS JONES

The World of Learning 1979–80. 2 Vols. 30th edn. *London: Europa. 1980. 2,061 pp. £35·00 (per set).*

THIS publication remains the only directory which provides detailed and up-to-date information on the cultural, educational and scientific institutions of the world. The fifty-one page opening section gives details of the membership, activities and publications of over 400 international organisations concerned with agriculture, the arts, economics, political science and sociology, education, engineering and technology, law, medicine, music and science. It is followed by a country-by-country survey of institutions.

The thirtieth edition of this work of reference contains new material throughout, including details of several new universities.

Chatham House NICOLE GALLIMORE

Middle East Annual Review, 1979. *Saffron Walden, World of Information, 1978. £11·50.*

THE fifth edition of this yearbook contains an enlarged selection of signed articles and essays dealing with political questions, trade, industry, agriculture and water and finance. The remaining two-thirds of the work is devoted to a country-by-country survey, from Mauritania in the west to Pakistan in the east and to Somalia in the south.

A great deal of useful information is provided but the very fine print and the inclusion of a disproportionately high number of advertisements make the country-survey section unattractive as a reference tool.

Chatham House NICOLE GALLIMORE

Africa South of the Sahara 1979–80. *London, Europa. 1979. 1,325 pp. £24·00.*

THE ninth edition of this reference work remains a reliable guide to the political state of the countries of Africa during the first six months of 1979. Events in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Chad, Congo, Ghana, Mauritania, Uganda and Nigeria are fully recorded in the surveys, which cover forty-nine countries.

In addition, ten articles cover demographic, economic, political and religious topics

in Africa. There is a section devoted to regional organisations. a who's who, and over thirty maps interleaved with the text.

Chatham House NICOLE GALLIMORE

The Far East and Australasia 1979–80. *London: Europa. 1979. 1,340 pp. £28·00.*

THIS annual reference book is one of a series on different parts of the world produced by Europa Publications.

Part I contains seven articles on development and population problems, trade commodities including minerals and religion. Part II gives up-to-date information on regional organisations and Part III, is a country-by-country comprehensive survey and directory. In this edition the survey devoted to the People's Republic of China uses the Pinyin system of romanisation of Chinese words for place names of people and addresses, replacing the Wade-Giles system used previously.

The volume is well produced, handles well and is a useful addition to the reference shelf in libraries dealing with Asia.

Chatham House NICOLE GALLIMORE

The Caribbean Yearbook of International Relations, 1977. *Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff for the Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, Trinidad and Tobago. 1980. 299 pp. Fl. 95.00. $47.50.*

THE third edition of this yearbook is slimmer than its predecessors, partly because of the omission of the chronological and documentary sections which are now issued separately. Besides articles on Caribbean and Latin American topics, it includes studies of several aspects of international economic relations. The Yearbook should prove of great value to students of a somewhat neglected area.

Chatham House DENIS JONES

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BOOKS REVIEWED, AUTUMN 1980

CORRESPONDENCE

Dear Sir,

It is, I think, a healthy convention that reviewers of books for *International Affairs* are requested to provide a page number when quoting from the books reviewed. Dr John P. Fox, in his review of my book, *Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945* [*International Affairs*, Jan. 1980, pp. 143-44], states that the book is concerned 'with the so-called "misdeeds" of the Allied nations who (so it is argued) must also be held responsible for the Final Solution or Holocaust'. In this instance no page number is provided by your reviewer. This is, indeed, not surprising, for no such statement is to be found anywhere in my book. The word, 'misdeeds', placed in quotation marks by Dr Fox, appears nowhere in my book. The view, ascribed to me, that the Allied nations were partly responsible for the 'Final Solution', I repudiate utterly, and my book does not argue anything of the sort. Dr Fox further states that I 'impl[y] that the policy of "extermination not emigration" was somehow forced on the Nazi leadership because Britain, not Germany, "sealed the escape routes" '. Again, the words 'extermination not emigration' which appear in quotation marks are unaccompanied by any page number. Again, they do not appear in my book. Again, I repudiate the grotesque and absurd views attributed to me. In short Dr Fox's attack on my study is based on a tissue of false quotations and misattributions. No doubt he feels that it is his privilege to claim that the book 'has to be supplemented—and in parts supplanted' [*sic*] by his own contribution to the subject.

Bernard Wasserstein
University of Sheffield
March 19, 1980

John Fox comments:

Dr Wasserstein's first point concerns statements in my review within quotation marks but without page reference numbers. These statements are not in his book because they are my own conclusions. I am surprised that apparently Dr Wasserstein is incapable of distinguishing between directly quoted and acknowledged passages from books, and the common enough practice of writers (and even reviewers) of using quotation marks to make a particular and easily identifiable point of emphasis of their own. Each is distinguishable from the other in my review.

This author also apparently objects to any criticism of his book *except* on 'the basis of false quotations and misattributions'. This would seem to deny the right of historians to judge Dr Wasserstein's book from any other point of view. Frankly, this is nonsense. His book, like any other, must be considered from the point of view of interpretation, its value as history, its contribution or purpose within the field of Holocaust studies, the impression it could create because of its arguments and structure, and so on.

Dr Wasserstein rejects as 'grotesque and absurd' my claim that the book implies that the Allied nations were partly responsible for the 'Final Solution', and that the policy of 'extermination not emigration' was somehow forced on the Nazi leadership because Britain, not Germany, 'sealed the escape routes'. I maintain my position, and refer you again to my review and the longer one I published in *European Studies Review* (January 1980). Yet what of other reviewers?: 'but who could have imagined,

until this year, that our nation would eventually stand accused, on the basis of convincing British evidence, of something approaching complicity in Hitler's murder of six million Jews?' (Nicholas Bethell, *Sunday Telegraph*, July 29, 1979); 'as the escape routes were sealed so was the fate of the majority of Jews in Europe, and they became victims of Hitler's "final solution", finishing up in extermination camps like Auschwitz' (John Miller, *Daily Telegraph*, July 26, 1979); 'Dr Wasserstein describes "a concerted British effort to seal the escape routes used by Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe" ' (David Pryce-Jones, *New Statesman*, August 24, 1979). I also expressed the opinion that the book was intended to prove a case, and here I refer to another review: 'this carefully-collated book is part-history and part-indictment' (Chaim Bermant, *Daily Telegraph*, August 2, 1979).

These extracts show how far, in one respect, my own conclusions accorded with those of other reviewers. Is Dr Wasserstein now attempting to distance himself from his own work and the conclusions most people have drawn from it? Or is his response to my review (alone?) due to my refusal to accept his arguments, structure and even research at face value and to have shown where all three are at fault, seriously so in some instances?

The key to an accurate assessment of British policy on this subject during this period is a *correct* appreciation of German policy towards the Jews, as and when it developed, together with an assessment of how those policies were seen by others at particular times. Only then can British policy be properly judged and, where necessary, *fairly* criticised. Even A. J. P. Taylor, in his review of the book in *The English Historical Review* (April 1980), repeats some of Dr Wasserstein's dangerous generalisations without any corrective statements as, for example, the author's main point in his Conclusion (p. 345); 'during the first two years of the war, when the German authorities bent their efforts to securing the exodus of Jews from the Reich and from Nazi-occupied territory, it was the British Government which took the lead in barring the escape routes from Europe against Jewish refugees'. In my reviews I have shown why that statement on German policy is scandalously inaccurate. But what really concerns me is the general and totally false impression that statement conveys for the subject as a whole—particularly when allied to Dr Wasserstein's practice throughout of substituting emotionalism for correct historical methodology and the blurring of issues and periods of time—*i.e.*, that Britain, not Germany, must be judged the 'guilty party'. Is Dr Wasserstein really aware of the wider implications of these statements about German policy and the obvious conclusions *he* wants drawn about British 'responsibility' for the fate of the Jews in Europe under Nazism? There are only too many neo-Nazis in the Federal Republic of Germany and elsewhere who welcome such interpretations, and it is one reason why one responsible West German publisher has declined to handle Dr Wasserstein's book for a German edition.

My own view is that Dr Wasserstein did this extremely important subject an injustice by writing such an emotionally loaded and stridently polemical book. The subject required absolute balance and total objectivity. Only then could we begin to get near the truth.